ML20117C408
| ML20117C408 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Salem |
| Issue date: | 09/13/1983 |
| From: | Murley T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Kuhrtz S NEW JERSEY, STATE OF |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20114F930 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-84-616 NUDOCS 8505090414 | |
| Download: ML20117C408 (5) | |
Text
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1.
SEP 131983 Mr. Steven G. Kuhrtz, Director Division of Environmental Quality State of New Jersey John Fitch Plaza, CN027 Trenton, New Jersey 08625
Dear Mr. Kuhrtz:
This is in response to your letter dated August 18, 1983 regarding your in-
-terest in remaining informed of the ongoing NRC and licensee actions that will assure continued safe operation of the Salem plants. You also requested information concerning how and when the NRC will perform evaluations and reviews of a number of areas. For the specific areas mentioned in your letter, the following information is provided.
1.
The Management Analysis Company (MAC) and Beta Corporation reports were issued in June and May 1983 respectively, and PSE&G committed to deve-loping an Action Plan to address the recommendations in the reports. On August 26, 1983, PSE&G submitted their Action Plan for NRC review. A copy of this Action Plan was sent to you on August 26. The NRC is reviewing this Action Plan and we intend to discuss the plan with the licensee at a meeting in the near future. We will inform you when the place and date of the meeting are set and you will have the opportunity to attend. We are
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also conducting periodic meetings with the licensee on an approximately bimonthly basis to monitor the licensee's overall progress on long term corrective actions. We will keep you informed of these meetings through our Regional State Liaison Officer. These meetings are a supplement to our ongoing inspection effort and are intended to focus on progress being achieved.
2.
The formulation of the PSE&G Nuclear Oversight Committee (NOC) is being monitored by the NRC and its activities and effectiveness, after imple-mentation, will also be reviewed through both routine inspections, and the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) Program. This will also be a topic for discussion at our periodic meetings.
3.
The NRC Task force study of the generic implications of the Salem ATWS events was completed in April 1983 and issued as NUREG-1000. Recommen-dations from that task force study have been developed into requirements which were issued to the industry by Generic Letter 83-28 dated July 8, 1983.
4.
With respect to the areas of loss of feedwater transients and better control of feedwater during startups, the licensee has undertaken a number of initiatives which should minimize these problems. To better control feedwater on startups, the licensee has inproved controls on feed bypass
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SEP 131983,
flow, installed additional steam generator feedwater flow instrumentation in the control room and, by license amendment, lowered the steam gene-rator low level reactor trip setpoints. The licensee has also taken action to increase feedwater suction pressure which should help minimize loss of feedwater due to suction pressure problems.
5.
With regard to additional systems controls (i.e. automatic initiation of turbine trip and auxiliary feedwater) related to the ATWS events, these features are incorporated in the proposed ATWS rule which is now being considered by the Commission. Hence, it is likely that these features will be required on Salem as well as other PWRs.
Regarding your request for clarification as to how the NRC will consult with the State as required by Public Law 97-415, as you may be aware, our regula-tions have recently been amended to implement that law. Specifically, 10 CFR 50.91 (b) and (c) delineate the requirements for state consultation and 10 CFR 50.92 provides the basis for the determination of no significant hazards.
A copy of those regulations are enclosed for your information.
As you know, such consultation deals specifically with amendments to the utility's license.
Such actions are currently the responsibility of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) within the NRC in Bethesda, Maryland. The point of contact within NRR is the plant project manager (Mr. Donald Fischer for Salem at 301-492-7377) and it is my understanding that Mr. David Scott is the New Jersey state official designated to be the point of contact on these matters. I suggest you contact Mr. Fisher directly to discuss details of consultation.
In summary, recognizing the need for the State of New Jersey to be kept in-formed of matters affecting Salem, our Region I State Liaison Officer has kept and will continue to keep your office informed of such matters. Due to your interest specifically in the operation of the Salem facility, I would suggest that we meet on an annual basis so that we can review with you our efforts as reflected in SALP. A copy of our last SALP assessment for Salem is enclosed for your information and I suggest that we meet after we prepare our next assess-ment, currently scheduled for November 1983.
Sincerely, origi'nai signed by Na*sE.
urYey Regional Administrator
Enclosures:
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PART 50 o DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTICN AND UTILIZATION FA 1(c) Each licensee licensed under ant to the provisions of this section to
$ $0.21 or 6 50.22 shall notify the NRC file a uTitten consent from the exist.
made to secure any creditor, any trust.
Operations Center g telephone og ing licensee or a certified copy of an ce or receiver of the facility appointed y
by a court of competent jurisdiction in emergency circumstances requiring it to order or judgment of a court of compe.. any action brought for the beneht o take any protective action that departs tent jurisdiction attesting to the per. ; any creditor secured by such mort-from e license condition or a technica! qulrements of the Act and these regu. Sson's right (subject to th specification, as permitted by 5 50.54(x) lations) to possession of the facility in.. foreclosure of such mortgage, plel of this part. When time permits. the a
volved.
s actification must be made before the (c) After appropriate notice to inter.
or lien or upon exercise of any power, i
- protective action is taken: otherwise, the % ested persons, including the existing 11 of sale contained therein. or any as.
1 i motificatlos must be rnade as soon as
- censee, and observance of such proce-signee of any such purchaser.
possible thereafter. 'Ite Commission g dures as may be required by the Act or may require written statements from a regulations or orders of the Commis.
a licensee concerning its actions taken
" sfon. the CommMn d appm an Applications for termination of h,.
5 50.82 under the provisions of I 50.54(x) of this app!! cation for the transfer of a 11-um
,P8FI-cense. If the Commission determines:
(a) Any licensee may apply to the (1) That the proposed transferee is Commission for authority to surrender qualified to be the holder of the 11-a license voluntarily and to dismantle US/1AEA SArsct?AADs AcaIIMDT Cense; and the facility and dispose of its cornpo.
(2) That transfer of the license is g quire information includio nent parts. The I 88.78 Installation information and ver.
otherwise consistent with applicable Iflestion.
ng informa.
provisions of law, regulations, and tion as to proposed procedures for the 2
Each holder of a construction permit orders issued by the Commission pur 5 disposal of radioactive material, decon-E* shall,if requested by the Commingion, suant thereto.
g tamination of the site, and other pro-E submit installation information.
cedures, to provide reasonable assur-permit verification thereof by the In.
ance that the dismant!!ng of the facill-
- ternational Atomic Energy Agency, I 50.81 Creditor regulations.
ty and disposal of the component I and take such other action as may be parts will be performed in accordance necessary to implement the US/IAEA (a) Pursuant to section 184 of the Safeguards Agreement,in the manner Act, the Commission consents' creation without set forth,in 1115.6 and 15.!! through individual application, to the 15.14 of this chapter, of any mortgage, pledge, or other lien upon any production or utilization fa-
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tility not ontaed by the United States TaAMarsas or Licusgs-Carottoas' which is the subject of a license or (b) If the app!! cation demonstrates RscwTs-8camasrosa or ucumsts upon any leasehold or other interest that the dismantling of the facility in such facility: Provided; and disposal of the component parts I*
(1)That the rights of any creditor so will be performed in accordance with the regulations in this chapter and (a) No license for a production or 3 utilisation facility, or any right there. pliance with and subject to the same fense and security or to the healthsecured may be exercised y under, shall be transferred, assigned,; apply to the licensee pursuant to the [ and safety of the requirements and restrictions as would or in any manner disposed of, either :
m notice to interested persons, the Com-or indirectly, through transfer of con ' regulations issued by the Commis mission may issue an order author-
.a trol of the license to any person,2 tzing such dismantling and disposal, unless the Commission shall give its pursuant to said Act; and and providing for the termination of the license upon completion of such consent in aTitina, (2) That no creditor so secured may procedures in accordance with any take possession of the facility pursu.
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ant to the provisions of this section conditions specified in the order.
(b) An application for transfer of a prior to either the issuance of a license license shall include as much of the in-from the Commission authorir.ing formation described in il 50.33 and such possession or the transfer of the Assunus7 or Deust on ConsTapc-50.34 of this part with respect to the bcense.
Tion PsRnt1T AT Rzecast or Hot.nta identity and technical and financial (b) Any creditor so secured may
~ eenee or construction permit.
k apply for transfer of the license cover.
8 St.se Application for amendment of 14 as ould u
y ins such facility by filing an applica g Whenever a holder of a license or tion for transfer of the license pursu g f
t lee
, if t e lice construction permit desires to amend ant to a 50.80(b). The Comminston will m lasued is a class 103 Ilcense, the infor.
act upon such application pursuant to ;; an amendment shall be filed w nation required by I 50.33a. The Com-150.80 (c).
j, g mission assy require additional infor.
(c) Nothing contained in this regula*
Commission, fully describing the g mation such as data respecting pro-tion shall be deemed to affect the changes desired, and following as far posed safeguards against hasards from means of acquiring. or the priority of, as applicable the form prescribed for n
s radioactive materials and the appil-any tax lien or other lien provided by original applications.
cant's qualifications to protect against,.,
- g such hasards. The application shall in.
t (lude also a statement of the purposes {
t og sawst nones perpees assument seate
{
a for which the transfer of the license is.(d) As used in this section:
eeneuftenen requested, the nature of the transac-7, tion necessitating or making desirable
- construction permit (1) ** License ' includes any license or,; followiycauaission wn! u which may be :
ng procedures on an application the transfer of the ucense, and an { lasued by the Cornminalon with regard
- M ved h W & 1ss3 m ues Eu as E
hm n pW hee or a a
uan i
3 o m alon may require any person who sub.
