IR 05000440/1985082
| ML20138B348 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 12/06/1985 |
| From: | Knop R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138B334 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-440-85-82, NUDOCS 8512120273 | |
| Download: ML20138B348 (7) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-440/85082(DRP)
Docket No. 50-440 License No. CPPR-148 Licensee: Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company Post Office Box 5000 Cleveland, OH 44101 Facility Name: Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Inspection At: Perry Site, Perry, OH Inspection Conducted: November 18-21, 1985 Inspectors:
S. Stasek J. McCormick-Barger R. Evans R. Larson N. Spang kC s-0
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Approved By:
R. C.
p, Chief
/1 4 O Reactor Projects Section 1C Date Inspection Summary Inspection during the period of November 18-21, 1985 (Report No. 50-440/85082(DRP))
Areas Inspected: Special announced inspection to determine level of consistency and compatibility between the plant Technical Specifications (Draft), Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Safety Evaluation Report (SER), as-built configur-ations, surveillance requirements, and preoperational test acceptance criteria.
The inspection involved a total of 140 inspector-hours onsite by 2 NRC inspectors and 3 consultants including 0 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results: No violations of NRC requirements were identified during the inspection. The documents reviewed exhibited a high degree of consistency with one discrepancy of potential significance identified (Inconsistent degraded voltage limits - paragraph 2.f).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Present at Exit Meeting Cleveland Electric illuminating Company M. Lyster, Manager, Perry Plant Operations Department C. Shuster, Manager, Nuclear Quality Assurance Department
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F. Stead, Manager, Nuclear Engineering Department J. Waldren, Manager, Perry Plant Technical Department S. Kensicki, Technical Superintendent, PPTD N. Lehman, Operations Engineer D. Hoffman, Operations Engineer B. Liddell, Operations Engineer
- B. Stetson, Operations Engineer
- W. Kanda, General Supervising Engineer, Technical Section B. Walrath, General Supervising Engineer, 0QS
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J. Lausberg, Supervisor, 0QEU E. Buzzelli, Senior Licensing Engineer B. Ferrell, Licensing Engineer
- T. Heatherly, Compliance Engineer
- V. Concel, Unit Lead, SPE G. Gerber, Element Supervisor, ADMN E. Root, Element Supervisor, MTE D. Thompson, System Engineer G. Chasko, Surveillance Engineer J. Hansen, Surveillance Coordinator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Consnission S. Stasek, Resident Inspector, Dresden
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J. McConnick-Barger, Project Inspector, Perry R. Evans, EG&G (NRC Consultant)
R.Larson,EG&G(NRCConsultant)
N. Spang, EG&G (NRC Consultant)
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J. Grobe, Senior Resident Inspector, Perry S. Hare, Reactor Inspector
- Denotes those persons attending the exit meeting who were contacted during the inspection.
2.
Comparison of Final Safety Analysis Report, Draft Technical Specifications, and As-Built Configurations The inspection was conducted to compare selected systems, components, and structures as described in the Final Safety Analysis Re' port (FSAR) and NUREG-0887 " Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of the Perry. Nuclear Power Plant" with the final draft of Technical Specifications and as-built configurations for uniformity and compatibility.
Additionally, surveillance requirements as outlined in the draft Technical Specifications
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were reviewed for proper inclusion into appropriate operating surveillance procedures. Acceptance criteria as incorporated into applicable preopera-tional test procedures were also verified to be compatible with the other documents reviewed.
The following systems were reviewed during the inspection.
a.
Reactor Recirculation System The inspector reviewed Sections 5.4 and applicable portions of Sections 3 and 14 of the FSAR and compared them with Technical Specifications, Section 3/4.4.1 for the Reactor Recirculation System.
The information contained in Section 3.4.1.4 of the Technical Specifications, regarding the need for flow in an operating loop to be 50% of the rated loop flow prior to starting flow in the opposite idle recirculation loop, was not referred to in Section 5.3.3.6 of the FSAR.
Applicable surveillance test procedures were compared with the requirements outlined in Technical Specification Sections 3/4.4.1,
4.3.4.1-1 and 4.10.4.1.
The inspector noted that in Surveillance Test SVI-833-T1168, Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, the requirement to verify that the differential temperature is within Technical
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Specification limits is accomplished by neting alarm reset conditions.
It is felt that, in addition, actual temperature conditions should also be observed and recorded when each verification is performed.
