ML20136A932
| ML20136A932 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 05/19/1979 |
| From: | Babbitt B, Haggerty P, Kemeny J PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20136A936 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7907180106 | |
| Download: ML20136A932 (152) | |
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THE PRESIDENT' S C05DtISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND SECOND MEETING MORNING SESSION, 9:00 A.M.
SATURDAY, MAY 19, 1979 at Multi-Purpose Building, Capitol Campus Pennsylvania State University Middletown, Pennsylvania .
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2 PRESIDENT'S C0hNISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND COMMISSION MEMBERS PRESENT l
JOHN G. KEMENY, Chairman l President of Dartmouth College 3RUCE BA3BITT
-Governor of Ari:ena l
PATRICK E. HAGGERTY '
Retired President of Texas Instruments l CAROLYN LEWIS Associate Professor of Journalism Graduate School of Journalism, Columbia University PAUL E. MARKS Vice President for Health Sciences l Columbia University CORA B. MARRETT Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin HARRY McPHERSON Attorney RUSSELL PETERSON President ofAudubon Society THEODORE TAYLOR Professor of Aerospace and Mechanical Science ,
Princeton University l ANNE TRUNK ;
Resident of Middletown, Pennsylvania COMMISSION MEMBERS A3SENT .
LLOYD Mc3 RIDE l President of United Steelworkers of America
- THOMAS PIGPORD Professor and Chairman ;
Department of Nuclear Engineering ,
University of California a: 3erkeley l
COMMISSION STAFP ,
l 3RUCE LUNDIN, Staff Director RONALD 3. NATALIE, Chief Counsel 3AR3 ARA JORGENSON, Public Information Director MICHAEL R. HOLLIS, Associa:e Chief Counsel -
3a 1.d U 5 5 May 19. 1979 - MORNING SESSION E2Jiii ROBERT REID, Mayor of'Middletown 6 DR. THEODORE GROSS, Provost, Capital Campus, 19 Pennsylvania State University KENNETH MYERS, Mayor of Goldsboro 36 PAUL WISE, Prsident, Middletown Borough Council 43 AL3ERT WOHLSEN, JR., Mayor of Lancaster 49 MICKEY MINNICH, Newberrytown Steering Committee 59 DR. JUDITH JOHNSRUD, Environment Coalition on 75 Nuclear Power EDWARD FIRST, Capital Area Task Force " Forward" 92 KENNETH L. MILLER, Hershey Medical Center 106
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PAUL DOUTRICH, Mayor of Harrisburg 124 WILLIAM F. GOODLING, U.S. Congress (R-19) 134 ROBERT J. WALKER, U.S. Congress (R-16) 140 LUNCH The morning sessi:n consists of pages 1 thr: ugh 152. ;
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3-b LIST OF MOTIONS AND INFORMATION REQUESTED OR OFFERED Page MOTION: Carried unanimously, to authori:e the Chairman to issue subpoenas for witnesses and evidence, and designation of staff to administer oaths and examine witnesses 123 Suggestion that Dr. Chauncey Kepford testify under cath on the subject of radiation monitoring 77/34 Dr. Kenneth Miller offers to provide a copy of his letter to friends which was published in the Hummelstown Sun, local newspaper 109 (Furnished on 5/19)
Suggestion that Dr. Arnold Muller of Hershey Med'.:21 Center be asked to testify regarding reports on Medical Center activities 113 '
Congressman Goodling will provide information on property appraisals and S6L activi:ies 139 1
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CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Will the meeting please come to order? Since we last met in this room, I am very happy to say i
that the major problem that we were facing on Thursday seems to have been solved.
I would like to take this occasion to express the Commission's sincere thanks to Senator (Edward) Kennedy for his promp t and effective action in breaking the bottleneck that seemed to block our ability to issue subpoenas and to take testi-many under oath.
A compromise was worked out that is totally satis-factory to this Commission and will enable us to do our work.
As I am sure all of you know by now, the Senate has passed unaniscusly the necessary resolution, and that resolution is going to the House of Representatives on Monday (May 21).
(Chairman %emeny adjusts equipment so he can be heard.)
CHAIRMAN KEENY: I was expressing the Commission's sincere thanks to Cenator Kennedy _for breaking through the bottleneck that was holding up our legislation, to say tha: the compromise that was worked out is totally satisfactory to this Commission.
The resolution is going to the House of Representatives on Monday and we have every reason to believe that it will go I ,
through :here promptly and that will enable the Commission to take testimony under ca:h a its next meeting, 2nd :herefore l
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3 we can get on with the serious investigative work of the Commission without further delays.
As those of you that were present on Thursday know, the Commission did decide not to cancel the Saturday hearings, because we are very eager to hear from the citi: ens that live near Three Mile Island, about their feelings, impressions and any suggestions they have have for issues that we ought to look at.
We have been swamped with requests to be heard :cday and we apologi:e to those we could not accommodate. I hope the fact that the Commission is willing to hear you from 9:00 a.m. !
til 9:00 p.m. today is an indication of our sincere desire to hear from as many of you as physically possible.
We have divided it in such a way that in the morning session certain public officials will be.given a chance for i statements of approximately ten minutes, and then individual citi: ens in the afternoon to be given time for statements of I
five minutes, with an opportunity in each case for Commissioners to ask questions to follow up the statements. It would be most i
i helpful if each speaker, as he or she comes up, would introduce himself or herself so we have the name on our tape and on our record. I Our first witness this norning is Rober: Reid, Mayor of the cwn of Middletown. Mr. Reid,.may : ask you to .icin us, pleas e ?
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O Mr. Reid, may I, incidentally, take this opportunity to express the Commission's thanks for your help in making this whole meeting possible for us. I understand that you had a great deal to do with giving us space and making it possible to reach the citi: ens of Middletown.
MAYOR' ROBERT 'REID, MAYOR OF MIDDIiETOWN: Mr. Chairman, Members of the President's-Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island: I would like to first start out asking you a question, through you to the NRC or to the other Federal agencies, why was Met Ed (Metropolitan Edison Company) issued a license -
to operate Three Mile Island at the time when they knew that this plant was not safe and was not ready to be operated to pro-duce electricity through nuclear power?
You know, I of ten think and wonder j ust exactly whose
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lmnsibility it was that an accident did take place at Three M. l e Island. I would really like to place the blame on three different agencies--the local communities, Metropolitan Edison Company, and the Federal Government.
I really don't believe that the local communities got involved enough with Me: Ed to really demand things that should have been uppermost in their minds to protec: the citi: ens of their communities. I think the local communities should have gone to Me: Ed-and demanded certain :hings : hat would assure the protection of the lives and property of the people living 9
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7 in their immediate areas. I think the communities should never have gotten involved with the technical aspects of nuclear power, but things that should have been set up in a way that the local communities would have had-some input into first-line communica-tions with Met Ed. I think we should have demanded monitoring devices for monitoring radioactive particles in and around Three Mile Island.
I know Met Ed had public hearings but they were required by law to have the public hearings. I think Met Ed should have come out :o the communities and said, 'this is wha:
we want to do; we want to have a good working relationship with you communities.'
We know that they had an observation center set up, but the people living in close proximity to the observation tower, these people very seldom went to this observation tower to find out exactly what was going on at Three Mile Island. I don't think it should have been their responsibility. I think Met Ed should have come to the communities and the surrounding 3 communities and should have shown :he people exactly what was going on at the island.
I think the Federal Government was at fault. I think the Federal Government is the agency that really protects the ,
life and the property of the individual, because they were the people who were giving ou: the license to operate this plant.
1 None of these :hings were done. Really, if you :ske l
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a look at the United States, the way things are set up in this country, the smalles: butcher shop requires an inspection, and
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that' inspector investigates or checks every carcass that is )
I hung. Yet, we had a plant in our area that had the potential
- o kill millions of people and didn't have one inspector on the l job. To me, that is the fault of the Federal Government. That is the fault of the Federal Government.
But Met Ed didn't do its homework. It didn't do its job. And you can't place all the blame on Met Ed or the Federal Government. I know my own community didn't do the j ob l
1 it should have been doing in working with Met Ed and in working with the Federal Government.
So, the blame could really be placed in three areas.
As far as nuclear power in the State of Pennsylvani'a is concerned, I don't think we need it. We have enough coal reserves to las us for 300 years in the Sta:e of Pennsylvania.
Half of the money that went into the construction of Three Mile Island could have been used--jus: half of it--could have been used in research learning how to clean up coal. The Federal Government spent billions of dollars on the space program. The Federal Government should have been involved in research, learn-ing how to clean up coal. The by-products would have been beneficial to mankind. The wastes could even be used by com-nuni:ies in this area--the cinders used in the winter months.
What are you going to do with the wastes from a nuclear pcwer
y plant?
So there are a lot of things that we have to look at when you talk about nuclear power--an awful lot of things.
That's my feeling. I really feel that we neglected a number of things, not only on Me: Ed's part, but on your part, the Federal Government, and our own local government, our state government. .
But mainly, I place the blame on the Federal Government because that was the licensing agent. We would not have had that accident at Three Mile Island if the Federal Government ,
would have been on the ball.
Now, if you have any questions of me, ask them, please.
CHAIRMAN KDENY: Thank you. May I just make one remark, Mr. Reid? I'm sure you know that this independen:
Commission is charged with looking at all the aspects that you did talk about, including, for example, you put great stress on the licensing procedure. We are charged by the President of the United States to look into the licensing of this particular plant. So the issues you speak to all fall within the purview ,
of this particular Commission. !
Are there Commissioners who wish :o ask Mayor Reid a question? Governor 3abbitt.
COMMISSIONER 3A3BITT: Mr. Mayor, would you care to l
i venture an opinion on the extent to which your feelings are ;
shared by the ci i: ens of Middletown?
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l MR. REID: I think most of the citizens of the borough 1
1 feel the same way that I feel, except for their feelings as far '
as placing the blame on three differen entities. I am quite sure that they haven't gotten into that part of it. But their feeling as far as the plant being licensed to operate, they feel very strongly about this. A lot of the people that I talked to really placed the blame en the Federal Gmvernment for allowing the plant to operate before it was in a safe operating i
position.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Dr. Marks.
CCho!ISSIONER MARKS: Mr. Mayer, could you tell us what specific community organi:ations or local government -
organi:ations have become involved in looking into the acciden:
and its consequences?
MR. REID: We have a group that is made up from the Chamber of Commerce; I think it's the Forward Group. I think that's the title; I'm not sure. But they are in the process of working with the com= unities where they feel were affected economically. They are working in that area trying to bring abou: things that will really help or stimulate the economy of this area. I'm not sure of the title of the group. In fact, I just read their letter last night. I think it is S::aightforward or Forward Ahead Group, made up of members of the Chamber of Commerce.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: C:mmissioner Lewis.
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COMMISSIONER LEWIS: Mr. Mayor, suppose this plant j were; closed down. What would be the economic consequences to ;
your town?
- MR. REID: The understanding that I have, that the ,
borough of Middletown, in fact, this entire area, gets very little electricity from the plant. The understanding that I have and according to the grid system that is set up as far as electricity is concerned, I'm not an expert on it, but most of the electricity manufactured by this plant leaves our state.
We don't even use it. We only use a portion of it. ;
Now, if this is true, if this is true and we only use a portion of the electricity, and the understanding that I have is that it is a small amount, then why should the people of this area be subjected to health problems, economic problems, when really the electricity is really not used in this ares?
Now, if the electricity goes to Delaware and New York and New Jersey, why not have that plant in those states if they ,
are benefiting from the electricity from that plant?
CCMMISSIONER LEWIS: But you haven't answered my question. '
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: I think Commissioner Lewis meant something slightly different, Sir.
CC>NISSIONER LEWIS: Yes. What I'm wondering is if this plant was not operating in your are, the impact in terms of loss of jobs, et:etera, is what I'm interested in.
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12 MR. REID: From my town, I would estimate that we might have 75 to 100 people working there. I know they do spend money in the businesses in town. But as far as a drastic economic disaster as far as that plant would leave, I really don't think it would be that great. Now, this is my estimation and I'm not an expert in that field.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Commissioner Peterson.
COMMISSIONER PETERSON: Mayor Reid, are you working now with the leaders of other governmental units to develop evacuation plans in case another emergency should arise?
hm. REID: My first three months in office I decided that we needed an emergency disaster plan. It was geared not mainly to Three Mile Island but to the Penn Central lines going through our town--the condition of the tracks. Well, if you watch a freight as it goes up and down the tracks, it frightens you. That line carries all kinds of tank cars, chlorine gas and other volatile chemicals and I wanted to hava a disaster plan set up just in case thera would be an accident from a derailment on the Penn Central lines or Amtrak.
We also have a chemical plant in town. I wanted to i
be prepared should there be an accident due to that chemical plant. We are close to the Pennsylvania Turnpike. I wanted to have a plan in case of a chemical spill there. (Route) 233 is a busy highway; I wanted t: have a plan in case of a chemical spill on that road.
13 But I never got the plan finished because it was too much of an operation for one person. I asked a number of people to assist me; I got very li::le help. The only persons that helped me were my Civil Defense Director and my Fire Marshall.
It.was really a big operation. But I tackled it; I di dn ' t get it finished. All of a sudden, we had the acciden: at Three Mile Island. I was very upset because the plan was not completed.
But I'm quite sure now since the acciden: I will have, in fact, I have had a number of people who have come to me and have asked, -
'when is your next meeting going to be so we can get this thing finished?' So things have changed.
CHAIRMAN KDENY: May I follow that up for a moment? -
You said that plan was finished fairly recently. Is that correct, Sir?
MR. REID: No. It is not finished.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: It is still not finished?
MR. REID: No.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Okay. Then I can ask the question I wanted to. Therefore, you feel that, let's say, a year ago there was no emergency plan for the borough?
MR. REID: As far as the borough is concerned, there was no plan. I CCMMI55IONER PETERSON: Mayor Reid, I'd like to try to understand what aspect of the events at Three Mile Island it was that concerned you the mos: in terms of the ha:ard to the
\i 14 community; specifically, were you more worried about radioactive releases that had already taken place, or were you more worried about what might happen if things got worse?
MR. REID: I was more worried about things if they would have gotten worse. I had a radiological team out 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day in my borough and they were instructed to take readings, the time of the day and the area of the town. During the whole incident those people never got one reading of radioactive disturbance or anything of that nature. I was more concerned with what might happen. In fact, I'm still concerned. What's going on down there now? I really feel as though the people aren't being told what's going on down there.
Information that came out of the plant. the first hours of the accident was very confusing. It allowed too many-people to use their imagination. Now imagination--that's the biggest nation in the world. This is what happened. The first day of the accident I turned to the differen channels on the television and each channel gave =e different information.
I still feel the same way today that information is not being given out. Now, they give you information that they want you to believe.
As far as the water is concerned, in the reactor building, I guess it is, one time time I heard--and these were reports on the radio and television--a50,000 gallons, 550,]00 gallons, a million gallons. Wha are we to believe if we hear l
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15 all of this confusin3 information? Everything is so contra-dictory. Again, we are allowing people to use their imagina-tions because they are not':elling us the truth.
COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Can you recall when, after the start of the accident Wednesday morning, you became most
. concerned about what might happen?
MR. REID: Wednesday morning I was no: concerned.
l 3ecause I was called out of my classroom a: quarter of 9:00.
I went to my office and my Civil Defense Director told me it was an accident at Three Mile Island, an on-site accident.
At 11:00 o' clock I got in touch with the Redding office of Three Mile Island, their home office, and a Mr. Garry (phonetic),
the man I talked to, assured me that no radioactive particles had escaped and no one was injured. I felt relieved and relaxed; I said 'there's no problem'. !
Twenty seconds later I walked out of my office and got in my car and turned the radio on and the announcer to me,
- over the radio, that there were radioactive particles released.
Now, I said, gee whi:, what's going on here? A: four o' clock in the afternoon the same day the same man called me at my home and said, " Mayor Reid, I want to update our conversation that we had at 11:00 o' clock." I said, "Are you going to tell me tha radio particles were released?" He said, "Yes." I said, "I knew tha 20 seconds after I spoke to you en the phone."
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Now,-this was a Me: Ed spokesman, Mr. Jack Garry.
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. i Now, how are we to believe anything? No, I wasn't ,
worried when I was first notified of the accident because I had spoken to a spokesman from Me: Ed Company and he assured me no
- radioactive particles had been released.
CHAIRMA.N KEMENY: Dr. Marks.
COMMISSIONER MARKS: Mr. Mayor, has any process been established ~since the accident to keep you or other officials in your town regularly informed as to the present status of TM2?
MR. REID: Mr. Marks, how do you find out about it?
COMMISSIONER MARKS: We hope --
MR. REID: How do you find out about it? You know how I find out about it? The television and the radio. During the accident when everything was going on, my Council president attended some meetings with Met Ed officials. Since that time -
when things have been quieted down--nothing. ,
COMMISSIONER MARKS: Has a' request been made for a regular briefing by your office?
MR. REID: Through Met Ed?
r COMMISSIONER MARKS: Yes.
MR. REID: I haven't heard anything from Me: Ed.
COMMISSIONER McPHERSCN: Mr. Mayor, excuse me, if I may interrup:, I wculd be interested in knowing--have you requested information from Me: Ed? Have you asked for briefings since tha: time?
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17 MR. REID: No, I have not. I have not. I don't think it's my place to ask. I think it's Me: Ed's responsibili:y :o come to us. They are the people that own that place down there and they are the people who are responsible to the communities close to that plant. This is the problem; this was the problem all along. I think Met Ed should have been more involved.
It is their plant, their responsibility. They should have been involved with the local communities all along, and : hey were not.
Like I said, they had their public hearings required by law.
They had their public tours, the local officials, to show exactly what was down there. I could have walked down there and never known anything because I'm not in that field. I don't know too much about the atom. What I know, my God, you could write on one line on a sheet of paper.
COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN KE>ENY: Yes, Commissioner McPherson.
COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Mr. Mayor, when you began, as I wrote down your first sentence, and I'n not sure I got it correctly and I'd like to know, it was: Why as Met Ed issued a license for this plan when they knew it was unsafe? I would like to ask you two questions abou: tha:. Who is the :hev in it; and secondly, what is your knowledge tha: :he plan: was unsafe?
MR. REID: The only way I :an answer : hat cuestion is what I've been reading in the paper.
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COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: You don't have any firsthand knowledge of that?
ilR. REID: 2No , I do not. But I think it is common knowledge now. This came right from the NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission), the licensing agent, that said it was not safe; there was problems. Now, the NRC put this out. And they were the licensing agent.
COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Thank you, Sir.
CHAIRMA.N KEMENY: Commissioner Trunk.
COMMISSIONER TRUNK: Do you have a list of demands should Met Ed open?
MR. REID: Yes. I had some things that I would like to see done. I think the air in the community should be moni-tored at all times. I would like to see some kind of monitoring device set up, stationary devices , in three areas of my borough, and those monitoring devices be monitored every day, not with a Met Ed official, but along with an official from the borough.
I think there should be some straight line communica-tions between the borough and Met Ed. If a fish should jump >
in the Susquehanna River near Three Mile Island, I would like that reported. I think they should ccme into the area from time to time and have public meetings with the citi: ens of the borough, telling them exactly what is going on down there 2nd try to explain, because it is very, very difficult to under-stand the atom. Most of the people living in this area are t
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I' don't think Me Ed should build or construct an observation tower. and say "here it is, you come on down and we will explain things to you". I think Met Ed should come out into the communities.
That's just some of the things.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Any other questions? (Pause)
Thank you very much, Mr. Mayor. You have certainly given us a great deal to think about, and we appreciate your appearance.
Next on our agenda is Dr. Theodore Gross, Provost, -
Capitol Campus, Pennsylvania State University. Dr. Gross.
Dr. Gross, before you begin, may I take this opcor-tunity to express the very sincere thanks of the Commission. ,
I must say Penn State, you in particular and some of your colleagues just went enormously out of your way to make this meeting possible and have helped us in every possit e way, and we are deeply grateful to you.
DR. THEODORE GROSS: Thank you very much for your kindness.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Commission: As we begaa to gain persepetive on the inciden- hree Mile Island, the question confronting the students, faculty and administration of The Pennsylvania State University / Capitol Campus became clear: What should be the appropriate response of an institu-tion of higher learning to a technological, social, and human
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20 event of such consequence?
The question for us was not merely academic, for we conduct our educational activities within the five-mile radius of Three Mile Island and our students and families live in the shadow of its meaning.
Children of the atomic age, we can still remember the birth of nuclear energy and the creative involvement of many scientists in its original development. Students during several wars, we know the limitations of an educational institution.
Teachers of the 1960's, when our students sought to reform the university, we have come to understand both its boundaries and its possibilities. A university cannot solve social problems rooted outside itself, but it can identify these problems and alter social and moral behavior and even help cause a war to terminate. We have seen the power of the academic conscience be very powerful indeed, and we know that an appropriate response can influence an entire society.
What then, we asked ourselves, should be our appropriate response?
On Wednesday, March 23, (1979), when the accident first occurred and on the days that followed, our concerns were entirely practical--we sought to protect the 2,600 students, 130 faculty and 300 supporting staff on this campus. Our resi-den: students, separated by great distances from their families, were dependen: upon our decisions. Worried parents culd no:
21 reach their children because of overloaded telephone circuits.
s The reports from nuclear officials were burdened by technical jargon difficult to understand. Our engineering faculty con-ducted a briefing to help us understand what was happening at Three Mile Island. Their efforts helped, but the reassurances from various " officials" seemed unreliable because of conflict-ing accounts .