" Credit r" includes, without im, h facilitylicensed under 150.21(b)or mits an application for license pursu l mortgage, pledge or lien on a facilityplied limitati (a)NoticefbrpbhecommM )
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50 35 April 29,1983 i
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PARTli0 o DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES b
the time a licenses requests an Commission expects its licensees to (3) & Commission will make i
amendment,it must provide to the apply for license amendmenta in a available to the State official designated Commission its analysis, using the timely fashion. It will decline to to consult with it about its proposed
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etandards in i 50.92, about the issue of dispense with notice and comment on determination the names of the Project no significant hazards consideration.
the determination of no signmcant Manager or other NRC personnelit (2) m Commission may publish in hazards consideration. if it determines designated to consult with the State.h the Federal Register under i 2.105 either that the licensee has failed to make a Commission will consider any an individual notice of proposed action timely application for the amendment ir-comments of that State official.lfit does E
as to which it makes a proposed order to create the emergency and to not hear fmm the State in a timely 5
determination that no significant take advantage of the emergency manner,it will consider that the State r
hazards consideration la involved. or, at provision. Whenever a threatened has no interest in its determination:
least once every 30 daya, a monthly closure or derating is involved. a nonetheless, before it issues the notice of proposed actions which licensee requesting an amendment must amendment it will telephone that omcial L
identifies each amendment issued and explain why this emergency situstion for the purpose of consultation.
each amendment proposed to be issued occurred and why it could not avoid this (4)De Commission will make a good r
f since the last such monthly notice. For situation. and the Commission will faith attempt to consult with the State r
each amendment proposed to be issued.
sesess the licensee's reasons for faDum before it issues a license amendment either notice will (i) contain the staffs to file an application sumciently in involving no significant bazards proposed determination. under the advance of that event.
consideration. if. however. it does not standards in i 50.92, (ii) provide a brief (6) Where the Comminion finds that have time to use its normal consultation description of the amendment and of the exigent circumstances exist in that a procedures because of an emergency ir" facility involved, (Lil) solidt pubhc licensee and the Commission most act situation. it will attempt to telephone the comments on the proposed quickly and that time does not permit appropriate State omcial. Inability to E
determination, and (iv) provide for a 30-the Commission to publish a Federal consult with a responsible State oScial day comment period. Normally, the Registae notice eBowing 30 days for following good faith attempts will not E
- amendment will not be granted until prior public comment,it will:
- prevent the Commission from making a
- after this comment period expires.
3 i) Use local media to inform the
- eNective a license amendment involving
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g (3)De Commission may inform the lic in the area surrounding a no significant hazards consideration,if public about the final disposition of an
[ cenne's facility of the licensee's E the Commission deems it necessary to r
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- amendment request where it has made a
- amendment request and of its proposed
- avoid a shutdown or detsting.
propos*d determination on no determination as described in paragraph (5) After the Commission issues the significant hazards consideration either (a)(2)of this section:
requested amendment.it will send a by issuing an ladividual notice of (ii) provide for a reasonable copy of its final determination to the g
lasuance under i 1106 or by publishing opportunity for the public to comment.
State.
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such a notice in its monthly system of using its best eNorts to make available (c) Coveois obtState consultadon.
Federal Register noticas. In either event' to the pubBc whatever means of The State consultation procedures in it will not make and pubhsh a final communicadon it can for the public to paragraph (b) of this section do not give g
determination on no significant hazards respond quickly; the State a right:
r consideration.unless it receives a (111) Publish a notice ofissuance under (1) To veto the CommiamiWe request for a hearing on that amendment i 2.106, providing an opportunity for a proposed determination:
4 Whm ee Comminion maku a hearing and for public comrnent after (2) To a hearing on the determination inuance* ifit determines bt the before the amendsnent becomes a
determination bt no signi5 cant
.gective; or
- 8 I
hasards consideration is involved and Q"rd (3)To insist upon a postponement of that the amendment should be issued.
g the amendment will be effective upon (iv) Require an explanation from the the determination or upon inuance of licum sWt b muon for b the amendment; issueace, even if adverse public g
comments have been received and even exigency and why blicensee cannot (4) Nor do thus procedums alter a
if an interested person mee b
avoid it, and use its normal public notice present provisions oflaw that reserve to the Commission exclusive responalbility d
P h2 e'ff mW"b'm H provisions for intervention ed for in for utting and enforcing radiological nw i 17t4 has filed a request for a hearing.
that the licensee has failed to use its health and safety mquimments for
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The Commission need hold any required bmNorts 2 mah a umly apphMu
.nuc!*ar power plants.
I
,'ey**jd 2 F I 30.s2 tenuense et amendment.
es i ermines that a g
cant basards consideration le ad e
g proadurs (a)la ddumining when as f
(5)Where b Comminion finds tha't N SMs mnsu todonH1) At &e amndment W e h w matmedan um a Ucenm mquuts an amudment.
puun wm be Ismd 2 es appucant,
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B en emergency situation exists,in that E
failure to act in a timely way would h mat mufy ee Stak in wMeh ha
&er-miasion wm be guided by es facili is located ofits request by considerations which govers the i
ruult in dmung a dutdown't a r
nuclew power plant,it asey 1sene a provi to that State a copy ofits imuanoe ofinidal Ucenses or.
license amendment involving no application and its analysis about no construction permits to the extent
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sign 2 cam haamde washon significant hazards consideration and applicable and appropriate.If the l
without prior notice and opportunity for indicate u es appheadon est H has
- application involves the material a hearing or for public comment. In such dm so@e Camission will make
- alteration of alicensed facility, a a circundann b Caminbh avellable to the licensee the name of the s
- construction permit wG be issued prior j
pubud a 6 of pmpM appropriate State official designated to a to the issuana of the amendment to the 1
acein suc amudents.)
determination on no significant hazarde
- license.If the amendmentinvolves a consideration, but wm pub!!sh a notice (2me Comminion wW advise &e of1senance under i 110a providing for State ofits pr p sed determination significant hazards considwetion, the Wa4on wm pda of us k
opportunity for a hearing and for pubhc considersti r all sending it a pmpond sedan pumaant k I LW 5
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copy of the Federal Registar notice.
this chapter before acting thereon.De y
notice wm be issued as soon se i
l April 29,1983 50-36 g
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PART O O DDMESTIC LICENSING CF PRDDUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES practicable after the application has I 50.102 Commisalon order for opration BAcxrstT No been docketed.
after r,,. cation.
pe Commisska wC) be Whenever the Commission finds 8 50.10s Backfitting.
particularly sensitive to a license that the public convenience and neces-(a) The Commission may. In accord.
amendment request that involves alty, or the Department finds that the ance with the procedures specified in irreversible consequences (such as one production program of the Depart-this chapter, require the backfitting of that. for example. permits e signincant ment requires continued operation of a facility if it finds that such action bcrease in the amount of efDuents or a production or utilization facility the will provide substantial. additional radiation emitted by a nuclear power license for which has been revoked, protection which is required for the
-- plant).
- the Commission may, after consulta-public health and safety or the 3 (c)The Commission may age a final tion with the appropriate federal or common defense and security. As used a
- state regulatory agency having jurts.
In this section. "backfitting" of a pro-determination. pursuant to the a diction. order that possession be taken, duction or utilization facility means 8 procedures in 150.91 that a proposed a of such facility and that it be operated ;; the addition. elimination or modifica-
. amendment to an operating license for a 3 for a period of time as, in the judg.
- tion of structures, systems or compo-
- facility licensed under l 50.21(b) or ment of the Commission, the public [ nents of the facility after the con-l W.22 or for a testing facility involves convenience and necessity or the pro.. struction permit has been issued.
mo significant hasards oonsiderations,1f duction program of the Department " (b) Nothing in this section shall be operseca of the fecGity la accordance may require, or until a license for op.
deemed to relieve a holder of a con-wick the proposed assendment would erstion of the facility shall become ef.
struction permit or a !! cense from fective. Just compensation shall be compliance with the rules, regulations.
act paid for the use of the facility, or orders of the Comminalon.
(1)lavolve a significant lacessela (c) The Commission may at any time the probability or consequenose of an require a holder of a construction accident previously evaluated; er permit or a license to submit such in.
(3) Create the possibility of a new er formation concerning the addition or
.different kind of socident boss any 8 Se.143 Suspnelon and opration in wa, proposed addition, the elimination or
national megency.
mposed elizninadon, or the anoddica-accident previously evaluated;er a
f (state of war or national emergency es, shete a) Whenever Congress declares that (3)levolve a alynihant reductico la a a
re ne ta of margin of safety.
g exists, the Commiaaton, if it finds it cility as it deems appropriate.
- necessary to the common defense and RsvoCAT!oN. $UsrsNstoN. MoDIFICA-security may.
TsoN. AasswnasswT or Licupass awn (1) Suspend any license it has issued.
ConsraccT1on PsaastTs. EnsumouNCY
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OrumArnows nT Tass Consas ssion 0 56.100 Revocation, suspenslen, modifles. I ENFomCEMrTT tien of licenses and constrwetion per.
h (2) Cause the recapture of special A license or construction permit maY w nuclear material.
An injunction or other court order be revoked, suspended. or modified, in.
may be obtained prohibiting any viola-whole or in part, for any material false 7 tion of any provision of the Atomic statement in the application for 11 L Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or eense or in the supplemental or other Title II of the Energy Reorganization statement of fact required of the ap-Act of 1974, or any regulation or order plicant; or because of conditions re.
lasued thereunder. A court order may M vealed by the application for license or (3) Order the operation of any 11 be obtained for the payment of a civil
" statement of fact or any report.
consed facility, g penalty imposed pursuant to section 6 record. Inspection, or other means.
(4) Order entry into any plant or fa. *; 234 of the Act for violation of section
= which would warrant the Commission ;; ci!!ty in order to recapture special nu. ~ 83.87.82.83.81,82.101.103.104.107 to refuse to grant a license on an origi. a or 108 of the Act, or section 206 of the nal application (other than those re. [ clear material or to operate the facilj. [ Energy Reorganisation Act of 1974, or ty, lating to II80.81. 80.42(a), and -
construct or operate a facility in ac. " for any damanes caused by recapture (b) Just compe any rule, regulation or order issued 80.43(b) of this part); or for failure to di special nuclear material or by oper, limitation of any license issued there.
cordance with the terms of the corb stion of any facility, pursuant to this under, or for any violation for which a struction permit or lleense, provided sectic9.
11oense may be revoked under section that failure to make timely oceapletion 180 of the Act. Any person who will.
of the proposed construction or alter.
fully violates any provision of the Act ation of a facility under a construction
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or any regulation or order issued permit shall be governed by the provi.
thereunder may be guilty of a crime alons of I 80.88(b); gr for violation of, and, upon conviction, may be punished or failure to observe, any of the terms by fine or imprisonment or both, as and provisions of the act, regulations, provided by law, lloonse, permit, or order of the Com.
asission
"$ N51 Retaking posseselon of special nessear snaterial.
