ML20112A991

Human Factors Evaluation of Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 & 2 Control Room Summary Rept, Detailed Control Room Design Review

ML20112A991
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	12/31/1984
From:	Eike R, Stephen Fleger, Mccafferty D ESSEX CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20112A970	List: ML20112A969 ML20112A991
References
NUDOCS 8501100173
Download: ML20112A991 (172)

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HUMAN FACTORS EVALUATION OF TE CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 CONTROL ROOM

SUMMARY

REPORT Prepared For:

Baltimore Gas & Electric Charles Center P.O. Box 1475 Baltimore, Maryland 21203 Prepared By:

Robin K. Elke Stephen A. Fleger Denise B. McCafferty Timothy K. O'Donoghue Everett M. Boyd Candace K. Weiss Carol A. Kain Frances Piccione Clifford C. Baker David R. Elke Essex Corporation 333 North Fairfax Street Alexandria, Virginia 22314 December 1984 2

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ACKNOWLEDGDENTS The authors would ilke to thank the following people for their contributions:

e Richard M. Kane e The Graphics Departrnent e The Production Staff Essex Technical Support Services Staff e

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Pace vil Executive Summary 1

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1

1.1 Background

1 1.2 Objectives 2

1.3 Scope 3

1.4 Constraints on the Evaluation Effort 4

2.0 APPROACH 4

2.1 Data Collection 8

2.2 Data Reduction 9

2.3 Data Filing System 21 3.0 OPERATOR INTERVIEWS 21 3.1 Introduction 21 3.2 Approach 22 3.3 Operator-identified Problems 4

23 3.4 Operator-identified Strengths 24 3.5 Operator Recommendations l

25 f

3.6 Conclusions l

4.0 CONTROL PANEL OPERABILITY - TASK ANALYSIS 26 26 4.1 latroduction 26 f

4.2 Objectives 28 i.

4.3 Technical Approach 31 4.4 Discussion l

33 5.0 ALARM ANNUNCIATORS l

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Paoe 35 6.0 SURVEYS 35 6.1 Control Room Workspace Arrangement Survey 36 6.2 Control Room Furnishings Survey 37 6.3 Control Room Illumination Survey 43 6.4 Noise and Control Room Communications 56 6.5 Operator-Computer Interface 57 6.6 Operator Protective Equipment 61 7.0 SPECIAL STUDIES 7.1 Determination of Options for the Backfit of Problem Controls 61 64 7.2 Readability of Miniature Annunciators 7.3 Review of Miniature Annunciator Summary Window Configuration 67 68 7.4 Full-Scale Mockup of PanelICl3 69

' 7.5 Control Room Labeling Study 70 7.6 Mirror-Imaging in Design and its impact 78 7.7 Mirror-Image Design impact on Performance - A Pilot Study 86 7.8 HF Review of the Proposed Redesign of PanelICO3 7.9 HF Review of the Proposed Auxiliary Feedwater System Design 86 89 7.10 HF Review of the Proposed Shutdown Panel Design 90

8.0 REFERENCES

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,a LIST OF FIGL.RES Floure Title h

2.1 Human Engineering Evaluation Report Coding Scheme 11 2.2 Component Sheet Organization 12 13 2.3 Panel Segments 2.4 Human Engineering Discrepancy Report Coding Scheme 14 15 2.5 HED Organization 4.1 Control Room Operations Task Analysis Form 29 39 6.1 Ambient Lighting Survey Form 7.1 Application of Demarcation and Summary Labels to Panel 1C03 87 y

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LIST OF TAN M Table Title Pace 2-1 Panel Number System Description 16 2-2 Subpanel Code 18 2-3 HED Source of information Code 18 2-4 Interface Nomenclature or Description 19 6-1 Ambient Light Levels for Main Control Panels 40 6-2 Ambient Light Levels for Main Control Panels Under Emergency 42 Lighting Conditions 6-3 Noise Survey 47 7-1 Miniature Annunciator Viewing Distance for 100% Recognition 66 at 900, 600, 450, and 300 vi

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EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

From May 1980 to March 1981, the Essex Corporation of Alexandria, Virginia, performed a human factors engineering (HFE) evaluation of the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP) control room (CR) for Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BGA#.). Data were collected in the control room of Units 1 end 2; at the Unit 1 plant-specific simulator at Combustion Engineering's facilities in Windsor, Connecticut; and from photographs taken of the control room. The evaluation employed human factors engineering assessment techniques developed by Essex Corporation specifically for power plant control room design reviews.

These techniques were developed while writing NUREG/CR-1580 for the NRC and subsequently refined during control room reviews for other utilities.

The objective of the evaluation was to perform the following:

Identify facets of the control room design that were at variance with e

NUREG/CR-1580 Conduct special studies to explore problem areas or resolve ambigu-e ous findings Recommend potential backfits for all of the design deficiencies e

identified Assess the adequacy of information presentation to the control room e

operators e Recommend human factors enhancements for control / display groupings.

f Primary human factors engineering problem areas identified during this evaluation included:

e Prioritization of annunciators Functional grouping of controls and displays e

e Use of demarcation and summary labels e Use of abbreviations and terminology in labeling e Use of mirror imaging in design, including reversals in switch operation.

Although the multitude of individual deficiencies identified were minor, their cumulative effect could degrade control room operability. Each deviation from guidance was reported as an HED (Human Engineering Discrepancy) and was reviewed by a i

vil

e committee of BG&E and Essex personnel. Essex's recommendations are to implement the committee-approved backfits, thereby increasing both the safety and reliability of the Calvert Cliffs control room, and to bring the control room in line with established principles of human factors engineering.

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

i 1.1-Background On 28 March 1979 the Three Mile Island accident occurred. One of the major contributing causes of the accident has been identified as operator error induced by the design of the control room (NUREG/CR-1270). This fact has created a tremendous j

amount of concern in both government agencies and utilities regarding the lmpact of nuclear power station control room design on operator performance. in an effort to 4

improve control room c'esign, those concerned have turned to human factors engineering (HFE).

Human factors engineering, as a discipline, seeks to reduce the chances of an operator _ error, thereby increasing the efficiency of a system. This is done by designing the interface between the human operator and the environment to f!*. the limitations of f

the operator rather than expecting the human to adapt to the interface. The more

. complex the system interface, the greater the necessity for a sound human-engineered design. Given the complexity of a reactor interface and the consequences of an error to i

human safety and plant reliability, maximizing effective operator use of this interface is crucial.

Recognizing this critical need, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BG&E) contracted the Essex Corporation to perform a human factors engineering review of the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant control room, Units 1 and 2, located in L9sby, Maryland. This report details the methodology and findings of the review. Supplemental f

information may also be found in BG&E's Program Plan Summary Report dated 1 September,1983.

i 1.2 Objectives The objectives of the human factors engineering evaluation of the Calvert Cliffs control room were to perform the following e Identify aspects of control room design that were discrepant with human factors engineering design principles as identified in NUREG/CR-1580 o Conduct special studies with the intent of enhancing human-eystem l

Interfaces Identify potential remedies (backfits) for all discrepancies i

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s e Document evaluation results in a manner that allows for immediate access to the data e - Recommend design or administrative changes where appropriate to enhance operator reliability in the control room.

It must be emphasized that the applicable industry document specifying WE criteria during the reviea period was NUREG/CR-1580. The detailed control room design review (DCRDR) was completed in good faith to meet the regulatory requirements of the day. Approximately six months after the completion of the BG&E DCRDR, NUREG-0700 was published. With the exception of the control room illumination survey, noise survey, and operator protective equipment survey, BG&E did not re-evaluate the DCRDR results in light of this new document.

It is BG&E's position that the differences between NUREG/CR-1580 and NUREG-0700 have been accommodated, given that the completed DCRDR was thorough and based on sound human engineering principles.

1.3 Scope The Calvert Cliffs dual-unit control center consists of one control room with adjacent control panels, in mirrored arrangement beginning from a center, shared panel.

Most of the data collection effort took place on-site in the Calvert Cliffs control room.

Data summation, analysis, and reporting were performed primarily at the Essex headquer-ters office in Alexandria, Virginia.

l Information sources used for the evaluation included, but were not limited to, the 1

following e FSARs i

e LERs e Operator Alarm Manuals e Abnormal and Emergency Operating Procedures e Operating Instructions and Procedures I

e Technical Specifications e Site Emergency Plan e P&lDs and other Engineering Drawings e System Descriptions.

The human factors engineering evaluation effort included the following tasks:

l e Evaluation of the present control room controls and displays using checklists and surveys m.

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S e Operator interviews i

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Task analysis and procedure walk-throughs using simulator and CR e

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e Evaluation of the alarm annunciator system - current design, pro-posed changes, and post-implementation validation i

Evaluation of the operator / computer interface l

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Development of design specifications as needed to address design j

e changes to be implemented i

e Documentation of results and recommendations for correcting dis-I crepancies identified I

Evaluation of the impact of environmental features, such as lighting e

j and noise, on operator performance Conduct of special projects as requested by BG&E Human pactors 1-e Task Force members.

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1.4 Constraints on the Evaluation Effort l

Few constraints were placed on the Essex review team in the conduct of the CR l-evaluation. One problem, however, in evaluating the operability of both units was that I

the plant-specific simulator is modeled after the Unit 1 plant. Therefore, assumptions

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were made that the operation of Unit 2, while mirrored in location of components, l

remains identical in easquence and operational set.

An additional constraint in completing the CR review is that post-TMI modifications have been implemented since the start of the evaluation. To accommodate these changes, i

l re-evaluations were performed using the criteria recommended in NUREG-0700. Most of the new components that have been added to the boards have been included in this review.

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1 2.0 APPROACH t-The human engineering evaluation of the Calvert Cliffs control room design consisted of two basic phases: data co!!ection and dets reduction. Data collection was eccomplished by certain methodologies tnat compared features of the control room design with principles of human factors engineering as delineated in Volume 1 of NUREG/

j CR-1580, " Human Engineering Guide to Control Room Evaluation."

Data reduction Involved identifying potential errors associated with design features found to be at variance with the criteria in Volume 2 of NUREG/CR-1580, sesessing the magnitude of i

the effect of these errors, and recommending ameliorative actions.

in addition to these two phases, Essex performed a series of special studies and evaluations of proposed design changes. The methodologies used in the evaluation are summarized below.

I 2.1 Data Collection The data collection phase involved application of the following data collection procedures e Evaluation of the control room for generic problems o Operator interviews i

e Procedure walk-throughs and task analysis i

Annunciator system review (which comprised a number of data e

collection methodologies) e Control room surveys e Checklists.

l 2.1.1 Evaluation of the Control Room for Generic Proldoms A number of human engineering design problems have been identified as common throughout the industry. The objective of this review was to examine existing control r

f room design against a list of generic human factors shortcomings that have been found consistently in previously examined control rooms. Problems identified in the generic problem review were documented and studied further using the relevant survey techniques and checklists, f

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2.1.2 OperatorInterviews Those who operate the plant and interact with the control room on a day-to-day basis are instrumental in identifying systems or instrumentation where human error does occur.

The objective of the operator interviews was to provide an opportunity for anonymous input regarding CR workspace and panel design. All licensed operators (35) employed by the plant were interviewed individually concerning design problems impact-Ing safe plant operation. Problems identified were documented and studied further using applicable surveys and checklists. The results of the operator interviews are presented in l

Section 3.0.

2.1.3 Procedure Walk-Throughs and Task Analyels i

The objective for conducting task analysis of operator activities under emergency, abnormal, and normal operating conditions is to create a basis for the evaluation of panel i

and workspace layout. While surveys and checklists treat vocific engineering aspects of the control room, operational aspects are examined through procedure walk-throughs and task analysis of operating procedures. With a detailed analysis of all operator tasks and j

clearly defined performance requirements, design problems and potential human errors can be identified. All emergency operating procedures were included as part of the j

analysis. _ in addition, selected abnormal operating procedures were reviewed to include L

scenarios which exercised all major control room work stations.

6 The following procedures were videotaped at the Unit 1-specific simulator at the Combustion Engineering facility in Windsor, Connecticut e EOP-1 Reactor Trip f

e EOP-2 Loos of Load e EOP-3 Loss of Main Feedwater e EOP-4 Steam Line Rupture e EOP-5 Loos of Reactor Coolant e EOP-6 Steam Generator Tube Rupture with no Automatic Trip e EOP-11 CEA Malfunctions i

e EOP-12 Loos of Reactor Coolant Flow e EOP-14 Loss of Instrument Air l

e EOP-15 Loss of AC Power e AOP-8 Excessive Reactor Coolant Leakage e AOP-15 Loss of Auxillery Feedwater.

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The video tapes were used to support the task analysis. One objective of the videotaped walk-throughs was to validate the completeness of the task analysis. Another was to gain data on the use of p rticular control / display components. By obtaining frequency and criticality of use data, the importance of HEDs identified by the surveys, checklists, and operator interviews could be verified. Instances of poc.r control / display relationships, lack of necessary information, and inadequate presentation of information can all be identified from this type of analysis. Task analysis is discussed in greater detail in Section 4.0.

2.1.4 Annunciator System Review A detailed review and evaluation was conducted of various aspects of both the current alarm annunciator configuration and use as well as the proposed redesign of the system. A post-implementation review was conducted subsequent to the redesign phase to validate the backfit effort.

Aspects of mirror-image consistency, discrimination of associated audible alarms, and labeling clarity and consistency were addressed. The annunciator system review and evaluation effort is dicussed further in Section 5.0.

2.1.5 Control Room Survey i

A survey approach was used to collect data of a general nature or data that could be i

collected by observations. That is, control room surveys were performed to cover aspects of the control room not well suited for checklist evaluation. For example, environmental I

espects such as nolee and illumination lend themselves well to the survey approach. in I

addition to habitability, the surveys provided information on operator interfaces other than the control panel itself. The specific surveys and activities performed are discussed in greater detall in Section 6.0.

2.1.6 Haman Factere E.A t., Checkliste Checklists are probably the most widely used tool for human engineering evaluation.

l When properly designed and systematically applied, checklists will enable the evaluator to pinpoint specific operator-control room interfaces that do not agree with recommended j'

human engineering design principles.

l The checkilets were used to address the control room on a panel and component level and, as expected, provided the greatest source of review results. These checklists consisted of statements drawn from NUREG/CR-1580. Each component was evaluated l

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a for compliance with the criteria contained in the checklist, and instances of noncompil-ance were noted. The checklists were administrated by using control board photographs of both units and through six weeks of on-site work at CCNPP. Twenty-eight different checklists were used for the control room evaluation, e

CR Environment e

Simple Indicators e

CR Workspace Arrangement e

Legend Lights i

e Mimic Lines e

Projection Displays e

Procedures Documents e

Vertical / Horizontal Meters e

Communications e

Circular Meters e

Labels e

Trend Recorders e

Rotary Selector Stvitches

-e Computers l

e Levers e

Computers - General e

Toggle Switches e

Computer - Keyboard e

Pushbuttons e

Computer - Printer e

Legend Pushbuttons e

Computer - Display o

Other Switches e

Computer - CRT l

e Counters e

- Computer Function Switches e

Process Control'ers e

Annunciator & Warning System Each checklist was divided into three sections: typical, sample, and each compo-nont. For the " typical" section, one component was evaluated for all identical component types. Typical item checklists contained criteria which could be measured once, such as handle dimensions for a particular type of pistol-grip controller, or cherecter size on switch position labels. For these parameters, one measurement on a typical component will suffice for the entire control room. For the " sample" section, one component was evaluated from each varietion of a component type. Semple item check!!sts contained criteria which were applied to a sempling of similar components. For example, the pull

- force on a " Pull-to-Defeat" J-Handle switch, msy require several measurements on identically configured components to determine both the means and variance of the force across switches. The "esch" section was the largest section, and all components were l

evaluated. Here criteria were applied on a component-by-component basis with each The component in a class compared to all relevant criteria on a point-by-point basis.

"eech" section was divided into subsections. For exemple, the rotary selector switches checklist was divided into control arrangements, control / display relationship, control i

location, control design, control operation, direction of motion, and control coding.

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i The checklists comprised matrices of component labels and statements from NUREG/CR-1580.

When a component complied with a specific statement on the I

checklist, a check was recorded. When a component did not comply with a specific statement, a "no" was recorded. For statements that did not apply to a particular component, an N/A was recorded. Human Engineering Discrepancy (HED) report forms were written for components that did not comply with a checklist statement. An HED 1=

l Included the following information: component type, component label, panel, specific problem, guideline reference, potential operator errors, and backfitt. An HED log was l

developed to document the progress of EDs from generation to final disposition. The i

following information was entered in the record for each HED:

e Assigned working number e HED title e Date of committee review e Review disposition e Final disposition l

e Correspr,nding file number h

e Sign-off date.

l To facilitate the access to information regarding the status of all EDs, ttge log was f

recently configured into a computerized data base. In addition to providing easier access to information concerning the history of all EDs, the data base served as an index to more detailed technical information contained within the DCRDR files.

For every l

component in the control room there was also a Human Engineering Evaluation Report j

(i.e., component sheet). A separate file was established for the component si.dets. A component sheet included the following information: component type, component label,.

l location, and a listing of all HEDs on file for the particular component. The HEDs and component sheets were coded for cross-referencing. The coding scheme is discussed in detail in Section 2.3 below.

2.2 Data Reduction Data reduction was done in two basic steps. The first step consisted of completing

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en HED Report. This report listed components found to be at variance with the criteria in l

NUREG/CR-1580, the variance, and the type (s) of error the verlance might precipitate.

The second phase consisted of presenting these findings to a review committee composed of BG&E engineers, operations experts, and Essex human factors specialists.

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2.3 Data Filing System 2.3.1 Introductlan An important third phase in the CR evaluation is to provide documentation of the review effort and all findings. The purpose of the filing system is to provide access to all data at a component level. The proposed filing codes facilitate the collation and retrieval of Human Engineering Evaluation Reports (i.e., component sheets) and the Human Engineering Discrepancy Reports (HEDs). Coding both sources of data also allows two available directions of retrieving data. By knowing the component location, one can find the associated component sheet in which all corresponding HEDs are !!sted. Conversely, by possessing an HED, one can find its related component sheets, which in turn provide access to all other HEDs relating to specific components.

The component sheets were coded and filed to facilitate access to any given control room panel component record. By knowing all of the human factors discrepancies written against a specific component, the review committee was able to select design improve-ments which had the greatest potential for alleviating the problem without introducing new deficiencies or interfering with previously selected backfits.

2.3.2 Component Sheets The component sheets are coded according to panel and subpanellocation, interface nomenclature or descriptions, and order of appearance within the same type of component en its associated subpanel(see Figures 2.1,2.2, and 2.3; and Tables 2-1,2-2, and 2-4).

e The first four characters of the first set of characters indicate the panel on which the interface nomenclature or description is located.

e The fifth character of the first set of characters indicates the subpanel, which is defined by the plane of the panel upon which the interface is located (see Figure 2.3). This character in the code is not included for vertical panels.

The second set of characters indicates the general interface nomen-e clature or description, such as the type of component or aspect of operator / system interface.

e The third set of characters indicates where the interface nomen-clature or description appears relative to others of the same type on the same subpanel.

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f 2.3.3 EDs The HEDs are coded according to interface nomenclature or description, HED number, and source of information (see Figures 2.4 and 2.5; and Tables 2-1,2-3, and 2-4).

The first set of characters indicates the panel on which the MD e

occurs.

e The second set of characters indicates the general interface nomen-clature or description, such as the type of component.

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employed in the HED or data collection task during which the discrepancy was identified.

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PANEL 3RD SUBPANEL MICROSWITCH SECOND COMPONENT l

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a TABLE 2-1 PAEL NUh4ER SYSTEM DESCRPTION Panel Number

System Description

IC01 SWITCHYARD CONTROL BOARD 1CO2/2C02 TURBINE CONTROL & TURBINE GENERATOR AUXILIARY 1C03/2CO3 -

CONDENSATE & FEEDWATER CONTROL BOARD 1C04/2C04 COMPUTER OPERATORS BOARD / AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM 1C05/2C05 REACTIVITY CONTROL BOARD l

1C06/2C06 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM CONTROL BOARD CHEMICAL & VOLUME CONTROL BOARD 1C07/2C07 1C08/2C08 ENGINEERING SAFEGUARDS CONTROL BOARD 11 1C09/2C09 ENGINEERING SAFEGUARDS CONTROL BOARD 12 ENGINEERING SAFEGUARDS CONTROL BOARD 13 1C10/2C10 SERVICE WATER & MISCELLAMOUS STATION 1C13/2C13 SERVICES CONTROL BOARD NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION & PROTECTIVE LOGIC 1C15/2C15 SYSTEM E&F REACTOR TRIP STATUS PANEL

- IC17 4 KV & 480 V SYSTEM NORMAL FEEDER BREAKERS 2C17 4 KV & 480 V SYSTEM NORMAL FEEDER BREAKERS l.

CONTROL BOARD IC18 13 KV & 4 KV SYSTEM ESSENTIAL FEEDER BREAKERS

& DIESEL GENERATOR 11 CONTROL BOARD 13 KV & 4 KV~ SYSTEM ESSENTIAL FEEDER BREAKERS 1C19

& DIESEL GENERATOR 12 CONTROL BOARD 13 KV & 4 KV SYSTEM ESSENTIAL FEEDER BREAKERS IC20 l

& DIESEL GENERATOR 21 CONTROL BOARD

. 1C22 RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM 2C23 OSCILLOGRAPH (MAIN GENERATORS) l 1C24 A D.C. CONTROL PANEL FIRE PUMP & D.C. CONTROL SYSTEM 1C24 B 2C24 SALT WATER SYSTEM 1C26 VIBRATION AND SEISMIC MONITORING SYSTEM

. IBRATION MONITORING V

2C26 l

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TABLE 2-1 PAPEL NUheER SYSTEM DESCRFTION (Cont'd)

Panel Number

System Description

GENERATOR METERING & MISCELLANEOUS 1C29 ELECTRICAL AUXILIARY PANEL LOOSE PARTS MONITORING SYSTEM 1C30 A&B 1C31/2C31 REACTOR REGULATING SYSTEM 11(21) CH X/ ACOUSTIC MONITOR UNIT 1(2) 1C32/2C32 REACTOR REGULATING SYSTEM 12(22) CH Y 1C33 WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM CONTROL PANEL 1C34 HEATING VENTILATING & AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS CONTROL PANEL 1C35/2C35 FEEDWATER CONTROL 11(21)

IC36/2C36 FEEDWATER CONTROL 12(22)

IC39/2C39 MISCELLANEOUS STATION RECORDERS 1C43/2C43 OLD ALTERNATE SAFE SHUTDOWN PANEL NEW ALTERNATE SAFE SHUTDOWN PANEL 1C43/2C43

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TABLE 2-2 SUBPAEL CODE (N/A TO VERTICAL PAELS)

A HIGHEST PLANE OF PANEL (NORMALLY CONTAINING ANNUNCIATORS)

SECOND HIGHEST PLANE OF PANEL B

C THIRD HIGHEST PLANE OF PANEL FOURTH HIGHEST PLANE OF PANEL D

TABLE 2-3 ED SOURCE OF NFORMATION CODE CL CHECKLIST TA TASK ANALYSIS / CONTROL ROOM WALK-THROUGH SV SURVEYS AN ANNUNCIATOR STUDY OR -

OPERATOR REPORT / INTERVIEW SI SIMULATOR VIDEOTAPE SS SPECIAL STUDY EE ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING GE GENERIC HED 1

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Ti BLE 2-4 INTERFACE NOtENCLATURE OR DESCRIPTION A

GENERAL (LIGHT, NOISE, ETC.)

00 01 LAYOUT (FURNISHINGS) 02 COMMUNICATIONS 03 COMPUTER-RELATED 04 STAFFING AND PERSONNEL 05 PROTECTIVE / SAFETY EQUIPMENT PANEL, GENERAL 10 11 LABELS 12 CONTROL / DISPLAY ARRANGEMENT 13 CONVENTIONS DISPLAYS, GENERAL 20 21 ANNUNCIATORS 22 METERS 22.1 VERTICAL 22.2 HORIZONTAL 22.3 CIRCULAR 23 LIGHTS 23.1 LEGEND LIGHTS 23.2 SIMPLE INDICATORS TREND RECORDERS 24 24.1 STRIP CHART 24.2 IMPACT RECORDER 25 COUNTERS 26 MIMICS 27 DEMARCATION LINES DIGITAL-TYPE DISPLAYS 28 19

TABLE 2-4 NTERFACE NOldNCLATURE OR DESCRIPTION (Cont'd)

CONTROLS, GENERAL 30 PROCESS CONTROLLERS 31 DISCRETE ROTARY SWITCHES 32 32.1 MICROSWITCHES THUMB ROTARIES 32.2 KEY-OPERATED 32.3 32.4 SELECTOR SWITCHES

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32.5 J-HANDLES 32.6 T-HANDLES 32.7 STAR-HANDLES PUSHBUTTON/MICROSWITCHES 32.8 33 CONTINUOUS ROTARY SWITCHES i

34 TOGGLE SWITCHES 35 LEVERS, JOYSTICKS 36 PUSHBUTTONS LEGEND PUSHBUTTONS l

37 38 THUMBWHEELS l-39 ROCKER SWITCHES PROCEDURES, GENERAL 40 SYSTEMS, GENERAL 50 l

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a 3.0 OPERATOR INTERVIEWS As users of the system under review, control room operators provide a unique source of information and insight into the functioning yd problems of the operator / system interface.

Through interviews with the operators, the human factors engineering researcher gains familiarity with the control room and acquires information concerning operability problems.

3.1 Introduction The objective of the operator interviews were to identify the following:

Most frequently used controls and displays and their locations e

e Most frequently monitored systems Most frequently used control panel segments e

e Procedures that were difficult to execute Ambiguous labeling e

Confusing control / display relationships e

e Most critical systems and procedures Operational problems encountered by the control room operators e

Strengths in control room design e

e Recommendations for improved operability.

These objectives were accomplished by using the Essex-developed nuclear power plant control room operator questionnaire. Human factors engineering problems were reported as HEDs.

3.2 Approach The operator interviews took place in three steps. Operators were briefed in groups of approximately ten. The briefing oriented the operators to the importance of their input -in the human factors engineering CR evaluation. Assured of anonymity, each

_ operator received a copy of the Human Engineering Questionnaire, which they were as ekd to read and complete before an Essex researcher returned for private, one-on-one interview sessions.

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During the private interview sessions, the operators' responses were reviewed.

Questions considered ambiguous were then explained and further responses recorded.

Operators were asked to point out controls or displays considered problematic.

All response items were obtained from the original questionnaires. As a result of the large sample size, many responses were similar. Consequently, these items have been paraphrased to facilitate their reporting. In some cases where interpretation was not appropriate, items were quoted to maintain their integrity.

3.3 Operator-Identified Problems The following is a summary of relevant problems identified by operators in response to selected questionnaire items.

Question:

In a two-unit control room, what types of problems do you experience in shifting from one unit to another?

Responses:

Mirror-imaging problem with control, display, and label arrangements.

Dissimilarity of control design for turbine generator controls.

Unit 1 is G.E. and Unit 2 is Westinghouse design.

Question:

What problems do you encounter with shif t turnover?

Response

Inadequate and inconsistent reporting of previous shift data and abnormalities due to unnecessary CR traffic and non-overlapping shif t hours.

Question:

Are there problems in reaching, seeing, or reading a required control / display?

Response

Most vertical (Sigma) meters on upper panel portions suffer from glare on glass meter faces and reading problems due to l

parallax.

Question:

Are there problems with location or grouping logic of controls j

on control / display arrangements of systems or subsystems?

Response

Inconsistent arrangement of sirallar controls on 1 & 2 C03.

Question:

Are important controls and displays inaccessible, or beyond view, because of placement (especially during minimum shift requirements)?

Response

Rad Monitor System, Fire Panel, and Vital Instrument Bus are important systems located on back panels.

Monitoring is difficult, especially during emergencies and minimum shifts.

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Question:

What CR environmental conditions interfere with effective performance of your job?

Responses:

Summer heat in CR causes drowsiness.

Excessive noise from CR traffic, " nuisance alarms," and P.A.

message and system inadequacy hinder operations and important communications.

Excessive CR traffic interferes with operations.

f Question:

Are there problems with communications procedures on equip-ment which interfere with receiving or transmitting required information?

Responses:

P.A. communications to field are hampered due to lack of dedicated lines for CR and general P.A. Interference.

P.A. communications from field to CR are hampered due to disrepair of system units and poor audibility of P.A. messages.

Too many communications on NRC hotline during emergencies-interfere with important operations procedures.

Phone communications are not limited during emergencies, causing distractions.

i Question:

Are there problems with the visual or audible portions of the annunciator system which interfere with annunciator intelligi-l bility?

Responses:-

~ General nature of alarms'does not orient operators to specific problem or tource.

Alarm signals lack prioritization.

Print on annunciator panels causes some parallax problems.

3.4 Operator-identified Strengths Several questionnaire items asked operators to identify aspects of the control room design which contributed to the performance of their jobs.

The items listed below l

represent the most frequently generated responses.

The consistent use of coding and labeling is a good job performance e

sid, helping operators to identify components and systems by func-l tion. These sids should be implemented as much as possible in the control room.

The computer is an essential supplier of information on performance f

e trends of equipment, system operation, and malfunctioning equipment L

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and systems. Early warning alarms appear on the CRT in real time, before equipment and plant conditions reach their setpoints on the annunciator alarm system.

3.5 Operator Recommendations In response to identified problems, operators recommended the following solutions:

Paying overtime to operators for a half-hour transition period during e

shift turnover would ensure a smoother transition and the reporting of critical data and abnormalities.

Detailed reporting systems should be developed to ensure necessary e

transfer of information during shift turnovers.

CR traffic should be limited to essential operator crews (especially e

barring maintenance crews) during day shift and shift turnover periods.

e Shif t turnover should be monitored by a designated operator to ensure proper transition.

Mimics should be added to more systems and subsystems because of e

their functionality.

e Mimics need to be maintained to ensure accuracy of flow direction and mimic line/ label connection.

Guard rails should be added at the edge of horizontal panels to e

prevent inadvertent activation of controls by bumping or brushing with hand.

Adding P.A. stations in strategic locations, with dedicated lines to e

the CR, and repairing or replacing the entire P.A. system would improve communications to and from the field.

Bypasses in CR for nuisance or incidental alarms associated with e

annunciators would help to reduce auditory distraction.

e Annunciator Acknowledge / Silence / Reset buttons on CO2, C03, C07-C10 panels, and on the SCRO desk are needed.

e Formal training in computer operations and capabilities was requested.

The addition of faster printers (or data reporting capabilities); larger e

CRTs with graph, chart, and extended readout display capabilities; and more detailed trend recorders would enhance computer diagnostic applications.

e Placement of CRTs on SCRO desks would help in recognizing important condition changes.

Updating and maintaining the procedures manual and index regularly e

would ensure that a complete reference for important procedures information is retained.

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e Automatic control of the SG FEED control for startup and shutdown operations would be helpful.

Implementing. a 4-day /12-hour-per-day schedule would be a better e

scheduling practice than the present shift reouirements, helping to reduce overtime hours.

The addition of more quellfied operators would aid in handling e

multiple functions during emergencies and minimum shif ts.

Rescheduling maintenance crew activity in CR would help alleviate e

CR traffic during the busy day shift.

3.6 Conclusions Essex reviewed operator suggestions and recommended further review by BG&E.

Some of these alternatives and suggestions have already been addressed by Essex in specific reports, special studies and in the Human Engineering Discrepancy Reports.

Other recommendations may contribute to operator comfort or efficiency if implemented, and are being given consideration.

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y 4.0. CONTROL PAfEL OPERABILITY - TASK ANALYSIS 4.1 Introduction The human factors engineer functions primarily to ensure that appropriate con-sideration has been given to requirements anc' limitations of a human operator during the process of equipment and system design. An important technique used in the evaluation j

of human factors engineering principles in design is the task analysis.

Task analysis, in general terms, is a method used to specify inputs, decisions and actions required of an operator to effectively perform some function. As an evaluation J

tool, it is a time-intensive process involving extensive examination of the human / machine interface for each procedural step. The task analysis conducted for BG&E was a systematic and detailed examination of the sequence of operations performed by a control t-room operator while abnormal and emergency conditions exist in the plant.

A distinction must be made between two phases of a task analysis: descriptive and analytical. The descriptive phase may best be understood as a statement of what is to be accomplished in operant terms. It describes a physical process, specifying such aspects as the cues or stimull which a person perceives in the task environment and the related 4

responses which are made. The descriptive aspect identifies critical operator behaviors l

and the CR instruments involved. The analytic phase derives equipment and behavioral implications from the description. To simply list or define tasks without analyzing them

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in terms of equipment requirements would not be a significant advance over what is provided in the operating procedure. By walking through'esch procedural task analysis in the CR,- the general operability of the control panel as it is used during emergency conditions can be evaluated.

