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April 5, 1996 HEMORANDUM T0:
Robert A. Watkins. Acting Assistant Inspector General for Investigations FROM:
Stewart D. Ebneter. Regional Administrator SU8 JECT:
OIG ALLEGATION 2608 REGARDING A PROBLEM WITH THE PUBLIC ALERT SYSTEM AT PORT ST. LUCIE. FLORIDA (REF: RII-95-A-0202)
This refers to our memorandum dated February 5. 1995, in which we acknowledged receipt of your memorandum dated December 20. 1995, in which you referred an allegation received at your office from an anonymous caller who indicated that an unclear announcement was made on the )ublic alert system during testing j
which caused concern in Port St. Lucie.
lorida.
Our inspection regarding this matter has been completed. The Division of Reactor Safety performed an inspection on February 5-9. 1996, of the emergency preparedness program that included a review of the allegation. The staff's i
findings are documented in the attached memorandum. Allegation Evaluation Report and Inspection Report Nos. 50-335/96-02 and 50-389/96-02. The inspector reviewed the testing program for the siren system used to alert the public if offsite protective actions were ordered by governmental authorities, as well as the_ particulars of. the Decembet.1.1995 test which was the focus of the alleger's concern.
Based on the information provided, the allegation was not substantiated. Additional information is provided in the attachments to this letter.
This concludes the staff's activities regarding this matter.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to contact us.
i Attachments:
- 1. Memo dtd March 27. 1996
- 2. Report Nos. 50-335/96-02 and 50-389/96-02 I
seiO 97o3140043 970301 DE 405 PDR
ALLEGATION EVALUATION REPORT ALLEGATION N0. RII-95-A-202 ALLEGED UNCLEAR PUBLIC NOTIFICATION SYSTEN TEST ST. LUCIE POWER PLANT i
DOCKET N05. 50-335 Ale 50-389 ALLEGATION:
In a December 7,1995, message on the Allegation Hotline, an anonymous alleger stated that sirens were sounding along with an unclear verbal announcement during testing of the public notification system for the St. Lucie Plant on that date. The caller wondered what neople were supposed to believe if an actual emergency occurred, and asked for a review of tF a circumstances.
DISCUSSION:
During onsite inspection on February 5-9, 1996, the inspector reviewed the testing of the siren system used to alert the public if offsite protective actions were ordered by governmental authorities. The full network of 85 sirens in the ten-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) was tested quarterly, at noon on the first Thursday of March, June, September, and December. The responsibility and physical capability to actuate the sirens rested with St. Lucie and Martin Counties,. whether.,for Atett.or an actual emergency.,
Prior to each quarterly test involving a full ' sounding of the sirens, the licensee and counties released statewnts to the news media (radio, television, and print to advise residents of the test. Each quarterly test began with an announce) ment, using the public-address capability of the sir stating, "The following will be a test of the Outdoor Warning System." This announcement was made with the siren horns fixed and pointed, in turn, in each of eight compass directions. The sirens were then sounded at full volume (rated at 123 dB at 100 feet) for two minutes with continuous horn rotation.
This alerting signal was followed by a closing announcement (made in the same manner as the pretest announcement) stating, "This concludes the test of the Outdoor Warning System." This testing regime required about 15 minutes, according to a licensee representative.
On an annual basis, a booklet on Safety Planning Information for the St. Lucie Power Plant was' mailed to each residence in the ten-mile EPZ. On page 5 of that booklet, residents were told that if tLey hear an outdoor warning siren, they should promptly tune to a designated local radio or television station for instructions.
The booklet also explains that the periodic tests include a voice announcement before and after the siren tone. The public-address capability of the siren system, used only during tests, was not intended to be used in the event of an actual emergency and was not part of the FEMA-approved prompt notification system.
On December 7,1995, a quarterly test of the siren system was conducted.
The inspector hypothesized that the alleger'was not familiar with the information regarding quarterly siren testing as contained in the Safety Planning Attachment I
k 2
Information booklet. Although it is certainly possible that the alleger was not in a location where he could understand the voice-message portion of the test, he nonetheless implicitly acknowledged in his complaint that he heard the sirens, and the booklet makes it very clear what action residents should take when they hear an outdoor warning siren.
CONCLUSION:
Based on the information provided, we were unable to substantiate the allegation becriuse there was no evidence available to indicate that the public notification system for the St. Lucie Plant failed in any manner during the test on December 7, 1995. This allegation is considered closed.
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March 18, 1966 i
Florida Power and Light Company i
ATTN: Mr. T. F. Plunkett President - Nuclear Division i
P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420
SUBJECT:
NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-335/96-02 AND 50-389/96-02
Dear Mr. Plunkett:
This refers to the inspection conducted on February 5-9, 1996, at the St. Lucie facility.
The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether activities authorized by the license were conducted safely and in accordance with NRC requirements. At the conclusion of the inspection, the findings were discussed with those members of your staff identified in the report.
Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with persor.nel, and observation of activities in progress.
Within the scope of the inspection, violations or deviations were not identified.
Inaccordancewith'10CFR'2.79'0,oftheNRC's"RulesofPractice,"acopyof this letter will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.
