ML20138D490

Third Partial Initial Decision LBP-85-49 on Emergency Planning & Safety Contentions.Served on 851211

ML20138D490
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	12/11/1985
From:	Bright G, Carpenter J, Kelley J Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
To:
References
CON-#485-474 82-472-03-OL, 82-472-3-OL, LBP-85-49, OL, NUDOCS 8512130241
Download: ML20138D490 (63)

Text

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LBP-85-49 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 05"9 "0 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,

ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD '85 Ec 11 P1:51 Before Administrative Judges:

James L. Kelley, Chairman IdyghN Dr. James H. Carpenter Glenn 0. Bright ERVED DEC 111985

)

In the Matter of ) Docket No. 50-400-OL CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY and )

NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN MUNICIPAL ) (ASLBP No. 82-472-03 OL)

POWER AGENCY )

)

(Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant)

PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION ON EMERGENCY PLANNING AND SAFETY CONTENTIONS Appearances Thomas A. Baxter, John H. O'Neill, Jr., and Delissa A. Ridgway, Washington, D.C., and Richard E. Jones and Dale E. Hollar, Raleigh, North Carolina, for the Applicants Carolina Power & Light Company, et al.

Wells Eddleman, Durham, North Carolina, pro se. e Stephen Rochlis for the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Charles A. Barth and Janice E. Moore for the Nuclear Regulatory Consnission Staff.

December 11, 1985 l

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INDEX Page 1

I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . .

II. EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS . . . . . 2 A. Protection Factors of Structures in the EPZ . . . . . . . . 2

1. Introduction . . . . . . . 2

2. Witnesses . . . . . . . . 3 a

3. Sheltering Effectiveness --

the Concepts Involved . . . . . 3

4. The Applicants' Surveys . . . . . 4

5. Intervenor's Proposed Findings . . . 9 B. Eddleman Contentions Based on the

( Emergency Planning Exercise . . . . 14

1. Introduction and Standards . . . . . 14

2. Application of Standards . . . . 18

3. The Lateness Factors . . . . . . 22 C. Other Emergency Planning Contentions . . . . 24

1. " Role Strain" in Adult School Bus Drivers . . . . . . . 24

2. Contentions Resolved by Summary Disposition or Withdrawn . . . . 25 III. SAFETY CONTENTIONS . . . . . . . . 26 A. Fire Protection . . . . . . . 26

1. Introduction . . . . . . . 26 l 1

Page

2. Control and Power Availability to Safety Equipment . . . . . 30

3. Qualification of Cable Tray Fire Barriers . . . . . . 30

4. Location of Fire Barriers . . . . 32

5. Fire Protection Analysis . . . . 35

6. Combustible Loadings Greater Than 240,000 BTU /Sq. Ft. . . . . . 39

7. Intervenor's Proposed Findings . . . 41

8. Conclusion . . . . . . . 43 B. Pipe Hanger Welds . . . . . . . 44

1. Introduction . . . . . . . 44

2. The Applicants' and Staff's Direct Cases . . . . . . 45

3. Intervenor's Proposed Findings . . . 49

4. Conclusions . . . . . . . 51 C. Steam Generator Tube Failure Analyses . . . 52

1. Introduction -. . . . . . . 52

2. Joint Intervenor's Contention VII (4) . . 53 i 3. Intervenors' Proposed Findings . . . 56

4. Conclusions . . . . . . . 58 IV.' CONCLUSIONS OF LAW . . . . . . . . 59 59 V. APPEALS . . . . . . . . . .

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l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges:

James L. Kelley, Chairman Dr. James H. Carpenter Glenn 0. Bright

)

In the Matter of ) Docket No. 50-400-OL

)

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY )

and )

NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN MUNICIPAL ) (ASLBP No. 82-472-03 OL)

POWER AGENCY )

)

(Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant) ) December 11, 1985

)

PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION ON EMERGENCY PLANNING AND SAFETY CONTENTIONS I. INTRODUCTION The factual and procedural background concerning this contested operating license case is set forth in our first partial initial decision on environmental issues. LBP-85-5, 21 NRC 410, 412-14 (1985). ,

A second Partial Initial Decision addressed most of the safety contentions that were heard in the Fall of 1984. LBP 85-28, 22 NRC 232 (1985). This third Partial Initial Decision addresses the remaining safety contentions (except for the drug use contention currently before the Board) and the emergency planning contentions that were heard in June 1985. It resolves those contentions in favor of the Applicants and adversely to the Intervenors. The Decision also has the effect of I

making o*ther dispositive Board rulings on emergency planning contentions l

-- i.e., ruitngs granting summary disposition motions or rejecting proposed contentions -- ripe for appellate review.

Hearings were held on the drug use contention and an emergency planning contention about siren effectiveness in November 1985. The Board anticipates that those contentions will be decided in early 1986.

II. EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS A. Protection Factors of Structures in the EPZ.

1. Introduction. Eddleman Contention 57-C-10, as originally admitted by the Board, stated in pertinent part that:

The State Plan provides no useful analyses or information on sheltering effectiveness . . . . The Plan does not comply with Evaluation Criterion J.10.m. of NUREG-0654, which calls for " expected local protection factors in residential units or other shelter for direct and inhalation exposure . . . ."

The Applicants performed a study of residential structures in the EPZ which formed the basis for their motion for summary disposition. We granted that motion in part, leaving for litigation "the adequacy of the Applicants' review of sheltering other than single family residential."

Memorandum and Order of April 24, 1985, at 6. Thus the remaining issue concerned the protection factors for " typical institutional structures (schools, churches, etc.) commercial structures and industrial l

facilities in the plume EPZ." Id. at 6-7. l l

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2. Witnesses. Guy Martin, Jr. and Joseph F. Myers testified for the Applicants. Mr. Martin is Manager of the Radiological Assessment Department of Ebasco Services, Inc. He has a master's degree in nuclear engineering and has experience in performing analyses to determine the sheltering effectiveness of buildings. Direct Testimony of Guy Martin, Jr. on Eddleman Contention 57-C-10 ff. Tr. 7895 (hereinafter " Martin"),

at 1-2. Mr. Myers is the Director of the Division of Emergency Management ("DEM") of the North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety. The basic responsibilities of DEM include fulfilling the State's role in emergency planning for natural and man-made disasters, in responding to and recovering from disasters, and in mitigating their effects. John C. Heard and Thomas I. Hawkins testified for FEMA and the NRC Staff. Both are employed by FEMA in the Natural and Technological Hazards Division, Technological Hazards Branch, Region IV,

'tianta, Georgia. As Branch Chief and Emergency Management Program Specialist, respectively, Messrs. Heard and Hawkins are responsible for providing assistance to State and local governments in the preparation of radiological emergency response plans. Mr. Eddleman did not call any witnesses on his behalf.

3. Sheltering Effec >tiveness -- the Concepts Involved. The Applicants proposed findings 43-45 provide a helpful explanation of the concepts involved in sheltering effectiveness. We adopt those findings, as set forth below:

43. "The sheltering effectiveness of a structure is measured in terms of its Protection Factor (PF). The PF is the ratio of the radiation dose outside the structure to the dose inside. It indicates the degree to which a structure would afford protection from a radiation release in comparison with no shelter at all. Martin at 4.

44. Evaluation Criterion J.10.m. of NUREG-0654 calls for a determination of protection for both direct and inhalation exposures.

Direct exposure is that which results from radiation impinging directly on the human body and organs either from airborne or deposited nuclides.

Airborne nuclides are the source of radiation in the air; direct exposure results when radiation (mainly in the fonn of gamma rays) is absorbed by the body. Deposited nuclides may be on the outside of the structure, such as on the roof or in the ground surrounding a building; radiation from these sources may penetrate a structure and the occupants inside. In contrast to direct radiation exposure, which results from radiation impinging directly upon the body and its organs, inhalation exposure results from breathing radioactive material in the air. In the event of an airborne release of radioactive material, the inhalation exposure to a person inside a structure increases over time because air carrying radionuclides penetrates the building so that the concentration of radionuclides inside eventually approaches the outside concentration.

How quickly this will occur depends upon the air exchange between the structure and the outside atmosphere. Martin at 4-5.

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45. The sheltering effectiveness of a structure is a function of the mass of material between the source of radiation and the person inside.

The PF of the building will be greater for a building that is constructed of dense materials in which there are a number of floors between the radiation source and the occupied area. Thus, the most important structural characteristics are the type of construction and exterior finish, number of stories, and presence or absence of a basement. A building of brick or concrete or similar construction generally has a higher PF than one of wood frame construction. A multi-story structure generally provides more protection than a one-story structure. If a basement is available, it will provide even better protection. Since the inhalation exposure PF is a function of the air exchange rate betwen the structure and the outside, data concerning the windows and other exterior openings are also relevant.

Martin at 5."

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4. The Applicants' Surveys. Applicants' proposed findings 46-53 describe their surveys of the sheltering effectiveness of buildings in the plume EPZ. Except in the minor respects noted below in Mr.

Eddleman's proposed findings, the Applicants' evidence in support of their proposed findings was not impeached. We adopt the Applicants' proposed findings 46-53, as follows:

46. "The ERP has already been amended to reflect the results of Applicants' survey of residential units in the Harris plume EPZ.

i Infomation on the PFs of typical residential structures is included in the ERP. Martin at 8; Myers at 2; Applicants' Ex. 29.

47. DEM staff members, Mr. Martin and other Ebasco personnel worked together to gather the necessary infomation to determine the PFs of institutional, comercial and industrial structures in the Harris plume EPZ. Infomation was gathered from a variety of sources including the property tax records of the counties in the EPZ, information maintained by Carolina Power & Light Company district managers, discussions with various persons knowledgeable about the Harris EPZ (including members of local chambers of comerce, municipal clerks and postal employees),

State listings of manufacturing facilities, State tax records, and State aerial photographic maps of the EPZ area. A road survey was also conducted to confirm the information obtained. Martin at 6-7; Myers at 2.

48. As a result of the survey, it has been detemined that +he predominant type of comercial/ industrial structure in the EPZ is small retail establishments, such as service stations, fast food restaurants and convenience markets. However, a smaller number of major establishments has a greater capacity for sheltering the population.

Fifty-one large comercial and industrial facilities were identified in the Harris EPZ, and they can be divided into six categories: (1) shopping centers; (2) butler-type buildings; (3) steel frame,

brick / concrete buildings; (4) multi-story homogeneous structures; (5) complex sites; and (6) downtovin shopping districts. Martin at 7-8.

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49. Institutional buildings in the Farris EPZ can be divided into three major categories: (1) schools; (2) churches; and (3) hospitals and nursing homes. There are also a number of other types of institutional structures in the EPZ. However, these structures were not separately analyzed because they either are of residential-type construction or are an integral part of another institutional structure. Information on the PFs of residential structures is already in the ERP. Martin at 8; Myers at 2.

