ML20107C703
See also: IR 05000219/1972004
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UNITED STATES
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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
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OIRECTOR ATE OF REGULATORY OPER ATIONS
REGION 9
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970 BROAD STREET
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NEWARK, NEW JERSEY 07102
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OCT 1.? ign
R. T. Carlson, Chief, Reactor Operations Branch,
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region I
R0 REPORT No. 50-219/72-04
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
OYSTER CREEK
This inspection was extended to 7 days at the site in an attempt to
close out all of the inquiry reports, Memo route slips from HQ, and
unresolved items from previous inspections. The inspection plan
started with 55 items but was expanded to include additional items
noted or that ocurred during the inspection. A 5 day routine in-
spection had been conducted February - March 1972. The number of
items on the inspection plan as well as the number of inquiry re-
ports for the calendar year to date (28) is an indication of the ac-
tivity associated with BWR's.
Another indication of the activity assoc,iated with reactors is the
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number of different groups that were at the plant during the inspec-
tion. A group from Region I met with HASL, HQ and JCPL one day. There
was a group from Oak Ri-se reviewing the proposed Environmental Report
for two days. EPA and representatives of the State of New Jersey
were taking samples in the discharge canal and in the bay one day.
I was informed by Mr. McCluskey that JCPL planned to create a new po-
sition at Oyster Creek of assistant superintendent. The purpose is to
provide promotional opportunities for present personnel and to provide
better supervision of plant operation.
He indicated that it had become
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about impossible for one man to follow the operation in the detail
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needed and to meet the other demand on the station superintendent. He
indicated Don Ross would be promoted to assistant superintendent but would
continue to carry the duties of technical supervisor until a replace-
ment is selected.
(Anticipated date is October 1, 1972 for the replace-
ment).
I concur in the planned action for the same reasons.
The requested action or information was obtained for the following HQ
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memos:
1.
MRS 7/8/71 OC Rep't Primary Containment Leak Rate Test
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9604170492 960213
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2.
MRS 3/28/72 W DB-50 Rx Seran Breakers Problem
OC does not use DB-50 breakers for load ehedding.
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3.
MRS 1/12/72 Millstone Report - Loss of Automatic Blowdown Func-
tion of A Relief Valve
OC does not have Target Rock relief vlaves. (Electromatic RV's)
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4.
MRS 1/12/72 Inspect Torus Baffles
Baffles .were inspected and 18 were removed (JCPL report dated
June 2, 1972)
5.
MRS 1/20/72 Capacity Test of Station Batteries
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Oyster Creek has TS requirement to load test for approximately
8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> ever 6 MOS
6.
MRS 3/14/72 Big Rock Point - System Breaker
Oyster Creek'has check valves in the Spent Fuel Pool fill line,
however, these checV valves are not tested. PORC is to evaluate
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means to assure that siphoning can not occur.
.7.
MRS 3/31/72 Reactivity Anomalies
1.
Discussed problem with Technical Supervisor
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2.
QC predicts critical based on experience not by calculating
individual rod worth.
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3.
GE did not supply a revised curve for SD margin vs MWD /NEU
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for Core 1A or 1B.
New curves included in submittal No.
3 for Core II.
4.
Actual shutdown margin was not determined only that the shut-
down margin met TS requirement at least 1.65% 4K (Rt .25%) with
most reactive rod withdrawal (Core II).
Core 1A & 1B required
0.25% AK shutdown margin.
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8.
MRS 4/18/72 Pressure Swt problem at Monticello
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1.
Licensee was not informed of problem by GE, however, License
had GE FEM 71-26 which prescribed the proper Swt setting.
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2.
Licensee has some of the same switches as Monticello and is re-
placing their switches with BZR-169. Replacement is scheduled
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to be completed by 10/14/72 (during routine surveillance tests).
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9.
MRS 4/6/72 GF. HFA Relays
1.
OC received FEM 71-26
2.
The pull in voltage has been checked and reset as necessary.
3.
The results will be fcrwarded to TSB with this memo.
10. MRS 6/19/72 Paddle Type Flow Swt
1.
a - Flow to Cleanup Filters ( 2 Swt)
b - Seal leakage from Recirculation Pump (5 Swt)
c - Liquid Poison System (1 Swt)
2.
Included above
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3.
PORC evaluating the problem
It is our understanding that a proposal has'been made to require all
licensee's to demonstrate the operability of t.he liquid poison sys-
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(OC's
tem by functionally testing with D.I. water once per cycle.