The inspector reviewed portions of Preoperational Test Procedure 1833-P-001 (Revision 1).
It was noted that comparison of recirculation loop flow data indicated unacceptable results at low flow conditions during two-loop, high-speed pump operations.
Discussions with plant engineering test personnel revealed that the problem had been properly identified and listed as an open item to be resolved prior to criticality. The flow acceptance test criteria was not based on Technical Specification limits, which assume total
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core flow conditions which are not present during preoperational testing. The specific cause for the unacceptable low loop flow comparisons has not been identified to date. Additional testing is planned by the test personnel subsequent to fuel load. This item is currently on the plant tracking system which is considered sufficient and will not be tracked separately by the NRC at this
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time.
The inspector performed a physical walkdown of the Recirculation System noting that the location and identification of main flow piping, valves and pumps were in accordance with the P&ID drawings and reflective of the FSAR. Oil leakage was noted at the base of the m nor stator housing for the A loop pump. A plant representative made note of the condition at the time of discovery.
No other discrepancies were noted.
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b.
Emergency Closed Cooling Water System The inspector reviewed the final draft of Technical Specifications, Sections 3/4.7.1.2, with Section 9.2.2 of the FSAR and the as-built configuration of the Emergency Closed Cooling (ECC) Water System.
The Preoperational Test IP42-P-001 results were also verified to be
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in compliance with the requirements listed in the FSAR.
Surveillance Instruction Procedures SVI-P42-T5326, -T5366, and-T5367 were reviewed for compliance with Section 4.7.1.2 of the Technical Specification. Two valves (1P42-F6138 and IP42-F614B) on ECC Loop B for the associated Hydrogen Analyzer were not included in Surveillance Instruction SVI-P42-T5326 verification list. Station personnel were made aware of this condition.
The inspector performed a walkdown of the ECC System to verify that the actual installation of the major valves in the flow path was in agreement with applicable drawings, the FSAR and Technical Specification requirements. No discrepancies were noted.
c.
Containment Isolation Systry The inspector reviewed Section 6.2.4 " Containment Isolation System" including Table 6.2-32 of the FSAR in comparison with Technical Specifications Section 3/4.6.4 including Tables 3.6.4-1(a),
3.6.4-1(b), and 3.6.4-1(c). During the review, it was noted that approximately 10% of the valves looked at from Table 3.6.4-1(a)
exhibited required closure times that were discrepant from the FSAR and Technical Specifications. This apparent inconsistency was brought to the attention of plant personnel during the inspection who subsequently determined that all of the valves involved had already been properly dispositioned and applicable changes to the FSAR were currently in process.
Following review of the appropriate field deviation disposition requests, nonconformance reports, and FSAR change requests, the inspector had no further questions in this area.
Approximately 80% of the containment isolation valves (82 of 104 valves) listed in Technical Specifications Table 3.6.4-1(a) were sampled, and verified inplace and in conformance with the FSAR, Technical Specifications, and P&ID drawings via physical walkdowns by the inspector.
No discrepancies were noted during the walkdowns.
Approximately 55% (57 of 104 valves) of Table 3.6.4-1(a) valves were sampled and reviewed for proper inclusion into surveillance test procedures as addressed by the surveillance requirements in Technical Specifications. Additionally, preoperational test procedures associated with these valves were reviewed to determine that acceptance criteria included as part of the tests were in conformance with the other documents reviewed. No discrepancies were identified as a result of the review in this area.
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d.
High Pressure Core Spray System The inspector reviewed Sections 6.3.1.2, 6.3.2.2, and 6.3.4
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including Table 6.3-1 of the FSAR in comparison to Technical Specifications Sections 3/4.3.3, 3/4.5.1, and 3/4.5.2 and Tables 3.3.3-2 and 4.3.3.1-1.
In addition, the specific sections outlined were compared with applicable plant surveillance procedures and preoperational tests for compatibility. A physical walkdown was conducted to assure that the as-installed system, including valve and component identification and orientation agreed with the current as-built drawings.
During the review of surveillance procedures for instrumentation functional checks, SVI-B21-T0187-G, L and R were found to be in
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error in that the instructions for verification of the HPCS Reactor low level (Level 2) and HPCS Reactor low Level High (Level 8)
annunciators were found reversed. When brought to the attention of plant personnel, they were able to produce inprocess revisions to the affected procedures that had corrected the errors.