4.2 Cbjectives

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The task analysis and the associated videotaped walk-through conducted at the plant-specific (Unit'1) simulator and the subsequent talking through of each emergency procedure in the CR were designed to identify those operational problems inherent in the overall design which affect operator performance and, therefore, system reliability. The following is a list of operational problems which the task analysis was designed to identify.

3 e inadequate time to perform control manipulations must be initiated too quickly L

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display information requires excessively fast operator response events require excessive speed of operator response Insufficient / inappropriate / misleading information e

too much to assimilate difficult to perceive or discriminate too much memory involved Inadequate / inappropriate / misleading control capability e

excessively fine manipulations required too much force required l

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l too many to perform in sequence e Excessive / insufficient task loading excessive task duration frequency of task performance insufficient information feedback accuracy too demanding / probability on task performance effect of error criticality concurrent multitask requirements Excessive demands 01 operator capabilities e

sensory

- motor perceptual -

cognitive / decision-making attention communication conditioning Negative impact on performance of psychophysiological states j-e stress fatigue boredom biological cycles e Identification of personnel hazards

- excessive temperature, humidity, noise safety o Panel arrangement patterning of controls ar.d displays Frequency / criticality of components and operations.

.e In addition to providing a source for the information listed above, the task analysis and the walk-throughs offered research analysts an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the panel and operability features of the CR. Documentation of plant operational requirements can aid in procedure development and evaluation and in identifying training requiremente.

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i 4.3 Technical Approach To develop task descriptions, all available information regarding system operation was first collected and organized. This was accomplished by using a predesigned task analysis form (see Figure 4.1). This form was used to identify each task, the activities performed for each task, the estimated time to perform, frequency, information require-ments, controls and displays utilized, shared tasks, and potential errors and their impact.

The information recorded on this form, along with flow diagrams which were developed for each procedure, were compared with the videotaped walk-throughs and the CR talk-throughs in order to determine the adequacy of control panel designs to support necessary operator tasks.

The analysis of the tasks involved: (a) identifying demands imposed in each task and (b) reporting aspects of the design which potentially precluded or impaired the operator's ability to successfully accomplish each task. Experienced control room operators were used as system and subject matter experts to fill in much of the data, such as estimated time required to complete each activity; frequency of each activity;information required to complete an activity; controls / displays necessary to perform the activity; tasks performed concurrently or shared; potential errors; and error impact. The individual task components are discussed further below.

4.3.1 Task Components 4.3.1.1 Task - Identifies the specific task to be accomplished; it is derived directly from the emergency operating procedure. Each procedure analyzed was converted to an informal flow chart format depicting discrete tasks incorporated in the steps and their sequential relationship. The tasks met the following criteria: they included an immediate purpose for the action; they resulted in a machine output or consequence of action; and they identified human inputs, decisions or outputs.

.In an attempt to maintain consistency and therefore facilitate clarity and under-standing, a systematic verb taxonomy was developed.

When a task irwolved a clear, unmistakable behavior, the appropriate action verb was used (e.g., SHUT, OPEN, TRIP, BLOCK, etc.). The verb VERIFY was used where displays were to be monitored only, with no subsequent action implied. The verb ENSURE was used when one or more displays I

were to be monitored and subsequent action taken contingent upon a decision. DETER-M1bE indicated an "if" condition written into the procedure or a clearly delineated decision point.

4.3.1.2 Activity - Description of what the operator must do to complete the task.

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This description includes an action verb which clearly describes the operator's resposise.

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The behaviors specified were logically deduced from the nature of the task output and the way in which the task was implemented.

Activities fell into the following general categories:

1.

Transmission of information 2.

Decision 3.

Control operation 4.

Display monitoring.

4.3.1.3 Est. Time (Min.) - Gross estimate of the time required to complett, the activity. It is intended to provide a relative indication only, with 15 seconds (.25 min.)

being the smallect unit of time required for the operator to physically relocate, find a component and carry out the activity.

4.3.1.4 Frequency of the Activity - In this column, the analyst records the number of times an activity is performed for each specific task. These tasks generally involve either an isolated or discrete behavior or one which is ongolog; therefore, since very few repetitive tasks are identified, frequency is generally "1.

4.3.1.5 Information/ Communication Requirements - Under this heading, the ana-lyst describes the information or communication needed to perform the task cueing the operator to take action.

Three sources of information are considered necessary for operator response. The first is knowledge recalled from experience and training, including knowledge of component location, procedures for information transmission, control operation, meter scales, etc.

The second is feedback derived directly from panel indications such as display cues (lights energized, scales hi or lo) and control positions (close, shut, auto). The third source of information is the operator's own output in the form of a decision based on the synthesis of information received from the first two sources.

4.3.1.6 Control - Exact label inscription of the controls to be operated.

4.3.1.7 Indication / Display - Label inscription of the source of fee &ack available l

to the operator which indicates that the necessary system response has occurred.

4.3.1.8 Concurrent / Shared Tasks - Either tasks initiated by the control room operator but performed by field operators, or tasks shared by other CROs or SROs.

4.3.1.9 Potential Error - Probable sources of error based on the type of response required of the operator and characteristics of the equipment used. For example, tasks which require a decision may be subject to error if the operator either delays a decision beyond the time at which it is needed, or makes an incorrect decision. Those tasks I

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Involving the ensurance or verification of an automatic action may give rise to error when the operator falls _ to observe en incomplete automatic action. In an activity requiring a control action, human error can be introduced by an operator's falling to make the response, performing the control action in the wrong direction, operating the wrong control, responding late, or performing inadequate or excessive magnitude or continuance of control action. Tasks requiring communications may be subject to error when an operator falls to convey or receive accurate information, responds too late or falls to make the response at all.

4.3.1.10 Error impact - Effect of human error on plant systems. In each case the most extreme impact was listed.

i 4.3.2 Task Analysis Information l

The information recorded on the task analysis forms were compared against the videotaped walk-throughs and the CR talk-throughs. The purpose of this comparison was i

j threefold. One objective was to validate the completeness of the operating procedures.

By reviewing the videotapes against the results of the task analysis, any operator actions not identified in the procedures task analysis can be recorded, ensuring completeness of i

the task analysis. Another was to gain data on the use of particular control / display components during normal and emergency operations. The number of times a particular component identified as discrepent (through HED Reports) is used during operations will j

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_ yield frequency and criticality of use data, which is important in evaluating human reliability. The frequency and criticality data will in turn influence and validate the l

Importance of human engineering discrepancies identified through the application of i

checklists, surveys, and operator interviews.

The third objective was to identify procedural and operational factors which may lead to human error. Where such factors as control / display accessibility, vital communications, and time-constrained steps occur in the procedures, the equipment or components being operated are more likely to be involved in human error during operation. In such cases, the interfaces were further scrutinized using applicable surveys and checklists in order to determine the adequacy of the control panel design to support necessary operator tasks.

l-4.4 Discussion l'

The analysis of the tasks involved identifying demands imposed in the individual task l

and reporting those aspects of the design which potentially precluded or impaired the f

operator's ability co successfully accomplish them. These aspects were then recorded in a i

Human Engineering Discrepancy Report.

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4.4.1 Strengths The overall operability of current control panel design was found to be satisfactory with respect to control room workspace, panel layout, and control / display integration.

Instrumentation necessary for the detection of abnormal conditions and for bringing the plant to a safe shutdown condition was found to be generally accessible to the operators.

Current staffing levels appeared sufficient to ensure complete and timely coverage of instrumentation in all simulated events viewed. General panel layout seemed to promote

' safe, officient procedures, operation and operator awareness of system conditions. The-arrangement and integration of controls and displays appeared to be logical and to meet operator expectations.

l 4.4.2 PotentialItman Engineering Deficiencies Several specific deficiencies were apparent in reviewing the videotaped walk-throughs:

e The lack of standardized communications between operators is a potential problem source.

Communications between operators as demonstrated at the simulator were informal and therefore subject to misinterpretation or loss of important informatien.

Operator tasks which require performance for or within a specified e

time period were noted, but no method is available to the operator for timing such actions.

Nuisance alarms (frequent alarms of little consequence) tend to l

e habituate operators to alarms, leading to ' routine annunciator acknowledgement and resetting of the annunciators without careful verification. If nuisance alarms can be eliminated and operators can be assured that all alarms coming in are important, a more serious attitude regarding alarm acknowledgement may follow.

Emergency procedures for control room operators include instruc-o tions for plant operators but do not make the distinction clear.

Contingent operator actions are presented in an unclear and confus-e Ing fashion.

e Controls and their associated alarms are located on different panels.

These and other human factors engineering discrepancies identified by the task analysis are described more fully in Human Engineering Discrepancy Reports.

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5.0 ALARM Al@4UNCIATORS A review of the annunciator system was undertaken by Essex Corporation from May 1980 through March 1981. The major goal of the study was to identify human factors discrepancies which existed both between and within the two units.

The evaluation concentrated on the following characteristics of the annunciator system:

Annunciator sequence, logic and display e

i e Prioritization e First out panel e Color coding e Auditory alarms e Localization of audible alarm signal e Localization of alarm reset function e General alarm reactivation (reflash) e Individual window design a

e Deactivation of choice alarms e Nuisance and false alarms e Mirror image in design e Labeling.

I' The results of the annunciator system survey served as input to a redesign effort

'which was initiated in the autumn of 1980. Two new annunciator designs were developed by BG&E, both of which were reviewed and commented on to ensure conformance with 7

the intent of the original study. Potential problems were documented, and a formal response to the Phase II design was issued by Essex in a suggested design change memorandum in January 1981. In 1983 Essex conducted an annunciator design validation f-

. study. The objective of the study was to ensure that certain issues raised during the DCRDR had been adequately addressed, and that the redesign of the alarm annunciator system had been implemented as suggested.

BG&E is currently in the process of reviewing the results of the validation study.

Rather than submit a report which describes the problems of the old alarm system, BG&E has elected to wait until all human engineering issues raised during the validation study have been resolved. Of major concern to BG&E is that the validation study resulted in the identification of additional problems not originally identified in the Phase II design change l

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memorandum. The origin of these discrepancies and the reason for their introduction must be resolved before any definitive conclusions can be drawn.

At that time, a complete report describing the technical approach taken together with the results and recommendations of the study will be issued. The expected release date of this report is June 1985.

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1 6.0 SURVEYS A survey approach was used to collect data that was either not amenable to a checklisting approach or was of a more general nature than the very specific component level at which detailed checklists are used. The survey criteria were based on human factors engineering principles and requirements cited in the Human Engineering Require-ments Specifications developed for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant by Essex Corporation and NUREG/CR-1580, the Human Engineering Guide to Control Room Evaluation, Volume II.

The surveys provided general information on control room habitability as well as operator interfaces other than the control panel itself. The specific surveys used were as follows:

o Control Room Workspace Arrangement e Control Room Furnishings e Control Room Illumination e Noise and Control Room Communications Operator / Computer Interface e

e Operator Protective Equipment.

6.1 Control Room Workspace Arrangement Survey General characteristics of the control room were evaluated, such as the layout of controls and displays on control panels, the accessibility of protective equipment, and the location and design of furnishings. Essex found both positive features and problem areas inherent in the workspace arrangement. The following positive features were identified during the survey:

The arrangement of desks, tables, shelves, etc., allowed personnel e

traffic to proceed unimpeded Visibility of the control panels from the SRO's desk and the other e

desks was generally unobscured (with the exception of bookshelves and cabinets)

Records and documents such as procedures were easily accessible.

e These positive features help minimize the potential for delays in obtaining informa-tion for decisionmaking and in performing operations.

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i The following are problems identified in the survey:

e inaccessibility of protective equipment - Protective equipment l

(e.g., gas masks) is concealed in the locker area.

Sharp edges and corners of fumishings - On desks, tables, shelves, e

and file cabinets.

Poor control / display location on panels - Trend recorders on back i.

e panels located well below normal viewing height (i.e., near foot level). J-handle switches located near panel edges.

Use of nonengraved labels - Paper and dymotape labels.

e Due to these problems, the operator may experience difficulties such as physical discomfort or personal injury, accidental operation of controls, and excessive time in reaching or identifying equipment and components. Potential backfits to these problems include relocating, replacing, or modifying existing discrepant materials.

6.2 Control Room Furnishings. Survey Considerations of control room fumishings should take into account workshif t, paperwork,'and operational requirements. Furnishings in the control room should conform to the anthropometric requirements of the 5th percentile female through the 95th percentile male and should conform to safety operability, maintainability, and aesthetic requirements. Using a tape measure, Essex examined various physical dimensions of the following furnishings:

l e Desks / Tables l

e ' Chairs e Bookshelves / Filing cabinets e Storage cabinets e Floor coverings e Trash baskets e Ashtrays e Carts e Bulletin boards l

e Ladders.

Essex then compared this data to the dimensions specified in the Control Room Furnishings Specification and found several positive features and some problem areas with the fumishings surveyed. The following positive features were identified:

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J Storage space in bookshelves, filing, and other storage cabinets was e

adequate.

With the exception of the problem described below, all chairs were e

found to be quite comfortable and allowed freedom of rotary and lateral movement.

The size and design of desks and tables were adequate for writing and e

having numerous materials close-et-hand, The selection or design of the floor coverings, trash baskets, and e

bulletin boards was adequate.

These positive features aid control room personnel in performing their daily tasks and operational dutles.

The following are problems identified in the survey:

e e Low CRO desk height I

Poor adjustability of chair height e

Bookshelves and cabinets slightly obstruct seated operators' view of e

the panels Lack of labeling to identify cabinet and file contents e

Ashtrays were made of breakable glass and were not attached to e

surfaces to preclude being knocked over e Carts' wheels were not lockable Ladder had small, nonfrictionalized rungs / step surfaces.

e These discrepancies may create various problems for the operator (e.g., physical discomfort or personal injury, obstructed field of view, and excessive time used to locate needed materials).

6.3 Control Room Illumination Survey 6.3.1 Introduction

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To use vision efficiently when operating equipment in the control room, moderately adequate levels of white !!!umination are required. This illumination should be distributed in such a way as to reduce glare and shadows. The initial lighting survey conducted for Calvert Cliffs Units 1 & 2 was incomplete since work platforms obstructed the overhead lighting. As a result, the illumination levels for all control panels were reevaluated.

Illumination levels for emergency lighting were also measured at critical panels and under simulated emergency lighting conditions for both units.

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6.3.2 Procedure Ambient lighting for normal conditions was measured at all control panels and a total of 97 readings were taken. For benchboard panels, each aegment of the panel was measured except the top portion, or annunciator section. The three segments below the annunciators are lettered and referred to as A, B, and C, respectively, with C as the benchboard. For vertical panels, one reading was taken on the panel surface approxi-mately 5'3" from the floor.

A Tektronix Model J16 digital photometer with a Model J6511 illuminance probe was used on lease from Leasametrics, Inc. (Leasametrics Asset Nos. 027950 and 014161). The probe was placed against the panel, thus measuring the amount of !!ght falling on the panel surface.

Light measurements were recorded in footcandles (fc) on an ambient lighting survey form (see Figure 6.1). The collected data were compared to the criteria contained in NUREG-0700, pages 6.1-46 to 6.1-49.

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6.3.3 Raoults Table 6-1 presents all of the normal light panel readings taken by Essex. All A

readings met the minimum NUREG-0700 criterion of 20 fc. A total of 13 readings failed to meet the recommended criterion of 30 fc. The five readings that were above the maximum acceptable level of 50 fc are benchboard segments (or c-segments) of panels 1C17, IC18, IC19, IC20, and 2C17. Also, all five panels were noted to have slight glare problems during the checklist evaluation.

Emergency light readings are presented in Table 6-2. For emergency lightings, the minimum acceptable illumination level is 10 fc. Four readings that failed to meet the minimum criterion of 10 fc are on the following panels: Radiation Monitoring panel -

1.5 fe, Condensate & Feedwater Control panel

.5 fe, Chemical & Volume Control panel - 1.3 fe, and the SCRO desk - 4.3 fc.

6.3.4 Recommandations Of the five benchboard panels which had illumination readings above 50 fe, one was 51 fe, three were 52 fe, and one was 53 fc. The deviation from the recommended upper limit of 50 fc was not that significant and the overall ambient control room lighting provided adequate !!!umination for the operators to perform their tasks.

Perhaps the use of light diffusing glass over the Electric Distribution panels would reduce the brightness of the panel to the level recommended in NUREG-0700. Although i-v i

}0

- 5 I

PLANT.

DATE:

TIME:

TEST CONDUCTED Bt PHOTOMETER MODEL WA0 PHONE MODEL CAUBRATION DATE:

SERIAL NUMBER:

SER'AL NUMBER:

LIGHTWG CONDITIONS OPERATORWEASUREMENT POSITION NORMAL EMERGENCY REMARKS s

4 I

9 k

FIGURE 6.1 AMBIENT UGHTING SURVEY FORM 39

s TABLE 6-1 AMBIENT LIGHT LEVELS FOR MAIN CONTROL PAPELS NUREG-0700 states that the minimum acceptable illumination level for control room panels is 20 fe, the recommended level is 30 fe, and the maximum acceptable level is 50 fc.

Control Light Control Light Control Light Panel Level (fe)

Panel Level (fc)

Panel Level (fc) 1C01-A 27 1C18-A 32 2C10-A 34 1C01-B 34 1C18-B 46 2C10-B 40 1C01-C 44 1C18-C 52 2C10-C 44 1CO2-A 29 1C19-A 45 2C17-A 37 1CO2-B 30 1C19-B 46 2C17-B 44 1CO2-C 40 1C19-C 53 2C17-C 51 1C03-A 30 IC20-A 43 1C13 37 1C03-B 25 1C20-B 50 ICO3-C 41 1C20-C 52 1C15 39 1C04-A 30 2C02-A 30 IC22 20 1C04-B 35 2C02-B 37 1C04-C 41 2C02-C 44 1C24 28 1C05-A 25 2CO3-A 29 1C26 16 1C05-B-29 2CO3-B 37 1C05-C 35 2CO3-C 45 1C29 14 1C06-A 26 2C04-A 28 1C30A 13 1C06-B 33 2C04-B 33 1C06-C 36 2C04-C 42 1C30B 17 1C07-A 29 2C05-A 25 1C31 20 1C07-B 32 2C05-B 34 1C07-C 39 2C05-C 40 1C32 25 l

1C08-A 25 2C06-A 26 1C33 30 l

IC08-B 31 2C06-B 34 1C08-C 40 2C06-C 45 1C34 23 1C09-A 30 2C07-A 28 1C35 29 l

1C09-B 34 2C07-B 34 l

1C09-C 41 2C07-C 39 1C36 31 s

1C10-A 37 2C08-A 31 1C39 22 1C10-B 38 2C08-B 35 1C10-C 43 2C08-C 42 2C13 35 1C17-A 31 2C09-A 30 2C15 43

(

IC17-B 45 2C09-B 36 l

IC17-C 52 2C09-C 39 2C23 21 l

I l

l 40

i l

TABLE 6-1 AMBIENT LIGHT LEVELS FOR MAIN CONTROL PAtELS (ContND NUREG-0700 states that the minimum acceptable illumination level for control room panels is 20 fe, the recommended level is 30 fe, and the maximum acceptable level is 50 fc.

Control Light Panel Level (fc) 2C24 31 2C26 20 2C31 29 2C32 22 2C35 28 2C36 29 2C39 19 41

TABLE 6-2 AMBIENT LIGHT LEVELS FOR MAIN CONTROL PAPELS UtOER EMERGENCY LIGHTING COtOITIONS Control Light NUREG-0700 Panel Level (fe)

Criteria SCRO desk 4.3 10 1C01 12.4 10 1C03

.5 10 1C05 11.6 10 1C07 1.3 10 1C08,IC09,IC10 11.9 10 1C22 1.5 (20)*

10 l

l l

l l

l'

• The reading of 20 fc was taken directly under a light source. By directing more light toward the panel, the lower reading of 1.5 fc currently below the minimum of 10 fc will be improved.

42

l s

=

the evidence of glare noted on the Electrical Distribution panels was minimal and not likely to cause operational problems, the use of light diffusing class could be used to minimize the glare.

I Those panels which failed to meet emergency lighting enteria should be evaluated to determine to what extent they are used during a loss of normal control room lighting.

At a minimum it seems that additional DC-powered emergency lamps should be installed over the Feedwater panel and the SCRO's desk.

6.4 Noise and Control Room Communications 6.4.1 Introduction A study was undertaken to evaluate the impact of noise on communications and auditory monitoring in the control room. During emergency operations, clearly audible communications and alarms are of increased importance. Therefore, it becomes neces-sary to assess noise levels and communications in light of critical situations.

6.4.1.1 Auditory Tasks - There are two categories of auditory tasks in the control room: voice communications and auditory monitoring of signals. Both are dependent upon signal nature for proper decision making.

Voice communications at CCNPP include interoperator conversation within the control room, telephone communications on any number of !!nes, and P.A. Intercom I

messages.

Alarms and signals constitute the other stimuli for auditory monitoring. These include audible annunicators for each of two units, fire and emergency alarms which may accompany annunciators, telephone bells for several telephones, an hourly buzzer, and the l

plant emergency alarm generated over the P.A. system.

Each different auditory signal contains specific meaning for the operator; therefore i

intelligibility is important in the control room. However, the control room environment is not always conducive to signal intelligibility.

6.4.1.2 Noise Levels and Signal Detection - Noise is composed of spurious signals, varying in frequency and amplitude. Combined, these signals produce auditory stimull of undiscernable nature. Noise is always present in the control room, as either ambient noise or undesirable masking tones.

l Ambient noise is attributed to plant noises from outside the control room; fans and blowers for heating and ventilation; and control room maintenance procedures, converse-tions and activity. Additional nonsignal noise emanates from printers located at various l

E l

l 43 l

+

+,

e.

.s

,m.._,,,...,,_,,.

,,, n

s stations in the control room to ensure signal detection. The ambient noise level (ANL) should not exceed 65 cB (A) or 58 dB PSIL if signals and communications are to be heard.

+

[

Signal noise occurs when complex and compouno' signals sound simultaneously in the l

control room. Signal messages may become difficult to interpret, because either too many signals are presented at one time or mdsking' tones hide mue important auditory information. To reduce the possibility of signal noise and to ensure detectability, a good practice is to raise signals at least 10 dB (A) above the masked threshold, whether it be ambient noise or signal noise. Signals should also be distinct in frequency and tone quality so that intended messages are relayed clearly and quickly.

Where distinctive alarms and communications exist, but signal isolation becomes a

(-

problem, the acoustical nature of the room should be assessed. Signal isolation problems can be caused by compound signal generation with]n en acoustically reverberEnt environ-ment, where sounds are reflected from various room surfaces. This cannot be corrected by attenuation of frequency or amplitude. In'stallation of acoustic tiles, baffles, curtains and/or other appropriate environmental acoustic controls is suggested.

l 6.4.1.3 Emergency Communications - Control room communication networks serve L

a dual purpose, performing under normal operations and during emergencies. Emergency.

communications should have top priority in eme gency situations. P.A.-Intercom emer-I gency channels should be predesignated and marked on each unit. Phone channels should be marked and individual phone lines should be labeled and color coded according to i

function.

f-Typically, several phone units are cluster)d in the same area. Their signals. tend to be similar.

In emergency situations, phone accessibility is crucial, but of equal importance is the operator's ability 'to identify sources of incoming messages quickly.

Phones with similar signals can confuse the operator in such situations, if signals cannot

~

be individualized within phone units, then the addition of flashing indicators is recom-mended. The optimum phone system should consist of unique signals and indicator lights for each phone.

,i i

6.4.2 The Noise Survey Conducting an industrial ~ noise survey requires the operation of a sensitive sound level meter which measurer the intensity of sound in decibels. Noise levels are recorded and assessed according to standard regulations and relative intensities within each plant.

6.4.2.1 Apparatus - The Essex noise survey utilized a Gen-Rad 1982-9700 sound level meter and analyzer. This apparatus is capable of measuring levels of intensity from

l. b i

'i i

44 ai..

i

' 6.4.3 Results 6.4.3.1 Problems - The results from the noise survey are presented in Table 6-3.

P.A. communications ranged from a low of 57.2 dB(A) to an average high of 76.4 dB(A).

.These relatively large differences point to some inadequacies within the P.A.-Intercom alarm system.

Inadequately audible messages were either too loud, distorting some messages, or too far below the ANL to be discernable to the average ear.

Problems arose with the annunciator alarms and their lack of directionality. The alarms wsre designed and positioned so that they were audible throughout the control room, with no cue as to location of the visual portion of the annunciator. Although each unit had a distinctively audible alarm, it was not obvious that it was generated from the 3

location of the visually displayed problem.

Annunciator alarms also produced a combination tone (specifically a third harmonic) which was confusing and irritating to the listener. Often the tones were difficult to 4

separate.

- Signals of greater relative intensity than the annunciator alarms, including the hourly alarm and P.A. communications, tended to mask annunciator alarms.

6.4.3.2 Strengtha - Basal level readings, taken at all sites, never rose above the 65 dB(A)' limit, remaining within the acceptable range. The basal level represents the ANL, or noise level during normal conditions.

This level indicates that the normal operating conditions in the auditory environment of the control room were conducive to

' safe and efficient operation. During testing, control room activity included moderate

- conversation, power tool operation associated with control panel maintenance, control room traffic, and moderately loud P.A. announcements.

Annunciator alarms rarely rose to the recommended 10 dB(A) level for alarms above the ANL. The readings, however, do not expose the fact that these high frequency alarms were audible above the ANL, and were quite adequate alone.

6.4.4 Recommendations 6.4.4.1 Noise - Audibility in the control room can be improved by the imple-mentation of several acoustical backfits. Annunicator alarms would best function as localized alarms, emanating from the visual portion of the annunciator system. This

- would direct the responding operator's attention toward the problem. This should also eliminate some of the acoustical problems mentioned in the previous section.

The addition of acoustical tiling and absorbents may be the best general improve-ment.

Strategically placed sound absorbers can help to deaden the room surface l

i 45

e 30-140 dB across ten octave bands from 31.5 Hz to 16 kHz. Microphone response is -

relatively flat in all directions.

Measurements were taken using three of the machines' weighting networks: flat, A, and C.

The flat response is an indiscriminate setting, attributing noise to no specific frequency range. The C-weighted readings are essentially uniform in response from 30 Hz to 8 kHz. The A-weighted readings are the most widely used for industrial standards and are the. readings upon which we base our recommendations. This network favors the l

l; frequencies between 1 kHz to 4 kHz, peaking at 2.5 kHz. Most sounds audible to the

. average ear fall within the A range.

Meter readings were made in either the slow response setting or the peak / maximum setting. -The slow response has a continuous readout, allowing for constant levels to i

register or for highest and lowest readings, which are averaged when recorded. Transient

' levels - sounds of short or instantaneous duration - are best measured with the peak /

maximum setting, which allows for quick rises in the sound pressure level (SPL).

6.4.2.2 Procedure and Data Collection - The survey was conducted on three separate days, February 11,12, and 19,1981. Measurements on the lith and 12th were taken during the day shift, between the hours of 11:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m.; measurements on February 19 were taken during the evening shift, between the hours of 3:00 p.m. and f

6:00 p.m. Readings were not measurably affected by the difference in survey time.

The apparatus was set up on a tripod, with the microphone at average ear level.

After consultation with several operators, nine operator positions were chosen for survey sites..These pos!tions included the following: panels 1C19, IC15/1Cl3, IC05, 2C15/2C13, 2C05, Radiation Monitoring System, Reactor Operator (Unit) 1, Reactor Operator (Unit) 2, and the Senior Control Room Operator's desk.

Direction of the microphone was.

determined by acoustical characteristics of the test site. The omni-direction with the microphone straight up was adequate for all measurements because of the microphone's response characteristics. The first measurement taken was the basal noise level at each test position.

The basal level represents the average ambient noise level without l

contributing noise from alarms, printers, or communications equipment.

Once this measurement was taken, each potential noise source -was integrated into the sampling Measurements were made toward panels, where possible, to test for any process.

influence of reflective surfaces on the SPL. No such influence was recognized from the data. Levels were also recorded with the microphone facing toward the nearest operator, and no significant deviations were noted.

I 46

TABLE 6 3 NOISE SURVEY ant m

nat _ _.,-

usf casucTs er.

num navn utta moon:

ammemmaamen:

caum w en ast:

GEN RAD 2/11/81 una museet onPJWffupWD1 D559 5327 i

.-Av.i unut commonsoscumvenon w nummemn a

aw so nasanus (a. To Panel)

a. 72.3

• 57.0*

68.8*

BASAL (b. To Source (OMN1 for

b. 71.75 60.0*

67.8*

BASAL + Annun))

(c. To SCRO)

c. 72.li 59.0*

68.l*

' BASAL + Annunciator (Unit 1) (OMNI Only)

b. 72.4 67.2 69.4 BASAL + Annunciator (Unit 2)(OMNI Only)

b. 73.6 68.0 69.2 B ASAL + P.A.

a. 79.0

• 69.1*

69.3*

b. 73.8*

71.7*

70.4*

c. 73.9

• 70.5*

72.l*

4 l

I i

l

• Represents an averaged figure for two values 47'

. TABLE 6 3 (cont'd) NOISE SURVEY

~

naut CCNPP este 2/12/81 TRIE.

1:10 p.m.

I inst coeucno et MMMME N C M W m 350 g/1gfg1 mem um m GEN RAD maat auseen.

1982-9700 mag g 01 neto.

wou s posmik ICIS & 1C13 nose commonsouRcEmMECTWN oF MEASUREMENT S

edu 30 BBAARES 69.4 (s. Back Wall)

a. 74.7 59.4 4 I

BASAL (b. OMNI)

b. 76.5 59.84 69.6 (c. To SCRO)

c. 76.5 64.24 70.6 BAS AL + Printer

b. 76.3

• 60.44 71.2 BASAL + Annunciator (Unit 1) (OMNI Only)

b. 76.3 72.4

• 69.9 4 BASAL + Annunciator (Unit 2)(OMNI Only)

b. 76.6

• 64.74 70.3 4 64.6 73.14

. B ASAL + P.A.

a. 76.8

• 4 71.7

b. 77.6

• 67.1' 72.3

c. 76.8 66.4'

• i l

• Represents an averaged figure for two values

. TABLE 6 3 (cont'd) NOISE SURVEY pust CCNPP narE:

2/19/81 inse 3:00 p.m.

usttueucTEoet sous e um m GEN RAD MCWPMoNE M CMBRAMON oETE 2/19/81 MAR NUMBEn.

1982-9700 mad'dMBE ngo m7 ornannon rosrTer-IC05 mosE conomossouncEmmtenot oF MEASUREMENT e

SW ec RHWES (a. To Panel)

a. 73.2 56.8 68.5 BASAL (b. To RO 1)

b. 75.5 56.5 69.0

• 63.6 68.6 *

(c. OMNI)

c. 76.3*

BASAL + Printer

a. 74.7

• 59.1

• 68.2 *

b. 72.9 66.0*

70.4

• BASAL + Annunciator (Unit 1) (OMNI Only)

c. 74.3 64.6 69.5 BASAL + Annunciator (Unit 2)(OMNI Only)

c. 74.3 64.6 69.5 B ASAL + P.A.

a. 73.E 61.6

• 69.5 *

b. 73.3 65.5*

68.9 BASAL + Hourly Alarm

a. 73.4 65.3 70.2

b. 77.1 68.1*

l l

(

• Represents an averaged figure for two values 49

r

. TABLE 6 3 (cont'd) NOISE SURVEY puwt CCNPP m

2/19/81 time 5:00 p.m.

usi comucun et sousnavtt u m moet GEN RAD

- non

- act 2/19/81 1962-9601 1982-9700 aEnm muustt sm mmAt muustt nsso spewes rosmon 2C15 & 2C13 nom commons:uRCEDRECTIoN of WASuMWNT e

SW SC REuARKS (a. OMNI)

a. 75.5*

57.1

• 69.4

• BASAL (b. SCRO)

b. 75.0 58.0 69.5 (c. Plant / Control Room Door)

c. 77.0*

59.0

• 69.2

• Marked difference due BASAL + Printers a.63.1 61.9 60.3 to a typical lull in activity

b. 59.4 58.5 56.9

c. 56.9 55.9 56.2 BASAL + Annunciator (Unit 1)(OMN1 only)

a. 77.0 66.0 69.8 BASAL + Annunciator (Unit 2)(OMNI only)

a. 78.0 74.5 73.8 l

BASAL + P.A.

a. 64.9*

64.9 66.5

• b.