It was not until a government official- Harold Denton--
spoke with one clear and understandable voice that we could respond intelligently. Throughout these difficult early hours and days of the accident, we depended upon the clear signals sent to us from the governor's office--an office that we felt must have had access to the best information available a: -the time. We evacuated the campus at 2:00 p.m., Friday, March 30; reopened ten days later, April 9, on a revised calendar which compensated for days lost. Since then we have continued to consider the effect on the morale of our studen:s, faculty, and staff.
The natural desire for each individual to act in ,
regard to this incident was very great indeed. Some among us fel that the appropriate response of the Universi:y was to state its unecuivocal position on nuclear energy, although it soon became clear that within the university :here was ac: One but many posi: ions, many peints of view. Some claimed tha: :he university should not be poli:ically concerned wi:h this issue;
20 others urged political action. Still others proposed tha: we monitor the radiation emitted by the nuclear reactor, although that was being done by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. And many among us urged a variety of research proposals that would investigate the effect on the local citi:enry--at once, before it was too late.
One could continue with a list of these immediate reactions, spawned from the impulse to assume an activist role, that would resemble those of most universities confron ed with a threat to the safety of its immediate community. These '
individual responses, distilled by reflection and debate, pro-vided us with a sense of what we felt the appropriate response of a university should be.
Your decision to use the facilities of The Capitol Campus to hold a public hearing provides one clue. The inquiry into this nuclear accident finds its proper setting in our university, where no vested interes: can obscure the truth the Commission seeks. It is not accidental tha educators dominate the Commission. It is not accidental that a mathema:ician and college president is its Chairperson. In this society, where so many people grow distrustful when an acciden: like this occurs, we turn to the university as a countervailing force to :he distrust and fear which s:em from lack of knowledge or understanding; it seems al ogether appropria:e :ha: the meeting in .'liddletown shouldbe here , in the land-gran: university. Our l
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I 23 first response, then, is to serve as a forum for your inquiry ,
and for a subsequent fact-finding hearing to be conducted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on June 6 and 7.
A second response.of the Pennsylvania State University / Capitol Campus is the establishment of a Research Information Clearinghouse for the Three Mile Island accident, a place where the information pertinent to the impact of this nuclear event will be collated and will perform some of the following functions: the collection, maintenance and updating <
of studies concerning the Three Mile Island incident and its aftermath; the development of a laboratory of pertinent research reports and documents; the publication of a periodic newsletter and published bibliographies to make this information available to researchers and to funding agencies; in brief, a place for the gathering and dissemination of knowledge.
A third response is the encouragement of research that will develop as a result of this most serious nuclear accident.
Already researchers throughout :he country have begun projects that will attempt to determine the truth of what happened a:
Three Mile Island and its effects on local citi: ens; the impact of the accident on residen:s in our communi y; :he dangers of radioactive waste; the reasons for the confusion in disseminating information :o people; the psychological stress it has imposed upon us; :he :hre2: to the health and economy i-of Iccal citi: ens, and other aspects of this ac:iden : hat only
1 24 independent, disinterested researchers can pursue.
Our final response as a university, as The Pennsylvania State University / Capitol. Campus, is to continue to conduct seminars, conferences, and lecturs that will call into question individual aspects of this accident. Every ele-ment in our society (and in our college curriculur.) has been challenged during this incident. Whose responsibility was the Three Mile Island accident? What is the history of nuclear energy.and what is its future? What should our energy policy La in the wake of Three Mile Island? What are the economics of nuclear energy? What are the effects upon health? What i
stress seems form this invisible accident? What civil defense ,
do we need as a consequence of this terrible warning? What are the local, national, and international attitudes toward nuclear power and energy? How was the public informed or misinformed by the media, industry, and government? What has been the effect l 1
on the Susquehanna River and our environment? What should be the personal and professional and governmental responsibility?
What are the ethical considerations raised by Three Mile Island?
What are our judgments? Our conclusions? And what, indeed.
are the choices we must make?
Never before have people been asked to live with such ambiguity. The TMI accident--an accident we cannot see er !
taste or smell--is our invisible wound, our collective wound, l l
our national wound. We may have to live with ambiguity if we
i 25 j wish to live with energy we now enjoy, but we should know the dimensions of that ambiguity. We need to educate ourselves.
We all need to become students in a great university where these questions are examined with a degree of honesty. Must we polari:e our attitudes and so charge the atmosphere with p4ssion that reason cannot set forth the alternatives available to us?
We have responded as a university to what we con-ceive to be our proper role in society. As host for these hearings conducted by this Commission in Middletown;1as a clearinghouse for all information pertaining to Three Mile Island; as a base for the encouragement of research that makes our invisible wound more nearly visible; as a catalyst for the convening of seminars, lectures, and ccnferences to enlighten ourselves and others--as a forum of these activities, The pennsylvania State University / Capitol Campus has sought to respond appropriately to the Three Mile Island accident.
)
1 l
Thank you very much. !
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Thank you. I would like to ask a l 1
couple of questions myself as one who on occasion has had to make decisions about an academic institution, though no on l 1
the scale that you have had to face it. I would be quite l
- fascinated to know how the institution made the decision
- o evacuate the students on Friday afternoon. I'n no: asking whether the decision was right or wrong; that's no: the issue.
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l.. - -
j
26 But I really would like to know what information you had avail- l able and what persuaded you to evacuate.
DR. GROSS: The situation we found ourselves in on Friday morning was one in which we had to depend, as 5fayor Reid l1 l
indicated before, almost exclusively on the mass media, l l
specifically on radic. We had in my office a radio that was !
l alerting us to what was happening. It was virtually impossible to reach any public official on the telephone. We tried again and again to reach the governor's office, feeling that that was the one office that had access to the most reliable information.
And we did finally get through to the governor's office.
But the information we really relied upon was that given to us by radio. -
When we felt that it was truly dangerous, when~the governor indicated that pregnant women and young children shculd leave the area as a safeguard, we then met in closed session--
my administration and myself--talked about the alternatives, worried about the calendar, worried about the lost classes on the part of students. Then we put a phone call in to University Park, which is the main campus of the Pennsylvania State University, received clearance from the President of the university, and then announcec that the campus would be closed.
We put a statement on a tape on a telephone nunber which anyone could reach who was unclear about the information; and then sent out the information on the radio and en television.
27 CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Thank you. I have one more question I would like to ask, then I'll turn to the other Commissioners.
I think I'd like to say a word why I'm asking this question so it isn't misunderstood. Only one Commissioner actually lived through the accident at a distance where you have a firsthand feeling on it. One of the things I'm trying terribly hard to come to grips with is the psychological situation and the psychological factors that occurr in such an accident.
Mayor Reid, in his very fine statement outlining his worries, mentioned,along with his worries about~Three Mile Island, his concerns about the number of other possible health hazards--a train being derailed, a truck that could be carrying highly dangerous chemicals, a chemical factory. I somehow have the feeling that these things would not concern the university '
as much as the accident at Three Mile Island. I'm not saying that you are right or wrong on this.
Can you help us get the feeling of why this particular accident really seems to have, at an order of magnitude, differ-ent reaction from, let's say, a suspected death from, let's say, a truck spilling an enormous amount of noxious material that might have killed 100 people?
DR. GROS 5: Well, my own feeling, and obviously this i
is jus: a personal perspective, is that, as I indica:ed in my remarks, this is an accident tha is invisible. I think the fac: that it is invisible crea:es a sense of uncertainty and 1
23 fright on the part of people that may well beyond the reality of the accident itself. But when something is visible and one can measure it in some way, but this is invisible, the effects are in the future. We have heard already at this campus a variety of speakers coming to us with different persepectives.
that se find personally very confusing. The informa: ion simply has not been given to us for us to base a judgment on it.
So, the invisibility, I think, of this accident is what causes its terror.
CHAIRMAN KDfENY: Yes. And I gather t'he confusing -
information also that you got. Thank you. I find that very helpful. Dr. Marks.
i
. COMMISSIONER MARKS: Dr. Gross, it would be very help-
.ful.if it were possible for you to identify the-actual data, if any, that led you to the conclusion that the situation was so dangerous, as you just described, to lead to the evacuation. '
DR. GROSS: Well, I can remember very specifically on Friday morning hearing on the radio the phrase tha "unreleased"
-- No, that's nor correct. " Doses of radiation that have not been clearly measured have been emitted from the nuclear l reactor." Tha: phase was very troubling to us because there was a kind of uncontrolled effect that all of us fel: here.
i Though we wanted to remain calm and obviously nct evacuate I i
1 unless it was absolutely necessary, it was the uncertainty of '
I
- he event tha: was so troublesome.
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29 The information that was given to us was simply terribly confusing. A the beginning, the officials from Met Ed were assuring us that there were no problems. And then the newspapers reported still another perspective. The people on our campus represented different points of view, as I indicated.
So it was terribly confusLng.
What we finally did was simply si: around a large table, hear everybody out, and then decided that the bes: thing to do was to err in the direction of caution.
CChWISSIONER MARKS: Did you have any so-called experts, either on the heal:h effects or radiation effects from your campus or the medical school involved in this caucus?
DR. GROSS: Oh, yes. In fact, the firs: thing that we did, in order to relieve the anxiety, because I knew i= mediately that the anxiety level was very high on the ca= pus, and one of the thoughts that I had was to ask a number of the nuclear engineers on our faculty to have a forum for the entire l
campus and simply : y to explain precisely what was happening at Three Mile Island. The diagrams came out and the faculty went through a very slow and laborious explanation. As the l
explanation became slower and more laborious, the anxiety level 1
decreased. As the information, in other words, became clearer and clearer, the anxiety was reduced.
But what s: uck me very clearly, when one doesn't know the facts abou: a si:uatien, one can bec:me terribly
30 fearful. So we had a forum; the information was disseminated,'
and the anxiety level was considerably reduced.
COMMISSIONER MARKS: But what about the health aspects?
Did you have anyone speaking to the potential or real risks to health?
DR. GROSS: Not on our campus; we don't have any.
The Medical Center, as you probably know, is the Hershey Medical Center, which is abou: ten miles from here. They were busy, of course, preparing themselves for possible evacuation and for psychological stress that was involved. It is my understanding that they had many people coming to the hospital with psychomatic problems as a result of this accident. But we did not have anybody specifically speaking to the medical ques- .
tions on our campus.
CHAIRMAN KDENY: Professor, Marre::, did you -- -
COMMISSIONER MARRETT: Yes. I wanted some more com-ment on your statement that you are continuing to consider the effect on the morale of students, faculty, and staff. Could you say a li::le bit more about what those effects have been and then how you are going about considering these effects?
DR. GROSS: Well, the immediate effect, of course, l has to do with enrollment of campus. That is, it is our con-cern, :bviously, that students will come here who wan: :o study in our programs and will no feel tha: they are in danger. That fear, I think, has affected the metale of f aculty,
31 students, and administration, to an extent. It is the sense, again, of uncertainty, of where are we going from here? Will that plant start up again? If it does start up again, will it be safe? Will there be any danger at all involved? That kind of cloud over everybody, I :hink, has affected the morale. i Now, how does one combat a situation like that? All I can think of, as somebody who has been an educator now for more than 20 years, is imply that you have to disseminate information, have as many conferences, as many seminars, as many lectures as possible from as many points'of view as possible, trying to clarify the questions and to speak to the issues. We have had people here and we will continue having people in the future. Students, faculty, and administration will in a sense, at least, be part of the analysis of what happened, and hopefully, part of the solution.
But it is very difficult to deal with that question.
And I think one has to go beyond the rhetoric that is often given to us among public policy speakers, you see, and informers.
I think that it is our obligation here to try to get to the I truth as much as we possibly can. So by conducting these seminars, I think we are trying to do that.
I CChNISSIONER MARRETT: One other question. You mentioned the establishment of a research information clearing-t house. Mas that been established? l l
DR. GROSS: Yes,1: has been.
I I
32 COMMISSIONER MARRETT: Is the information available to us on what kinds of studies have been identified?
DR. GROSS: It is. And that was the purpose of that clearinghouse--to have available to anybody who might be interested in the Three Mile Island accident the information here on this campus.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Let's see. Several Commissioners
, asked for the floor. Commissioner Trunk.
COMMISSIONER TRUNK: I'm still confused on why you i
evacuated. The governor got on television and he said only pregnant women and preschool children should evacuate if they felt comfor:able. It was just an advisory. Now, the campus does not have pregnant women; it does not have preschool children. Why did you evacuate?
I DR. GROSS: Well, sitting here and looking b--k on the !
situation, I think you question seems very cogent and compelling.
On Friday morning when the governor's statement went ou , and when the schools in Middletown and in the area closed down, and there was suggestion of evacuation, our thought at tha: :ime was to err in the direction of caution. We knew that we could closa - ' '. 5 campus for a week and still have the same number of classes and the same educa:ional process go on. We would have to schedule classes later in order to make up for what we'd lost, but we did not wan: :s be in a position of holding classes, keeping :he campus open,'. hen other educational institu: ions
- m , - . - . . . . . 2 - - - ,--r -,m--ie- -
~q w, , , - . = w
33 l
were closing down, and when the governor himself was suggesting l a partial evacuation.
If it does seem, in retrospect, :o be an error, at least it is an error in the direction of caution.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: May I just make a comment on that, as a university president. I have great sympathy for that and ,
this is why my question I carefully said that I did not ask whether it was correct or incorrect. It is very often, you have to make the decision on whatever information you have available at the moment and sometimes you have to make it right or wrong, and it is easy to get critici:ed two weeks later when in retrospect i: may have been the wrong decision. But I, myself, have to make decisions under great degrees of uncertainty and you just have to take your best guess under those circumstances, I feel'..
DR. GROSS: I would also say this. I don't think, truthfully speaking, I don't think that the educational process could have continued on that Friday or on the Monday following with any degree of real meaning under the circumstances, given the media coverage, given the hysteria generally in the country.
I should say also that the panic or excitemen: was must greater as one left this area than it was here. I know, because I went to my home in New York tha: Ftiday. As I drove and then came :o New York, :he anxiety level was much higher in New York, much higher on the mass media, en television, han 1: was here.
34 So I can understand your question, Mrs. Trunk..
COMMISSIONER TRUNK: Are you going o change the courses now? The technology students have to take a humanities course. Are you going to make the humanities people take a technology course? Or don't you think : hey should?
DR. GROSS: No, no, no. I think it is very inter-esting that the word we use for required curriculum, at Harvard, for example, the curriculum that was j ust passed by Harvard faculty is called a core curriculum. I don't want to use 'due vantages' unnecessarily but I think that core curricu-lam has taken on a new meaning for all of us. (Laughter)
As somebody who is a humanist, and has been a humanist for,20 years now in education, I certainly feel the need to be better educated I would hope that our students would be required to have certain courses in nuclear energy, C0bWISSIONER TRUNK: I agree.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: May I thank you for the bes joke we have had before this Commission yet. Governor Pe:erson.
COMMISSIONER PETERSON: Dr. Cross, did the nuclear '
engineers and the nuclear physicists on your campus join in the recommendation :o evacuate the campus?
DR. GROSS: I did not seek their specific advice.
They.were faculty members and :he people I spoke :o were people from my administrative s:aif. But I did, as I say, clear :his with the administra: ion it University Park before we :cok l
i
- . - - . ,, --- , . , , - ,-, , . . - . , , , - . , , , - - . , , , ,--.,-n.- , ,,
35 such extreme action.
COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: One question, Dr. Gross.
Did you decide to stay _out for 10 days or was that decision made subsequently as to coming back? How did you decide to stay out for 10 days?
DR. GROSS: Well, we decided to stay out for an entire week. We projected ahead and we said to ourselves, and as Dr. Kemeny has indicated, this was made in a state of some uncertainty, we fel: that once we closed the campus that it would be foolish to keep it on a tentative basis and to tell students and faculty and administration : hat we might be opening on Tuesday but we might not be opening on Tuesday; we might be opening on Wednesday if things looke'd better. We felt that we should make a firm and clear decision and that a week would give us time to see the situation abate. That is why we made it one clean week.
In fact, what we did was not make another sta:emen:
about it; we simply opened the campus cr. Monday. We did not even issue a second statement saying the campus would epen.
We just assumed that everybody would believe that it was open.
Our intention throughout all of this was to reduce the anxiety level as much as we possibly could.
CHAIDIAN KIMENY: Thank you very much for your testimony.
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36 Our next witness will be Ken Myers, Mayor of Goldsboro.
KEN SUERS, MAYOR OF GOLDSBORO: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen of the President's Commission: When I received this letter'from Washington inviting me to attend your session today, I felt that there was some concern in regards to my being mayor of a small borough, population of around 600, and with about 200 homes built in the borough.
In the letter that invited me here, it stated that I should tell you of my role as mayor, and this is what I'm going to do. According to my statement, it is very short and sweet and to the point.
Goldsboro, as you know, is located in Northern York County and is approximately three-fourths of a mile across the Susquehanna River from Three Mile Island.
My role as Mayor of Goldsboro with a population of around 600 residents during the crisis was as follows:
First: I had charge of the local police departmen:
and then I deputi:ed three extra sen in the bcrough to help our local Chief of Police, James Herman, to help preserve order and in the patrolling of the borough :-- ' the clock, because we had cuite a few people leave our town :n their own recogni-
- ance. I think tha: they were probably concerned and afraid and scared, so those with families of small children just packed up between *iednesday and Friday and took Off to stay l
l 37 with relatives and in =otels and even out of state.
1 Second: I worked with the local Emergency Operation l Coordinator, Dennis Hamsher, in preparing a local evacuation plan for our borough in case we had to leave in a hurry.
Third: I called a special borough council meeting on Wednesday. evening at 7:30 p.m. (March 23) to update the councilmen on what we had learned so far about the accident at Three Mile Island. We learned this through the news media and the press; no other way. The councilmen discussed the borough's evacuation plan.
Fourth: I initiated a door-to-door, visit to all residents living in the borough by the councilmen and myself.
We advised them of what we had learned about Three Mile Island and the accident, what we had discussed at our borough council meeting, and about our evacuation plans. Our Goldsboro resi-dents did not panic. 1 think this is one cause of why they did not, because we let them know exactly where we stood, wha: we were going to do, and this, I think, relieved a lot of pressure.
Like I say, though, since that time from, I'd say, Friday until at least Saturday night when we took a special head coun: through the borough--and in a borough as small as Goldsboro you can do this on foo:--so we took a special head count and out of 600 people on Saturday evening around 3:00 o' clock, we had about 60 to 55 people lef in the borough. Of course, you know tha: :hrough tha: we had to have poli:e
38 protection and then is when we called in the State Police who patrolled all night long, and we were up nearly all night long.
I know I didn't get to bed until 3:00 or 4: 00 in the morning.
The last of my statement is this: The primary con-cern of all involved over there in that town was really what could have really happened if a more serious acciden: would of took place and how the people, they discussed how we would get out of town in a hurry and no: get involved in traffic accidents and maybe get killed ourselves through that.
That ends my statement. -
CHAIR >MN KEMENY: Thank you very much.
COMMISSIONER HAGGERTY: Just a question. Did you say you had 60 to 65 out of the 600 left in the borough, or had left the borough?
MR. MYERS: No. They remained in the borough.
i CHAIRMAN KEMENY: So only about 65 out of 600 remained; ;
so about 90 percent of your people left?
i MR. MYERS: Yes.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Thank you. Commissioner Lewis. .
COMMISSIONER LEWIS: Mr. Mayor, it seems your town :
1 is really the closes: to Three Mile Island facili:y. When :ha-
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facility was buil:, were you warned tha: this kind of thing might happen? What did you know abou i: when you agreed :
having the facility placed so close to your :cwn?
l MR. MYERS: That's a good question and I believe I 1
l
39 will be able to-try to answer that. I was born and raised in Goldsboro and I saw that plant being built. But a: tha t time I can safely say that probably 15 percent of our people in the borough did not understand what nuclear power was all about.
I think they knew that it was a plant being buil: to give
, additional electricity to the area or the electrical companie:,
but I don't think the word radiation meant a darn thing. Now, ,
that's my personal opinion of it.
COMMISSIONER LEWIS: Looking back on it now, did you feel that you should have been, somebody should have made an effort to teach you, or was the failure the failure on the part of the citi: ens themselves to inquire?
MR. MYERS: No, I think the failure lies with the people that built the plant. I think their public relations really stunk, in other words. Because I don't think they came out and told the people exactly what the plant involved. I really do think that that is what.should be--a better public relations system.
COMMISSIONER LEWIS: Do you have regrets now that you have the plant so close to you?
MR. NUERS: No, I really don't regre it.
CChWISSIONER LEWIS: Why not?
MR. MYERS: Well, the firs: :hing, I'm no: afraid. !
L I said this en TV on television and radio stations and i. :he newspaper and press before. I'm concerned but I am no: afraid ,
l
_ _ _ - _ ._ ~ _ _ . .
40 and that's two different words in my book.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Professor Taylor.
COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Mayor Myers, you indicated, I gather that you and the rest of the community were mostly con-cerned about things getting much worse.
MR. MYERS: Yes.
COMMISSIONER TAYLOR:
I'm very interested in knowing how you reacted to the press statements , the media statements ,
that there appeared some hydrogen in the reactor and in :he con-tainment and there then developed talk about a hydrogen explo-sion. I'm curious to know whether that increased your concern considerably or not.
