IR 05000244/1985020

Insp Rept 50-244/85-20 on 850925-27.No Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness & Annual Emergency Exercise Performed on 850926

ML20134A288
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	10/22/1985
From:	Harpster T, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20134A285	List: IR 05000244/1985020 ML20134A283
References
50-244-85-20, NUDOCS 8511040324
Download: ML20134A288 (5)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /85-20 Docket N License N DPR-18 Priority --

Category C Licensee: Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation 49 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649 Facility Name:

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R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At: Ontario and Rochester, New York

, Inspection Conducted: September 25-27, 1985 Inspectors: Team Leader, EPS, EP&RPB,

////F/F date W. Cook, Senior Resident Inspector, Ginna Station, DRP, RI J. Stair, DRP, RI S. Hudson, Senior Resident Inspector, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 G. Wehmann, Battelle, PNL J. Martin, Battelle, PNL ,

H. Larson, Ba elle, P L Approved by: /T u LO M'

T. L. HarffsVer, 'hief, Emergency

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Preparedness y ction, RPB, DRSS, RI, NRC pty Inspection Summary: Inspecti(ti on September 25-27, 1985 (Report N '

50-244/85-20)

Areas Inspected: Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's annual emergency exercise performed on September 26, 1985. The inspection involved 147 inspection-hours by a team of seven NRC and NRC contractor personne Results: No violations were identified, however, concerns were raised regarding the performance of the dose assessment team in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).

8511040324 e51030 PDR O ADOCK 05000244 PDR

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted

• Backus, Technical Assistant to the Operations Manager

, *D. Burke, Corporate Emergency Planner J. Bodine, Nuclear Assurance Manager

. *R. Kober, Vice President, Electric and Steam Production R. Morrill, Training Manager J. Meyer, Superintendent, Support Services o

• B. Snow, Superintendent, Nuclear Production

• S. Spector, Superintendent, Ginna Production The inspectors also interviewed and observed other emergency response personnel during the exercis * denotes those present at the exit interview on September 27, 198 . Emergency Exercise-A full-scale (involving FEMA, state, and local governments) emergency exercise was held at the R. E. Ginna Station on September 26, 1985, from about 6:30 a.m. to 5:00 Pre-Exercise Activities

. Prior to the exercise, the inspector reviewed the exercise objectives and scenario and discussed comments with the license In addition, NRC observers attended a licensee briefing for licensee controllers and observers on September 25, 1985, and participated in the discussion of emergency response actions expected during the various phases of the scenari The exercise scenario included the following events:

• Fire in the Oil Storage Roo *

Dropped control rod and turbine runback to 80% powe .

Reactor fails to trip following manual trip initiation (ATWS).

Fuel cladding failure from ATWS results in high reactor coolant fission product activit *

-Reactor coolant pump seals fail (loss-of-coolant-accident).

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High head safety injection pumps fai .

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Reactor core uncovers causing gross fuel cladding failur *

A hydrogen explosion occurs inside containment causing depressurization valves to stick ope The above events caused the activation of the licensee's emergency response facilities and permitted the state and counties to exercise their Emergency Plans, Exercise Observation During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization; activation of the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations ' Support Center (OSC), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of these emerg. enc.y esponse facilities. In addition, periodic observations were made at the flews Media Center, and of

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plant security and access control. The following activities were observed:

(1) Classification and assessment of scenario events; (2) Direction and coordination of the emergency response; (3) Notification of licensee. personnel and offsite agencies of pertinent information; (4) Communications /information flow, and record keeping; (5) Activation of Emergency Response Facilities; (6) Fire fighting pri.ctices; (7) Performance of offsite and inplant radiological surveys; (8) Assessment and projection of radiological (dose) data and consideration of protective actions;

'(9) Maintenance of security 4nd access control at the EOF; (10) Accountablitt'y'of personnel; (11) Preparation of information for dissemination it the flews Media Center; and .

(12) Management of Accident Recovery Operation .

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4 Exercise Findings The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of the offsite emergency response facilities, and actions in use of these facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedures. The team also noted the following areas where the licensee's activities were thoroughly planned and efficiently implemente * The objectives and scenario were submitted for review well in advance of the exercis * Emergency response facilities were activated and staffed in a timely manne *

Excellent team work, use of procedures, and good interaction among control room operators were note *

The Technical Support Center (TSC) Manager made timely,

conservative, decisions regarding recommendations to upgrade the emergency classificatio *

Off site survey teams were well trained and equippe * Recovery Manager in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

kept everyone well informed of changing plant conditions through announcements and status board . TSC dose assessment team made an early dose calculation

.(9:25 a.m.) to verify that the current emergency classification was appropriat .

Protective action recommendations were made promptly based on plant condition * A comprehensive recovery plan was outline The following areas were identified and brought to the attention of the licensee as areas which could have degraded their response to an actual event, and which should be evaluated for corrective actio * There was some question as to the required event classification regarding the ATWS among control room operator (50-244/85-20-01).

• The TSC and-EOF did not update offsite agencies regarding plant conditions from about 9:00 a.m. - 10:50 a.m. (50-244/85-20-02).

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• Fire Brigade Response

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The fire brigade captain and another me.aber did not respond with self-contained breathing equipment (SCBA) as require The fire brigade brought only one spare air bottle for SCBA's and ran out of air before entr The fire brigade did not check adjacent rcoms for involvement untti requested to do so by the control room. (50-244/85-20-03)

Dose Assessment

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Prior to the release from the containment, the EOF dose assessment team did not perform any dose projection calculations based on the known source ter An error by the MIDAS computer operator inputting release rate data, resulted in an error of 10' which was promptly identified as erroneous, but a half-hour was lost in correcting the erro The EOF dose assessment team did not efficiently manage the offsite monitoring teams to obtain meaningful plume information in a timely manne '

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The EOF dose assessment team did not stay current with changing plant conditions. The source term status board was not updated during the release. Available information was not utilized to characterize the source term in the containment prior to the releas Although appropriate protective actions were recommended based on plant conditions rather than dose assessment, the lack of effectiveness of the EOF dose assessment function is of concern. Had it been necessary to rely on prompt, accurate dose assessment data to determine appropriate protective actions, unacceptable delays may have resulted. The licensee has been requested to provide a written response within 30 days of receipt of this report, describing proposed improvements in this area. (50-244/85-20-05)

3. Exit Interview A meeting was held with the licensee at the conclusion of the inspection on September 27, 1985, to discuss the findings from the exercise observation as detailed in this repor '

No written material was provided to the licensee by the inspectors at any time during this inspectio