63.9

• c.

57.2 j

[

BASAL + Door Closing a.05.6 85.3 86.0 Transient b'

response j

(momentary l

c. 84.5 86.2 85.7 noise) l BASAL + Hourly Alarm a.

63.7 61.2 l

l l

l

• Represents an averaged figure for two values x

50

i

. TABLE 6 3 (cont'd) NOISE SURVEY naut CCNPP nart:

2/19/81 Tiut:

3:40 p.m.

Itst camoucno et 80Uuo WEL utTEn m GEN RAD mma e enu m ou asn.

2/19/81 unat muustst 1982-9700 unkNn.01 6

o m,,

ornemon rosmou-2C05 most conomossounctanscnom oF MtasuntMENT e

edu S0 REMAnKS 68.1 63.5 (s. Back Wall)

a. 72.5

• 4 4

BASAL (b. To SCRO)

b. 71.7

• 60.24 67.74 (c. OMNI)

c. 73.5

• 62.5 67.4

+

68.5 61.8 BASAL + Printer

a. 74.2

• 69.3'

b. 73.8 64.2+

c. 73.5 62.8 68.4 BASAL + Annunciator (Unit 1)(OMNI only)

c. 76.2 69.2 74.0 BASAL + Annunciator (Unit 1)(OMNI only)

c. 75.0 67.2 74.0 69.7 65.7 BASAL + P.A.

a. 74.4

+

68.3

b. 74.1 64.7 *

+

67.7+

c. 72.9' 64.2

• BASAL + Hourly Alarm

a. 73.5 BASAL + Door Close (Plant Noise + Impact)

a. 88.4 81.4 80.9 NOTE:

b. 88.7 79.6 88.1 Instrument

• • I"9

c. 89.2 80.0 87.6 Max-Readout Imp-Rate This mess. Is for a transient response (impact of door) which is of only momentary duration, but is louder than plant noise.

(

• Represents an averaged figure for two values l

51

.TABl.E 6 3 (cont'd) NOISE SURVEY CCNPP 2/12/81 2:10 p.m.

~

m w

m usT comucrEn et cauensen act:

2/12/81 souso uYEL METER Moon:

GEN RAD g,g 1982-9700 ment uuMsEn. 0559 8ESAL NUMBER 5327 wEnanou rosmon:

Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) most conomou:SouRCEjDRECTeN oF MEA $uREMENT e

SW ec anWW3 67.1 P.A. Spkr at 58.5 (s. Back Wall)

a. 72.5*

Ieast 4 f t.

BASAL (b. OMNI)

b. 72.5 61.3

• 69.4 *

,9m 67.5 test location (c. To SCRO)

c. 75.0 59.3

• 68.5 Mike on tripod BASAL + Printer

b. 80.5 66.8

• for all conditions BASAL + Annunciator (Unit 1) (OMN1 Only)

b. 79.0 70.2 77.6 P.A. almost constant BASAL + Annunciator (Unit 2)(OMN1 Only)

b. 83.2 77.2

• 78.9 during Annun.

tests BASAL + P.A.

a. 81.5 73.2

• 77.4 *

b. 82.5 76.4 79.4 76.4

• 78.3

c. 78.9 +

BASAL + Hourly Alarm

a. 73.4

• Represents an averaged figure for two values

~~.

52 l

. TABLE 6 3 (cont'd) NOISE SURVEY PLANI CCNPP act:

2/12/81 inu:

11:15 a.m.

Testcoeucreose:

mm causmanen act:

2/12/81 GEN RAD sEs#4L uumeest 1982-9700 sEsk'ab[iiL601 g,,,,

m PosmoN Reactor Operator (Unit 1)

NDGE CONDmONSOURCEJDmECT10N OF MEASURGENT e

mW ACI REMAAKS 66.3 BASAL (Only one direction: OMNI) 72.3*

61.5 67.4

• BASAL + Printer 62.6*

BASAL + Anaunciator (Unit 1) 73.0*

70.4*

71.8*

BASAL + Annunciator (Unit 2) 73.0 63.5 67.6 BASA.L + Annunciators (Both Units) 65.6 This is an actual measurement, net a com-putation of Unit 1 & 2 l

Annun.

readings i

BASAL + P.A.

73.6 63.2 70.2

• BASAL + Telephone 72.3 4

l j

w

• Represents an averaged figure for two values l

i 53

o

. TABLE 6 3 (cont'd) NOISE SURVEY PUNT. CCNPP DEL 2/19/81 tuK:

3:40 p.m.

~

usi coeuce er:

N N*M 2/19/81 m g g "p01 GEN RAD mmt numeEn 1982-9700 c,, _

mwa rusTm Reactor Optratcr (Unit 2)

WBE CON 0m0NS0uRC12WECTen OF MEAtumMNT as mW mc gewg3 BASAL (Only one direction: OMNI) 73.6*

62.90 57.20 BASAL + Printer 73.9*

61.10 69.3 BASAL + Annunciator (Unit 1) 72.3*

69.0 69.80 BASAL + Annunciator (Unit 2) 75.2*

67.0 "

70.40 BASAL + P.A.

73.7*

63.4" 69.4o BASAL + Hourly Alarm 75.2 65.5 69.0 BASAL + Door Closing 91.5 82.0 92.0 NOTE:

Instrument settings:

Max-Readout Imp-Rate This meas. is for a transient response (impact of door) which is of only momentary duration, but l

is louder than plant noise.

• Represents an averaged figure for two values q

1 54 1

- - - -. ~.

l

. TABLE 6 3 (cont'd) NOISE SURVEY Puwt CCNPP OsrE:

2/11/81 w

1:55 p.m.

usT cumucTEn n.

888 N """ "

8""M 2/11/81 GEN RAD meat numEL 1982-9700 SE m e,.,,

m.,

-~,

OPER8 TEN PORTM.

Senior Control Room Operator's Desk (SCRO) sow commoNisounctDRfcTeh W WA$uREENT e

sw 30 m MARKS BASAL (only one direction: OMNI) 71.7*

62.5

• 66.2' BASAL + Printer 73.3*

64.3

• 73.2

• BASAL + Annunciator (Unit 1) 74.6 64.2 68.5 BASAL + Annunciator (Unit 2) 72.3*

61.4 70.8 BASAL + P.A.

72.9*

64.7

• 69.6

• l t

• Represents an averaged figure for two values 55

i v

i

-acoustically, resulting in a quieter environment. As the threshold for alarms and audible l

communications is lowered, the dynamic range of each auditory stimulus is shortened.

Hence, annunciator alarms will become more localized because there will be less l

reflectance in the room. Volume attenuation of the hourly alarm is recommended to

_ make it less of a masking factor.

6.4.4.2 Communications - Inconsistent volume levels in the P.A.-Intercom alarm 1

system should not be overlooked.

To ensure that messages are received clearly, a compressor / limiter or other adequate volume compensation should be added to each unit.

l If such devices are in use, then the system should be inspected for the causes of the l

Inadequacies.

There are five separate telephone units in the control room. These units are part of a network of communication from the CCNPP control room to other areas within the plant and outside agencies such as the NRC and emergency services. Essential lines of communication are clustered about the SCRO's station. The telephones do not have distinctive signals to slert the operators to the source of the incoming call. Operators have expressed difficulty in answering a specific phone because of this problem.

Therefore, it is recommended that each phone be color coded according to its use if it is limited in source (as is the NRC Hotline), and that a flashing indicator be placed on each phone to indicate the source of the call.

6.5 Operator-Computer Interface The interface between operator and computer is a frequent area of activity, especially in monitoring system status.

Thus, a well designed operator-computer interfacs is mandatory for safe and efficient control room operation. Various elements of the control room computer system were evaluated, such as keyboards, printers, CRTs, displays, computer function switch terminals, and the computer system in general. Both l

posi.?ve features and problem areas were found in the computer system. The following

(

are pos:*1ve features of the computer system:

e The physical design of the CRTs, keyboards, and the switch terminals t

side the operator in interfacing with the system e The message or information organization displayed by the printers i

and the CRTs allows the system to be readable and thus more usable

-e The location of the CRTs is sufficient for visibility.

These positive features allow the user to more efficiently interface with the computer system.

l w

56

The following are problems identified in the survey:

e Nondiscriminating use of color on the keyboards Wearing of labels / obscured characters e

Command language not reflecting operator's viewpoint - The opera-e tors are required to refer to the Unit 1 operator's guide for computer operation when using the IC04 and 2C04 utility printers. Addition-ally, addressing is by component type rather than by parameter or l

system e Poor letter separation on CRTs j

i e Use of an unconventional zero on printers Labeling on nonfunctional keyboard pushbuttons e

Files for past printer recordings not readily accessible e

Excessive computer response time to complex operator inputs o

e No indication of low-level printer paper.

The problems may cause the operator to err in interfacing with the system by misinterpreting or misreading displayed information, taking excessive time to read displayed information and applying it to decisionmaking, and falling to apply all relevant i

information during the decisionmaking process. Backfits to consider in resolving these problems may include modifying, replacing or relocating the existing materials, compo-l nonts, or system programming.

l 6.6 Operetar Protective Equipment 6.6.1 Introduction Tne presence of protective equipment in the control room is essential in the event of environmental contamination. Smoke, toxic vapors, and lonizing radiation are all potential candidates for rendering the control room uninhabitable in the event.of a catastrophe. To allow for continued operations while ensuring personnel safety, certain precautionary steps must be exercised in the design, location, and use of protective j

l' equipment. To meet this end, a human factors engineering review was undertaken to masses the human factors engineering adequacy of the operators' emergency protective equipment. ~

i

{

57

l 6.6.2 Procedure i

The evaluation involved the conduct of two separate analyses, a videotaped walk-l

.through of a control room contamination drill and a questionnaire survey of operator i

)

protective equipment. The walk-through was conducted at BG&E's Unit 1 plant-specific I

. simulator in Windsor, Connecticut. Observations were made of two operators donning j

protective. equipment and their subsequent actions during a simulated walk-through of an l

EOP. The procedure was recorded on v!Jeotape for later review and study. The second f

analysis involved the distribution of a questionnaire to all licensed (35) control room i

operators. The intent of the survey was to gather information relating to the aval! ability l

and usability of the protective equipmsnt. The responses were summarized, and the results from both analyses were compared tr. the criteria in NUREG-0700, pages 6.1-40 to 6.1-42.

l 6.6.3 Results t

i The protective equipment reviewed included both protective clothing (i.e., anti-Cs)

I and breathing apparatus. The anti-Cs were not located in the control room (CR), but in a i

separate room above the CR.. The anti-Cs were available in three different sizes, with i

sach size color coded to facilitate identification. The protective garments appeared to t

allow the operator to move about freely with unrestrained reach. No instructions for donning or doffing the garments were provided with the suits.

One complaint from I

esveral of the operators concerned the design of the gloves. While the gloves provide adequate tactile sensitivity to manipulate the majority of the controls on the panels, they

~ appeared to interfere with pushbutton (PB) actuation. Upon activation, the tip of the rubber glove would become lodged between the plunger case and the control panel. This could result in the inability to correctly activate pushbuttone with the associated hazard l

of jeopardizing the health of the operators should the glove inadvertently rip during PB f

release.

The breathing apparatus, while located in the CR, are not immediately available to i

the operating staff. The face meeks and respirators were located in a cabinet in a remote corner of the locker room. ' There were no signs or labels directing attention to the f

equipment location. The MSA401 air breathing units are hung on a well just outside the computer room. Two of the four units are beyond reach of 5th percentile operators.

Procedures were available, however, for instructing the operators in the use of the f_

breathing apparatus.

A frequent complaint from operators wearing glasses was the i

Inocceselbility of spectacle inserts for respirators. The Inserts are presently located in l

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i Red Chem, requiring the operators to leave the CR to procure the devices in the event of I

a potentially hazardous condition.

Communication, both between operators and between operators and auxiliary

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personnel outside the CR (via hand-held transmitter / receivers) appeared to be difficult.

Over 90 percent of the questionnaire respondents reported that the protective breathing

)

apparatus interfered with operstor-to-operator communications.

The messages were described as garbled and difficult to understand without shouting. Approximately 80 j!

percent of the operators reported difficulty using communications equipment in con-k junction with the face masks. The majority of operators which experienced no difficulty reported that they held the transmitter under the mask to talk, then repositioned the r

receiver to listen. This particular phone design does not appear to be conducive to i

intelligible communications.

The design of the face masks were reported by 45 percent of the operators to l

interfere with visibility. A narrow field-of-view with limited peripheral and downward i

vision was the most frequent complaint. Several operators also commented that the masks would fog up under extended use.

+

A large number of operators were concerned with the inadequate supply of personal i

protective equipment in the CR. An insufficient quantity of expendables (i.e., oxygen bottles and filters) were reported should the CR remain an airborn activity area for longer I

than 30 minutes. Additionally, the CR was found to lack the required number of air I

breathing units and respirators to accommodate all CR personnel on shift.

t-j l

6.6.4 Reconwnandatlans l

Spectacle inserts should be relocated to the control room, or at minimum to the lockers of those operators who require such devices. Likewise, enti-Cs should be stored in j

the control room, and preferably removed from their storage containers and hung on a well to minimize donning time. Instructions should be available describing the correct donning and doffing procedure.

Redesign of the face masks or hand-held phones may be necessary to enhance voice f

communications. A speech Inte!!!gibility test is recommended to determine the extent of the problem end the best way to address it. In any case, equipping the face masks with diaphragms designed for speech transmission is highly recommended.

[

Since relatively few operators reported problems with the protective gloves, further research la desirable before recommending a redesign. The few citations may,be due to l

c the operators' inability to recall the problem, or simply from lack of exposure to actuating i

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59

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pushbuttons with gloved hands. Since nearly one-half of the operators reported trouble seeing with the face masks on, the problem may be due to the anthropometric nuances of difforent operator face sizes and facial features. The face masks should be compatible in a wide enough range to accommodate all expected face shapes and sizes (5th through 95th percentile).

Face masks and respirators should be removed from their present storage locker to a more accessible and clearly marked location. The MSA401 air breathing units should be lowered making them accessible to 5th percentile personnel. Finally, the supply of respirators, filters, and oxygen tanks should be increased to ensure sufficient quantitles for CR personnel under all anticipated working conditions.

i 0

9 f(

i I

i.

4 7.0 SPECIAL STUDES L

During the course of the control room evaluation, special studies were commissioned l

by the BG&E Human Factors Task Force committee to be performed by Essex Corpora-j tion. These special studies resulted from the need to address specific human factors engineering aspects of the control room that were outside the scope of the original review plan. Eleven special studies were conducted. Ten of the eleven studies are described below. The eleventh study involved the generation of Human Engineering Requirement Specifications which will be included as part of the BG&E In-House WE Design Manual.

)

In addition to the special studies, several special projects were also comissioned by BG&E to be performed by Essex. These projects, including a design evaluation of a candidate SPDS display and a pilot study on shiftwork, were submitted as separate deliverables.

7.1 Determination of Options for the Beckfit of Preblem Controls 7.1.1 Introduction l

An early task in the conduct of the CR evaluation was to recommend a suitable backfit which would preclude the misoperation of a set of controls located within the l

Safety injection System mimicked control panel. The specific controls in question were for CNTMT SUMP DISCH VLV and REFUEL WTR tat

• DISCH VLV. The problem stems l

from the fact that these are sets (four sets, two on each unit) of identical switches adjacent to each other. The refueling tank valve is normally open and the containment sump valve is normally closed. An incident occurred in which the misoperation of one of these switches had gone unnoticed long enough to result in a reportable event and i

violation of technical specifications.

7.1.2 Approach to the Preblem l

Essex was asked to review the design and arrangement of the control switches in question and to recommend suitably human factors engineered backfits. Essex human l

factors engineers reviewed the problem and compiled the following list of backfit options, along with their inherent advantages and disedvantages. Each option was also ranked for human reliability on a scale from 1 to 9.5, with 1 representing the most reliable backfit.

7.1.2.1 Bookfit Option 1 - Addition of Enable (or Permissive) Switch e Advantages

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r would positively preclude inadvertent actuation by requiring two steps to a::tuate e Disadvantages would add to visual clutter would increase response time e - Rank for Human Reliability: 1.

7.1.2.2 Backfit Option 2 - Change in Switch Operation (Push-To-Turry I

e Advantages two-stage motion clearly discriminates between switches precludes inadvertent operation requires replacement operation requires replacement of knob only e Disadvantages does not visually discriminate does not tactually discriminate may violate established convention e Rank for Human Reliability: 2.5.

7.1.2.3 Beckfit Option 3 - Add Guarding L

i e Advantages would preclude inadvertent operation visually discriminates tactually discriminates l

e Disadvantages gives no indication of incorrect switch position if guard is not permanently affixed, could be lost if permanently affixed, could interfere with adjacent con-trols/ displays I

may add visual clutter e Rank for Human Reliability: 2.5.

7.1.2.4 Beckfit Option 4 - Addition of Annunciator e Advantages provides positive visual and audible feedback of incorrect switch position e Disadvantages would not preclude inadvertent operation would provide undesired fee &ack during intentional operation would add to visual clutter in annunciator system l

e Rank for Human Reliability: 5.

i 7.1.2.5 Beckfit Option 5 - Addition of Mint-Annunciator. Small difforentiated indicator which flashes on panel above control.

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62

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'8 e Advantages visual feedback of incorrect switch position clearly related to control e Disadvantages would not preclude inadvertent operation would provide undesired feedback during intentional operation would add to visual clutter, increasing operator visual search time burned-out bulb would result in loss of indication (unless bulb l

l test functions) may violate conventions t

e Rank for Human Reliability: 5.

7.1.2.6 Backfit Optiors 6 - Addition of Flashing Capability to Present Indicators e Advantages would give positive visual feedback of incorrect switch post-tion would not change panel conflguration would not increase visual clutter e Disadvantages would not preclude inadvertent operation would conflict with convention for alarm annuncistors would provide undesired feedback during intentional operation e Rank for Human Reliability: 5.

7.1.2.7 Backfit Option 7 - Change Handle Geometry e Advantages tactually discriminates visually discriminates e Disadvantages would not preclude inadvertent operation would not indicate incorrect switch position may violate established conventions e Rank for Human Reliability: 7.

7.1.2.8 Backfit Option 8 - Demarcation e Advantages ease of implementation e Disadvantages would not preclude inadvertent operation could be overlooked if operated without looking directly at control would give no indication of inaccurate switch position e Rank for Human Reliability: 8.

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63

7.1.2.9 Beckfit Option 9 - Administrative Procedure. Checklist per shif t.

e Advantages

~

ease of implementation e Disadvantages would not preclude inadvertent operation would not give positive indication of incorrect switch position application not highly reliable e Rank for Human Reliability: 9.5.

i 7.1.2.10 Beckfit Option 10 - Training e Advantages ease of implementation e Disadvantages would not preclude inadvertent operation not highly reliable e Rank for Human Reliability: 9.5.

7.1.3 Recommandations Essex's intention was to outline possible backfits and give some idea of their relative reliability in minimizing or preventing inadvertent control actuation. Those ranked from 7 to 9.5 are not recommended because of their low reliability. For the others, advantages and disadvantages must be weighed to determine the most reliable backfit for the cost.

7.2 Reedsbility of Miniature Annunciators l

7.2.1 Introduction One task under this effort was to evaluate the feasibility of implementing mini-annunciators to supplement the existing annunciator group. The focus of the task was to determine the readability envelopes for miniature annunciators utilizing.109" characters.

i 7.2.2 Technical Approach

' The task was conducted in two phases. Phase I focused on an analytical evaluation of the readability of the proposed character size using the standard formula for computing

^

visual angles visual angle (min) = (57.3X60) L D

where L = character height and D = viewing distance.

64

e e

An analysis was conducted to determine the viewing distance at which a character size of.109" would subtend 16.4 minutes of visual arc on the retina of the eye. The criterion of 16.4 are minutes was selected as representative of experimental results and design criteria cited in the human factors engineering literature (e.g., paragraph 5.5.5.13 of MIL-STD-14728). A visual angle of 16.4 minutes is generally accepted as equivalent to i

a 97 percent character recognition probability.

Phase 11 involved an empirical validation of the conclusions drawn in Phase 1.

Empirical validation was deemed desirable due to the relatively conservative values generally attributed to analytically derived design criteria. A panel was constructed to

- replicate a stack of the mini-annunciators comparable in size and design to the DIALCO sample provided by BG&E. Legends were printed using actual annunciator messages, in

.109" characters using a standard block type.

Fifteen Essex employees, selected at i

j random, served as subjects.

The experimental design was a variation of the standard method-of-limits survey.

The procedure was as follows: one of the ten annunciators was illuminated and the j

subject instructed to approach the target until the legend was just legible. The subject was then Instructed to back away until the characters were no longer legible. This 3

process was repeated until the subject had selected a subjective recognition threshold.

The experimenter then turned off the target annunciator and illuminated another annunciator which served as the test stimulus. The subject was then asked to read the lighted annunciator, with 100 percent' accuracy being the criterion. If the subject was

, unable to read the annunciator with 100 percent accuracy at the selected distance, then the process was repeated until the criterion was achieved.

For each subject, the procedure was repeated at each of four angles relative to the face of the annunciator:

900 (perpendicular),600,450, and 300. Because subjects varied in height, reading distance was measured as the distance from the subject's eye reference point to the center of the annunciator group.

l l

7.2.3 Raoutta l

As anticipated, the analytical evaluation proved to be somewhat conservative compared to the empirical results. Analytically, the annunciator's readability envelope l

was determined to be approximately 23 inches when viewed at an angle of 900 (perpendicular). Results of the empirical demonstration Indicated that 97 percent of the l

population should be able to read the annunciator legend from approximately 36 inches at l

900 and 26 inches at 300 Empirical data are presented in Table 7-1.

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o TABLE 7-1 MNIATURE APNUNCIATOR VIEWING DISTANCE (INCES) FOR 100% RECOGNITION AT 900 (PERPEPOICL.A.AR), 600,450, APO 300 Anale Sublect 900 600 450 300 1

58.0 39.5 38.5 38.0 2

60.5 47.5 45.5 33.0 3

63.0 48.0 53.0 33.0 4

56.0 63.0 57.5 48.5 5

55.5 52.5 49.0 35.5 6

71.0 56.5 53.0 41.5 7

49.0 52.0 52.0 8

55.0 54.0 45.5 36.0 9

60.0 63.5 47.0 34.0 10 76.5 69.0 52.5 40.5 11 72.0 69.0 62.5 51.0 12 66.0 52.5 52.0 31.0 13 32.0 37.0 36.0 34.0 14 46.5 41.0 48.0 35.0 15 57.5 55.0 48.0 48.0 IC 58.6 53.3 49.3 38.5 SD 11.05 9.92 6.68 6.47 97% Confidence 36.5 33.5 36.0 25.6 Interval 0

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- - - - - -. - - - - ~

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t 7.2.4 Analysis As previously described, the purpose of this studv was to determine the readability envelope of the mini-ennunciator using.109" characters. As indicated in Table 7-1,~ the envelope varies from approximately 36 to 26 inches depending on the viewing angle.

I Given the size of the control room, this is not a particularly large envelope; therefore, it will probably' be often necessary for the operator to approach the annunciator to effectively read the legend. This may or may not be a problem, depending on what f.

activity the operator is engaged in when the annunciator is activated. Some activities t

(e.g., manual rod control during start-up) prohibit the operator from leaving his work station, thereby precluding him from approaching a signaling annunciator.

On the basis of these results, it was strongly recommended that if mini-annunciators were to be used, serious consideration should be given to their design, location and I

i organization to onours optimal readability by " fixed-position" operators.

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' 7.3 - Review of Miniature Annuncletor Summary Window Configurstlen L

7.3.1 senkground f

I Following the study conducted (described in this report unde-Section 7.2) to determine readability envelopes for the miniature annunciator system to be installed in i

the CR, Essex was requested to review the proposed location of each summary alarm within the main alarm configuration. Since the summery alarms are necessary to cue the operators to the relevant bank of miniature alarms while imbedded in a matrix of standard i

alarm windows, it is critical that their location be clearly recognizable.

i 7J.2 Review Approach Information sources were gathered indicating the location of each summary window within its panel metrix and in relation to its associated miniature annuncistor bank.

Half-scale drawings were made to !!!ustrate these sesociations and to evaluate design logic consistency in arrangement. Inconsistencies were found in location conventions.

i For example, the summary windows for the four RCP auxiliary status panel banks (located in the left ende of IC07) were located on the top row of the IC06 annunciator metrix occupying the end four windows. This was found to be inconsistent with the location of i

summary windows for the CISO, MVS and SFVS status panels (located on the right side of L

1C07). For these systems, the summary windows were located on the end column, arranged vertically instead of horizontally, on the matrix on IC08.

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o 7.3.3 Review Findings and Recommendations

~

The arrangement of the summary windows within various annunciator matrices reportedly was designed to remain consistent with other conventions of prioritization and functional grouping.

To maintain the design logic but ensure discriminability of the summary windows, it was recommended that the configuration remain as proposed but that each summary window be highlighted in some clearly recognizable fashion. A simple and effective yet inexpensive backfit tested and implemented was the addition of striping I

tape in a dark, and therefore contrasting, color along the borders of each summary window. The dark border is clearly visible and discriminable against the white-lighted clarm condition annunciator window.

7.4 Full-Scale Mockup of PenelIC13 Special photographs were taken of panel ICl3, service water and miscellaneous stations services, enlarged to reale and affixed to a foam core backing upon which backfits could be drawn. This mockup was built in order to develop and evaluate proposed demarcation and labeling enhancements to mitigate human factors engineering discre-pancies in the panel layout. The identified human factors engineering problem areas were as follows:

e Nongrouping of components within same system o Poor delineation of separate systems e Poor system display association Lack of group or summary labels e

l e Inconsistent use of abbreviations and acronyms in labeling motape labels for safety system The use and poor placement of Dy/V tags) e status sids (e.g., SIAS, CIS, CIAS, U l

e Lack of range coding on several Sigma meters.

The approach taken to implement corrective changes was to develop a working mockup with which Essex and BG&E could examine various backfits. A new mockup representing the final version was produced, incorporating the following backfits:

e Color coding of component labels and tape surrounding microswitches within the same system of the following systems:

Component Cooling System - Quebec blue Salt Water System - orange Service Water System - apple green e Demarcation with brown tape of the following systems:

Component Cooling System l

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Salt Water System Service Water System 68

1 o

Circulating Water System Main Condenser System Mimicking the Compressor System using metallic blue and azure blue e

colored tape e Group or summary labeling of the following systems:

Component Cooling System Salt Water System Service Water System Circulating Water System Condenser Tube Cleaning System j

i e Standardized labeling languago Engraved plastic labels for safety system status tags and optimum e

placement relative to their associated components Reage coding of normal, caution and danger positions on selected e

Sigma meters.

7.5 Control Room Labeling Study Control room evaluation identified numerous inconsistencies in the use of abbrevi-ations and acronyms.

Instances were found in which several abbreviation forms represented a single item or system and in which single abbreviations represented a number of different following items. An example of the latter instances would be the abbreviation " COMP" representing the following terms: component, compressor, com-partment and computer. These inconsistencies could cause the following operator errors:

e Misreading a label e Misinterpreting a label Excessive search and identification time taken to locate and/or e

operate needed component Selecting wrong control / display.

e A survey of abbreviations and acronyms used in annunciator legends, panel labels, procedures documents and computer printouts was conducted to identify those which were inconsistently or ambiguously used. The survey also identified relative frequency of use of conflicting abbreviations.

From this survey a dictionary was developed which recommends standard abbreviations of words or phrases, especially when conflicts or ambiguities could not be solved simply based on frequency of use. In conjunction with the development of this standard dictionary, a specification was developed to lend human factors engineering guidance in designing and applying functional, descriptive and Identifying labels in the control room.

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7.6 Mirror-imaging in Design and its impact 7.6.1 Background Mirror-imaging in design is considered to present a serious problem in terms of impact on human factors in systems operation. The design practice is one of pattern reversal in the layout of functionally identical operating stations.

From a human factors engineering perspective, this practice is to be heartily discouraged.

Much advice has been handed down by human factors specialists and designers on the matter. For example: "Of the human factors discrepancies observed (in reviews of nuclear power plants) the practice of mirror-imaging control boards in multi-unit control rooms is at the top of the list... we strongly recommended that this design practice be abandoned" (Seminara, Gonzalez, and Parsons,1977). Seminara et al. (1977) also solicited comments from nuclear power plant operators regarding mirror image designs. Representative comments include the following:

Mirror-imaging is lousy; you find yourself getting up and turning the e

wrong way.

e Units 2 and 3 are mirrored. That's bad news. You get used to one orientation and then get confused - especially when you are new and have just spent 90 days training on the simulator.

e it's terrible to have to operate Unit #2 after #1.

WhGe many reports provide Paaman factors angineering advice against a mirror image design, no articles or pubilcotions have been amcovered which ad#ses the problem in detail, r M&iy with regard to nuctor power plant control room design. This section of the report has been written to indicate the potential impact of mirror-imaging design at the Calvert Clifis station on the learning, perceptions, and operating behavior of the plant operators. In addition, an analytic pilot study has been conducted to pinpoint some of the control room locations (specific controls and displays) where the deleterious effects of mirror-imaging are most likely to occur.

7.6.1.1 Mirror-imaging at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (b5'P) - There are two central control rooms (CRs) at Calvert Clif fs, each a mirror of the other in layout and component arrangement. In addition, a simulated control room for operator training exists and reflects the layout of the Unit 1 CR, and therefore is a mirror-image of the Unit 2 CR.

The following characteristics of the CR designs at Calvert Cliffs are relevant to the

(

lesue of mirror-imaging.

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The two CRs are completely mirrored.

That is, systems panels, panel components and mimic diagrams are mirrored.

What is not mirrored are switch use conventions (with exceptions), labels (of course), and the physical appearance of individual board components.

The mirroring is reliable; that is, symmetric layouts (e.g., strings of meters) j e

. are mirrored consistently in terms of the mirrored relationships of components and systems.

Both control panels (Units 1 and 2) are located in one room, with similar e

atmospheric conditions, lighting, noise levels, and so forth.

..Other than being mirrored, the boards of both CRs are visually similar (control e

and display types used, paint color of the boards, and so forth).

i Another set of conditions which affects the mirroring issue is plant staffing.

Reactor operators (ROs) are licensed for both units, and operate on a schedule in which operators work alternate units on a daily basis. One operator is dedicated to monitoring and controlling the nuclear instrumention for both plants simultaneously. Two Senior Control Room Operators (SCROs) complete the CR manning. One of the SCROs must remain available and in the CR at all times, while the other is free to leave the control t

room (but must be within minutes of return to the control room).

A final circumstance which relates to the problem is that of the simulator. Here, j

operators are given extensive behavioral and skills training on a simulator which I

corresponds directly (in terms of layout) to the Unit 1 CR, and mirrors the Unit 2 CR.

Further, simulator training, for the most part, extends to those CR behaviors required to 1

ameliorate hypothesized plant accidents - behaviors which are not encountered fre-quently in the actual CRs.

In summary, operators at Calvert Cliffs must interact with mirror-imaged designs l

on a daily basis.

1 i

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7.62 Human Leaming and Perceptiam Principles and Phenomena Relating to Mirror-Image Design l

7.L2.1 Control Room Task Definitions - Prior to discussing specific research and l

theory relating to mirror-image designs, specific control room task types which may be affected by mirror designs must be identified and defined.

in a general sense, operators' major inputs (tasks) to the system include reception of l

. information, information processing and decision-making, and control manipulations.

Information processing and decision-making, while affected by external information and i

control, are essentially cognitive processes externally influenced only so far as accurate Y

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information is gathered and accurate control exists. In the present context, critical operator inputs are informatico reception and controlling effects. These, in turn, can be broken down into four relevant control room tasks: display localization (search), display

. reading (eye fixation), control localization (search), and control manipulation (motor operations). While this list is short, it is sufficient to discuss mirror-imaging in light of the data on human learning and perception below. The following potential error types are associated with the tasks, regardless of CR layout and incidence of mirror-imaging:

e Display substitutions e Control substitutions Excess response time (display /centrol localization and use) o e Omissions in using controls and displays e Failure to detect occurrence of operational error.

These tasks operate in networks (chains) which are initiated by control room stimuli (alarm, SCRO request, display reading, etc.). A stimulus (S) elicits a response (R); the original response can then serve as a stimulus for another response, and so forth. For example, an operator notes that pressurizer pressure is falling slightly (the stimulus is a display), decides to reduce pressurizer spray (a cognitive decision task linking the stimulus and the response), responds to the stimulus by adjusting the pressurizer spray controller (a response task requiring both control localization and manipulation), verifies spray flow (a response elicited by the stimulus of control adjustment), looks at pressurizer pressure display (a response to looking at spray flow), and so on. Note that in the simple S-R paradigm, detailed localizations (as a part of a response) have no required cognitive element. An operator can and will locate and reference a feecback display after a control manipulation without " conscious thoughts" as to where the display may be located.