50. Representative structures within each of the six categories of i large commercial / industrial structures were selected for detailed i analysis. They were selected so as to represent the range of construction type within each category. In addition, two schools were selected as representatives of the type of design and construction used by all school facilities. Each of these facilities was visited to obtain more detailed infomation regarding the construction material, wall, floor and roof thickness, among other characteristics. The infomation derived was transmitted to FEMA for input into FEMA's Shelter Analysis for Nuclear Defense (SAND) computer code which was used to calculate PFs for direct exposure to deposited nuclides. The identification of PF values for churches and small commercial structures was made by comparing their construction characteristics to those of

typical residences for which protection factors were previously determined. Similarly, based upon an earlier survey of the hospitals, nursing homes, family care facilities and Homes for the Elderly (a senior citizen comunity), construction characteristics were identified and compared to those for other structures for which protection factors are known. Martin at 8-11.

51. On the basis of the information obtained, a range of protection factors for representative structures in each of the six categories of major comercial/ industrial structures and for the two representative schools was derived. Martin at 11-12 and Attachmer.ts 6-8. Using a series of standard calculations, a range of protection factors for inhalation exposure was also derived for comercial and industrial structures and schools. Martin at 12 and Attachment 5.

52. For the typical smaller comercial establishments and churches in the EPZ, the range of PFs was determined by comparing their construction characteristics to those of typical residences in the EPZ. The range of PFs for direct exposure is comparable to that for residences in the EPZ.

For inhalation exposure, the range of-PFs for typical smaller comercial establishments is derived in the same manner as for other comercial and industrial structures. For a typical church, the range for PFs for inhalation exposure would be comparable to that for residences. Family care facilities in the EPZ are of residential construction and their range of PFs is the same as for typical residences. The relevant I

structural characteristics of the nursing homes are similar to those for the smaller commercial establishments. Thus, the nursing home PFs have a range comparable to that for typical small commercial structures. The hospitals have structural characteristics comparable to certain wings of schools that were visited and analyzed. Thus, the hospital FFs fall within the range of school PFs. Martin at 12-13 and Attachments 5, 8.

53. The Division of Emergency Management has accepted the results of the survey and the protection factor estimates for typical institutional, commercial and industrial structures in the Harris EPZ.

The ERP will be amended to reflect the results of the survey and to include an analysis of the level of protection from radiation releases afforded by representative commercial, institutional and industrial structures in the Harris EPZ that could be used as shelter in the event of an accident at the Harris Plant. The information will be available to officials who will decide what protective action (that is, evacuation or sheltering of the population) to take in the event of an accident at the Harris Plant. Myers at 3; Tr. 7904, 8058 (Myers)."

5. Intervenor's Proposed Findings. Mr. Eddleman's proposed findings 1-11,16 find some isolated support in the record, but read in context they do not undercut the Applicants' case. Tha thesis underlying certain of these finding; appears to be that the survey of structures must be more site-specific than the survey the Applicants' actually conducted. Thus, proposed finding 4-implies that the surveyors

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must look for cracks in particular buildings. Similarly, proposed finding 9 faults the survey because assumed air change rates "are not specific to typical wind speeds around the Harris site." These proposed findings misconceive the purpose of the requirement that sheltering effectiveness in the EPZ be assessed. The purpose is to allow planners to make informed, but relatively gross, judgments about sheltering in the EPZ as a whole, or large segments of the EPZ, wherever people happen j to be at the time. Its purpose is not to assist decisionmakers in deciding whether to move people, e.g., from wood buildings to brick buildings, seeking to maximize sheltering protection. See Tr. 8151, 8156 (Heard). Thus, what the decisionmakers need is a manageable set of reasonable estimates, not a finely tuned and detailed mass of data.

cimilarly, we see no need to develop varying infiltration estimates based on " typical wind speeds around the Harris site" -- at least in the absence of any evidence that high wind speeds are typical. Mr. Martin was justified in relying on published studies for estimates of infiltration rates, which were incorporated into his conclusions.

Martin Testimony, Attachment 5, p. 1; Tr. 8027. Furthermore, we can assume that planners faced with an evacuation / sheltering decision and a high prevailing wind could take that factor into account on an ad hoc basis, noting, for example, that while the high wind might increase infiltration rates in buildings, presumably it would also disperse the radioactive release more rapidly.

6. Mr. Eddleman's proposed finding 12 states that the Applicants' sunenaries of protection factors " collapse data to the point that the ranges given are not typical of the actual structures within the EPZ."

It is true that these sununaries are not designed to and do not necessarily convey protection factor information about typical" structures. They merely provide low and high range data on various categories of buildings. See Attachment 8 to Mr. Martin's testimony.

But that is all that is necessary for emergency planning purposes.

Indeed, as discussed in paragraph 9 below, it probably would have been sufficient to determine that the non-residential structures in the EPZ generally have higher protection factors than residences.

7. Mr. Eddleman's proposed finding 17 asserts that "there is no i evidence that the PF's of structures in the EPZ do all fall in [the]

ranges" listed in the Applicants' direct case. This proposed finding largely ignores the .\pplicants uncontradicted case, including their fairly detailed description of how th'ir survey was performed. See Applicants' proposed findings 47-50, which the Board has adopted.

Furthermore, that there may be a few isolated buildings in the EPZ which fall outside the Applicants' ranges is both irrelevant and unlikely.

8. Mr. Eddleman's finding 18 faults the survey for not making separate calculated measurements of protection factors for churches and small consnercial structures. Uncontradicted testimony in the record confinns the common-sense expectation that protection factors for

churches and small comercial structures are similar to residential structures. See Applicants' proposed finding 52, which the Board has

- adopted. We think the Applicants took a reasonable approach and that separate calculations for all such structures would have been a waste of time. Furthermore, calculations were made for inhalation exposures of small comercial establishments.

9. Eddleman proposed finding 19 notes a " low range of airborne direct exposure Protection Factors of about 1.2 in non-residential buildings, or less than that provided "in a single story brick house with no basement." Proposed finding 20 points in the same direction.

The apparent implication is that reliance on the brick house protection factors as a basis for a sheltering decision would not be conservative.

While that may be true as an abstract proposition, it would not happen in this case. As shown by a comparison of Applicants' Exhibit 29 with Attachment 8 to Mr. Martin's testimony, single story wood frame houses with no basement are the general category of structures in the EPZ with the lowest protection factors, substantially lower than virtually all comercial/ industrial buildings and schoolc, Furthermore, the Applicants' motion for sunraary disposition atablishes that most of the houses in the EPZ are of wood or similar construction, not brick or stone. It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that the protection factors of wooden houses would be taken into account in a conservative decision whether to shelter. In any event, since the Board, in effect, required the Applicants to expand their initial survey beyond i

residential houses to other structures, all of the relevant protection factors will be before the decisionmakers. The manner in which they would make that decision is beyond the scope of this contention.

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10. Eddleman proposed findings 20-22 seek to raise questions about the value of the FEMA witnesses' testimony on this contention. The thrust of that brief testimony was that the use of residential protection factors as a basis for choice between available protective f action options is " conservative since larger, institutional-type structures being normally more spacious and massive, offer a greater degree of protection." Testimony of Heard and Hawkins at 3. This broad generalization is supported by the Applicants' empirical data, i particularly with respect to deposited nuclides. See Attachment 8 to Mr. Martin's testimony. However, we agree with Mr. Eddleman that FEMA's consideration of this contention was cursory and that FEMA did not materially contribute to the record. Whether, in these circumstances, the FEMA presentation should nevertheless be accorded substantial i evidentiary weight (see 10 CFR 50.47(a)(2)) is ultimately not significant, because the Applicants presented a substantial case which j Mr. Eddleman failed to rebut in any material respect. The Board is relying primarily on the Applicants' case in resolving this contention.

11. With the inclusion in the State Emergency Plan of information on the protection factors of representative institutional, comercial  ;

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and industrial structures in the EPZ, the plan will meet Evaluation Criterion J.10.m. of NUREG-0654 and the Applicants will have met their

- a turden'with respect to Eddleman Contention 57-Ci 10.

B. Eddleman Contentions Based on the Emergency i '

Planning Exercise

1. Introduction and Standards. :On' day 17-13, 1985, the preliminary emergency planning exercise, required by 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV.F was . conducted for ths Shearon Har'ris facility.

Particip' ants .in the exercise included CP&L, the State of North Carolina,

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and-the four counties irt,the plume EPZ -- Wake, Chatham, Harnett and Lee 1

Counties. R'eprfese'ntatJves of the FEMA and NRC Staffs were present as

,,cbservers. IEMAsubsequentlyissuedan="ExerciseReptrtid and " Interim

l Findings" based on the exercises, which',were transmitted to the NRC on August 7, 1985. The NRC Staff prepared a report (No. 50-400/85-20) focusing on onsite aspests of the exercise. Officials,cf the State'of s.

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North Carolina prepared an " Evaluation Report" on the exercise, which i was accompanied by an " Operations Journal" and copies of messages of the State Emergency Respon;e Team. <

On September 3ica 1985 Mr,jEddleman served a set of twelve f

l m . ,, contentions based on the emergency planning exercise as reflected in the

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docusepts cited aboys. The text.,of these contentions is set forth in theietschmenthereto. The Applicants and the NRC Staff subsequently fiTed pleadings in opposition to all twelve contentions. Mr. Eddleman then filed a reply to those oppositions.

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On November 5,1985, at the close of the evidentiary hearing on Eddleman Contention 57-C-3, the Board ruled on the twelve exercise contentions. We admitted two of these contentions (one as modified) and rejected the remaining ten. We stated that we would provide reasons for our rulings in this opinion. Tr. 9971-74. Those reasons follow.

The contentions before us are, of course, subject to the specificity and other rules applicable to all contentions See Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Station), 8 A.E.C.13, 20-21(1974). They are also subject to the limitations applicable to late-filed contentions. 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714(a)(1). See Duke Power Co.

(Catawba Nuclear Station),17 NRC 1041 (1983). Beyond that, we think these contentions should be considered in light of the fact that they are arising at the end of a lengthy public evaluation process -- a process designed to surface serious planning defects -- and relatively close to expected operation of the facility. Furthermore, we should take into account that FEMA has made an overall detemination that the exercise was satisfactory and that the cited deficiencies are correctable. As we next explain, these latter two considerations were largely decisive in our rulings.

Through an amendment to its emergency planning rules in 1982, the NRC sought to exclude emergency planning exercises altogether from consideration in operating license cases. That amendment was successfully challenged in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See Union of Concerned Scientists v. U.S.N.R.C., 735 F.2d 1437 (1984). The Connission had argued before the court against l

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undue limitations on its discretion to structure its proceedings in the interests of speed and efficiency. The court rejected the implication that its ruling was intended to have any such effect. Most significantly, it stated that:

1 The Comission argues throughout its brief that the exercise is only relevant to its licensing decision to the extent it indicates that emergency preparedness plans are fundamentally 7

flawed, and is not relevant as to minor or ad hoc problems occurring on the exercise day. Today, we in no way restrict the Conunission's authority to . adopt this as a substantive licensing standard (emphasis added). Id. at 1448.