Upon revocation of a lleense, the Coasmission may immediately emuse the retaking of posseeston of all spe.
cial nuclear material held by the !!.
I oensee i
50 30e April 29,1903 (nemt seee is 5047 )
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UNITED STATES 8
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REGION I Q(* O 1
831 PARK AVENUE o#
KING OF PRUS$1A, PENNSYLVANIA 19406 JAN 111983 Docket Nos. 50-272; 50-311 Public Service Electric and Gas Company ATTN: Mr. Richard A. Uderitz Vice President - Nuclear P.O. Box 236 Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey '08038 J
Gentlemen:
Subject:
Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) Report and j
your letter, dated December 16, 1982 This refers to the SALP for Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, conducted by this office on November 1,1982, and discussed with your staff at a meeting on November 23, 1982. The list.of attendees at the meeting 6 is attached as. Enclosure 1.
The NRC Region I SALP Report is attached as and evaluates the peHod September 1,1981 through August 31, 1982.
Our letter dated November 15, 1982, which fomarded the SALP Report, v
and your letter dated December 16, 1982, which provides your proposed action and coments regarding the SALP Report, are attached as Enclosures 3 and 4.
Overall, your performance in operating the facility was found acceptable.
As noted in our letter fomarding the SALP Report, additional NRC and Public Service Electric and Gas Company management attention is needed in the area of security and safeguards.
g DuMng the meeting of November 23, I982, we disdussed our assessment of your regulatory performance in each functional area. Your coments at the meeting, and your December 16,1982 letter, described actions that you are taking to improve your perfomance. We have found these actions to be responsive to the identified weaknesses.
In particular, the initiatives you have described with respect to the site secuH ty program appear to reflect an effort which would provide continuing improvement in perfomance.
' With respect to engineeHng support, our assessment is based on our perception in light of the examples provided.
Each example is an unresolved inspection issue awaiting engineeHng resolution. We fully recognize and acknowledge s
the management mandate to establish pHorities, particularly in view of the volume of engineeHng effort necessitated by post-TMI changes.
Our inspectors have noted that appropM ate measures are in fact promptly taken by the i
operating and engineering staffs whenever significant operational safety concerns are identified. However, as reflected in the SALP Report, some of these l
measures are interim in nature and require final engineeHng resolution. Our concern i
is that the inteHm measures and the delays in resolving equipment problems places additional burdens on the operating staff and such burdens could undulyL complicate operator actions and assessments of plant conditions duMng plant emergencies.
a For these reasons, we believe that you should continue to. focus on more prompt engineering attention to these matters.
h ig?i i
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Public Service Electric and Ga's Company 2-J:@ 1.1 1983 We found that the meeting was beneficial and improved our understanding of your activities. Based on your consnents during the meeting and with due regard to your December 16 letter, we have found that no changes to our assessment are necessary. Therefore, we have not supplemented our report.
Since SALP is a continuing effort by the NRC, the effectiveness of your actions to improve perfomance will be evaluated during the routine inspection program.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. No reply to this letter is required.
Your actions in response to the NRC Systematic Assessment of Licensee Perfomance will be reviewed during future inspections of your licensed activities.
Your cooperation is appreciated.
Sincerely, o~. k h
onald C. Haynes Regional Adninistrator
Enclosures:
1.
SALP Management Meeting Attendees 2.
NRC Region I Systematic Assessment of Licensee Perfomance, Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Salem Nuclear Generating Station, 3.
NRC Letter, R. W. Starostecki to R. A. Uderitz, November 15, 1982 4.
Public Service Electric and Gas Company Response Letter, R. A. Uderitz to R. W. Starostecki, December 16, 1982 cc w/encls:
R. L. Mitti, General Manager - Corporate QA H. J. Midura, General Manager - Salem Operations E. A. Liden, Manager - Nuclear Licensing and Regulation C. P. Johnson, Assistant to Vice President - Nuclear R. Fryling, Jr., Esquire PublicDocumentRoom(PDR)(LPDR)
Local Public Document Room Nuclear Safety Infomation Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident Inspector State of New Jersey
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bec w/encls:
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
Senior Operations Officer (w/o encis)
DPRP Section Chief T. Martin V DPRP Directors. Regions II. III. IV. V i ir
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- i ENCLOSURE 1 I
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM1ISSION SALP MANAGEMENT MEETING ATTENDEES Licensee:
Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey Facility:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Meeting At:
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey Meeting Conducted:
November 23, 1982 '
l..
Licensee Attendees J. Boettger, General Manager - Nuclear Support J. Driscoll Assistant General Managar - Salem Operations R. Eckert, Senior Vice President - Energy Supply and Engineering L. Fry. Operations Manager J. Gallagher, Maintenance Manager P. Krishna NRB Chairman B. Leap, Station QA Engineer (Acting)
E. Liden, Manager - Nuclear Licensing and Regulation H. Midura, General Manager - Salem Operations R. Mitti, General Manager - Corporate Quality Assurance P. Moeller, Manager - Nuclear Site Protection J. O' Conner, Radiation Protection Engineer R. Uderitz, Vice President - Nuclear J. Zupko, Jr., General Manager - Nuclear Services 2.
NRC Attendees l
R. Starostecki, Director, Division of Project and Resident Programs l
L. Norrholm, Senior Resident Inspector, Salem Nuclear Generating Station R. Summers, Resident Inspector, Salem Nuclear Generating Station L. Tripp, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 28. Division of Project and Resident Programs
.a ENCLOSURE 2 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE FUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION NOVEMBER 1, 1982 4
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. Introduction 1.1 Purpose and Overview...............
2 1.2 SALP Board and Attendees.............
2 1.3 Background.....................
3 II. Summary of Results 5
III. Criteria 6
IV. Performance Analysis 4.1. Plant Operations...................
7 4.2. Radiological Controls 10 4.3. Maintenance 12 4.4. Surveillance............
13 4.5. Fire Protection 14 4.6. Emergency Preparedness.............
16 4.7. Security and Safeguards 17 4.8. Refueling / Outage Activities 19 4.9. Licensing Activities................. 20 V. Supporting Data and Summaries 5.1. Licensee Event Reports................
22 5.2. Investigation Activities...............
25 5.3. Escalated Enforcement Actions
............ 25 5.4. Management Conferences During the Assessment Period 25 TABLES Table 1 - Tabular Listing of LER's by Functional Area... 26
' Table 2 - Violations
................... 28 Table 3 - Inspection Hours Summary
............ 29 Table 4 - Inspection Activities..............
30 ATTACHMENTS - Enforcement Data..............
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INTRODUCTION 1.
Purpose and Overview The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) is an inte-grated NRC staff effort to collect the available observations on an annual basis and evaluate licensee performance based on those obser-
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vations with the objectives of improving the NRC Regulatory Program and licensee performance.
The assessment period is September 1, 1981 through August 31, 1982.
This assessment, however, includes pertinent activities and NRC ob-servations of licensee performance through October 1982. The prior SALP assessment period was July 1,1980 through June 30, 1981.
Sig-nificant findings of this assessment are provided in the applicable Performance Analysis Functional Areas (Section IV).
4 Evaluation criteria used during this assessment are discussed in Section III.
Each criterion was applied using the " Attributes for Assessment of Licensee Performance" contained in NRC Manual, Chapter -
0516.
2.
SALP Board:
R. W. Starostecki, Director, Division of Project
,and Resident Programs, Region I T. T. Martin, Director, Division of Engineering and Technical Programs E. J. Brunner, Acting Chief, Projects Branch No.1, Division of Project'and Resident Programs R. R. Keimig, Chief, Projects Branch No. 2, L
Division of Project and Resident Programs W. Ross, Licensing Project Manager, Operating Reactors Branch No. 1, Division of Licensing, Office of NRR L. J. Norrholm, Senior Resident Inspector, t
l Salem Nuclear Generating Station l-Other Attendees:
R. Summers, Resident Inspector, Salem Nuclear Generating Station W. J. Lazarus, Project Engineer, Projects Section 2A, Division of Project and Resident Programs s
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===3.
Background===
(1) Licensee Activities Unit 1 Unit 1 operated in a power coast-down during the period November -
December 1981 until it was shutdown for refueling on January 1, ~1982.
The outage, which included a number of NUREG 0737 TMI Action Plan modifications, concluded on April 12, 1982 when the unit went critical on the Cycle 4 core.
Leaks in Boron Injection Tank isolation valves resulted in a shutdown for repairs and the unit returned to service on April 19, 1982.
During the evaluation period, Unit 1 experienced nine reactor trips which resulted in short-duration shutdowns. Three safety infections were associated with loss of 1A Vital Instrument Bus precipitated by tripping of the output breakers caused by control system interference from an enclosure cooling fan. The problem was corrected by re routing fan cables in the enclosure.
Unit 2 i
Unit 2 completed power ascension startup testing on September 2,1981 with the 100% trip test and the last natural circulation test. During the period September 21 - October 7, 1981, Unit 2 was shutdown for i
steam generator modifications due to indicated high moisture carryover.
Unexpectedly high steam flow indication resulted in limiting power to 90 - 95% during the last 3 months of 1981 until the problem was resolved as a combination of carryover and calibration errors. Unit 2 was declared commercial on October 13, 1981.
Between October - December 1981, Unit 2 tripped on seven occasions caused by low steam generator level following loss of one or both steam generator feedwater pumps as a result of low suction pressure.
Based on data from a number of monitored load reduction tests con-2 ducted in December, the Ifcensee confirmed that secondary system stability was such that minor perturbations in the heater drain system could cause significant swings in feedwater pump suction pressure.
With added awareness of the problem, addition of low suction pressure alarms and modifications to procedures, short-term corrective action appeared effective. Of four additional reactor trips caused by loss l
of a feedwater pump since the first of the year, only one was due to _
low suction pressure.
Long-term system modifications are being deve-1 loped.
Four additional Unit 2 reactor trips during the period resulted in short-term shutdowns.
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Site During the period May 1 - June 11, 1982, all bargaining unit employees represented by International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) local 1576 were on strike. The IBEW represents all personnel on site with the exception of security and office workers.