MR. MYERS: Yes, I think that was a major concern, especially when the press and the news media reported the possibility of a bubble appearing in the reactor. I think that caused a great concern. I think when that anno unc ement was made, I think more of our people did flee the area after that.
COMMISSIONER. TAYLOR: Do you think that a majority of the people had already left before that word came through or -- I i
MR. MYERS: I don't think a majority did, no. There j was quite a few left, but it's hard to tell the exac: numbers; you know what I mean.
COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: I understand. Thank you.
, CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Professor Marre::.
-COSNISS:0NER MARRETT: Mr. Mayor, y:u indica:e tha:
you and the other councilmen made door-:o-door visits to hose j
41 who were remaining in Goldsboro. Could you say something about what you told the residents? You said you were advising them of what you'd learned about the accident. What did you tell them? How much technical detail, for example, was involved?
MR. MYERS: I'll try to answer that one. On Wednesday evening airer our borough council meeting, .I suggested to the burough council that why not go around door-to-door and talk to our residents. Our population isn't that high, because out of the o00, I could safely say that we have quite a few children, They all agreed that we do this. So we assigned certain streets in the borough to each councilman and myself and we went house-to-house knocking on doors. We were very graciously invited in; I must say that. Everyone listened to what we had to say.
We mainly told them of what we had heard through the -
radio, TV, and even our own public relations and communica:icns depar:sent in the basement of the York County Courthouse through County Control, which we were in connection with.
Then we told them also of our evacuation plans in case the governor would declare emergency and that we would all have to leave. Of course, right away they gave us questions:
"Well, what should we do? Do you think i:'s safe that we should stay or do you think we should go?"
The ones that I :alked to, I :cid them: Use your own judgment. We dare no tell you to leave vour homes. Tha:'s l one thing we dare not do. You can s:ay with ycur home c:me l
.- - - -. . _. . . ~ . . - -. . . - . . - - -- - - - _ _ _ _
f t
42 hell or high water. We cannot tell you to leave. Su -we can advise you that leaving maybe would be the best thing, especially with small children because of what we already knew '
and about the leakage of radiation in :he area.
Like I said before, I told quite a few people: Who are you going to believe? You listen to one radio station and you hear one story; you hear another story from another radio station; and the TV the same thing. So who are you actually i going to believe?
I don't think anybody can answer that. ;
COMMISSIONER MARRETT: You were relying entirely then on what the media reports were with reference to the information -
about the accident?
4 MR. MYERS: Yes, yes. Of course, every home we went into, you know, you ran into the TV in the living room because they had it on and was listening. Of course, then, we also told our residents that their house would be protected if they did leave, that we would have enough police coverage and we would patrol the town very well.
I must say that no incidents happened in our borough at all; through all those people leaving, we had no houses '
broken in:o, no looting. And I can safely say that all of our people were cals to a certain extent. You have some people that are really worked up over a li::le bi of any:hing, as far as t
that goes. Su: nos: of our people, I think, were-cals and no:
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43 panicky at all. But I think they would hav~e been if we had not gone around house-to-house telling them of what we had learned and what we had in mind of what we would do.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Since I also am a resident of a small town, though not quite as small as your borough, it does bring out the great advantages of small, closely-knit community that you are able to go house-to-house and talk to everyone.
That is remarkable.
Are there any other questions? (Pause) Thank you very much for coming and testifying before the Commi-ssion. -
MR. MYERS: You're welcome.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Our next witness is Paul Wise, President of the Middletown Borough Council.
MR. PAUL WISE, PRESIDENT OF MIDDLETOWN BOROUGH COUNCIL:
Dr. Kemeny, other Members, Ladies and Gentlemen of the President's
- Commission: Paul Wise, President of the Middletown Borough Council. I have a prepared statement here that I would like to read.
. Sir, since the accident at Three Mile Island early i i
i on the morning of March 23, 1979, the members of Middletown l
'Surough Council have been giving careful consideration :o the entire incident. . The events that have taken place in the after-math of that: accident have been extensively reported by the media. In addition, each councilman has either received reports or has had first-hand. knowledge of many of the experiences that y ' W - r ee - ee-m:+y- -m ze- -mm- t- +e -s++ k
44 resulted on the local scene.
s Both as a body and individually, 3crough Council has heard varying reactions and responses from the citi: ens and businessmen of Middletown. However, before making any judgment in the matter or taking any official course of action, Burough Council is awaiting the findings of official review bodies at the state and federal levels, such as the President's Commission.
In any event, the indications to date appear to clearly point to the need for strengthening the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and for tightening the operating practices -
and procedures for civilian nuclear power plants. I urge that the President's Commission act thoroughly bu:~ swiftly in' order
.that whatever needs to be done can be ac'curately determined and promptly implemented. Thank you. -
- ~
~
I also would like to make a statement that before our April Council meeting there had been several citi: ens who had appeared and requested tha: the council draw up a resolution '
to close Unit 1 and Uni: 2 nuclear plants at TMI. Just recently, last week, we know tha: there is a petition being circulated !
within our borough requesting our citi: ens to sign another !
1 petition which I am sure we will have before us a: our May l 1
meeting Monday night. j Some questions asked of these citi: ens are:
l e There were too many unknowns by Me: Ed and state i officials. What amounts of radia: ion to the public were t
(-
t i _ _
\
45 really released?
e Emotion stress, real danger not given to the general public in all the areas surrounding TMI. We should have had evacuation plan ready prior to the accident.
e Three Mile Island should be converted to use coal.
e NRC on-site inspection is a definite, e Better reactor training for reactor operators as specified by the NRC.
I would also like to add that I was asked by the mayor to attend briefings that were conducted by Met Ed on the morna ings of Friday, Saturday, and Monday. When I pursued to go to the Old Crawford Station, which was the coal facility that was used before the construction of the TMI facilities, on the way ~
to the meeting I had my radio on and, of course, as we all know-now, we heard this word about the radiation releases. Before I went to that meeting, I went to the borough office where the mayor was and I must state that were in quite a state of panic situation at that time, not knowing wha: to do. At tha: time we were trying te prepare for the officials that were there; the fire chief, the civil defense director, and the fire marshall and the mayor were all trying tc - ' ,ta in what event we should do should we do any sort of evacuation.
I was asked by the mayor if I would then attend the meeting a: Crawford Station. A::ending the meeting a: Crawford Station, when I lef: hat mee:ing, I was assured by the officials
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46
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i that were there that they felt everything was under control at that time. George Tropher, who was the public relations director of Redding, stated in the meeting that they saw no '
need'for any kind of evacuations at that time. When I left the meeting I fel' very assured that things were well under control.
Of course, you know, as the incident that had taken place, what some of the releases were with news releases of what some of the aftermath was.
I also attended the meeting Saturday morning and at this time we were made aware of some of the critical situations that they had gotten into, such as the hydrogen bubble. I would
. like to state also that at that meeting, Mr. Tropher was quite alarmed at the news of the evacuation,that Met Ed~did-dot seem to think that'there was any need for that at all.
These are some of the questions that we, as borough officials, would like to know:
e Was there a need for evacuation?
e Do we have to be in a situation where we have to ,
live under these conditions, be prepared for an evacuation, through an inciden: like this?
Met Ed seems to think that, no, there is no need for i
alarming unless they give us the word, although when we read our newspapers and hear the other reports we have :o feel differently.-
17 I also would like to state that when we talk about the closing down of nuclear power plants--I'm a lifelong resi-dent of Middletown and I remember back in the late 50's when there was a petition circulated to c1.ose down the Crawford Station. The Crawford Station was a c: filed station and the one thing that we heard so much of was the release of coal soot. The petition was circulated ; Met Ed in turn converted to oil. .
So as we progress in our society, we go from coal to oil and now we are living in a nuclear age. Are we at a point that we live in a nuclear age that we say we should be convert-ing back? ,Or should we say that nuclear is the answer? These -
. are the questions that ponder most people when they say to themselves; which way are we to turn?
We, as council, do not feel that the closing of Three Mile Island would be the total answer. These are the 1
questions that I think the Commission has to ask itself:
Do we develop fusion power? I've done some research on fusion power, and to date there are 52 billion in federal funds that have been invested in fusion research over 27 years. Researchers estimated 512 to 316 billion will have been spen: before fusion power is practical for use.
So I think the question is: Can we nake nuclear power safe? We sus: make nuclear power safe. Thank you.
CF. AIRMAN :G:ENY: Thank you. Questions from i
(
48 Commissioners?
COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: I'd like to follow up a little bit on your comment just now about fusion. Do you believe that fusion would be safer than nuclear fission? I'm not sure I understand the point you were making about the government --
MR. WISE: I have a report here that, being.in development work, I receive a machine design magazine and the statement is made that a fusion power plant will have little of the radiation danger of present nuclear fission plants.
COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: So that's the basis for your telling us about the expenditures?
MR. WISE: Yes, Sir.
COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Were you giving us those numbers
. to indicate that they were much too small or what? - I'm not sure what --
MR. WISE: Pardon?
COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: I guess I'm asking why you are interested in the expenditures of federal money for fusion.
MR. WISE: The reason I make that comparison is because I think we live in a society today that we demand more energy. When we relate to the development of energy, and I know that when we compare, jus t for instance, the power plan:
that is across from TMI is a water power, hydroelectri: power; that produces 19 megawa::s. The two units combined 2: TMI produce in excess of 1600 megawa :5. Now, the answer, when you I'
i l
I
. 49 say to yourself, what do we do for energy, and all of our de-mands that we ask of energy today, can we convert back to coal that can produce the amount of megawatts that we get from nuclear? That's why I feel that the future of energy has to be safe and clean, but with what source?
COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN KDENY: Thank you very much for your testimony before the Commission.
MR. WISE: Yes, Sir.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Next, the Commission calls Mr. -
Albert Wohlsen, Jr., the Mayor of Lancaster.
. MAYOR AL3ERT WOHLSEN, JR., LANCASTER: Mr. Chairman ,
Members of the Commission: I'm being joined by Peter Schonauer (phonetic) who is my administrative assis tant.
COMMISSIONER MARKS: Ne cannot hear at this end of the table. The echo just prevents us from hearing, unless the witnesses speak very close to the microphone; and even then, it is very difficult (to hear).
MR. WOHLSEN: I would like to thank the Commission for this opportunity to express my views abou: the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plan: accident. By way of background, and for your information, Lancaster is the largest metropolitan com-muni:y located southeas: downwind Of Three Mile Island. We have the strong mayor / city council form of goverr. ment and I am
50 serving as the. interim mayor of Lancaster, which is a full-time position.
My background is 40 years experience as the former president of a family-owned general construction and engineering firm established in 1890 involved in the construction of
.lndustrial, . commercial. and -institutional proj ects .
The week to ten-day period following the March inci-dent at Three Mile Island was one of the most trying periods of my life. This time for me was filled with great uncertainty and soul-searching.
As mayor of the City of Lancaster, I am responsible for the welfare of approximately 60,000 people who depend on city government and me for leadership, especially during an emergency like the one we are discussing today. This is a responsibility which is always foremost in my mind.
Before I proceed further, I would like to say that I reali:e there has never been before an acciden: like the one at Three Mile Island, and because of the uniqueness of this accident, government and utility officials were understandably treading on new ground and facing problems never before faced.
For this. reason, I want it to be understood that my criticisms are levied in a constructive sense, so thac if such an acciden:
should ever happen again, :he same' mistakes would act be repea:ed.
One : heme which is evident throughou: :his entire experience, from the time of :he acciden: itself :: the presen:
31 deliberations of how-to dispose of radioactive water at the nuclear power plant, has been a total disregard and lack of consideration for the responsibilities of local government. By far the most serious problem faced by the city's civil defense organi:ation and the city staff was and continues to be a lack of constant and reliable information upon which to base intelli-gent decisions. No person was willing and available to answer our basic questions, and those questions about which the citi-
- ens of our community were interested. Such questions as:
How could this problem which was taking place only 23 miles awy effect the City of Lancaster? What effect would it have on our water supplies? What problems of fall out might the public face if the situation got out of hand? These are reason-able questions which the public had a right to have answered and to which there were no available answers.
Other questions included: What was the basis for setting up the 5, 10, and 20-mile evacuation limits? We assumed that a margin of safety was included in setting these limits, but we were never certain. We also wanted to know what informa-tion we should disseminate to the public as to any precautions 1 they might take.
We were not advised ,as to,in the event there was a l
20-mile evacuation called for, as to how we should advise the l citi: ens of our community as to whether we continue business as usual, do we close the schools, do people take cover, and
52 just what they should do in that event.
During the emergency period, no one from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or state government bothered to call the City of Lancaster government staff. On the Sunday following the accident, I initiated a call to the office of the Governor, but was. referred to a press assistant. The responsible City Staff and I were, in effect, left to grope our way toward making decisions in this situation.
The consequences of this lack of information and disregard for the citi: ens of Lancaster could have been very serious. I say this with the realization that the NRC and state officials may have been preoccupied with problems at the TMI site and that the lack of consideration was probably not in*entional. But members of my staff began ' feeling that -
the " experts" thought they had the situation in hand and that there was no reason to contac: the mayors of nearby boroughs and cities. I am sure the local government officials in the TMI area would unanimously share my opinion. We had to rely solely on the media for our information. Those reports were often misleading and conflicting.
Because of this information void, the city staff and I decided it would be prudent to opera:e under the assumption tha: the worst was likely :o happen. In fact, after a March 31 l
t meeting wi:h the County Civil Defense officials, who had the same informational problem as we had, city staff and I were l
l
53 convinced there was a very good chance that some type of evacua-tion would take place.
Operating under the assumption that the worse would happen, preliminary planning was begun on Friday evening, March 30, for a possible evacuation of the community. On Monday, April 2,' detailed contingency plans were essentially completed. The positive aspect of this acciden: is that the City of Lancaster now has a very well-thought out evacuation plan in readiness for future emergencies .
. All during this very critical and uncertain time, in the back of my mind and in the minds of my staff members , was the possibility of exercising the mayor's authority to order the evacuation of the city. Certainly, considering the lack of information and in light of the serious. duties of my office, I thought constantly about this possibility.
The lack of information has continued right up to the present time. Imagine yourselves as average citi: ens in a situation where you read in the newspapers that a u::.lity ,
which has just mishandled a nuclear accident, and a federal agency are contemplating a plan which could conceivably con-taminate your water system with radioactive elements. I'm con- ;
i cerned, as I'm sure you would be concerned,-about this. '#hy didn': Metropolitan Edison or the NRC le: the City of Lancaster know tha: they were planning to discharge hundreds of thousands of gallons of radicactive water into the.Susouehanns River, 1
54 the source of much of Lancaster's water?
I might mention that there was a meeting in Hershey this past Wednesday at which time NRC and the Met Ed representa-tives briefed those people who were invited to attend the meet-ing. We heard about the meeting through the media and our state senator's office. The meeting was on Wednesday; we received our invitation on Thursday morning.
Another serious problem was created for us by the seemingly arbitrary 20-mile evacuation planning limit, and the resultant lack of inclusion in the planning itself. As I- -s a id -
previously, Lancaster is 23 miles from Three Mi'le Island and three miles outside the evacuation area. Whil'e plans were put together for the 20-mile area, we felt ti was incumben: upon us to continue formulating our plans. It was conceivable to'us that the situation could have gotten worse and that Lancaster could be included in an evacuation. If no one else was plan-ning for us, we had the responsibility to do so, even if it was independent of their planning.
It is obvious to me that this lack of information and coordination could have caused terrible problems of public confusion and panic, and that an orderly evacuation of Lancaster would have been very difficul: to achieve.
I would again like to say :ha: my remarks are intended to be constructive. I believe the lessons we learn from this accident should be remembered by those who may be in charge of
r 55
-decision-making and information disseminating in future emer-gencies, should they occur. Local government officials should be notified and kept abreast, as is practically possible, under the dictates of an emergency. This much is owed the people of our country.
I would again like to thank you for this opportunity to present testimony before :his-Commission.
CHAIRMAN KDENY: May I follow-up your very helpful statement since it speaks very directly to one of the major charges we have from President Carter, and I quote: '
"What steps should be taken during similar emergencies to provide the public with accurato comprehensible and timely i information?"
We are ordered to make recommendations on thatr May -
I therefore ask, have you had the chance to think what machinery would'have been effective? What would you have liked to have l
had happen?
MR. WOHLSEN: As far as the information, it would i seem to me that it is important or would have been importan:
l that we had had a line of communication with either the state l
level or the NRC where we would receive direct, good, solid
'information from someone in authority who could appraise us of what was contemplated for our particular area. We fel: :ha:
we were completely in the dark in Lancaster, that our informa-tion had to come from the media and the press, and of course, i
l
-. , - . - - - - - - - - - - - - ~---- - ---~'4
56 some of that was confusing.
Actually, I would say we were looking for orders from someone in more authority than we had in our municipality.
CHAIRMAN KEhENY: Professor Marre::.
COMMISSIONER MARRETT: Mr. Mayor, I'd be interested in what kind of information did your office transmit to the citizens of Lancaster. Once you had information, how was that passed cn, what kinds of recommendations, comments about evacua-tion or whatever, was taken care of out of your office?
~
MR. WOHLSEN: We, of course, met with our staff and -
we formulated a civil defense unit very quickly over that week-end and we set up committees in connection with the u:ilities; 1
we met with the various utilities; we set up plans for the evacuation of the hospitals and the elderly; we arranged for food and, transportation and all those things that would have been necessary in the event of an evacuation. We communicated i with the citi: ens of our community through the newspapers and !
l through the radio, indicating to them that we were preparing l
contingency emergency plans. l COMMISSIONER MARRETT: Did questions come into your office regarding the advisability of evacuation, and if so, how were such questions handled? 1 MR. WOHLSEN: I beg you pardon; I didn't hear you. ,
i i
C0bNISSIONEF MARRETT: Did people ask you whether or no they should evacuate Lancaster; tha: 13, did calls come
57 i
l directly to your office asking about whether or not they should leave and if such calls came in, what advice, comment, or s
whatever, was passed on? '
MR. WOHLSEN: Well, we didn't indicate to them tha: ;
they should evacuate. We indicated to them that we would advise them at the point in time that it was determined that we were either called upon to evacuate of if the mayor's office had made a decision to evacuate.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Dr. Marks.
COMMISSIONER MARKS: Mr. Mayor, I wonder if you could :~
inform us about two aspects of this crisis. One, do you have a health officer that you have identified to whom you can turn with respect to advice in such crises as to the real and poten-tial dangers to public health and safety? ~
~
MR. WOHLSEN: Yes, we have a health officer. I'm would not say that he is qualified to make the determinations as it relates to this type of an accident. Now, we did monitor at our local fire headquarters for radioactivity and the hospital did that, and the college in our community also did some monitoring.
CCMMISSIONER MARKS: If he is no: qualified, does he have any established means of access to, say, state authorities who are qualified to obtain information to advise you in a situa: ion like this?
MR. WOHLSEN: Well, he would have access to the state l
l
53 health authorities, probably the same access that I would have to the governor's office.
COMMISSIONER MARKS: From what we've heard, that doesn't seem to have been very effective.
MR. NOHLSEN: That was not very effective .
COMMISSIONER MARKS: How do you communicate to the people of Lancaster in a situation like this, advisories with regard to what they should or should not do?
MR. WOHLSEN: This is done through news releases, the radio and television.
COMMISSIONER MARKS: There is a local radio station to which you have access in Lancaster?
MR. WOHLSEN: Oh, yes. Yes. -
COMMISSIONER MARKS: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN KDENY: Commissioner Lewis. -
COMMISSIONER LEWIS: Mr. Mayor, you talk about the information problem. Would it help to have something like a hotline between the local governments, organs, and. *ay, the state? Would that be the sort of thing you would need?
l MR. WOHLSEN: Yes. Yes. Very much, yes. We fel: '
l i
that we needed someone that we could pick up the phone and talk l to a person who had access to good, solid information.
COMMISSIONER LEWIS: Are any of the local authorities like your own moving oward that? Are vou pressing the state to establish :ha kind of line for you?
l l
l 59 MR. WOHLSEN: Well, not a concerted method, but we i are mentioning it everywhere we have an opportunity, such as this Commission and this forum.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Thank you very much, Mr. Mayor, MR. WOHLSEN: Thank you very much.
CHAIRMAN KE>ENY: Next witness?
l MS. JORGENSON: Our next witness is Mickey Minnich l from the Newberrytown Steering Committee, l
l
. MR. MICKEY MINNICH: Good morning, everybody. My name is-Mickey Minnich, and I'm an educator by p'rofession. I'm:--
a member of the Newberry Township Steering Committee for TMI.
We have had meetings every Thursday since the incident,- acci-'
dent, whatever you want to call it, trying to-find the truth. -
We are trying to establish ourselves or find a cleari'nghouse -
of truth, which has been very difficult. !
i At our latest meeting this past Thursday we had 1
l Congressman Goodling there asking his certain questions trying )
I to go through the democractic process. ;
I live three and a half miles from TMI and I'm west i of Goldsboro, and then Yocumtown, and then our little develop- !
ment, which we feel is kind of in the forgotten par: of this j i
whole incident. Hopefully, at some future time some things I will be held in Goldsboro, in Yocumtown, because the people there are very concerned.
l
. . __ _. .. -._ _ _. . _ _ . . . - _ . - _ . ~ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . . _ __ .
60 I wonder how I can really help here? If I can intro- !
duce-the human elements, I think that could be my big contri-bution. As I talk about my family, sometimes I get emotional and I might have to back up and take a drink of water, but I ,
think being a parent, you all understand that; that's just the nature of my composition as a human being.