The Board believes that the criteria implied by'the underscored language t

should be applied to the pending contentions, namely, exercise contentions alleging a " fundamental flaw" (and satisfying other contention requirements) should be admitted; contentions alleging only minor or readily correctable problems should be rejected, even if they might have been admitted at an earlier stage.1 1

In discussing the application of these criteria, the court stated that the NRC could "sunenarily dismiss any claim that did not raise genuine issues of material fact about the fundaraental nature of emergency preparedness plans." Id. As an abstract proposition, therefore, it might be argued that the " fundamental flaw" criterion should only come into play at the sumary disposition stage, that it should not be applied to exclude a contention at the threshold.

We find it significant, however, that the court did not draw this distinction and that it cited with approval BPI v. AEC, F.2d 424 '

(CADC 1974), which approved threshold exclusion of contentions.-

Furthermore the court went on to state that "the only central requirement is that there be an opportunity to dispute issues raised by the exercises under the relevant decisionmaking criteria." Id. at 1449. We believe that such an opportunity has I been affordeThere, where the pleadings have made it apparent that'

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i Apart from the " fundamental flaw" criterion, the NRC's emergency planning regulation,10 C.F.R. 50.47(a)(2) provides that: "In any NRC

- licensing proceeding, a FEMA finding will constitute a rebuttable presumption on questions of adequacy and implementation capability." In this case, the overall FEMA findings on the Shearon Harris exercise were that:

The State and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented, and the exercise demonstrated that offsite preparedness is adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Station in the event of a

< radiological emergency. Memorandum from Richard Krimm, FEMA, to Edward Jordan, NRC, dated Aug. 7, 1985, p. 2.

I In addition, FEMA made specific findings about several of the problems that were to form the bases of Mr. Eddleman's contentions. To be sure, the quoted regulation is not directly applicable at the contention stage: it comes into play when a contention goes to evidentiary hearing. Nevertheless, this regulation implies that a Board should give I (FootnoteContinued) the bulk of these contentions do not involve fundamental flaws.

We are mindful that the court spoke of "the Connission's authority" to adopt such substantive licensing standards and, to our knowledge, the Comunission itself has not fonnally done so.

Apparently, this is an issue of first impression. However, our delegated authority to decide this case includes the authority to decide novel legal questions, sub.iect to Appeal Board and Connission review. Cf. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station),

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a FEMA finding of adequacy or correctability some deference at the contention stage. We have done so in this case.

2. Applications of Standards.

Admitted Contentions -- 2 and 8. These contentions were admitted because they could, if substantiated, involve a fundamental flaw in planning. Contention 2 alleges six areas of communications deficiencies. Effective communications among emergency personnel are crucial to plan implementation. In addition to unit capabilities, there must be effective interconnections and coordination among units. The number of problems cited here suggests that adequate coordination may be lacking. If, as the Applicants argue, Contention 2 merely " strings together a series of diverse, relatively minor communications problems,"

it should be amenable to summary disposition.

Contention 8 cites various implementation deficiencies in the Emergency Broadcast System. The effective functioning of that system is of crucial importance. The FEMA Exercise Report is critical of the system in various respects (pp. 12-13,17-18) It includes no specific determination of adequacy, noting only that " activation of the EBS did improve as the emergency continued." Id. at 18. The FEMA Findings refer to but do not discuss the EBS.

Contentions Reflecting Minor Problems -- 3, 4, 6, 7, 9-11. These I

seven contentions allege minor, ad hoc, correctable problems. Even if I

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substantiated, they would not represent " fundamental flaws" and thus would not compromise substantial implementation of the emergency plans.

Specifically:

Contention 3. This contention was taken out of context from the State Evaluation Report, p. 3, which gave a generally favorable review of emergency medical operations. Whether viewed separately or together, these criticisms can hardly represent a " fundamental flaw" in planning, i.e., the plans could be carried out successfully even if equipment like splints were unavailable and measures against contamination were not perfectly executed. The NRC Staff Report, p. 8, found on-site emergency medical activities to be satisfactory. In any event, any deficiencies of this sort are readily correctable.

Contention 4. This contention is also based on circumstances described in the State Evaluation Report, p. 5. The FEMA Exercise Report is generally more favorable on decontamination activities.

Report, pp. 4-5. Moreover, as noted above, problems in decontamination are readily correctable through training.

Contention 6. This contention alleges various problems with " rumor control," relating principally to dissemination and coordination of information among the media. These problems are discussed in some detail in the FEMA Report, and all appear to be minor and correctable.

Report, pp. 11-13. FEMA found, correctly in our view, that these l

i problems "are not significant enough to seriously hamper emergency response." Findings at 11.

Contention 7. The first part of this contention is redundant in light of Contention 11, which also concerns hard-copy data transmission.

See discussion of Contention 11, below. The second part of this contention concerns delays in tabulation of coordinates of traffic control points to facilitate dose projections at those points. While i better coordination might be helpful, we view it as a refinement in planning, not an essential element. FEMA apparently agrees. See Exercise Report at 9; Findings at 15.

I Contention 9. This contention alleges, out of its context from the 4

State Evaluations, p. 12, a " weak level of training" in the use of i

anticontamination clothing and respirators by radiation survey teams.

The Evaluation also- notes generally, however, that the teams had adequate knowledge of their responsibilities and perfomed in a professional manner. For its part FEMA stated that " team members in general were adequately trained." Exercise Report at 15. Assuming some training deficiencies in these areas, they are minor and correctable.

i Contention 10. This contention alleges several minor and readily correctable problems with respect to protection against radioactive i

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4 iodine. See FEMA Exercise Report at 15, 29. FEMA found (at p.13) that l

methods, systems and equipment for accident assessment and protection against radioactive iodine were adequate.

Contention 11. This contention alleges various problems in hard-copy transmission of information. As the Applicants point out, while such hard-copy messages "are useful for record-keeping and are more convenient than hand-written notes for maintaining logs, they are not integral to effective communication." Response at 11. The primary means of communication are by telephone and radio. Furthennore, such

problems are correctable. According to one county official

[T]he facsimile unit that we had was not nearly as effective as we would have liked it to have been. It worked great up until Thursday morning, and it's working great today. So, evidently, it just didn't want to work for that drill.

i FEMA Public Meeting, Tr. 86.

Contentions Rejected on Other Grounds -- 1, 5 and 12. Contention 1 4 alleges an " approximate 42 minutes delay" in plant authorities' notifying SERT of an uncontrolled release and a consequent lack of assurance of timely notification of emergencies. The allegation is based on an erroneous statement of such a delay in the State Evaluation Report, p. 7. The Applicants' analysis of contemporaneous messages demonstrates that notification of the release was virtually immediate.

In addition to their analysis we note that State E0C Message 207 states that the county sirens sounded at 12:44, also demonstrating that notification must have been received prior to that time. Contention 1

, _ _ _ z_ _ _ _ _ . , _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ ._ _ , _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ . . _ _ . _ ,

thus mischaracterizes the very documents on which it rests; it must be rejected.

Contention 5. This contention lists a number of problems with the sirens. Installation of the sirens has not been completed and, as noted in the FEMA findings, p. 8, "the official FEMA testing of the alert and notification system has not yet been conducted." Accordingly, any contentions based on installed siren performance are premature. We note, however, that the problems cited in this contention, should they arise in further testing, appear to be straightforward and correctable.

Contention 12. This contention is similar to Contention 1 in that it misstates the record upon which it rests. It alleges a lengthy delay in dispatching assistance to boaters on the Cape Fear River. State E0C Message 151 shows that assistance was dispatched in less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

As the Applicants point out, such a response is acceptable for reaching remote areas of the EPZ. See NUREG-0654 at 3 "best effort basis" acceptable. In any event, isolated instances of delay in such circumstances are to be expected.

3. The Lateness Factors. Applicants and the Staff argue at length that, for various reasons, all of the exercise contentions should be rejected under the Catawba "five factors" balancing test. Having i

rejected ten of the twelve contentions on other grounds, it is only i

l

necessary for us to apply that test to the two contentions we are admitting. For the reasons briefly sumarized below, they pass.

(a) Good cause. We accept Mr. Eddleman's statement that he did not actually receive the FEMA Exercise Report and Findings -- on which Contentions 2 (in part) and 8 were based -- until the end of August.

(b) Other means and representation of interests by another party. The Staff acknowledges that these factors favor admission.

Staff Response at 9. Mr. Eddleman has been at odds with the Staff and FEMA on virtually all emergency planning issues. The Applicants' l

suggestion that FEMA will represent Mr. Eddleman's interests (Applicants' Response at 36) is difficult to take seriously. See Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project),18 NRC 1167, 1175, (1983).

(c) Contribution to the proceeding. This factor tilts against Mr. Eddleman, but only slightly. He has failed to provide sumaries of the proposed testimony of witnesses, which the Appeal Board has generally deemed a requirement. See WPPSS decision supra at 1177.

On the other hand, since Mr. Eddleman expects to call the exercise evaluators, the substance of their expected testimony can be gleaned in part from the exercise reports and underlying papers.

The Applicants direct our attention to past Board criticisms of Mr.

Eddleman's perfomance as bearing on his potential contribution here.

In that connection, the Board's most recent such assessment provides a t

more balanced perspective. At the close of the hearing on the siren contention, we said:

i

- The Board would just like to add that we thought that Mr.

Eddleman's cross-examination was well prepared and professionally presented. We appreciate that. Thank you.

Tr. 9955.

Delay. Admission of these contentions may delay conclusion of this

+

proceeding but not, we expect, by very much. We have established an accelerated discovery and summary disposition motion schedule which concludes on February 13, 1986. Tr. 10,206. We expect to decide any sumary disposition motions by the end of February and we also expect to decide the siren and drug issues by that time. Therefore, if summary disposition is granted, there will be no resulting delay. Should hearings be necessary, hearings, findings and a Board decision could be accelerated to completion in the spring of 1986. Since these issues

would not effect fuel loading, they would not impact the Applicants' schedule for operations.

In light of the foregoing, the "five factors" balancing clearly 1

favors admission of Eddleman Contentions EPX-2 and -8.

I C. Other Emergency Planning Contentions.

1. " Role Strain" in Adult School Bus Drivers. The Joint Intervenors sponsored a contention (denominated EPJ-4(b)), subsequently narrowed by the Board, that focused on whether adult school bus drivers i

in a " role strain" situation occasioned by a nuclear emergency would  ;

subordinate their driving duties to family obligations. This contention was litigated in an evidentiary hearing, with the Applicants and FEMA I

l '

l

i presenting direct cases and Mr. Eddleman conducting cross-examination for the Joint Intervenors. The Board directed all parties to file proposed findings of fact (Tr. 8159-8160) and the Applicants and FEMA did so. The Joint Intervenors, while filing proposed findings on the protection factor contention heard at the same time, elected not to file findings on the " role strain" contention. As a result, this contention is no longer contested. Since this Board's decisional authority is limited to contested issues,2 the EPJ-4(b) " role strain" contention must be dismissed.