Plant operators, up to the level of reactor operator, were included.
The ifcensee retained approximately 390 management and engineering personnel on site and continued to operate the two operating units in two 12-hour shifts. Adequate numbers of management personnel were gva11able to cover licensed and unlicensed operator positions.
Management operators assigned in the control room had recent or current operating experience.
For the duration of the strike, both units continued to operate at nominal full power.
The licensee initiated a planned transfer of corporate management and engineering functions to the site vicinity during the evaluation period. All functions related to the facility are being included in a new Nuclear Department, headed by a Vice President located on site. By the end of the evaluation period, functional transfer had been completed; however, some vacancies still existed in the new organization which were being filled by corporate office personnel on a temporary basis.
(2) Inspection Activities' Two NRC resident inspectors were on site for the entire appraisal period, with a change in resident inspector taking place in January 1982.
Total NRC Inspection Hours:
3824 (Resident and reg'on based)
Distribution of Inspection Man-hours is shown in Table 3.
During the period April 29 - June 18, which included the entire duration of the strike, 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> coverage by NRC inspectors was maintained.
A tabulation of Inspection Activities is attached as Table 4.
A tabulation of Violations is included as Table 2.
Specific enforce-ment data is presented in Attachment 1.
Two investigations of apparent tampering with plant equipment were conducted during the period April 28 - September 15, 1982.
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II.
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION FUNCTIONAL AREAS CATEGORY CATEGORY CATEGORY 1
2 3
1.
Plant Operations X
2.
Radiological Controls Radiation Protection Radioactive Waste Management X
Transportation Effluent Control and Monitoring 3.
Maintenance X
4.
Surveillance (Including Inservice and Pre-X operation Testing) 5.
Fire Protection X
6.
7.
Security and Safeguards X
8.
Refueling / Outage Activities X
9.
Licensing Activities X
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III. CRITERIA The following evaluation criteria were applied to each functional area:
1.
Management involvement in assuring quality.
2.
Approach to resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint.
3.
Responsiveness to NRC initiatives.'
4.
Enforcement history.
5.
Reporting and analysis of reportable events.
6.
Staffing (including management).
7.
Training effectiveness and qualification.
l To provide consistent evaluation of licensee performance, attributes l
associated with each criterion and describing the characteristics appli-cable to Category 1, 2, 3 performance were applied as discussed in NRC l_
Manual Chapter 0516, Part II and Table 1.
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The SALP Board conclusions were categorized as follows:
Category 1:
Reduced NRC attention may be appropriate.
Licensee management attention and involvement are aggressive and oriented toward nuclear safety; licensee resources are ample and effectively used such that a high level of performance with respect to opera-tional safety or construction is being achieved.
Category 2: NRC attention should be maintained at normal levels.
Licensee management attention and involvement are evident and are concerned with nuclear safety; licensee resources are adequate and are reasonably effective such that satisfactory performance with j
respect to operational safety or construction is being achieved.
Category 3: Both NRC and licensee attention should be increased.
Licensee manage. ment attention or involvement is acceptable and considers nuclear safety, but weaknesses are evident; licensee l-resources appeared strained or not effectively used such that l
minimally satisfactory performance with respect to operational safety and construction is being achieved.
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l IV. Performance Analysis 1.
Plant Operations (56.4%)
Analysis of this area includes direct plant operational activities as well as operational support activities.
The operations area was under continual review by resident and region-based inspectors during the assessment period with inspections covering the following areas; compliance with license and procedural requirements, design changes and modifications, quality assurance, training, housekeeping and cleanliness, drawing control, audits, corrective action systems, on-site and off-site committees, reporting systems, and operations during an employee strike.
During the assessment period, significant improvements were noted in management attention to and control of dissemination of policy and tracking of commitments to final resolution. With respect to the latter, clearly defined and functional department and station-wide systems have been established.
A large portion of inspection activities were associated with plant events. During these followup activities, licensed operators displayed a detailed working knowledge of the plant and an ability to explain transient respocse, reflecting a good state of training.
Forty-one LER's are attributed to personnel errors; only 6 of those were ascribed to licensed operators.
The training staff is well managed and operates with clearly defined policy and authority. An effective system is in place to disseminate operational events and design cha~nge information to licensed operators.
The licensee's commitment to quality operator training has been demon-strated by the on going construction of a modern training facility which will house a plant-specific simulator in 1983. This facility, opened late in the assessment period, consolidate previously scattered training activities. The level of training was further demonstrated by the operators' ability to work around the problem of a lack of current as-built information available in the control room.
Since drawing updates take over a year, the licensee files outstanding design change information with the most recent drawing revision, leaving interpretation 'to the operators.
These files were found incomplete.
This problem appears to have been resolved in response to an inspection finding toward the end of the assessment period.
One violation dealt with a failure to make timely application for operator license renewal, but is considered an isolated case.
Inspection of licensee reviews and QA audits found evidence of planning and priority lacking in that the QA audit section had no management system to ensure coverage of Technical Specification required audits. Audit reports do not address the required area of 7
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program effectiveness, nor is the effectiveness of the corrective action system addressed. Management of the audit program appears to focus on getting scheduled audits done, at the expense of effective-ness'and completeness.
On site and off site review committees (SORC and NRB) are properly constituted, meet frequently, and, based on results, ask cogent questions.
Safety evaluations, particularly in support of design changes, were well documented and generally sound.
i Six violations during the period deal with failures to prepare, properly issue, or use procedures.
Three of these stemmed from failures to effectively communicate system status to field personnel or contractor maintenance forces, resulting in tagging or system alignment errors. Tagging and alignment errors have been recurrent problems over the past few years. Corrective actions, including the use of an independent verifier have not been effective in some in-l stances. An additional violation since the end of the assessment i
period occurred in early October,1982, when the auxiliary feedwater flow path to one steam generator was valved out due to auxiliary operator error.
Verification of valve tagouts was not independent and failed to detect this error.
The remaining three violations in l
this area dealt with failure to review and approve procedures and i
failures to prepare r,equired procedures.
The. licensee practices a documented policy of strict procedure adherence as evidenced by inspector observation and the large number of authorized on-the spot changes found in the procedures. The above failures to prepare and approve procedures had no commonality and do'not suggest programmatic problems. The isolated procedure adherence problems appear to be rooted in the fact that management holds some personnel outside the control-room insufficiently accountable for this area.
The licensee is generally responsive to NRC reporting requirements.
Four violations identified with respect to reporting were not indica-tive of programmatic failure. Some LER's were received which provided i
insufficient information to fully understand and assess the event.
Based on reports received toward the end of this period, these report-1 ing inadequacies-appear to have been corrected. Continued management attention in this area is necessary to ensure that the quality of LER's is not degraded.
In resolving safety issues, the' licensee's engineering department shows a lack of responsiveness to operational concerns. When i
presented with a safety concern by the operating or safety review group, a rapid response is obtained only when plant shutdown or power reduction is imminent. However, the licensee has never failed to initiate a plant power reduction or shutdown when dictated by regulation, ifcense, or safety considerations. The following examples of untimely response to potentia 1' safety issues were observed: an evaluation of the ability to test of redundant diesel generator air i
start solenoids, begun in July 1981, is not complete; no effective 8
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4 corrective action has been implemented to preclude frequent air lock seal failures which has been a recurrent problem for several years; no corrective action, beyond weekly radiography, has been implemented to solve the problem of failing auxiliary feedwater steam supply check valves since the problem was first identified in June 1981; an evaluation of both BIT inlet valves' failure to open on a safety injection in November 1981 has not been completed; an evaluation of vital heat trace surveillance acceptance criteria and technique has not been completed since identification of the potential problem in July 1981; the solution to a potential VCT level control problem 1
identified in May 1981, has only been procedural in nature, to date; 52 Licensee Event Reports discuss inoperability of Containment Fan Coil Units for various reasons and corrective measures for the pre-dominant cause are still to be implemented in Unit 2.
Such delays in providing engineering resolution have resulted in additional burdens on the operating staff.
Each of these issues was referred to the Engineering Department for evaluation and resolution.
Since this Department enjoys independence under a separate Vice President within the company, little motivation to respond could be imparted by station staff as evidenced by their responses to questions from the inspectors. The recent reorganization to place engineering support within the Nuclear Department should resolve this lack of responsiveness.
Operations first line supervisors are aggressive and knowledgeable.
This was demonstrated by their ability to maintain both units opera-ting and in compliance during a seven week strike by bargaining unit employees, including control room (licensed reactor operators) and field operators.
In general, the operating crew has several years of experience at Salem with a minority of license holders who lack Salem field operator backgrounds.
Operator licensees include 28 SRO's and 26 RO's.
5'SR0's and 4 RO's hold licenses for Unit 1 only.
Management strengths include positive steps to establish controls over intra-departmental activities including qualification of personnel, tracking of commitments, adherence to procedures, com-pliance with Technical Specifications.
Significant failures to completely address issues occur when corporate inter departmental communication and cooperation are required. This aspect requires management attention at the highest levels.
Conclusion Category 2 Board Recommendations None. The Board notes that had deficiencies not existed in engineering support, this conclusion would have been Category 1.
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2.
Radiological Controls (8.2%)
During the assessment period, regional Health Physics Specialists conducted four inspections of the radiation protection program and portions of the radioactive waste management, transportation, and effluent-control program. A transportation inspection was conducted by a Resident South Carolina State Inspector at a burial ground and reviewed by a Regional Health Physics Specialist. Resident inspectors conducted monthly reviews of selected program areas.
Man-res exposure data in a draft NRC report show the total personnel i
radiation dose at Salem Unit 1 in 1981 decreased 43% from 1980 levels.
The Salem 1 total dose of 254 man-rems was the second lowest of all power reactors in Region I in 1981, significantly below the national i
PWR average of 656 man-rems.
Radiation dose data was not included in the draft report for Salem Unit 2, which started commercial opera-tion in October 1981. No major outage involving primary systems was conducted on either unit during 1981.
Although three violations in radiation protection were identified in the areas of:
(1) work permit compliance, (2 posting, and (3) per-sonnel contamination surveillance, no programm)atic problems were identified in the radiation protection program during the assessment period. The licensee, conducted prior planning for major outage tasks and maintained explicit procedures for health physics activities.