I have participated in my first march down a:
l Washington. I want to inferm the public that if you are an I activist that doesn't mean that you are a long-haired hippie, whatever they call you, a communist; though I've been called all -
those things,.which has been interesting. I plan to go to the March on Redding tomorrow for the mothers and children.
I want to thank you for the opportunity to speak here because I feel the consumer has so little time to make an impact. When you are a commission on the PUC, when you look i at the hearings with Metropolitan Edison and PUC, they have like eight full days. I had five minutes. I think that is an imbalance. But I don't know how you can correct it. Hopefully, the PUC and the consumer advucates office will represent us well.
3ut I evacuated on March 30, a Friday, and I returned once'they allowed the pregnant women to return because I have two small boys, 9'and 11. The radiation doesn't know the difference, I think, between 9 and 6, or and 6, or 3.and 6 years of age. I think radiation mizht know the difference abou
l 61 body mass and not age.
But I left in fear and I still have fear now. Friday morning, this may sound insignificant to you, but they were crop dusting in our development, and a 5:50 in the morning,
- oom, a plane came over our house at treetop level. I got up, the family got up; I ran out in my bathrobe on the front lawn and I saw other people out. At first I thought it might be the State Police. I know this sounds odd and maybe I'm paranoid, and this is what this whole thing has done to me, because our group has been investigated by the-State Police -
because we have certain views, you know, about this whole incident.
. Then I said no, it hac to be, there's an accident at
.Three Mile Island and they're doing radiation checks. So I ~-
thought that and I was about ready to get my family all together and evacuate again. This is how paranoid one can get. Then I called our local township. They said don't worry abcut it; they are only crop dusting.
Don't worry about it. I looked out: You say a man in his pajamas with his binoculars; you saw kids out on the lawn a: 5 : 50 in the mo rning. So that's the fear that I feel.
Mcw do I feel now? When I came into this hearing, coming off the turnpike, I saw the towers. I have such emotions when I see the towers :ha: I wan: to tear them down; that's how I feel. Then I look, and I said, wai: a minute, : hey remind
62 se of one of the seven wonders of the world -the pyramids. I said what was forgotten in one of the sevea wonders of the worl'd was all the people lost their lives building the pyramids.
That just went through my brain as I saw those towers. And-that is how I look at that: the number of people that could lose their -lives because of Three Mile Island and nuclear power.
Even yesterday, I called the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiological Protection:-I try to call them daily. I said, l
what is being emitted from the plant? They said, :ero, nothing.
They said the charcoal filters are doing the job, there's no iodine, nothing to worry about. I said, you mean to tell me that nothing is being released? They said, yes, you have nothing to worry about; everything is under control.
I know this Commission went Thursday to visit Three
, Mile Island. I called another source and they said, that's an-outright lie. There's radiation being emitted from Three Mile Island. Right away, there's the fear of the truth. I don't know who to believe or what to believe.
People are calling me all the time now because of my involvement in Newberry Township. People are having nightmares over this whole matter. A mother having daily nightmares, running away from the towers pulling her child, that type of thing. Mothers not allowing their children to drink milk, only the powdered milk. Somebody you are going to hear testify l
- later, his family just returned from Sweden this past Tuesday, 1
l
63 ,
he was that scared. People from Goldsboro calling me all the time: Hey, Mr. Minnich, the helicopters are flying, the Met Ed trucks are going up and down and I think they're messing with us again. So I call Bruce Smith and we have a little geiger counter and we try to check it out and we call them back and say, hey, eve,rything is okay.
So we have this all the time. Even at our meeting on Thursday there was a mother who said, I'm not becoming pregnant; I'm not going to take that chance. There is that type of fear over your health. Then when you a father and you look at your boys and you wonder if they have been affected by it; that is real fear.
But along the health aspect, we have a health commit-tee. We would like to see a 30- or 40-year program, not a '
a handout program--I don't know how you would finance it--where' everybody in a five-mile radius , ten-mile radius would be monitored yearly, blood work taken, to make sure that if any-thing happens, people aren't going to say in the year 2000, Gee, icok what happened to those people in Newberry Township, in Goldsboro. We would like to see people like myself protected because I've lived through cancer deaths, and it dessimates your financial bases. So if I would.have to die as a result i
of this , that I'm not wiped out; that my family is taken care of. I think that should be looked into. We have strtng ten- i cerns over this health issue. Plus we do not feel that we are m -- a
1
-64 getting the truth and tha: this is being monitored properly at all. We would like to see some outside agency that is not caught up in this nuclear juggernaut, that's not caught up in this whole mess, that doesn': have a vested interest, to come out and tell us the truth.
l I ,; ally do not believe the truth is being told, and I just' cite it from what I read in the newspapers. Why South Carolina rejected the latest shipmen from TMI because of plutonium, and they said in the paper that every time you call, i
is plutonium? Don't worry about it; we can't detect once ounce -
of it; it's not here. We know that is the eternam alpha emitter and that is the real killer.
. But, anyway, you don't want to hear the emotional things, but maybe you do, and I hope to finish here very quickly.
Presently, in taking petitions around and everything, this - - -
area right now is currently paying some of the highes: utility bills in Pennsylvania. I went to one family: their utility bill through the heating month is $300 per mon:h. My brother is $250 per month--and I can show you those bills. There is a retired couple that can't even use their electricity; they {
I have to use coal, so he had to build a little coal storage curside to deal with that. I j us use it, basically, I hea with a wood s:cve. The rule of thumb is you pay more for your utility bill-than you do for your mor: gage. People are really cramped.
65
- 1 I bring up about the purchasing power, and I don't know if this is the nature of your Commission here; we have an attorney on our steering committee and he said if Me: Ed is allowed to pass the purchasing costs to us, we will have the highest utility bills in the United States of America. Whether that is 1, 2, or 3, that is pretty gosh-darn high. So we can't afford anymore, nu.ber one, when you get to dollars and cents. We feel, as everybody feels , tha: Me: Ed and its stock-holders should pay for it.
.. .:- - Now, you know, I'm an educator. I can't afford to
. invest in stock. I checked one time and I backed out because the guy told ne 'if you can't afford to lose the noney you are going to invest, don't bother with it.' So I did not do that.
- So this whole controversy over Met Ed going bankrupt and deal- ~
. ._ ing with that issue has us very angry and conidsed. -
Our steering committee has certain ideas on that, but due to time, I'll pass over that. We are strongly in favor of a consumer owned utility where we will get a safe, reascnable fair price for our electricity where we have a choice in it, because we didn't have a choice with Three Mile Island. I
'" .P it was the greates snow job cf this decade.
Maybe I was ignorant. I admi: that I'm at faul ,
that I wasn't aware, that I wasn': involved, that I didn't knew what was taking place. Su: I would have known and if our community would have known, I don': think you wculd ever have
66 that Three Mile Island facility produced. .
But back to my family. You know, in our development, three out of 70 people stayed. I'm not like the mayor of Goldsboro and say I'm not afraid; I am afraid of certain things .
and I'm afraid of the unknown that I can't see. That's one thing about radiation. I almost didn't make it here today to this hearing. . When I had breakfast I was assaulted by some farmers over there that said, "If we had people like you we never would have won World War II." I said, "Yes, but at least then I knew who my enemy was." I said, "I was in the Army."
~
And I'm in that type of argument. -
But I'll never forgive nor will I forget what Met Ed
.did. Put yourselves in our position on Wednesday, and my boys
.were at the bus stop at 7:00 o' clock. And Thursday at the bus stop and Friday at the bus atop, and they did what they pleased ;
on releasing radiation. .They did what they pleased and we didn't have a hand on the monitoring until Saturday.
If I could just read you a little article out of the l
paper here, which is out of the Philadelchia Inc.uirer, frem Donald Costle (phonetic), the EPA, Environmental Protection 5 i
Agency. He said:
"The gravity of the situation appeared very slowly.
The first real signal of the seriousness of the situation did '
not reach me until Friday morning, three days after the reacter went out of control on March 23." He said, "The radiation '
67 monitoring systems around the plant could not cope with the emergency situation. It was not until Saturday when EPA set s
up monitors that adequate information on radiation was avail-able." He said, "The EPA was unprepared generally to provide immediate assistance."
I only read that, that what were my children and myself exposed to in those three days? The irresponsibility of Met Ed and the irresponsibility of NRC and how could this every happen?
I just hope that we do not become a statistic in 20., 30 years from now, but I know we are going to be a stat ~is-tic. Califano came out and said one, ten, -- I have the feeling anything you hear from the government multiply it times ten.
I don't mean to be snide about that. But who is the one? Have you -lived through a cancer death? I have.
~
If that ene is my -
son or my wife or me, I think it's wrong.
But anyway, with my feelings understood, asking me as a consumer to pay for any cleanup which insurance would take care of, or any purchasing power, I think is like asking the survivors of the holocaust to pay for a retirement village'for the 55. I really believe that. I don't say that -- on words. I look at Me:ropolitan Edison and maybe some other people, not as murderers but maybe as murders, but it's the murder tha: won't show up for ten, twenty, thirty years from now. In fact, I feel so strong abou: 1: that if they pass on
53 the cost to me and the PUC allows them to do that, I'm not going to pay it; I'll go o jail first. I'm willing to suffer the consequences for that. They may call you a radical or whatever. I like to think it's a patriot. I don't know what things keep bu::ing through my mind- " don't tread on me" or things like that, or maybe I'm wrong in those feelings, but this is how I feel, many people feel.
There's a key issue here that I hope you address your-selves to, and I'm trying to in education, is responsibility and accountability. When will someone--I wish I could do it--
please say to somebody in . Metropolitan Edison and all their ' -
affiliates, "You are wrong. You are responsible. You are going to pay the consequences."
If you would do that, or anybody, I think you would -
. hear America get up and applaud and you would hear applause ~
through the country. I think that would be a positive step in the right direction. Nobody has done that. This would put big business and all utilities on notice. " Listen. You are accountable when you deal with human lives; and if you do this, be ready for this action."
I think this is the problem in our country. I take this responsibility issue and I know we have some educators on this Commission here. Paren:s no longer, many of them, feel responsible for their children. We have a grea: throw-away j 1
generation eith children. Teachers sometimes aren': respons'k'= l 1
l l l
, 1 l
69 for t, heir students: "They don't want to learn; I'm not responsible." Educators aren't responsible for the curriculum:
"I don't have any money; what do you expect?" And when is the whole vicious cycle ever going to stop?
The justice system: I just read in Philadelphia, a young man banged the head of a woman against a wall; killed her.
He's going to get three to 30 years because he was not respon-sible at that time. So I think this is a key, monumental case right here, very serious and I hope someone has :ne ' courage, but with a vested interest, can you have courage? I don't know.- l Just say, " Met Ed, you were responsible; you wd-11 pay."
You know democracy has a key test right now and maybe this is not what you want to hear. But our motto on our
~
committee is " people do make a difference." But I was at the rally in Washington and there were a lot of young people there' ~ -
and a lot of middle-aged people like myself with gray hair, etcetera. They're saying, look, don't waste your time; people do not make a difference; money, big business speaks.
So you have apathy. In our primaries here, I got out and worked for my first time and lost for somebody I was supporting. Only 24 percen voted. This is causing apathy.
Look a: today. You would think tha: this would be filled with people vitally interested in it. They are not, because they feel that, really, their input does not make a difference.
But honestly, you knew what, I j us t talked to somebody
- - - - . - ~ . . . - . --
70 before I came in here that said, you're wasting your time; you don't make a difference. As I started looking at the facts and jotted them down here, our governor has come out and stated publicly that we should pay. Maybe not the full cost, but that we should pay. In fact, we tried to get the truth after our first three meetings; we couldn't get to first base with anybody.
So we said, let's go to the governor himself as responsible citi: ens. We called his appointments secretary; he said the governor doesn't have time to meet with every radical, splinter group that comes along. We tried the lieutenant gove rno r.
~
He had more important business to attend to. So that got ui u'p' set but that didn' t deter our energy to find the truth.
Look at our consumer advocate. Mark Woodoff (phonetic) resigned. They knew four or five months in advance he was going.to resign. Do you know we don't have a consumer advocate fighting Met Ed, representing me? How else am I going to be represented? Do you know they should have eleven lawyers? They are down to seven. They may lose three more; they're down to four. And their morale was low and they are in a critical battle like this. Where do I turn to?
So we're turning to our legislators. Bu: I'm finding they are very apathetic about it and they won't give you a straight answer. Even Thursday, Ccngressman Goodling said, I can't give you an answer until I find all the facts.
! think the facts abou: Net Ed are so eviden: *
.ou'd I
, - , _ _ . - _ _. ~ , . .
71 stumble over them if you didn't even look for them. And now the Attorney General's office is interfering with the Consumer Advocr.te's office, which I don't know the reason behind it.
If you look at the PUC which is supposed to represen:
me, Heavens! that's the only check we have on this monopoly.
They are our free enterprise system, you might say. Historically, they are pro-utility, but Thornburgh j ust appointed Rober: Bloom, or nominated his for the PUC; he is so pro-utility he is the only one that voted against not shutting off the electricity for elderly people. He thought if they didn't pay the bill,~it should be shut off. We are very concerned abou: that.
Even President Carter and Schlesinger. We worry about what is the bottom line. I know I'm naive in this. I hope to finish up in one minute here. What is their influence even on' -
Governor Thornburgh? Because we feel that the State of -
Pennsylvania should have been declared a disaster area. But you ask the governor : hat question and you ask other people, they'll hedge on you. They feel if Presiden: Carter interfered, and say, no, that will cause too many problems, don't do it.
So the bottom line is how they feel down in Washington. I even read in the paper today that maybe this Commission here has even been put on the back burner by ?residen Carter--whatever that means.
What I'm trying to say is the influence of Presiden:
Carter and how he really feels, and then the NRC, their pas:
/'
l history, and their shoddy way that they licensed, there's no way : hat Me: Ed should be open and how they monitor. And now they even say they are going to allow Met Ed to dump the 800,000 gallons of water, once it gets to a certain level, at their discretion. No, no. That can't be done.
I only bring this out to say, who speaks for me? Who speaks for the consumer? I think the cards are stacked against us. However, we're optimistic. I'm an optimistic guy by nature. It's David versus Goliath, we look at it. We're David; they're Goliath. But however, one thing was significant--David.
did kill Goliath. I hate to use the word kill, and I hope that is not taken out of context.
So, hopefully, I hope that we can offer some solutions.
At the same time you ge emotional and you rant and rave. Right -
now if something happened at Three Mile Island and you' heard a -'
whistle, would you know what the signal is for nuclear evacua-tion? Is it one? Is it two? Nobody knows. I think we should practice that. I think this influenced Governor Thornburgh's decision to evacuate. I think there's a coverup in that evacuation. I think we probably should have evacuated, but everybody said we're no: prepared and we're going to have panic.
Our Committee feels, and we mentioned this to Congressman Goodling, that.:here should be a mandated practice evacuation once a year around every nuclear facility, and
- they should practice
- hat, whether it's a 5 or 10-mile radius,
I so ,
l we don't know.what the cut-off would be.
i Amend the Price-Anderson Act, make it a law, but this should be done immediately. Within three months we ought to have a practice evacuation here in this area. Now, why not?
I'm an educator. We do this four times a year. The police come in and time 1:. Why? Because the safety of your young '
l people are at stake. I think the same-thing should carry over j to the people.
Also, you are going to hear a lot about repealing the Price-Anderson Act. You know, we almost lost Pennsylvan'ia . -
I I left my house with my family and just I think that was it. .{
We didn't both to take anything. What would a good insurance l policy be on TMI--515 billion? I CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Excuse me. Could I ask you just to --l conclude your remarks in fairness to all the other people. who -
want to be heard?
MR. MINNICH: Okay. I'll conclude. So with our l committee, the Newberry Steering Committee, we're working hard I I
and trying to work the system, and we know this is a complicated problem. )
You know, however, we are ready for the worst. If the costs are passed on to us, I :hink Pennsylvania is going to hear an outcry from the public : hat they have never heard before. I thing the spirit of the Boston :ea party is going to be reincarnated and ! think tha migh; be good for democracy, I and I hope this doesn't happen, ,
i
14 If TMI-1 is allowed to open, you're going to see such demonstrations and civil disobedience that you've never seen before. And a strong statement from me for the safety of my children and other children, I would participate in civil disobedience to keep TNI-1 from opening, knowing that would probably cost me my job.
And you might say TMI, we call it the middle-class impact. And we want to have our first amendment, the pursuit of happiness. We feel that TMI-1 does not allow us to do that.
Hopefully, getting philosophical again, that we'can believe this is the kind of country--of the people, by the people and for the people.
That's the end of my testimony. My gut feeling is I didn't do a real good job communicating feelings to you, but these are my honest evaluatiens.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Thank you. Questions from Commissioners? (pause) I want to say it certainly helped me. It is one of the reasons we are here is to get a very strong impression on what the feelings and emotions are in this area which is one of the key things we do have to find out in order to appreciate the impact tf this kind of accident. I thank you very much for testifying before the Commission.
MR. MINNICH: Thank you.
(Applause) l
1
/3 MS. JORGENSdN: Our next witness is Dr. Judith Johnsrud from the Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power.
DR. JUDITH H. JOHNSRUD, Co-DIRECTOR, ENVIRONMENTAL COALITION ON NUCLEAR POWER: Mr. Chairman and Members of the Presidential Commission: It is not a pleasure to be here today. It is a matter of very deep personal pain for ne, as I'm sure it is for other residents of the Harrisburg/Middletown/
Goldsboro area.
My name is Judith Johnsrud. I reside in State College, Pennsylvania. I hold a doctorate in the field of Geography and have speciali:ed in the study of the environmental, politi-cal, and social aspects of the nuclear power industry for a good do:en years. I have also been a participant observer in a number of nuclear proposals in Pennsylvania over the last do:en years, and the testimony which I believe'you have before you will outline some of those projects that have been proposed for our Commonwealth that have also been rej ected by the citi-
- ens of Pennsylvania as being unsound, unwise, unsafe.
The breeder reactor was proposed in our state, underground nuclear explosions, uranium mining and milling, energy parks , 20,000 megawatts , half nuclear , and indeed, radioactive waste disposal, commercial low-level waste.
All of these projects over the last do:en years have been rej ected strongly through legitima:e political processes and by legal action where necessary by the ci i: ens of this
Commonwealth. But at the same time, there have been many projects of the nuclear energy that were beyond the control of the public. That is to say, the commitments had been made before members of the public were really aware and able to respond within the legally provided framework of administrative procedures.
Here I refer to a number of those projects which we in the Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Pcwer, of which I am co-director, have participated over, again, much of the last
. decade. In licensing proceedings for a full do:en reactors, we have attempted to improve the safety of nuclear energy if we ' "
were required to have it in our state.
I've outlined for you some of the areas in which we believe we have had some i= pact on reactor safety. The siting-of reactors, water availability, cooling tower needs 'for the protection of inland waterways, the use of the "as low as resonably achievable" standards, safety related health related equipment to be added to reactors, and perhaps most importantly, the establishment in the licensing proceedings for Three Mile Island Unit 2 of the fact that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has failed to account for the largest single long-term source of radioactivity in the entire nuclear fuel cycle.
This is, as I'm sure many of you are aware, the problem associated with raden-::: frem uranium mines and mill tailings. This issue, in fact, was first raised in the licensing l
l.
[ ,
/ '/
1 proceedings for Three Mile Island Unit 2 by my colleague, 1 Dr. Chauncqr Kepford.
Before I proceed, Mr. Chairman, I would like to men-tion that Dr. Kepford was to have testified today as well. As the legal representative of the interveners in the on-going licensing proceedings for Three Mile Island Uni: 2 and as a radiation chemist who has' undertaken independen: study in the time period since the accident of matters relating to radiation monitoring, dose rates, dose commitments, Dr. Kepford has asked that his testimony be taken under oath when that procedure is available to you. And I. hope that it will, indeed. We strongly -
ask that he be rescheduled to appear at the appropriate time.
It is extremely painful for me as one who has been ~
engaging in public education with respect to the variety of ha:ards associated with the complete nuclear fuel cycle for - -
so many years, to have to say to you and much worse, to the people of Middletown, we failed to prevent this unsafe reactor from-coming on line. I share with those who live here the experience of having been within the communi:y at the :ime of large release from the plant. I share with : hem the uncer:sinty, having no way of detecting the degree to which I, myself, along with the residents, may have suffered an inhalation dose, 2 ,
I dose that would not appear in subsequent :esting. I wish there i 1
were a way tha: we in cen:ral Pennsylvania could convey to you, '
and equally importantly, to the ci:i: ens of the entire na:icn
._ _ .-. . _ _ . .. - - - - - ~,. . - . - . - -
78 the terror that permeated our lives through those on-going days of worsening accident, insufficient information, and l uncertainty about the best course of action to protect ourselves and our families.
There are four points out of the many hundreds tha: 1 l
1 I wish we had time to address today that I would like to raise briefly with you, if you will turn to pages 6 and following of the prepared statement.
- 1. First in order is what we in the Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power view to be the on-going nature of
.the accident. The Three Mile Island accident is far from over. ~ ~
In fact, as we face the prospect of the accumulating amounts of water within the containment building, the lack of adequate cleanup systems for the treatment of that water, undertainty ~ ~
concerning its disposition altogether, and all of us fear the -
continued potentiality for accidental, unplanned, and uncon-tro11able release such as we have experienced with air venting.
We must recogni:e tha: the accident is most seriously still in progress.