2. Contentions Resolved by Summary Disposition or Withdrawn.

Apart from the exercise contentions, the Board admitted twenty-eight emergency planning contentions. Of these, three were later withdrawn, one was settled, three were heard on the merits, and the remaining twenty-one were resolved in the Applicants' favor by summary disposition. See Applicants Proposed Findings of Fact 3-5 for a detailed description of these rulings. In the case of contested sumary disposition motions, we issued a statement of " Reasons Supporting Sunnary Disposition of Emergency Planning Contentions" dated August 14, 1985. Many of the Applicants' sumary disposition motions were uncontested. In those cases, we could have simply dismissed the 2 10 C.F.R. 5 2.760a. The Board may put an issue in controversy on its own motion only upon a detennination that a " serious safety ---

l (FootnoteContinued)

)

l l

contentions.3 We nevertheless satisfied ourselves that the Applicants, supported by the Staff, had met their burden of proof and that the contention did not raise a " serious safety matter" within the meaning of 10 C.F.R. $ 2.760a.4 However, we see no need to provide in addition detailed statements of our reasoning in dismissing contentions which had been abandoned by their sponsors.

III. SAFETY CONTENTIONS A. Fire Protection.

1. Introduction. Eddleman Contention 116 states:

The fire hazard analysis of section 9.5A (Appendix) in the FSAR does not address the availability of control and power to the safety equipment. In establishing fire resistance ratings of fire barriers with respect to fire in cable trays, Applicants have not established that qualification tests represent (FootnoteContinued) matter exists." There is no basis for such a determination with respect to EPJ-4(b). On the contrary, we found the direct cases of the Applicants and FEMA persuasive.

3 See note 2 above, and accompanying text.

4 One of Mr. Eddleman's contentions on which summary disposition was granted, 57-C-7, concerned arrangements for medical treatment.

Following the Board's sumary disposition ruling, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed a Comission ruling on which an earlier Board ruling narrowing Mr. Eddleman's original contention had been based in part. GUARD v NRC, 753 F.2d 1144(1985). A motion from Mr. Eddleman to reconsider his Contention 57-C-7 as originally drafted is pending before the Board. We have issued an order establishing a pleading schedule on Mr. Eddleman's motion. We expect to address and resolve this matter expeditiously.

i actual plant conditions or comparable conditions.

Another vague statement is that fire barriers are used "where practical" without defining practical or stating the criteria to decide where a fire barrier is or is not

- practical (and what type of fire barrier should be used).

FSAR 9.5.1.1.1. The " Analysis" of Appendix 9.5A does not demonstrate as 9.5.1.1.1 claims it will, the adequacy of other fire protection measures in all cases. Rather, it estimates the BTU of combustible material, smoke generation and removal rate from the area, gives usually a qualitative description of some measures to mitigate or reduce the fire effects, and assumes that the fire will be promptly detected (usually no analysis of location of detection instruments etc.) and the fire brigade will respond rapidly and put out the fire, or the automatic equipment will work. These assertions are made despite the time it takes to get people into the containment and to the fire (not well analyzed). Further, the " analysis" of what happens if the fire spreads is generally a rationalization that it can't spread much, not an analysis. See e_.jL. " Analysis of effects of postulated fires." The effect of a fire in a fire area or a fire zone with a combustible loading greater than 240,000 BTU /sq.ft. doesn't get dealt with in realistic tems. The plant fire fighting capability of simultaneous fire is inadequate, or at least unanalyzed."

This contention was admitted by the Board in its Memorandum and Order dated July 27, 1984. During the evidentiary hearing on this issue the Board dismissed the issue of simultaneous fires. See Tr. 4370, 4831-32.

2. Applicants presented the testimony of Margareta A. Serbanescu and David B. Waters. " Applicants' Testimony of Margareta A. Serbanescu in Response to Eddleman Contention 116 (Fire Protection)" ff. Tr. 4256 (hereinafter Serbanescu); " Applicants' Supplemental Testimony of Margareta A. Serbanescu in Response to Eddleman Contention 116 (Fire Prntection)" ff. Tr. 4256 (hereinafter Serbanescu II); " Applicants'

, ,. - - - , , . _ . _ _ . w. ._y-._ y. 7 __v.-- g --v79ye ._y ---m%y9 9%_.w

1 Testimony of David B. Waters in Response to Eddleman Contention 116 (Fire Protection)" ff. Tr. 4250 (hereinafter Waters).

3. Ms. Serbanescu is a Principal Mechanical Engineer with Ebasco Services, Inc. and is the supervisor of the Ebasco Fire Protection Engineering Group. She was assigned as the Fire Protection Engineer for Harris in 1978, and is now in charge of the Fire Protection Group which is responsible for the Harris Fire Protection Program. Serbanescu, ff.

Tr. 4256 at 1-3. Mr. Waters is employed by CP&L as the Principal Engineer-0perations, and is responsible for the administration of the Fire Protection Program at Harris. Waters, ff. Tr. 4250 at 2-3.

4. The Staff witnesses were Randall Eberly and Robert L. Ferguson.

"NRC Staff Testimony of Randall Eberly and Robert Ferguson Concerning Eddleman Contention 116", ff. Tr. 4626 (hereinafter Eberly/Ferguson).

The Staff also presented the testimony of Dennis J. Kubicki in the form of a Joint Affidavit with Mr. Eberly. " Joint Affidavit of Randall Eberly and Dennis J. Kubicki Concerning SER Open Item 8 (Acceptability of Fire Doors)". Mr. Kubicki was cross-examined on the contents of this +

I Affidavit on December 17, 1984. Tr. 7415-31.

5. Mr. Eberly was employed as a Fire Protection Engineer in the Chemical Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. He was directly responsible for the review of the fire protection programs at the Shearon Harris facility.

Eberly/Ferguson, ff. Tr. 4626 at 6. Mr. Ferguson is a Section Leader of the Fire Protection Section, Chemical Engineering Branch, Division of 1 Engineering, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. He is responsible

i for supervising the Staff's review of the fire protection programs at I

nuclear power generating stations. Id. at 3. Mr. Kubicki is a Fire

- Protection Engineer in the Chemical Engineering Branch of the Division of Engineering, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, and is responsible for performing safety reviews and evaluations of the fire protection programs of nuclear power plants. Staff Ex. 8, Attach. 1.

6. Intervenor Eddleman presented no testimony on this contention.

7. The basic purpose of a fire protection program in a nuclear power facility is that, in the event of a fire, the capability of shutting down the reactor in a safe manner, maintaining it in a safe shutdown condition and limiting any release of radioactive material to the environment is assured. Eberly/Ferguson, ff. Tr. 4626 at 6-7.

I 8. The NRC regulations and regulatory guidance for nuclear plant fire protection programs are set forth in 10 CFR Part 50, App. A, General Design Criterion 3; 10 CFR 50.48; Regulatory Guide 1.70, Rev. 3; NUREG-0800, " Standard Review Plan", Section 9.5-1. 5

9. Implementation of the NRC rules is carried out by using a defense in depth philosophy. In the case of Harris, the plan encompasses plant system and facility design, fire prevention, fire

- detection, annunciation, confinement, fire suppression, administrative 5

The Harris plant is not required to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, App. R, as the plant was not operating prior to January 1, 1979.

However, Applicants' have comitted to meet the requirements therein. O'Neill, Tr. 4598-99.

i l- .

l

- 3d -

controls, fire brigade organization, inspection and maintenance, 1

I training, quality control and testing. Applicants' Ex. 6 at 9.5.1-1.

i i 2. Control and Power Availability to Safety Equipment

' 10. The first subpart of Contention 116 alleges that the

! availability of control and power to safety equipment is not addressed j- in the Fire Hazards Analysis (FSAR App. 9.5A). Both Applicants and Staff testified that it is true that this is not addressed in Appendix i

9.5A; rather, it is discussed in detail in FSAR Sections 9.5.1.2.1 and 8.3, and in the Applicants' Safe Shutdown Analysis. As the Staff l '

indicated, the entire fire hazards analysis for Harris is made up of the FSAR, Appendix 9.5A and the Safe Shutdown Analysis. The availability of power and control cables to safety equipment is therefore addressed in

Applicants' fire protection program. Serbanescu, ff. Tr. 4256 at 6; 1

Eberly, Tr. 4653-54. Intervenor did not identify any specific l

i deficiencies in the.FSAR and SSA analyses, i

t

3. Qualification of Cable Tray Fire Barriers

11. The second subsection of Contention 116 expresses concern that qualification of cable tray fire barriers does not correspond to actual conditions which might be encountered during a fire at the plant. Fire j barriers are an integral part of the fire protection program. The plant i

is divided into a number of fire areas, each of which is enclosed by a i three-hour fire-resistant enclosure or its equivalent. Additionally, as i set forth in the SSA at Table 9.5B-3, certain cable trays within a fire i

i i

area are protected with 3-hour or 1-hour rated enclosures. Where a cable tray penetrates a fire area barrier, penetration fire stop seals are used. These have a minimum fire-resistance rating equal to that of ,

the fire area barrier. Serbanescu, ff. Tr. 4256 at 8.

12. There are a number of standard testing procedures which have been developed. Applicants' witnesses testified that the ratings of their fire barriers are based on standard fire tests performed in accordance with the following: ASTM E-119; NFPA 251; Nuclear Material Limited, " Property Loss Prevention Standards for Nuclear Generating Stations", App. A-14; Underwriters Laboratories 263, " Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials"; and American Nuclear Insurers Bulletin No. 5, " Standard Fire Endurance Test Method to Qualify a Protective Envelope for Class IE Electrical Circuits." Serbanescu, ff.

Tr. 4256 at 7-8.

13. In detennining the qualification conditions for fire barriers an exposure fire is used which is based on a standard, empirically derived time-temperature curve. This time-temperature curve represents a worst-case exposure fire, not an average. Serbanescu, ff. Tr. 4256 at 10,11; Serbanescu, Tr. 4526; Ferguson, Tr. 4656-58, 4666-68. Therefore a fire barrier tested under the standard time-temperature conditions will resist a fire from the maximum calculated combustible loading in any fire area in the SHNPP power block. Serbanescu, ff. Tr. 4256 at 11.

l

14. For each barrier, tests will be performed by an independent laboratory on a " generic" assembly of that fire barrier, and o _- - _ __ -

- 32'-

installation of that barrier will be done in accordance with the I

recommendations of the testing laboratory to insure that the actual

(

barrier has the same configuration as the test assembly. Serbanescu, i

ff. Tr. 4256 at 12.

15. The Board finds that the qualification methods to be used by the Applicants represent equivalent or more rigorous tests of cable tray fire barriers than would be experienced under actual plant conditions.

4. Location of Fire Barriers

16. In the third subpart of Eddleman 116 the complaint is made that FSAR Section 9.5.1.1.1 is vague in that the term "where practical" is used in describing barrier placement but is not defined; neither are the criteria used to decide whether the location or type of barrier is or is not practical. A detailed description of the use of fire barriers is not contained in 9.5.1.1.1; a detailed treatment is presented in 9.5.1.2.2 and in App. 9.5A (Applicants Ex. 6). Specific barrier 4

locations and qualifications are contained in FSAR App. 9.5A and

Applicants' SSA. Serbanescu, ff. Tr. 4256 at 13; Eberly/Ferguson ff.

! Tr. 4626 at 11.

17. Applicants used the guidance of the Standard Review Plan, ilC.5 and 6.7, to determine the location of the Harris fire barriers.