Radiation protection records for personnel radiation exposure, respiratory protection, and radiation surveys were i-complete, well maintained, and available.
Radiation protection procedures were rarely violated.
Program audits were timely and corrective actions were prompt.
Radiation protection staffing is adequate, with backleg and overtime under control. The licensee maintains and implements a training and qualification program for radiation protection personnel and radiation workers which contributes to work understanding and adherence to procedures.
l The radioactive waste management program received minimal inspection effort during the assessment period.
No violations were detected in the araa.
Program audits were timely and corrective action prompt.
The licensee's organization and administration of the chemistry program (responsible for effluent analysis and monitoring) changed during the assessment period. A new Senior Supervisor of Chemistry and a Chemistry Engineer have been named.
In addition, foreman positions have been staffed. Staffing is adequate.
Current chemi-stry supervision is responsive to NRC comments and suggestions and appears committed to improving the quality of the overall chemistry J
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program. All effluent measurement comparisons were in agreement with the exception of one tritium measurement due to an improper calibration of the liquid scintillation counter. This contributed to a violation.
Two violations were cited during the assessment period for unmonitored effluent releases from a gas decay tank and from steam
- generator blowdown. While technical specification release limits were not exceeded, minor programmatic breakdown may be indicated.
The events were promptly and completely reported. Overall, effluent program policies were rarely violated.
One transportation violation (Severity Level III) for failure to package LSA waste in strong, tight packages was detected during the assessment period, however, no programmatic breakdown was indicated.
Transportation records were complete and available. After the violation in this area, a training program was implemented for trans-portation personnel which contributed to understanding of work and few personnel errors.
Strong and direct management involvement is evident in this area.
Conclusion
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Category 1 Board Recommendation None 11
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Maintenance (4.2%)
During the assessment period, one region-based inspection was i
performed in this area and routine monthly inspections of maintenance activities were conducted by the resident inspectors.
Management involvement and control in assuring quality is evidenced by prior planning and assignment of priorities. Decision making is usually at a level that ensures adequate reviews. Quality related records were complete and well maintained; reviews were generally timely and technically sound.
Key positions in the maintenance staff are identified and staffing level is adequate as evidenced by minimal corrective maintenance backlog.
The licensee has a well established maintenance training program which contributes to an adequate understanding of work and adherence i
to procedures. The training program is well defined and has been implemented for the major portion of the maintenance staff. Work is assigned and supervised so as to apply the correct level of training and experience to a given job.
Management and control of the site maintenance contractor is included 1
in this area although the majority of contractor work deals with design changes and plant modifications.
In general, the contractor's activities appear to be more closely monitored than in the past.
One violation was identified with respect to the use of a metal filler compound to repair Containment Fan Coil leaks. While the i'
process was later found to be acceptable, repairs were made and the units returned to service prior to completion of a safety evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.
4 While maintenance management practices are generally sound, this violation resulted from an over zealous attempt to fix the problem.
The licensee's deficiency report / corrective action system had failed j
to explicitly require a review of the design implications attendant with short term problem resolution. As a result, the repair had l
received engineering review and approval but the 50.59 review was not done. This oversight was a singular program deficiency which l
has since been corrected.
Maintenance activities are accomplished in a controlled, procedure-oriented, technically sound, and closely supervised manner with adequate quality group involvement.
Conclusion Category 1 Board Recommendations i
None 12 1
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Surveillance (4.20 One region-based inspection and continual review by resident inspectors occurred during the assessment period.
In general, management control was evident. Adequate staffing, planning and prioritization were in place. Procedures affecting safety equipment are thoroughly prepared, are reviewed by SORC, and are rigorously used for surveillance activities. All periodic surveillance testing, including those tests dictated by Technical Specifications, are scheduled by means of a computer-based Inspection Order system which provides reminders to perform the tests within a given time frame, and also provides management reports which flag nearly overdue tests so that timely action can be taken.
The licer.see's resolution of technical issues in this area is generally conservative but relaxes once the immediate concern is addressed, usually through procedure additions or changes.
Staffing levels are adequate in that, generally, required tests are performed on time with no backlog. Technicians, especially in the I&C area, are specifically trained and qualified to perform designated tests.
Two violations in this area dealt with the measuring and test equip-ment program.
In one case, sufficient control was not exercised in issuing the equipment to retain a complete, documented history of where the equipment was used. The other item concerned timely review of where test equipment, which-failed periodic calibration, had been used. A programmatic weakness was not evident.
Two violations and seven LER's concern 6 instances of missed surveil-lance tests.
In view of the number of tests required to be conducted and the unique causes of each missed surveillance, program weakness is not indicated.
The Technical Specification concept of periodic surveillance testing t
to demonstrate operability is well understood by management and opera-tors. No instance was identified in which a failed surveillance test, or a missed test, resulted in anything short of a declaration of inoperability and application of the appropriate at. tion statement.
The IST program is coordinated by a dedicated and knowledgeable on site group and no problems were identified with the eaecution of this function. Needed improvements in the containmenc local leak rate testing program as identified in a program review and discussed during a combined inspection and Itcensing evaluation at the end of the assessment period, had already been initiated by the licensee's staff by the time of followup on-site inspection.
Conclusion Category 1 Board Recommendations None 13
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Fire Protection (4.3%)
This assessment is based on two region-based inspections and routine observations by the resident inspectors.
Prior planning and assignment of priorities by licensee management is evident in program procedures with specific assignments made to implement the requirements of those documents.
Decision making was consistently at a level that ensured adequate management review, e.g. review of fire protection supervisor activities by the General Manager-Sales Operations. However, the licensee's currently docu-mented fire protection program has been in place for several years.
Although the need to update and improve the program has been recog-nized,.no modification has been issued. The new Nuclear Department organization splits responsibilities for the program between the
. station operating group and the Nuclear Department services group.
This action will provide more attention to the area of fire protection, removing operating personnel from program concerns and permitting them to focus on the continuity of site fire detection / suppression capability.
NRC review of a problem with fire protection system valve supervisory panels 1RPS and 2RPS indicates that the design and correction of the design has not been given.high priority by the licensee. The design problems of this system were identified to management by the fire protection supervisor. However, due to the departmental interface problems discussed in Functional Area 1 (Plant Operations),
engineering resolution of these design problems has not yet been developed.
Regional review of Appendix R indicated that requirements appear to be understood by the licensee with design modifications sent to NRC for review and acceptance. Three Appendix R exemptions were requested, of which two were granted to date.
The licensee filled key staff positions in a reasonable time. The fire protection supervisor requires additional dedicated staff to assure that adequate fire protection program requirements are complied with. A re-organization that the licensee plans to implement should correct problems'that were identified in this area.
The licensee's training and qualification program has been adequate to provide the requisite number of qualified fire brigade members on shift. Planned development and implementation of a new training program are expected to improve understanding of personnel duties and adherence to procedures.
One violation in this area resulted from a failure to adequately post and maintain fire watches at a fire barrier cable penetration which had been opened for plant modification work.
Three LER's detail similar problems with open or breached fire barriers.
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doors have historically been a concern due to high traffic flow and the frequent degradation which results.
In October 1981, the licensee took the position that maintenance of fire doors as presently configured was impossible. Accordingly, the Technical Specification Action Statement was entered and permanent assignment of contracted fire patrols and fire watches throughout the plant was implemented.
A design change package to upgrade door hardware and modify door designs to alleviate this condition has been issued but work is not complete.
Plant cleanliness and housekeeping is generally acceptable with an evident program of cleanup underway for several months. The concept of cleanliness and fire prevention is, however, not clearly under-stood by or promulgated to those creating the problem.
Current efforts are aimed at cleanup after the fact rather than preventing accumula-4 tions of debris in the first place. Additional management attention in this area is warranted.
One violation of a Unit 2 license condition identified a failure to completely implement a design change to install protective fire wrap on selected cable trays. This problem has its origin in a recurrent failure to verify work completion by contractors. This aspect is discussed further in Functional Area 8 (Refueling / Outage Activities).
Failure to completely address the design and program concerns outlined suggests that the fire protection program did not have management priority commensurate with NRC concern in this area.
4 Current organizational initiatives should resolve this situation.
There were no onsite fires during the reporting period.
Conclusion Category 2 Board Recommendation I
None
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6.
Emergency Preparedness (1.0%)
Due to a schedule delay, the 1982 exercise was held in October 1982, after the evaluation period. No NRC observed full exercise was held in the period under review and no region-based inspection was conducted in this area. This assessment is based on the routine observations of the resident inspectors.
The revised Emergency Plan in effect for the period had never been tested in a NRC-observed full exercise.
Some drills, for specific L
groups (e.g. radiation protection, emergency duty officers), and a j
practice exercise in April, 1981, were conducted. The Technical, i
Support Center was moved to an interim location with adequate provision taken for continuity during the move.
Management attention to viable emergency planning was evident.
j Emergency Plan training continued to be a significant part of the operator training /retrafning curriculum.
Shift manning was observed to meet all requirements for non operator coverage (shift I&C and maintenance personnel).
Inspector observation during unusual events indicated that the l
Emergency Plan and Procedures continue to be viable documents with which shift supervisors remain familiar.
Emergency Duty Officer assignments continue to be made and the designated individuals were readily available by telephone or page.
The licensee completed installation and initial testing of the Public Notification System by February 1982.
In addition to the l'
siren system, approximately 800 radios have been distributed.
After the assessment period, the 1982 annual exercise was observed on October 13, 1982.
The licensee demonstrated an adequate capabi-lity to deal with a plant emergency. A number of deficiencies, most of which were recognized by the licensee, were identified relating to timely personnel accountability, communications, and procedure adherence. The inability to account for station personnel quickly j
was evident in two drills conducted prior to the exercise, but no j
significant corrective action was taken.
Conclusion Category 2 Board Recommendation 1
None I
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e 7.
Security and Safeguards (18.4%)
The assessment period included three special security inspections, i
one routine security inspection, one inspection of material control and accountability, two investigations prompted by security related events, and observations by the resident inspectors.
Frequent and, in'some cases, continuous inspection at the start of bargaining unit employee strike and following suspected tampering events provided the inspectors added opportunities to* evaluate security plan imple-mentation, management involvement, staffing, shift routines and l
condition of equipment.