For this reason, the Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power is announcing today thz: we have filed with the i Nuclear Regulatory Commission a supplementary petition to require that public hearings into the procedures planned in this experimental phase of reactor control be subjected to public evidentiary and adversary hearings through the Nuclear I
l
79 Regulatory Commission. We have also asked, in the absense of adequate radiation monitoring during the month and a half plus since the accident, that a far more extensive array of radia-tion monitoring devices be installed within a full 40-mile radius of the plant and that the public be apprised of the full doses, dose commitments, to which they are perhaps continuing to be exposed,- and in the uncertainties of the handling of further radioactive materials from the plan: have every right to feel they may be exposed.
In addition, in these hearings we are asking for what we consider to be the fundamental need at this point: ths withdrawal of the operating license for Three Mile Island Unir 2 and we will follow this subsequently with a request for the permanent withdrawal of operating license for Un'it 1-as well.
We believe firmly that Metropolitan Edison Company and its ~
parent company have demonstrated their inability to operate a nuclear power reactor safely.
I would be glad to make available to the Commission, in fact, I have submitted for your record and for your perusal a copy of this petition filed with the NRC.
- 2. Secondly, I want to address the question of the failure of response to protect the public and to notify the public during the on-going period of :he accident. First, of the need for evacuation. As the accident proceeded and i: be-came eviden: tha conditions were deteriorating, it seemed ::
30 us, particularly after the days of cross examination of Mr. Molloy and of Mr. Williamson, the county and state officials r'esponsible for evacuation and emergency planning, it seemed to us chat it was indeed time to move people. As you well recall, it seemed that way also to the NRC.
They were not moved for reasons that continue to pu::le us and which I hope you will investigate mos: thoroughly.
We were told by Mr. Ahern of the Commission that the fear was that more people might be injured or killed in the process of a panic evacuation than if they were simply left there, no matter what might happen to the reactor.
Now, had a proper precautionary evacuation been begun at the initiation of the accident, I believe no panic would have ensued among the American people, certainly among the people of this area. They would have been given, instead, confidence that their various levels of government were acting to protect them in the best ways possible.
A second realm of this issue that particularly troubles me is the lack of notification to those who lived beyond the lethal :ene, but in those areas downwind in the eastern United States where we could rightly have anticipated substantial radiation doses with the passage of the initial 1 1
plumb. I
( New, those I know in Philadelphia, in New York City, l
and Scranton, Nilkes-3arre, Easton, Se:hlehem, even Washington, l
l
31 D.C., any of those metropolitan areas where indeed that stagnant !
I mass of air might have moved when it finally began to pick up l
speed, those people said, we were told there was no immediate i danger and no immediate damage. By so informing the public, I j believe deeply that our agencies of-government have failed to protect properly. There were measures that could be taken.
They were simple, they did not require evacuation for the mass of people of the Eastern Seaboard. But had the public been notified of their ability to minimi:e the radiation exposure and thereby to minimi:e the additional risk of subsequen:
development of cancer--leukemia--we believe that the ' pub'lic ' '
would have been far better served and, indeed, the magnitude of the potential damage might now be fully unders'tood b'y the -
American people as I believe it is still not. ' ' ~
I found myself astonished to refer back to the l'964-1965 revision of the infamous Brookhaven Report, WASH-740--
and I have submitted certain selected documents from that 1964-65 revision for your benefit--to find in those documents the indication that a thousand megawatt reactor a thousand days.
of operation with a small hole in the containment would cause prompt fatality as far as ninety miles downwind, that sub-stantial iodine doses to the thyroid would be experienced at distances beyond 600 miles. The public was not informed in
- he Eastern Seaboard of their ha:ard.
- I
, . . . . . . . - . . - - -- ~ ~ -
- 82 1
- 3. A third' issue that I have raised here, which I won't go into in any great detail, has to do with who pays the cleanup costs. We firmly believe it should not be the rate payers of Metropolitan Edison. These people are, certainly in this part of Pennsylvania, suffering far more than any per-son in our society has a right ever to have to suffer.
We do, however, believe that the repeal of the Price-Anderson Act is a move that must be recommended and strongly backed by the administration and passed by the Congress.
4 With respect to NRC's procedures, my fourth '
point, the rules of practice and the procedures for siting.and licensing nuclear power plants have been wretchedly bad; We -
who have attempted to protect the public by participation-in' these proceedings over many years have been forced in the -past -
few years into a position of supporting the existing licensing proceedings which are, I must say from my participation in a do:en license cases, totally unfair to the public, in no way deal in any depth whatsoever with the fundamental issues of safety, of environmental impacts, of health effects, of quality assurance, ct . control, or any other aspect of nuclear regulation which we, as the public, should have the righ :o expect from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
I mus say that my conclusion has to be a: this stage tha: there is ne justification whatscever in our society
83 for further licensing of any additional nuclear power plants.
Perhaps we could simply abolish the NRC's licensing function.
We have more than enough reactors placing us at risk at the present time.
From the terror and trauma that have been experienced and are still being experienced by the residents of the Susquehanna Valley and all of central Pennsylvania, I must con-clude that nuclear power plants are not safe enough to be operated, that no alleged need for electricity can in our wealthy society at this time possibly justify subjecting the - '
American people to the kind of experience that we have had in Pennsylvania in the past seven weeks.
And beyond that, I mus add from my view as a geographer, we are tending in our concern with reactor safety a: the present time perhaps to overlook that very most funda' 1
mental problem of nuclear energy, and that is the on-going and desperately rapidly increasing need for safe disposal of the radioactive waste that we have already generated. When we review radioactive waste as a production problem of nuclear power plants, I think we can see that in the absence of the fundamental research and demonstration needed to precede the disposal of radioactive waste, we are acting foolishing in the extreme to permi: the continued additional accumulation of such waste.
I haven't conveyed, I'm afraid, the sense of internal l l
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34 turmoil and anguish, pain and very real damage that I see in the eyes of my many friends and associates throughou: this part of Pennsylvania. I hope tha: they will be able to do a better job of doing so before you. I ask you to open yourselves to what they have to say.
I will be happy to answer questions, and thank you for your attention.
CHAIRMAN KDENY: Could I just ask a simple question of fact? There was one point early in your testimony; I simply couldn't hear you on one thing. I heard the request that Dr. Kepford be called as a witness under oath. I didn': hear your statement on what subject he wished to testify specifically.
DR. JOHNSRUD: Yes. Mr. Chairman, Dr. Kepford has undertaken independent monitoring in the vincinity of the '
~
plant and distances quite substantially beyond the' NRC's-monitoring :one during the course of the accident. And he has found on more than one occasion tha: the levels of radioactivity, the dose rates at distances very far beyond the monitoring by the NRC where it is substantially higher than background levels l and very much higher than the levels actually experi~enced a:
the plant site.
l l This has said to him tha: the location of :he moni-
- oring devices has been inadequate to detect the actual places where the plumes have touched to ground and where the doses have been experienced. In the mos extreme instance, on the
85 ,
afternoon following the Easter Sunday release of iodine, Dr. Kepford found 30 miles northwest of the plant upwind dose rates that were on the order of 50 times the natural background level, and this was upwind, a most peculiar situation. At the same time he found normal background radiation in the vicinity of the plant itself.
He has undertaken, from the published data, a review of the dose calculations, the dose estimates, particularly from the ad hoc group report that was released this past week, and has information at variance with some of what is becoming
- the conventional wisdom from the published reports that he would -
like to present to you.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Thank you. I think I can speak for :
the Commission.: hat we will most certainly want to tale testi- -
. many from Dr. Kepford under oath under the circumstances. -
DR. JOHNSRUD: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Thank you. professor Marre::. -
COMMISSIONER MARRETT: I would jus: like a little more information on the Environmental Coalition. I understand from
, your statement that this is a Pennsylvania based group.~~ Does that mean that it is principally one in this locality? Approxi- >
mately how many members do you have? Just a little description of your organi:ation.
DR. JOHNSRUD: Surely. The Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power came toge:her in 1.370 f:11owing the developmen l
86 and, we feel, successful opposition to both the Plowshare Program to explode over a thousand nuclear bombs underground here in Pennsylvania back in 1968, and in 1969 and '70 the proposal for siting the liquid metal fast breeder reactor in the northeastern part of the state.
j In 1970 the utilities--Philadelphia Electric, Metro-politan Edison, in particular, and of course, Penn Elec (Pennsylvania Electric Company) -were combining to construct a number of nuclear power plants in both the Susquehanna and Delaware valleys. And the small local citi: ens groups simply banded together to form the statewide coalition in Ncvember of 1970.
We,are public interest. We are very loosely organi:ed and loosely functioning, trying on the whole to provide docu-mentary evidence. We carry the government reports around to people who are curious, eager for information. And to attempt to coordinate the efforts of citi:en groups in Pennsylvania.
We have had over the years something on the order of 35 member groups. It fluctuates, of course, as little grassroot citi:en groups come and go, depending upon the backyard urgency of a problem. But these groups include a number of well established environmental organi:ations, chapters of Audubon Societies, for examp le . And hence, the numbers represented, we feel, are on the order of 10,000 altogether.
3ut, of course, the : ore of each of these groups
07 would be the small group of people who are particularly con-cerned about the nuclear issue. Some of the groups are inter-ested in other environmental issues as well.
So we have attempted to provide a coordinating func-tion and a function of information provision, a bridge to the s tate goverr. ment. l am servin;; and have been serving since 1975 on the Governor's Energy Council Advisory Conmittee. We have a member on the PUC Advisory Committee, and have partici-pated in task forces on energy policy in Pennsylvania, trying to act in the legitimate political and legal r'ealms'. ~ -
~~ ~
COMMISSIONER MARRETT: I suppose I'm particularly interested in the local groups. Are there quite a few which are involved with the coalition; that is, from rhis immediate area?
DR. JOHNSRUD: It's a curious thing, you know.
The Three Mile Island Aler: group here in Harrisburg had organi:ed back about two or three years ago and had been in contact with us and had looked to us for information. We had provided speakers for their programs. We were alreadv deeply involved in licensing proceedings, having been requ. red to file clear back in 1971 for the Three Mile Island Uni: 2 proceedings that didn't get underway until '77.
In the 1977 evidentiary hearings, however, curiously here was very 11::1o interest here in the Harrisburg area in those proceedings. Sessi:n after sessicn, Jr. Kepford and I,
.- ... . -- . . . - . . ._ - . - . . - . . - . . . _ . . ~ _ . _ - . . . . - - . - . .
38 who conducted the proceedings in the absence of our financial 4
ability to hire an attorney, sat in that room with the brace of attorneys from the utility, from the NRC, from the state, all favoring the plan and no one at our backs. We had no money for expert witnesses. There wasn't support. We did the best we could, certainly; it wasn't good enough.
But since the accident, of course, now the people of this part of Pennsylvania and elsewhere in the state under-stand the things that many of us had been trying to teach for
^
a long time. We have internali:ed nuclear energy.
CHAIRMN KEMENY: Commissioner McPhe rson.
COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Dr. Johnsrud, you say in your testimony that if.the authorities had ordered an evacuation ,
at once as a precautionary measure that you believe that public ;
confidence in the authorities would have outweighed any ten-dency to panic. Does that mean that you think an evacuation ,
should have been ordered at once? l DR. JOHNSRUD: I certainly do.
C0bNISSION5P McPHERSON: That "at once" means on Wednesday?
DR. JOHNSRUD: It means on Wednesday, yes. Sir.
COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: And that would have been for I
a 3-m11e or a 10-mile aren? l l
DR. JOHNSRUD: Had we begun :he evacuation proce- l dures Oh, by.the way, I may have mentioned in the :estimony, i
j
89 I was not allowed to cross examine the witnesses from the Commonwealth or the county on evacuation beyond the 4.3 mile radius that was set in the utility's design basis accident.
Under the NRC's rules and regulations, that is prohibited, no matter how far evacuation might actua]1y be needed and no matter what the responsibilities of the county and state officials might be.
But certainly they had assured us under oath that they were well prepared to proceed, three to four minutes is all it would take, Mr. Molloy says under oath, to have his -
people ready to go. Now, by noon on Wednesday the close in
. area could have been pretty well evacuated. I would surmise that.within the following hours and days as the condition of
- - . the reactor worsened, that there would then have been'the -
~
_ appropriate mechanisms and ability to proceed outward in an -
orderly manner with people leaving.
As we all know, as it worked out, people had to take the initiative of doing so themselves, which placss an enormously unfair disadvantage to those who are poor, lack automobiles, had nowhere to go, couldn't afford $ 0-S25 a night for a motel a hundred miles away, as many people were doing, were infirmed, were unable to move. They were the people who were caught in this area and could not leate even if they wanted to.
Certainly we had tried to ge: evacuation inicrmation
90 out. One of our contentions in the licensing proceeding had been that a real live drill or drill procedures should have s
been testec with the population in the vicinity of this plant before it was ever allowed to operate. And every witness--for ,
the NRC, for the utility, and the Commonwealth--protested mightily that people would only be confused and alienated if they were forced to take part in an evacuation practice.
COMMISSIONER McTdERSON: May I ask you one last question? When do you think it would have been safe, had an evacuation been ordered on Wednesday, when would-it have been -
safe to permit people to return to this area? - ~ -
DR. JOHNSRUD: Given our problem with accumulating water in the containment structure, there are many who might question if it is safe now. However, I would say at the very .
. - minimum, in view of the uncertainties concerning the effective -
ness of the shift to convective cooling on April 27, in view the experimental nature of the procedure once they made that shift--the NRC was uncertain whether they could go back to cooling pumps, what a high pressure injection system would do--
given the uncertainty of the condition of that core 'and the -
effect of suddenly increasing the flow rate again, if it were necessary to restart the pumps, we had, with another nuclear engineer, Dr. Kepford had done some calculations, had investi-gated the possibilities for temperature rises sufficien: to put them back in a situation of :ir:enium burn, and fel: that a:
91 the time that they moved to convective cooling those uncertain-ties of the effectiveness of convective cooling to remove adequate decay hea were such that we were back in a very high ha:ard period.
As a matter of fact, Dr. Kepford's initial petition 1
I to which the one I've submit'ted to you today is a supplement was submitted to the NRC after a day of consul:ation with 4
l l
Roger Mattson and others, submitted within an hour of that 1 forced move to convective cooling. That was a period of very high hazard. I was very frankly --
COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: That was on what day? i l
DR. JOHNSRUD: That was on April 27.
COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: About a month afterwards?
1 DR. JOHNSRUD: Yes, almost to the day.
CONNISSIONER McPHERSON: So you think that probably cecole should have been evacuated, ordered evacuated and e e 1
1 1
ordered to remain away for tha: non:h?
DR. JOHNSRUD: I would say as a conservative measure, in view of the kind of ha:ard associated with that shif: to convective cooling.
Now, of course, I recogni:e tha: that would represent a very grea economic de rimen: :o this area and :o :he recipient areas. Su: I think tha: we have tended to pu: a bi ou: of join the rela:ionship be: ween ec:nomic de:riment and de:rimen: to human health and geneti: hea.':h. I, f:: :ne, feel
1 i
l 4
- o. .- i i
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1 certain that we have not received a full dose assessment tha: l includes the inhalation doses that in:egra:es appropria:ely over the full period of the accident to date still on-going.
1 I feel certain that, jus: as with the atomic bomb l i
i testing situation, we are going to find some years down the line that the optimistic one or two or ten cancer deaths was ,
an unjustified position for the government to have taken at this time.
COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN KE.NENY: Any questions? (Pause) Thank you very much for your testimony.
P DR. JOHNSRUD: Thank you.
(Applause)
MS. JORGENSON: Our next witness this morning is Mr. Edward First. :
EDWARD FIRST, CAPITAL AREA TASK FORCE " FORWARD": ;
Good morning. My name is Edward First. I'm a Harrisburg 2:torney and a pas: presiden: of the Harrisburg Area Chamber i
of Commerce, past president of the Harrisburg Area Industrial r Development Corporation, and chairman of the Steering Committee ,
of the Capital Area Forward Task Force, which I'll explain a bi: nore briefly.
The gentleman on my lef is Mr. Joe Krajsa, a '.oc21 publisher and he is also a member of Our Steering Commi::ee for the Capital Area Task.Fer:e ?crward.
a-
.3 We didn't ask to come before your fine Commission this morning; we were urged to be here and of course we responded :o that invitation and are glad to make any small l
contribution we may make. We're not really concerned with '
nuclear energy pro or con, the reason for TMI, how or why it happened, whether it should be soon reactivated and reopened l 1
or never reopened. Our concern is chiefly related to the l
economic and psychological fallou: that we know is presen:
with respect to the grea:er capital city area.
j l
As a group of concerned citi: ens, we've tried to put l
- cge:her a program that, by affirm and positive steps, will l
effectively overcome wha: the doom sayers : ell us may very well make this a nuclear leper colony for a long, long time.
I don't know, very frankly, if your Commission is concerned with the responsibility and :he objectives that we have in mind, but we were asked to be here, so le: me make a brief statement, and if you can help us, God bless you. I'll try to be brief. I'll try to confine it to the ten minutes that we were asked to observe. I think I will be more successful in that regard if I stick to the script, than if as
)
8 an a::orney I get off and inclined to ramble.
Within five days after the March 23:h "ac:iden:" a:
t TMI a small group ci ::ncerned citi: ens f rom :he Grea:er Capital City Area me: :o assess wha: the ews media were : hen pain:ing in br0ad strokes as the wors: nuclear ac ifen
- a h i s : O r'." . 2:
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94 a time when a mass evacuation was seriously spoken of and when there was even a conviction by many, including so-called experts, that we would have a core meltdown that could lead to a loss of lives in this area where you are today of anywhere from 10,000 to 30,0-0 persons as well as serious health impairments for about 100,000 persons over the nex: 30 years. These were the extremes that we were told.
And so the Capital Area Forward Task Force was created.
The group consists of 130 leaders--and I use the word leaders loosely; they are representative and re,ponsible folks from every level of our private, governmental and cultural communi-ties, and also consists of investors who believe that the Greater Harrisburg Area is not only strong, but it has a healthy heartbeat and can accelerate its growth through c:=munity and governmen: leadership.
But even as late as May la in tha: May la issue of Time Magazine, millions of readers of that publication read that " Secretary o f Heal:h, Educa: ion and Welf are , Joseph A.
Califano, Jr., had backed away from his original estimate tha:
the Harrisburg nightmare would cause no cancer deaths among the 2,000,000 people living wi:hin a 30-mile radius cf Three Mile Island. Appearing before Chi: Senator John Glenn's
.'iuclear pr:liferation and Energy Subc:mmi::ee, :alifano pre-dicted 2: leas: One dea:h and acknowledged th:: 3 =e scientifi:
investigat:Ts Were estimating up :: ten dea hs. T '~. e r e V *. s i 0 n i
l Q*
was necessary because i: turns out tha: the initial levels of I radiation released in the accident were higher than thought at the time" (underscoring added) ano so today there are federal committees and studies such as your own functioning at the executive level, numerous congressional studies and investigations, an official pennsylvania Commission on Three Mile Island soon to get underway next week, local Chamber of Commerce seminars and studies, county and other forms of local government studies and a myriad of other priva:e groups assess-ing the impact of the acciden: pro and con. I'm sure you've I
had a great deal of duplication and a great deal of reiteration l in :,en :,ings n. you,ve hear,, anc. I hope we may .or:ng you, 1: . ..
nothing else, a differen viewpoint abou: this matter froa what I've heard here this =orning as repetitious.
It may be that the proliferation of activity in this area would sensibly indicate that the volunteer, ad hoc task force for which I speak is unnecessary and should be disbanded at an early date. If that be the case, we shall be realistic I
enough to take that step, although it is a: the r.oment a bit too soon to tell, even though the Pennsylvania Secretary of Commerce, James F. Sodine, stated within the las: week :ha:' based on a telephone survey which had been made by experienced profes-sionals, "i: now appears the trave". industry will no: ::n:inue
- o suffer the stigma of TMI and bear the brun: ci :he ec:nomi:
im act."
l 9e 3y the same token, no one yet seems to know whether or not there will be any significan adverse agricul:twal side er:ects although there are reports from our Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environmental Resources tha: 1 I
1 there will not be, and we pray they are correct.
Some conventions have been cancelled and some that were cancelled have been rescheduled. Sales of real estate ,
were slightly depressed in the firs: 15 days after March 23, but ::ansfers of real property now seem :o be proceeding at a )
normal rate.
While we do not know today wha: the actual economic ,
fallout may be, we know tha: there is enou-h 5 strong = peculation about economic fallout that it seems to be wise to observe the '
old adage that "a stitch in time saves nine" and so if our task force is able to be instrumental in moving forward a number of badly needed and long-planned area proj ects , this will completely offse: the sychological fallou and the real i uncertainties that continue to exis: about wha: the nega:ive implications of TMI might be to the Greater Capital City Area over the next few years.
The Ca; ' Area " Forward" Task Force recen:17 developed and submi::ed to the Governor and L:. Gcverner of Pennsylvania, because the Lt. Governor is to chair a special
- mmi::ee and will have aanv Of the same Objectives we hare, a pcsi:ica paper indicating its aims and Obj eC!ives. That has
- 0. .
been attached to what we have given you today. I'm no: going to read that whole thing through. You can read it if you see fit.