Sincerely, (Original signed by K. P. Barr)
Kenneth P. Barr, Chief Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-335, 50-389 License Nos. NPF-4, NPF-7 4
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report cc w/ enc 1:
(See page 2)
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ATTACHMENT 2
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W. H. Bohlke Jack Shreve Vice President Public Counsel St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Office of the Public Counsel P. O. Box 128 c/o The Florida Legislature Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0128 111 West Madison Avenue, Room 812 i
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1400 H. N. Paduano, Manager i
Licensing and Special Programs Joe Myers, Director Florida Power and Light Company Division of Emergency Preparedness P. O. Box 14000 Department of Community Affairs Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 2740 Centerv.ew Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 J. Scarola Plant General Manager Thomas R. L. Kindred St. Lucie Nuclear Plant County Administrator
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P. O. Box 128 St. Lucie County Ft. Pierce, FL '34954-0128 2300 Virginia Avenue Ft. Pierce, FL 34982
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E. Weinkan Plant Licensing Manager Charles B. Brinkman St; Lucie Nuclear Plant Washington Nuclear Operations P. O. Box 128 AE3 Combustion Engineering, Inc.
j Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0218 12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 3300 J. R. Newman, Esq.
Rockville, MD 20852 Morgan, Lewis & Bockius Distribution w/ encl: (See page 3) 1800 M Street, NW Washington, D. C.
20036 John T. Butler, Esq.
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Steel Hector and Davis 4000 Southeast Financial Center Miami, FL 33131-2398 Bill Passetti Office of Radiation Control i
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 e
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Report Nos.: 50-335/96-02 and 50-389/96-02 Licensee: Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Hos.:
50-335 and 50-389 License Nos.:
Facility Name: St. Lucie Plant Units 1 and 2 Inspection Conduct p February 5-9, 1996 fJ 3/Rh6 Inspector:
/gW. M. Sartor Jr., Team Leader Okte' Signed y
Accompanying Personnel: K. Clark, RII F. Kantor, NRR J. Kreh, RII S. Sandin, Resident Inspector Approved by:
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Kerineth P. Barr,-Effief Date' Signed Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety Sul04ARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of the annual emergency preparedness exercise, conducted from 7:00 a.m. to 1:46 p.m. on February 7, 1996.
The onsite ins of the licensee's emergency response program, pection focused on the adequacy the implementation of the Emergency Plan and procedures in response to the simulated emergency conditions, and the effectiveness of the emergency response training program as reflected by the players' performance during the exercise.
Correlative offsite activities involving State and local emergency response organizations were evaluated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
The exercise demonstrated that the onsite emergency plans were adequate and that the licensee was capable of implementing them. A significant observation was made by the licensee during its self-evaluation critique process.
The observation resulted from the exercise process rather than the exercise itself. The observation consisted of licensee objectively questioning its overall state of emirgency response readiness as a result of the need to D R 8i(oC324 6oL7 f d 2((-
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conduct two practica drills prior to the graded exercise for management to be i
satisfied with the performance observed. Management's response to this-
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observation provided a potential for a significantly improved emergency response. Specifically, management indicated a need to conduct periodic j
drills or exercises that focus on verification of ths emergency response organization's capability to respond at any time vice the confirmation of this l
capability just prior to a graded exercise. Additional observations made as a i
result of the exercise itself included numerous positive remarks and some areas for improvement. Two areas for improvement included:
the need for management to become more involved in assuring the correctness of information being provided in the offsite notification forms (paragraph 7) and the need to refine the command / control coordination between the damage control teams j
dispatched from the Operational Support Center and the operational teams l
dispatched by the Control Room (paragraph 10).
i me e-1 Enclosure
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i REPORT DETAILS 1
1.
Persons Contacted j
Licensee Employees
- 8ailey, P.,
Corporate Health Physics, Master Rad Controller j
- 8enken, E.,' Licensing Engineer
- 8ohlke, B., Site Vice President
- 8urton, C., Services Manager
- Czarnicki, R., Security Operations Supervisor 2
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- Denver, D., Engineering Manager
- Fincher, P., Training Manager a
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- Frechette, B., Chemistry Supervisor
- Heffelfinger, K., Protective Services Manager
- Lavelle, S., Non-licensed Operators' Controller i
- McCullers, R., Health Physics Operations Supervisor l
- Mohindrou, K., Chief Site Engineer
- Mothena, D., Emergency Preparedness Manager e
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- Paduano, H., Manager, Licensing and Special Programs
- Pennenga, R., Simulator Lead Controller l
- Quillen, T., Licensing Engineer l
- Revell, J., Emergency Prep 7edness Coordinator
- Rogers, L., System and CoLponent Engineering Manager
- Sager, D., Vice President, Nuclear Assurance
- Scarola, J.,
Plant General Manager
- Walker, R. (Richard),
Emergency Preparedness Coordinator i
- Walker, R. (Roger), Licensed Operator Instructor j
- Weinkam, E., Licensing Manager
- Welle, R.. Nuclear.P1 ant.Superv.isor j
- West, J., Operations Manager j
- Whitwell, D., Emergency Planner l
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, technicians, and office personnel.
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- Attended exit interview
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2.
Exercism Scenario (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine whether i
provisions had been made to tes+ the integrated capability and a major i-portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee, State, and local emergency plans and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),
i 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F. and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
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The scenario was reviewed in advance of the exercise and was discussed with licensee representatives. The scenario developed for this exercise I
was adequate to drill the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of 1
the licensee.
