05000265/LER-1997-002-05, :on 970228,unit 2 Was Shutdown,Because Four Main Steam Relief Valve Closure Time Did Not Meet IST Program Limits.Ist Acceptance Criteria for PORVs Will Be Revised Using Data Obtained from Qcos 0203-03 on 022897
| ML20137H798 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 03/28/1997 |
| From: | Peterson C COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137H741 | List:
|
| References | |
| LER-97-002-05, LER-97-2-5, NUDOCS 9704030054 | |
| Download: ML20137H798 (6) | |
text
{{#Wiki_filter:* w LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) Form Rev. 2.0 Facihty Name (1) Docket Number C) Page (3) Cities Unit Two 0l5l0l0l0l2l6l5 1 l of l 0 l 6 Unit 2 was shutdown, per the requirements of Technical Specifications 3.5.A. and 3.6.F, because four Mam Steam Relief Valve (4) losur3 times did not meet laservice Testing Program limits. The timing methodology had changed; however, the acceptance criteria c been reevaluated. Ev:nt Date (5) LER Number (6) Report Date (7) Other Facihties involved (8) Month Day Year Year Sequential Revision Month Day Year Facibry Docket Number (s) Number Number Names 0l5l0l0l0l l l 0l2 2l8 9l7 9l7 0l0l2 0l0 0l3 2l8 9l7 0l5l0l0l0l l l OPERATING THIS REPORT is $UBMfITED PURSU ANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR MODE (9) (Check one or more of the following) (11) 1 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)G)(iv) 73.71(b) 1 POWER 20.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)C)(v) 73.7)(c) LEVEL 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)G) 50.73(a)C)(vii) Other (Specify (10) l9l 8 20.405(a)(1)(iii) X 50.73(a)C)(i) 50.73(a)G)(viii)(A) m Abstract 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)G)(ii) 50.73(a)C)(viii)(B) below and in 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)C)(iii) 50.73(a)C)(x) Text) LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE Chtries Peterson, Regulatory Affairs Manager, ext. 3609 3l0l9 6l5l4l-l2l2l4l1 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) ME SisTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABl.E
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRD5 TO NPRD5 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I $UPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) Expected Month Day Year S ubnussion lYES (If yee. complete EXPECTED SUBMIS$10N DATE) X lNO Date (15) ABSTRACT (1.4mn to 1400 spaces, i.e., appronunately fifteen single-space typewnnen imes) (16) l l l ABSTRACT: At 0500 on 022897, Unit Two was in Mode One at approximately 98% power and testing was being conducted in accordance with QCOS 0203-03, Main Steam Relief Valves Operability Test. During the testing, four Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) did not close within the limits specified by the Inservice Testing (IST) Program. All four valves were declared inoperable. At 0900 on 022897, a Unit 2 shutdown was initiated in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specifications 3.5.A and 3.6.F. At 0735 on 030197, the reactor was placed in Mode 4, COLD SHUTDOWN. Subsequent investigation determined that the IST baseline data and associated acceptance criteria had not been reevaluated when the method used to time the PORVs was revised. Evaluation of the PORV closing times utilizing the method originally used to establish the acceptance limits determined that tne valve closure times were acceptable. The root cause of the event was the failure to recognize the impact that changing the timing methodology had on the IST acceptance criteria. The IST acceptance limits for these valves will be revised based on data obtained by the current valve timing methodology. ('iseventdidnotadverselyimpactthehealthandsafetyofonsitepersonnelorthe v olic. LER265s97\\002.%TF 9704030054 970328 PDR ADOCK 05000265 g PDR
UCENSEE EVENT REPC*iT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Form Rw. 2.0 FACILrrY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) Year Sequential Revision Number Number cities Unit Two 0l5l0l0l0l2l6l5 9l7 0l0l2 0l0 2 lOFl 0 l 6 TEXT Energy Industry identmcation System (Ells) codes are identified in the text as (XX] l
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
General Electric - Boiling. Water Reactor - 2511 MWt rated core thermal power. EVENT IDENTIFICATION: ' Unit 2 was shutdown, per the requirements of Tech' ical n Specifications 3.5.A. and 3.6.F, because four Main Steam Relief Valve closure times did not meet Inservice Testing Program limits. The timing methodology had changed; however, the acceptance criteria had not been reevaluated. A.