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The ifcensee was found to be ineffective in maintaining certain aspects of the security program.
For example, assignment of only one on-site licensee security manager is apparently insufficient to manage the contractor program. Corporate security management, although relocated to the site, appeared minimally involved in i
routine security operations. Shift supervision of security per-
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sonnel was provided by the contractor.
Key licensee positions were identified with clear definition of duties and responsibilities and with policy decisions usually made at appropriate management levels.
Contract security staffing with about 200 guards and watchmen would be adequate under most circumstances. However, the prolonged use of compensatory posts in, lieu of installed equipment resulted in t
significant hours of overtime work.
While responsibilities are well defined, the resources actually applied to security program oversight were insufficient to detect and correct the following:
Maintenance support for security equipment is sporadic, resulting in extended inoperability of lighting and detection aids and a
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continuing requirement for compensatory posts.
Security hardware, such as lantern batteries, radios, and inspection mirrors, was not maintained or replaced.
Design problems in the security
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system were not addressed with any priority.
Fouling of a micro-wave zone by building a new contractor guard house precipitated deployment of two compensatory guards for over a year, The security training program and security procedures poorly i
described actual shift security activities. The procedures do not completely implement the security plan.
Audits of the program are not thorough.
Security documentation was frequently found incomplete in describing events and in many cases was missing.
Responsiveness to NRC findings was short sighted and, as evidenced by a number of repetitive findings, did not provide effective measures to prevent recurrence.
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L-Inspection findings during the period included nine violations (one Severity III).
Several of these violations were the result of erroneous or misinformed decisions made by licensee site management.
Escalated enforcement has been proposed for i
five of these items.
Sixteen violations and a $40,000 Civil Penalty during the previous evaluation for similar findings strongly suggests that corrective and preventive measures have not been aggressive or effective.
As a result of the strike by the IBEW and three possible acts of tampering with plant equipment, the security force and on site security management were severely challenged by functioning in a
' reactive environment for the last four months of the assessment i.
period. The lack of depth in on-site licensee management during this period may have contributed to breakdown in the program.
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Although the security program was severely stressed during the strike and considerable NRC inspection was conducted, the findings themselves reflect chronic lack of management control and involvement.
l Investigations of three suspected tampering events were not success-ful in conclusively identifying perpetrators.
In response to NRC Region I, the licensee instituted programs to assure continued operability of systems important to safety and programs to improve the probability of identifying any subsequent perpetrator. Reviews 4
of the events and discussions with personnel have confirmed only the first event, two days before the strike, as an intentional act of malicious tampering.
Demonstrated management control of this area is weak and ineffective in correcting long-standing program deficiencies.
i Conclusion A
Category 3 i
Board Recommendation None i
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8.
Refueling / Outage Activities (3.3%)
One 14-week refueling outage was conducted during the current appraisal period on Unit 1 (during the period January 1 - April 12, 1982). Originally scheduled for 10 weeks, the outage included a number of TMI Action Plan modifications and the replacement of one component cooling heat exchanger which proved to be the controlling schedule item.
Prior to and throughout the outage, management involvement in scheduling and sequencing of work was evident. Daily planning meetings were effective in coordinating work to be accomplished and identifying mechanisms to improve schedules on critical path work.
A significant increase in the scope of steam generator tube inspec-tions resulted from degradation found in some peripheral tubes.
Preparation and contingency scheduling was sufficient to prevent this from becoming a delaying item.
Fuel moves, conducted by a Westinghouse team, were accompitshed without incident.
Due to a previously identified failure of one in-core thimble tube, all were replaced during this outage. This work, involving highly activated components, was carefully planned and executed with no attendant problems.
In response to previously identified problems with the reporting of design change work completion by the contractor, a system or walk throughs and more rigorous reporting system were instituted.
In past outages, verbal statements from contractor supervisors were accepted by licensee management and, on the basis of these statements, assertions were made to NRC that required work had been completed.
Later inspection by NRC and the licensee frequently found that some aspect of the work remained incomplete. During this outage, the licensee imposed a system of walk throughs by cognizant engineers and documentation of completion before declaring work complete or systems available for operation. The licensee demonstrated less reluctance to accept " paper work" delays in the interest of assuring the work was satisfactorily completed. Despite pressures to reduce these delays, quality reviews were not compromised.
One instance of incomplete outage work was identified after the assessment period.
Function of the plant vent Air Particulate Detector (APD) was lost due to Partial implementation of a design change. The APD would not have provided automatic isolation of containment vent valves if required. This condition existed for the entire 6-month operating cycle.
Causes for this occurrence are' under review.
Inspection in this area identified no adverse findings.
Conclusion Category 1 Board Recommendation None 19
~ ^~
l '.
~
/
9.
Licensing Activities The licensee continued to place a high degree of management attention and involvement on most iteensing activities.
This has assured prompt attention to site-specific actions. However, this system was less effective in ensuring timely attention to several dated license condi-tions for Salem Unit 2.
PSE&G has nearly completed an administrative transition that will transfer all nuclear activities to a department on site under a corporate vice president who is also stationed at the Sales site. The presence of all key nuclear-oriented people at one location should facilitate focusing of management attention to the nuclear units when needed, and, thereby, improve corporate officer /-
plant operation interchanges.
PSE&G continued to maintain a very effective staff of engineers and scientists at the corporate headquarters and at the Salem site to resolve technical issues. Most of the employees who have been involved with licensing reviews have had several years experience with operating nuclear plants and working with the NRC.
The licensee has been very cooperative in scheduling technical meetings with the staff to resolve complex licensing issues.
In some reviews (e.g., rod exchange methodology and Appendix R), there have been multiple technical discussions wherein the licensee and NRR staff continue to have significant technical disagreements.
Licensee responsiveness to NRC initiatives has been very good to poor, depending on the individual activity. The ability previously exhibited by the Salem licensing group appeared to be adversely effected by the reorganization of the Nuclear Department. The relatively small staff was reduced even further when some members chose not to transfer from corporate headquarters to the station site.
The effectiveness of this group remained reduced during the period that other members transferred their residences. The activities of the group remained fragmented between the corporate headquarters and the Salem site. At the end of the assessment period, however, there were no overdue responses and all responses during the period were satisfactory in content.
The Itcensee has shown an acceptable understanding of the reporting requirements and has issued an average of 10 LERs per unit each month.
It is evident that the Itcensee is alert to problem areas and trends that have been identified by these LERs and is planning corrective action, where necessary, during the next refueling outages.
The licensee has capable operating and support staffs for Salem and these staffs should become even more efficient as the new Nuclear Department matures.
Two potential problem areas remain. The sm'all residue of the licensing staff needs to be upgraded by replacing personnel who did not transfer to the Salem site. Also, the 20
i-licensee is currently shifting many experienced support staff members to new responsibilities at the adjacent Hope Creek site.
Care must be taken to ensure that the capability of the Salem support staff is not decreased.
With respect to training effectiveness and qualification, the results of licensing examinations have been mixed.
In November 1981, the 4
passing rate for 14 R0s and one SRO taking the exam was only 43% (6 Ros and 1 SRO); however, when 5 R0s were retested, they all passed.
A new training center near the site has been placed in operation.
The strength of the utility's management licensed staff was evident during the labor strike in May and June, 1982 when licensed management personnel operated the Salem station without any reduction in safety or power generation. The licensee has implemented the NUREG-0737 l,
requirements for shift manning.
J Assessment of this area was based on NRR evaluation of the following licensing activities:
Responses to NUREG-0737 items Operating Events performance i
Steam generator inspections i
Calibration of control rod worth by rod exchange methodology Appendix I 4
Fire Protection - Appendix R Snubber operation and surveillance i
Environmental Protection Plan Heavy Loads f
In several areas (management involvement, approach to technical issues, operating and technical staff capability) the licensee would j
appear to be superior. The licensee, in response to previous appraisals, is attempting to strengthen all operational and safety aspects of the Salem station by concentrating all of the corporate nuclear-related personnel at the site and placing the entire Salem station and adjoining Hope Creek construction site under a corporate vice president. This assures prompt attention of all of the Itcensee's i
expertise to normal or emergency requirements; however, there may be a tendency to dilute the existing capability at Salem by assigning many of the support personnel primarily to the Hope Creek operation.
i
}
The licensee is remaining current with all regulatory requirements and actions; however, it is evident that the licensing group is short-handed and needs management attention and support during the reorganization period.
Conclusion Category 2 Board Recommendation None 21
)
V.
Supporting Data and Summaries 1.
Licensee Event Reports Tabular Listing Unit 1 Unit 2 Total Type of Events:
A.
Personnel Error 19 22 41 8.
Design / Mfg /Constr/ Install.
7 12 19 C.
External Cause 12 20 32 D.
Defective Procedures 2
1 3
E.
Component Failures 61 63 124 X.
Other 10 17 27 TOTAL 111 135 246 Licensee Event Reports Reviewed Unit 1:
Reports 81-76, 77, 78, 84, 86 through 122, 82-01 through 66, 68 through 71 Unit 2:
Reports 81-85, 86, 90, 94 through 131, 82-01 through 85, 87 through 90, 94 through 97, 102
..,\\
22
. h:.
Causal Analysts Thirteen sets of common mode events were identified:
29 LER's (13 on Unit 1,16 on Unit 2) involve service water leaks in con-a.
tainment resulting from leaks in Containment Fan Coil Unit cotis on the supporting service water system.
The Itcensee completed a program of material upgrades on Unit I during the January-April, 1982 outage and plans similar modifications on Unit 2 during the January 1983 first refueling outage. The LER's in this group are:
(Unit 1) 81-76, 77, 78, 84, 92, 94, 96, 105, 108, 109, 114, 118, 82-18; (Unit 2) 81-90, 94, 114, 115, 82-28, 39, 40, 70, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 80, 84, 89.
b.
10 LER's (3 on Unit 1, 7 on Unit 2) detail inoperability of CFCU's due to low service water flow indication resulting from silt buildup in trans-mitter sensing itnes.
Despite weekly blowdown of the lines and daily operation of the units, this is a recurring item. The LER's in this group include:
(Unit 1) 81-86, 89, 82-61; (Unit 2) 81-99,103,110,117, 82-17, 38 and 96.