The scenario also prompted a range of response activities sufficient for local government agencies and the State of Florida to exercise the various facets of their respective emergency response plans during this full-participation exercise.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
3 Enclosure 1
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3.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301) l This area was observed to determine whether primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee had been specifically established and whether adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as i
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, l
Paragraph IV.A.
l The inspectors observed that specific assignments had been made for the licensee's ER0 and that there was adequate staff available to respond to j
the simulated emergency. The initial response organizatien was augmented by designated licensee representatives. The capability ft,r long-tem or continuous staffing of the ERO was discussed, and planning for rel
. was l
initiated at each of the ERFs.
i No violations or deviations were identified.
ll 4.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301) i The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to determine whether the responsibilities for emergency response were defined, whether adequate staffing was provided to insure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times, and whether the interfaces l
were specified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E. Paragraph IV.A.
l The inspectors determined that.the licensee's-onsite emergency l
organization was well defined and was generally effective in dealing with j
the simulated emergency. Adequate staffing of the ERFs was provided for
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i the initial accident response, and the interfaces between the onsite l
organization and offsite support agencies wmt adequate to ensure prompt notification and support from offsite agencies as required.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources were made, whether arrangements to acconnedate State and local personnel in the EOF were adequate, and whether other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response were identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A.
The licensee's Emergency Plan provided information regarding additional support and resources that may be called upon to assist in an emergency.
The inspector observed that representatives of the State of Florida were readily accommodated at the E0F, and that arrangements for requesting offsite assistance resources were in place.
No violations or deviations were identified.
r i
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3 6.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
I This area was observed to verify that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
i Licensee procedures provided for off-normal events to be classified into j
one of the four emergency classification categories. The licensee's staff made the following emergency classifications during the exercise:
l A Notification of Unusual Event was declared at 7:40 a.m. based on an i
unidentified Reactor Coolant System leakage of five gpa and proceeding j
with plant shutdown.
An Alert was declared at 9:20 a.m. based on an increase in RCS leakage i
i to greater than 20 gpa.
It was not clear to the inspector whether the l
Alert classification was anticipatory to the EAL criterion of "RCS leakage greater than 50 gpe", or whether this infomation was simply erroneous and should have stated 50 gpe.
The leakage had been 4
programmed into the simulator as a step function increase to approximately 65 gpe. The 20 gym entry was not a significant issue because the leak rate was increasing rapidly and the declaration was conservative.
A Site Area Emergency declaration was made at 10:18 a.m. based on a rapid decrease in RCS pressure and Safety Injection actuated and flowing to the RCS.
A General Emergency was declared at 11:06 a.m. based on no emergency core cooling available.
The inspector concluded the licensee satisfactorily classified exercise events in a timely manner.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel; whether the content of initial and follow-up messages to response organizations had been established; and whether means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway EPZ had been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D.
The inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been established and were used to provide information to the offsite government agencies in a timely manner.
Several inconsistencies were observed in the use of the State of Florida Notification Message Fom. Although none were considered debilitating, they indicated that improvements in training of i
communicators and a beu:9r review of the notification forms by management would be a significant improvement.
Enclosure
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Separately frem the exercise, the inspector reviewed tM testing of the j
siren sy: tem used to alert the public if offsite protective actions were i
ortiered by governmental authorities.
The full network of 85 strens in the ten-mile EPZ was tested quarterly, at noon on the first Thursday of March, i
June, September, and December. The responsibility and physical capability to actuate the sirens rested with St. Lucie and Martin Counties, whether i
for a test or an actual emergency. Prior to each quarterly test involving i
a full sounding of the sirens, the licensee and counties released 4
statements to the news media (radio, television, and print) to advise residents of the test.
Each quarterly test began with an announcement, i
using the public-address capability of the sirens, stating, "The following will be a test of the outdoor Warning System."
This announcement was made j
with the siren horns fixed and pointed, in turn, in each of eight compass directions. The sirens were then sounded at full volume (rated at 123 d8 i
l at 100 feet) for two minutes with continuous horn rotation.
This alerting i
signal was followed by a closing announcement (made in the same manner as i
the pretest announcement) stating, "This concludes the test of the Outdoor Warning System." This testing regime required about 15 minutes, according to a licensee representative.
On a annual basis, a booklet on Safety Planning Information for the St. Lucie Power Plant was mailed to each residence in the ten-mile EPZ.
In that booklet, residents were told that if they hear an outdoor warning stron, they should promptly tune to a designated local radio or television station for instructions. The public-address capability of the siren
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system, used only during tests, was not intended to be used in the event of an actuakenergency and was not part-ef the FEMA-approved prompt
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notification system.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Emergency Communications (82301) l This area was observed to determine whether provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6); 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E; ar.d specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
Communications among the licensee's emergency response facilities and emergency organization and between the licensee's emergency response organization and offsite authorities were good. No communications related problems were identified during this exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether information concerning the simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific i
criteria in NURF.G-0654,Section II.G.
Enclosure
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l Information was provided to the media and the public in advance of the exercise. During the exercise, the ENC was established and the licensee demonstrated the capability to perform a timely and accurate response to news inquiries. The licensee also effectively demonstrated the ability to coordinate the preparation, review and release of public infonmation with State and local government agencies. The licensee's public spokesperson i
demonstrated the capability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and i
timely manner.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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- 10. Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301) l This area was observed to determine whether adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as rem: ired by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8); 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
The inspectors observed the activation, staffing, and operation of i
selected ERFs and evaluated equipment provided for emergency use during the exercise.
a.
Control Room Simulator - The CRS staff operated as an effective team
.in its response to, and management of, the simulated emergency. The NPS/EC demonstrated able coemand and control during the portion of the exercise observed in the-CRS by the-inspector. The EC ccrrectly
- classified the conditions that initiated the emergency as a NOUE, and i
notified designated State authorities within 15 minutes. The inspector noted that crew briefings by the EC would have been helpful in ensuring that all personnel were fully aware of changing plant conditions.
b.
Technical Support Center - The inspector observed the latter stages in the process of activating the TSC following the Alert declaration.
