ML20136E425
| ML20136E425 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 10/05/1995 |
| From: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20136C539 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-96-485 NUDOCS 9703130207 | |
| Download: ML20136E425 (3) | |
Text
.. -. _. _ _. _.. _ _. _ _. _ _ _..
_. _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _. _. _ _ _ _. _. ~. -
j:
i I
[
l Hi
- #fo I
ji y=
g UNITED STATES i
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
\\*****[!
WASHINGTON, D.C. 30006 4001 l
j i
ATTACHMENT 1 1
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION CONCERNING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE EXTENDING THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-335 1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated May 17, 1995, Florida Power and Light Company, the licensee i
for St. Lucie Unit 1, requested a Technical Specification Change that would l
extend the Reactor Coolant System Pressure / Temperature Limits and the maximum t
allowable heatup and cooldown rates from 15 effective full power years to 23.6 i
effective full power years. Extending the applicability of the pressure / temperature limit curves affects Technical Specifications 3.4.9.1 I
with Figures 3.4-2a, 3.4-2b and 3.4-3 Technical Specifications 3.1.2,1 and t
3.1.2.3 with Figure 3.1-lb.
Technical Specifications 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.3 are also being amended to lift the requirement to verify that two of four valves in the operable high head safety injection flow path are shut with power removed, when in Modes 5 and 6, with a high head safety injection pump in operation and the reactor coolant pressure boundary not established. This safety evaluation is limited to the changes in the limitations imposed on the use of the high head safety injection pumps as the required boration flow path
)
while shutdown. The time-dependent aspects and the acceptability of the pressure / temperature limits are being reviewed in a separate safety evaluation by the Materials and Chemical Engineering Branch.
2.0 DISCUSSION The power-operated relief valves on the pressurizer provide the low
^
temperature overpressure protection (LTOP) %c the St. Lucie Unit I reactor coolant system.. The staff reviewed the LTOP setpoints and documented the review in a safety evaluation dated June 11, 1990 for-St. Lucie in support the license amendment No. 104. The review assured that the LTOP setpoints were adequate to prevent a violation of Appendix G heatup and cooldown curves
'should a reactor coolant system pressure transient occur. The license amendment requested by the May 17, 1995, letter does not change the LTOP or the pressure / temperature limits. The current pressure and temperature limits are being extended beyond 15 effective full power years and therefore the current LTOP setpoints remain adequate.
The limiting mass addition and energy addition transients have been analyzed.
The mass addition transient is based on the maximum possible pumping capacity available. Technical Specif.ications 3.1.2.1 and'3.1.2.3 have a footnote that requires two of four isolation valves in the operable high pressure safety injection header be verified closed with power removed when a high head safety injection pump is being used for the boration flow path. This requirement
~
9703130207 970301 j
- PDR,
A O
a i
o 1
2
+
assures the amount of water that can be pumped into the RCS is limited while i
one of these pumps is in operation. The current requirement is that these valves be verified closed with power removed whenever the high head safety injection pump is in service. The amendment requires that the valves be verified closed with power. removed only when the high head safety injection i
i pump is in service and when RCS pressure boundary exists. Removing the requirement to verify the two valves are closed with power removed is 4
acceptable because only when RCS pressure boundary is established can a mass addition transient cause an over pressure event.
If the RCS pressure boundary is not established, there is no chance of over pressurizing the RCS. The r
burden of verifying the valves are closed and power is removed is, therefore, not necessary when RCS pressure boundary is not established. The licensee i
pioposed changes to Technical Specifications 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.3 are acceptable.
3.0 CONCLUSION
S t
i Based on the consideration discussed in Section 2.0 above, the staff has
]
concluded that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common l
defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
i ji
4.0 REFERENCES
1.
Letter from D. A. Sager (Florida Power and Light Company) to NRC, "RCS l
Pressure / Temperature Limits," Docket No. 50-335, dated May 17, 1995.
t 2.
Memorandum from R. Jones (USNRC) to H. Berkow (USNRC), " Safety Evaluation for Technical Specification Changes for LTOP - St. Lucie Unit 1 (TAC No. 75386)," dated Nay 23, 1990.
l 3.
Amendment No.104 to the St. Lucie Plant Unit No.1, dated June 11, 1990.
i i
4 1
4 h
J i
1
.a i
ATTACHMENT 2 4
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE 1
}
FACILITY NAME:
ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 i
SUMMARY
REVIEW:
Florida Power and Light Company, the licensee of St. Lucy Unit I., has submitted an application to extend the applicability of the reactor coolant system pressure / temperature limits and therefore the low temperature over pressures protection setpoints from 15 effective full power years (EFPY) to 23.6 EFPY. The Reactor Systems Branch (SRXB) has reviewed the proposed changes to Technical Specifications and the supporting analysis and concluded that the proposed changes are acceptable.
f I
NARRATIVE DISCUSSION OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE - SAFETY ASSESSMENT /00ALITY VERIFICATION 3
The licensee showed a general understanding of the technical issues and used acceptable approaches to resolve them.
1 1
4 i
AUTHOR:
C. Jackson DATE:
9/19/95 i
.