Nothing could be more appropriate as a par: ci :his statement than to quote from a portion of that paper (dated May 2) and I will quote from only a portion:
The Task Force is also presently seeking an appoint-men urgently and realistically seeking an appointment with the President because his presence here during the peak of the emergency made it clear that he has a strong personal interes:
In ne.3 ping to dispel any notion that wha- happened at tA1 should make this Greater C apital Ci:y Area a nuclear leper colony. A copy of the position paper that has been delivered to one of the President's aides is also attached to that which we gave you today.
As time goes by and as many of the hundreds of the news repor ers who covered the TMI acciden: return here to assess its impact a year from now, and TV sc.ecial o.rc~ srams are already being arranged that will be released March 23, 1980, we have to present--we, I believe -ha: the community, concerned persons--have to star: n:- -- 'e prepared then :o presen-unmistakable evidence tha: :he people of this region have go: en :oje:her *o Cove forward -- tha ' 5 -he reason f 7 the word "f0rWard" in :he denCminati0n of :he :ask f 0rce -- :0 T.CYe forward :0gether wi-h 10 Cal, state and federal 3 0 Ye rn.r e n t s
93 l
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as well as the private sector, all expressing a confidence in this area.
ine private sector n,as a,reac.
. y mani:e s t e,. . :s c o n:. .1-dence by proceeding after the TMI accident with Appleton Paper Company's, a $30 million plan: expansion, very close to Harrisburg. IBM is planning major new facilities. Marrio::
Hotel will break ground next week for a $15 million plant. The local newspaper, The Patriot and Evening News, is about to expand physically its plan to almos: double its si:e.
These projects manifest the confidence of the private sector in the future of the area. There are, however, concrete and visible means by which the state government can, and we think must, con:ribute substantially to this attitude of con-t fidence and progress.
When the reporters return to central Pennsylvania, will they again be jarred first by the inadequate and decrepi:
gateways to our region in the form of the Harrisburg Inter-national Airport which lies nearby, and the Amtrak Termina'. ;
in Harrisburg? Or will they observe that real progress has been made in turning these facilities into ccmmunity asse:3, restored, renewed, modern, efficient, and comfortable?
These are but two examples ci solid forward motion for the Harrisburg area-where s a:e governmen: can be very effective in the movement. The 3:2:e governmen; shculd L solidly suppor: :he :: :inued revita'.i:2:icn of dowr.::wn l
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o c.
Harrisburg, the core of the area. This it can do by under-standing and supporting the centinued progress of what we refer to as Harris:cun.
In the near future the state will be faced with a decision concerning the establishment of a Judicial Center for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and it is going to be philadelphia er Harrisburg. We believe i: needs :: be in Harrisburg because this is where state government is and it can be more effi-ciently and economically cperated if it is located in Harrisburg.
Our South Bridge and its approaches have long been recognized as one of the mos dangerous stretches of highway in the East. Acceleration of the remodeling and reconstructica of that bridge and its au.n.racches will save lives and will l l
1 demonstrate tha: the state government believes in the capital )
i ci:7 area.
1 The Departmen: of Defense, prior :c -he TMI accident, announced sharp cutbacks in its programs 2: :he defense facilities at Indiantown Gap and New Cumberland. These cut-backs will have a serious econc=ic impac: en the Harrisburg l
area a: the very time we're fighting what I' ve explained :: vou '
we are fighting. 5: ate governmen: should ge: solidly behind l efforts presen:17 being made by the ?cnnsy'.vania Congressi:na'.
1
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- j . . .A .o .h. %.1 a* $ .x 's* s. h.
. . e. .%. a. D. e.A. .x A. .A. n .n. e. e. .o ms f .e .. s m
o.. e.q.e. m. e.A .e.s .m.
l On any OutbaCN in ~he $acil'*ies II ei~her O Ihese bO3I3111IiCE3' l
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100 A major flood control projec: has long been of grea:
importance in the Susquehanna River here. 5:a:e governmen and the federal government can put real muscle behind efforts to make this flood control projec: go from the drawing boards to reality.
Our Cameron Street corridor, now a major access artery to :he city, can be greatly improved by :he completion of the long-planned widening of that street.
Needed improvements in neighborhood housing and development in Harrisburg and other communi:ies can be acceler-a:ed substantially if the state government will arrange its priorities so that solid progress can be made in this area.
The state governmen soon must face squarely the need for new and vastly more efficient exposition facilities to repisce the obsolete and undesirable facilities at our Sca:e Farm Show complex. In the light o f the energy and transportation constraints which will inevitably confron us in the future, these facilities should be located in easy proximity to public transportation, namely, the intermodal i
- ansportatica center in down:cwn Harrisburg. 1 1
Imagine the reaction of the doomsayers of recen: iays l if : hey re: urn a year from now and they find, no: a wasteland
\
. W 4% w y w w w 44 66 w l
- obil :ed in:2 1::icn, ;:ing i:rward w :n ::nfidence 2nd I 1
en:husiasm to make ??nnsylvania's Capital Ci y and this 1rea
101 the vibrant and vital center of sta:e government it can and should be and one of which we will all be proud.
Thank you for listening. If there are any ques-tions, Mr. Krajsa or I will try to respond.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: May I ask you one question? Have you thought in what way a Commission like this could be helpful in your goals?
MR. FIRST: I thought you migh; ask that question because I was pu:: led when I was asked to come here about how our concerns and responsibilities might, vis-a-vis your Commission, be something that you could -- I would guess ensure a Presidential Commission that if you find sympathy and logic and reason in what we have advocated a no:e in your final report that because there is a real psychological concern about this area, tha: the federal governmen should show a sympathetic if not a priority ear to some of the programs like flood control and the military installations nearby and some recogni: ion or observance from you -- it might not need to go so far as a strong recommendation --could certainly help us with some of the assis: that we are looking for from the federal government. !
l I guess :he same thing might go for the 5:a:e govern- ,
1 ment. Su: we think we're right here in Harri; burg a: the !
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Capital and we hink we can 7011 up Our 31eeve5 and pretty Well je: from the g0 verner, if I nay be blun:, wha: we need. Bu: e:u
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I could certainly be helpful, ! believe, if you could make some s
discreet recognition of how a federal assis: could help to I
move the clouds away.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Any other questions? Professor Marret:?
COMMISSIONER XARRETT: One of the things that we have to do is get some indication of changes in the community. Now, I gather from your comments, 2nd I need some clarification, that you have been monitoring economic changes. You mention, for example, real estate sales. I'm wondering if this has been done on a fairly systematic basis so that we could get informa-tion with reference to a variety of economic indicators. I guess I'm not referring simply to proj ects that migh; be planned in the fu:ure, but is there any indication of the kinds of things we could look at to gi ve us some sense of what has been going on economically?
MR. FIRST: Yes, that's a good question, and like all good questions, : hey're the :ough questi ons. Both the Harrisburg and the West Shore Area Chamber of Ccamerce, which lie on each side of the banks of the Susquehanna River, are now undertaking the kind of economic survey to which you make reference. I'm sure if you asked them o submi: a tabu]ation of their findings, they will be happy to do so. Tha: is now und e r*.iay .
Jus: in this morning's mai; . go: my :opy of :he form
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from the Wes: Shore Chamber of Commerce. The Harrisburg one l has been done, and I believe the State Departmen: of Commerce l is conducting a survey, too.
l From what I've learned, very frankly, from the results t
( of the Harrisburg area Chamber survey so far, it's not very i meaningful. Now, I don't know if that's because they don't have the experts to put together :he righ: kind of cuestions but, 1
I frankly, wha: they've go::en back doesn't tell us :co much. !
But, again, this is all on the :hreshold; more is to come. !
I think our big concern is something else you referred to and : hat is a timidity about business and industry and that means jobs and cash flow for people. There's some reluctance. The further away you get, it's funny, the stronger that reluctance is to come into this capital city area. We don't find the timidity within 50 miles of here as much as we find it with a business that might be in Illinois or Ari:ena or l 1
Oregon that have some reason to come to this central Pennsylvania I area but now they say, whoops, we'd better :ske ano:her look a:
this; maybe we'd be better off in Atlanta.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Governor 3abbitt.
CCMMI55IONER 3A33ITT: That covers my question.
CHAID(AN KEMENY: He jus: covered your questien. Yes.
?rofessor Taylor.
C0httI55ICNER TAY'OR: -Jo you have any cencerns now abou: :he public health and safety 1spects of the pr cess of
104 dealing wi-h the radioactive materials now in containmen a:
the Three Mile Island reactor?
MR. FIRST: No. I don't mean to be blun and say we have no concerns; we're not addressing ourselves, Sir, to tha phase of the problem. There are many other groups that are digging deeply--the Hershey Medical Center,-the Pennsylvania Department of Health--so we've go enough to de with economics and jobs that we really haven't decided to get.into the heal:h aspects of it. No: that they are not impor an:, bu: we think others can do it be::er.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Professor Lewis.
COMMISSIONER LEWIS: Mr. First, tell me, if there is no way -this is an "if"--to make these plans 100 percen: safe, could you estimate for me the economic impact of doing withou:
the electricity from a nuclear power plant versus the economic fallout when you have a crisis like this? Do you think i:'s a fair trade-off? Are you willing to risk this kind of :hing happening in order to have the benefits of the plant, in ;
i economic terms? I l
MR. FIRST: That's also a tough question. I ;uess you're saying :o me'if TMI should never reopen, and I knew there is a large grcup of persons tha: think i: shculd never reopen, no: even the par: of i: which was unaffected, wha: 13
-ha going :: dc :: -he economy cf :he area? I guess 1:'s no:
.g0ing 00 do an?:hins "o the ec000my of "he. area, becauseLI'm I
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I
105 convinced that if it doesn't reopen we'll still have all the electrical power and energy we need here from other sources.
We may pay more for it because it is going to be more expensive to substitute, and that additional cos: I guess would be a negative factor if business and industry have to pay 15 or 25 percent more because it can't reopen. This would be another reason why people would select ano her location; maybe even a reason to move :o another location. I hadn't though abou:
that, but it would seem to be a logical conclusion.
COMMISSIONER LEWIS: Do you feel--this is just asking an opinion o,uestion--that it's worth the risk in economic terms to keep this plant going?
MR. FIRST: Do I feel what, Ma'am? Excuse me. Do I feel it's worth --
C0hWISSIONER LEWIS: The risk in economic terms to I
l keep this plant in operation?
MR. FIRST: Now, I'm going Oc give you my personal l l
. . . . 1 opinion, and I can't speak -- t think we teec to ge : put back into shape subjec: to all the safeguards and precautions j 1
that your study is going to indicate need to be applied and ge: I it back into operation, because I jus don': -hink we can speak - I speak for myself. I just don': hink we can mee:
this country's energy needs withour safe and sound, and I underscore safe and sound, nuclear energy.
....,.._.y.. .. . .
W sN e ) E i b ei E *N aus E l7' . _e)* 4 # 4 I
._. _ ~ , . , .. -- - -
106 MR. FIRST: I have many opponents when I say that, but you've asked me for my opinion, and you got it.
(Applause)
CHAIR >US KEMENY: Any other questions? Thank you very much for your testimony.
MR. FIRST: Thank you very much.
(Applause)
MS. JORGENSON: I'd now like to call Ken Miller, please, from the Hershey Medical Center.
KENNETH L. MILLER, M.S. ; C.H. P. , DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF HEALTH PHYSICS AND ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF RADIOLOGY, HERSHEY MEDICAL CENTER, PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY:
MR. MILLER: Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen. I am Ken Miller from the Milton S. Hershey Medical Center of the Pennsylvania State University. I am Director of the Division of Health Physics a: the Medical Center and I am Assistant
?;ofessor of Radiology.
I was asked by the Commission to come here and to share with you the results of monitoring that we did following the March I3 shutdown of the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant. In particular, you asked that I address our radiciodine monitoring program. We have two aspects of tha: program.
To being with, I would like :o share with <:u the information :ha: was ob:ained fr:m :he peri:d April 5 through April 15 in which we did provide :hyroid uptake :cun:ing for 137 citi ens Of the area requesting such a Ocun !c determine
3 .
P if there was any detectable radioactive iodine in their thyroid glands.
Throughout that period we evaluated the thyroid glands at 111 individuals. The breakdown of the communi:ies repre-sented by these individuals are on the document which I provided for you.
In particular, the areas most frecuently represented were Middletown (31), Etters (30), Elizabethtown (13),
York Haven (9), Harrisburg (9), hainbridge (7), Hershey (6),
Royalton (2), Mount Wolf (2) , Hummels town (1) , Dallas town (1))
In each situation we did not detect any radioactive iodine in the thyroid glands of these individuals.
We did our own monitoring throughou: his period of time because the information which we were receiving--and I'm referring now to environmental monitoring and radiation levels around our own facility--we did what monitoring that we were capable of because we did no have a good indication fica any of the news reports as to the exac: situation tha was occurring with the Three Mile Island nuclear power plan:. There-fore, we did our own environmental monitoring, our cwn environ-mental radiation determina:icns, and so :n.
Ni h one exception, and tha: exception being air samples which we pulled on Friday, March 30, we were unable ::
- detect any radioactivi:y, any radioactive ma erial, any radia-tica levels above the normal back;rcund '.evels in our area.
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'The air samples that we detected radioactivity in on Friday, March 30, were further evaluated and, to the best of our ability, we could not detect any radioactive iodine within the i sample, in particular the radioisotope of iodine-131. The gamma ray energies that we did determine to be representative of the sample were more indicative of radioactive xenon-gas, ,
in particular those of xenon 133 and xenon 133. The samples were taken on Friday. afternoon. They were repea:ed on Saturday.
And the levels had dropped significantly by Saturday. Through-out the entire period, this was the only time in which we detected anything in the Hershey area and particularly in the area of the Hershey Medical Center.
In addition to the thyroid, glands of the 111 residents of'the area that we counted, we also counted the thyroid glands of three employees of an organi:ation known as Ichthyological l
Associates from Goldsboro. They called recuesting that we do I coun: their thyroid glands because they were fearful that they had been expcsed because on the day of March 23 thev. had been ,
I l
taking environmental samples on the river and on the banks of Three Mile Island on Wednesday, March 23. They were brough: to the Hershey Medical Center; their :hyroid glands were counted, l and as wi:h all the rest, we saw absciutely no indi:2:ica of radicactive iodine in their thyroid glands.
One further bi: cf ini:rma:icn which I would like ::
share with vou was :he fac: :ha: :ur departmental secretary
109 F
from the Department of Radiology, by the way, did not evacuate '
s the area, did no: leave the area throughou: the entire time -
and who lives in Middletown, Pennsylvania approximately two miles from the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant. She was provided with a radiation detector known as a pocket docimeter on Friday following the initial incident at Three Mile Island.
This was kept in her home for the nex: ten days. The amount of change that we saw in the pocke dosimeter was six milli-roentgens, and as far as I'm concerned, this does not imply any type of radiation exposure from the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, but would be more consistent with the normal drif: rate that we see wi:h :ime with this type of radiation detector. '
That is really all I have to report. I would be happy to answer any questions that you might have.
2 t CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Dr. Mark 3.
COMMISSIONER MARKS: Thank you very much, Dr. Miller.
I wonder if I can ask you several questions. Wha: did you do ,
with this information? Today we've heard a fair a=oun: abou i
the lack of information about what was going on. You have here rather pertinen: =easurements during the time of :he Three Mile Island inciden: and for the period thereafter. Wha: did you do with this informa:lon in :erms of public health and safe:y?
MR. MI'~2R: Other than present;ng i: :: :his-1 I
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, ,n p - - -
.- . - .=. . . . ==
, , c, Commission, I have not presented i: formally to any other group.
~
However, this information was collected and was used :c provide assurance to the faculty, the staff, the patients, and so on, at the Milton S. Hershey Medical Center. This information was also made readily available to the areas of the community, and par:icularly the Hershey area.
On a week fellowing the inciden: a: Three Mile Island I did publish in the local Hummelstown Sun a le::er addressed to my friends in areas of this --
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: I'm sorry. I think we couldn't hear where it was published.
MR. MILLER: In the Hummelstown Sun, a 1e::er exp.3 aining to :.ne oes: c: my abi.,::y the situation as :. saw it in this area. I would be happv, to share with vou a cepv, of that le::er.
COMMISSIONER StARKS: We would appreciate that. Do you have any official designated role in :he evacuation or disaster reactica plan for the ares?
MA. MILLER: For the area, no. The only involve =en:
that we really have is tha: the Hershey Medical Center does maintain a medical radiation emergency plan. We have a formal agreemen; wi:h the Me repolitan 5dison Company that we wil", in .
the event of an acciden:, receive and provide reatmen:. for ;
radia:ica acciden: victims frca the p'_2n:.
~0MMISSICNER MARX 5: Nas tha activated in :his ins ance? j l
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111 Were you alerted to the possibility that you might receive any casualties?
MR. MILLER: No, Sir, we were not. At no time were we contacted and asked to prepare for this, although we were '
prepared should the need arrive.
COMMISSIONER MARKS: I'm sorry; I can': hear you.
MR. MILLER: A no time were we called and asked to put our medical radiation emergency plan into effect. And at no time did we receive a radiation accident victim or any indication tha: there had been a radiation acciden: victim at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant.
CO.NDtI55IONER MARK 5 : Are you the nearest large hospital o Three Mile Island?
MR. MILLER: We are approximately, as the crew flies ,
abou 3-1/: miles from the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant. I don't know how close the other hospitals are. How-ever, I :hink that we are probably the bes equipped from a personnel standpoin: and fr:m a monitoring s:andpoint, and a radiation detec:!cn standpcin:, we are probably the bes:
equipped within a 50 to 75 mile radius.
CC.'C:' ' ' ' ":3R MARK 5 : One last point. What censidera-ti:n was given and what decisi:ns were made a: :he Hershey Medical Cen:er with regard :: evacuation? You are w::hin the 10-nile ::ne, I understand. Were vou. involved in any discussions wi:h regard :c :he evacua:i:n :f the Medical Center :self,
I and to your knowledge was -here any evacuation in the Medical Center?
MR. MILLER: I was involved in discussions regarding what steps would be taken in the event of evacuation. This discussion occurred at approximately noon on the Saturday following the initial incident a: Three Mile Island--this, I guess, would be the 315: of March--a: which time a Dr. Washington who is as far as I know the Assis tant Secretary of Health for the Commonweal h of Pennsylvania, and at one time Acting Secretary of Health for the Commonwealth, did come to the Hershey Medical Center and discuss with no: only myself but out emergency room physicians, our hospital administra:ica, and so i on,-steps : hat would be taken in the event that an evacuation were ordered.
COMMISSIONER MARKS: Wha: decisions were taken? In other words, was anybody evacuated from the Medica 1' Center?
Did anybody evacuate voluntarily? What recommendations did you make to Dr. Washington as a result of your discussions on ;
Sa:urday?
MR. MILLER: Dr. Washington seemed a: the time to have informatica which I certainly did no have access :: a-the time, and his outlook cer ainly was grim. A: the time he seemed o have information which wculd indicate tha the situa-tion-wculd defini:ely ge: considerably werse. A: :31: poin:-in
- ime we recommended :: Dr. Washing::n -ha- if this ere in fa::
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the true situation and his source of informa ion were true and factual, that we would recommend immediately a very orderly i
and complete evacuation of the entire area. Because he was talking at tha: time about potential evacuations of areas out to 20 miles. The Hershey Medical Center is 3-1/: miles from Three Mile Island.
We told him quite frankly that in the event this type of situation did arise, we also lived within the 20 mile radius e
and those of us would be very concerned about getting our own !
families out of the area.
As far as evacuation from the Medical Center, there never was an evacuation. However, I think that we did decrease our patient census to the fulles: exten: possible so that in the event that an evacuation was called for, we would have a !
minimal number of patients to evacuate from the Medical Center.
COMMISSIONER MARKS: So in other words you began to implement a series of actions which would be par of a process i
that could even:uate in evacuatica? Did you actually transfer pa:ients or did you limit admissions?
i MR. MILLER: Both.
CCMMISSIONER MARKS: 3cch.
MR. MILLER: Patients were transferred. I :hink tha t
i some of our neo-natal patients who were in critical :are or ,
who needed very :1:se attenti:n were ::ansferred to the Philade'phia Children's Hospital.
. C:hers ".0 in as 3: eat a ".eed L
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114 of this critical type care were transferred to other hospitals.
patients who could be discharged at tha: time were discharged. i I think that we stopped admitting patients, a: leas: for a very short period of time, un:i1 we were fully aware of wha: the situation was.
The answer to your question is I think we transferred as many patients as we could. Our census dropped from somewhere in the neighborhood of 300 patients to slightly over 100 patients by the weekend. Yes.
COMMISSIONER MARKS: Would i be possible for us to get some kind of report on the tvents as it involved the Medical Center?
MR. MILLER: Yes, Sir. I think the individual tha:
you would want to call to testify would be Dr. Arnold Muller, who is Director of Emergency Care Department. He is also extremely active as an emergency care physician for the area.
Yes, I think that he could provide you with very good insigh:
- as :o this. I think :ha: this type of question is jus: slightly ou: o: my line. I'm no: a physician; I am a heal:h physicist.
COMMISSIONER MARKS: Thank you very much.
MR. MILLER: Cne other thing that I might add is as a resul: of this' discussion with Dr. Washing: n, we did discuss wi:h him the vari:us steps that would be taken in the even:
- ha: :here was a serious situa: ion resultin; in wiie-s:a'e .
- n:amina:i:n ci :he area. Xe T.ade very specifi: re:::menis: ions i
115 to him for implementation throughout the area. A: the Medical Center we lined up supplies and equipment and decontamination capabilities to the best of our ability within the requests that he made of us.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Commissioner McPherson. I'm sorry.