Under these guidelines, if it is not feasible to locate a fire barrier in compliance with SRP Section 9.5.1, an applicant may use an approved

]

alternative. The Staff cited as an example that if it is not feasible to erect a barrier between redundant safe shutdown components in the

_ . _ . . . _ _ _._ _____ _ _.__.._____,...__,_. _ _._.~_.--_._ _ _ -

control room, an alternative safe shutdown capability would be provided in another area. Deviations can also be requested for other features such as a combination of partial walls and automatic suppression systems. Id. at 12.

18. Where the Staff's guidelines reconnend a barrier, Applicants hava attempted to install one. Where construction or equipment problems have rendered the placing of a barrier impossible, the Applicant has found an acceptable alternative. The Staff witness considers this statement to be, indirectly, their definition of "where practical".

Eberly, Tr. 4670.

19. In view of the preceding discussion, the Board finds no merit in this part of Eddleman 116.

20. A number of doors used in the Harris facility have not been specifically fire tested. These are special-purpose doors, bullet resistant doors, and air-and water-tight doors. Serbanescu II, ff. Tr.

4256, answer 7. A great deal of cross-examination was conducted on these doors which was objected to by both Applicants and Staff as being beyond the scope of the contention. The Board allowed the cross-examination to continue, and now feels that the fire resistance of these doors, while not specifically called out in the contention, has at least a peripheral bearing on the contention insofar as they are part of the barrier system.

21. Applicants' witness testified that the doors, while not undergoing standard fire-resistance testing, were so constructed that i

l

\ . . _. ._ _ __ -

I.

they otherwise met the requirements for a standard three-hour, A-label

type fire door, and the vendors were requested to provide the appropriate certification. The witness further stated that many of these doors are located toward the outside of the building, and thus even if they failed, it would not contribute to the fire spreading.

Serbanescu, Tr. 4417-18, 4440-41.

22. Staff witness testified that Applicants had taken a comon approach when using specialty doors. These special purpose doors are l nonnally very heavy, bullet resistant and missile proof, and therefore would have a degree of built-in fire protection. Eberly Tr. 4804-05.

23. Staff's witness further testified that the special purpose doors are too large to fit into a standard test furnace, and too heavy for the furnace supports to bear. In the Staff's opinion, even if a ,

f special furnace were to be built for testing purposes the results would i

not be standard and there would be nothing to compare them with.

! Eberly, Tr. 4811-12.

24. The Staff has completed its review of the adequacy of the ,

Harris fire doors. Staff Ex. 8. Except for the specialty doors Applicants have committed to provide tested fire doors. The special purpose doors were found to be constructed of steel plates many times 4

thicker than that used in approved fire doors, and have multiple point steel locking pins which should prevent uneven expansion of the door and J

its frame, and thus prevent warping of the door in the event of a fire.

f Additionally, the combustible loadings on either side of the specialty I

f doors are insufficient to create a fire which would endanger the I j

. i strength of the doors. The Staff therefore found that there was I

sufficient reason to justify a deviation from fire protection guidelines. Staff Ex. 8.

25. In view of the uncontroverted facts presented, supra, the Board finds that Applicants have adequately defined the location of the-fire barriers at the Harris plant and, further, that there is reasonable assurance that the untested special purpose doors in the plant will be adequate to prevent the spreading of a fire.

5. Fire Protection Analysis

26. The fourth allegation in Eddleman Contention 116 takes issue with the analyses of the fire protection system in Appendix 9.5A of the Applicants' FSAR in certain specific aspects. We consider these aspects, namely the BTU content of combustible material, smoke generation and removal rate, measures to mitigate fire effects, fire detection capability, fire brigade effectiveness, and fire spreading, seriatim.

27. The Harris plant is divided into a number of fire areas which are established through consideration of a number of factors. One of these factors is the possible combustible loading, which is determined by the amount and BTU content of the materials within the area.

Serbanescu, ff. Tr. 4256 at 16. Both normal and transient combustible materials are included; the transient materials being controlled administratively through written procedures. Heat values, or BTU contents, have been determined by use of those contained in the Fire

,s- - - _

l

- 36 -

Protection Handbook (14th Edition-1976) prepared by the National Fire Protection Association. The analysis itself is conservative, as it assumes complete ccabustion of all combustible materials in the area, takes no credit for lack of continuity of combustibles and does not i assume that any automatic or manual suppression systems will limit combustion. M.at17-20. The Board finds that the heat values, or BTU l contents, used by the Applicants are acceptable and that the heat loadings which result from the analysis are reasonable and adequate.

l

28. The Standard Review Plan lays down no criteria for treatment of smoke generation and ejection. The Staff review relies on industry standards. The Harris philosophy follows a containment plan wherein the f area is more or less sealed off to remove a continuing source of available oxygen. Eberly, Tr. 4677-83. To implement this plan the ventilation ducts are equipped with dampers which close automatically f-when a fusible link is melted, and ventilation fans leading to that area are automatically stopped. Serbanescu II, ff. Tr. 4256 at 5-6. There b

is then a greatly lessened smoke removal capability. However, if it is determined that the fire must be fought manually, the ventilation system can be put back in operation from the control room or by the plant operator. Additionally, the fire brigade has smoke ejector equipment and self-contained breathing units which will allow them to manually l

fight the fire. M. at 6. The Board finds that Applicants' approach to i

this problem in fire fighting is both reasonable ud adequate.

29. The principal means of mitigating or reducing the effects of l

l fires at the Harris plant is the use of sprinkler systems. Tne most

,-,,---,,.---,--,u

, , . , , ,_p- , -m--. .,.,,,-,,,...--..-,--,--..,,~,,.,,---n,,.,,--,.,,4-n,e,,-v-.-..,,,-m

s connon is the wet-pipe system, where the supply pipe is water-full and actuation of the system is achieved by nozzles controlled by fusible links. Other systems, used where inadvertent actuation of the 1

l sprinklers might damage equipment, are of the pre-action, or dry pipe 4

type, where a valve which is temperature controlled must open to fill the sprinkler pipe. Some of these systems then actuate as in the wet-pipe system; where a minimum amount of water is desired other systems have a temperature-controlled valve that cycles open and closed as the temperature rises and falls. Still another system, used to mitigate fires which spreac rapidly or produce high temperature quickly, ,

acts much like the preaction system but has open spray nozzles, allowing inmediate discharge of water when activated by fire detectors.

Serbanescu, ff. Tr. 4256 at 23-26. The Harris systems will conform with NFPA codes, as comitted to by the Applicants. Eberly/Ferguson, ff. Tr.

4626 at 16. The Board finds that these systems, designed and

! constructed in accordance with the applicable NFPA codes, are an adequate means to mitigate the effects of potential fires.

i 30. The types of fire detectors used at the Harris plant are selected on the basis of the kinds of fires which would be expected in

k. any particular fire area. The primary detectors are ionization smoke

detectors, which respond to the first traces of fire in the form of visible or invisible combustion products; these are general purpose instruments and provide early warning for timely fire brigade response.

Themal detectors, which are used to actuate water suppression systems, j l

l have a set point at 30*F above ambient temperature. Ultraviolet flame i

I l

detectors are used in the diesel generator building and fuel oil pump areas inasmuch as a fuel oil fire can develop quickly and with little smoke. Serbanescu, ff, Tr. 4256 at 22-23. Applicants have committed to following the NFPA codes in the design of these detection systems.

Eberly/Ferguson, ff. Tr. 4626 at 16. The Board finds that these systems are adequate to provide timely warning to personnel and actuation of the fire suppression systems.

31. The fire brigade at the Harris facility will consist of a minimum of five people on each shift who have been trained as described in FSAR Section 13.2. In addition, there will be at least one fire protection technical aide available for advice and assistance. If the need arises, additional plant personnel are available. Waters, ff. Tr.

4250 at 9-10, Attachment 8; Tr. 4600-02. Applicants' witness Waters testified in some detail as to the staffing, training, equipment, drills, and other relevant items concerning the fire brigade. Waters, ff. Tr. 4250 at 5-11; Tr. 4306, 4308, 4311-12, 4318-19, 4330-31, 4601-02. After reviewing Mr. Waters' testimony and the ensuing cross-examination by Mr. Eddleman, the Board finds that the estimate of 5 to 15 minutes for fire brigade response in the power block is reasonable. We also note that the Staff evaluation of the fire protection program assumes that the fire brigade arrival time is thirty minutes, an estimate the Board considers conservative.

32. Mr. Eddleman contends that Applicants' analysis of the effects of fire spreading from one fire area to another is inadequate.

- 39'-

Applicants maintain that this is an inherent part of their analysis, as j l

each fire area's combustible loading has been calculated, and, if the j fire should spread from one fire area to another, that combustible loading would describe the effects of such spreading. Serbanescu, Tr.

4521-24. It is the Steff's view that if the Staff's guidelines are followed there will be no spreading of the fire. That is, if the proper fire barriers are provided and detection and extinguishing equipment is l- provided, an adequate level of protection against fire spreading is attained. The Board agrees with both Staff and Applicants; if the proper barriers and mitigation sources are provided, the fire will not spread, but if it should spread, Applicants' would know what the effect would be. We find that the Applicants' and Staff's analyses are adequate.

i f

6. Combustible Loadings Greater Than 240.000 BTU /Sq. Ft.

! 33. The NFPA has determined, through tests, that the reference i time-temperature curve is followed by a fire in a fire area with a combustible loading of 240,000 BTU /sq. ft. Serbanescu, ff. Tr. 4256 at

! 11. Special attention must therefore be given to fire areas in the i Harris power block which have combustible loadings above this figure.

Eddleman Contention 116 alleges that the effects of fires in these areas are not treated in a realistic fashion.

34. There are four fire areas in the Harris power block that have I

combustible loadings above 240,000 BTU /sq. ft. These are the two diesel

l 1 fuel day tank rooms and the two diesel fuel storage tanks. Serbanescu, ff. Tr. 4256 at 28; Eberly/Ferguson, ff. Tr. 4626 at 20-21; See also,

. Serbanescu II, ff. Tr. 4256 at 5. The storage tanks are underground, constructed of reinforced concrete with a steel liner and are Seismic I

Category I design. The only access to the tanks is through a reinforced concrete hatch. The tank vent is equipped with a flame arrestor, and l

yard hydrants for fire fighting are located adjacent to the area. The tanks are also located at a distance of over 175 feet from the principal

< plant structures. Serbanescu, ff. Tr. 4256 at 30; Eberly/Ferguson, ff.

Tr. 4626 at 20-21. The Board agrees with Applicants that these tanks do not present a threat to safety-related systems.

35. The 3000-gallon capacity diesel fuel day tanks are isolated from other fire areas by three-hour rated reinforced concrete walls.

The tanks themselves are safety Class 3. Seismic Category I components which are designed to remain functional after a safe-shutdown earthquake. Inasmuch as the combustible load was calculated on the basis of the burning of 3000 gallons of diesel fuel, the only way this i

could happen would be if the tank ruptured, thereby making all of the fuel available. Serbanescu, ff. Tr. 4256 at 29. The fuel would be

, confined to the day tank room, as the entrance to the room is located at a level which is 110% of the level the spilled fuel could attain.