' Therefore, given deterministic responses to stimull, cognitive factors need not now be addressed as part of the paradigm.

It is not until decision requirements exist that cognitive factors (recall, rule application, etc.) intrude into these simple S-R associations.

7.6.2.2 Human Learning and Perception - Having defined the underlying nature of the control room tasks relevant to mirror-imaging, the following principles of learning and perception bearing on the issue may be discussed:

e Transfer of training e Stimulus and response similarity j

4 e Habit strength.

Generally stated, transfer of training deals with the effect of learning one S-R

(

'relatlanship upon the learning of a subsequent S-R relationship (Fitts & Posner,1967).

72

That is, prior learning can facilitate or hinder subsequent learning, depending on the degree of similarity of both the stimuli and responses. " Positive transfer" is used to term facilitation of learning; " negative transfer" is the term corresponding to inhibition of learning. The matrix below predicts transfer for conditions of stimulus and response similarity (adapted from Osgood,1949).

STIMULUS Identical Similer Neutral Perfect Slight No Positive or Identical 4

Transfer Positive Negative Transfer R

Transfer E

S Slight Slight No Negative or P

Similar Negative Negative Positive Transfer O

Transfer Transfer N-S Moderate Moderate No Positive or

~

E Moderate Negative Negative Negative Transfer Transfer Transfer High Moderate to No Positive or Opposite Negative High Negative Negative Transfer Transfer Transfer In studies of transfer where stimuli are similar but not identical, measures of response facilitation or inhibition are usually " trials-to-criterion" (Kling & Riggs,1971), where an individual behavior (S-R relationship) is learned and the time (measured by number of trials) to learn the new S-R relationship within error criteria serves as the measure of transfer of traiaing. With this, the effects of transfer are as follows:

a No Transfer - No facilitation or inhibition of learning L

e Positive Transfer - Decrease in number of errors and error rate over time Negative Transfer - Increase in response error rate and time to learn e

new S-R relationship.

l According to Bilodeau (1966):

l l

. Negative transfer occurs not between extremely dissimilar or unrelated l

tasks, but when some elements are similar and some dissimilar. For l

example, transfer may be negative when the transfer task requires the j

same general pattern of fee &eck control as the learning task but involves changes in direction or space displacement of some one compo-

,(

nent.

l l

73 l

o t

2

. According to the Tufts Handbook of Human Engineering Data (1952):

In general, if an individual goes from a first learning task to a second in which the Stimulus-Response relation is reversed while the similarity of stimull-and of responses is maintained, neoative transfer is to be expected and will decrease in amount as the degree of similarity between the elements of the two tasks decreases.

Within the context of the Calvert Cliffs control rooms, transfer from unit to unit qualifies as negative. The behavior chains discussed earlier relate to a negative transfer

. problem as follows: in one unit, a stimulus (for example, a display) invokes the response of looking at another display. The specific behavioral constituents of the response include a turning of the head and eyes to a new point of visual fixation, i.e., the other display. (As in the example earlier of chained control room behaviors, this chain may continue.) Were this sequence (e.g., always the same response constituent - turn right) determlncts for a l.

period of time, the behavior-associated " Habit Strength" and a set of " Expectancies" develop (expectancy is an anticipation of reward, is location of the reward, is the display).

l

. For those operating in a mirrored CR, the behavioral constituents of the response effort.

l change. After stimulus presentation, the appropriate response would be to look in the l'

opposite direction, while vertical localizations remain the same. However, habit strength and expectancies for the right turn may (and occasionally will) invoke a rioht turn (the l

erroneous response). Kinkade (Van Cott & Kinkade,1972) terms this " habit interference" and states, "In the course of true habit interference, the responses given could be identified as those appropriate to task A (but not task B)".

If the expectation of this wrong response is fulfilled (another display is located, or another control is located and manipulated), the wrong response can be rewarded. In this case, regardless of which control room is being attended by the operator, the response (the correct one in one.

I instance, incorrect in the other) can become dominant by virtue of a stronger habit strength.

That the above applies to the Calvert Cliffs control rooms is readily demonstrated.

All stimull in the control rooms are identifiable, or very nearly so, since ' industrial components are used in both CRs. Given that the behavioral constituents of a localization response vary only by left-right body rotations and head turns (the vertical arrangement

of controls and displays remain the same in both CRs), the learned responses are essentially opposite. Referencing the transfer matrix for similar stimuli and opposite responses, moderate to high negative transfer is anticipated.

Extraneous cues, or " contextual associations" (Mikulas,.1974), can and almost certainly da, to some extent, mitigate the above. Extraneous cues are those that more or I(

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r less indirectly serve as stimulus elements. For example, the stimulus of a meter may elicit a response, which may extend to looking at one of two adjacent meters. If an incorrect response is made but only one meter is located, the behavior may not be reinforcing due to the absence of the other meter. In other words, the other " extraneous" meter serves as a cue to the correct response.

The crux of the above is that, given certain conditions, incorrect responses to l

stimull can and will occur due to stimulus similarity, and may be rewarded. That is, the expectation, in the example of locating another display, albeit the incorrect display, is fulfilled. (This is in fact the basis for the analytical pilot study to identify where those conditions exist in the Calvert Cliffs control room.) Issues which compound the problem include the following:left-right discriminations and confusion which humans are known to occasionally experience (Cornballis,1976); stimulus and response generalizations (Kling &

Riggs,1971); and induced stress and response degenerations.

The extent of the problem of transfer in the Calvert Cliffs control rooms cannot be estimated without conducting empirical studies.

However, based on the above and without expressing specific levels of error and response decrement, the following can be said of the mirror-imaging effects on operations at Calvert Cliffs:

Response errors of the sort indicated will occur (control and display e

substitutions)

These response errors may be reinforced (failure to detect errors) l e

Where response errors occur but are not rewarded (error is deleted),

e time will be lost Given that multiple responses are possible in almost all S-R cases, e

time-consuming cognitive elements may be introduced in the S-R

)

network in the form of incidentally learned rules of operation Stimulus-Response habit strength will be weakened (leading to errors e

of omission).

1 7.6.3 Mrror-Image Problem Resolution at Calvert Cliffs Operational problems associated with mirror images in control stations may be addressed by a variety of means. Those discussed in this paper (1) have been selected as being feasible resolutions for an existing system; (2) introduce by their implementation subsequent problems, economic or human factors engineering, which are the result of inadequate initial design and oubsequent backfit trade-offs; and (3) represent an effort to reduce, not eliminate, the problems. Four backfit methods are discussed as potential means to address the problem:

(

i 75

1. Adjust shift organization

2. Alter contextual cues

~

3. Manipulate response-reward expectancies

4. Address through procedures and training.

7.6.3.1 Adjust Shift Organization - By manipulating duty assignments (i.e., dedi-cating certain board operators (CROs) to specific units), some of the mirror-imaging problem can be reduced. Only partial relief would be expected due to the following:

e Vacations, sick calls, employee turnover and so forth would often still require operators to run both units e Negative transfer would still exist between the Unit 2 CR and the simulator A residual negative transfer would probably exist for a period of time e

after adjustment of schedules.

For operators working at specific boards, predominant responses to stimull would result, and substitutions of controls and displays should decline in frequency. However, given that predominant responses would develop, requesting a6 operator to then work the other control boards should be avoided; otherwise,' great levels of negative transfer might '

result when an operator has accumulated practice on one panel over time and then is expected to operate a panel which has not been practiced on for some time. Unless sufficient manpower exists to effect a backfit such as this without deviation, dedicating personnel to specific boards should be avoided.

The frequent shift rotation between units for CROs (daily) which currently exists is probably optimal in avoiding the development of precedent responses. Indeed, it probably i

facilitates learning of another expectancy, mirror-imaging.

However, the process I

involved in acquiring this " cognitive expectancy" would tend to crowd the far more

- important information processing and decision-making tasks of the operator.

7.6.3.2 Altor Contextual Cuas - The intention here is, in a sense, to uniquely code each of the mirrored panels. One means would be to color the beards differently; for example, one control board might be painted green and the other one brown. What effect this would have on learned responses is uncertain. Learning of the responses-at a l

psychomotor level would be incidental to tasks at hand..' However, board coloring may enhance the type of cognitive expectancy mentioned earlier.

Another means to help alter contextual cues would be that of functional demarca-tion and summary labeling. These may break the board up sufficiently and provide cues s

~

76

s j

for component localization.

The level (resolution) of demarcation would need to be sufficient to provide ample cues to the locale of controls and displays. Again, negative transfer problems would probably still exist in specific areas.

Results of an analytic study of these areas would be useful as input into a demarcation study.

7.6.3.3 Manipulate Responae-Reward Expectancles - The feedback from a response, or " reward" in previous parlance, is what is to be manipulated here. If an incorrect response is made, a visual or tactual cue could be used to inform the operator.

For example, if the eyes cross a line of demarcation where they should not, or if a label or line is missing, assuming an incorrect response, the operator may realize that an incorrect response was made.(denial of reinforcement). In other words, the expectancy was not realized. Again, an analytic study to pinpoint areas where mirror-imaging is likely to induce such errors should be conducted. The results of the study could serve as input into the demarcation effort. Indeed, where (1) errors are expected to occur, (2) expectancies may be realized, and (3) errors would be critical to operational safety, other devices such as switch guards and warning labels may be required to further manipulate expectancy.

7.6.3.4 Procedures and Training Backfits - Means of addressing mirror-imaging with either procedures or training are briefly discussed below.

7.6.3.4.1 Procedure Backfits - It is indeed possible to specify poor HFE designs' in notes and cautions as part of procedure design; this approach, however, inadequately addresses mirror-imaging problems for the reasons listed below:

Much of what takes place in CRs (in terms of control and display use) e is not procedurally bound but rather is directed by training and experience.

t e During application of EOPs, CROs work the boards while the SCRO l

directs activities from procedures. Therefore, cautionary informa-tion is not presented directly to the operator working the boards.

Further, immediate operator actions are learned (memorized) behav-lors, not directed by EOPs.

e Procedures are already large, somewhat complex documents which tend to induce error. Contributing to their complexity and unreada-bility should be evolded.

e Procedures are essentially (forced) aids to memory, means to " check-list" CR activities, and sources of complex information. They are not intended to illustrate poor design, thereby obscuring the information they were meant to present.

l Therefore, procedures fall to address the problems of mirror-imaging for the following reasons: (1) the information may not reliably be imparted to operators; (2) if Imparted, most errors induced by mirror-imaging will not be alleviated; and (3) presenting l

additional notes and cautions will tend to obscure other procedural information.

i i

77

,. ~.. -,.

7.6.3.4.2 Trainino - CROs and SCROs receive essentially two types of training:

conceptual (cognitive-information processing, model development) and perceptual-behav-local. Mirror-imaging problems can be discussed in relation to both, but more directly to

- perceptual-behavioral training.

Operator training is performed on a simulator and I

represents little more than. learning (mediational responses) and procedure design. In mirror-imaged designs, the stimulus requires a discrimination reversal from one side or the other of the mirror, which complicates the discrimination and is apt to cause errors (perhaps due to response persistence, inadequate search, a breakdown of response mediation, and so forth).

' Training assessments on simulators in power plants are based heavily - in fact, I

almost exclusively - on analysis of outcomes; that is, whetner simulated accidents and situations were successfully mitigated by operator activity.

This means that each operator develops his own strategy for dealing with the problem design. Little control can be applied to this type of learning.

At the Calvert Cliffs plant, use of the mirror-imaging design depends on long-term memory retrievals and requires high levels of information processing. Rules may not be

. totally unreliable during low stress periods, but will be highly unreliable where time, operator attention, recall and processing are limited.

The following, therefore, are problems with addressing mirror-imaging via training programs:

e Learning objectives would be difficult to identify.

Adequacy of training would likewise be difficult to assess.

Much of any learned strategies would be lost under high stress and a

time-constrained periods, since strategies would require access to -

1 long-term memory, extensive sensory input, and extensive informa-tion processing, all of which often fall (except sensory input) during high stress periods.

7.6.4. Summary At this point, it appears that some altering of contextual cues and response expectancies best addresses mirror-imaging problems at Calvert Cliffs. Not until speelfic problem areas are somehow identified, however, can more definite recommendations and means of implementation be provided. -

7.7 Mirror-Image Dealgn Impact on Performance - A Pilot Study A number of reports on human factors engineering and nuclear power plant control

(

room design have cited mirror-imaging in panel design of multi-unit control rooms as 4

78

l l

l L

seriously. discrepent from good human factors engineering practice. NUREG/CR-1278 (Swain and Guttman, 1980) considers mirror-imaging as "perhaps the most serious l

deviation from accepted ergonomics practices in the design of NPPs." Swain and Guttman suggest that even experienced operators will suffer confusion as a result of this design. A study conducted for EPRI (Seminara, Gonzalez, and Parsons,1976) included a review of j

i two plants in which mirror-imaging of panels for two-unit control rooms was used. One I-l of the plants reviewed was Calvert Cliffs; however, only Unit I was operational at that time. The problem of negative transfer of training, the interference of a previously learned response to new stimuli, was identified as a probable result of mirror-image in -

[

design. The guidelines for control room evaluation (NUREG-0700) currently being applied l

by the NRC recommend that mirror-imaged panel design be avoided.

Measures are not easily implemented for alleviating the human reliability degrada-tion likely to result from mirror-imaging. The cost involved in panel redesign is clearly prohibitive. The guidelines and EPRI report (Seminara et al.,1976) recommend licensing I

of operators for only one unit. While this would certainly eliminate the problem inherent in mirror-image design, this is not a feasible alternative at Calvert Cliffs for the j

following reasons:

I e Since there is only a Unit 1 simulator available, Unit 2 operators would be unable to train for emergency conditions e There would be a reduction of capable personnel available for emergency and off-normal operations e Restrictions to advancement would increase operator dissatisfaction Inherent cost of additional manpower (at least one man per shift) e e Nebulous region of " common" control boards for common systems e Residual interference for existing operators will continue e Inability to obtain manpower in sufficient numbers t

e Vacations and sick leave would still require operators to work both units.

l The guidelines and EPRI report also suggest that different color schemes be used so that l

separation between units is clear in the visual field. Color-coding of unit panels is an option which should be considered. Before any backfits are made, however, it seems l

sensible to first identify the extent to which human reliability, and therefore, system i

reliability is jeopardized at Calvert Cliffs due to the mirror-image design.

1 79

7.7.1 Statement of the Problem The.first step taken to assess the impact of mirror-imaging on operator performance involved the conduct of a licensee event report (LER) review. The review was undertaken to identify any reportable events which were potentially attributable to mirror-imaging.

The findings from the review were inconclusive; no LERs were found which could be clearly attributable to mirror-imaging.

The next phase of the data collection effort involved interviewing operators using the Essex Human Engineering Operator Questionnaire. Questions were asked about errors made in control operation as well as about controls or displays which induced confusion or hesitation in operation. Confusion might be illustrated by starting to operate a control incorrectly, even though no error was actually made. It is assumed that a number of such near-errors occur that are not consciously noted by operators who automatically compen-sate or correct their actions. However, a number of components were identified which have been involved in operational errors or near-errors and are clearly attributable to the mirror-imaged design.

Among those components identified by operators as induced error due to mirror-imaged arrangement are the following:

o Containment Spray. LPSI and IPSI - The reverse order of arrange-ment of these identical switches, with too many similarities in labeling between LPSI and IPSI as well, are highly subject to incorrect switch operation.

e Volume Control Tank Makeup (CVC-512MU) - Placed within a mirror-imaged mimic, the problem in operation of these switches is

. exacerbated by the mirror-imaging of the direction of operation as well(i.e., on Unit 1, to open requires a clockwise motion; on Unit 2, to open requires e counterclockwise motion).

i

!~

Circulatino Water Box Primino Valves and Vacuum Breaker Valves -

e Positioning of these valve switches is reversed such that in normal

. setting for Unit 2, arrows point inward during normal operation. This 4

problem is exacerbated by discriminating labeling information being Imbedded within two lines of text.

e Emeroency Diesel Generator Controllers - While arrangement of controllers for Emergency Diesels 11 and 12 is similar, arrangement of number 21 is mirrored. This arrangement is particularly suscepti-ble to error as the controls for the three generators, while belonging to different units (11 and 12 to Unit 1, 21 to Unit 2), are in fact located on the same panel.

The problems reported by the operators are most likely those which either occur with greater frequency or have serious ramifications and are therefore readily recalled.

Other controls and displays may be subject to the same kinds of problems, but with less

. 3 frequency or less serious ramifications, and are therefore not recalled or reported..There 80

e may still be some unreported components which suffer from negative transfer of training due to unit differences for which the error may be more subtle, while the risk to system reliability is still great. These potential problems need to be identified in a thorough and systematic review of the mirror-imaged design, comparing component arrangement, system by system, operating station by operating station.

Essex has conducted an extensive search of the relevant literature, reviewing reports of basic and applied experimental studies. While there are no directly applicable

('

studies, particularly none specifically directed at nuclear power plant control problems, the relevant research would imply that some interference or control / display reversal problems are likely to exist. Since there is no clearcut evidence as to the degree and nature of the likely impact of mirror-imaging in control panel design, Essex conducted a

).

pilot study to develop a method for identifying those components most likely to suffer from operator error due to the mirrored arrangement between units.

7.7.2 Technical Approach and Results For the pilot study, the Chemical and Volume Control panels (1/2C07) were selected. (Certain panels were eliminated due to the lack of mirror-imaging, such as the Turbine Control panels or common panels, and others were omitted from consideration because of planned design changes.) The panel segment for each unit was photographed in segments, the photographs printed at one-quarter scale, and acetate-covered mosaics were developed upon which operational sequences could be diagrammed for comparison.

The evaluation utilizing these mosales was conducted in two phases.

7.7.2.1 Phase 1 - Approach - The first phase involved diagramming operational response sequences performed at the Unit 1 and Unit 2 CVCS (Chemical and Volume Control System) Stations.

Operator orienting and search pattern requirements were compared between units.

Controls or displays arranged within similar and therefore difficult-to-discriminate surroundings were noted and the likely control or display reversal was recorded.

7.7.2.2 Phase 1 - Results - The following describe controls or displays identified within operational sequences as potential sources of error.

L e In response to LETDOWN HX COMPT CLG WATER DIFF PRESS HI, l.

Step 1 involves correctly selecting LETDOWN HY TEMP CONTR which is located in a mirrored arrangement on each panel (1/2C07).

Change in location may cause confusion or inadvertent activation.

e In response to CHG PMP OIL LVL LO and CHG PMP PACKING COOLANT LVL LO, Steps 4 and 5 involve correctly reading

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CHARGING HEADER PRESS and. CHARGING FLOW meters (IC07),

which are not in prioritized sequence.

o In response to CHG HEADER FLOW LO PRESS LO, Steps 1 and 2 require correctly reading CHARGING HEADER PRESS and CHARGING FLOW METERS (lC07), which are not in critical order.

e PLACING A PURIFIC. ION EXCH. IN SERVICE, Step 3, involves use of LET DOWN HX TEMP CONTR, which may be confused with LETDOWN PRESSURE controller due to inverted placement.

VENTING VCT involves correctly reading VOLUME CONTROL TANK e

PRESS meters, and activating associated controls. All are arranged In confusing reversal.

e STARTING CHG and LETDOWN involves reading VOLUME CON-TROL TANK TEMP and VOLUME CONTROL TANK PRESS meters, I

which may be confused with each other due to reversal of arrange-ment.

in response to REGEN HX OUTLET TEMP HI, CHARGING HEADER e

PRESS must be read correctly.

Reversal of order may cause incorrect reading.

In response to HX OUTLET TEMP HI, LETDOWN HX TEMP CONTRO l

e l

and LETDOWN PRESSURE controller must be used.

Inadvertent -

l activation may result due to reversed arrarigement.

e In response to RCP CONT. BLEED OFF PRESS HI/HI-HI, RCP

' BLEED OFF HEADER PRESS meter and RCP BLEED OFF IN CONTMT ISO VLV controls must be used interdependently. Reversal of arrangement may cause confusion in activation.

e In response ~ to VCT TEMPERATURE HI, VOLUME CONTROL TANK PRESS and VOLUME CONTROL TANK TEMP meters must be read correctly. Reversal of order may confuse operator.

In response to LETDOWN PRESS, LETDOWN PRESSURE controller e

must be activated. It can be confused with adjacent controller due to reversal of order. -

In response to BORON and RAD. MONITOR FLOW LO, the process s

controller used in Step 3 is located next to an identical process controller which could result in control substitution.

In response to BA TAW LEVEL LOW, the placement of the 11 and 12 e

l-Boric Acid Tank Level vertical displays (IC07) is in accordance with i

the panel convention; however, the 12 Boric Acid Tank Level is used first, which does violate the left-to-right, top-to-bottom convention for the IC07 panel. The placement of the 22 and 21 Boric Acid Pump Control (2C07) violates mirror-imaging conventions. The convention for control operation is right-to-left and bottom-to-top for the 2C07 panel..

In response to VCT PRESS, the reversed control / display arrangement e

is confusing and could result in control / display substitution (for the RCMW FLOW PROP VALVE and VOLUME CONTROL TA* PRESS).

82

e e In response to RADIATION MONITOR LEVEL HI, AR-203 and RR?02 (engineering numbers) must be read. Reversal of order in each panel may confuse operator's response.

No apparent problem due to mirror-imaging was found in operator response to the following Alarm Manual Responses:

e 21/22 BA PMP DISCH PRESS LO e 21/22 BA PMP SIAS o BLOCKED o AUTO o START 11/12 & 21/22 RC MAKEUP PUMPS DISCH FILTER DIFF PRESS H1 e

e 21/22 & 23 CHG PMP SIAS o BLOCKED o AUTO o START e CHG PMP OIL LVL LO (2C07) e 23 CHG PMP BRKR LINE UP IMPROPER e CHG HEADER o FLOW LOW o PRESS LOW CHARGING PUMPS (Shifting Pumps & Charging Pump Select) e Securing CHG & LETDOWN e

e Boration e Dilution e VCT LEVEL & CHG. PMP SUCT. FROM RWT e PURIFICATION ION EXCHANGE DIFF PRESS HI e Baron Concentration e LETDOWN STRAINER DIFF PRESS HI l

e LETDOWN ISOLATED 2-CV-2085 e DEMINERALIZED WATER FLOW e BORIC ACID FLOW e LETDOWN FLOW HIGH e PURIFICATION FILTER.DIFF PRESS Hl.

7.7.2.3 Phase 2 - Approach - Predominant design conventions representing opera-tor expectancy sets used in the Calvert Cliffs CR were listed. The application of these was compared for IC06 and 2C06, and deviations, which are potential sources of error, were recorded.

Operator expectancies based on design conventions are as follows:

e Mirror-imaging in CR layout operators expect a reversal in control station arrangement and panel layout when going from one unit to the other e Identical components used for identical functions on both units t

e Consistent use of control operation

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83

l L.

control operation requires clockwise motion to increase ficw ar.d counterclockwise motion to decrease flow e Consistent use of indicator light meaning and arrangement.

red signifies flow (open valve, closed breaker, etc.); green signifies l

no flow (closed valve,' tripped breaker)

'~

red indicator lights are placed on the right, green on the left, above and near associated controls Identical terminology for identical function for controls and displays for e

both units.

e Consistent use of meter display information vertical meter scales increase in value from bottom to top; l

horizonal meter scales increase in value from left to right e Flow direction within the mimic -indicated by lines, arrows and display arrangement.

Where violations of these conventions or conflicts involving two or more of them exist, the likelihood of operator confusion and possible error is increased.

7.7.2.4 Phase 2 - Results - Violations of expectancies and conventions are listed below.

7.7.2.4.1 Violation of Mirrored Arranaement e Recorder and controller in reversed arrangement between units -

BORIC ACID FLOW and MAKEUP FLOW components e Arrangements of associated controls and displays differs between units for CHARGING PUMPS.

".7.2.4.2 Violations of Identical Components for Identical Functions - None.

7.7.2.4.3 Violations of Consistent Use of Control Operation e VCT DISCHARGE VALVE Controls

-e REFUELING WATER TANK ISOLATION VALVES e VOLUME CONTROL TAW MAKEUP VALVES (512,513) e BORIC ACID TAW RECIRC VALVES RCP BLEED'-OFF OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES e

l e VCT BYPASS TO WPS s VOLUME CONTROL TAW VENT VALVES e BORIC ACID TAW DIRECT FEED ISOLATION VALVES e BORONOMETER PROCESS RAD MONITOR ISOLATION VALVES e CHARGING LINE VALVES t

~ LETDOWN LINE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES i

e l

LETDOWN ISOLATION VALVES e

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L 84

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e BORIC ACID DIRECT MAKEUP VALVES

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e ION EXCHANGER BYPASS VALVES.

7.7.2.4.4 Violations of Consistent Use of Indicator Licht Meanino or Arranaement Associated (integral) indicator lights with those controls listed above e

(7.7.2.4.3) are also in violation of indicator light arrangement convention. Of overriding ?mportance is the fact that their position meanings remain intact.

l l

7.7.2.4.5 Violations of Labelino Consistency e AUXILIARY SPRAY LINES e VOLUME CONTROL TANK VENT VALVES e VOLUME CONTROL TALK MAKEUP VALVES e CHARGING PUMPS.

7.7.2.4.6 Violations of Consistency in Meter Display Information e LETDOWN TEMP REGEN HX OUTLETS e VOLUME CONTROL TAtK LEVELS.

7.7.2.4.7 Violations of Mimic Direction - None.

7.7.3 Recommendations The components identified in the two-phase review are those components which are most likely to induce error in operation or use. The most probable result and error would j

be loss of time in locating or correctly operating the specific instrument. In most l

Instances, in the operation of a nuclear power plant, time-critical tasks do not exist per se. In other words, the brief add,itional time needed for searching is not a serious problem. However, a number of controls are listed, specifically, CMCs with reversals in direction or operation, which could be actuated incorrectly. A determination must be made as to whether any of these likely errors could have a serious impact on plant safety or reliability.

A serious conflict of conventions exists within the C07 mimics. This conflict is between the expectancy for conventional, indeed stereotypical, clockwise-to-increase Y

switch operation, and the mimic design which illustrates valve position and flow path requiring reversal of switch operation. Consistency is important. If a decision is made, as is recommended, to correct contradictions in expected switch direction of operation, the entire mimic may require revision.

b 85

Controls and displays which are identified as subject to reversal errors in search tasks can be retrofitted with enhanced and more discriminating labeling, different colored instrument bezela, or distinctive borders around selected components.

7.8 W Review of the P.w-i Redesign of Panel 1CO3 e

i 7.8.1 Background The addition of a third auxiliary feed pump system has necessitated the redesign of the current feed system control panel, IC03. By moving the majority of the auxiliary feed-related components to the adjacent IC04 panel, the remaining components are left better functionally grouped and less crowded. Essex was asked to review the plan for the main feed station design during the CR evaluation project, and to suggest demarcation and functional group labeling to enhance panel operability.

7.8.2 Technical Approach and Recommendations Functional demarcation and summary labeling serve a variety of purposes: (1) to reduce time to visually locate control board components;(2) to reduce control and display substitution errors; and (3) to reduce the time it takes new operators to learn the location of subsystems and components on the control panels. This is realized by demarcating, with lines or colors, associated groups of controls and displays. In the course of the search, whole groups of components are eliminated from that search until the appropriate group is located. The individual control or display is then located within a group.

Essex human factors engineers reviewed the design drawings provided by Bechtel illustrating those components to be removed and those to be rearranged. Functionally l

associated controls and displays were identified from engineering drawings and systems descriptions. Essex's recommendations for the application of demarcation and summary labels are illustrated in Figure 7.1.

i 7.9 W Review of the Pi--;-- M Auxiliary Feedwater 0,hc. Design Essex was asked to perform an evaluation of the human factors engineering fitness C the proposed design for the Auxiliary Feedwater System (Panel IC04). An overall evaluation of the proposed layout has revealed no serious violation of human factors engineering criteria. Particularly positive aspects include the following: Integration of labeling space requirements into the design; bottom-to-top direction of flow which is consistent with the operational layout of the Main Feed System on the adjacent panel

,C 86

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s (1C03); mimic' lines which are clear, with minimal cross-over; and integration of direction-of-flow arrows.

A problem does exist, however, in designing and coloring the mimic so as to enhance discrimination of Steam Generator flow lines, as well as discerning steam-driven from motor-driven system flows for each Steam Generator. There are several methods which would accomplish this goal while remaining consistent with human factors principles and

(

criteria. Described below are those which seem feasible at the current phase of design.

l 1.

Use of dual shades of blue mimic line: Using two shades of blue, one to indicate flow from the steam-driven system and another for the motor-driven system, would be an acceptable fix. One problem, however, could result from the fact that the components are placed quite closely i

together on the panel and, hence, the portion of mimic line visible to the operator may not be sufficient to clearly distinguish one system from the other.

2.

Use of cross-hatching on one system flow line: Using one shade of blue for the entire mimic with the flow line for one system crosshatched in white or black could possibly result in discrimination problems for the same reason stated above.

3.

Use of demarcation lines around system components: Demarcation lines of a different color for each system can be added to highlight com-ponents within flow lines, clearly distinguishing components in the motor-driven flow line from those in the steam-driven system. The integrity of the flow mimic color coding, _with red meaning steam and blue meaning feed flow, 'is clearly maintained while the different systems are clearly identified. The drawback to this approach is the amount of additional information in terms of color and taping added to an already full panel.

4.

Addition of LEDs indicating path of flow: From a human factors point of view, perhaps the most reliable and efficient method of indicating flow path to the operator would be the addition of LEDs along the flow path.

Blue LED-type indicators positioned at intervals along each system flow mimic line could be tied logically to each drive system, illuminating when the appropriate pump system, either steam-or motor-driven, is actuated.

Such an indication would clearly and immediately cue the operator to the correct line of flow and remain unobtrusive when not actuated.

5.

Rearrangement of panel layout by drive system: A fifth possibility, which would require redesign and might interfere with separation requirements, would be to rearrange the panel layout by drive system rather than by Steam Generator. In such an arrangement, the flow lines and associated components coming from the steam-driven system would be located on the left, above the controls for the steam-driven pumps; the two sets of components feeding from the motor-driven pump would be on the right, above the motor-driven pump controls. With this layout, the mimic lines would cross at the top of the mimic, indicating flow to the 11 or 12 Steam Generator.

s 88

t i

l The effectiveness of the first three suggestions would be best evaluated on a full-scale mockup (perhaps simply on a photomosaic or scale drawing). Clearly though, if not cost prohibitive, the integration of indicator lights as suggested under item 4 would give the cleanest and most reliable indication to the operator without contributing to visual clutter or confusion during system operation.

7.10 W Review of the Piwd Shutdown Panel Dealgn Essex was asked to review the proposed design for the shutdown panelincorporating new requirements for additional auxiliary feed capabilities. It is critical that the remote shutdown panel be soundly human engineered, clearly labeled, and arranged to meet operator expectancies; since the shutdown panel is rarely operated, the opportunity for l

practice is limited. It also follows that when operation of the shutdown panelis required, it is because the CR is inaccessible due to some emergency condition, and the criticality of all operations, as well as the stress under which they are performed, is increased.

The proposed design incorporates some positive features which will contribute greatly to operator reliability. Particularly good human factors engineering features incorporated into the design include the following: system demarcation lines; summary -

labels identifying major groups of system components; and mimic lines connecting related I

components.

1 L

Labeling font style and character size should follow the guidelines presented in the i

CCNPP labeling specification. A recommendation is that component labels have a font size of approximately.25 inch, and that summary (or group) labels have a font size of apprcximately.50 inch. Demarcation lines should meet the criteria provided in the specification on demarcation and mimic lines.

For standing operation, total panel console height should not exceed 72 inches above -

standing surface; the vertical portion of the panel used should not exceed 36 inches, nor should console width exceed 36 inches (MIL-STD-1472B, Table XVIII, p.124).

Components should be arranged on the vertical panel in an area between 41 and 70 inches above the standing surface (NUREG-1580, p. WA-1; MIL-STD-14728). -

One item of concern in the operation of this panel is that comparisons of displayed r

values must be made between meters placed above/below one another. Although side-to-

' side comparisons are conventional in the control room, this above/belnw convention is consistent within the shutdown panel.