The ED declared the TSC operational at 10:06 a.m., about 45 minutes after the Alert declaration. TSC personnel appeared to understand their emergency duties and responsibilities, and executed their functions in an organized manner. The staff's demeanor and the EC's consand and control in the TSC were very good. Half-hourly briefings in the TSC were concise and informative, although some personnel used more abbreviations and acronyms than actual words in their briefings.
The ERDADS printers in the TSC produced a very high noise level which was unnecessarily obtrusive. When those printers were not running, the TSC noise level was quite low.
Communications systems appeared to function properly.
Status boards were updated at least every 15 minutes and were well maintained throughout the exercise. The functional and operational adequacy of the TSC were demonstrated in this exercise.
i Enclosure
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Operations Support Center - The inspectors observed the activation and c.
i staffing, establishment of communications, briefing and dispatch of i
in-plant repair teams, radiological controls, and oper'ation of the facility. The OSC was activated in a timely manner. The requirements on the OSC were not very challenging during this exercise as only five i
teams were dispatched. However, this was due in part to the non-licensed operators not being dispatched from the OSC. The inspector accompanying one of the repair teams noted confusion as to who had primary control of the repair mission when repair personnel from both the OSC and the NLO's dispatched from the Control Room were at the i
same location. Although this did not have a negative impact, the i.
licensee was going to review this for possible refinement of the command / control of damage repair teams.
l d.
Emergency Operations Facility l
. Activation of the EOF was not an objective for this exercise.
i Although the scenario shom:d activation of the EOF as an objective, the team was informed at the scenario briefing that the E0F staff wodid be prestaged. The initial EOF staff comes from the plant while the majority of the EOF staff is from FP&L corporate offices in Juno Beach.
It is the latter staff that was prestaged. The prestaging, while well meaning in intent to assist the State and counties in achieving their objectives, introduced an air of artificiality inte the exercise play and interfered with the TSC in fully achieving some i
of its objectives.
The initial EOF staff from the site were notified to report to the E0F following the declaratica of the Alert at 9:20 a.m. in accordance with i
4 EPIP-1102.
The minimum staff needed for EOF operation is specified in EPIP-1102 and includes the Recovery Manager (RM), the RM Operations Advisor, an ERDADS operator, two dose assessment coordinators, and a communicator.
The RM declared the EOF in standby mode (per EPIP-1102)
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at 0956. The decision was made by the Emergency Control Officer (ECO) to fully activate the EOF with the corporate emergency response organization shortly after the declaration of the Alert. As indicated in the emergency plan and EPIP-1101, the activation of the EOF at the Alert stage is optional and the ECO was requested by the controllers to activate the EOF to maintain the scenario timeline. At the time
'the EC0 was under the mistaken impression that the leak rate which caused the Alert was 20 gpa due to an erroneous message from the Control Room when in actuality the leak rate was 65 gym. The RM declared the EOF operational at 1006 at which time the E0F assumed responsibility for offsite communications and PARS.
Offsite organizations represented in the EOF included the State of Florida Division of Emergency Management (DEM), the State of Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS) which included dose assessment personnel and field team controllers, and St. Lucie County and Martin County emergency response personnel.
The senior DEM person in the EOF was the Governor's Authorized Representative (GAR) who along with the senior St. Lucie and Martin County representatives had decisionmaking authority.
This is a unique arrangement to have Enclosure
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7 onsite and offsite decisionmakers both in the EOF and it greatly facilitated the exchange on information and the development of protective actions for the public.
As plant conditions deteriorated, the RM made effective use of his staff and consulted frequently with the Emergency Coordinator (EC) in the TSC. The RM and his Operations Advisor frequently referred to the EALs in the site emergency plan and the PAR flowchart in the plan and EPIP-1102. The PAR f'owchart is consistent with current NRC guidance and properly emphasizes the development of PARS based on plant conditions for severe core damage accidents.
The Site Area Emergency (SAE) was declared at 1018 and the General Emergency (GE) at 1106.
Following the declaration of the GE.by the EC in the TSC, the E0F staff quickly developed PARS using the PAR flowchart.
The GE declaration and the PARS were based on plant conditions prior to the release of any radioactive material from the plant.
The licansee's PARS, to evacuate o to 2 miles in all directions and 2 to 5 miles in the downwind direction, were given to the GAR and County representatives in the E0F. The GAR in coordination with the DHRS and Cour.t representatives in the EOF concurred in the PARS upon confirmation from the County EOCs that there were no impediments to evacuation in any of the offsite evacuation areas.
A release occurred about 1100 and began to increase in severity. The
-EOF dose assessment staff developed dose projections utilizing the FP&L dose model in accordance with EPIP-3100033E. Based'on monitor readings from the plant-stack and plant-4eformation from ERDADS and other sources, the Health Physics Manager recommended at about 1215 that the PARS be expanded in accordance with the PAR flowchart to include evacuation to 5 miles in all directions and 5 to 10 miles in the downwind directions. The RM concurred in the recommendation and the PARS were given to the GAR and subsequently issued to the public.
The decision to expand the PARS was based on calculated thyroid doses which in turn were based on a default iodine to noble gas ratio in the due model. Although the development of the expanded PAR based on due projections was in accordance with procedure, in retrospect it would have been prudent for the staff to acquire more information on plant conditions and the composition of the release prior to modifying the PARS.
From a programmatic standpoint, the EOF staff adequately demonstrated the capability to perform dose assessments and met their exercise objective in this regard.
The EOF staff performed core damage assessment in accordance with EPIP-1302, a comprehensive procedure for assessing core damage under emergency response conditions. The EOF staff's understanding of the core status and their eventual estimate of the extent of core damage agreed reasonably well with the scenario value of core damage. The EOF staff met their objective to perform core damage assessment.