Serbanescu, Tr. 4530-31.

I

36. From the testimony, the scenario would be: (1) fuel tank ruptures, fuel is released; (2) ignition of the fuel is assumed to

l l

l l

occur; (3) the automatic multi-cycle sprinkler system would actuate; (4) dampers in the ventilation ducts would close, limiting the available air supply; (5) the fire brigade would arrive, manually actuating the sprinkler system if the automatic system had malfunctioned; and (6) fire brigade would combat fire according to the proper procedures for this event. Serbanescu, ff. Tr. 4256 at 29.

37. The Board finds that the testimony presented does portray a

" realistic" description of the event, albeit a very conservative one.

We further find that all the fire protection measures taken in combination provide adequate assurance that the fire would not endanger safety-related components.

7. Inrtervenor's Proposed Findings.

38. Mr. Eddleman submitted proposed findings on fire protection.

" Wells Eddleman's Proposed Findings on Contention 41 (Pipe Hangers QA/QC),116 (Fire Protection) and 9 (Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment)" on January 8,1985, pp. 8-15. The Board has i

reviewed these proposed findings and finds them to be unsupported by the record and to provide little assistance in arriving at our findings in this matter. We therefore reject them. We briefly discuss our evaluations below.

39. Proposed Findings 11-15 concern the special purpose doors which are at various locations in the plant. Due to their sizes, they have not undergone standardized testing for fire resistance. The Staff has, however, granted exceptions for these doors for reasons which are l

l 1

- - - - - - ~ . - ~ . _ - . . . . . . - . - . . . , .

I 3

; c -

contained in the redord. The' 3oard agrees that,the exceptions are

,n -

reasonable and well-founded. See Board Fir. dings;20-24, at pp. 33-34.

[ '

!, 40. Mr. Eddleman's Proposed Findir.gs 16-21 consist of various allegations 'aoout material being omitted from the F5M, in an apparent i effort to impeach the FSM's credibility. The Board finds that the i

j material in question was placed in the record at the hearing, and thus

) any earlier omissions do not alter any conclusions the Board has l,

reached.

41. Eddleman Proposed Finding 22 attacks the fire brigade training 1

! e as being inadequate,' tut the only conclusion drawn is that there must be awell-traine'firebhigadehapabilitybeforetheplantisoperated.

d D The Board was presented a great deal of testimony on this subject and is

^

confident that:there will be such capability in place prior to

l .,

! operation. 54 Board Fibi,2 31 at p. 38.

I - 42. Ed41eman Proposed Finding 23 takes issue with the fact that the seals betwen fire areas are not yet in place, and suggests that t

!. proper installation must be verified by the NRC walkdown inspection.

I Although verification of proper installation of these. seals could take 1

l place during the, NRC walkdown inspection, they will be subject to the

) Applicants' QA progna inspections, 'like any other piece of hardware in q

l the plant. Mr. Eddlev n does not point to any specific deficiencies in thesesealsortheilproposed_ installation. We therefore reject this proposed fiading. ,

43. Proposed Findings 24 and 25 argue that a fire ia the diesel da'y tanks would td very serious, especially if the autctnatic suppression f s ,;

.- -s

< k* '

_9

. '. , . -bhj

r 4 system did not work or if a door were lef t open. There is nothing in the record to show that this accident scenario should be considered.

Adequate testimony was presented to support the Board's decision on the diesel fuel tanks. See Board Findings 35-37 at pp. 40-41.

44. Mr. Eddleman's Proposed Finding 26 questions the quality assurance aspects of the fire suppression systems. This is beyond the scope of this contention and is therefore rejected.

I 45. Proposed Findings 27 and 28 express concern that the Staff

) will not properly perform certain inspections and reviews. There is no basis in the record for this concern.

46. Proposed Finding 29, Parts A-H, present a lengthy list of various items, many of which have been discussed above. We find them to be of little help to the Board in its deliberations. The fire protection contention is quite broad. This creates opportunities for an f

opposing party to present pieces of the record out of context in

~

proposed findings, as is attempted here, i

! 8. Conclusions

! 47. The Shearon Harris fire protection program is based on a defense-in-depth concept wherein no single aspect of the program is depended upon to protect against fire. The elements of the program are designed to (1) prevent fires, (2) detect any fire condition, (3)

! suppress fires, (4) confine fires, and (5) separate redundant I safety-related equipment so that control of the plant can be maintained in case a fire occurs. Applicants have demonstrated that the various

_ . _ _ . . . _ . _ _ _ __a_____

, elements of the program meet at least minimum requirements.' The Staff s

concurs. Inviewoftherecordbefore~ustheBoardfindsthat Applicants have met their burden with respect to Eddleman Contention 116.

i B. Pipe Hanger Welds.

1. Introduction. Eddleman Contention 41 states: " Applicants' QA/QC program fails to assure that safety-related equipment is properly inspected (e.g., the "0K" tagging of defective pipe hanger welds at SHNPP)." This contention was admitted by the Board on September 22, 1982. However, the Board ruled that the entire QA/QC program would not be the subject of litigation. ' Rather, the contention would be limited to Mr. Eddleman's only specified concern "that there exist defective hanger welds that have been improperly inspected and approved." 16 NPC, 2069,2097(1982).

2. The Applicants' direct testimony was sponsored b James E.

Nevill, Principal Engineer-Civil, Harris Pl'.at Engineering Section; Alexander A. Fuller, Principal Engineer-Mechanical (Hanger Engineering),

Harris Plant Construction Section; David R. Timberlake, Senior Engineer-Metallurgy / Welding, Harris Plant Engineering Section; and Kumar ,

V. Hate. Principal QA/QC Engineer, QA/QC Harris Plant Section. Nevill et al . , ff. Tr. 6663.

3. The Staff's direct evidence was sponsored by Paul R. Bemis, t

Acting Division Director, Division of Reactor Safety; Jerome J. Blake, A. .__ _ _ _ _ _ _

a Chief, Materials and Processing Section; and George A. Hallstrom, Reactor Inspector, all from the Atlanta Regional Office of the NRC.

Bemis et al . , ff. Tr. 7217.

4. At the request of Mr. Eddleman and with the concurrence of the Board, the following appeared for cross-examination by Mr. Eddleman:

Kenneth A. Douglas, QA specialist; William H. Pere, QA/QC specialist; and Gene G. Tingen, a pipe hanger welding inspector until February 1982 (all being employees of Applicants); and Mr. George F. Maxwell, the NRC senior resident operations inspector.

5. Mr. Eddleman sponsored no direct evidence to support his contention. Instead he relied upon extensive cross-examination of the witnesses and upon numerous documents (Exhibits 20 through 59) accepted into evidence.

2. The Applicants' and Staff's Direct Cases.

6. Applicants' testimony is a general narration of the problems relating to pipe hanger welding and the corrective and preventive actions that have been instituted. Installation of pipe hangers began in early 1979. In September 1980 during a routine inspection, the NRC Resident Inspector identified several Bergen-Patterson pipe hanger drawings with unclear and incorrect weld symbols, as well as several cases in which the field weld was different from the drawing without the discrepancy having been identified by QC. Consequently, a site l investigation was conducted by CP&L, with the result that full reinspection was deemed necessary. A report on the deficiencies and i

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reinspection program was submitted to the NRC Staff in May 1981 and the NRC closed out this item in September,1981. Nevill et,al,,, ff. Tr.

6663 at 14-16.

7. In 1982, some different problems were identified. The Applicants' Receipt Inspection Program discovered deficient shop welds made by Bergen-Patterson. It was discovered that Applicants' inspectors and craftsmen were using an improper technique in the measurement of skewed tee welds. Several remedial actions were taken. Another reinspection program was carried out. Several remedial actions were taken. The Ebasco Vendor QA program at the Bergen-Patterson facility was upgraded to include both in-process and 100% final weld inspections.

Applicants also instituted a 100% receipt inspection of shop welds on pipe hangers. Nevill et al., ff. Tr. 6663 at 18-20. Additional training was provided to craft and QC welding inspection personnel which utilized the 1981 edition of AWS D-1.1. That document clearly outlined the proper techniques for measurement of skewed tee fillet welds.

Timberlake, Tr. 6947.

8. Despite the efforts undertaken by Applicants, deficiencies related to pipe hanger erection continued to be identified. A stop work order was issued in July 1983 as the result of a QA surveillance; this stop work order required that final inspections of pipe hangers by both CI and QC be discontinued.6 During this time, site management reviewed the problems that were identified by that surveillance, by subsequent  !

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hanger and welding engineering surveillances, past NRC inspection reports and previous nonconfonnances. The need to have a system that would stand up to constant scrutiny was recognized. In December 1983 a completely restructured pipe hanger program was implemented. Nevill et d.,ff.6663at23.

9. The enhanced program for pipe hangers includes new and revised procedures intended to clarify the installation and inspection requirements; further, the enhanced program provides for engineering / technical support to the craft before and during the installation process in order to resolve potential problems prior to turning the hangers over for final inspection. The major improvements of the enhanced program as they relate to pipe hanger welding are summarized below.

10. First, pipe hanger work packages are reviewed by a work package group prior to issuance to the field. At this time, the hanger design drawing is " weld mapped," 1.e., each joint to be welded is given a specific identifying number, thereby precluding the possibility that a joint would not be identified or would be confused with another joint during the inspection process. This weld mapping process has been 6

Although final inspections / approvals were not undertaken until the new program was in place, QC welding inspections continued. Tr.

7327(Bemis).

retrofitted to previously inspected hangers as well as in-process hangers. Nevill et a_1_., ff. 6663 at 23; See also, Fuller, Tr. 6915; Douglas, Tr. 7189.

11. Generic engineering documents are, for the most part, no longer used as solutions to common problems. Instead, field modifications are written for each hanger detailing necessary changes due to these problems. This has greatly reduced the potential for misinterpretation and subsequent misapplication of construction requirements. Nevill et al,. ff. 6663 at 24; Fuller, Tr. 6792; Douglas Tr. 7189.

12. Additional engineering and technical resources have been provided to support the craft. A field hanger engineering support unit has been developed whose purpose is to support the craft during hanger installation. Welding engineering personnel examine hanger welds (both shop and field) prior to submitting the hanger package to QC for final weld inspection. Finally, in addition to the QC final review, a hanger engineering final review group has been formed to review seismic hanger packages prior to final turnover to the permanent QA records vault.

Hanger package documentation is thus verified as being complete and accurate. Nevill et a_1.., ff, 6663 at 24-25; Hate, Tr. 7038; Blake, Tr.

7358-59.

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13. Although not fonnally a part of the enhanced program, in 1983 the visual weld acceptance criteria were also revised; by providing well-defined criteria for inspecting weld attributes, the potential for f

I conflicting judgments based upon personal interpretation has been

lessened. Douglas, Tr. 7159-60; Maxwell, Bemis, Tr. 7324-27. The i revised acceptance criteria have been reviewed and accepted by the Staff. Bemis, et a,1., ff. Tr. 7217 at 14-16; Hallstrom, Tr. 7334-36. I

14. Applicants' actions and rnulting program appear to have been reasonably effective. For example, in the second quarter of 1984, approximately 93 percent of the work presented by the craft to QC for weld inspection was found to be acceptable. QA surveillance of QC final acceptance of hangers during the period January through October 1984 revealed 98.8 percent acceptance rate for attributes inspected by welding QC. Hate, Tr. 6670-71, 7041-42.