Although no major problems are anticipated operationally, this difference should be covered thoroughly in operator training.

p 69

.=

8.0 REFERENCES

Annunciator secuences and specifications (Standard No ISA-518.1). Research Triangle Park, N.C.: Instrument Society of America,1979.

Bilodeau, E.W. Acauisition of Skill. New York: Academic Press,1966.

Cakir, A., et al. Visual display terminals. New York: John Wiley & Sons,1980.

Christ, R.E.

Review and analysis of color coding research for visual displays. Human 1975, 1_7,(6), 542-570.

7

Factors, Cornballis, N.C., and Beale, I.C. The psycholoay of left and rioht. Hillsdale, New Jersey:

John Wiley and Sons,1976.

Curran, P.M., and Lane, N.E. Desian procedure for aircrew station labelina selection and

_ Reprinted from Conference Proceedings No. 258.

abbreviation (AGARD Rep.).

(

n.d.).

Fitts, P.M., and Posner, M.I. Human performance. Belmont, Ca.: Brooks / Cole Publishing Co.,1967.

i Handbook of human enaineerina data for desian enaineers. Boston, Mass.: Tufts College, 1952.

Hulse, H.H., Deese, J., and Egeth, H. The psycholoay of learnina. New York: McGraw-Hill,1975.

Kling, J.W., and Riggs, L.A.

Experimental osycholoay. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.1971.

Mallory,- K., Fleger, S., Johnson, J., ' Avery, L., Walker, R., Baker, C., and Malone, T.

Human enoineerina aulde to control room evaluation Vol. I. Control room evaluation process - (Report No. NUREG/CR-1580, Vol. I).

Washington, D.C.:. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August 1980.

i Mallory, K., Fleger, S., Johnson, J., Avery, L., Walker, R., Baker, C., and Malone, T.

Human enaineerina cuide to control room evaluation Vol. II. Human enaineerina cuidelines (Report No. NUREG/CR-1580, Vol. II).

Washington, D.C.:

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August 1980.

I Malone, T.B.', Kirkpatrick, M., Mallory, K., Elke, D., Johnson, J., and Walker, R.' Human

' factors evaluation of control room desian and operator performance at Three Mile Island 2: Final reo. Vols. II and 111 (Rep. No. NUREG/CR-1270, Vol. II, Vol. III).

Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 1980.

McCormick, E.J.

Human factors in enaineerino and desian (4th ed.).

New York:

j-McGraw-Hill,1976.

s I

d 90

Vf

.m og Mikulas, William L. Concepts of learnina. New York: Harper & Row inc.,1974.

. MIL-STD-1472B. Human enoineerina data for desian enaineers. Boston, Mass.: Tufts College,1952.

Osgood, L.E.

The similarity paradox in human learning: A resolution. Psycholoaical Review, 1949, 56, 132-143.

Parsons, S.O., Eckert, S.K., and Seminara, J.L.

Human factors desian practices for nuclear power plant control rooms. Proceedings of the Human Factors Society, 1978.

Procram plan summary of the Calvert Cliffs nuclear power plant units 1 and 2 control room. Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, September 1983.

Seminara, J.L., Gonzales, W.R., and Parsons, S.O. Human factors review of nuclear power plant control room desian (EPRI REP. WP-309). Palo Alto, Ca.: Electric Power Research Institute, November 1976.

Seminara, J.L., and Parsons, S.O. Human factors survey of Control room desian DracticSs (Rep. No. EPRI NP-1118, V.2). Palo Alto, Ca.: Electric Power Research Institute, November 1979.

Seminara, J.L., Seldenstein, S., Eckert, S.K., and Smith, D.C. Human factors methods for nuclear control room desian. Vol. 1:

Human factors enhancement of existina nuclear control rooms (Report No. EPRI-NP-lll8, V.L). Palo Alto, Ca.: Electric Power Research Institute, November 1979.

Swain, A.D. & Guttmann, H.E. Handbook of human reliability analysis with emphasis on nuclear Dower Dlant SDDlications: Draft report for interim use and comment (Rep.

No. NUREG/CR-1278).

Washington, D.C.:

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, October 1980.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Guidelines for control room design reviews (NUREG-0700). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,1981.

- Van Cott, H.P., and Kinkede, R.G. (Eds.). Human enoineerina auide to eauipment desian.

Washington, D.C.: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.

l l

L 91 1

l

Q ar Mr. 3. R. Miller Decemb:r 31,1984 Attachment A

' ASSESSMENT OF HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY SIGNIFICANCE As described in the Program Plan, once an HED was identified (during data collection and. reduction) it was forwarded to the HED Review Committee and its

disposition determined. Since no systematic documentation was performed during the initial HED assessment meetings performed in 1980 and c1981, one of the first tasks performed after BG&E received the Staff's comments on our program plan submittal was to develop a more systematic, documentable assessment methodology and to implement this method to prioritize corrective action scheduling.

The initial determination, made by the Human Factors Specialist, was to assess the extent of deviation from the guideline (generally from NUREG/CR-1580).

l This~1s described in section 3.1.1 of the Program Plan. If the reported discrepancy was determined to be an inappropriate application of the guideline, it was dismissed without generation of an HED report. Otherwise an HED number was assigned at this time.

Determining the Significance of HEDs A set of criteria (listed in Table 1) was applied in a structured manner (see Figure 1) to classify HEDs in terms of their significance and associated scheduling priority. All HEDs were subjected to this process to ensure consistent categorization and i

prioritization.

I Categories were established on the basis of the likelihood that an HED would i

degrade operator performance, the safety significance. of the systems potentially involved, and the potential consequences. The probability of an operating crew error and the severity of the potential consequences of that error were qualitatively evaluated by appropriately qualified members of the HED Review Committee.

Each HED was i

assumed to potentiate the most severe associated operator error identified, avoiding the.

need to assess multiple modes of performance degradation.

. All HEDs known to have actually contributed to an operating error were considered prima facie to have a high potential to induce an operator error. Documents, such as licensee event reports, and operator questionnaires and interviews were used to L

identify these cases. If a safety-related (SR) system was involved and violation of a f

technical specification or other unsafe condition could have been potentiated by the f

HED, it would be assigned the highest category of importance and the highest scheduling l

' priority.

p

(

For all other HEDs, the potential for error was assumed to be high unless i'

Human Factors Specialist explicitly evaluated the potential to be low on the basis of the performance shaping factors in Table 2.. If the most severe operator error associated with a low-potential HED would not lead to a technical specification violation or to an unsafe condition, the HED was not considered to be significant. These HEDs were assigned to the lowest category of importance and, if a reasonable and cost-effective method of correction' was identified, were scheduled for correction when convenient.

Until and unless such HEDs are corrected, they will be tracked to ensure that their cumulative impact remains acceptably small.

1 l

i

L

's tL HED Categories i

Category I HEDs for which there a e documented errors or reported potential for errors with safety-related equipment or systems capable of creating l

unsafe plant conditions and/or violation of the Technical Specifications.

These are assigned "A" scheduling priority.

s.

?

Category II HEDs which potentiate errors with equipment or systems designated as safety-related; or which create or contribute to effects which could cause

~ unsafe operations, plant _ cor.ditions, and/or violations of the Operating License's Technical Specifications.

These are assigned a scheduling priority based upon evaluated significance.

Category III HEDs which potentiate errors with equipment or systems which are NOT safety-related, would not contribute to unsafe operations or plant conditions, and would not contribute to a violation of the Technical Specifications.

r Corrective Actions J

In evaluating proposed design modifications, the HED assessment committee considered the following:

1. Does the modification conform to the applicable precepts of human engineering

. practice?

2.. Does the modification introduce new HEDs?

' 3. Will the information and control requirements be met after the modification; and (b) will other requirements for effective task performance (e.g., proximity and consistency of controls and displays used in the task) be met after the modification?

4. Fo'r each function affected, will the modification enhance (or at least,.not detract from) Integrated performance of - the task sequences involved in accomplishing the function?

In addition, as ~ indicated above, the modifications were checked for consistency and compatibility with established control room conventions, features that-will not be modified, and other proposed modifications.

Evaluation of proposed modifications were facilitated through the use of mock-ups, full-color control board photographs and control room-walkdowns as necessary.

Scheduling Priority of Corrective Actions The categorization of discrepancies resulting from the application of criteria

'and methods described in the previous sections were used as the basis for determining the urgency of corrective actions. All Categories I and II HEDs have been evaluated and are scheduled for corrective action or have been determined to be acceptable without -

correction.

2

s i

For the purpose of scheduling corrective actions,'the following priorities were assigned.

Priority A

- Prompt - By the end of the next refueling outage for each unit, subject to the availability of materials and engineering.

Priority B

- Near Term - By the end of the second refueling outage for each unit, subject to the availability of materials and engineering.

Priority C

-- Long Term - By the end of the third outage for each unit.

In-all cases, actions on a shorter schedule than that indicated will be considered as schedules of other plant modifications change. Non-outage work will not be deferred to outage periods without justification.

3 i

1

~

Attachment A _ -

TABLEI PRIORITY ASSIGNMENT GUIDANCE NOTES Responsible Question Guidance Committee Member How was the potential a) Was it documented through post-trip reviews, outage reports, operator Program for human error interviews, or LERs? (This grouping represents reported operator errors Director identified?

or operator-identified situations where errors could occur with significant probability.)

b) Was it assessed through design surveys, guide document comparisons, i

procedural task analysis / function analysis or other design document reviews? (This group represents potential errors with no prior reports of operational occurrence.)

c) All error occurrences reported in committee meetings are to be treated as documented errors.

Is the error potential Has the HED been determined to have more than a minimal potential for Human significant?

degrading human performance capabilities? (See attachment for Factors performance shaping factors.)

Specialist is the equipment

Reference:

Calvert Cliffs Q-List and its attachments.

instrumentation and safety-related?

Controls Engineer Does the effect of Could the induced error have direct safety impact or does it Reactor the error have high increase the potential of an event sequence leading to any unsafe Operator or safety significance?

occurrence significantly?

I&C Engineer (see note) or Nuclear Engineer Could the error induce a) Resources: Technical Specifications, Final Safety Reactor o Technical Specification Analysis Report, team knowledge of systems / equipment interactions, Operator or or lead to unsafe design diversity and redundancy; various plant specific and NSSS I&C Engineer

. operations or plant Generic transient anlaysis, or Nuclear Engineer conditions? (see note) b) Determinations of potential Technical Specification violations should include the citation if readily identifiable.

4

HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY

=_

CLASSIFICATION

! h, Est u ms

(

START )

ECH SPEC POTEN lAL DOCUMENTED.

SAFETY YES VIOLATION OR YES

- I A

N ON ASSESSED NO NO HIGH POT IAL S AFETY YES ggp y YES VI L TIOPJ OR YES - H A

RELATED SIGNIFICANCE OPg ERROR LOW NO NO NO TECH SPEC YES CR VIOgA OPERATION 0

No o

ECH YES VIOLgoN OR OPERATION '

No h

YES o

CPERA NO I

g FIGURE I 5

L

i a.

Attachment A TABLE 2 ERROR POTENTIAL ASSESSMENT The following were evaluated in assessing error potential:

Whether overall operator performance is degraded by the HED's impact on body physiology.

Whether the HED degrades sensory performance.

Whether information processing capability is exceeded because of the HED.

Whether the HED induces direct error due to principles of learning.

Whether task difficulty and reliability are affected by the HED.

The following performance shaping factors were considered:

Body physiology

- fatigue / physical stress

- discomfort

- injury

- anthropometry Sensory / perceptual performance

- vision

- audition

- proprioception

- touch-Information processing

- overload

- confusion l

- recall l

- pattern matching / recognition

- data manipulation (comparing, extrapolating, etc.)

Learning

- inhibition

- habituation i

- response predominance

- transfer l

- response competition

- response latency Task demands

(

- frequency

- duration

- competition l

- sequence

- speed

- communication

- precision l

- information I

b

s

.i Mr. 3. R. Milltr Decambtr 31,1984 Attichmtnt B

HEDs FOR WHICH NO CORRECTIVE ACTION IS PLANNED There are a number of Category 11 HEDs for which no additional action is planned.

In each case, the HED Review Committee has evaluated the HED and determined that correction is neither necessary nor practical. To reduce the volume of i'

l the justification, as suggested by the Staff during its pre-implementation audit, HEDs have been grouped below according to the basis for taking no further action. A given than one group because several devices or multiple i

HED ' may. appear in more characteristics of a single device may be discrepant and yet acceptable without i

. corrective action for different reasons.

l A. The specific functions potentially affected by this HED can be performed I

with acceptable reliability, taking into account expected operator

!~

compensatory behavior and the availability of alternative methods for satisfying the functional requirement.

I HED Numbers:

2, 132, 138, 142, 143, 145, 148, 248, 262, 280,284,336,356,402,440,441,464, 474, 531, 553, 600, 603, 697, 729, 737 B. Labeling or control / display association does not precisely comply with the evaluation criteria but-is nevertheless clear, unambiguous, and adequate.

This is sometimes related to controls and displays within a single vendor package which cannot be readily altered.

HED Numbers: 51,116,123,129,130,146,150,281,297, 1-316, 321, 323, 324, 400,.419, 480, 481, 483,549,590,719 B. The evaluation criterion evaluated to generate the HED is violated but does not significantly interfere with satisfying the relevant function or for some reason should not be applied in the case of a particular device. (e.g.,a difference inmetering between units due to having different equipment in each unit)

HED Numbers: 5,66,112,124,131,135,264,286,289, 443, 444, 507, 543, 572, 578, 729,'740 D. The correction of one HED creates another of similiar potential to induce error and/or similar safety'_ significance, generally related to local stereotypes or conventions and negative transfer.

HED Numbers: 34,35,70,470,397,616 l

i i

i I

L t

I

Mr. 3. R. Miller Decemb:r 31,1984 Attachment C

SUMMARY

OF HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES The following is a brief report on each human engineering discrepancy identified in the course of.the detailed control room design review.

The report is organized in order of the arbitrary sequence numbers assigned to each human engineering

-discrepancy (HED) as described in the Program Plan. In general, there is a one-to-one correspondence between each HED and a sequence number. However, because certain HEDs_ were combined and others were subdivided subsequent to sequence number assignment, the numbers are not unique in every case, nor are all numbers used.

In addition to the file number and title of each identified HED, additional relevant information is provided:

Category I, II, or III, as assigned by the HED Review Committee in accordance with the procedure described in Attachment A.

Priority A, B, or C, as assigned by the HED Review Committee in accordance with' the procedure described in Attachment A.

Status All Category I and II HEDs are assigned one of the following status classifications:

e CORRECTED the HED no longer aists because of a modification to the control room RESOLVED the HED no longer exists or has been substantially i

ameliorated by changes to training or administrative procedures, or, existing training or administrative -

procedures not known to the evaluation team have been identified and assessed to be adequate _and acceptable by the HED Review Committee REVIEW the HED has been assigned to the appropriate responsible design organization or operating section for additional study and recommendations, and the results of that review are not yet available or have not yet been accepted by the HED Review Committee l

FCR the HED is to be - corrected by a design change (accomplished through a Facility Change Request for all I

such activities at Calvert Cliffs) but completion of the corrective action has not been reviewed and approved by the HED Review Committee.

MR the HED is to be corrected by a modification that does not l

require a design change (normally accomplished through a l

Maintenance Request) but has not yet been corrected i

NO ACTION no practical and justifiable method to correct the HED has l

been determined and the condition has been explicitly' i

evaluated as acceptable without change.

I 1

l.

.i Attachment C 4

. Schedule All Category.I and II HEDs assigned a status of 'FCR,'MR, or REVIEW are also assigned a schedule date. This constitutes our commitment to complete corrective action. Due to the nature of these items, some part of their correction must generally be performed during a planned outage, so the schedule commitments are expressed in terms of the refueling outage schedule. Changes to these schedules, if required, will be reported with an explanation y

of the conditions necessitating the change.

. Category III HEDs (those which do not ' affect safety related systems, technical specifications, or otherwise potentiate unsafe plant conditions) may be assigned to any of the above status classifications and may be scheduled, but this information is provided for information only and does not constitute a commitment to complete action. It should be emphasized that our original objective was to correct all HEDs where practical regardless of their category. As a result, a large number of these HEDs have already been corrected or are scheduled for correction despite the lack of a ii requirement to do so.

i

'A few HEDs were not assigned to a category because their final disposition had been determined before the classification procedure was implemented.

l Jy,

I I

I 1

9 2

, ryg r

6

Attcchment C

-HUMAN ENGINEERING' DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING as of December 31, 1984, for i

CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 i

File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri, and Brief Description (if assigned) 1C07 1-OR II B ANNUNCIATORS SPRING 1988 CHARGING PUMP OIL / SEAL TANK COMMON ALARM FCR 2-OR II C ANNUNCIATORS 1C17-21 FIRE PROTECTION SYS - MULTI-CHANNEL ALARM NO ACTION 1C13-22.1-3-OR I A VERTICAL METERS FALL 1986 COMP. CLG., ETC., DISPLAY FCR 1C03-22.1-4-OR II C VERTICAL METERS INVERTED SCALE ON CONDENSER VACUUM SAUGES BETWEEN UNITS CORRECTED 1CO2-22.1-5-OR II C VERTICAL METERS STM GLAND SEAL INDICATORS DIFF. MERSURES BETWEEN UNITS NO ACTION 1C03-32.5-6-OR II C J-HANDLES FALL 1986 CONDENSATE PUMP & BOOSTER PUMPS-REVERSE ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN FCR UNITS 1C83 7-OR II D CONTROL / DISPLAY ARRANGEMENT FALL 1986 FEED SYS LAYOUT FCR 8-CR II B PROCESS CONTROLLERS SPRING 1988 1C03-31 PROC. CONTROLLERS MOUNTED CLOSE TO PANEL EDGE MR

.1C13-32.1-9-OR II B MICR0 SWITCHES FALL 1986 WTR BOX PRIMING & VRC BRKR-MIRROR IMAGE & LABELING PROBLEMS FCR l

1C00 10-OR I A PROCEDURES PROCEDURES MAINTENANCE RESOLVED 1C88-32.5 11-OR II B J-HANDLES FALL 1986 SI & CNTMT SPRAY-VARIATION IN LAYOUT BETWEEN UNITS FCR 1C87-32.1-12-OR II B MICR0 SWITCHES CVC-512 MU SWITCHES-REVERSE DIRECTION OF OPERATION BETWEEN' l

CORRECTED UNITS

s' a

Attechment C

HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY, REPORT LISTING

.as' of Decercer 31,11984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigned) 1C03 13-OR II B PROCESS CONTROLLERS FALL 1986 SG LEVEL CONTROL-LABELING FCR 1C18-32.2-14-OR I A THUMB ROTARY SWITCHES DIES. GEN. SPEED & VOLT-MIRRORED CORRECTED 1C06-32.2-15-OR II B THUMB ROTARY SWITCHES FALL 1986 PORV STATUS INDICATION AND DVERRIDE SWITCH-REVERSE 0~

FCR CONVENTION & LABELING PROBS.

1C00 16-OR II B COMMUNICATIONS SPRING '968 COMMUNICATING IN-PLANT SPEAKERS NOT FUNCTIONING FCR 1C18-32.2-17-OR I A-THUMB R3TARY SWITCHES DIES. GEN VOLT, ETC., SWITCH POS. VIOLATES STEREOTYPE CORRECTED 1C06-32.3-18-OR I A KEY-OPERATED SWITCHES PORV ISOL. VALVE SWITCH POSITIONS VIOLATE CONVENTION CORRECTED 19-OR ~I A-DIGITAL-TYPE DISPLAYS FALL 1986 1C06-28 ACOUSTIC FLOW MONITORS-NOT COLOCATED W/ CONTROLS-NOT LABELED

'FCR 1C03-32.1-20-CL II B MICR0 SWITCHES SPRING 1988 BLOWDOWN RECOVERY-LACKS LRBELS

'FCR 1C03-32.2-21-CL II A THUMB ROTARY SWITCHES MS SUPPLY MOVS TO AUX FEED PUMPS-NO LABEL

. CORRECTED I

1CC3-22.2 22-CL II C THUMB ROTARY SWITCHES

. FALL'1986 i

MAINT. DRAIN & MSIV TEST-NO LABELS FCR

~1C03-32.3-23-CL II C KEY-OPERATED SWITCHES 12 SG LO PRESS TRIP BYPASS-NO LABEL l

CORRECTED L

1C03-32.1-24-CL III MICR0 SWITCHES f..

SGFP OIL PUMP & TURN GEAR - VIOLATION OF PLANT CONVENTION l

FCR I

Atttchment C

<s 6

-HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT. LISTING

.as-of December,31,-1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assignec) 1C03-32.1-25-CL III MICR0 SWITCHES CONDENSATE DEMIN BYPASS-OPERATION NOT LABELED FCR 2CO3-32.1-26-CL III MICRDSWITCHES FALL 1985 STARTUP DRAINS FOR SGFP TURBS NOT LABELED FCR.

1C68-32.1-27-CL MICROSWITCHES SGFP-TURNING GEAR RESOLVED VIOLATION OF DIRECTION OF OPERATION CONVENTION 1C03-32.8.28-CL -III PUSHBUTTCN/MICR0 SWITCHES FDWTR HTR BTV RESET SWITCHES LABELING PROBLEMS MR 1C03-32.1-29-CL II C MICR0 SWITCHES SG BOTT. BLOWDOWN VLVS-LABELING CORRECTED-1C03-32.1-30-CL II C MICR0 SWITCHES FALL 1989 SGFP TURN GEAR & SG BOTT BLOWDOWN VLV-LOW CONTRAST LABELING FCR

'1003-32.8-31-CL -III PUSHBUTTDN/MICR0 SWITCHES

[

RIGID /SQLID COUPLING SWITCHES NON-FUNCTIONAL i

CORRECTED

- 1C03-32.8-32-CL II B PUSHBUTTON/MICR0 SWITCHES SPRING 1988 f-SGFP HYDRAULIC JACK SWITCHES PB FUNCTION NO INFO. ON FCR OPERATION 1C83 33-OR I A ANNUNCIATORS I

ANNUNCIATOR-SG AUX FEED P DISCH. SUCT. PRESS-MULTIPLE ALARM CORRECTED l

1C00 34-TR II B PROCEDURES, GENERAL H

STEPS DON'T IDENTIFY PLANT OPERATOR ACTIONS DUTSIDE CR NO ACTION 1C98 35-TR II C PROCEDURES, GENERAL-AMBIGUOUS WRITTEN PROCEDURES

-NO ACTION 1C8 -0 40f-36-TA II C PROCEDURES, GENERAL INSPECIFIC & AMBIGUQUSLY WRITTEN PROCEDURES CORRECTED

~v-

Attcchment C 3

3

. HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY. REPORT LISTING

-as of December.31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Senedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigned) 1C03 37-CL III PROCESS CONTROLLERS VIOLATION OF STERE 0 TYPE-INCREASE IN CONTROL & DISPLAY VALVE FCR SIGNIFIES CLOSED VALVE 1C03 38-CL III PROCESS CONTROLLERS OPERATION OF CONTROLLERS NOT CLEARLY LABELED-SEGUENTIA.

RESOLVED OPENING OF TURB BYPASS VALVES 1C03 39-CL III PUSHBUTTONS GUARD INTERFERES WITH OPERATION OF SWITCH MR 1C03 40-CL III PROCESS CONTROLLERS NO POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE INDICATORS AROUND ZERO POINT NO ACTION 1C04 41-CL II B COMPUTER RELATED SPRING 1988 COMPUTER CRT AND PRINTER MESSAGES REQUIRE TRANSLATIONS BY REVIEW OPERATOR 1C06-32.4-42-CL III SELECTOR SWITCHES POOR PLACEMENT 0: ROTARY SWITCHES AND LABELING WITH RESPECT NO ACTION TO TREND RECORDERS 1C07-24.1-43-TA III STRIP CHART RECORDER INACCURATE BORON 0KETER READINGS FCR 1C08 44-CL II C PROCESS CONTROLLERS FALL 1989 CONTROL LABELING LDLATION VIOLATES ESTABLISHED CONVENTION FCR l

l 1C08-22.1-45-CL II A VERTICAL METERS FALL 1986 HANDWRITTEN INDEX AND LABELING OF METER MR FALL 1986 1C08 46-CL II C LABELS POOR PLACEMENT AND ABBREVIATION USAGE OF LABELING IN MIMIC FCR 1C68-22.1-47-TA II A VERTICAL METERS FALL 1986 INAPPROPRIATE METER SCALING FCR l

1C10-32.1-48-CL I A MICR0 SWITCHES NO SPRING RETURN CORRECTED

Attechment C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT. LISTING as of= December 31,<-1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigned) 1C18-22.1-49-CL II C VERTICAL METERS FALL 1989

-INCONSISTENT POINTER "0FF" POSITION 7

REVIEW 2C18-22.1-58-CL III VERTICAL METERS MALFUNCTIONAL VERTICAL METER NO ACTIOM 1C18-32.7-51-CL II C STAR-HANDLES NO FUNCTIONAL LABELING OF CONTROLS NO ACTION 1C88-22.1-52-CL II A VERTICAL METERS FALL 1986 SIGMA INDICATORS, GENERIC FAIL-AS-IS FAILURE MODE ON LOSS OF FCR POWER

~2C03-22.1-53-CL III VERTICAL METERS INVERSION OF SCALE VALUES STEREOTYPE MR 1C83 54-CL III LABELS LABELIF.3 DOES NOT A. LOW DISCRIMINATION AMONG S.4 ITCHES CORRECTED 1C03-22.2-55-CL III HORIZONTAL METERS.

FUNCTIONALLY IDENTICAL DISPLAYS HAVE DIFFERENT SCAES NO ACTION

-1C83 56-CL II A LABELS INADEDUATE LABELING FOR CONTROLS / SIMPLE INDICATOR i

CORRECTED 2C83 57-CL II'C LABELS FALL 1986 POSITION LABELS WORN FCR 1C83 58-CL II C LABELS FALL 1986 VIOLATION OF LABEL POSITION CONVENTION FCR 1C83-11 CL III LABELS FALL 1986 LAELS NOT VISIBLE WHEN TREND RECORDER DOORS OPEN FCR 1C83 60-CL II C. LABELS VIOLATION OF ABBREVIATION LABELING CONVENTION f

CORRECTED i-l l

iL

Attcchment C HUMAN ENG1NEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTIN3 as-of December 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File. Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigned) 1C03 61-CL II B PROCESS CONTROLLERS SIMILAR CONTROLS ARRANGED IN STRINGS CORRECTED 1C03-32.2-62-CL III THUMB ROTARY SWITCHES CONTROLS NOT COLOCATED WITH ASSOCIATED CONTROLS & DISPLAYS CORRECTED 1C03-23.2-63-CL III SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS NON-FUNCTIONING DISPLAYS ON PRIME PANEL SPACES CORRECTED 1C03-32.2-64-CL III THUMB ROTARY SWITCHES FALL 1986 CONTROLS LOCATED ON PANEL SEGMENT EDGE-LABELS ON OTHER FCR SEGMENT 1C03-32.8-65-CL III PUSHBUTTON/MICR0 SWITCHES PUSHBUTTON FUNCTION NOT LABELED CORRECTED 2CO3 66-CL II C PROCESS CONTROLLERS POINTERS OBSCURE SCALE ON PROCESS CONTROLLER METERS NO ACTION 1C03 67-CL II B PROCESS CONTROLLERS FALL 1986 LABELING INADEQUATE DN PROCESS CONTROLLER FCR ACO3-22.1-68-CL II C VERTICRL METERS VERTICAL METER INFORMATION OBSCURED BY POINTER FCR SPRING 1988 f

2C03-22.1-69-CL II B VERTICAL METERS VERTICAL METER MOUNTED TOO HIGH CAUSING PARALLAX AND l.

FCR DIFFICULT READING 1C03-23.2-70-CL II B SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS ARRANGEMENT OF SIMPLE INDICATORS VID ATES STEREOTYPE -

NO ACTION MIRROR-IMAGED BETWEEN UNITS 1C03-23.2-71-CL III SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS HTR DRAIN PP RECIRC VLV ARRANSEMENT OF VERTICAL METERS

_FCR VIOLATES STERE 0 TYPE - MIRROR-IMAGED BETWEEN UNITS FALL 1986 1C03 72-CL III LABELS USE OF PERIODS IN ABBREVIATION FCR' i

Attcchment C o

e HUMAN ENGINEERING 3 DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING

-as of December 31,'1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigned)

IC03-23.1-73-CL III LEGEND LIGHTS NON-FUNCTIONAL LEGEND LIGHTS ON PANEL-LEGEND ON PAPER RATHER CORRECTED THAN ENGRAVED 2CO3 74-CL II B PROCESS CONTROLLERS SDRING 1988 VALVE POSITION NOT INDICATED ON CONTROLLERS MR 2CO3 75-CL III LABELS POOR CONTRAST BETWEEN LETTERS & BACKGROUND MR' 2C03-32.2-76-CL III THUMB ROTARY SWITCHES FALL 1986 POOR CONTROL NOMENCLATURE LOCATION FCR 2CO3-22.1-77-CL III VERTICAL METERS POOR CONTRAST POINTER COLORING NO ACTION 2C03-22.2-78-CL III HORIZONTAL METERS POOR CONTRAST POINTER COLORING NO ACTION 2CO3-22.1-79-CL II A VERTICAL METERS FALL-1986 POOR DISPLAY POSITIONING / LOCATION FCR 2CO3-22.2-80-CL III HORIZONTAL METERS POOR LABEL PLACEMENT / LOCATION NO ACTION l

2CO3 81-CL II C PROCESS CONTROLLERS FALL 1989 l

NO IDENTIFYING LABELS i

MR f

2CO3-24.1-82-CL III STRIP CHART RECORDER FALL 1986 POOR LABELING MATERIALS & READABILITY FCR 2CO3-24.1-83-CL III STRIP CHART RECORDER SCALING OBSTRUCTS VIEW OF PEN MR 2C03 84-CL III LABELS i

VIOLATION OF LABELING LOCATION REVIEW

Atttchment C Q

' HUMAN ENGINEERING-DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING as of' December 31,.1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigned) 2CO3 85-CL III LABELS FALL 1986 NOMENCLATURE PURPOSELY OBSCURED BY INK FCR 2CO3 86-CL III LABELS POOR LABEL LOCATION / POSITION NO ACTION 2C03 87-CL II B LABELS SPRING 1988 LOOSE NOMENCLATURE AND HANDWRITTEN SCALING MR 2C03 88-CL III LABELS FALL 1986 22 SGFP TURBINE TURNING GEAR AMMETER POOR LABEL SEPARATION FCR DISTANCES 2C83 89-CL III LABELS 22 TURN GEAR AMMETER A TYPICAL SCALAR UNIT MEASUREMENT USED MR 2CO3 90-CL III LABELS NO FUNCTIONAL LABEL FOR TROUBLE LIGHT MR 2C83 91-CL III LABELS SGFP TROUBLE LIGHT NO LABELING OF INDIVIDUAL CIRCUITS CORRECTED IC03 92-CL III LABELS FALL 1985 EXTENSIVE USE OF DYMO TAPE AND PRESSURE OF UNFASTENED LAEELS FCR 1C83 93-CL III LABELS FALL 1986 LABELING INK SMEARS FCR 1C83 94-CL III LABELS POOR LABEL LOCATION / POSITIONING NO ACTION 1C83 95-CL III LABELS INCONSISTENT LABEL LETTERING-LABEL PLATE COLORING NO ACTION 2C93 96-CL III LABELS FALL 1986 LOCATION OF LABELS DOES NOT MINIMIZE WEAR AND OBSCUREMENT FCR t

Attecnment C O'

HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING as of December 31,+1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigned) 1C81-32.5-97-CL III J-HANDLES LACK OF SHAPE CODING FOR J-HANDLE ROTARY SWITCHES NO ACTIGN IC81-32.5-98-CL -III J-HANDLES VIOLATION OF CONTROL DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT CONVENTIONS

~ CORRECTED 21 GENERATOR VOLT REGULATOR 2C81-23.2-99-CL III SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS FALL 1986 NON-FUNCTIONAL DISPLAYS OCCUPY PRIMARY VISUAL SPACE FCR WAUGH CHAPEL LINE 1C81-22.3-188-CL III CIRCULAR METERS INCONSISTENT ARRANGEMENT OF DISPLAYS CORRECTED 2C81-32.5-181-CL III J-HANDLES INCONSISTENT LOCATION OF SIMILAR CONTROLS NO ACTION 11 AND 21 GENERATOR 2C81-32.7-182-CL III STAR-HANDLES FALL 1985 POOR CONTROL / DISPLAY ARRANGEMENT OR LOCATION FCR SYNCHROSCOPE AND 588 KV BUS SELECTORS 1C81-32 -183-CL III DISCRETE ROTARY SWITCHES EXCESSIVE CONTROL DISTANCE FROM OPERATOR

-NO ACTION 1C81-32.5-184-CL III J-HANDLES DISPLAY OBSCURED FROM VIEW BY CONTROL NO ACTION FALL 1986 1C81-32.5-185-CL III J-HANDLES

[-

USE OF TAPE LABELS & POOR LABEL LOCATION FCR 1C81-32.7-186-CL III STAR-HANDLES CONTROL POSITION LABELING NOT VISIBLE

~

NO ACTION STAR HANDLE SWITCH FALL 1986 1C81-11 -187-CL III LABELS GROUP LABEL LOCATED BELOW DISPLAYS FCR 21 GENERATOR AMPS 1C81-22.3-188-Cs-III CIRCULAR METERS POINTER OBSCURES SCALE NUMERALS NO ACTION t

l L.