8 LER's (4 on Unit 1, 4 on Unit 2) involve low service water flow to CFCU's c.
resulting from flow control valve problems. These include LER's (Unit 1) 82-22,24,29,37;(Unit 2)82-06,35,65,88.
d.
5 LER's (all Unit 2) involve loss of service water flow to CFCU's resulting from oyster shell blockage of flow control valves.
Incidence of oyster shells to date appears to support a conclusion that a relatively small colony was established in the Unit 2 Service Water System. The problem does not appear wide-spread nor has the frequency of valve fouling been
' great.
Steps to obtain approval for increased chlorination are underway.
"he LER's included in this group are:
(Unit 2) 82-41, 46, 49, 50 and 58.
15 LER's (5 on Unit 1,10 on Unit 2) detail inoperability of a containment e.
air lock door, usually due to poor sealing or failure to door hardware apparently resulting from harsh use.
Improvements in personnel training and hardware reliability are underway.
Recently, the licensee proposed the addition of' snubbers to prevent slamming of the doors.
The LER's included
.in this group are:
(Unit 1) 81-89, 116, 82-48, 66, 68; (Unit 2)81-112, 122, 82-21, 44, 45, 47, 51, 55, 56, 102.
f.
38 LER's (11 on Unit 1, 27 on Unit 2) involve protection channel instru-mentation, including setpoint drifts, transmitter failures, and functional failures discovered.during surveillance testing.
In each case, redundancy was maintained and frequently the failure was discovered by lack of con-sistency between redundant channels. Operability was restored within required time frames. The LER's in this group include:
(Unit 1) 81-91, 100, 103, 104, 113, 115, 82-21, 25, 49, 59, 63; (Unit 2) 81-86, 95, 96, 100, 102, 105, 119, 120, 123, 124, 131, 82-01, 05, 08, 12, 14, 18, 19, 42, 52, 61, 66, 67, 69, 72, 85, 94, 23
g.
7 LER's (1 on Unit 1, 6 on Unit 2) detail drift in individual rod position indication instruments.
This has been a recurring problem with this type of instrumentation at a number of facilities. The single event on Unit i during the period indicates that the licensee, through recognition of temperature sensitivity, has developed techniques to deal with the problem.
No plans exist for replacing the instrumentation.
The LER's in this group include: (Unit 1) 82-70; (Unit 2) 81-97, 98, 108, 121, 82-10, 26.
The high number of reports on Unit 2 in the preceding two groups is probably attributable to instrument break-in during the first full year of power operation.
h.
4 LER's (2 on Unit 1, 2 on Unit 2) deal with errors in construction or design while making plant modifications. The LER's in this group include:
Unit 1) 82-10, 82-15; (Unit 2) 81-85, 109.
1.
7 LER's (2 on Unit 1, 5 on Unit 2) deal with missed surveillance tests.
The most frequent cause appears to be a failure to realize that additional tests are prescribed for some Unit 2 systems beyond those required for Unit 1.
The LER's in this group include:
(Unit 1) 82-39, 62; (Unit 2) 82-15, 27, 43, 62, 81.
J.
7 LER's (all Unit 1 or common) are associated with degradation of fire suppression systems.
Design changes to the fire pump diesels are expected to reduce the number of occasions in which alternate or back-up fire suppression equipment or systems will be required. These LER's include:
(Unit 1) 81-88, 93, 82-09, 19, 27, 35, 55.
k.
7 LER's (2 on Unit 1, 5 on Unit 2) detail rapid down power transient in which axial flux difference was driven out of the target band as an expected result of driving rods into the core. The LER's in this group include:
(Unit 1) 82-33, 57; (Unit 2)81-130, 82-04, 16, 32, 57.
1.
4 LER's (2 on Unit 1, 2 on Unit 2) report DNB parameters out of limits for intervals less than allowable by Technical Specifications due to control system malfunctions or radical power transients. The LER's in this group include:
(Unit 1)81-101, 82-38; (Unit 2)81-111, 81-128.
4 LER's (2 on Unit 1, 2 on Unit 2) discuss events precipitated by l
m.
electrical noise interference resulting in unwarranted and unexpected control system operation. Additional operating events not resulting in reportable occurrences, have been attributed to these interactions. A program of signal isolation and decoupling has been initiated to resolve this problem. As specific interactions were identified, modifications to attenuate the noise or sensitivity of the control system was implemented.
The LER's in this group include:
(Unit 1)81-107, 110; (Unit 2) 82-31, 63.
24 l
l
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2.
Investication Activities Investigation April 29 - May 5, 1982 to followup on apparent deliberate tampering with Steam Generator Feedwater pump on April 28, 1982.
i Investigation August 9 - September 15, 1982 to followup on apparent deliberate tampering with Essential Inverter power supply on 3
j August 9, 1982.
3.
Escalated Enforcement Actions
'^
a.
Civil Penalties A
Notice of proposed civil penalty issued on October 27, 1982 based on security' inspection findings during the period June 14-18,,1982.
b.
Orders Prior to the assessment period, an Order modifying the Unit 1 license was issued July 10, 1981 confirming licensee commitments for TMI related requirements contained in NUREG 0737 (Issu'ed to all licensees).
s c.
Confirmatory Action Letters Confirmatory Action Letter 82-15, dated April 29, 1982 confirming 1
}
actions in response to an apparent act of tampering which resulted in deliberate trip of a steam generator feedwater pump on April 28, 1982.
1 Confirmatory Action Letter 82-22, dated August 18, 1982 confirming actions agreed to by the licensee in a meeting with NRC Region I i
management on August 17, 1982 following a suspected tampering event involving diesel air start valves on August 16, 1982.
4.
Management Conferences Held During-The Assessment period SALP Cycle II Management Meeting at Sales Nuclear Generating Station on October 29, 1981.
i
' Meeting held at the NRC Region I offices on June 29, 1982 to discuss licensee plans for post-strike security and additional steps to preclude plant tampering or vandalism.
'l' Enforcement conference held in NRC Region I office on August 12, 1982 to discuss inspection findings and proposed corrective actions resulting from physical security inspection June 14-18, 1982.
f 3
+
25
M TABLE I TABULAR LISTING OF LERs 8Y FUNCTIONAL AREA SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - UNIT 1 Area Number /Cause Code Total 1.
Plant Operations 5
12/A 3/C 14/E 6/X 35
_2.
Radioloofcal Controls 2/A 3.
Maintenance 2
2/A 1/B 3/C 5/E
_4.
Surveillance 11 3/A 1/8 3/C 1/0 18/E 1/X 27 5.
Fire Protection 1/B 5/E 2/X 8
6.
Emergency Preparedness 1/C 1
7.
Security and Safeguards 8.
Refuelino 9.
Licensing Activities i
1/D 1
10.
Other (Original Design Errors and Equipment Failures Not Classifiable Into Areas 1-9) 4/B 2/C 19/E 1/X 26 TOTAL 111 Cause Codes:
A - Personnel Error B - Design, Manufacturing, Construction, or Installation Error C - External Cause D - Defective Procedures E - Component Failure X - Other i
i i
26
TABLE I TABULAR LISTING OF LERs BY FUNCTIONAL AREA SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - UNIT 2 i
Area Number /Cause Code Total 1.
Plant Operations 14/A 1/8 10/C 12/E 9/X 46 2.
Radioloaical Controls 1/E 1
3.
Maintenance 2/A 1/8 6/C 9/E 3/X 21 4.
Surveillance 2/A 3/B 4/C 1/D 30/E 4/X 44 l
5.
Fire Protection 4/A 4
6.
7.
Security and Safeguards 8.
'Refuelina 9.
Licensing Activities I'
- 10. Other (Original Design Errors and Equipment Failures Not Classifiable Into Areas 1-9) 7/8 11/E 1/X 19 TOTAL 135 Cause Codes:
A - Personnel Error 8 - Design, Manufacturing, Construction, or Installation Error C - External Cause D - Defective Procedures E - Component Failure X - Other h
4 27
TABLE 2 VIOLATIONS (9/1/81 - 8/31/82)
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION A.
Number and Severity Level of Violations 1.
Severity Level Common Unit 1 Only(*)
Unit 2 Only(**)
Deviations 0
0 0
O O
O O
S,everity Level III 2
0 0
Severity Level IV 12 3
5 Severity Level V 8
4 1
0 1
i Total 24 T
T B.
Violations Vs. Functional Area FUNCTIONAL AREAS I
II III IV V
2*
1**
1**
1**
1 1.
Plant Operations 3
2 1*
2*
2.
Radiological Controls 1
1**
3 1**
3.
Maintenance 2
4.
Surveillance 1**
2 1
5.
Fire Protection 1**
6.
Security & Safeguards 1
7 1
8.
Refuelino 9.
Licensing Activities
- 10. Others Totals 2
20 13 3
Total Violations = 38 28
TABLE 3 SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION INSPECTION HOURS
SUMMARY
September 1, 1981 - August 31, 1982 HOURS
% OF TIME 1.
Plant Operations 2153 56.4 2.
Radiological Controls 315 8.2 3.
Maintenance 160 4.2 4.
Surveillance 159 4.2 5.
Fire Protection 166 4.3 6.
Emergency Preparedness 40 1.0 7.
Security and Safeguards 705 18.4 8.