3. Intervenor's Proposed Findings.

15. Mr. Eddleman's proposed findings are largely a recitation of the Applicants' problems with the pipe hanger welding program, as are many of the Board's findings, supra. Applicants state in their reply that these are " problems which Applicants readily concede have occurred." However, Mr. Eddleman gives little attention to the numerous remedial actions that CP&L has taken.

16. The Board finds that Mr. Eddleman did not focus on the basic

- issue; namely, whether or not a "significant safety issue" exists with respect to pipe supports. In the context of this operating license proceeding, the issue is whether uncorrected errors endanger safe plant operation or whether there has been a breakdown of the quality assurance program sufficient to raise legitimate doubt as to the plant's capability of being operated safely. See Pacific Gas and Electric 1

--- , , , - n,- , - - ~ , - - - - ~ ,

Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-756,18 NRC 1340, 1344 (1983); see also Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Unit

1) ALAB-740, 18 NRC 343, 346, (1983).

17. We take the view that Mr. Eddleman was faced wf th an uncommon situation between the time this contention was admitted in September 1982 and tried in November, 1984. By the Appitcant's own testimony and the fact--testified to by Staff--that Applicants shut down their weld inspection program from July to December,1983 (Bemis et al., ff. Tr.

7217 at 11), deficiencies clearly requiring remedial action existed at the time the contention was admitted. However, by the Fall of 1984, CP&L had reviewed the program, identified several deficiencies, and instituted an " enhanced" program, that has now been demonstrated to be effective. See Finding 14. Lengthy and detailed cross-examination by Mr. Eddleman failed to uncover any significant safety issues in the revised program.

18. In Proposed Findings 4 and 5, Mr. Eddleman would have us find that staff witnesses did not agree on "what the root cause of the problem was." As the Staff witnesses responded to questions about the root cause in sequence, different aspects of problems with the weld acceptance criteria were described. However, these views are not inconsistent, but rather complement each other. Tr. 7321-7326.

The Board finds that there have been a variety of problems in the pipe support welding program as reflected in the variety of corrective actions that have been taken by CP&L. It seems probable that there was I not a solitary root cause.

f

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19. In Proposed Finding 10, Mr. Eddleman concludes that CP&L has not been keeping its connitments to quality assurance at the Harris 4

plant. We do not reach such a broad conclusion. The record documents from Mr. Eddleman's exhibits and cross-examination that numerous nonconformances requiring additional work were identified. As required ,

by 10 CFR 50, App. B, I, the primary function of quality assurance is to verify -- by checking, auditing, and inspection -- that activities

]

> affecting safety-related functions have been correctly performed.

Reporting of nonconformances is a demonstration of proper program execution, while at the same time revealing that corrective actions are needed.

20. We note that whenever the need to improve some activity is found necessary for regulatory compliance, ipso facto the activity must have not been in compliance previously. The various problems that CP&L and the NRC found in the pipe support welding activities caused extensive rework and reinspections to be carried out. One might wish, in retrospect, that the problems had been discovered sooner than they were, but the essential issue for this Board is whether adequate corrective actions have been taken.

4. Conclusions

21. The Board finds CP&L and its contractors had a variety of problems in carrying out the pipe support welding activities. This contention may have had merit when it was initially raised but remedial j actions have averted a possible breakdown in quality construction. No

t uncorrected errors that would affect safe plant operation were identified in this proceeding.

C. Steam Generator Tube Failure Analyses

1. Introduction Joint Intervenors' Contention VII was originally admitted by Board Memorandum and Order of September 22, 1982. It stated as follows:

Applicants have failed to demonstrate that the steam generators to be used in the Harris Plant are adequately designed and can be operated in a manner consistent with the public health and safety and ALARA ex-posure to maintenance personnel in light of j (1) vibration problems which have developed in Westinghouse Model D-4 steam generators; (2) tube corrosion and cracking in other Westinghouse steam generators with Inconel-600 tubes and/or carbon steel support plates and AVT j water chemistry; (3) present detection capability

for loose metal or other foreign objects and; (4) existing tube failure analyses.

Applicants submitted a Motion for Partial Sumary Disposition on May 16, 1984, in which they asked for dismissal of parts 1, 2 and 3 of the contention. Staff responded in support of Applicants' motion on June 5, 1984. Joint Intervenors answered on June 14, 1984, infonning the Board that although they disagreed with the premises advanced by Applicants'and Staff, that time and resource constraints did not allow them to respond adequately to the merits of the motions.

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)

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The Board has reviewed the arguments and accompanying affidavits submitted by the Applicants and Staff and has reached the following con:lusions:

1. Sufficient experimental data, analyses and testing have been perfomed to provide assurance that vibration in the Shearon Harris steam generators will not be a major problem;

2. The use of all-volatile treatment (AVT) water chemistry is state-of-the-art and provides reasonable assurance of obviating many of the corrosion, cracking and denting problems experienced in earlier systems; and

3. The " loose-parts" detection system for foreign objects in the steam generators has been tested and found to be capable of detection of any such objects which might affect the integrity of the steam generators.

In accordance with the foregoing uncontroverted findings the Board confirms its prior grant of Applicants' motion for sumary disposition of J.I. VII (1), (2) and (3).

2. Joint Intervenors' Contention VII (4)

1. A portion of this contention was settled by stipulation of the parties which was approved by the Board in a Memorandum and Order dated July 27, 1984. The remaining issue at bar is the question whether the Applicants were required to consider multiple tube failure in their tube rupture analysis.

54 -

2. Applicants' witness was Michael J. Hitchler, the Manager of l

Plant Risk Analysis with the Nuclear Safety Department of Westinghouse l

Electric Corp., the steam generator vendor. Staff's witnesses were Ledyard B. Marsh, a Section Leader in the Reactor Systems Branch, Division of Systems Integration, NRR, and Herbert F. Conrad, a Senior Materials Engineer in the Materials Engineering Branch, NRR. Joint l

Intervenors presented no testimony on this contention.

3. Using the conditions set forth in the " Standard Review Plan",

NUREG-800, Rev. 3, the Harris FSAR presents an analysis of a single double-ended break in a steam generator tube. Testimony of Michael J.

! Hitchler, ff. Tr. 4012 at 4. Results of the analysis show that the resulting release of radioactivity would be well within the limits of 10 CFR Part 100. Staff Testimony of Ledyard B. Marsh and Herbert F.

j Conrad, ff. Tr. 4176 at 2. Intervenors did not question the analysis, but contend that analysis of a multiple-tube break should be included.

4 Applicants argue that the frequency of multiple-tube failures would be exceedingly small, and thus would present no significant risk to the public. Hitchler, Tr. 4014. The Staff agrees, and further argues that the conservatisms embodied in the single-tube analysis assure that the analytical results will be bounding. Marsh /Conrad, ff.

Tr. 4176 at 3.

5. Applicants' witness testified that a data base of over four million tube-years of operating Westinghouse steam generators using Inconel tubes has been accumulated. During this time only five tube ruptures have occurred. Hitchler, ff. Tr. 4012 at 5. Using a i

P

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conservative number of 3.6 million tube-years to allow for 10% tube plugging, it would be predicted that a tube rupture at the Harris plant could occur with a frequency of 1.6 x 10-0/ tube-year, or about one tube rupture every 45 years. M.at6. This is a very conservative number, as the causes of the five failures - stress corrosion cracking, denting, and loose foreign objects in the system - have been either eliminated or mitigated by design and operational changes and sophisticated testing, as the Board determined in its sumary disposition rulings, supra.

M.at7-10. If these changes are factored into the analysis, single-tube failure would be predicted to occur about 0.6 x 10-6 / tube year, or about once in 120 years. Id. at 10.

6. Westinghouse has developed an analytical method which can be used to determine the probability of multiple-tube ruptures. This was necessary inasmuch as there is no historical data; no multiple-tube failure has ever occurred. The method, termed the " pressure pulse" model, relates the pressure differential across the tubes to the probability of tube failure. M. at Attachment A. Using this model, the single-tube rupture is calculated to have a probability of 7.5 x l 10-3/ year, which compares well with the 8.2 x 10-3/ year obtained using i historical data. M.at11. Multiple-tube failure predicted by this i model shows a frequency of 7 x 10-5/ year, or once in about 14,000 plant years. M.at12. The Joint Intervenors did not question the analytical method or the conclusions reached.

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3. Intervenors' Proposed Findings

7. Intervenors submitted a number of arguments opposing the Applicants' findings. The Board has had great difficulty in detennining a nexus between these proposed findings and the necessity of perfonning a multiple-tube rupture analysis in the FSAR. Nevertheless, we discuss them seriatim.

8. Intervenors' first and second proposed findings consist of a calculation not previously aired at the hearing or in any comunications between Intervenors, the Board and the other parties. Intervencrs include only U.S. plants in the calculation, rather than all Westinghouse plants worldwide using Inconel tubing, thus applying 4 of the 5 failures which have occurred to a reduced tube-year count. While this may be a legitimate statistical compilation for some uses I no grounds were laid for the four tube failures in the U.S. reactors and one tube failure in the foreign ones to be considered anything other

{ than fortuitous. In any event, the results of the Intervenors' calculation show a probability of 1.8 x 10-6 compared to the result derived from using total plants data -- 1.6 x 10-6 -- a difference which the Board considers insignificant and not to indicate a trend in tube failures to either higher or lower values.

The Board notes that using only the statistics compiled by the four plants which have experienced tube failure would perhaps be valid under some circumstances, but that in the present case such use would be a reductio g absurdum.

._ .- .L- _ _ _ .

9. Intervenors' third finding is somewhat difficult to follow.

However, the bottom line appears to be that, by Intervenors' calculations, two single-tube failures can be expected over the life of the plant, and therefore the possibility of multiple-tube failure is not zero. Even accepting Intervenors' calculations, the probability of two single-tube failures over the life of the plant occurring at the same time, absent a comon-mode initiation, is too remote to consider.

- Intervenors state that common-mode failure "cannot be excluded" but they do not elaborate. We find no merit in this finding.

10. Intervenors' fourth finding states that (1) there is no analysis of multiple tube failure in the FSAR, (2) Applicants' witness has never done one, and (3) the Staff did no statistical analysis for the Harris plant. These statements are all true, but have no discernible bearing on whether multiple-tube failure analysis should be required.

11. The fifth finding states that Applicants' witness has not reviewed Harris QA procedures, as the witness testified. Hitchler, Tr.

4136. However, Intervenor neglects to include the continuation of the witnesses' remarks, wherein he says:

What I have reviewed [is] where the recomendations have been made and what the plant has agreed to in terms of check list and keeping track of parts that go into and out of the steam generators. Also,[thereis]the fact that this plant is using loose parts monitors such that when you start up the plant you will be able to hear these things and take corrective actions. So I have not specifically gone through every item in their QA procadure, but I know what the generic recomendations l are at this point and those are being adhered to.

