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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION s
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001
,8 November 16, 1994 MEMORANDUM TO:
David Matthews, Director Project Directorate II/3 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II FROM:
Robert C. Jones, Chief e
i Reactor Systems Branch Division of Systems Safety nd Analysis i
SUBJECT:
ST. LUCIE UNIT 1, TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 IDENTIFICATION OF SUCCESS PATHS AVAILABLE TO MAINTAIN A SAFE SHUTDOWN CONDITION FOLLOWING A i
SEISMIC EVENT (TAC NOS. M69483, M68303 AND M68304)
REFERENCES:
1.
Letter from W.
H.
Bohlke (Licensee) to NRC,
" Verification of Seimic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI)
A-46 (Generic Letter (GL) No. 87-02)" dated September 8, 1992.
2.
Letter from W.
H.
Bohlke (Licensee) to NRC,
" Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 (Generic Letter (GL) 87-02) dated September 15, 1993.
i 3.
Letter from W.
H.
Bohlke (Licensee) to NRC,
" Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactor, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI)
A-46 (Generic Letter (GL) (87-02) dated May 5, 1994.
The unresolved safety issue (USI) A-46 requires that the licensee be able to bring the plant to, and maintain it in, a hot shutdown condition during the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).
The Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) developed Generic Implementation Procedures (GIP) to resolve USI A-46 issue.
Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) is not participating in the SQUG program based on the low seismicity area l
for these plants.
The licensee developed his own program to resolve USI A-46.
The licensee has identified a primary path and an alternate path to l
l achieve hot shutdown.
Both paths account for the following plant safety functions:
reactivity control, inventory control, and residual heat removal.
The plant-specific systems and equipment available to perform these safety functions are listed in the Figures 1 and 2 respectively.
For both sites, decay heat removal is accomplished with tha auxiliary feedwater system taking suction 6 pp
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The steam generator code safety valves provide a back-up heat removal path should the atmospheric steam dump valves fail to function.
The licensee did not commit to a minimum of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to reach and maintain a hot shutdown condition.
FPL only commits to bring the reactor to hot shutdown condition and remain there for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> with safety related and non-safety related equipment.
(Ref. 1).
Recently, the licensee has provided additional non-seismic water sources and primary bleed and feed approach to maintain hot shutdown condition for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (Ref. 3).
The licensee has provided various diverse water sources to remove reactor core decay heat at these plants. The first core decay heat removal cooling path is the Auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) taking suction from the condensate storage tank (CST).
The CST has a capacity of about 240,000 gallons which will last for the first 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> of core decay heat cooling for Turkey Point 3/4 and 19 hours2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br /> for St. Lucie plant.
This period of time is sufficient to conduct post trip surveys and conduct contingency planning if required.
Other operational cooling configurations are available via this procedure are reestablishing main feed water flow, establish feed flow using the standby steam generator feed pumps and establishing feed flow from other unit assuming it has not lost power.
These are the long term cooling sources that can provide indefinite decay heat removal.
If these cooling sources are unavailable, the operator will move to line up the numerous other non-seismic water sources located at the sites.
These are:
Turkey Point 3/4 Raw water storage tank #1 500,000 gallons Raw water storage tank #2 750,000 gallons Demineralized water storage tank 500,000 gallons S$. Lucie Unit 1 City water tank #1 500,000 gallons City water tank #2 500,000 gallons Treated Water tank 500,000 gallons Following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> of cooling for Turkey Point 3/4 from the CST and 19 hours2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br /> of cooling for St.
Lucie Unit 1 from the CST, an additional 190,000 gallons of cooling water is needed for Turkey Points 3/4 and 325,000 gallons of cooling water is needed for St. Lucie Unit 1 in order to provide core decay heat removal for the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
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- . In the unlikely event that all of these cooling sources are unavailable, the operator would impler.ent the primary bleed and feed mode of cooling which uses the refueling water storage tank and the safety injection pumps.
The licensee stated that components and equipment within this cooling path are either seismically qualified per original plant design or they were walked j
down by the GL-87-02 seismic review team and determined to be seismically adequate.
The numerous water sources, flow paths and time available for achieving the operational alignments provides reasonable assurance that adequate decay heat removal capability is available.
Symptom based normal and emergency operating procedures for lining up cooling sources are available at these sites.
DE should confirm that the equipment necessary to assure core decay heat removal for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in both of the safe shutdown paths are seismically capable.
We conclude that the approach to achieve and maintain hot shutdown for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> during a seismic event is acceptable. Attachment 1 is our SALP report.
Attachment:
As stated cc:
G. Holahan R. Wessman J. Norris R. Croteau K. Manoly M. McBrearty
Contact:
K. Desai, SRXB/DSSA 504-2835 SRXB:DSSA*
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l ATTACHMENT 1 3
l SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF APPLICANT PERFORMANCE l
1 FACILITY NAME:
St. Lucie Unit 1 i
Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 l
SUMMARY
OF REVIEW:
1 The SER involved a review of the safe shutdown success path during
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a seismic event.
The Reactor Systems Branch has reviewed the licensee approach and concluded that it is acceptable.
NARRATIVE DISCUSSION OF APPLICANT PERFORMANCE - SAFETY ASSESSMENT / QUALITY VERIFICATION The - staff has spent a great deal of time to get a reasonable response-from the licensee.
It took many conference calls and meetings to'get the response.
The licensee delayed the responsa for a few years.
AUTHOR:
K.
Desai DATE:
10/31/94