ML20107C085

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Forwards AO Rept 50-219/74/21
ML20107C085
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 03/22/1974
From: Ross D
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Anthony Giambusso
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
Shared Package
ML18039A986 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-95-258 NUDOCS 9604170215
Download: ML20107C085 (1)


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Jersey Centra Power & Lig7t Company b

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MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD

  • MORRISTOWN, N.J. 07960
  • 201-539-6111 uumum rue dy)(([, Public Utilities Corporation General

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d Mr. A. Giambusso g,p-Deputy Director for Reactor Projects E.g(,k 3

Directorate of Licensing

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United States Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545

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Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Subj ect: Oyster Creek Station i

Docket No. 50-219 Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/21 The purpose of this letter is to forward to you the attached Abnormal Occurrence Report in compliance with paragraph 6.6.2.a of the Technical Specifications.

Enclosed are forty copies of this submittal.

Very truly yours, 8/

4 Donald A. Ross Manager, Nuclear Generating Stations cs Enclosures c

cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Direc' tor Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region I 2601 1

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9604170215 950213 PDR FOIA DEKOK95-258 PDR

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  • OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR' GENERATING STATION

' FORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY;08731; Abnormal 0ccurrence Report No. 50-219/74/21

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March ' 22,.19 7'4' -

Occurrence-'Date'

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March - 13, 1974 -

Identihication of Occurrence -

Violation of the Technical Specifications, Table 3.1.1.B.2, which _ specifies (that the RE22 mair) steam line high flow sensors actuate at a differential pressure corresponding to a line flow' of 1120% of rates steam flow (97.5 psid).

his event is considered to be 'an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15B.

i' Conditions Prior to Occurrence-

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Re plant was operating at steady-state power.

' he major plant parameters at the time of the event were as follows:

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Power:

Core,1750 Mit Electric, 595 Mie 5

l Flow:

Recirculation,15.1 x 10 epm 6

Feedwater, 6.46 x 10 lb/hr l

Stacli Gas: 27,000.pCi/sec Description of Occurrence l

At 0040 on March 13,-1974, whiledaking daily Technical ~ Specification log read-

-ings, an operator noted and reported to the shift foreman that the ' differential pressure:: indicator for Sensor RE22D indicated 0 psid and that the instrument

-lines were hot. The operator'found the RE22D bypass valve to be open, causing (Sensor.RE22D to be inoperable.

Upon closir;g the bypass valve, the RE22D differ-ential pressure

  • indication returned to normal.

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Apparent cause' of Occurrence h

The apparent' cause of this incident was incorrect valve positioning.

Investi-

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L Lgation has not established the' exact' time or the individual (s) involved in the U

Lopening of the RE22D. bypass'.

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r-I Abnormal Occurrence No. 50-219/74/21 Page 2 The valve lineup of the steam flow sensors was checked by an instrument techniciar.

and then independently rechecked by another instrument technician at approxi-mately 1000 on b! arch 11, 1974.

The RE22D bypass was found to be closed at this time.

Plant startup commenced subsequent to these checks and criticality was achieved at 1614 on March 11, 1974.

It has been concluded that the incorrect positioning of the RE22D bypass valve took place sometime between the completion of the valve lineup checks on March 11, 1974 and discovery of the incorrect valve position at 0040 on March 13, 1974.

Analysis of Occurrence The original report 'of this incident (March 15, 1974) stated that the safety significance of this occurrence was minimal since seven of the eight RE22 sensors remained operable during the period when the RE22D bypass was open.

At that time, it had not been noted that the RE22D bypass could have bypassed the differential pressure signal to RE22A, B, and C and the No. I steam line steam flow sensor had the bypass flow path been less restrictive.

The fact that the RE22A, B, and C and the No. I steam line flow sensor remained operable and accurate is demonstrated by log readings and the steam flow recorder graph.

The operator who discovered the "0" differential pressure indication of RE22D re-corded the readings of all eight sensors as found while the RE22D was open.

The indications of RE22A, B, and C were comparable to those of the unaffected sensors, RE225, F, G, and. H.

A check of the steam flow recorder graph shows no increase in indicated steam flow as would be expected had the differeritial pressure applied at the steam flow sensor undergone an increase when the RE22D bypass valve was shut.

It is noted here that this discrepancy was identified during the taking of Technical Specification log readings.

This not only demonstrates the useful-ness of this data taking, but also indicates that the operator taking these readings was alert and properly responded to an abnormal indication.

Corrective Action Instrument technicians'will be advised via a memorandum of the details of this event, the critical importance of valve lineup checks on systems associated with reactor protection, and the importance of immediately reporting instances in which valves are found to be incorrectly positioned.

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