Attrenment C f

HUMAN-ENGINEERING, DISCREPANCY" REPORT LISTING as-of December 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Scheoule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigr,ec) 1C01-36 -109-CL III PUSHBUTTONS FALL 1986 NO FUNCTIONAL LABELING OF CONTROLS FCR WAUGH CHAPEL DISCONNECT 1C01-23.2-110-CL III SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS FALL 1986 POOR LABELING OF DISPLAYS FCR SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS 1C01-26 -111-CL III MIMICS FALL 1986 MIMIC LINE TERMINAL NOT LABELED FCR RED MIMIC LINES 1C05-28 -112-CL II C DIGITAL-TYPE DISDLAYS NOT LABELED ACCORDING TO FUNCTION NO ACTION 1C05-11 -113-CL III LABELS CONFUSING MEANING OF ABBREVIATION NO ACTION 1C05-11 -114-CL III LABELS FALL 1986 DYMO TAPE USED FOR FUNCTIONAL LABLES FCR 1C05-11 -115-CL II B LABELS FALL 1986 LABELING / CONTRAST NOT VISIBLE DURING NORMAL OPERATION FCR 1C85-22.1-116-CL II C VERTICAL METERS MANJFACTURER'S LABEL ON VERTICAL DISPLAYS NO ACTION 1C85-11 -117-CL III LABELS FALL 1986 LABELING ON HINGED DOOR NOT VISIBLE WHEN DOOR OPENED l

FCR 1C85-24 -118-CL III TREND RECORDERS PARALLAX NO ACTION 1C05-24 -119-CL III TREND RECORDERS RECORDER PEN-LINE CONTRAST BELOW 50% MINIMUM NO ACTION 2C05-32.2-128-CL III THUMB ROTARY SWITCHES FRLL 1986 INCONSISTENT LABELING OF CONTROL FCR b

Attcchment C f'

e HUMAN 1 ENGINEERING DISCREPANCYsREPORT. LISTING

-as'of December 31, 1984,:for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status ;/Pri.

and Brief Description (if assignec) 1C85-22.1-121-CL II C VERTICAL METERS FALL 1986 LACK OF FUNCTIONAL LABELS FOR DISPLAYS

'FCR 1C85-22.1-122-CL.III VERTICAL METERS FALL 1986 INCONSISTENT LABELING OF DISPLAYS FCR 1C85-22.1-123-CL II C VERTICAL METERS IMPROPER PLACEMENT OF DISPLAY LABELS NO ACTION 1C85-22.1-124-CL II C VERTICAL METERS PROPER CODING ON VERTICAL DISPLAYS LACKING NO ACTION-1C85-32.2-125-CL III THUMB ROTARY SWITCHES FALL 1986 USE OF TAPE FOR FUNCTIONAL LABELING OF CONTROLS FCR 1C05-32 -126-CL III DISCRETE ROTARY SWITCHES FALL 1986 INCONSISTENT LABELING OF CONTROLS "FCR 1C85-11 -127-CL III LABELS FALL 1986 LABELS ARE DIRTY FCR 1C85-22.3-128-CL III CIRCULAR METERS WIDTH OF POINTER WIDER THAN MARKS (INDEX)

NO ACTION 1C85-22.1-129-CL' II B VERTICAL METERS LABELING PLACED BELOW DISPLAY RATHER THAN RBOVE NO ACTION 2C85-22.1-138-CL II C VERTICAL METERS CONTROL / DISPLAY ARRANGEMENT NO ACTION 2C05-22.1-131-CL II C VERTICAL METERS DISPLAY ORDER INCONSISTENCY NO ACTION 2C85-28 -132-CL II B DIGITAL-TYPE DISPLAYS DISPLAY REFLECTS CONTROL POSITION RATHER THAN ACTUAL NO ACTION EQUIPMENT

Attcenment C HUMAN ENGINEERING' DISCREPANCY-REPORT LISTING as of December 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number

-Cat.

Affected Component Senedule Status /Pri, and Brief Description (if assigned) 2C05-37

-133-CL-III LEGEND PUSHBUTTONS LIGHTS APPEAR LIT-THEY ARE NOT NO ACTION 1C05-37 -134-CL III LEGEND PUSHBUTTCNS NOT DESIGNED TO PREVENT INADVERTENT INTERCHANGE RESOLVED 1C05-23.1-135-CL II C LEGEND LIGHTS NO TEST FUNCTION NO ACTION 1C05-22.3-136-CL III CIRCULAR METERS METERS PLACED TOO HIGH NO ACTION IC05-37 -137-CL III LEGEND PUSHBUTTONS NON-FUNCTIDNAL CONTROLS IN PRIMARY PANEL SPACE MR 1C05-25 -138-CL II B COUNTERS PDOR CONTROL / DISPLAY FUNCTIONING NO ACTION 2C05-24 -139-CL III TREND RECORDERS PARALLAX FROM POINTER-SCALE SEPARATION NO ACTION 2C05-24 -140-CL III TREND RECORDERS LUMINANCE CONTRAST BELOW 50% MINIMUM NO ACTION 1C05-37 -141-CL III LEGEND PUSHBUTTONS LEGEND PLATES ARE INTERCHANGEABLE MR

-2C05-35 -142-CL II C' LEVERS, JOYSTICKS EXCESSIVE TIME DELAY BETWEEN CONTROL OPERATION & FEEDBACK NO ACTION 2C85-23.1-143-CL II C LEGEND LIGHTS LACK OF LIGHT TEST FUNCTION NO ACTION 2C85-23.1-144-CL II A LEGEND LIGHTS FALL 1986 INADEQUATE LETTER SIZE ON DISPLAY MR

Je N

Attcchment C

'HUMANzENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT. LISTING

-as of December 31,z1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 l

File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule l

Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigned) 1C05-23.1-145-CL II B LEGEND LIGHTS POOR LIGHT BULB REMOVAL DESIGN NO ACTION 2C85-25 -146-CL II C COUNTERS FAILURE OF DEVIATION CONTROL COUNTER EFFECTS ASSOCIATED NO ACTION DISPLAY 1C85'-25 -147-CL III COUNTERS INCORRECT CONTROL / DISPLAY RELATIVE POSITIONING NO ACTION 2C85-25 -148-CL II C COUNTERS POOR DISPLAY READABILITY / VISIBILITY NO ACTION 2C85-24 -149-CL III TREND RECORDERS LACK OF FUNCTIONAL LABEL & POOR CONTRAST OF LABEL CORRECTED 2C85-22.1-158-CL II C VERTICAL METERS CONTROL / DISPLAY ASSOCIATION NO ACTION 1C04-25 -151-CL II B COUNTERS LACK OF INTERIOR LIGHTING FOR DISPLAY - POOR READABILITY /

CORRECTED LIGHTING 1C04-32 -152-CL DISCRETE ROTARY SWITCHES POOR POSITION INDICATORS ON CONTROLS CORRECTED 1C84-24 -153-CL III TREND RECORDERS INADEQUATE AND NON-ADJUSTABLE LUMINANCE NO ACTION

-1C84-28 -153-CL III DIGITAL-TYPE DISPLAYS GLARE DUE TO IMPROPER ANGLE OF DISPLAYS NO ACTION 1C84-24 -154-CL I!!

TREND RECORDERS FALL 1986 IMPROPER PLACEMENT OF NUMERALS AND MARKS ON SCALE MAKING FCR READING DIFFICULT - POINTERS DBSCURE NUMBERS ON SCALES 1C84-36 -155-CL PUSHBUTTONS NO FUNCTIONAL LABELING OF CONTROLS CORRECTED

Attcenment C

-HUMAN-ENGINEERING: DISCREPANCY REPORT: LISTING

.as.of1 December.31,,1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.-

and Brief Description (if assigned) 1C04-36 -156-CL PUSHBUTTONS POOR SEPARATION DISTANCES OF CONTROLS CORRECTED 1C84-36 -157-CL PUSHBUTTONS POOR CONTROL LOCATION CORRECTEE 1C04-36 -158-CL PUSHBUTTONS UNCONVENTIONAL SEQUENCE OF CONTROLS ON SAME PANEL

' CORRECTED 1C84-36 -159-CL PUSHBUTTONS ABSENCE OF FUNCTIONAL LABELS FOR CONTROLS

-CORRECTED 1C04-36 -168-CL III PUSHBUTTONS POOR LABELING LOCATION OF CONTROLS CORRECTED 1C02-32.5-161-CL III J-HANDLES POOR CONTROL / DISPLAY ARRANGEMENT, INCONSISTENT SEQUENTIAL

'FCR ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN CONTROLS / DISPLAYS 2C82-32.7-162-CL III STAR-HANDLES INCONSISTENT USE OF CONTROL-NO ACTION TURNING SEAR 1C82-32.5-163-CL III J-HANDLES LABELING OBSCURED BY EQUIPMENT.

NO ACTION 1C82-32.5-164-CL III J-HANDLES UNCLEAR CONTROL / DISPLAY RELATIONSHIPS NO ACTION 1C42-33 -165-CL-III CONTINUOUS ROTARY SWITCHES SCALE DIFFICULT TO READ NO ACTION 1C02-32.4-166-CL III SELECTOR SWITCHES POOR CONTROL LOCATION NO ACTION EXCESSIVE REACH 1CS2-32.4-167-CL III SELECTOR SW!TCHES EXCESS SWITCH POSITIONS NO ACTION t

A A

.,.c,,-

-,nm--w mw-------wm

Attechment C 9

s

' HUMAN

• ENGINEERING + DISCREPANCY-REPORT LISTIhG es of December:31, 1984,'for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Senedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (1f assigned) 1C82-32.4-168-CL III SELECTOR SWITCHES FALL 1986 NO LABELING INDICATING FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP FCR VIBRATION PHASE' METER 1C82-32.4-169-CL III SELECTOR SWITCHE3

=!-

POOR CONTROL / DISPLAY ARRANGEMENT NO ACTION 2

1CS2-22.2-179-CL III HORIZONTAL METERS INCONSISTENT NUMERICAL PROGRESSION BETWEEN CONTROL AND

+

FCR DISPLAY -RPM 1C82-22.2-171-CL III HORIZONTAL METERS INCONSISTENT SCALAR NUMERICAL PROGRESSION i

NO ACTION i

1C82-22.2-172-CL III HORIZONTAL METERS POINTERS PAINTED DIFFERENT COLOR THAN INDEXES I

NO ACTION HORIZONTAL METERS 1C82-22.1-173-CL III VERTICAL METERS USE OF VERTICAL LABELS FCR VARIOUS METERS f

1C48-22.1-175-CL III VERTICAL METERS POOR DISPLAY ARRANGEMENT j

CORRECTED GEN. H2 SYS, PURITY, PRESS, AND TEMP, GLAND SEAL PRESS INDIC z1CS2-22.1-177-CL III VERTICAL METERS INCONSISTENT PARAMETERS USED FOR IDENTICAL MEASUREMENTS FCR GEN H2 SYS TEMP 1C02-22.1-178-CL III VERTICAL METERS LACK OF READILY AVAILABLE INFORMATION MR VERTICAL METERS 1CO2-22.2-179-CL !!!

HORIZONTAL RETERS NO FUNCTIONAL LABELING NO ACTION AMMETER 1CS2-22.1-180-CL !! B VERTICAL METERS SPRINS 1948 POINTER NOT PAINTED SAME COLOR AS INDEX FCR STEAM VALVES

.1C02-34 -181-CL III TOOSLE SWITCHES POOR LUMINANCE CONTRAST BETWEEN CONTROL AND BACKGROUND NO ACTION

Attcenment C e

HUMAN ENGINEERIhG DISCREPANCYsREPORT. LISTING as of December 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigned)

IC02-23.1-182-CL III LEGEND LIGHTS POOR LUMINANCE CONTRAST NO ACTION 1C02-23.1-183-CL III LEGEND LIGHTS DISPLAY COVERS INTERCHANGEABLE RESOLVED 1CS2-23.1-184-CL III LEGEND LIGHTS POOR DISTINGUISHABILITY BETWEEN DISPLAY TYPES NO ACTION 1C82-22.3-185-CL III CIRCULAR METERS 900R DISPLAY READABILITY DUE TO GLARE NO ACTION 1C02-24 -186-CL III TREND RECORDERS FALL 1986 NO FUNCTIONAL LABELING FCR 1C02-24 -187-CL III TREND RECORDERS INK SMEARS ON GRAPH PAPER RESOLVED 1C82-24 -188-CL III TREND RECORDERS INITIAL MARdINGS NOT DISCERNABLE FCR TREND RECORDER 1C82-24 -189-CL III TREND RECORDERS POOR COLOR CONTRAST BETWEEN GRAPH LINES & RECORDING NO ACTION 2C82-32.1-190-CL III MICR0 SWITCHES MICROSWITCH OPERATION, CAUSES MUSCULAR STRAIN NO ACTION 2CS2-32.1-191-CL II C MICR0 SWITCHES FALL 1989 ILLEGIBLE POSITION LABELING FCR 2CO2-32.d-192-CL III SELECTOR SWITCHES FALL 1986 NO FUNCTIONAL LABELING FCR ROTARY SELECTOR SWITCH 2082-32.4-193-CL !!!

SELECTOR SWITCHES FRLL 1986 USE OF HANDWRITTEN LABELING FCR REHEATER CONTROL SYSTEM x

'f Attcchment C

~ *

'H'JMAN. ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING

,as of December 31, 1984,'for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2

. File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigned) 2C02-32.4-193-CL III SELECTOR SWITCHES FALL 1986 CONTROL HAS FIXED POINT, MOVING SCALE FCR 2C02-22.1-194-CL III VERTICAL METERS INCONSISTENT SCALE INDEXING NO ACTION 2C02-22.1-195-CL III VERTICAL METERS NO CODING OF OPERATING RANGES NO ACTION VERTICAL METERS 2C82-22.1-196-CL III VERTICAL METERS POOR ARRANGEMENT OF DISPLAYS NO ACTION VERTICAL METERS 2C82-22.1-197-CL III VERTICAL METERS LABEL LOCATION VIOLATES CONVENTION NO ACTION 2C02-22.1-198-CL III VERTICAL METERS VERTICAL ORIENTATION OF PARAMETER LABELING NO ACTION 2C82-22.1-199-CL III VERTICAL METERS WIDTH 0: POINTER EXCEEDS INDEX MARKS NO ACTION 2C82-22.1-200-CL III VERTICAL METERS INCONSISTENT METER SCALING NO ACTION 2C82-22.1-201-CL III VERTICAL METERS SCALE INDICES TOO PRECISE NO ACTION 2C02-22.1-202-CL III VERTICAL METERS CONTROL / DISPLAY FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP UNCLEAR RESOLVED 2C92-22.3-203-CL III CIRCULAR METERS UNCALIBRATED METER MR MESAWATTS LOAD 2C82-32.1-284-CL III MICR0 SWITCHES POOR LABEL LOCATION CORRECTED

Attcenment C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTIN3 as<of December 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule j

Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigned) 2C02-25

-205-CL-III COUNTERS POOR LABEL LOCATION NO ACTION 2C02-11

-206-CL III LABELS LABEL NOT SECURELY FIXED TO PANEL NO ACTION 2002-37 -207-CL III LEGEND PUSHBUTTONS EXCESSIVE USE OF COLOR AND NON-UNIFORMITY OF BRIGHTNESS NO ACTION 2C02-22.3-208-CL III CIRCULAR METERS AMBIGUOUS POSITION LABELING ON SCALE NO ACTION PHASE ANGLE METERS 2C02-23.1-209-CL III LEGEND LIGHTS POOR LABEL POSITION NO ACTION LEGEND LIGHTS 2C02-23.1-210-CL III LEGEND LIGHTS CONFLICTING INDICATIONS APPEAR SIMULTANEOUSLY NO ACTION 2C02-23.2-211-CL III SIMPLE. INDICATOR LIGHTS FALL 1986 P00R CONTROL / DISPLAY ARRANGEMENT FCR 2C02-28 -212-CL III DIGITAL-TYPE DISPLAYS NON-UNIFORM LUMINANCE OF DISPLAY CORRECTED 2C02-28 -212-CL III DIGITAL-TYPE DISPLAYS NO FUNCTIONAL LABELING r

NO ACTION 2C06-32.3-213-CL II C KEY-OPERATED SWITCHES FALL 1986 CONTROL / DISPLAY ARRANGEMENT NOT COLOCATED FCR 2C96-11 -214-CL LABELS NO POSITION INDICATION CORRECTED 2C06-11 -215-CL II A LRBELS FALL 1986 CONTROLS HAVE NO LABEL FCR

Attcenment C

' HUMAN ENGINEERING' DISCREPANCY REPORT. LISTING

-as of December 31,-1984, for CA'1ERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2

?

File NumDer Cat..

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigned) 2C06-11

-216-CL III LABELS FALL 1986 LABEL NOT CLOSE TO COMPONENT BEING IDENTIFIED FCR

'2C66-11 -217-CL III LABELS FALL 1986 NO FUNCTIONALLY GROUPED LABELS FCR 2C96-11 -218-CL II A LABELS COMPONENTS ARE UNLABELED CORRECTED 2C06-11 -219-CL III LABELS PAPER LABELS USED FOR FUNCTIONAL LABELS CORRECTED-2C96-11 -229-CL III LABELS FALL 1986 INCOMPLETE LABELING FCR 2Ce6-32.5-221-CL -III J-HANDLES FALL 1986 NON-VISIBLE POSITION LABELS FCR 2C86-32.6-222-CL III T-HANDLES FALL 1986 NON-VISIBLE POSITION LABELS FCR 2C86-32.3-223-CL II C KEY-OPERATED SWITCHES INCONSISTENT POSITION LABELING CORRECTED 2C06-11 -224-CL III LABELS FALL 1989 LABELING CONVENTION MR FALL 1989 2C06-32.5-225-CL III J-HANDLES INCONSISTENT LABELING MR FALL 1986 2C07-11 -226-CL III LABELS NO LABELING FCR FALL 1986 1C96-32.5-227-CL III -J-HANDLES INCORRECT POSITION LABELING FCR

1 Attcenment C HUMAN ENGINEERIhG DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING as of December 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NLCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Prl.

and Brief Description (if assignec) 1C26-32.5-228-CL III J-HANDLES CONTROLS & DISPLAYS ARE NOT COLOCATED NO ACTION 2C06-32.5-229-CL III J-HANDLES CONTROL / DISPLAY ARRANGdMENT NO ACTION 1C87-32.7-230-CL II C STAR-HANDLES FALL 1986 INCOMPLETE FUNCTION LABEL FCR 2C07-32.7-231-CL II C STAR-HANDLES FALL 1986 INCOMPLETE FUNCTION LABEL FCR 1C07-32.1-232-CL MICR0 SWITCHES CONFUSION A.c TO WHAT POSITION THE CONTROL IS IN CORRECTED 1C87-32.1-233-CL

.MICR0 SWITCHES CONFUSION AS TO THE CORRECT CONTROL POSITION CORRECTED 1C86-32.3-234-CL II C KEY-OPERATED SWITCHES FALL 1986 UNLABELED CONTROLS FCR 1C87-32.6-235-CL II C T-HANDLES FALL 1986 PROBLEMS IN LABEL READABILITY FCR 1C96-32.2-236-CL II C THUMB ROTARY SWITCHES FALL 1989 VIOLATION IN CLOSE/0 PEN CONVENTION FCR PORV, PORV ISOL VLV, RCP BLEED-OFF 1 CSS-11 -237-CL II C LABELS FALL 1986 INCONSISTENT LABEL TEXT FCR 1C86-22.1-238-CL III VERTICAL METERS FALL 1986 NO LABELING OF DISPLAYS FCR 1C86-22.1-239-CL II C VERTICAL METERS NO LABELING OF CONTROLS CORRECTED

l AttCchment C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING as of December.31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2

-File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description

-(if assignec) 1C86-11

-248-CL II C LABELS FALL 1986 NOT LABELED ACCORDING TO FUNCTION x

FCR

1C86-11 -241-CL III LABELS FA.L 1986 LABELS LOCATED ADJACENT TO ONE ANOTHER FCR 1C86-11 -242-CL II C LABELS FALL 1986 LABELS ARE DIRTY - MINIMIZE READABILITY FCR 1C86-11 -243-CL II C LABELS FALL 1986 FUNCTIONALLY GROUPED CONTROLS NOT LABELED FCR

1C87-26 -244-CL III MIMICS FALL 1986 MIMIC UNATTACHED & PARTS ARE MISSING FCR 1C87-26 -245-CL III MIMICS FALL 1986 DYMO TAPE USED IN MIMIC FCR

-1C87-26 -246-CL III MIMICS FLOW DIRECTIONS NOT INDICATED AT BRANCHES NO ACTION 2C87-26 -247-CL II C MIMICS FALL 1986 INCOMPLETE MIMIC-FCR

[

2C87-26 -248-CL II C MIMICS CLOSE ASSOCIATION OF DIFFERENT SYSTEMS NO ACTION FALL 1986 2C87-26 -249-CL II C MIMICS HORIZONTAL POSITIONING OF LABELS 4

FCR 2C87-26 -258-CL III-MIMICS LACK OF FLOW DIRECTION FOR MIMIC LINES l

NO ACTION FALL 1986 I

1C07-25 -251-CL III COUNTERS IMPROPER TYPE OF COUNTER FOR FUNCTION AND PURPOSE FCR i

ob e

Attcenment C 4

SuMAN ENGINEERING 4 DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING Y

as of.Decenser.31, 1984, -for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Numoer Cat.

Affectec Component Senedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assignec) 4 1C07-25 -252-CL III COUNTERS FALL 1986 ND LABELS FOR CONTROL l,

FCR ICC7-25 -253-CL III COUNTERS ASSOCIATED DISPLAY / CONTROL DOES NOT ADPEAR BELOW NO ACTION 2

' IC07-25 -254-CL III COUNTERS DIGITS ARE NOT ADEQUATELY SiPARATED NO ACTION 2C87-25 -255-CL III COUNTERS MORE THAN ONE DIGIT ADPEARS IN WINDOW NO ACTION I

4 t

CC86-36 -256-CL III PUSHBUTTONS ARRAYS NOT IN PROPER SEQUENCE 7

NO ACTION 1C86-24 -257-CL III TREND RECORDERS TRACING PENS ARE B.UE NO ACTION I

1 2 -24

-258-CL III TREND RECORDERS POINTER NOT MOUNTED CLO6E TO SCALE NO ACTION 1C07-31 -259-CL III PROCESS CONTROLLERS VIOLATION OF CONTROL MOVEMENT RESPON6E t

NO ACTION 2C46-31' -260-CL !!!

PROCESS CONTROLLERS FALL 1986 INADEOUATE LADELING FCR I

1C07-31 -861-CL !!!

PROCESS CONTROLLERS INFORMATION NOT PROVIDED IN A DIRECTLY USADLE FORM NO ACTION 1C06-31 -262-CL II C PROCESS CONTR0d.ERS POOR CONTRAST WITH SCALE AND INDEX MARMS NO ACTION 1C97-31 -863-CL III PROCESS CONTROLLERS UNLABEL DIRECTION OF ACTIVITATION NO ACTION i-f f

i o

Attcenment'C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY-REPORT LISTIhG

-as of Decemoer 31, 1944, for CALVERT CLIFFS NGCLEAR P0wER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 l

File Nummer Cat.

Affectec Component Senecule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assignec) 1C86-22.1-264-CL II C VERTICAL METERS NO CODING TO INDICATE OPERAT!hG RANGE NO ACTION A

1C06-22.1-265-CL II C VERTICAL METERS FALL 1989 j;

SRADUATION MARKS ARE EXTREMELY SMALL 1

MR 1C06-22.1-266-CL -II C VERTICAL METERS FALL 1989 j

NUMERALS PLACED ON SAME S!!)E AS POINTER 4

MR 1C96-22.1-267-CL' II B VERTICAL METER POINTER DOES NOT EXTEND TO INDEX MARKS MR I

1C87-22.1-264-CL II B VERTICAL METERS S& RING 1988 LADDERS REGUIRED FOR READING SCAwES

[

FCR 1C86-22.2-269-CL III HORIZONTAL METERS FALL 1986 CONFUSION IN CONTROL / DISPLAY INTEGRATION FCR 2C07-22.1-279-CL VERTICAL METERS SEQUENTIAL GROUP!h6/ ORDER NO ACTION i

1C07-83.1-871-CL !!!

LEGEND LIGHTS 1

INADVERTENT INTERCHANGE OF LEGEND COVERS MVIEW 1C06-11 -272-CL !!!

LABELS FALL 1986 INADEGUATE STROKE WIDTH OF LETTERING ON LADELS FCR 1C06-11 -273-CL !! C LABELS FALL 1946 MAGNETIC LADELS EASILY REMOVED / MISPLACED FCR

. 2C07-26 -274-CL !!!

MIMICS FALL 1906 DYMO FCR 1C07-83.2-875-CL !!!

S!MPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS NO IM0! CATION OF WHAT IN0!CATOR L10H18 MEAN MR

t e

A:ttenment C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING as of December 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File humber Cat.

Affected Component Schecule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assignec) 1C06-23.2-276-CL III SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS FALL 1966 INDICATOR LIGHTS ARE NEEDED FCR 1C06-24 -277-CL III TREND RECORDERS FA L 1956 TRACING PEN UNLABELED FCR 1C00-32 -278-GE II C DISCRETE ROTARY SWITCHES FALL 1989 VIEW OF POSITION LABELING OBSTRUCTED BY HANDLE REVIEW 1C00-24 -279-GE II C TREND RECORDERS FALL 1986 POOR LABELING CONTRAST OF TREND RECORDERS FCR 1C00-31 -280-GE II C PROCESS CONTROLLERS POOR PROCESS CONTROLLER POINTER / SCALE DESIGN NO ACTION 1C00-22.1-281-GE !! C VERTICAL METER 5 USE 0* SIGMA MANUCACTURER'S LABEL ON DISPLAY NO ACTION 1C02-32 -282-GE II A DISCRETE ROTARY SWITCHES FA.L 1985 NO INDICATION OF SWITCH PULL-TO LOCK POSITION REVIEW 1C00-32.1-283-GE II C MICR0 SWITCHES FAwL 1989 POOR CMC DESIGN FCR IC00-22.1-284-GE !! A VERTICAL METERS POOR POINTER DESIGN OF VERTICA. METERS NO ACTION FALL 1986 1C00-11 -285-GE II C LABELS VARIOUS LABELING PROBLEMS FCR 1C00-32.5-286-GE II C J-HANDLES J-HANDLE DOES NOT CONFORM TO THE REQUIRED DIMENSIONS NO ACTION FALL 1986 1C17-32.5-287-CL !!!

J-HANDLES LABELS-READABILITY FCR

t A:tcenment C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING as of: December 31, 1964, ' f or CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File humoer Cat.

Affected Componen Senecule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description-(if assignec)

IC17-26 -288-CL III MIMICS LACK OF FLOW DIRECTION NO CTION 1C17-32.3-269-CL II C KEY-CDERATED SWITCHES POSITION INDICATORS FOR CONTROLS NO CTION 1C17-22.2-290-CL FORIZOATAL METERS VISUAL DISPLAYS-DIR/ RATE FOR MOTION CORRECTED 1C17-32.5-292-C.. III J-HAND.ES ORIENTATION OF INFORMATION NO ACTION 1C18-32.2-293-CL III THUMB ROTARY SWITCHES FALL 19M POSITION INDICATORS FOR CONTROLS FCR 1017-22.2-294-CL II B HORIZONTAL METERS SPRING 1988 VISUAL DISPLAYS-CODING REVIEW 1C17-22.2-295-CL II C HORIZONTAL METERS FALL 19M-VISUAL DISPLAYS - LABELIhG FCR 1C17-22. 2-2%-CL III HORIZONTAL METERS VISUAL DISPLAYS - READABILITY NO ACTION 1C17-22.2-297-CL II C HORIZONTAL METERS VISUAL DISPLAYS - LOCATION NO ACTION 1C17-26 -294-CL III MIMICS CONTROLS NOT CONNECTED WITH MIMIC NO RCTION 1C17-36 -299-CL PUSH 3UTTONS CONTROL OBSTRUCTS VIEW OF LABEL RESOLVED.

1C17-23.2-300-CL !!!

SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS FALL 1946 NOT LASELED ACCORDIh8 TO FUNCTION FCR

.t Attrenment C HUMAN-ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING

.as of-Decomser 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Senecule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assignec) 1C17-26 -301-CL II C MIMICS FALL 1986

. MIMIC MISSIMG FCR 1C17-11 -302-CL II C LABELS FA.L 1986 ABBREVIATIONS USED ARE INCONSISTENT FCR 1C18-32.5-303-CL J-HANDLES IMPROPER ORIENTATION O.2 CONTROL LABELS CORRECTED 1C18-11 -304-CL II C LABELS FA.L 1989 POOR ARRANGEMENT OF FUNCTIONALLY SIMILAR CONTROLS FCR 1C19-11 -305-CL LABELS PROBLEMS WITH LABELS CLOSE TO EACH OTHER CORRECTED 1C16-11 -306-CL III LABELS FALL 1986 LABELS CLOSE TOGETHER FCR 1C17-11 -307-CL II C LABELS FALL 1986 LABELS NOT FIRMLY ATTACHED FCR 1C17-11 -308-CL II C LABELS FALL 1986 PERIODS USED IN ABBREVIATIONS FCR 1C17-36 -309-CL III PUSHBUTTONS LACK OF FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ASSOCIATED CONTROLS CORRECTED AND DISPLAYS 1C18-32.2-310-CL !!!

THUMB ROTARY SWITCHES LACK OF FUNCTIONAL LABEL NO ACTION 1C17-32.2-311-CL THUMB ROTARY SWITCHES V10LATION OF CONVENTION FOR CONTROL POSITIONS CORRECTED 1C17-32.5-312-CL I!!

J-HANDLES FALL 1986 INCOMPLETE FUNCTIONAL LABEL FOR CONTROL FCR

Attienment C

~ HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTIN3

.as of Decencer 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Senecule File Nummer

. Cat.

Affected Component Status /Pri.

anc Brief Description (if assignec)

FA L 1966 IC16-32.4-313-CL II C SELECTOR SWITCHES

-IMPROPER PLACEMENT OF CONTROL LABEL FCR 1C17-11

-314-CL III LABELS DISPLAY NOT LABELED COMPLETELY ACCORDING TO FUNCTION NO ACTION IC17-11 -315-CL LRBELS OBSCURED LABELS CORRECTED

'1C17-22.E-316-CL II C HORIZONTAL METERS VISUAL DISPLAYS-LOCATION NO ACTION IC17-22.2-317-CL III HORIZONTAL METERS VISUAL DISPLAYS-IDENT/ CODING NO ACTION 1C19-22.3-316-CL III CIRCULAR METERS CONTROLS / DISPLAYS NOT LABELED TO INDICATE RELATIONSHIP NO ACTION FALL 1986 1C17-11 -319-CL II A LABELS WARNING LABELS - UNCLEAR FCR FALL 1986 1C18-32.4-320-CL II C SELECTOR SWITCHES INCONSISTENT FONT STYLE FOR LETTERS FCR c

1C19-22.3-321-CL II C CIRCULAR METERS CONTROL / DISPLAY NOT ON SAME PANEL NO ACTION FALL 1986 AC17-11

-322-CL II C LABELS IDENTICAL LABELING FCR 1C17-11 -323-CL II C LABELS SIMILAR LABELING NO ACTION 1C17-11 -324-CL II C LABELS SIMILAR LABELING NO ACTION

6 Attecnment C

' HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPAaCY REPORT LISTING as of December 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 8 2 7,

'l File NumDer Cat.