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT
I Unit: Two Event Date: 022897 Event Time: 0900 Reactor Mode: 1 Mode Name: POWER OPERATION Power Level: 98% This report was initiated by Licensee Event Report 265\\97-002. Power Operation (1) - Mode switch in the RUN position with average reactor coolant temperature at any temperature. A
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
/ n At 0500 on 022897, Unit Two was in Mode One at approximately 98% power. Testing was being conducted in accordance with QCOS 0203-03, Main Steam Relief Valves Operability Test in order to evaluate relief valve performance prior to reactor shutdown for refueling. During the testing, the 2-0203-3B, -3C, -3D, and -3E Relief valves [SB][RV)'d.id not 'close within the acceptable limits specif.ied by the Inservice Testing Program (i.e.'less than 2 seconds). The observed closure time for these valves ranged from 2.74.to 3.63 seconds. As a result of this testing, all four valves were declared inoperable. Technical Specification 3.5.A Action 4b requires that with two or. more Automatic Depressurization Valves inoperable, the reactor must be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and the reactor steam dome pressure reduced to s 150 psig within the following 24 hours. Technical Specification 3.6.F Action 3 requires that with the relief valve function inoperable, the reactor must be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours. At 0900 on 022897, the Unit 2 shutdown was initiated in accordance with QCGP.2-1, Normal Unit Shutdown. At 0909 on 022897, a 1-hour Non-Emergency Notification was made to the Nu' ar Regulatory Commission (NRC) in accordance with 10CFR50.72 due to initiation of a Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications. At 0735 on 030197, the reactor was placed in Mode 4, COLD SHUTDOWN and the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) noted above were exited. Following the shutdown, Quad Cities Unit 2 began refueling outage Q2R14 approximately 12 hours earlier than planned, tv LER265\\97\\002.WPF
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Form Rav. 2.0 PACILrrY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUM ER (6) PAGE (3) Year Sequential Revision Nurnber Number Cities Unit Two 0l5l0l0l0l2l6l5 9l7 0l0l2 0l0 3 lOFl 0 l 6 T2XT Energy industry identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX) C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT: The root cause of the event was personnel cognitive error in that the IST acceptance, criteria.was not reevaluated when the method for timing.the PORVs was ch'nged from a a calculation using Sequence of Events Recorder (SER) data to manual timing of PORV light indication using a stopwatch. 4 The following information is relevant to understanding the discussion of the cause of this event: 1. Three types of main steam relief valves are installed at Quad Cities. Unit 1 has one (1) Target Rock 3-Stage Combined Safety Relief Valve and four(4) i Dresser Electromatic Relief Valves (ERVs). Unit 2 has one(1) Target Rock 3-Stage Combined Safety Relief Valve (SRV) and four(4) Target Rock Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs). 2. The PORVs were installed as replacements for the ERVs during refueling outage i Q2R13 in 1995 3. Magnetic position indication switches provide the operator with true. position indication of the main disc of the PORVs. 4. Valve position of the SRV and ERV valves must be determined by indirect means(i.e. acoustic monitor read.ings, discharge line thermocouple temperatures, bypass valve response). The SRV and ERV position indication lights do not reflect true valve position indication. The SRV position ) indication lights are controlled by a pressure switch which is an indication whether or not air is being supplied to the SRV operator to open the valve. The ERV position lights i.nform the operator if the ERV actuator solenoid is energized. On 080395, du' ring start-up from Q2R13, functional testing of the PORVs was performed; however at that time, IST valve stroke timing was not required. On 082595, a requirement to stroke time the Main Steam Relief valves was added to QCOS 0203-03 to support implementation of Revision 5 of the IST Program for the 3rd 10 year inspection interval. When the new IST Program was implemented, baseline data for the Unit 2 PORVs was calculated using the SER data from the testing performed on 080395. In addition, QCOS 0203-03, Main Steam Relief Valve Operability Test, was revised to specify the methodology for calculating the PORV opening and closing times using the SER data. i 1 LER265\\97\\002 WPF
e LICENSEE EVDir REPC;T (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Form R2v. 2.0 ' FACILTTY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) Year Sequential Revision Number Number Cities Unit Two 0l5lol0l0-l2l6l5 9l7 ol0l2 olo 4 lOFl 0 l 6 l TEXT Energy industry identi6 cation System (EIIS) codes are ident:6ed in the text as DCXl l On 013196, QCOS 0203-03, Rev 7 was approved. The method used to determine PORV opening and closing times was revised to time the PORVs with a stopwatch. This change was intended to more accurately reflect the actual valve stroke times. The method of timing the SRV and ERVs was not changed since direct indication of valve . position for these valves is not available..The baseline reference stroke times and associated IST acceptance limits were not reevaluated when the method for timing the PORVs was changed. The