The RM exhibited good command and control in the EOF, effectively directed and utilized his staff, and provided periodic briefings to the general EOF staff as the accident progressed. The RM was assisted in his decisionmaking efforts by the ECO who is a member of senior Enclosure
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i corporate management. The support for and coordination with the State and county representatives in the E0F was excellent. At all times the i
HH and his staff maintained an awareness of the need to coordinate closely with the offsite representatives in the E0F.
Coemunica m ns with the other response facilities including the Emergency News Center which is co-located with the E0F was good.
l Messages to the offsite response organizations utilizing the State of 3
Florida notification form were issued within the prescribed time limits. Some minor discrepancies were noted in the information on the j
foms. A discrepancy involving the PARS at the General Emergency stage was identified and corrected by the licensee. This error had no i
adverse impact as the correct infomation was given to the State and l
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county representatives in the EOF.
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Overall the EOF staff adequately demonstrated their capability to perform their assigned emergency response functions in a manner j
consistent with program requirements and guidance.
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No violations or deviations were, identified.
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- 11. Exercise Critique (82301) 4 The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to j
determine whether deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee management fer-corrective actions as
- required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14); 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E Paragraph j
IV.E; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The licensee conducted player critiques following termination of the exerciu. A detailed controller / evaluator critique was conducted on the day after the exercise. A formal presentation of the licensee's critique i
. conclusions was made on February 9, 1996, with exercise controllers, i
licensee management, and NRC personnel attending. The licensee reviewed the exercise objectives and evaluated the performance of the emergency organization in meeting the objectives.
It was during this process that the licensee acknowledged the basis of the results paragraph of the summary portion of this report.
i.e., Licensee management objectively questioned its overall state of emergency response readiness as a result of the need to conduct two practica drills prior to the graded exercise for management to be satisfied with the performance observed. As a result, management identified the need to consider conducting periodic drills or exercises that focus on verification of the emergency response organization's capability to respond at any time vice the confirmation of this capability just prior to a graded exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Enclosure
~
1 i
j 9
i
- 12. Review of UFSAR Commitments A recent discovery of a licensee operating its facility in a manner 4
contrary to.the UFSAR description highlighted the need for a special focused review that compares plant practices, procedures, and/or a
i parameters to the UFSAR descriptions. While performing the inspection discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the UFSAR that related to the areas inspected. The inspectors verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the observed plant practices, l
procedures,and/orparameters.
i The UFSAR contains specific references to the site emergency plan.
i However, the site Emergency Plan is maintained as a separate document from the UFSAR.
l
- 13. Exit Interview i
The inspection scope and results were summarized on February 9, 1996, with i
the persons whose names are listed in Paragraph 1.
The Team Leader describ.ed the areas inspected and discussed observations made during the inspection.
Licensee management was informed that the NRC considered the exercise to'have been successful. The Team Leader acknowledged the ilcensee's comments made regarding doing periodic drills. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee. Proprietary information was reviewed during the' inspection but none is contained in this report.
l
- 14. Federal Evaluation Team Report l
The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Regions IV staff) concerning the j
activities of offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded by separate correspondence.
i
- 18. Index of Abbreviations Used in This Report l
CFR Code of Federal Regulations i:
CRS Control Room Simulator i
dB decibel i
DEM Division of Emergency Management EAL Emergency Action Level EC Emergency Coordinator ECO Emergency Control Officer i
E0C Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPIP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ERDADS Emergency Response Data Acquisition Display System i
ERF Emergency Response Facility ERO Emergency Response Organization FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 4
FPR Florida Power and Light GAR Governor's Authorized Representative GE General Emergency Enclosure
10 gpa gallons per minute NLO Non-licensed Operator NOUE Notification of Unusual Event 4
NPS Nuclear Plant Supervisor NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OSC Operations Support Center PAR Protective Action Recommendation RCS Reactor Coolant Systes 3
RN Recovery Manager i
SAE Site Area Emergency j
TSC Technical Support Center UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Review Attachment (10pages):
?
Scope and Objectives, and Narrative Summary and Timeline 1
i l
l l
f t
Enclosure
j
)
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGET COtfEANY ST.LUCIE PIANT 19M EMElitaxNCY PREFAREDNESS EVALUATED aritantste FEBRUARY 7,19M i
2.1 SCOEE j
i l
To assure that the health and safety of the general publir, is prW in the event of an j
accident at St. Lucie Nuclear Plant (PSL), it is necessary for Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) to conduct an ananal emersmacy prepmedness exercise. 'Ihis is the 1996 Evalosand Exercise at St. Lucie Nuclear Plant. This exercise invoWes mahilimian of 1
FPL, Staae of Florida and Local Govermnent Agency gM and resources to respond to i
j a mimulard accident scenano. The exercise will be observed and evaluaand on-site by the l
Nuclear Regulasory Cnemiazion (NRC). An FPL Controller / Evaluator organization will l
control, observe, evaluate and critique the PSL partion of the exercise so that the emerEency response capabilities of the utility may be assessed. "Ite exercise will be observed and j
evaluated off-siac by the Federal Er.r.ency Management Agency (FEMA). A State of Florida and Local Government Agency Controller / Evaluator orgamzation will control, j
observe, evaluate and critique the off-site pcntion of the exercise so that the emergency i
i response capahilitian of the off-site agencier, may be==sammari i'
Due to the compressed timalina of the exaresse, some poruons of the FPL Es.af Response Orgamzation may be prepositioned. All on-site Es-.sf Response Facilities j
(ERFs) will be activated in accordance with aimulatari conditions and appropnate emergency l
response receb.
for the exercise. F.xercise participants (" players") will not haveasy prior i
knowledge of the simular*<f accident events, operational sequence, radiological effluents or j
weather canni*iana.
i l
The operanons portion of the exercise will be phre.d from the Plant Simulator.
l Operations data will be generated and supplied real-time by the Plant Simulator.
j State and Local Govenunent Age.ncies will participate in the off-site portion of the exercise.