Affected Component Senecule Status /Prz.

and Brief Descriptiom (if assigneo) 1C28-31 -325-CL III PROCESS CONTROLLERS GLARE NO ACTION 1C09-36 -326-CL III PUSHBUTTONS PUSHBUTTONS ABOVE MAXIMUM 57" ABOVE STANDING SURFACE NO ACTION

.1C09-26 -327-CL II C MIMICS FALL 1986 POOR MIMIC DESIGN FCR 1C09-22.1-326-CL II A VERTICAL METERS FALL 1986 METERS LOCATED TOO HIGH DN PANELS FCR 1~05-11

-329-CL III LABELS FA.L 1986 CONFUSING LABELING FCR 1C09-23.2-330-CL II A SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS FALL 1986 DISPLAYED INFORMATION CAN'-BE MISINTERPRETED: POOR INDICATOR FCR LIGHT PLRCEMENT 1C09-32.2-331-CL III THUMB ROTARY SWITCHES A'

POOR CONTR3L/ DISPLAY ARRANGEMENT NO ACTION 1Cis-26 -332-CL III MIMICS EXTENSIVE VIEWING AREA 0F MIMIC NO ACTION 1C08-26 -333-CL III MIMICS FALL 1986 EXCESS AMOUNT OF COLOR CODING IN MIMIC LINES FCR i1C00-22 -334-GE II A METERS FALL 1986 CIRCUIT FAILURES FREQUENTLY NOT A; PARENT 1

FALL 1986-1C09-11 -335 CL II C LABELS VERTICALLY ORIENTED LABELING FCR

's 1C08-22. '1-336-CL II C VERTICAL METERS GRADUATION MARK SPACING BELOW MINIMUM REQUIREMENT NO ACTION q}

i

Attcenmen C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING

-as of December 31,.1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assignec) 1C10-40 -337-CL PROCEDURES, GENERAL POOR DOCUMENT LOCATION RESOLVED FALL 1986 1C08-11 -338-CL III LABELS INCONSISTENT LABELING FOR IDENTICAL WORDS FCR 1C09-23.2-339-CL III SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS VIOLATION OF LABEL ORIENTATION CONVENTIONS NO ACTION

'1C08-23.2-340-C.

III SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS VIOLATION OF LABEL LOCATION CONVENTIONS NO ACTION 2C10-32.3-341-CL II C KEY-OPERATED SWITCHES FA.L 1986 LACK OF UNIFORM LABELING FOR SAME CONTROL ON UNITS 1 & 2 FCR FALL 1986 1C08-32.5-342-CL II C J-HANDLES NO POINTERS OR REFERENCE LINES ON J-HANDLES FCR FALL 1989 1C10-32.5-343-CL II C J-HANDLES DIFFERENCE IN J-HANDLE DESIGNS OF THE SAME FUNCTION FCR ICOB-23.2-344-CL III SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS VIOLATION OF INDICATOR LIGHT LOCATION CONVENTIONS NO ACTIGN 2C09-23.2-345-CL III SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS POOR DESIGN AND LOCATION OF CONTROL / DISPLAY RELATIONSHIP NO ACTION 1C09-23.2-346-C' II C SIMPLE' INDICATOR LIGHTS FALL 1966 POOR LABELING LOCATION ON SISMA METERS FCR 1C88-11 -347-CL II C LABELS FALL 1986.

LABELING SUSCEPTIBLE TO OBSCUREMENT FCR 1C09-32.1-348-CL III MICR0 SWITCHES VIOLATION OF CALVERT CLIFFS ABBREVIATION CONVENTION NO ACTION

Attcenment C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REDORT LISTING as of-Decemser 31, 1584, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schecule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigned) 2C09-32.1-349-CL MICROSWITCHES OBSCUREMENT OF LABELING CORRECTED 1008-32.5-350-GE III J-KANDLES NO FUNCTIONAL LABELING NU ACTION 1C10-32.2-351-CL II C THUMB ROTARY SWITCHES FALL 1986 LABELING IS NOT BRIEF ENDUGH FCR iCle-32.1-351-CL II C TMUMB ROTARY SWITCHES FAuL 1986 LABELING 15 NOT BRIEF ENDUGH FCR IC09-32.1-352-CL III MICRCSWITCHES USAGE OF UNECESSARY PERIOD IN LABELING NO ACTION 1C08-32.3-353-C.

III KEY-OPERATED SWITCHES

. IMPROPER CHARACTER SIZE OF CONTROL POSITION LABELING NO ACTION 2C08-32.1-354-CL II C MICR0 SWITCHES FRLL 1989 LABELING WEARING OFF MR 1C00-11

-355-GE LABELS NC CONTRASTING PIGMENT IN ENGRAVED LABELING RESO.VE IC08-22.1-356-CL II C VERTICAL METERS UNEQUAL SCALAR INTERVALS (NON-LINEAR SCALES)

NO ACTION

.1C10-32.1-357-CL II C MIOR35 WITCHES FALL 1986 LACK OF UNIFORM LABELING FOR SAME CONTROLS DN UNITS 1 & 2 FCR 2C89-32.3-358-CL III KEY-OPERATED SWITCHES FALL 1986 INCORRECT FUNCTIONAL LABEL FCR 1C10-32.3-359-CL II C KEY-OPERATED SWITCHES FALL 1986 VIOLATION OF CLOSE/0 PEN CONVENTION FCR

Attcchment C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING as of Decommer 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Senedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assignec)

IC08-32.3-360-CL III KEY-0DERATED SWITCHES VIOLATION OF LABEL POSITION NO ACTION 1009-32.3-361-CL KEY-DDERATED SWITCHES INCONSISTENT CONTROL / LABEL / INDICATOR ARRANSEMENT RESOLVED 1C09-32.5-362-CL III J-HANDLES VERTICAL ORIENTATION OF POSITION LABELS NO ACTION 1C09-32.3-363-CL III KEY-OPERATED SWITCHES INCONSISTENT LOCATION OF SAME CONTROLS FOR UNITS 1 & 2.

FCR VIOLATION OF CONVENTION FOR ARRANGEMENT 2C10-32.2-364-CL II C THUMB ROTARY SWITCHES FALL 1986 IMPROPER LABELING FCR 1C10-22.1-365-CL VERTICAL METERS INCCSISTENT POINTER POSITIONING DUPLICATE IC08-26 -366-CL III MIMICS FALL 1986 NO FLOW DIRECTIONS INDICATED BY ARROWHEADS FCR 2009-26 -367-CL III MIMICS FALL 1986 PART OF MIMIC LINE IS MISSING FCR 1C08-26 -368-CL III MIMICS FALL 1986 INCONSISTENT COLOR CODING FCR

,1C10-25 -369-CL III COUNTERS MORE THAN ONE DIGIT IN COUNTER WINDOWS AT ONE TIME NO ACTION 1C10-25 -370-CL III COUNTERS IMPROPER FONT WIDTH HEIGHT RATIO AND IMPROPER HORIZONTAL NO ACTICN SEPARATION 1C10-25 -371-CL III COUNTERS GLARE ON HIGH FINISH AREAS SURROUNDING COUNTERS NO ACTION

Attcchment C i

' HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING as of~Decemoer 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schecule Status /Dri.

and Brief Description (if assignec) 1C10-25 -372-CL III COUNTERS REVOLUTION-COUNT RATIO WRONG NO ACTION 2C09-24 -373-CL III TREND RECORDERS FALL 1986 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNITS 1 & 2 FCR 1C09-24 -374-CL III TREND RECORDERS IMPROPER WIDTH: HEIGHT NUMERAL RATIO ON TREND RECORDERS NO ACTION 1C09-24 -375-CL III TREND RECGRDERS RECORDED MATTER IS OBSCURED BY COnLDOWN RATE LINES NO ACTION IC09-36 -376-GE III PUSHBUTTONS NO POSITIVE INDICATION OF PUSHBUTTON ACTUATION NO ACTION 1C09-36 -377-CL II C PUSHBUTTONS FALL 1986 INCONSISTENT GROUPING ORGANIZATION OF DEMARCATION LINES AND FCR NO GROUPING ORGANIZATION BY DEMARCATION LINES 1C08-31

-378-CL II C PROCESS CONTROLLERS FALL 1986 VIOLATIONS IN MIRROR IMAGING 0~ THE TWO UNITS FCR 1C09-22.1-379-GE III VERTICAL METERS P.ETER INDEXINS CBSCURED BY RED BOUNDARY POINTS NO ACTION 1C10-33 -380-CL III CONTINUOUS ROTARY SWITCHES NO DIRECTION OF ACTIVATION LABELINS NO ACTION 2008-11 -381-CL III LABELS FALL 1986 MISLABELING FCR 1C99-22.1-382-CL II C VERTICAL METERS FALL 1986 NO FUNCTIDNAL GROUP LABELING FCR 1C88-32.1-383-CL III MICR0 SWITCHES INCONSISTENT POSITIONING OF LABELING WITH RESPECT TO NO ACTION ASSOCIATED CDNTROLS/ DISPLAYS

Atteenment C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING as oftDecember 31, 1984, for CALVERT. CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assignec) 2C08-32.5-384-CL II C h-HANDLES FALL 1986 LABELING OBSURED BY DYMO TAPE LABELING FCR 2Ce8-32.1-385-CL MICR0 SWITCHES r

DIFFICULT-TO-READ LABELING NO ACTION 1C00-02 --386-CL II B COMMUNICATIONS LACK OF DISTINCTIVE CODING FOR CRITICRL PHONES CORRECTED 1C00-02 -387-CL II B COMMUNICATIONS SPRIND 1988 MESSAGE INTELLIGIBILITY IN PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM REVIEW 1C04-36 -388-CL PUSHBUTTONS LABELING ON NON-FUNCTIONAL CONTROLS NO ACTION 1C04-11

-389-CL III LABELS FALL 1986 REFLECTED GLARE FROM DYMO TAPE LABELING FCR l

1C04-36 -390-CL III PUSHBUTTONS LABELS 02 PUSHBUTTON-KEYS ARE NOT CLEARLY VISIBLE FCR l

1CB4-03 -391-CL III COMPUTER RELATED i

NON-READILY AVAILABLE FILES FROM PRINTERS NO ACTION 1.

11C04-83 -392-CL III COMPUTER RELATED EXCEEDING TIME RESPONSE REQUIREMENTS BY COMPUTER-CRT NO ACTION l

1C04-83 -393-CL III COMPUTER-RELATED I

NO POSITIVE INDICATIDN OF REMAINING SUPPLY OF RECORDING REFERRED MATERIAL 1C99-91 -394-SV III LAYOUT (FURNISHINGS)

LESS THAN REQUIRED MINIMUM TABLE HEIGHT NO ACTION 1C80-91 -395-SV III LAYOUT (FURNISHINGS)

FURNISHINGS OBSTRUCT VIEW OF PANELS NO ACTION

~

l-L

Attcchment C RUMANcENGINEERING DISC"CPANCY' REPORT LISTIN3 as of December 31, 1984,'for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR PDWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigned) 1C00-01 -396-SV III LAYOUT (FURNISHINGS)

NO LABELING IDENTIFYING CONTENTS STORED NO ACTION 1000-01 -337-SV III LAYOUT (FURNISHINGS)

CART WHEELS NOT LOCKED NO ACTION 1C00-05 -398-CL PROTECTIVE / SAFETY EQUIPMENT FALL 1986 NO INDICATION OF PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT LOCATION FCR 1C00-01 -399-CL III LAYOUT (FURNISHINGS)

SHARP EDGES ON CR FURNISHINGS

-NO ACTION 1C15-32.4-400-CL II C SELECTOR SWITCHES POOR CONTROL / DISPLAY LOCATION NG ACTION 1C00-01 -401-CL III LAYOUT (FURNISHINGS)

LACK OF SAFETY FEATURES ON LADDEPS NO ACTION 1C13-22.1-402-CL II C VERTICAL METERS VERTICAL METERS-NUMBER 0 MINOR MARKS BETWEEN MAJOR NJMERALS.

NO ACTION EXCEEDS NINE 1C13-23.1-403-CL III LEGEND LIGHTS INSUFFICIENT INDICATOR ILLUMINATION REVIEW 1C13-32.5-404-CL III J-HANDLES PUMP ARRANGEMENT VIOLATES POPULATION STEREOTYPE NO ACTION 1C13-32.5-405-CL III J-HANDLES CONDENSER VACUUM PUMP /SFP CONTROLS-ARRANGEMENT DOES NOT NO ACTION MEET SEPARATION REQUIREMENTS OF 1.0" BETWEEN ROTARY CONTROLS 1C13-32.5-406-CL J-HANDLES TASS OBSCURE DISPLAYS - PANEL 1C13 RESOLVED 1C13-32.1-487-CL II C MICR0 SWITCHES FALL 1986 LABELING PARTIALLY DBSCURED BY CONTROL KNOB FCR

Attcchm:nt C HUF.AN' ENGINEERING' DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING as of. December 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Numcer Cat.

Affected ComDonent Seneaule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assignec) 1C13-32.1-408-CL II C MICR0 SWITCHES FALL 1986 CONTROLS NOT GROUPED FUNCTIONALLY 1C13 FCR 1C13-22.1-409-CL III VERTICAL METERS DISPLAY SCALES DO NOT START AT ZERO NO ACTION 1C13-22.2-410-CL III HORIZONTAL METERS METERS LOCATED DUTSIDE PREFERRED VISUAL AREA NO ACTION 1C13-22.2-411-CL III HORIZONTAL METERS IMPROPER PRINTER LOCATION NO ACTION 1C13-22.2-412-CL III HORIZONTAL METERS VIOLATION OF LABEL LOCATION CONVENTIONS NO ACTION iC13-22.2-413-CL III HORIZONTAL METERS VIOLATION OF POINTER' COLOR CONVENTIONS NO ACTION 1C13-22.2-414-CL III HORIZONTAL METERS VIOLATION OF LABELING CONVENTIONS NO ACTION 2C13-22.1-415-CL III VERTICAL METERS VERTICAL INDICATORS HIGH-MOUNTED 2C13 NO ACTION 2C13-22.1-416-CL-III VERTICAL METERS VERTICAL LABELING USE ON SCREEN D/P VERTICAL INDICATORS NO ACTION 1C13-22.1-417-CL VERTICAL METERS VERTICAL SCALE DOES NOT INCREASE WITH UPWARD POINTER RESOLVED MOVEMENT 1C13-31 -418-CL II C PROCESS CONTROLLERS FA L 1989' OPERATIONALLY OBSCURED PROCESS CONTROLLERS REVIEW-1C80-31 -419-GE II C PROCESS CONTROLLERS INAPPROPRIATE PROCESS CONTROLLERS-LABELING AND DISPLAY NO ACTION

Attechment C HUMAN ENGINEERING:DISCREPANC) REPORT LISTING

-as of: December 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assignec) 2015-32.4-420-CL III SELECTOR SWITCHES CONTROL NOT CLEARLY LABELED 2C15 NO ACTION 2C15-32.4-421-CL III SELECTOR SWITCHES-LOW MOUNTED CONTROL NO ACTION 2C15-32.4-422-CL II C SELECTOR SWITCHES UNLABELED CONTROLS RESOLVED 2C13-32.5-423-CL II C J-HANDLES FALL 1936 UNCLEAR C/D ASSOCIATION FCP 2C13-32.1-424-CL MICR0 SWITCHES DBSOURED LABEL-EC13 CORRECTED FALL 1986 2C13-32.5-425-CL II C J-HANDLES ASSOCIATED CONTROLS NOT ARRANGED CLEARLY FCR 2C13-32.5-425-CL J-HANDLES DBSCURED LABEL 2C13 RESOLVED 1C00-40

-426-TA. II A PROCEDURES, GENERAL ESTIMATING TIME LAPSE BETWEEN CONTROL ACTIONS RESOLVED FALL 1966-IC80-48 -427-TA II

A. PROCEDURE

S, SENERAL PROCEDURES FAIL TO ADEQUATELY INCORPORATE OPERATOR REFERRED INTERACTION FALL 1986

'1C02-40 -428-TA _II A PROCEDURES, SENERAL CONTROLS AND ASSOCIATED ALARMS ARE LOCATED ON DIFFERENT

-FCR PANELS FALL 1986 2C28-26 -429-EE III MIMICS PENCILED MIMIC USES INCORRECT MIMIC DESIGN FCR 2C82-23.1-438-CL III LEGEND LIGHTS USE OF CONFUSING COLOR COMBINATIONS NO ACTION _

Attcchment C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY : REPORT LISTING

-as of December 31,c1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigneo) 2C02-38 -431-CL III THUMBWHEELS FALL 1986 NO INDICATION OF DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT FCR 1C00-11

-432-GE II C LABELS FALL 1986 CLUTTERED PANEL SURFACE DUE TO AMOUNT AND INCONSISTENCY OF FCR LABELING 2C07-11 -433-CL III LABELS MAGNETIC LABELS INCONSISTENTLY PLACED ON PANEL REFERRED MAY OBSCURE OTHER INFORMATION 1C07-23.1-434-CL III LEGEND LIGHTS FAILURE OF DISPLAY NOT IMMEDIATELY APPARENT NO ACTION IC07-23.2-435-CL III LEGEND LIGHTS FALL 1986 LACK OF LABELING FOR LEGEND LIGHTS FCR 2006-24 -436-CL III TREND RECORDERS INSTRUMENTATION NOT LABELED IN TERMS OF WHAT IS MEASURED CORRECTED

.1C07-25 -437-CL III COUNTERS NO INDICATION OF FAILURE OF DISPLAY NO ACTION 1C06-24 -438-CL III TREND RECORDERS j.

NO INDICATION TREND RECORDER HAS FAILED NO ACTION 1C06-36 -439-CL III PUSHBUTTONS RLL ASSOCIATED DISPLAYS NOT GROUPED TDGETHER l

l NO ACTION IC06-22.1-440-CL II C VERTICAL METERS CALIBRATION INFORMATION INTERFERES WITH LEGIBILITY NO ACTION 1C86-31 --441-CL II C PROCESS CONTROLLERS NUMBERS ON SCALE EXTREMELY SMALL-DIFFICULT TO READ NO ACTION 1C86-31 -442-CL III PROCESS CONTROLLERS SCALE INDICATION IS OFF CENTER WHEN SHOULD BE "ZERDED" l

~NO ACTION L:

Attcenment C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING as of'Dece=ber 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assignec) 1C06-28 -443-CL II C DIGITAL-TYPE DISPLAYS NO LAMP TEST CAPABILITY NO ACTION 1C05-32.2-444-CL II C THUMB ROTARY SWITCHES LACK OF SHAPE CODING NO ACTION 1C07-32. 2-445-CL III THUMB ROTARY SWITCHES INCONSISTENT COLOR CODING NO ACTION 1C07-23.2-446-CL II C SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS FALL 1989 DISPLAY INCONSISTENCY IN MIMIC PATH INDICATOR FCR 1037-32.1-447-CL II A MICR0 SWITCHES FALL 1985 IMPROPER PLACEMENT OF CONTROL POSITIONS FCR 1CC5-11 -448-CL II C LABELS FALL 1956 POOR CONTRAST OF MIMIC LABELING FCR 2C13-32.5-449-CL J-HANDLES WARNING TAGS OBSCURE UNRELATED DISPLAYS CORRECTED 2C13-32.1-453-CL II C MICR0 SWITCHES FALL 1986 LABELS ARE PLACED UNCONVENTIONALLY BENEATH CONTROLS FCR 2C13-32.1-451-CL MICRDSWITCHES EXITING AT COMPUTER-CONTROLLED PASSAGEWAY MAY CAUSE CORRECTED ACCIDENTAL CONTROL ACTIVATION 2C12-E2.1-452-CL VERTICAL METERS USE OF-INAPPROPRIATE LABELING TO DENOTE DISPLAY CORRECTED RELATIONSHIIPS 2C13-22.1-453-CL VERTICAL METERS VERTICAL METER VIOLATES STEREOTYPE INCREASES FROM TOP TO RESOLVED BOTTOM 1C13-22.2-454-CL II C HORIZONTAL METERS FALL 1989 CONTROL / DISPLAY ARRANGEMENT UNAPPARENT FCR

Attcchment C HUMAN ENGINEERIhG DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTIN3

.as-of December 31, 1964, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assignec) 1C13-22.2-455-CL !! C HORIZONTAL METERS FALL 1986 NO LABELS FOR COMPONENTS FCR 1015-22.3-456-CL III CIRCULAR METERS CIRCULAR METER ABOVE MAXIMUM REQUIRED HEIGHT ON PANEL NO ACTION 1C15-22.3-457-CL III CIRCULAR METERS GLARE PRESENT ON METER COVERS NO ACTION 1015-22.3-459-C.

III CIRCULAR METER POINTER OBSCURES THE NUMBERS ON CIRCULAR SCA E NO ACTICN 1C15-22.3-459-CL II C CIRCULAR METERS FALL 1986 CALIBRATION INFORMATION INTERFERES WITH METER LEGIBILITY FCR 1C15-22.2-460-CL III HORIZONTA'_ METERS MANUFACTURER' S NAME APPEARS ON SCALE FACE NO ACTION 1C15-33 -461-CL II C CONTINU0US ROTARY SWITCHES FALL 1989 COVER PROHIBITS PROPER FUNCTIONING AND IDENTIFICATION OF MR CONTROLS 1C15-22.2-462-CL III HORIZONTAL METERS SCALE GRADUATION MARKS PROGRESS BY 3 NO ACTICN 1C15-22.2-463-CL III HORI2ONTAL METERS DISPLAY READING DIFFICULT DUE TO HIGH LOCATION ON PANEL NO ACTION IC15-22.2-464-CL II C HORIZONTAL METERS POINTER OBSCURES SCALE NUMBERS

'NO ACTION 1C15-22.2-465-CL III HORIZONTAL METERS LABEL ON METER FACE-SMALL, DIFFICULT TO READ NO ACTION-1C15-22.2-466-CL III HORIZONTAL METERS SCALES DO NOT START AT ZERO NO ACTION

~

~

~

t Attcchment C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING as of December 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLRNT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schacule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assignec) 1C15-22.2-467-CL III HORIZONTAL METERS LABELS ARE PLACED BELOW DISPLAYS RATHER THAN ABOVE NO ACTION 1C15-22.2-468-OL III HORIZONTAL METERS MANUFACTURER'S NAME IS PLACED ABOVE SCALE NO ACTION 1C15-23.1-469-CL II B LEGEND LIGHTS FALL 1986 LACK OF FUNCTIONAL LABEL FCR 1C15-10 -470-CL II A PANEL, GENERAL VIOLATION OF MIRROR IMAGING CONVENTION NO ACTION 2C15-33 -471-CL II C CONTINUOUS ROTARY SWITCHES FALL 1989 CONTROL INCREASES IN VALUE WITH A COUNTERCLOCKWISE MOTION REVIEW 1C15-32.4-472-CL III SELECTOR SWITCHES KNDBS ON CONTROLS DO NOT CONFORM TO GUIDELINES FOR BEST NO ACTION INTERFACE

- IC15-32. 4-473-CL III

_ SELECTOR SWITCHES LACK OF FUNCTIONAL LABELING NO ACTION 2C15-32.4-474-CL II C SELECTOR SWITCHES CONTROL POSITIONS ARE OBSTRUCTED FROM VIEW DUE TO LOW l

NO ACTICN M0JNTINS 1C24-32.7-475-C'_

III STAR-HANDLES FALL 1986 IMPROPER POSITIONING OF CONTROL-LABEL FCR 1C24-32.7-476-CL III STAR-HANDLES LOW MOUNTED CONTROLS NO ACTION 1C22-32.2-477-CL II A THUMB ROTARY SWITCHES FALL 1986 INAPPROPRIATE CONTROL / DISPLAY ARRANGEMENT i

FCR 1C24-32.2-478-CL III THUMB ROTARY SWITCHES CONTROL LABEL VISIBILITY NO ACTION i

L-

y -

o Attcchment C HUMAN. ENGINEERING' DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING as of December 31,.1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 Schedule File Number Cat.

Affected Component Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigned)

IC24-32.2-479-CL III THUMB ROTARY SWITCHES OVER-EXTENDED REFERENCE LINE ON CONTROL SURFACE NO ACTION IC00-32.7-480-GE II C STAR-HANDLES VERTICAL ORIENTATION OF CONTROL POSITION LABELS NO ACTION 1C22-22.2-481-GE II C HORIZONTAL METERS MANUFACTURER'S LABEL APPEARS ON METER FACE NO ACTICN 1C22-22.2-482-CL III HORIZONTAL METERS POOR LABELING PLACEMENT NO ACTION 1C22-22.2-483-GE II C HORIZONTAL METERS UNCLEAR LABELING OF MEASURED PARAMETERS NO ACTION SPRING 1988 1C22-24.2-484-CL II B IMPACT RECORDER POOR LEGIBILITY OF IMPACT RECORDING REFERRED 1C22-24.2-485-CL III IMPACT RECORDER FALL 1986 IMPACT RECORDERS OBSCURED FCR IC22-24.2-486-CL III IMPACT RECORDER SCALE INDEXING OBSCURED Bf POINTER; SCALE PAPER BACKFIT NO ACTION FALL 1986 1C90-11 -487-CL II C LABELS USE OF POOR LABELING MATERIALS FCR FALL 1989 2C24-32.2-488-CL II C THUMB ROTARY SWITCHES POOR POSITION LABEL DESIGN MR FALL 1986 2C24-11 -489-CL II C LABELS LABELS BELOW EYE LEVEL AND COMPONENTS FCR FALL 1986 2C24-26 -499-CL II B MIMICS NO ARROWHEADS INDICATING FLOW DIRECTION ON MIMICS FCR

Attcchment C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING as.of December 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assignec) 2C26-32.4-491-CL III SELECTOR SWITCHES FALL 1986 UNUSED POSITIONS ON CONTROLS AND CONTROL / DISPLAY ASSOCIATION FCR UNLABELED 2C24-32.2-492-CL II C THUMB ROTARY SWITCHES FALL 1986 CONTROL /DIGPLAY ARRANGEMENT FCR 1C24-32.7-493-CL III STAR-HANDLES INSUFFICIENT CONTROL LABELING NO ACTION IC26-32.4-494-CL III SELECTOR SWITCHES UNIMPORTANT DISPLAYED INFORMATION (MANUFACTURER' S LABEL) /

NO ACTION LACK OF FUNCTIONAL LABELIN3 1C26-32.2-495-CL III THUMB ROTARY SWITCHES FALL 1986 IMPROPER PLACEMENT OF CONTROL LRBEL FCR 1C22-32.4-496-CL III SELECTOR SWITCHES VIOLATION OF CONTROL POSITION CONVENTI0h5 REFERRED 1C24-11

-497-CL LABELS POOR WORD SPACING OF LABELS NO ACTION FALL 1986 1C24-11

-498-CL II C LABELS POOR LABEL PROXIMITY TO IDENTIFIED DISPLAY FCR 1C24-11 -499-CL III LABELS LABELS DBSCURED BY CONTROLS FCR j

1C24-11

-500-CL III LABE_S INCONSISTENT LABEL LOCATION

'NO ACTION FALL 1986 1C24-11 -501-CL LABELS SAME SIZE LABELING USED TO DESCRIBE CONTROL / DISPLAYS AND FCR POSITION INDICATIONS 1C24-23.2-582-CL III SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS USE DF TRRDEMARK OF MANUFACTURER l

NO ACTION E

Attcchment C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT-LISTING

-as of December 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri, and Brief Description (if assigned) 1C24-22.3-503-CL III CIRCULAR METERS POOR SCALE GRADUATION - METER SCALE DIFFERENT THAN OTHER FCR METERS FOR IDENTICAL FUNCTIONS 1C24-22.3-504-CL III CIRCULAR METERS POINTER POSITION NOT DIRECTLY COMPREHENSIVE FCR 1C26-22.1-505-CL III VERTICAL METERS MANUFACTURER'S LABEL ON DISPLAY FACE NO ACTION 2C26-23.2-506-CL III SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS FALL-1986 UNLABELED INDICATORS FCR 1C22-32.4-507-CL II C SELECTOR SWITCHES LESS THAN MINIMUM SEPARATION BETWEEN CONTROLS NO ACTION 1C30-32.4-508-CL III SELECTOR SWITCHES VIOLATION OF MINIMUM CONTRJL SEPARATIDN NO ACTION 1C30-32.4-509-CL III SELECTOR SWITCHES PROPER KNOBS FOR CONTROL FUNCTIDN NO ACTION 1C30-32.4-510-CL III SELECTOR SWITCHES LACK OF CONTROL LABELS NO ACTION 1C30-33 -511-CL III CONTINU0US ROTARY SWITCHES IMPROPER PLACEMENT OF CONTROL LABELS NO ACTION-1C30-33 -512-CL III CONTINUCUS ROTARY SWITCHES LABEL OBSCURED WHEN ACTIVATING CONTROLS NO RCTION 1C26-22.1-513-CL III VERTICAL METERS COMPONENTS TOO LOW FOR BEST VISIBILITY NO ACTION 2C26-22.1-514-CL III VERTICAL METERS COLOR CODING FOR VERTICAL METERS NO ACTION I

Attcenment C

-HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY 1 REPORT LISTING as of December 31, 1984,'for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigned) 2C26-23.2-515-CL III SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS FALL 1986 NO LABELS FOR SIMPLE INDICATORS FCR 2C30-33 -516-CL III CONTINUOUS ROTARY SWITCHES CONCENTRIC OR GANGED KNOBS NOT CODED FOR DISCRIMINATION.

NO ACTION 1C30-34 -517-CL III TOGGLE SWITCHES POOR LABEL CONTENT AND LOCATION NO ACTION 2C30-34 -518-CL III TOGGLE SWITCHES FA.L 1985 AMBIGUQUS ARRANGEMENT OF LABELING, SURROUNDING CONTRO-FCR FALL 1986 1C30-11 -519-CL III LABELS PRESENCE OF UNNECESSARY LABEL FCR-1C30-11 -520-CL III LABELS USE OF MANUFACTURER'S LABEL NO ACTION

.1C30-11 -521-CL III LABELS PRESENCE OF UNNECESSARY LRBEL NO ACTION FALL 1986 f

IC30-11

-522-C1 III LABELS SAME SIZE LABELING FOR GROUP AND COMPONENT LABELS-FCR 1C30-22.2-523-CL III HORIZONTAL METERS l

POINTER OBSCURES GRADUATION MARKS OF SCALE NO ACTION 1C30-23.2-524-CL III SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS POOR LABEL LOCATION NO ACTION 1C31-32.4-525-CL III SELECTOR SWITCHES DIMENSIONS OF KNOB-SKIRTED ROTARY SWITCHES VIOLATED NO ACTION 1C31-22.2-526-CL III HORIZONTAL METERS USAGE OF MANUFACTURER'S LABEL NO ACTION

.3 Attachment C e-HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTIN3

.as of December 31,.1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number

- Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status./Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigned) 1C31-22.2-527-CL-III HORIZONTAL METERS POOR POINTER LOCATION AND COLORING POINTER OVERLAPS INDEXING NO ACTION FALL 1986 1C31-11 -528-CL III LABELS P00R LABEL POSITIONING FCR FALL 1986 1C31-11 -529-CL III LABELS GROUP LABEL LETTERING IS TOO SMALL FCR IC31-36 -530-CL III PUSHBUTTONS POOR SEPARATION DISTANCE BETWEEN CONTROL NO ACTION 1C15-37 -531-CL II C LEGEND PUSHBUTTONS NO PRESS TO TEST CAPABILITY NO ACTION

-1C31-23.2-532-CL III SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS POOR VIEWING SEQUENCE OF DISPLAYS NO ACTION FALL 1986 IC31-28 -533-CL III DIGITAL-TYPE DISPLAYS DISPLAY NOT LABELED ACCORDING TO FUNCTION FCR FALL 1936 IC32-34 -534-CL III-TOGGLE SWITCHES WRONG DIRECTION OF ACTIVATION FCR 1C33-32.1-535-CL III MICR0 SWITCHES

' INCONSISTENT COMPONENT ARRANGEMENT REVIEW 1C80-22.1-536-CL VERT %. METERS METER FOINTER OVERLAPS SCALE INDEX NO ACTION 1C33-22.1-537-CL III VERTICAL METERS HANDWRITTEN SCALES MR 2C33-22.1-538-CL III VERTICAL METERS.