At OC chis is
TS 4.2 currently require function test cace/ cycle).
the only direct path in which a shattered flow tiwitch could get to
the reactor.
In other systems the poison would ou .:tceped by fil-
ters or demineralizers.
11. MRS 6/15/72 Sent,itivity of the Leak Detection System
The OC leak detection system is based on sump levels and flow from
Other methods that JCPL stated they would evaluate were
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the sump.
unsuccessful (semi-annual report January-Jane 1972)
Over a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period the accuracy of the system has been cal-
a.
culated by JCPL to be 1 0.1 gpm at a rate of 1 gpm and 1 0.02
spm at a rate of 5 spm.
A 5 gpm leak would be detected within 20 minutes if the timer
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on the pump works as designed.
(Timer is set to alarm if the
1eakage rate reaches 4 gpm.)
The bases for TS 3.3 states that the " leakage of the magnitude
specified can be detected reasonably in a matter of a few hours
."; " Addition-
utilizing the available leak detector schemes .
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al qualitative information is available . . .via the monitored
drywell atmospheric condition . . . fluctuation in atmospheric
condition are expected". The Technical Supervisor indicated that
the latter is almost useless.
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b.
The action point administrative 1y for unidentified leakage is
4 gpm to shutdown, however, any increase above the 1-1.2 rpm
normal leakage would require an evaluation. The drywell can-
not be inspected during power operation.
c.
Identified leakage, ie valve and pump packing is piped to one
sump and unidentified leakage goes to another sump. OC has
determined a fan cooler leak by water analysis.
(Fan cooler
leakage is considered unidentified.)
d.
The minimum sensitivity of the leak detection system (based
on the sumps) is given in a. (above).
12.
MRS 11/11/71 Failed Retaining Pins-Turbine
OC had same problem. Details in report Paragraph 24.
The information or action requested by your notes on memos was ob-
tained as follows:
1/ Note (undated) Standard for Overhead and Gantry Cranes-advised li-
censee
2/ Note (5/26/72) Shipping Cask Liner Failure-advised licensee
3/IM 3/72-02 Bearing Failure Limitorque Valve
Licensee does not have this model.
4/ Memo Brunner to Keppler 2/28/72 Use of Membranes in Stored Water
Tanks. No floating membranes at OC.
4p----The licensee has been requested to supply us with up-to-date copies
of P&ID in nse at the plant. We provided him a list of the drawings
we have and the list of revisions.
Some revisions have been supplied
in the form of blue print size drawings.
db--- Jersey Central Power & Light report (August 10, 1972) on the 11
overexposures has been reviewed and is not acceptable for the fol-
lowing reason
1.
Radia'. ion enter vore r.ot provided
2.
Specific control meaauses were not given i.e. how close to 3 rem
the men were allowed to approach.
3.
Corrective action to prevent recurrence and the date corrective
action will be implemented.
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According to the letter which was written approximate 1: 20 days
af ter Jersey became aware of the overexposures, GORB was still
planning to investigate the overexposure.
It is my understanding
that the reason a 30 day report is required (vs a 10 day report)
is;to allow time for an investigation and to provide the above
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information.
If HQ does not inform JCP&L that the report is un-
acceptable, I feel we should cite JCPL for. inadequate controls
or surveys and require them to provide the above information.
Currently _00 does not have a specific requirement to test the re-
lief valves on the Liquid Poison System. Mr. McCluskey stated
that a definite schedule would be established and implemented, how-
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ever, I feel this matter should be referred to Licensing for inclu-
sion in the TS 's.
I feel JCPL had shown definite improvement in reporting of unusual
events, however, I still plan to encourage prompter. reports.
In- the area of audits by GORB, I f eel that the audits performed
are not in the depth required to detect problems.
I need to do
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more in this field.myself to come up with specifics. The audit
reports that I have seen generally indicated compliance with pro-
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cedures.
It is difficult for me to believe that procedures are
adequate and followed and to have as many unusual events and oc-
currences as OC,
If I don't get satisfied in this area, I plan
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to request that I be informed when audits are being performed and
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accompany the auditor.
If it still appears to be a problem, I
think we should attend PORC and GORB meetings on an unannounced
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basis - at least once per year. With our present inspection pro-
gram, we cannot reasonably assure the safe operation of one of
these plants unless these groups funceton as intended.
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Floyd S. Cantrell
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Reactor Inspector
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