J The following dnlls are incorporated into the exercise scenario and will be demonstrated concurrently in the course of tle exercise:
4 Radiological'?- % Defd: Both on-site and off-site teams will be dispatched dunng the j
drill to obtain required air ssemples and measurements associated with a n=nlatari off-siae j
release of radioactivity and communicate these results to the appropriate Ers.wf Response
{
Facility (ERF). (Field monitaring team protective clothing and respiratory stion will be j
simulated in the field.)
l j
Rankh Physics Drill: Involves the response to and analysis of simulata<i elevated activity j
airbome or liquid samples, radiation exposure control, emergency dWr-+y and the use of i
j protective eqmpment on-site.
1 1
man.
2.t.:
osanz.a e.no.1:4s j
FER PROrKTEst MIME
[
2.1 SCDrE <-i P6 DdE:
Acmal usage and dan =narruina of the insegmy of emergency insponse -......... -.c.
links and equipment between St. Lucie Plant and the FPL as.sias Emergency Rampanse Orsmammion (ERO) and of-sies response arancies. Since the doenus of the exer 6e are held E 5'-- - - =2. this driu also annar== the annual Unmananarwi ca===aicariana Drin.
Medient Emnergency DrSl: D-w the ability of the off-site medical support facility (Martm Memorial Medical Center) to treat an injured and caar==iannet individual.
The overall intent of the exercise is to ri~aaa'asse that the FPL staff==* iga ~i rep-d.:
Hrien in an em.wi situation are adequately tramed to perform in accordance with emergency 1
pph plans and pusd-w.
l l
e e
l s
i 2 I*I N aav.O.101IM
-MR PROrE M
ON sEVKmEJ
t i
FEORRE POWER ANDIJGBT CIMEFANY l-ST.LUCIE PLANT-l 19M MMB8CY PREFAREDNEW EVALUATED ETWRr'rer j
PEREUARY 7,1996 l
l 2.2 ORIECTIVES 1
}
'Ihe St. Imcis Plant (PSL) 1996 emergency preparedness exacias objectives are based
{
upon Nacinar Ragnissory c'h reqamunants provided in 10 CPR 50, Appendix E, Emergency Pisenhg and Prupandesstfir Producrian ant' UdNesdan Faciudas and i
i ia=Iw== crisada listed in the NRC Inspaedan MannaL Additicaal guidamos provided in j
NUREG454, FEMA-REP-1, Revtsion 1, Criseriafor Preparanon and Ewdmanon of
)
Radiological Emergency Responu Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power j
Plantr, was unlized in developing the objectives.
1 The exercise will be cr=wkw*d and evaluated using a realistic basis for activities. Scenario
{
events may escalate to a release of radioactive matenal to the environmaar.
4 t
l The following objectives for the excretse are consistent with the aforementioned documents:
l l
A.
Accident Assessment and Cimadnemh 1
1.
Demonstrate the abdity to assess accident conditions.
2.
D-=' ente the ability to idennfy initiating cdide=*. review conditions against the E-.wi Action Level (EALs), and wiQ classify the 1
j emergency throughout the exercise.
~=
B.
Na*
- mdaa 1.
Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify and mobilize Florida Power and Ilght 1
(FPL) emergency response personnel.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to alert and notify non-emergency response personnel.
3.
Demonstrate ayywydate procedures for both initial and follow-up notifications.
4.
D=_=trate the capability to promptly notify the State of' Florida and Local Authorities of an emergency declaration or change in emergency classificanon.
5.
E='= me the capability to pmmptly noufy the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory C"== ion (NRC) of an emergency declaranon or change in emergency claam*mrinn 6.
D=a==' rate the ability to pmvide accurate and timely information to State, 14 cal and Federal Authorities concerning class of the emergency plant status / conditions and whether a radioactive release is in progress, as appropriate.
7.
Dennaaerrate the ability to provide periodic plant status tpa'as to State, i
Imcal and Federal Authorities.
nwss.
u1 wanz.a e.toases MR Pao!EEEBf MIM
2.2.
(MIEIITER <-s C.
,m 1.
Desmanserase the avaHahHity and operabuity of emergency aa====immia==
ognipment for nanfiemrian of State, Lacal and Federal Authorities.
2.
Demonstrate the means to primde fouow-up information to Staan, Imoal and Federal Authorities.
3.
Demonsense the availmhility and operabihiy of ---. ' 7
- l.. equipmentin the h.wi Response FacGides (ERFs) for : -- ' =hy -....,<... '
- l. -
4.
N=anerrate the avadabuity and chay of emertency -.".-..' II...
equipment a~a y for off-site monitoring activities.
5.
N=aastrate the means to acquire meteoroiogical data a==?ry for emergency response.
D.
V
_ - 7 Response 1.
Maaetrate staffing of E% af P=aane Facilities (ERFs).
2.
Nmanerrate planning for 24-hour per day emergency response capahilitian 3.
N=aairrate the actiiatido df the* Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operational Support Center (OSC).
4.
Daman<trate the activation of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
5.
Demonstrate the functional and operational adequacy of the Emergency Response Facilities, TSC, OSC, EOF.
6.
Demonstrate the ability of each Emergency Response Facility Manager to maintain commanti and control over the emergency r-r activities j
conducted within the facility throughout the exercise.