NUMBER OF MINOR MARKS BETWEEN SCALING EQUALS NINE NO ACTION

A:techment C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING as of December 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR PCWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Senedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assignec)

IC33-23.2-539-CL III SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS LACK OF FUNCTIONAL LABELING AND PRESENCE OF COMPANY RESOLVED TRADEMARKS ON DISPLAYS-1C34-26 -540-CL III MIMICS FAJ. 1986 MIMIC LINES USE SAME COLOR FOR 2 DIFFERENT SYSTEMS WITHIN FCR MIMIC PANEL 1C34-26 -541-CL III MIMICS NO DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN MAJOR AND MINOR MIMIC LINES RESOLVED 1C34-26 -541-CL III MIMICS NO DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN MAJOR AND MINOR MIMIC LINES RESOLVED 1C34-32 -542-CL II B DISCRETE ROTARY SWITCHES FALL 1536 NO VISUAL SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONALLY DIFFERENT GROUPINGS CF FCR COMPONENTS 1C34-32 -543-CL II A DISCRETE ROTARY SWITCHES POOR NUMERICAL SEQUENTIAL ARRANSEMENT OF CCMPONENTS NO ACTION 1C34-32.1-544-CL II A MICR0 SWITCHES FALL 1986 INCONSISTENT LABEL PLACEMENT ON CONTROLS FCR FALL 1986 1C34-26 -545-CL III MIMICS LACK OF DIRECTION FLOW AND DESTINATION INDICATORS IN MIMIC FCR FALL 1986 2C34-26 -546-CL III MIMICS INCONSISTENT USE OF MATERIALS FOR MIMIC LINES FCR l

1C39-24.2-547-CL III IMPACT RECORDER SCALE DOES NOT INDICATE UNITS OF MdASUREMENT REVIEW IC39-24.2-548-CL III IMPACT RECORDER FALL 1986 USE OF LOWER CASE LETTERS AND PERIODS IN LABELING FCR 1C39-36 -549-CL II B PUSHBUTTONS POOR LABELING LOCATION NO ACTION n.

.w

Attcchment C e

HUMAN ENGI'NEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING as of December 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigned)

IC39-23.2-550-CL II C SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS FALL 1989 LACK OF DISPLAY FAILURE DETECTION REVIEW 1C39-24.2-551-CL III IMPACT RECORDER POINTER OVERLAPS INDEX NO ACTION 1C39-24.2-552-CL III IMPACT RECORDER POOR DISPLAY ARRANGEMENT NO ACTION 1C00-24.2-553-GE II C IMPACT RECORDER POOR VISIBILITY OF RECORDED MATERIAL NO ACTION 1C29-24.1-554-CL III STRIP CHART RECORDER VERTICA. INSTEAD OF HORIZONTAL ORIENTATION OF NUMERALS ON NO ACTION RECORDED PAPER IC29-24.1-555-CL III STRIP CHART RECORDER NON-CRITICAL DISPLAY BELOW PROPER VIEWING LEVEL

- NO ACTION 1C29-32.4-556-CL III SELECTOR SWITCHES UNLABELED SWITCH NO ACTION IC29-32.4-557-CL III SELECTOR SWITCHES POINTER MOUNTED TOO FAR OFF SCALE MARKINGS NO ACTION 2C29-32.4-558-CL III SELECTOR SWITCHES SWITCH LOCATION EXCEEDS MAXIMUM HEIGHT ALLOWED ABOVE FLOOR NO ACTION 1C35-32.4-559-CL II B SELECTOR SWITCHES SORIN 3 13cE NO REFERENCE LINE ON SWITCH MR

-2C29-32,4-560-CL III SELECTOR SWITCHES IMPROPER LABEL LOCATION FOR SWITCHES ABOVE, AT, AND BELOW NO ACTION EYE LEVEL 2C29-32.4-561-CL III SELECTOR SWITCHES MANUFACTURER'S LABEL ON INSTRUMENT FACE NO ACTION 9

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,r

Attcenment C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING as.of~ December 31, 1964, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri, and Brief Description (if assignec) 2C23-11 -562-CL III LABELS FALL 1986 LACK CF LABELS RELATING COMPONENTS TO OTnERS IN MAIN CONTROL FCR ROOM

.2C23-23.2-563-CL III SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS LABELS ON COMPONENTS OBSCURED ABOVE EYE LEVEL NO ACTION

.2C23-22.2-564-CL III HORIZONTAL METERS COLOR CODING FOR OPERATING RANGES ON HORIZONTAL METERS NO ACTION 2C23-11 -565-CL III LABELS FALL 1986 NEED FOR VISIBLE, IDENTIFIABLE LABELS FOR COMPONENTS FCR IC24-21

-566-AN III ANNUNCIATORS VIOLATION OF REDUNDANCEY PRINCIPLE: FAILURE OF CIRCUIT NOT RESOLVED EASILY DETECTABLE 1C24-21

-567-AN III ANNUNCIATORS VIOLATION OF MAINTENANCE REGUIREMENTS RESOLVED 1C24-21 -568-AN RNNUNCIATORS VIOLATION OF PURPOSE OF TEST FUNCTION RESOLVED 1C24-21 -569-AN III RNNUNCIATORS POOR ALARM-CONTROL-INTEGRATION NO ACTION 1C24-21 -570-AN ANNUNCIATORS ALARM MANUAL ACTIONS CORRECTED 1C24-21

-571-AN III ANNUNCIATORS INCONSISTENT ENGRAVINGS NO ACTION 1C24-21 -572-AN II B ANNUNCIATORS POOR CODING SCHEME NO ACTION 1C80-21 -573-GE ANNUNCIATORS USE OF LEGEND PLATES RESOLVED

Atteenraant C e-HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY RIPORT LISTING as of December 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigned) 1C24-21 -574-CL ANNUNCIATORS MASKING TAPE LEGENDS CORRECTED 1C00-40 -575-CL PROCEDURES, GENERAL FIRE RESPONSE MANUAL RESOLVED 2C00-21 -576-GE II C ANNUNCIATORS FA.L 1939 TEMPORARY ILLUMINATION OF MINI-ANNUNCIATOR REFERRED 1C00-21 -577-GE ANNUNCIATORS CIRCUIT DEACTIVATIDN RESOLVED 1C00-21 -578-GE II C ANNUNCIATORS NO ALARM CLEARANCE FOR MINI-ANNUNCIATOR NO ACTION 1C10-22.1-579-CL III VERTICAL METERS NO CODING TO INDICATE OUT OF TOLERANCE RANGES NO ACTION 2C10-32.3-580-CL II A KEY-OPERATED SWITCHES FRLL 1986 EXCESSIVE RESISTANCE OF KEY-OPERATED SWITCHES FCR 1C09-22.1-581-CL III VERTICAL METERS THE BOTTOM GRADUATION MARK ON SCA.E IS NOT NUMBERED NO ACTION IC06-22.1-582-CL III VERTICAL METERS FALL 1986 THE POSITION OF SCALE ON PANEL PROHIBITS PRECISE READINGS FCR BETWEEN THE 0-100 RANGE l

1C10-32.3-583-CL II C KEY-OPERATED SWITCHES FALL 1986 CONFUSING POSITION LABELING ON CONTROLS FCR 1C96-32.3-584-CL II C KEY-OPERATED SWITCHES FALL 1986 CONTROL OBSTRUCTS POSITION LABELS FCR 1C06-32.3-585-CL KEY-OPERATED SWITCHES CONTROL POSITIONS VIOLATE PLANT CONVENTIONS AND POPULATION l

l CORRECTED STEREOTYPES

Atteenm:nt C HUMAN-ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPOAT LISTING as of. December 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Senedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assignec)

'1Ce7-32.3-586-CL II B KEY-OPERATED SWITCHES FALL 1986 LACK OF CONTROL POSITION LABELS AND CONTROL BACKGROUND FCR PLATES 1007-32.3-587-CL II B KEY-OPERATED SWITCHES FALL 1986 NON-STANDARD LABELING ON NEWLY INSTALLED INSTRUMENTS FCR 2C24-32.1-588-EE II C MICR0 SWITCHES FALL 1986 IMPROPER LOCATION OF INSTRUMENTATION FCR 1C22-37 -589-CL II B LEGEND PUSHBUTTONS SPRING 1988 LEGEND PUSHBUTTON LIGHTS OFFER MARGINAL INDICATION OF SYSTEM

. REVIEW STATUS 1C22-37 -590-CL II B LEGEND PUSHBUTTONS LEGENDS ON PUSHBUTTONS ARE OF INSUFFICIENT CHARACTER SIZE NO ACTION TO BE READ EASILY 1C22-37 -591-CL III LEGEND PUSHBUTTONS FALL 1986 CONTROL GROUP LACKS

SUMMARY

AND FUNCTIONAL LABELS FCR 1C39-24.2-592-CL III IMPACT RECORDER FALL 1986 i

SG TURBIhE RESORDER LACKS APPROPRIATE LABELING REQUIRES FCR CALIBRATION i.

1C88-22.1-593-OR II C VERTICAL METERS FALL 1989 CONFUSING CONTROL / DISPLAY ARRANGEMENT-SAFETY FEATURES' REVIEW CONTROLS AND ASSOCIATED DISPLAYS 1C26-22.1-594-CL III VERTICAL METERS SCALE POINTER COLOR IS DIFFERENT FROM NUMBERS AND INDICES OF t

NO ACTION DISPLAY

'1C80-32.5-595-GE III J-HANDLES LACK OF POSITIVE INDICATION OF COMPONENT STATUS WHEN CONTROL REVIEW IS IN PULL-TO LOCK POSITION l

1C00-22.1-596-OR II C-VERTICAL METERS

' FALL 1989 DISPARITY BETWEEN ALARM MANUAL SET POINT LEVELS AhD DISPLAY-REVIEW SET POINT. LEVELS 1C80-21 -597-SV II C ANNUNCIATORS ANNUNCIATOR ALARMS ARE NOT LOCALIZED, AUDIBLY NO ACTION k.

~

Attechment C 4

HUMAN: ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTIN3 as of December 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 l

Schedule File Number Cat.

Affected Component Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigned) 2C00-21 -598-SS ANNUNCIATORS LACK OF PRIORITIZATION SCHEME CORRECTED 1C80-21 -599-SS II A ANNUNCIATORS FALL 1986 LACK OF REFLASH (REACTIVATION)

REVIEW IC80-21 -688-CL II C ANNUNCIATORS LACK OF RUDIBLE INDICATION OF ALARM CLEARANCE NO ACTION 1C00-21 -601-CL II C ANNUNCIATORS INCONSISTENT ENGRAVING 3

. RESOLVED

,1C00-21 -602-CL III ANNUNCIATORS SMALL CHARACTER SIZE NO ACTION 1C00-21 -603-SS II C ANNUNCIATORS LACK OF LOCALIZATION OF RESET NO ACTION 1C80-21 -684-SV ANNUNCIATORS OVERUSE OF ALARM CARD PULLING RESOLVED 1C80-21 -685-OR II C ANNUNCIATORS NUISANCE OF FALSE ALARMS RESOLVED FALL 1989 1C88-88 -686-SV II C GENERAL (LIGHT, NOISE, ETC.)

AMBIENT ILLUMINATION REVIEW FALL 1986 IC88-88 -687-SV II A GENERAL (LIGHT, NOISE, ETC.)

EMERGENCY LIGHTING - CONTROL ROOM REVIEW FALL 1986 2C82-22.1-688-CL III VERTICAL METERS NO FUNCTIONAL LABELING FCR FALL 1989 AC83-11 -689-CL IIIC LABELS SWITCH POSITION LABELS OBSCURED BY CONTROLS MR

Attcchment C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REDORT LISTING as of December.31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assignec) 1C04-03 -610-SV III COMPUTER RELATED USE OF AN UNCONVENTIONAL ZERO ON PRINTERS CORRECTED 1C08-32 -611-SS I A DISCRETE ROTARY SWITCHES PROBABLE MISOPERATED/ SUBSTITUTION OF ADJACENT CONTROLS CORRECTED 1C13-11 -612-SS II B LABELS FALL 1986 INPROPERLY PLACED AND THE USE OF DYMD TAPE F0E SALFETY FCR STATUS TAGS 1C08-32 -613-SS II A DISCRETE ROTARY SWITCHES EALL 1986 MIRROR IMAGED COMPONENTS THAT ARE FREQUENTLY USED OR MAY MR RESULT IN SERIOUS RRMIFICATIONS IS MISdSED 1C13-32.1-614-SS II B MICR0 SWITCHES FALL 1986 MIRROR IMAGE COMPONENTS THAT ARE FREQUENTLY USED FCR & MR 2C07-32 -615-SS III DISCRETE ROTARY SWITCHES VIOLATIONS OF EXPECTANCIES AND CONVENTIONS OF MIRROR NO ACTION IC87-32 -616-SS II B DISCRETE ROTARY SWITCHES VIOLATION OF CONSISTRNT USE OF CONTROL OPERATION AND NO ACTION INDICATOR LIGHT' MEANING OR ARRANGEMENT 1C87-11 -617-SS II B LABELS FALL 1986 VIOLATION OF LABEL CONSISTENCY FCR 1C87-20 -618-SS IIIC DISPLAYS, GENERAL VIOLATIONS OF CONSISTENCY IN DISPLAY INFORMATION l

NO ACTION l

1C99-80 -619-CL I A GENERAL (LIGHT, NOISE, ETC.)

CONTROL ROOM OCCUPIED BY NON-ESSENTIAL PEOPLE IMMEDIATELY RESOLVED AFTER A TRIP 2C00-88 -629-OR I A GENERAL (LIGHT, NOISE, ETC.)

c NON-ESSENTIAL C.R. TRAFFIC INTERFERE WITH OPERATIONS CORRECTED 1C99-90 -621-OR I A GENERAL (LIGHT, NOISE, ETC.)

CONTROL ROOM CLIMATE l

CORRECTED i

(

l

Attecnment C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING as of December 31,.1984,.for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigned) 1C00-05 -622-OR I A PROTECTIVE / SAFETY EQUIPMENT CONTROL COMPATIBILITY WITH EMERGENCY GEAR CORRECTED 1C00-05 -623-OR I A PROTECTIVE / SAFETY EQUIPMENT ANTI-C STORAGE CORRECTED 1C00-05 -624-SV II B PROTECTIVE / SAFETY EQUIPMENT OXYGEN TANK STORAGE CORRECTED 1C00-85 -625-OR II B PROTECTIVE / SAFETY EQUIPMENT SPRING 1988 SPECTACLE INSERTS REFERRED 1C00-05 -626-DR I A PROTECTIVE / SAFETY EQUIPMENT COMMUNICATION THROUGH FACE MASKS RESOLVED 1C00-05 -627-OR I A PROTECTIVE / SAFETY EQUIPMENT FACE MASK INTERFERS WITH VISIBILITY RESQLVED 1C00-85 -528-OR I A PROTECTIVE / SAFETY EQUIPMENT INADEQUATE SUPPLY OF PERSONAL PROTECTION EQUIPMENT CORRECTED IC04-03 -629-SV IIIC ' COMPUTER RELATED FALL 1989 COMPUTER COMMAND LANGUAGE NOT REFLECTING OPERATOR'S FCR VIEWPOINT 1C00-02 -630-OR I

'A COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL OF COMMUNICATIONS DURING AN EMERGENCY RESOLVED 1C00-11 -631-OR I A LABELS FALL 1986-ALL RECORDER I.D.' S HARD TO READ ON CONTROL BOARDS FCR 1C01-22.2-632-OR II B HORIZONTAL METERS SPRING 1988 U-1 GENERATOR FIELD AMPS REVIEW DYMOTAPE LABEL FOR CURRENT LIMIT 1C01-22.2-633-OR II B HORIZONTAL METERS SPRING 1988 l

U-1 SENERATOR VOLTMETER REVIEW DYMOTAPE USED FOR VOLT LIMIT l

A:ttenment C

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTIN3 as of Decemoer 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigned)

IC01-22.2-634-OR I A HORIZONTAL METERS FALL 1986 500 KV VOLTMETERS REVIEW 1C01-22.3-635-OR II B CIRCULAR METERS FALL 1986 500 KV 5051/5052 MVARS MW MTRS NOT MIRROR-IMAGED FCR 1C01-22.3-636-OR II B CIRCULAR METERS FALL 1986 MAIN GEN MVAR/MW MTRS NOT MIRROR-IMAGED

-FCR 1C01-22.2-637-OR II B HORIZONTAL METERS SPRING 1988 500 KV 5051/5052 TRANSMISSION LIhE AMP.ETERS GO OFF SCALE REVIEW BEFORE 3000A LIMIT IS REACHED (0-2000A)

.1C01-26 -638-OR II C MIMICS FALL 1989 HIGH SIDE DISCONNECT GROUNDS FCR 2C82-32.1-639-OR II B MICR0 SWITCHES SPRING 1988 CONTROLS FOR MSRH 1ST STAGE STEAM SUPPLY FCR 2C82-32.1-640-OR II C MICR0 SWITCHES FALL 1989 NON-FUNCTIONAL HAND SWITCHES FCR 1C03-22.1-641-OR II B VERTICAL METERS SPRING 1968 SGFP SPEED INDICATORS MR IC03-22.1-642-OR II B VERTICAL METERS SPRING 1988 SGFP SUCTION PRESSURE-l MR 1C83-23.2-643-OR II C SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS FALL 1986 SGFP TROUBLE LIGHT LABELS FCR 2C83-22.1-644-OR II B VERTICAL METERS SPRING 1988 SGFP SPEED INDICATORS REVIEW 2CO3-22.1-645-OR II B VERTICAL METERS SPRING 1988 SGFP SUCTION PRESSURE REVIEW E--'

e e

Atttchment C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTIhG as of December 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schecule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigneo) 2CO3-11 -646-OR II B LABELS FALL 1986 SGFP CIRCUIT FAILURE LIGHTS FCR 2CO3-23.2-647-OR II C SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS FALL 1989 21 & 22 HEATER DRAIN PUMP RECIR CV'S FCR 1C83-23.2-648-OR II C SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS FALL 1986 FEEDWATER HEATER HIGH-HIGH LEVEL ALARM LIGHTS FCR

~ 1C03-21 -649-OR II B ~ KEY-OPERATED SWITCHES SPRING 1988 ANNUNCIATION 1C03/2CO3 FOR LOW PRESSURE FEED WTR HEATER FCR HI-HI LEVEL IC03-32.3-650-OR II B KEY-OPERATED SWITCHES FALL 1986 OVERRIDE KEY SWITCHES ON 1/2 C03 FOR FEEDWATER TRIP FCR 1C03-22.1-651-OR II C VERTICAL METERS FALL 1989 CONDENSATE HEADER PRESSURE INDICATOR MR 1C03-27 -652-OR II C DEMARCATION LINES FALL 1986 1C03/2CO3 DEMARCATION FCR 1C03-36 -653-OR II B PUSHBUTTONS SPRING 1988 SGFP TRIP BUTTONS ARE NOT PROTECTED FROM INDAVERTENT ACTUATION I

MR-FALL 1986 1C83-11 -654-OR II B LABELS CONDENSATE DEMIN. BYPASS FLOW INDICATION LABEL FCR 2C83-32.2-655-OR II C -THUMB ROTARY SWITCHES Fr,LL 1986 BLOWDOWN TANK PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE HANDSWITCH NOMENCLATURE FCR FOLL 1986

~ 1C83-11 '-656-OR II C LABELS CONDENSATE HEADER FLOW SIGMA FCR FALL 1986 2C83-27 -657-OR I A DEMARCATION LINES MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE HANDSWITCHES ON 1(2) CO3 FCR

[

w

Attcenment C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY. REPORT LISTING

>as-of December 31ii1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2

_ke File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status ~/Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigned) 2CO3-13. -658-OR II C CONVENTIONS FALL 1989 21 & 22 ATMSOPHERIC DUMP CONTROL VALVES FCR 1C04-22.1-659-0R II B VERTICAL METERS SPRING 1988 13 AFW MOTOR AMMETER x

FCR i

1C04-31 -660-OR II B PROCESS CONTROLLERS SPRING 1988 AFW TURBINE SPEED / FLOW CONTROLLERS REVIEW 1C04-31 -661-OR I A PROCESS CONTROLLERS FALL 1986 AFW TURBINE SPEED CONTROLLERS FCR

.1C04-26 -662-DR II B MIMICS SPRING 1988

+4 AFW MIMIC MR FALL 1986 1C94-31 -663-OR -I-A PROCESS CONTROLLERS AFW FLOW CONTROLLERS FCR FALL 1986 i~

1C43 -664-OR I A LABELS KEY SWITCHES 1-HS 100 4A & 6A FCR 2C43-32.3-665-OR KEY-OPERATED SWITCHES HEY EWITCHES 2-HS 100 4A & 6A CORRECTED

.tC85-22.1-666-OR-II B VERTICAL METERS FALL 1986 t

l. ~

HIGH POWER SIGMAS FCR l

2C85-11 -667-OR II C LADELS FALL 1986 REACTOR REGULATING SYSTEM A

FCR i

1C96-11_.-668-OR' I A LABELS'

' LOW iMNGE PRESSURIZER PRESSURE I

CORRECTED 1C96-11 -669-OR II B LABELS FALL 1986 WIDE-RANGE PRET W rjr s ! ESSURE FCR l

l

Attechnent C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING as of December 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri, and Brief Description (if assigned)

'1C87-32.3-678-OR I A KEY-OPERATED SWITCHES FALL 1986 2

1-CVC-587-CV RCP BLEED OFF RV ISOLATION KEYSWITCH FCR

'1C87-26 -671-OR II C MIMICS FALL 1966 MIMIC FOR CVCS PURIFICATION CROSS CONNECT TO SHUTDOWN FCR COOLING PENCILED IN OR DYMO TAPED 1C87-11 -672-GR II C LABELS FALL 19B6 MAGNETIC STATUS PLAQUE FOR LETDOWN CV AND BACK-PRESSURE CV FCR ISOLATION VALVES

-2C87-11 -673-OR II C LABELS FALL 1986 BORIC ACID /DEMINERALIZER WATER BATCH INTEGRATORS FCR 1C88-58 -674-OR I A SYSTEMS, GENERAL AUX HPSI HDR ISOLATION MOV ISI-656-MOV (2-SI-656-MOV)

CORRECTED 1C88-32.5-675-OR I A J-HANDLES FALL 1986 LOW PRESSURE AND HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION LOOP HEADERS MR-MOV HANDSWITCHES 1C88-26 -676-OR II C MIMICS FALL 1986 ENGINEERING SAFETY FEATURES MIMIC FCR 1C88-26 -677-OR I A MIMICS FALL 1986 12(22) HPSI PP MIMIC FCR 1C18-23.2-678-OR I A SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS INDICATOR LIGHTS FOR KEY SWITCH INSTR. AIR OVERRIDE TO MOV CORRECTED i

1C18-23.2-679-OR I A SIMPLE' INDICATOR LIGHTS KEYSWITCH INDICATION LIGHTS FOR PS S464-CV DVERRIDE ON C15 CORRECTED 1C18-11 -688-OR I A LABELS FALL 1986 l

CVCS RESET PUSHBUTTGNS

(

FCR l

2C18-23.2-681-OR II C SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS FALL 1986 l

INDICATORS ON PANEL IMPROPERLY REMOVED FCR l

l l

l

Attcchment C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING as of December 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2

)

File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule l

Status /Pri, and Brief Description (if assigned) 1C10-32.3-682-OR I A KEY-OPERATED SWITCHES FALL 1986 CONTAINMENT SUMP OVERRIDE KEY SWITCH FCR 1C13-22.1-683-OR II B VERTICAL METERS SPRING 1988 SALTWATER HEADER PRESSURE INDICATION FCR 2C13-22.1-684-OR II B VERTICAL METERS SPRING 1988 SALTWATER HEADER PRESSURE INDICATION FCR 1C13-22.1-685-OR II B VERTICAL METERS FALL 1986 SALTWATER HEADER PRESSURE INDICATORS FCR & MR 1C33-11 -686-OR II C LABELS FALL 1986 REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK FLOOR DRAINS FCR 1C34-23.2-687-OR II C SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS FALL 1986 REMOVED PANEL INDICATION FCR 1C34-11 -688-OR I A LABELS CAVITY COOLING SYSTEM CORRECTED FALL 1986 1C34-11 -689-OR I A LABELS SPENT FUEL POOL VENTILATION CHARCDAL FILTER FCR 1C34-11 -690-OR II C LABELS FALL 1989 CONTROL ROOM CHILL WATER SYSTEM FCR 1C19-11 -691-OR II C LABELS FALL 1986

1. 23-13 KV BUS FCR 1C18-11 -692-OR II C LRBELS FALL 1986 SWITCHYARD SERV TRANSFROMER AMMETER LABELS FCR 1C18-11 -693-OR II C LABELS FALL 1986 V-4800 SERVICE TANSFORMER AMMETER FCR

i Attcchm;nt C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING as of December 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assignec) 1C17-11 -694-OR II C LABELS FALL 1986 ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION PANEL LABELS FCR 2008-26 -695-OR I A MIMICS FALL 1986 21A & 21B SAFETY INJECTION COMPONENTS FCR 2C24-11 -6%-SV III LABELS FALL 1986 LABEL CONTRAST FCR 2C24-22.1-697-SV II C VERTICAL METERS DISPLAY READABILITY NO ACTION 2C26-24.1-698-SV II A STRIP CHART RECORDER INADEQUATE LABELING CORRECTED 2C26-24.1-699-SV II A STRIP CHART RECORDER INADEQUATE LABELING CORRECTED 1C10-24.1-700-SV II A STRIP CHART RECORDER FALL 1986 AMBIGUQUS INDICATION FCR 1C82-22.1-701-SV III VERTICAL METERS HAND LETTERED DISPLAY SCALE MR 1C18-11 -782-SV II C LABELS FALL 1986 LABEL READABILITY-GLARE i

FCR IC34-26 -783-OR II C MIMICS-HVAC MIMIC-MISSING LABEL CORRECTED 2C02-22.1-704-SV III VERTICAL METERS DISPLAY SCALE CONTRARY TO CONVENTION FCR 2C24-19 --785-OR III PANEL, GENERAL DISPLAY LOCATION NO ACTION

.-., ~,

+ -.

==

Attcchment C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING as of December 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description

-(if assigneo) 1C04-32.6-796-SV II B T-HANDLES FALL 1986 VIOLATION OF CONVEr4 TION FCR 1C04-31 -787-SV PROCESS CONTROLLERS FALL 1986 AMBIGUGUS LABELING FCR 1C04-22.1-708-SV II C YERTICAL METERS VIOLATION OF OPERATOR EXPECTATION DUPLICATE 2C04-22.1-709-SV III VERTICAL METERS FALL 1986 i

NON-STANDARD ABBREVIATION FCR 2C24-28 -710-SV II C DIGITAL-TYPE DISPLAYS FALL-1986 AMBIGUGUS LABELS FCR 2C24-13 -711-SV II C CONVENTIONS FALL 1986 NON-STANDARD COLOR CODING FCR 2C26-24.1-712-SV III STRIP CHART RECORDER INCORRECT RECORDER PAPER RESOLVED 1C10-24.1-713-SV II C STRIP CHART RECORDER FALL 1989 IMPROPER RECORDER PAPER MR 1C24-23.2-714-OR II B SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS SPRING 1988 VITAL BUS GROUND INDICATORS MR

'1C24-23.2-715-OR II B SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS SPRING 1988 BATTERY TROUBLE LIGHTS ~

MR

~ 1C99-22.1-716-OR II B VERTICAL METERS SPRING 1988 WIDE RANGE CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 9-158 PSIG REVIEW l

1C94-31 -717-SV II A PROCESS CONTROLLERS SPATIAL ORIENTATION l

_ CORRECTED i

I

~ _, _. -.... -. -

Attechment C

' HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING as of December 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assigned) 1C04-11

-718-SV II A LABELS STATUS INFORMATION RESOLVED 1C04-31

-719-SV II A PROCESS CONTROLLERS AMBIGUQUS INDICATIONS NO ACTION FALL 1986 1C04-11 -720-SV III LABELS COLOR CODE VIOLATION FCR 1C04-23.1-721-SV II C LEGEND LIGHTS AMBIGUCUS SENSING BY OPERATORS CORRECTED 1C04-22.1-722-SV II C VERTICAL METERS FALL 1989 HANDWRITTEN SCALES FCR 1C04-22.1-723-SV III VERTICAL METERS AVOIDANCE OF EXTRANEDUS ITEMS NO ACTION 1C04-22.1-724-SV III VERTICAL METERS USE OF GRADUATIONS REVIEW FALL 1986 1C04-31 -725-SV II A -PROCESS CONTROLLERS GRADUATION & NUMERAL SEPARATION REVIEW 1C04-22.1-726-SV II C VERTICAL METERS FALL 1989 INTERMEDIATE GRADUATIONS REVIEW

-1C04-22.1-727-SV II A VERTICAL METERS FALL 1986 READABILITY REVIEW 1C04-24.1-728-SV II C STRIP CHART RECORDER FALL 1989 POINTER / BACKGROUND CONTRAST MR 1C84-22.1-729-SV II A VERTICAL METERS ZONE MARKING NO ACTION

- ~.

7 3

Attrenment C HUMAN ENGINEERIAG' DISCREPANCY-REPORT LISTING as'of December 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assignec) 1C04-22.2-730-SV III

' HORIZONTAL METERS NUMERAL OBSCUREMENT REVIEW 1C04-11 -731-SV II C LABELS FALL 1986 LETTER GRADUATION FCR 1C04-23.2-732-SV III SIMPLE INDICATOR LIGHTS FALL 1986 RANRING FCR 1C04-26.-733-SV II A MIMICS FALL 1966 MIMIC LINES FCR 1C04-22.1-734-SV II A VERTICAL METERS FALL 1986 INCONSISTENT MIRROR IMAGE FCR

_1C00-02 -735-SV II A COMMUNICATIONS FALL 1986 HANDSET CORD LENGTH REVIEW 1C80-08 -736-SV II A GENERAL (LIGHT, NOISE, ETC.)

FALL 1986 EMERGENCY LIGHTING -REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL REVIEW 1C90-00 -737-SV II A GENERAL (LIGHT, NOISE, ETC. )

BACKGROUND NOISE-REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL NO ACTION 2C02-22.1-738-SV III VERTICAL METERS EXCESSIVE GRADUATIONS BETWEEN UNIT NUMBERS' FCR

'1C82-22.1-739-SV III VERTICAL METERS FALL 1986 NON-STANDA9D CHARACTER SIZE ON LABEL FCR GLAND ~ STEAM COND PRESS 2C94-22.1-740-SV II C VERTICAL METERS EXCESSIVE DISPLAY SENSITIVITY NO ACTION 2C96-22.1-741-OR II C VERTICAL METERS FALL 1989 (HOT LEG TEMPERATURE SIGMA LOOP 22) IMPROPER SCALING OF METER MR

te d.

Attcenment C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTIN3 as of December 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status /Pri.

and Brief Description (if assignec) 2C06-22.1-742-OR II C VERTICAL METERS FALL 1989-IMPROPER SCALING OF METERS FCR 1C03-31

-743-OR II B PROCESS CONTROLLERS SPRING 1988 FAILURE OF A CONTROL SYSTEM WITHOUT ADEQUATE WARNING TO FCR OPERATOR 1C08-22.1-744-OR VERTICAL METERS INCOMPATIBLE SCALE UNITS kEVIEW 1C09-22.1-745-OR II B VERTICAL METERS SPRING 1988 INDADEQUATE SCALE RANGE-RWT LEVEL REVIEW 1C00-23 -746-SV II C LIGHTS FALL 1989 LACK OF LAMP TEST CAPABILITY REVIEW 1C43-12 -747-CL II C CONTROL / DISPLAY ARRANGEMENT FALL 1989 DISPLAY LOCATION-ON PANEL FCR 1C43-22.1-748-CL II C VERTICAL METER POINTER DESIGN FCR 2C43-11 -749-CL II C LABELS FALL 1986 IMPROPER LABELING FCR 1C43-22.1-750-CL III VERTICAL METER EXTRANEDUS INFORMATIDN ON DISPLAY FACE NO ACTION 1C43-22.1-751-CL II C VERTICAL METER FALL 1989 MULTISCALE INDICATOR REVIEW 1C43-22.1-752-CL II C VERTICAL METER FALL 1989 INADEQUATE SCALE RANGE REFERRED 1C43-OO -753-SV II B GENERAL SPRING 1988 LIGHTING-AMBIENT ILLUMINATION REVIEW

Lt

• e -

Attrehment C HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY REPORT LISTING as of Decemoer 31, 1984, for CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 File Number Cat.

Affected Component Schedule Status ' /pri.

and Brief Description (if assigned)

-1C43-22.1-754-SV II C VERTICAL METER DISPLAY LOCATION-WORK AREA FCR 1C00-23.-755-CL II C LIGHTS FALL 1989 DUAL FILAMENT BULBS OR BULB ASSEMBLY ARE NOT USED ON REVIEW-INDICATORS =NO LAMP TEST FEATURE AVAILABLE 1C00-21 -756-SV II B ANNUNCIATORS SDRING 1968 LACK OF SAFEGUARDS TO PREVENT INTERCHANGING OF ANNUCIATOR REVIEW TILES

,