testing performed on 022897 was the first time the PORVs had been tested since the method for calculating the stroke times was revised. Following the testing, the SER data from the surveillance testing performed on 022897 was reviewed against the baseline SER data taken 080395. When the closing times were evaluated using the same timing methodology, all 4 valves met the IST acceptance criteria (i.e. < 2 seconds) that had previously been established. The following table presents a summary of this evaluation (times listed are in seconds): Valve Number Close Time (SER) Close Time (SER) Close Time (Stopwatch) 080395 022897 022897 2-0203-3B 1.118 .931 2.85 2-0203-3C .61 .411 2.74 7 ) 2-0203-3D .92 .789 3.36 ~' 2-0203-3E .81 1.502 3.63 The SER valve closure time was calculated by measuring the difference between the time the control switch for the valve was returned to the " Auto" position and the time the Acoustic Monitor associated with the valve reset. Closure timeusing the stopwatch was measured as the difference between the time the control switch for the valve was returned to the " Auto" position and receipt of the close light indication. The observed differences in the results between the two methods is not. unexpected considering that the Acoustic Monitor is an indirect means of determining valve position. D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT: This event did not adversely impact the health and safety of onsite personnel or the publ ic. Upon initial determination that the PORVs did not meet the established IST acceptance criteria, the valves were declared inoperable and the appropriate i Technical Specification action steps initiated. Subsequent review of the SER data associated with the surveillance determined that the closing time of the PORVs was acceptable and the valves performed as required. I b LER265\\97\\002.WPF
.e LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Form Rev. 2.0
- FACILIIT NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) Year Sequential Revision Number Number Cities Unit Two 0l5l0l0l0l2l6l5 9l7
- - 0l0l2 0l0 5 lOFl 0 l 6 TEXT Energy industry Identification System (Ells) codes are identified in the text as {XXI
. E.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Corrective Actions Completed: 1. . An investigation was completed to determine the cause of the PORVs not meeting i the IST acceptance criteria for valve closure time. 2. A review of components in the IST program was performed to determine if any similar situations with respect to acceptance criteria existed. No related problems were identified. j 3. The System Engineer and the IST Coordinator have discussed this event in detail. These discussions have resulted in a clear understanding that changes { to test methods must be thoroughly evaluated including possible impact'on the i IST acceptance criteria. ) i Corrective Actions Scheduled: 1. The IST acceptance criteria for the PORVs will be revised using the data obtained from QCOS 0203-03 performed on 022897. New baseline data will be q established for valves repaired or replaced during Q2R14 during start-up Q testing. This action will be complete prior to startup from refueling outage Q2R14. (NTS 2651809700201; Engineering). 2. This LER will be included as required reading in the training program for the Inservice Testing Coordinator. This action will be complete by 071597. (NTS 2651809700202; Engineering). 3. QCAP 0410-01, Inservice Testing Program Administration, will be revised to require re^ evaluation of baseline data and th'e associated a'cceptance criteria when the test methodology is changed. This action will be complete by 071597. (NTS 2651809700203; Engineering). OO LER265\\97\\002.WPF i 1
... _ _._.~,. _,_- _ .. -~ ~ . ~ ~.. _ - m _. -. _ e e LJCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CotrrINUATION Form Rxv. 2.0 PACILJTY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) Year Sequennel Revision Number Number L /Chios Unk Two 0l5l0l0l0ls2l.6l5 9l7 0l0l2 0l0 6 lOFl 0 l 6 TEXT - "
- - i induouy ideen6 cation System (EDS) codes are identined in the text sa (XX)
F. PREVIOUS EVENTS: The following similar Licensee Event Reports (LERs) have occurred since 1995 whic'h involve cognitive personnel error and are related to testing: 254/96-023 "The control room emergenciy filtration system failed to maintain .j I required airflow due to a cognitive personnel error, which allowed a flow instrument loop to be incorrectly calibrated." 254/96-024 "The Control Room Heating Ventilation and Air Condition Isolation System j was inadequately tested due to a cognitive personnel error, which resulted in credit being taken for a technical specification requirements by a procedure that did not contain steps to satisfy that i technical specification requirement." A review of previous Licensee Event Reports (LER) at Quad Cities Station Units One and Two, since 1995 did not identify any similar instances related to a deficiency in the implementation of the IST Program. i f-PIF 95-2376 documented a similar problem where the 1-0203-3E ERV was declared l inoperable due to a closing time that was greater than the establish IST acceptance -{ limit. The investigation of this PIF determined that the closing time was calculated improperly and that the actual valve performance was acceptable. d G.
COMPONENT FAILURE DATA
i The components involved in this event are Target Rock Power Operated Relief Valves, Model 93V-001. a l l J 4 i 1 l i 6 'Q r LER265\\97\\002.WPF I [ }}