The Board finds that Mr. Hitchler's review of the actions to be taken at the plant to be entirely adequate for the purposes of his calculations.

12. The sixth and seventh findings concern tube leakage before breaking and the technical specifications limit on detected leakage.

Intervenor states that leaks before breaks cannot be depended upon and that the high technical specifications for tube leakage at Harris make it more difficult to detect leakage before rupture. These may be debatable points, but they shed no light upon the issue considered here; the need for multiple-tube failure analysis. The finding is therefore rejected.

13. Findings 8, 9 and 10 are somewhat difficult to evaluate, because they depend largely on isolated statements taken out of context.

In any event, the Board finds nothing here which would support a need for rigorous analysis of multiple-tube failure in the FSAR.

4. Conclusions l 14. The Board has evaluated the record before us and finds that there is no need for multiple-tube failure to be considered in the FSAR.

I It has been established that single-tube failures are rare and that multiple-tube failures are even more unlikely. We conclude that the testing, design modification, water chemistry procedures, loose parts monitoring and inspection and maintenance procedures which have been or will be implemented should make tube failure even more unlikely than it has been historically. The Board therefore finds that ana1ysis of l

potential single-tube failure is adequate.

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l IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The emergency planning and safety matters in controversy in this proceeding are limited to those raised by the Intervenors. 10 C.F.R. 9 2.760a. As reflected in the foregoing findings of fact, those matters have (with the few exceptions noted herein to be addressed later) now been resolved in favor of the Staff and the Applicants and against the Intervenors. Based on those findings of fact, the Board concludes that as to the contested emergency planning and safety matters addressed herein, there is a reasonable assurance that, if an operating license is subsequently granted for the Harris facility, the activities authorized thereby can be conducted without endangering the health or safety of the public and that such activities will be conducted in compliance with applicable NRC regulations.

V. APPEALS This Partial Initial Decision is effective immediately and will constitute the final decision of the Commission 45 days after the date hereof, unless a party appeals or obtains a stay pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 5 2.788. Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 59 2.760(a) and 2.762, an appeal from this Partial Initial Decision or from any prior Board Order granting a motion for sumary disposition, in whole or in part, of an emergency planning contention or excluding a proposed emergency planning contention from litigation may be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the Atomic

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Safety and Licensing Appeal Board within 10 days after service of this Decision. A brief in support of an appeal must be filed within 30 days after the filing of the notice of appeal (40 days if the appellant is theNRCStaff). Within 30 days after the period for filing and service of the briefs of all parties has expired (40 days if the appellant is the NRC Staff), any other party may file a brief in support of or in opposition to an appeal. O THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

a. b  %

Ja y L. Kelley, Chairman f ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE M

D JamesH.Carpeger, Member INISTRATIVE JUDGE M/- 6duk Glenn O. Brig 1t, MWn5er' &

ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE pf Bethesda, Maryland December 11, 1985 8

The Applicants' unopposed motion August 1, 1985, concerning transcript corrections is granted and the evidentiary record shall be deemed araended to incorporate said changes.

2

, ATTACN/81M r 30 Saptenbar 1965 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR BEGULATOBY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOABD Glenn O. Bright Dr. James H. Carpenter James L. Kelley, Chairman In the Matter of CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT CO. et al. )

4 (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) ASLBP Mo. 82-h68-01

) OL Contentions based nn Emargancy , Planning,, @ rcise, -

Af ter the emergency planning exercise for the Shearon Harris plant in May 1985, I sought the evaluations and other documents related to these exercises. However, the State evaluations were not in my hands until af ter 1 September 1985, the main cause being delay by the State in releasing same. Likewise I received FOTA docunents from FEMA only at the end of August 1985.

FEMA has still not fully resnonded to the FOIA requests for Harris, nor has the State to my knowledge made its original message logs available.

Nevertheless, the available information makes it possible to frame the following contentions. In general the same "5 factors" discussion under 10 CFR 2 714 applies to each, and thus a general "5 factors" section and any specific additions re these contentions will come af ter all the contentions.

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CONTENTIONS EPX-1. Timely notification of radiation releases is not assured, e.g. in light of th'e apnroximate 42 minutes delay in notifying SEET of an uncontrolled radiation release during the exercise ( State E00 evaluation by NC State Govt Evaluattor) .

Without timely notice to emergency response personnel, the emergency management agencies cannot adequately protect the nublic fron radiation releases.

EPX -2. Communications deficiencies revealed in the exercise could have severe bad effects in a real emergency, including lack of effective communications and radiation monitoring results, lack of contact with field and ground units, etc. For examnle, the emergency inter-system mutual aid frequency was so overloaded the state's communications evaluator stated it was "oroved that there could be absolutely no communications with ground units on this frequency due to constant misuse." Other examples: The Highway Patrol evaluator found " communication inadequacies; equipment ... is not yet capable of adequately handling the impact of so many units responding to an emergency of this type."; Harnett County had " insufficient teleohones":

'Ikhtraradiotrafficoverloadedpersonnelonduty"inChathamCounty;

" excessive delays" in Energency Medical Services Office receiving messages from SERT (State Emergency Resoonse Team); communications from the mobile radiation lab had to be relayed to base stathion at times, which "always introduces the possibility of delayed and/or  !

incorrect information" according to the State Radiation Protection Section evaluator.

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EPX-3 CP&L emergency medical versonnel do not have adeouate equ6pment available (e.g. splints) to treat fractures, and have not demonstrated the ability to maintain a high level of natient care while preventing contamination of themselves and the environment.

(Ref: State of NC's on-site evaluation of Emergency Bedical Operations).

EPX-4 Lee County's decontamination training and practice are not adequate. For example, evaluation revealed that the group of decontaminators indicated "they had not been trained and were unsure what to do. They appeared to have no knowledge in the use of the instruments, no consideration was given to collecting water and attempting to control contamination. None of the personnel (knew)...

'when is decontamination complete' "' (Lee County evaluation ). This problem must be remedied by training and ratesting to assure neoole evacuating in this area can be decomtaminated and that Lee County's volunteers and other personnel are assuredly able to carry out first-class decontamination work.

EPX-5 Emergency siren activation is inadequate and the"e is no reliable means assuring that Wake County emergency resconse personnel will know when the sirens have been activated. Ref:

Wake County evaluation by State of NC "some method daould be devised to determine, if emergency warning sirens have been activatedy";

State EOC messages 53, 122, 160, 166, 176, 182,205; numerous areas had sirens not sounding, sounding of sirens was delayed about h0 minutes and there appeared to be initial confusion over confirmation.

l EPX-6. Management and coordinataion of rumor control were Inadequate (FEMA exercise report, e.g. at 13, see discussion at 11-13) especially in that there was no announcement of the early Harris Lake evacuation (necessary to avoid panic, FEMA, p.12); likewise the General Emergency was not publicly announced for almost an hour

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-h-after it was declared (FEMA, p.12). With the General Emergency declared but unannounced, public knowledge (e.g. from emergency personnel and radio-frequency scanners and listeners) could also spread panic. (FEMA renort received 8/30/85).

EPX-7. Radiation dose assessments were not promptly communicated to State Emergency Response personnel, data files were delayed un to half an hour, and coordinates of Traffic Control Points (TCPs) were not tabulated to allow faster calculation of doses giving allowable

" stay times" at those TCPs. (FEMA, pp8-9). All s uch deficiencies need to be remedied to protect the health and safety of the bublic, which depends on accurate and timely radiation dose assessment.

EPX-8. Emergency Broadcast System use was incomplete and ineffectively managed (FEMA, 2 3 1. (2), page 13; see p.12 discussion). Inadecuacies include Drocedures for activation and in-use of the EBS (before the State assumes control); adequate coverage in-of the emergency area and emergency response area,4 complete messages and instructions to the public. (Ref FEMA renort received 8/30/85 Board Notification 85-078) Numerous problems with EBS activation mentioned on pp 17-18 of the same report also need to be identified j and rectified. All these problems must be resolved to ensure timely 4

and effective notice to the public about nuclear / radiation emergencies so that the'public can be protected in such emergencies.

EPX-9. Radiation survey teams have a weak level of training in the use of anticontamination clothing and/or resnirators (State Badiation Protection Section evaluation). This needs to be remedied to protect the health and safety of these teams and to ensure that they will be able to do their work in a timely manner.

EPX-10. Protection of emergency norsonnel and the nublic from radioactive iodine is not assured because (1) low volume air samnlers l

l are deficient in calibration and flow rate information, as detailed

A.

5 in the NC Radiation Protection Section evaluation, and (2) there are deficiencies in the distribution of, and notification of when emergency personnel are to use, notassium iodide (KI):

See, e.g., Wake County workers being notified late (after nonsible contamination) (Wake Co. evaluation by State of NC/Meck. Co. evaluator)

EPX-11. There are numerous deficiencies in hard-cony transnission of information (see, e.g. , State E00 messages 13,1h,15,16,25,3h,35,ho,hl, 57,67,71,127) which must be remedied to assure timely and accurate emergency information is available to orotect nublic health and safety.

EPX-12. Emergency assistance needs to be upgraded to assure evacuation of neople fishing, boating, camping, etc. near the Cape Fear River in Zone ('H') - see State EOC message 162, a high priority third request to get assistance.

FIVE FACTORS (generic)

(i) There is good cause for not filing these "on time" (5-1982) since the exercise hadn't been done then, the right to litigate based on emergency planning exercises hadnot been zd clearly established, and the information was not in my hands to nrovide the basis of these contentions. State and Federal agencies controlled the timing of the release of this information. I have filed widbin 30 days of having it.

(ii) and (iv) Rhere are no other means or other narties that will protect or respresent my interests in these matters.

(iii) I can call as witnesses the evaluators and other knowledgeabh persons (e.g. exercise participants); I am able to conduct discovery and cross and direct examination and have more time available now to deal with contentions; also my health is better than it was during the safety hearing ne riod. Without a record, of course, there is no sound record.

(v) Admitting these contentions would broaden the issues, but that t

(

is inherent in emergency plan exercise contentions since they cannot be framed until af ter the exercise. Since the scheduling of the exercise and the release of the information about evaluations of the exercise were outside my control (the information was timely sought, e.g. one FOIA request near the time of the exercise to FEMA, other reauests to the State of NC within a reasonable time of the exercise ), this delay should not be charged to me as an intervenor.

There is sufficient time to have discovery until la te December, and still hold a hearing (if necessary) in February on these issues, before fuel load (even if Applicants don't delay it again -- they Cay deny delays and then delay, as experience shows), and fuel load and low-power testing could go forward without the emergency plan being aporoved.

Thus, the de&ay and broadening of the issues are inherent in preserving the public's right to litigate based on the energency planning exercise, and there is time to carry out a hearing.

Specific factors: the time informat* cr. was available enn each contention's basis is the tire the information was in my hands for each such contention, this being 8/30 for the FEMA evaluat'.on and af ter 1 September for the .9 tate evaluations and messages.

For the above reasons, the cententions given above should be admitted.

9%--.

30 September 1985 Wells Eddleman i

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