When comparing FSAR Table 6.3-1 "Significant Input Variables Used in the Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analysis" with the Technical Specification Table 3.3.3-2 " Emergency Core Cooling System Actuation Instrumentation Setpoints", it was found that the Technical Specification trip setpoint for reactor vessel water level - low, level 2 (10' 9.8" above top of active fuel) was non-conservative with the FSAR value of 10' 10.8".
When brought to the licensee's attention A FSAR Change Request (CR No. 700) was produced that had previously identified the discrepancy and proposed a change to the FSAR which would result in a new value of 10' 6".
Reference to supporting design documents were provided in the Change Request.
Because the two discrepancies identified above had been previously identified by the licensee and were in the process of being corrected the inspector has no further concern in this area. No other discrepancies were identified during the review of the HPCS system e.
Low Pressure Core Spray System The inspector reviewed Sections 6.3.1.2, 6.3.2.2, 6.3.4, and 7.3.1.1.1.3 including Table 6.3-1 of the FSAR and compared them to Sections 3/4.3.3, 3/4.5.1, and 3/4.5.2 including Tables 3.3.3-2 and 4.3.3.1-1 of draft Technical Specifications.
Surveillance procedures were verified to be inplace specifically addressing the Technical Specifications surveillance requirements. Applicable preoperational test acceptance criteria were verified to be in conformance to the other documents reviewed.
A physical walkdown of the LPCS system was performed during the review to verify that all major components were identified and oriented in cccordance with the P&ID drawings.
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No discrepancies were identified in this area.
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f.
Class 1E AC power Distribution System The inspector reviewed Section 8.3.1 of the FSAR in comparison with Sections 3/4.8.3.1 and 3/4.8.3.2 of the Technical Specifications for Divisions 1, 2, and 3 of the ac power distribution system from the 4160-volt bus to the 120-volt distribution panels. These documents were also compared with the electrical one-line diagrams for the
system. The documents agreed with each other and with diagrams as to the components of each of the divisions. The FSAR and the Technical Specifications also agreed as to the delay times for
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tripping offsite power in the case of degraded or loss of voltage.
The surveillance requirements, as given in Technical Specifications Section 4.8.3.1 and 4.8.3.2, were compared with the Surveillance Instruction document and found to cover the Technical Specification requirements.
A walkdown of the three divisions was performed to verify that the
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actual installation agreed with the one-line electrical diagrams, the FSAR, and the Technical Specifications. All major components of the 4160-volt system and the 480-volt system were verified. Spot checks were made of the components of the 120-volt distribution panels. Minor drafting errors and the absence of some tags on equipment were found and reported to the applicant. No other discrepancies were noted on the walkdown.
The inspector noted an apparent discrepancy between Section 8.3.1.1.2.11.2 of the FSAR and Table 3.3.3-2 of the Technical Specifications relative to what constitutes degraded and loss of voltage. The FSAR defines degraded voltage as between 96 percent (FSAR Change #781 changes this to 95 percent) and 75 percent of equipment rated voltage. A discussion with station personnel
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indicated that the equipment rating was 4000 volts. A walkdown of
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three Residual Heat Removal pump motors and the Low Pressure Core Spray and High Pressure Core Spray pump motors confirmed this.
Using this voltage as the 100% voltage level, the FSAR requirements were compared to the Technical Specification setpoints. The following discrepancy was subsequently noted:
FSAR Technical Specification Voltage Condition Section 8.3.1.1.2.11.2 Table 3.3.3-2 95%((3800v)
Degraded 3760 to 3840 v 75% 3000 v)
2859 to 3161 v Loss l
In both cases, the lower end of the Technical Specifications acceptable limit was found to be below the FSAR acceptable limit.
Consultation with plant representatives verified this discrepancy.
Station personnel indicated that they would look into the problem.
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The applicant committed, at the conclusion of the inspection, to perform a sampling of similar areas that exist in the FSAR/ Technical Specifications.
Specifically, a m]re indepth review will be conducted in areas where conversions of parameters between FSAR values to Technical Specification values could exhibit error.
The sample program will be approved by the NRC and will be completed prior to final certification of Technical Specifications. This is considered to be an open item (50-440/85082-01).
3.
Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which
will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. An open item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 2.f.
4.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 2)
at the conclusion of the inspection on November 21, 1985, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection a~ctivities.
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After discussions with the licensee, the inspectors have determined there
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is no proprietary data contained in this inspection report.
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