Governor Peterson.
CCMMISSIONER PETERSON: Mr. Miller, did any of the employees of the plant come to your Medical Center for any testing of radioactive iodine in the thyroid?
MR. MILLER: I don't know if any of the individuals tested were specifically from the plant. We did not have any specific requests from individuals a: the plant saying, I work at the plant, I woule like to be checked out. It is very possible that some of the people checked were from the plant, but I couldn't swear to that.
CChWISSIONER PETERSON: You don't have any first-hand information about the testing of the exposure of plan: e=ployees during that event?
MR. MILLER: No, Sir, I do not.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Yes. (recogni:ing Commissi:ner
- McPherson)
CClNISSICNER McPHERSCN: Mr. Miller, le: me see if I understood correctly :wo or hree things you said. The acousti:s are so bad in here that it is hard to fo'1:w sometimes, .
bu:'as I go: l'., y:u said tha: :he Hershey Medical Center is i
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115 the outstanding facility probably within 75 miles of the Three Mile Island plant, the outstanding facility in equipmen:
and personnel to deal with this kind of situation, to monitor it and to respond to radioactive injury. Is that correct?
MR. MILLER: That is correct.
COMMISSIONER McpHERSON: And that you had been so Ocenti: led o.y the State or ,.ennsylvania as :n.e nosp :a1 :.nat would respond in the even: of an acciden: at Three Mile Island?
MR. MILLER: I'm not sure that the State of pennsyl-vania had anything whatsoever to do with that. We were approached initially manyo many years ago by Metropolitan Edison and Three Mile Island people. .
COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: By Metropolitan Edison?
MR. MILLER: Yes. Requesting that we develop our 6 program and that we serve in this capacity in the event tha:
they should ever sustain a radiation accident victim at the plant. l COMMISSIONER Mc?HERSON: Is it true that in order to I i
l ge a license to. operate the plant, the operator has to show j that he has developed post accident plans which would include medical plans? In other words, Metropolitan Edison would have seen you.or your Medical Center in pursuance of i:s obligation to have such a plan?
MR. MILLER: Yes, I'n :ertain ha: such a reouiremen:
is 2. par: ~;f the licensing. No: Only is hating a p'.an par: :f I
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the license, but periodic review and testing of that plan is required. Fr:m the beginning of the operation of Uni: 1 we have enducted on a yearly basis simulated radiation drills with the plant in which simulated acciden victims from :he plant would actually be sent to the Hershey Medical Center -
C0hotI55IONER StARKS: Pardon me, Mr. Chairman. Ne j us t simply cannot hear the testimony.
CHAIMtAN KDtENY: Yes. Can you try concentrating on the mike on your left. I know i: 13 confusing having two mikes.
MR. MILLER: Do I need to repea: all of that, Sir?
CHAIMIAN KDIENY: The trouble is you are being :co polite and looking at the person you are talking to, which seems to be the wrong strategy here.
MR. MILLER: I said tha: not only is it a required part of the license to have such a plan, but it is also recuired to periodically test such a plan, and :o fulfill those recuire-nen:3, at least once a year we had a review training program, not only with our emergency care personnel, but wi:h personnel from the Three Mile Island nuclear power plan in which we wou d actually go through a simula ed radia:ica ype emergency there. We would normally get from one to three radia: ion acciden "vi::ims" supposedly :entaining no Only :rauma bu-con amina-icn. Cur people wculd g: -hr: ugh a'*_. -he pr:cedures tha: wouli normally be used in the even tha: :ha were :he
118 real situation, following which we would have a critique of the si:uation to pick out any problem areas or any weaknesses or any areas that should be changed. So we were constantly reviewing the program and constantly updating it as necessary.
COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: You ran these drills? You went through with these drills once a year?
MR. MILLER: At least once a year.
C0bSIISSIONER McPHERSON: When this even occurred or after this event occurred, you were not contac:ed by Me Ed or by snyone else to ready yourself. Is that correct? To get the Medical Cen:er ready in :he event of a need?
MR. MILLER: No, Sir. I think tha: they assume, and probably correctly so, that we are always on :he ready.
COFDlISSIONER McPHERSON: I couldn't unders:and that.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: He said that he things that they assume tha: : hey always were in the ready.
MR. MILLER: As a resul of tha:, the procedure is that they will call us only when there is a probabili y tha:
they will be sending us a radiation accident victim.
CCMMISSIONER McPHERSON: All righ:. They did no:
call you. We can't presume exactly why they didn': call you, but you assume it is because they didn': have anybody who was hur or ::n:amina:ed?
MR. MILLER: That is correc:.
COMMI5SICNER Mc?HERSON: The evidence veu presented
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119 in your original testimony suggests tha: the're was very, very little radiation effect, change in the radiatica levels as a result of this accident, at leas: in the areas that you monitored. Is that correc:?
MR. MILLER: That is correct.
COMMISSIONER McPHERSON: On the basis of these measure-ments, it would not have seemed to you that an evacuation of the area was in order. Is that correct?
MR. MILLER: That also is correct. As I indicated in the information which I gave you, we did evaluate various types of biological samples, including grass, leaves, puddles from water, soil, stones, etcetera, and found absolutely, to the best of our capability, no radioactivity on any of these samples. We have, following each Chinese nuclear bomb test, in the atmosphere been able to detect very significan: levels of radioactive material on all of the same types of samples. So, therefore, we would have to conclude that certainly the ha:ard represented in the area was far, far less than the ha:ard that existed a week after a Chinese bomb test.
CCMMISSIONER McPHERSON: How quickly :culd that change, if you .easured it, say, a: 5:00 o' clock in the afterncon en I
Wednesday, March 23, and f:und no measurable change in radi -
activi y levels, how quickly could tha: have chan;ed, had there been 2 mal:r release of-radi activity f 0m the pian: 7 MR. M:LLER: I suspec :ha; any change tha: we migh:
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( T 1:0 see in the area of the Medical Center would certainly depend on whether or not radioactive material being released reached us. Certainly if the winds were moving a a sufficient velocity in directions opposite from us, I wculd not expect to find any of it. How soon could i: theoreticall,< reach us, 12 seconds after I :cok my last sample, ! would guess.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Dr. Marks.
CCMMI55IONER MARKS: I'm not sure you are the person to ask this question, but in view of the =easurements tha: you were making and the lack of indication tha: there was any significant increase in background, I'm curious as to what was the reasoning behind decreasing the census and preparing the hospital for evacuation. In other words, wha: was the input you go: that started that procedure?
MR. MILLER: Well, I think tha: that particular time was about the time or shortly after the time it was discovered tha: there was a hydrogen bubble within the core of he reac:Or.
The situation certainly looked to be much worse than anybody 1
had previously thought. Based on the possibility that it migh:
get worse; also based on the problem that we might face because many cf the :eco.le
. ur.en hearin s the verv. distressing news tha:
was being released a: the time, many people, including I'r. sure i some of cur own e=playees, had already lef: :he area.
So 1: was purely en cur par: a.very pre:au:i:narv !
- hing to decrease Our census; nc: :nly were we helping curselves l 4
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oy coing t.s.is, out .oy :reeing up patients who eculd very sa:.e ly go home, I'm sure we were taking a tremendous burden off the minds of the families of :hese patients by providing them a me ans , if they were moving out of the area, :o take their 1
i friends or relatives, what have you, with them. '
So, like I say, you're delving into some areas tha:
I really are not within my expertise.
J l
CCMMISSICNER MARK 3: To what exten:, if any, was the '
cecrease in census owin to the :.ac: :na: no s o. l :a., c. e r s o n n e .,
were leaving the area?
1 1
MR. MILLER:
I'm sorry. I don't understand your question.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: The question is to what extent was the decrease in census due to the possibili y : hat some of your own hospital personnel may have been leaving the area?
CC)NISSICNER MARK 5: In other words, you might no:
have enou,,3n s a:: :o adequate.,y care :or :s.e in-patients so -
that would be a factor in wanting o decrease :he census.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Could I put the question more directly? To your knowledge, did some hospital personnel leave the area?
MR. MILLER: I don': hink that really was a factor at 211. A: no time throughou: the en-ire crisis were we : s poin:, :: ty knowledge, tha we 'ad insuffi:ien personne; ::
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CHAIR >LAN KEMENY: Professor Lewis.
CCSD4ISSIONER LEWIS : You say in your testimony that on March 30 the result indicated gamma ray activities ranging from four to five times normal background. Could you tell us what are the likely health results of that increase, if any?
MR. MILLER: These were gamma ray activiries in the activated charcoal air samples that we were pulling ou: side the facility. These were not increases in the background readings as being detected by the other instruments that we were using.
What we were doing with these samples was concentrating the background to a point where we could see radicactivi:y. The results of :his were that we had 2: that point in :ime enough radioactivity that we could begin to evaluate specific radio-isotopes within the sample.
To the bes: of our ability, we were unable to determine tha: there was any radioactive iodine within : hose samples, and tha: the gamma ray energies were mere indica-ive of the radic-ac-ive xenon gases.
COMMI55ICNER LEWI5: Su: you haven': said specifi: ally was there a danger to human health as a result of this increase in gamma rays?
MR. MILLER: As far as I was ::ncerned, and still am, no. The levels, the actual ::ncen:rati:n levels were verv, very 1:w.
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l CH.A:?!IAN KIStENY: Thank v:u terv T.uch for r:ur l testimeny.
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1., a-I'm conscious of the fac: that we have one shor:
' item of business to transact and I don' t want to forge: it.
Perhaps as a brief break, we could take it up.
We have the following dilemma with the Commission. It is a very temporary one that although we are very confiden:
that early next week we will have the subpoena and cath-taking power that we have been seeking all this time. We do no: have it as of today. Unless the Commission delega es the power to issue those subpoenas, as i: did at its previous mee:ing in anticipation for this one, I would have to call a special meeting of the Commission in order to issue such an order.
Therefore, I think a motion would be in order. Commissioner McPherson.
COMMISSIONER: Mr. Chairman, if I might make the following motion and ask my fellow Commissioners to support i::
I would move that the Chairman be authori:ed for the period commencing with the enactment of SJ Res 30, that is the s, Senate Joint Resolutica that contains this authority for this Commission, and ending with the convening of our next meeting I t
on May 30 to exercise the following powers of the Commission: '
First, the issuance of subpoenas recuiring the a::endance and testimeny of wi:nesses and the produ:: ion of evidence, and 5econd, the designation of Commission 2;ents, in o *he r. Wo rds , staff , to admi.".is t e r oa ths and af firma
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examine witnesses and receive evidence.
CHAIR >IAN KDIENY: Is there a second :: that motion?
CC>t>t!SS IONER : Second.
CHAIDIAN KDIENY: Discussion of the motion. (Pause)
If not, will all those in favor of the motion please raise your hand?
(Commissioners voted as requested.)
CHAIR >lAli KDIENY: Thank .ou. That is unanimous vote of the Commission, y o
(THE >10 TION CARRIED UNAND10USLY.) :
e CHAIR >IAN KDIENY: Stay we call our next witness, please?
StS. JORGENSON: Our nex witness i: Paul Doutrich.
PAUL DOUTRICH, StAYOR OF HARRIS 3URG: I'm Paul Doutrich, stayor of Harrisburg. I have nc wri :en statement bu: I could talk for an hour on it without a wri :en statement.
I will condense that hour into five minutes so we have time for questions.
First, a li::le c:mmen: cr question ! heard you ask
>lr. >liller. Hershey is the closes: hospital :: the O!! area.
Ho.ever, wi:hin a 13 mi'.e radius :here are five hospitals.
They are the only hospi als in the "arrisburg area -mainly, "cly Spiri: On :he Nes: 5h:re, the Harrisbur; Hespi:a' -hich .
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Harrisburg Polyclinic Medical Center, which is about 12 miles, maybe 12-1/2. There are no other hospitals within the 20-mile radius and the next closes; hospital would be in Lebanen, Lancaster, or up north. I just add tha: to the previous testimony.
I'd like :o s:nr: by giving you a sequence of events, or lack of events. This problem, I'm told, began arcund 4:00 o' clock in the morning of March 23. Harrisburg, inci-den: ally, is abou: 52,000--the largest single entity in the area. I got in my office about 3:30. A 9:15 I got a tele-chone call--not from TMI, no: from Metropolitan Edison, but from a 3oston radio station.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: From whom?
MR. DOUTRICH: A 3cston radio station.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: 3osten. Well, Bos n is a very progressive city.
(Laughter)
MR. DOUTRICH: They asked me what we were doing abou:
the nuclear emergency. My response was, " Wha: nuclear emergency?" They said, "Well, at Three Mile Island." I said, "I know nothing abeu: i. We have a nuc'. ear plan: there, but I knew nothing abou a problem." 5c they ::'d me; a 3oston i
radio sta*i0n.
I then :allei :ur :ivil defense Offi:e and they said res, -hey knew about i and were aking steps. Harrisburg s l
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, , b-t the county seat as well as the capi:al; this was the county civil defense. So from that point on, we began working with civil defense and with the state government', Governor
.hornburgh s , who lives in h.arrisburg; he is not jus: :.ne i
governor there but his residence is also there. I got into the proceedings immediately. He designated L:. Gcverner Scranton.
To this momen: I have not received a call from ,
Metropolitan Edison concerning a problem a: Three Mile Island.
I received calls frem Australia, Japan, a' German T7 5:2:icn came in, the Mayor of Austin, Texas called me to ask abou the situation since they were having a referendum on a nuclear plan: the following Tuesday-- hat's where the info.rma-icn came frCm.
Through Wednesday we weren': too excited in Harrisburg. We thought something was wrong and we were s:arting
- take precautions. Thursday was a sther tense day. 5till nothing frca Three Mile Island. Thursday we began preparing 1
?
I evacuation plan, no: tha we thought we'd need it; we hcped we '
wouldn't, but we started to prepare one. Thursday also the j o.eco.le started o leave the city of their own valition,- thev, wanted :o ge elsewhere. This presen ed wha I :ensidered picbably a leas: ec.ually as grea a problem as -he pessib'e nuclear : cube'--mainly, . 1:0-ing and fires, "ack . i pr::ec:i:n 4,
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and kep: the une that was on all around the clock. We had firemen and policemen patrolling the ci y.
Friday afternoon, still having heard nothing from l l :
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Three Mile Island, my deputy public works director and I drove down to the island--not to the i: land, but to across from the l
1 island at their communications center which is about a quarter :
I of a mile from the actual reactors. You see it right out there, of Course.
We did ask to talk with the president, Mr. Cri:es 4
(phonetic) and Mr. Herbein, the public information officer.
Now, we will give them some credi:: they did spend one hour with us discussing the matter, giving us their impression of things. ,
A: this time I did not seek to alk to scmebody from the Nuclear Agency but we did talk with them. Oddly enough, one of the things that impressed me the most and gave me the mos feeling of confidence tha things were all right was that everybody 1.1 that area, all :he employees, the presiden: and so for:h, were walking around in their shir: sleeves, bare headed. I saw not one indica:icn of nuclear pro:ec-icn. So 1
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i Sy Friday evening we had the evacua:i:n p'.an c:n-pletely prepared bu I'm su e vou :an apprecia:e when ecu pre-
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123
- o implement it, you are going to be in real trouble. 3ecause no: only did we have our 52,000 people to get out (by now i:
1 was down to about 40,000 I would guess), but also remember
~
that all our surrounding areas--Lower Paxton Township, Susquehanna Township, the whole horseshoe around Harrisburg--
would also be leaving at the same :ime.
We were, however, prepared. We did have the plan.
We do have the plan and we are refining that plan.
Constantly we were in touch with the civil defense; we met at the courthouse. The governor's office sas repre- '
sented. By Saturday evening we began to feel tha: things were going to calm down a little bit.
But Sunday morning I got an emergency call to come to the courthouse. Fortunately, it wasn't too serious. They had had a little flaw at the plant, but as you know, we never did have to evacuate. The point I can't emphasi:e enough is that, I think it was Winston Churchill who said, "The only '
l thing we have to fear is fear itself," -- the fear of the people of Harrisburg tha: they had to ge: ou:.
I One little comic relief--no: comic then, bu: i: is now: During the meeting in my office en Frida:- ve were ,
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clannin-s our evacua:ica clan, the civil defense air raid l
siren wen off accidentally. You :an imagine wha: tha: caused in Harrisburg f:: abou: 15 minutes. : ::1d people-it was sc ebody's :ar horn tha: ;c: :uck. 3u: i: wen: off 1::iden:al'y, _
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190 Fortuna ely, it was an accident; no real reason for it.
I think in our considerations of any fu:ure problems, there are two very importan: things. First, any nuclear plant existing--and whether or not there are any future ones has ye: to be decided--should help the area in whi:h i: is located to prepare an evacuation and emer5ency plan. -
There was abso-lutely none. Quite frankly, people in this area, a: least in Harrisburg, didn't think =uch abou: Three Mile Island until this happened.
Also, there should be direct communications with the local municipalities governing bodies.
My basic feeling was to play i: low key--don': cause panic. That's wha: we did and I think we were successful. We were ready; we weren' panicky; and I think the people--I jus:
speak for Harrisburg, I'm not saying pro or con about surround-ing areas--I think the people of Harrisburg deserve a grea:
deal of credit for the calm manner in which -hey :cok this crisis, the slow but steady preparedness they did on their cwn and their readiness to take whatever steps were necessary to get out of town if they had to. I'm more than I can say how grateful :ha: we never had :: evacua e. That wculd maybe have been :he wors: catastrephe than the situatien itself.
Hospitals, nursing hemes: Tri Vil" age (phene-i-)
here in Middle:cwn did evacuate. Tha: 15 a high-rise f:r :he elderly which ! menti:n because tv mother 1;ves there, bu:
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130 fortunately she was visiting my sister at the time and was not evacuated. Those plans were handled by -he county. :
.or Instance, in our p.,ans or On.e evacuation c:...arrisburg, n we did not include the hos itals. Those plans were handled by the county. Our plans included the use of school buses--
schools were closed, incidentally--school buses, Capital Trailways buses, Harrisburg Area Capital Carrier Transi buses, and we had a standby arrangement wi:h Amtrak for a train to get out of town, north, obviously. We had designated areas to w..:ch
- s. to go, one or which was 3.enn o. tate, one c:. wn en was tewisburg.
I'll close so there can be c,uestions. I don': wan:
. to prolong this. I j us t did talk for an hour on this at a
. National Conference for Mayors in Lexington, Kentucky.
One final thing I think I wan: :o mention every time I talk about Three Mile Island: I go ene of the nices:
le::ers that I've ever received frc= the Mayor of Cumberland, Maryland and the Council. Thev. said,"Anything vcu :eo:le in narr .suurg u need, any-hing we can cc :o heip you, our decrs are open, our nospt:a.3s are open, cur armories are open, our nomes are cpen. If you wan: to come to Cumberland, .:u re we':::e." -
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131 misunderstand the next cuestion. I do admire what you achieved in 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, but since we are asked :c look 2: the emergency preparedness as of the time of the accident, I hope I'm interpreting you correctly that as of Wednesday :here was no evacuation plan at all.
.\m. DOUTRICH: As somebody mentioned be fore , :he acoustics in here aren't so great.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Yes, hey are terrible. Su: I said I very much admire what you managed to do in 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. But as of Nednesday, I gather : hat before Nednesday there was no evacuation plan at all for Harrisburg.
MR. DOUTRICH: 3efore Wednesday, Harrisburg, the people there, the government, though: of Three Mile Island as four smokestacks out in the Susquehanna River that provided some employmen to residents in this area. There was absolutely no preparation, none whatsoever, nor was there any c nsidered.
I've lived in Harrisburg all my life and never did I ever hear anybody even mention :he thought of prepara: ion for an emergency at Three Mile Island.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: I jus: wanted to be sure tha: that is wha: you me ant.
MR. DOUTRICH: That's :crrect.
CHAIR.'4AN KEMENY : Any ::her ques: ions?
'IR. DCUTRICH:
I did have :ne more ::mmen: :n the ec:nomi: face: Of whi:h Mr. Firs: spcke. Three Mile Island
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does employ, is a very large employmen: factor in this area, but I (on't think that will be a serious problem. I also con,: thinx, tha: the ong-range--immediate economic effects, yes--but the long-range economic effects of this disaster I don't :hink will hur: Marrisburg. Certainly the ci:y govern-ment and surrounding areas are going to do everything they can to not only have it not affect it adversely but to use i: as an asset, a tourist attraction, and to ge: people to come here ra:her than :o keep them out of :he city.
I don't think it will have people to say, "Ch, I can' t move to Harrisburg; it's too close to Three Mile Island" anymore than they will say "I can': move to San Francisco because they have earthquakes occasionally" er Chicago because Mrs. O' Leary had a cow or Miami where there are hurricanes. I do no: think 1: will have long-range economic effects. If it does, it's our fault; we are getting ready to prevent that.
, CHAIR >UJi KEMENY: Professor Taylor.
CCRMISSIONER TAYLOR: De vou remember a: wha: time roughly and by whom you were informed tha: the original esti-mates of the damage to the core, and so on, the potential threa:
of the release of radioactivi y, a wha: time were you informed tha: :his si naticn was worse than people had criginally said?
MR. DCUTRICH: I don': really recall being specifi: ally
, informed. The ;a:hering informa:icn led :o :ha: conclusi:n.
i Then my ini:rmati:n, and wha: 1ed us :: tha: ::n:1usi:n, I 1
1 l
4 .; .-
would say was late Thursday we began to suspect tha it was that way, sy cr: cay we were convinced that it was extreme.,y serious and that's when I decided to proceed.
COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: I see. From what source --
MR. DOUTRICH: The informatica came thr ugh the civil defense offices at the county courthouse; all my informa-tion came through the coun:y civil defense and the governor's office and wha: I garnered on my own. As I mentioned before, none came from the corporation itse.3 :-
COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: I'm not sure I understood --
MR. DOUTRICH: Harrisburg is not serviced by Metropolitan Edison. We are Pennsylvania Power and Ligh:. So we are no: serviced by them and that's another sligh: question I have. Why would a plan be loca:ed in an area that i; does no: service, just because probably of the economics, from the plan 's standpoin: indicated that. I do not -hink future plants should be in a heavily popula:ed area such as curs.
I think I did answer your question.
COSNISSIONER TAYLOR: Yes. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN KE>ENY: Any more ques-ions? (Pause)
Thank you very much, Mr. Mayor.
MR. DCUTRICH: Thank veu, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: We have one more witness bef:re lunch, and the p'an will be after hearing Our nex
. distin;;;shed witness, We will declare an hCur's lunch break.
.,- a ,.
MS. JORGENSON: Congressman Goodling.
CONGRESSMAN WILLI.Ut F. GCODI.ING, 19:h DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA:
Mr. Chairman, I'm happy to be here this morning to testify. I'm going to stick s:rictly to what you said ;.1 the let:er. In the letter you asked that I address the primary concerns of my constituents during the accident at Three Mile Island and its impact, rather than any sta:emen: :ha: I migh:
have. I would say tha: the President of the United States, the Secretary of Energy, and all of my colleagues have been lobbied heavily by me since this accident and therefore I will do all my work with those folks and I will attemp: :o relay to you just what your letter asked, the concerns of my constituents and the impac: they feel this acciden: has upon their lives.
I probably will be repeating much of what Mickey-Minnich (page 59) said, and he very emphatically said. Since I have gathered my material from five mee ings that I have had in the last three weeks with about 1500 constituents, many of those meetings had been scheduled befcre the Three Mile Island accident. I'm going to primarily concentrate on the five-mile area because I don't believe, as I say in my report, I don':
believe my colleagues, I don't believe mos: Americans under-stand the psy:hc1:gical impac: this ac:iden: has had upon :he residents, particularly in the five-mile area, who were'::n-stantly par: Of :he news day 2i:er day, da:. liter day.
l l
- 3. s: 0 Much of the infomration tha: I have given :c my colleagues and to the Presiden: comes from the fac: :ha: :
spen: a great deal of time Thursday, .riday, : Saturday, Sunday, and Monday at Three Mile Island after the accident and in that particular area.
Let me, then, very cuickly--and I don't usually ,
ac.o.reciate Y eople who come before cur committees rea,-inb :ne:r estimony--but since i: isn't mine, i 's wha my consti uents are saying, I want to make sure that you know exactly wha-they have told me, primarily the people who reside in the five-mile area.
3eginning w :n :.ne ::rs cay c:. :,e n acciden:: mes-cons:::uen:s in this area cannot understand how :n.e:r cn ,:ren . .
cou.,a nave been permittec to .ce exposec curing those early . .
hours while waiting for school buses or while on the play-ground. They jus: think that it was sheer negligence tha:
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.. a c. an ear,.ier no::... : ca :en been given, they certainly would have kep: their children indccrs. . hey are concerned a.ccu
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136 1
studies over a period of years prove tha: there is little danger or no fanger from low-level radiation. They wan: :o know how much low-level radiation they can take before i:
becomes an obvious detrimental health factor.
They have indicated that many scientis s believe low-level radiation to be very detrimental to one's health.
They want to know if preventive =edicine is going :o be prac-ticed during the ensuring years 5 that all in this area are closely =anitored so that we won't have reports 20 years fr:m now because of this accident similar to those released recently from testing tha: took place many years ago.
Many have indicated tha: the peace of mind and the quali:y of life which were so abundan in :his area prior :o the acciden: have now disappeared. They believe that in the pas: they have been lied to or strongly misled in relationship to the safety aspects of nuclear power. They wan: :o know the real truth abou: the possible damaging heal:h affects of drink-ing milk or eating mea: or produce fr:m :his area. Their mental health cannot stand for the dumping of the c ntaminated water into the Susquehanna River no ma::er how improved one migh: say i: is. They are sick and ired of hearing :ha: ::
will be within :he allowable limits because they d:n': believe
- here is any proof tha: there are al;cwable, safe limi:5 Turning :o some :f : heir econcmi: ::ncerns, :ney wan:
- know wha: :he real truth is in 'tetr:pci :an Ediscn's l
137 generating power capability with TMI versus kilowatt usage in the Metropolitan Edison supply area. They want to knew whether they are paying a surcharge for power being sold around the grid which is really genera:ed here.
They have been told that locally federally chartered savings and loan associations and banks have reouested that real estate appraisers attach a statement to their appraisals as to whether the preperty being appraised is within the five-mile radius of TMI. If this is so, they are wondering whether i; isn't inherently unfair and unlawful.
Many are adamantly opposed to the reopening of Three Mile Island as a nuclear generating plan . They have indi-cated that thirty-five homeowners in one area are seeking to relocate in case TMI is again opened.
As for the future, they wan :o know the real schedule for radioactive releases in the air and water and wha: :he isotopic conten: will be. They want an improved civil defense program in the area because they believe any mass evacuation would have been a disaster and still do no: believe :here is a workable plan. They also believe that any plan should be tried at designated times.
They do not wan: the damaged : re perr.anently s:: red ,
- n Three Mile Island. They want your Ccami::ee :: si: on the Nes: Shore, believeing tha: this downwind area has been nere expcsed than any ::her. They wan: :he scanning ec,uipmen:
l l
. . . . _ ~ ._ _ _ ~ . . _ _ _ _. ._,
i
133 provided to the citi: ens of Middletown to also be brought into ),
1
- he Newberry Township Area. I might say, 300 fee across the river if you would swim you would be in Goldsboro. It is a l
long way if you don't swim to get around to Middletown. They )
feel that right across the river has been neglected in many instances, and particularly in :he downwind area.
They want safe energy at a price they can afford.
Finally, they want your Commission to si: in Goldsboro.
Let me again say in closing my testimony that I am sure most people do not understand the psychological damage that has been done to residents within that five-mile area surrounding the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant. Let me also say that I believe the federal government has been instrumental in bringing on nuclear power because , first of all, it '
succumbed to extreme environmentalists wi:hou: thinking wha: ,
the alternatives were and then promulga:ed regulations which would move us away from coal. The federal government, of course, encouraged this developmen: :hrough the Price-Anderson Act.
Therefore, it is my believe tha: the entire United '
Sta:es must help us a: this particular :ime. If we mus:
carry the burden alone, we will not be economi: ally compe:itive because our cos: for electricity will be entirely ::e high.
Thank veu.again i:: ;iving me this :pper uni y :: ,
- estify.
L _
139 CHAIRMAN: Thank .vou. Are there c.ues:icns of :he Congressman? professor Marre::.
COMMISSIONER MARRETT: You indicated a number of things that are concerns of the citi: ens. I wondered if there are ways that we could gather some information with reference to a few of : hem? Fcr example, :here was a ccament about the action of :he savings and Ican assccia:icns and banks. This fo11cws up on an earlier c,uestien I had about what do we know as.:he economic impact. Is there any way we ,
can find out any more on something like this to determine, in a sense, the facts with reference to that as well as a ccamen-on':he interest some homeowners have in relocating? If we are interested in trying to gather wha; evidence there is, what indications there are for a number of these kinds of things, how would we proceed?
MR. GOODLING: Yes, I can certainly provide you with that informa:icn. They definitely have inforam:icn in rela:ica-ship :o the savin s and loans and the appraisal si:uation.
They also have the pecple who have indicated in that small area tha: they would move from this particular area. We can provide you with those names and with the information in relationship.: the savings and loans and the appraisals. I have made'i: very clear to all cf my :ensti:uents that we nus-
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I40 CHAIRMAN KEMENY: We would very much appreciate receiving that indormation, Congressman Goodling.
MR. GOODLING: I will see that you personally get that information.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Other questions? (Pause) If not, le: me thank you very much for your courtesy of appearing.
I,ve .oeen :n:orme.a that because of our s.3:.ppage c:-
timetable, if we take lunch now we will not be able to hear from Congressman Walker. Therefore, I certainly am going to call Congressman Walker before we ea: lunch.
(Applause)
CONGRESSMAN ROBERT J. WALKER, 16th DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA: I thank v.ou ve.rv. much, Mr. Chairman, for v.our courtesy on this. I am meeting with some constituents down river who are also concerned abou: Three Mile Island later on this afternoon and I would ha:e to miss that.
Wha: I will do, though, is a summa: ion of :he :ex:
of my remarks rather than : ying :o go all the way through i:
- o try to speed things along and highligh some concerns. ;
I might first of all divert from the text and say
[
ha: I became aware en Friday of your problems with some legislati:n that you had bef:re the C:ngress. That was the firs:- I had heard abou: it. I wan: :: p' edge :: this
- mmission v.ou will have av. ::cc. era:icn in the House in :rv.in>-
- push ".ha*. :hr: ugh. u.9.ders and We haVe th:nys pre::y Well
141 in hand for tomorrow and i: takes a record vote on Tuesday, but I certainly want to cooperate with you in any way to make 1
l sure that you ge: the power that you need to ge: o the full facts of his matter. l l
I CHAI.UtAN KEMENY: Ne very much appreciate your help.
MR. WALKER: I would, first of all, like to thank you for your willingness to allow me to testify, because I think there are a few concerns that became apparen: to ne in ,
I the course of the crisis and since that need some focus, and they are concerns that I find are being reflected by my con- <
1 stituents regularly as I talk to them.
the :..1rst or my recommendations to vou wou a..
come from the standpoint of communica: ions. My constituents felt throughout that the problem of communications became acute because they fel: that policy decisions were being made in a vacuum in many instances. They also found that the communica-
- ions that they were getting :o allow them to make their own decisions were very, very bad.
I would think :ha: one of the firs: :hings I would hope the Commission would look into is be::ering the communica-tions facilities a: each plan: site so that when and if an acciden takes place, immediate'.y a sophistica:ed kind of I'
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information they need to assess their own position rela:ive to the accident, and finally to permi: the press and news media ':0 s
disseminate that information on a timely and accurate basis.
Legisia: ion to this exten: has been introduced by Congressman Goodling, Ere:1 and I that would ask for a sophisticated com-munications set-up at each and every site across the country.
Also, I think, there is also a need for the state e =e r ~> e n cy preparedness plans to be un. graded.
. :n carticular there, I found it particularly disturbing that each area does not have before it or have within i: anti-radiation con:amina-tion chemicals to help a populace tha: might find itself immediately contaminated. think : hat those kinds of things should be put into each area where there's a nuclear plant operating.
It is interesting to note , in light of the crisis, tha: the Price-Anderson Act seems completely inadec,uate in its coverage of an area that nigh; be subjected to a nuclear catastrophe. ' would think tha: this Commission 1: least should look in:o broadening the covera;e of tha: Act and naybe even the actual repeal of the Act is wcrthy of the consideration of this group.
Another disturbing aspec: .5 :he whole business of t
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i federal government activity and research aimed in the direc-tion of decontamination of an area to help bring farmland back i
into.oroduction and hela. businesses, communities recover from the crisis.
Finally, in this summation, I wan: to deal with an issue that I think is the mos: important issue right now on the minds of my constituen:s that is an aftermath of this l
crisis. It directly concerns -he public health and safe y as a significant policy issue. In particular, we are faced with the question of how a nuclear industry treats clean-up problems related to a nuclear accident. I: is the issue of whether or not the radioactive waste water once trea:ed will be dumped into the Susquehanna River.
Naturally, my constituents are concerned about such a process because it means tha: the treated water which will still contain low levels of radioactive material will eventually end up in their drinking water supplies. For such an ac- o be contempla:ed seems to me to be wholly irresponsive to :he need to assure the public that every possible course .5 being taken to assure their health and safety. It does not respond to the legitima:e demand that we should in no way take conscicus actions whi:h would produce even the mos: minimal 'evels . of
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i 144 and concerns. '
It is my personal opinion the decision to dump the waste water into the Susquehanna will be not only an unaccept-able act, but will signal to the people of this area and the people of the United States a kind of calousness on the part of industry which is calamitous, particularly given the grave potential danger of the material with which tha: industry deals daily.
You have in your hands a large role in determining the future of nuclear energy production in this country, a future which I believe we must not and cannot abandon capriciously. But I must say :ha: my faith in the assumptions on which the nuclear industry has previously been based have been shaken. My awareness of the public safety issues have been increased and my understanding of public concerns about nuclear issues has been heightened by the Three Mile Island incident.
The public is seeking new assurances. They are seeking new ways of handling the dangers and potential of nuclear power. They are seeking a credible conviction tha
- he lessons learned a: Three Mile Island will mean the problems of Three Mile Island will never again be repea:ed, and : hey are seeking cur guaran:ee that any c:ntinued generati:n of I
nuclear pcwer will be based :n mere v:5-ilance than has ever l 1
been exer:ised in the pas:. This C:mmissi:n has an :pper uni:y
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to provide the people of this area with those kinds of assur-
, ances and av. consti:uents will wa :h your work mos c l o s e l v. .
Thank you very much.
CHAIRMAN KIMENY: Thank you. Congressman, could I lead off? You raise several very important points. I would like to follow up the first one.
MR. WALKER: Fine.
CH. AIRMAN KEMENY: We have heard again and again about the lack of communication and you made a very concrete suggestion that, as I understood it, that there should be ccm-munication network in place permanently in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant. Do you have a feeling, because this is part of our charge, whether such a communication network should be manned by federal agency or by state agency?
MR. WALKER: What I would hope is tha: this would be the responsibili:v, of the plan:, once it was buil: 2nd as i:
is being, right now, as they are being upgraded :: mee: the s:andards tha: grew out of the Three Mile Island incident. I wou3c. . nope :: would .oe One responsici.3.:y c:. :.g.e p.an: to pu:
in such sophisticated communications network on a standby basis, There is no: a grea expense involved in this : mpared :: :he overall expense of operating plants. Such standby kinds of
- mmunica ions I think would be in the bes: interes: ci :he
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lao utilities as a part of their nuclear commi: men .
CHAIR EN KEMENY: 3o therefore you are suggesting, in effect, it should be the responsibility of the utility to get promp notification to all public officials in the area.
MR. WALKER: Tha: would be my suggestion. That's right, Sir.
CHAIRMA.N KEMENY: Professor Lewis.
CCMMI55IONER LEWIS: Do you think, in the light of this e:cperience , tha: the people would trus: information tha:
came directly from the utility? Wouldn't i: be better :o have a state or a federal source of that information?
MR. WALKER: Well, I'm not really responding to the issue of who should utili:e the communication facili:ies once they are in place. I think i: became apparen: in the course of this crisis that the people believed the NRC. When the NRC go on site, particularly Harold Denton who we around here believe did a superb job, he was believed. I :hink : hat what we have to have in any incident of this type is a belisvable figure disseminating information :o :he public, s What I am trying to get at is there needs to be a means.for them to reach the pubi :. There needs :o be a neans for :he NRC in Nashing:cn to be getting all of the bes: infor-ma*iCn.
I happened 00 be On site on Fr* day, the day :he release 00Ck pla:e, the additi Cal re' ease tha! Oaused a grea i-i
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4 deal of concern. I knew tha: the information being gathered
.a:L:ha; poin: by :he people on site was no: the informa: ion that was'being used by policy-makers, both in Harrisburg and Washington :o make their decision as to whether.or no: :o I
evacuate because the people there couldn': get open phone {
lines to tell them what the updated information really was. )
l I considered tha: to be just a complete breakdown at-: hat point. It was no: the fault of the telephone companies and so on. They came in right away and worked very hard to ge:
those communications facili:les in place, but they should have been in place beforehand so that as soon as the information was developed they could get i: to the policy-makers. That is wha: wasn't there. I think tha: is wha: 1ed to :he breakdown 1
of communications righ: off. j CHAIRMAN KEMENY: professor Taylor.
C05DlISSIONER TAYLOR: Wha: kind of a process would you propose be the one by which the public becomes informed abou:' the na:ure of the clean-up process and the basis for whatever clean-up process is decided on to be j udged :o be safe?
Have you though; about the process itself by which public exposure to :he nature of tha: and perhaps some capacity, some mechanism for the public :o ge: some feedback in:: :ha process?
Have you : hough: abou: tha: 2: all?
Mr. NALIIR: ~
- hink tha: the essential ingredien: in ;
all Of this is :he ingredien:, as far as the pub 11: :s m._ -- ___m__.__________-_.____m_____-__-__--____-__-__.___-_____________m.-.__ _m -
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- me .A wou.,,. say that in :nis crisis the crec.... ;ol. .1:7 rests with the NRC. Most particularly it rests with one individual within NRC, Harold Denton.
Su the main aspect : hat I -hink has :o be addressed in an ,sind c :. re,ationsn . . w :n :u.e cuo,:: .
. :n a c.,ean-up is .
to make certain that they think the information : ming to them
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- or instance, wi:h regara :o dumping :.u.e water into :he Susquehanna coming from Me: Ed is no: going to be believed by O.ne vas majority of my cons::.:uents. 2nere: ore, i: becomes a very grave politica., Issue. e mo ::o n a ., Issue, anc in :ne
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decide to do won't be believed by the public tha: :he resul:s are wha: they say they will be.
I think it is extre=e1y .4mportant :n' a : the spokesman .
on all aspects of this, particularly as we go about cleaning it up, be a credible spokesman. As I say, i: seems c be
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CCMMISSICNER TAYLCR: Would vou favor publ;; hearings
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1s9 think that we should go through the whole EIS procedure--
public hearings and a.,:, of tha --to insure :.na: each and every major step that is taken in the clean-up is something which the public is assured has been addressed in all of its various options.
It is disturbing to me that when I contacted the NRC at first about this business of dumping the waste wa er into the Susquehanna, I was told that the only option ever con-sidered was dumping the waste water into the Suscuehanna, that there were no other options even talked about. Well, that, to me , j us t doesn't respond to wha: he real need is here. So it seems :o me that if we follow the procedure -ha: :cok EIS statements of all maj or activities related to the clean-up you some .<ind c:. public assurances growing fr:m -hat.
would ge .
COMMISSIONER TAYLOR: Thank ycu.
CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Dr. Marks.
CO.NNI550NER MARK 5 : Congressman, was there any effor:
pric: to the accident to establish scne credible communi:stica with the utility and the a c. roc.riate r communi:v. >roups with -
regard to disposal of waste?
ME WALKER: Well, I think'tha mos public officials ll
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130 had been out and tourec :.u.e is.3and when reactor number ., was .
still being buil:, and number 1 was on line. ! think that has probab.,y gone on to a number of Oct unity leaders. sus; how far it went, I don't know.
Some of the issues with regard to waste disposal were addressed a: that point, of course, primarily from the stand-point of the people who were prc=cting this particular plant and nuclear energy in general.
3ut, yes, there was some attemp to establish lines of communication along this line, which I :hink things stayed open. But i: broke down ::mpletely as the incident :cok place.
I feel -ha in the initial going in the inciden: that I was misled with regard to information I was given. I arrived a: .
the site about 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> after the accident :cok place, along with Congressman Goodling. We also brought along Mike McCormack,
- he chair =cn of one of the nuclear subcommi: .ees in the Congress ,
and Jack Nydler, who is the ranking Minority Member.
A: : hat point, we tried c : ell them, make sure :ha-you give the public every detail of informati:n -ha: is avail-able to you so that the public can go about assessing this.
Ne were assured tha: tha would happen. Obvi:usly, i difn':.
I fel that even sc=e of -he informati:n -ha we were given in
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So the problem was that even though there were communications prev 10us,v., :.siev seemed :: .crea.< cown 2: :ne c.oin: Of the incident.
COMMISSIONER MARKS: Testimony that we've heard even
- cday suggests tha: the situation continues, tha: there is still a major credibility gap and lack of information as :o precisely what's happening.
MR. WALKER: I think that's true.
COMMISSIONER MARKS: Do you have any suggestions as to what Can be done or should be done right nCW to CorreC: it?
I mean the situation is right now.
MR. WALKER: I'm having problems with that, :: tell v.ou the truth. I mean I have tried every way .cossible to . .
.mpress upon the ut i ., i ty c::.iciais , t h e i r
.3 c.o b y :.s:s in Washing:On, the nuclear industry, the NRC, the EPA, all of these pecple, I've tried to impress upon them the sericusness o:. the r uo,:c croo.,e= o:. cuso.:ng
- .,.e waste wa er into the Susquehanna. I don't know whe:her I've go::en through Or not.
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l the bulk of my con 5. cts. It is a public concern that, in my opinion, will lead to near revol if they go ahead and put the firs: thimbleful of that water into the'Susquehanna, ,
l Now, if I can't get that across to :he people l l
responsible, there is a breakdown of communications.
CHAT.RMAN KEMENY: Any other questions? (?ause)
Thank you vary much for your testimony.
MR. WALKER: Thank you very much for has CHAIPMAN KEMENY: I declare a one-heur rec.
the Co= mission.
(Applause)
(WHEREUPON, at 1:15 p.m. :he Commission meetin- ,
recessed for lunch, to reconvene a 2:15 p.m.)
,