Refuelino/ Outage Activities 126 3.3 Total 3824 100%
1 r
29 y
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INSPECTION REPORT ACTIVITIES SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION REPORT INSPECTOR AREAS INSPECTED WWI WU2 81-23 81-21 Resident Routine 81-22 Specialist Startup Test Program 81-23 Spedalist Startup Tests 81-24 81-24 Spedalist Material Control and Accounting 81-25 81-25 Resident Routine 81-26 81-26 Specialist Fire Protection Desir x Changes
)
81-27 81-27 Resident Routine 81-28 81-28 Management Meeting (SALP) 81-29 81-29 Resident Routine 81-30 Spedalist Radiation Protection 81-30 Specialist Startup Test Program l
82-01 82-01 Resident Routine 82-02 82-02 Specialist Chemical and Radiochemical Measurements Program 82-03 82-03 Specialist Physical Protection 82-04 82-04 Specialist Refueling Radiation Protection 82-05 82-08 Resident Routine 82-06 82-05 Resident Routine 30
Table 4 (Con't)~
REPORT INSPECTOR AREAS INSPECTED UNIT 1 UNIT 2 82-07 82-06 Specialist Design Changes and Modifications 82-08 82-07 Specialist Waste Shipment at Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. Bud al Site l
82-09 82-11 Specialist Physical Protection I
(StHkeRelated) 82-10 82-09 Resident Routine 82-11 82-10 Specialist Training Program 82-12 82-13 Resident Routine 1-13 82-12 Investigator Followup on Steam Generator Feed Pump TH p of ApH1 28, 1982 82-14 82-14 Resident Routine 82-15 82-15 Specialist Physical Prote'etion 82-16 82-16 Management Meeting (Post-Strike SecuHty) 82-17 82-17 Resident Routine 82-18 82-18 Specialist Fire Protection / Pre-vention Program 82-19 82-19 Resident Routine 82-20 82-20 Specialist Radiation Protection 82-21 82-22 Investigator Inverter TH p of August 9,1982 i
m
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Table 4 (Con't)
REPORT INSPECTOR AREAS INSPECTED UNIT 1 UNIT 2 82-22 82-21 Specialist Maintenance and Calibration 1
82 23 Specialist IST 82-24 82-23 Specialist PhysicafProtection l
i l
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ATTACHMENT ENFORCEMENT DATA SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION September 1, 1981 - August 31, 1982 Inspection Inspection Nimber Date Subject Rec.
Sev.
Area Unit 1 Unit 2 81-23 81-21 8/4-9/14/81 Failure to Perform Periodic TS VI 4
Surveillances 81-23 81-21 8/4-9/14/81 Failure to Comply With TS IV 1
Technical Specification Requirements Prior to Mode Changes 81-21 8/4-9/14/81 Failure to Comply With a TS IV 3
License Condition 81-23 9/2-3/81 Failure to Monitor Steam ETS IV 2
Generator Blowdown 81-25 9/15-10/19/81 Failure to Post Airborne 10CFR20 Y
2 Radioactivity Area 81-27 10/20-11/23/81 Failure to Submit a Report DPR-75 VI 1
as Required by the License 81-29 81-29' 11/24-12/31/81 Failure to Establish, Imple-TS V.
I 4
ment, and Maintain Procedures 81-29 81-29 11/24-12/31/81 Failure to Perform a Safety 10CFR50 IV 3
Evaluation 82-01 82-01 1/1-2/8/82 Failure to Follow / Implement TS IV 1
Procedures t
82-01 1/1-2/8/82 Failure to Properly Approve TS V
1 and Issue a Procedure 82-01 1/1-2/8/82 Failure to Make a Report in 10CFR50 IV 1
Accordance with 10CFR50.72 1/1-2/8/82 Failure to Follow Radiation TS 6.11 IV 2
k Protection Procedure i
33 l
5
Inspection Inspection Naber Date Subiect Rec.
Sev.
Aret Unit 1 Unit 2 82-02 82-02 1/18-21/82 Failure to Have Calibration ETS V
2 i
Procedure 82-02 82-02 1/18-21/82 Failure to Make Provisions ETS V
2 l
for Preserving Caposite Samples l
82-03 82-03 1/11-15/82 Failure to Maintain the Sec. Plan IV 7
IntegH ty of the Protected Area Barrier 82-03 82-03 1/11-15/82 Failure to Detemine a Sec. Plan IV 7
l Need Prior to Revalidating l
Gontractor Personnel's Access into Vital Areas t
82-03 82-03 1/11-15/82 Failure to Completely Sec. Plan V
7 i
Search a Vehicle PMor to Entry into the Protected Area s
82-03 82-03 1/11-15/82 Failure to Provide Adequata Sec. Plan IV 7
Compensatory Measures DuMng the Loss of a Peri-meter Intrusion Detection System 82-05 82-08 3/9-4/5/82 Failure to Follow Tagging TS IV 3
Procedures 82-05 2/9-3/8/82 Failure to Post Fire TS IV 5
Watches at Open Penetrations 82,
2/9-3/8/82
~ Failure to Apply for 10CFR50 IV I
Timely Operator License Renewal 82-07 82-06 2/8-11 and Failure to Address Program App. B VI 1
17-18/82 Effectiveness in QA Audit wig 82-08 82-07 1/22/82 Delivery of a Shipment of 10CFR71.5 III 2
Licensed Material to a Carrier for Transport with two Containers of Shipment Not Strong and Tight 34
'i Inspection Inspection
" mber Date Subject Rec.
Sev.
Area unit 1 Unit 2 82-10 4/6-5/11/82 Failure to Make a 50.72 10CFR50 IV 1
Report 82-10 4/6-5/11/82 Failure to Monitor Gaseous TS V
2 Release 82-12 82-13 5/12-6/8/82 Failure to Review and TS V
1 Approve Procedures 82-13 5/12-6/8/82 Failure to Perfom Sur-TS IV 4
ve111ance Tests on Containment Valves 82-14 6/9-7/6/82 Failure to Follow Proce-TS V
1 dures 82-15 82-15 6/14-18/82 Failure to Maintain Vital Sec. Plan III 7
Area Barrier 82-15 82-15 6/14-18/82 Failure to Repor't Security 10CFR50.54 IV 7
Plan Changes de-15 82-15 6/14-18/82 Failure to Provide Adequate Sec. Plan IV 7
Illumination 82-15 82-15 6/14-18/82 Misuse of Photobadge Sec. Plan IV 7
82-15 82-15 6/14-18/82 Failure to Secure Vehicles Sec. Plan IV 7
82-17 82-17 7/7-8/3/82 Failure to Provide As-Built 10CFR50, IV 1
Drawings App. B 82-17 7/7-8/3/82 Failure to Follow Report-TS Y
1 ing Procedures 82-1S 82-19 8/4-31/82 Failure to Follow Radia-TS 6.11 Y
2 tion Protection Procedures 82-22 82-21 8/23-27/82 Failure to Control Test App. B V
4 and Measuring Equipment 82-22 82-21 8/23-27/82 Failure to Effect Timely App. B V
4 Corrective Action 35
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COPHISSION No. 83-87
}
REGION I NOTICE OF SIGNIFICANT LICENSEE MEETING I
SEP 2 91983 f~
v of Licensee: Public Service Electric and Gas Company nome of Facility: Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 and 2 l
Docket No. 50-272 and 50-311 Time and Date:
10:00 a.m., October ll,1983 Location: Salem Nuclear Generating Station
Purpose:
Periodic Meeting on Salem ATWS Event Corrective Action Program NRC Attendees:
R. Starostecki, Director Division of Pmject and Resident Programs (DPRP)
H. Kister, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch No. 2. DPRP A. Norrholm, Chief, Reactor Pmjects Section 28. DPRP S. Varga, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No.1. Div. of Licensing, NRR R. Jacobs, Pmject Engineer, DPRP J. Linville, Senior Resident Inspector R. Sunners, Resident Inspector D. Fischer, Licensing Project Manager, NRR Licensee Attendees:
H. Sonn, President and Chief Operating Officer R. Eckert, Senior Vice President, Energy Supply and Engineering R. Uderitz, Vice President - Nuclear J. Zupko, General Manager Salem Nuclear Station J. Driscoll Assistant General Manager, Salem Nuclear Station Note: Attendance by NRC personnel at this meeting should be made known by 4:00 p.m.,
October 10,1983 via telephone call to L. Norrholm, Reg on I, at FTS 8-488-1114.
. Prepamd by MJ If.
- 3. Kitter, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2. DPRP Distribution:
W. Dircks, Executive Director for Operations R. DeYoung, Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement D. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing, NRR S. Varga, Chief, Operating Reactor Branch No. 1. DOL, NRR C. Heltemes, Director, Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data J. Axelrad; Dimetor,(Enforcement Staff, IE Public Document Room PDR) l Local Public Document Room (LPDR)
S. G. Kuhrtz, Director, Division of Environmental Quality, State of New Jersey OYi~
\\\\
W' bec: Regional Administrator Public Affairs Officer Division Directors Region I Receptionist Branch Chiefs DRMA Files DPRP Files F. Brenneman
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CDItt!SSION REGION I No. 83-95
}
NOTICE OF SIGNIFICANT LICENSEE lEETING 3
NOV 0 41983 Name of Licensee: Public Service Electric and Gas Company Nuee of Facility: Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Uniis 1 and 2 Docket No.
50-272 and 50-311 Time and Date: 9:30 a.m., November 18, 1963 l
Location:
Salen Nuclear Generating Station
Purpose:
Periodic Meeting on Salem ATWS Event Corrective Action Progrom NRC Attendees: R. Starostecki, Director, Division of Project and Resident Programs (DPRP)
H. Kister, Chief Reactor Projects Branch No. 2, DPRP L. Morrholm, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 28. DPRP R. Jacobs Project Engineer DPRP J. Linville Senior Resident Inspector Licensee Attendees:
R. Uderitz, Vice President - Nuclear J. Zupko, General Manager, Salem Nuclear Station Note: Attendance by NRC personnel at this meeting shculd be made known by 4:00 p.m.,
November 17, 1983 via telephone call to L. Norrhols, Region I, at FTS 8-488-1114.
HarryS. Kister, CMef(,$le
+4 m mir f s<gr4 Prepared by
(
Projects Branch 2, DPRP Distribution:
W. Dircks. Executive Director for Operations R. DeYoung. Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement D. Eisenhut, Dirwetor, Division of Licensing, NRR S. Varga, Chief Operating Reactor Branch No.1. DOL, NRR C. Heltames Director, Office of Analysis, and Evaluation of Operational Data J. Axelrad. Director,(Enforcement Staff, IE Public Docunent Room PDR)
Local Public Document Room (LPDR)
S. G. Kuhrtz, Director, Division of Environmental Quality, State of New Jersey bec. -Regional Administrator Public Affairs Officer
- Division Directors Region I Receptionist Branch Chiefs DRMA File y
F. Brenneman DPRP File D
9
\\F J
RI DPRP DPRP
,//
Norrholm Kister'N OTIICIAL E00E COPY kp h3
-