{
7.
N=aa=mue the ability of each facility manager to pc**=Jiy inform facility personnel of the stams of the emergency situation and plant conditions.
8.
Damanetrate the transfer of E% wf Coordinator (EC) function from the i
Nuclear Plant Supervisor (NPS) to designated senior plant management and i
transfer of Es.wy Cw::. mar responsibilities ((1) off-site notification to
{
the State and 1.ccal Authormes and (2) recommending protective actions) to l _
the Recovery Manager (RM).
1 i
i ITUPE.
2.13 96 5 E.aar.a.101188
- MMMD
i 4
i 2.2-M rm D.
Em Response (-
9.
Demonstrums the abGity to prtunpdy and w li transfer informadan j
between E--..wi Response Facilirian (ERFs).
[
10.
na-anarrate the abuity of the TSC to aquest and prioritized E
.af Response Teams (ERTs) in a tunely manner.
i i
11.
namanarrate the ability of the OSC to assemble, dispatch and control ERTs in a timely manner.
q 12.
Demonstrate the c=aahility for devaiaamaat of the appropriate Lou ii.
{
Action Reco - =d=riaae (PARS) for the general public within the 10 Mile Es.sf Planmng Zone (EPZ).
13.
Demonstrate that the appuriate PARS can be communicated to State and I.ocal Authorities within the regulatory time constraints.
I 1
Demonstrate the activation, srmfHng and connel of the Emergency News Center 14.
j (ENC).
i j
E.
Radiological A-t and Control
~
l 1.
Demonstrate the capability to provide radiological monitoring for people i
evnen='ad fmm the site.
l 2.
Wetrate the coorthnated gathering of radiological data n-==7 or f
emergency response. including collection and analysis of in-plant surveys and samples, as applicable.
i i
j 3.
Demonstrate the capability to calculate radiological release dose projections and perform timely and accurate dose assessment, as appropriate.
1 i
4.
Demonstrate the ability to compare on-site and off-site dose projections to the EPA protective action guiMinem and ?- =. W and recommend the appmpriate l
rwtive actions.
i 5.
Demonstrate the ability to provide dosunetry to emergency response personnel j
as requued and adequately track personnel exposure.
6.
Werrate the capability to confirm and periodically assess the habitability of 4
the on-site Emergency R==p-:=+ Facilities (ERFs).
4 Frurst.
1.23 96BE.aer. O, to t145 PER fro mc!E M sEVEEEUBE
4 2.2. OM (-
j E.
Radialeskat Amamanent and Concret emademme 7.
Demonstrase the capability for on-sies -.....~.../. comemL 8.
nama==rrate the ability to Wi=raly cannot radiadon expanse to ans j
enasency woders, as appopians to radiologeal -andidaa-j 9.
Demonserme the decision making process for authorizing emergency wodnes j
to neceive radiation doses in excess of 10 GR Part 20 limits, as appopdmas.
d l
10.
Damnaarrate the ability to control and coordinate the flow of informanon I
regarding off-site radiol @l consequences between radiological=======aar j
j
]
11.
n.mns., rate the ability of field monitoring teams to respc d to and analyze an auborne radiological release through direct radiarian measuremanet in the a
environment, as appropriate.
i l
12.
Damanarrate the manne to Luane the necessity of and the capehili y for t
l
.u.c z.
in.
t 13.
Damanerrate the ability to =<aemble and di==='eh field monitoring teams.
?
14.
Daman=' rate the collection and analysis of air samples and provisions for effective communications and recordb ping, as appopriate.
1
{
15.
n.-a ate the ability to control and coordmate the flow of informanon j
regardag off-site radiological consequences with State radiological==nenament j
personnel in the EOF.
i f
1 4
F.
Public Information Program l
1.
N =s.e the timely and accurate r== pan => to news mquiries.
j 2.
D-.w- -e the ability to brief the madin in a clear, accurate and timely j
- manmy, i
l 3.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the preparation, review and release of i
public information with State and Local Government Agencies, as appropriate.
j 4
4 1
l J
j yytJyE.
2.14 96 5 X.ser.a.l H 1 5 i
s.
U (N
G.
Mamad Emmergamey 1.
n==a== wane the abuity to respond to a radiadon medical emergency in a timely mannar.
l 2.
Demonstrate the capability of the First Aid and Personnel nann i
in.
I i
Team to respond to a medical emergency, admiainwr first aid and survey for j
t,, on a mi==1==d eaar==i==wd injured individual i
i 3.
Damanawate the capability to arrange for and obtain transportation and off-she
)
madical support for a radiolopcal accident victim.
4 4.
4--=-
te the ability of Martin Memorial Medical Center g.c,M to treat j
an injured and/or conenmm.wa paneet.
i IL Evaluation 1.
4--=--.ie the abdity to condact, post-exercise critique to determine areas
{
reqmring corrective action or Lorvist.
2 L
n_ : -a
-v.
"7 t
4 l
Areas otthe PSL Ewgsf Plan that will HQI-be demanenated during this exacise Dx:lude:
i 1.
(E.1) Acusal radiological mnm nring of evnenstad personnel (off-site HP monitoring resources will be identified and allocated to the off-site AtmamMy Area).
2.
(E.9) Credit will be taken for discussion of the decision-making process during evaluation of the need for dose extension (s).
3.
Site evacuation of non-essential personnel.
4.
On-site personnel accountability.
5.
Avadability and operability of backup commumcations equipment.
i M
m M ast. O. 1 411 4 M N NM
1 i
CONMDEN'HAL (smasees l
i FIDlHDA POWER ANDIJGBT COMPANY j
ST.LUCIE PLANT i
top 6 mantmanNcY PREFAMEDNEEE EVALUATED EXERCIEE FEBRUARY 7,1996 i
3.1 NARRATIVE
SUMMARY
j Unit 2, which is operating at 100% power, has a Henkh I",A (HP) team perfonning a
')
j caarminiaant enny. When the team is narinad to leave eaar=iamme due to the initiation of a j
Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak, the utdity worker, in his basse, trips and falls in the i
airlock. The Radi=riaa Protection Man (RPM) asusts the utdity worker out of enarmiammat j
and secures the personnel hatch. The ennranaastad injured utdity worioer is transponed j
offsite for inedical tramrment l
The Operators have commenced a downpower when the RCS leakage increases to greater j
than 10 gallons per maure (gym) and an (Notificarmn of) Unusual Event is declared.
De RCS leakage cannaae< to increase to greater than 50 gym and an Alert is declared.
)
Operators increase the rase of the downpower.
I When the Operators trip the Unit, or shortly thereafter, a large break occurs in the "2Al" Cold Leg. As the I. ass of r'aninnt Accidaar (LOCA) is initiated the 2B3 4.16 KV bus experiences a di5erennal cunent fault which diamhle< all B side safety systems. A Site Area l
F=-
i
--7 s declared at-this tune. -
i i
j The Connel Room (Shanlaw) receives an inadvertent Reciciadan Actuation Signal (RAS) l which results in the isolation of the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), the RWST Suction Valve fails to reopen. Both trams of the E-,wy Core Caalia-System (ECCS)
{
are lost and cause the declaranon of a General E-wy.
ECCS will be reestablished but not until after Core Exit Thermocouple (CET) temperannes exceed 700 degrees Fahrenheit and a core melt sequence is initiated. The radiological release, monitored by the plant vent. requires a recommended protective action of evacuation out to five nules downwind of the release.
I, i
i 4
2 CONFIDENTIAL (uns244s) j man.
3.i.:
waar.a.a.no..as ranmoracrumsnmanusa 4
m
~.
2 s
i CONMDSNUAL (mmeM4e
~^
j nonEA POWER ANDIRMET COREFANY ST. LUCE PLANT
? D6 namentmqCY PREFARuBNEW EVALUATED EEERCISE l
FEBRUARY 7,19N i
i 3.2 SCENARIO TBEELINE i
TBEE l
(an dans appmummme)
EVENT l
Scenario Qock l
00f00 0700 Shift Turnover - Initial candieinne.
l 00G0 0730 Reactor raalmar System (RCS) leakage increases to greaser than i
i gallon per munne (gpm).
h Nuclear Plant Supervisor (NPS) should declare an (Nani&arian of) i j
UNUSUAL EVENT due to RCS leakass GREATER THAN allowed by Technical Specifications.
3 00/45 0745 W inidase a dow.
?
l 0120 0000 A Medical bry is reported to the Unit 2 Contml Room i
(Rimnimenr)...
~ -...
C - ",, -, Massagefor the Unassaal Erant
'01M5 0805 The First Aid / Personnel nanrmemminanan Team is activated to l
respond to the injured person.
1 i
01/50 0850 The conraminated injured person leaves the Radiation Connolled j'
Area (RCA) and is taken to Mamn Mernarial Medical Center.
{
02/15 0915 RCS leakage increases to 65 gpm.
~
The Emsgf Coordmator (EC) should declare an ALERT due to RCS leakage GREATER THAN 50 som.
j Operators increase the rate of the downpower.
l 02/45 0945 C: ",
y Massagefor the Alert j
(Depending on rate of downpower, Operators take Unit offline.)
1 I
i CONFIDENHAL (smswas)
FFDFsL 3.2-1 96mE.asy.e, NM14s Impagverarmerm133
8"'E N.
~
i, 3.2 SCENARED TIMEL11M (eemineme i
i l
N l
(as times appanhaus)
EVENT i
Semmerio Qeck j
03/15 1015 A large break occurs on the 2A1 Cold Iag resuking in a Iass of j
Coolant Accident (14CA).
i J
a i
The 2B3 4160 volt Bus is lost due to a differential cuneet funk.
l
'Ibe EC should declare a SITE AREA RimizacENCY due to i
I.DCA GREA'Mt THAN 2 = : v of cha wi== _
i i
Operators trip the Unit. if the Unit is not aheady omine.
i j
03/45 1045 On the ne=wplainad A side Recirculation Actusnan Signal (RAS),
)
the R f r!'
Water Storage Tank (RWST) Suction Valve fails
}
closed, but the ('aarminenmar Sump Suction Valve fails to open.
j
.i i
j All E
- y Case CA-System (ECCS) capability is lost.
i 1
'Ibe EC should declare a GENERAL ElmtstnENCY due to j
~
r=.__ _4 c _y - ;E 's FR ---
tha' ?
-:- = i: := 5= ;
l ek., m.k. F'= -- of larme==--- = of r "= ::,k, in a <'=t l
nonod anocer nosible or likniv. (Any cose melt situation)
J l
l Commintency Massagefor Site Arus Essergency 4
y 04/15 1115 Core Exit h--
-:-3uple (CET) temm==4 exceed 700 degrees Fahrenheit.
A release of radiarian is laid ='ad i
04/15 1115 C:: '
Mesangefor General Emergency
__f 04/45 1145 ECCS is restored and radiation levels start to diminish 07K)0 1400 Exeresse is termin= rad CONFWENTIAL(amesMes) man.
3.n osa n z. ase.e. m a w s PERPeoIE:IE3t M EME
.