ML20101M706

Applicant Answer in Opposition to Amended Petition of City of Brook Park,Oh for Leave to Intervene Out of Time.* City of Brook Park Untimely Intervention Petition Should Be Denied.W/Certificate of Svc

ML20101M706
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse, Perry
Issue date:	06/30/1992
From:	Charnoff G OHIO EDISON CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
CON-#392-13062 91-644-01-A, 91-644-1-A, A, NUDOCS 9207090012
Download: ML20101M706 (21)

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~ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[

BEFORE THE ATOMIC. SAFETY AND LICENSItJ BOARD '92 IL -1 P3 :26

M uom.m4,s af.0,f

tn 1 1

) . sam u In the Matter of )

)

OHIO EDISON COMPANY ) Occket No. 50-440-A

) 50-346-A

'(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, )

Facility-Operating License )

No. NPF-58) ) (Suspension of THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC TLLUMINATING

) Antitrust Conditions)

)

COMPANY ) ASLBP No. 91-644-01-A THE TOLEDO EDISON COHPANY )

)

(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, )

Facility Operating License )

No. NPF-58) )

(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1, Facility Operating License )

No. NPF-3) )

)

APPLICANTS' ANSWER IN OPPOSITION TO THE AMENDED PETITION OF THE CITY OF BROOK PARK, OFIO, FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE OUT OF TIME Last year the City of Brook Park, Ohic unsuccessfully sought

-to intervene in this proceCling #1 On Jur:e 15, 1992, Brook Park filed an Amended Petition for Leave to Intervene Out of Time

(" Brook Park Petition"). This Answer is submitted on behalf of Ohio Edison-Company ("OS"), the Toledo Edison Company ("TECo")

and the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company ("CEI")

1/ See Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclaer Power Plant, Unit 1),

LBP-91-38, 34 N.R.C. 229, 252 (1991) ("LBP-91-38").

9207090012 920630 PDR ' ADOCK 05000346- 3p g30 2 M. PDR

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i f(collectively " Applicants"), who oppose. Brook Park's amended request to intervene in this license amendment proceeding.

I.

Leoal~ Standard for Late Intervention Petitions As Brook Park recognizes,2/ the NRC's rules of practice 4 include specific provisions'that govern untimely requests for intervention in an ongoing NRC licensing' proceeding.EI Nontimely intervention petitions " vill.not be entertained" absent a deter- i

.mination that, on balance,. veighing the following five factors, the late petition should be granted: (1) " good cause" for fail- .

ure to file on time; (2) the availability of other means whereby the petitioner's-interest will be protected including, specifi-cally, (3) the extent to which the petitioner's interest vill be represented by existing parties; (4) the extent-to which the petitioner's participation may reasonably be expected to assist in developing a sound record; and (5) the extent to which the

. petitioner's participation vill broaden the issues or delay the proceeding.

'The requirements for late intervention are supplemental to the judicial requirements of standing, set forth in NRC's rules 2/ Brook Park Petition at 4-5.

l/ See 10 C.F.R. S 2.714 (a)(1)(i)-(v).

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l of practice, which a late' petitioner also must satisfy.S/ In summary, in order to have standing, a petitioner must have a cog-nizable interestLin the proceeding that could be adversely affected by the proceeding's outcome. In addition, the peti-tioner must indicate the specific aspect of the subject matter of the proceeding asfto which it wishes to intervene.EI If a late petitioner does not satisfy all of the require-ments specified above, it is not entitled to intervene. In its discretion, however, a Licensing Board may nevertheless grant a petitioner's request to intervene if the Board concludes that it vill serve the public interest to do so.5# In particular, dis-cretionary intervention may be appropriate where a petitioner shows a "significant ability to contribute on substantial issues of law or fact which vill not otherwise be properly raised or presented, sets forth these matters with suitable specificity to allow evaluation, and demonstrate (s] their importance and immedi-acy, justifying the time necessary to consider them."2#

.1/ 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714(a)(1); see 10 C. F. R. 5 2.714(d)(1); Flor-ida' Power & Licht Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), CLI-91-13, 34 N.R.C. 185, 187-88

.(1991).

5/ See Metropolitan EdisonlCo. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Sta-

-tion, Unit No. 1), CLI- 8 3-2 5, 18 N. R.C . 3 2 7, 331 (1983).

.6/ Portland General Electric Co. (Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1-and 2), CLI-76-27, 4 N.R.C. 610 (1976).

2/ Id. at 617

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II.- The Brook' Park Petition Does Not Satisfy the Recuirements for Late Intervention ,

The Brook Park Petition does not satisfy. any of the require-ments for' late intervention set forth in110 C.F.R. Section 2.714(a)(1).E/ Accordingly, _the Petition should be denied.

A. Failure to Meet the Good Cause Requirement Brook Park explains in great detall in its Petition why it did not file an amended petition to intervene until April 21, 1992, the date that Brook Park adopted an ordinance creating the municipal electric system, Brook Park Public 8/ - Applicants continue to maintain that Brook Park lacks stand-ing to intervene due to its failure to establish an " injury-in-fact." See Answer of-CEI and TE to Petition of City of-Brook-Park for. Leave to Intervene and Supplement Thereto (Sept. 16, 1991) at 2-3; Answer of OE to City of Brook Park's : Supplement to Petition.for Leave to Intervene (Sept.-16,-1991) at 6-9 While. Brook Park citizens passed a referendum and the City Council enacted an ordinance-autho-rizing Brook Park to establish a municipal electric system, Brook Park.has taken'no concrete actions toward the actual development of-the system.. For example, Brook Park has yet to arrange.for the' financing of this expedition. Although the Board has indicated that the referendum alone may remove the'" provisional" aspect of any potential injury, (LBP-91-38 at:38), Applicants believe that the_ municipality is nothing more-than a shell incapable of incurring the requisite injury-in-fact in the absence of financing arrangements and similar: concrete affirmative actions establishing the actual-

' municipal. electric system. _In_ addition, Brook Park has not specifically identified any particular~ aspects of the case as to which it vishes to intervene.

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i Pover.E/ Absolutely no explanation is provided, however, as to why Brook' Park did not file its amended petition two months ago, immediately after Brook Park's adoption of that ordinance. What has Brook Park been doing for the last two months ? Perhaps Brook Park would contend that it need not have filed its Petition until May 21,.1992, _the effective date of the ordinance. But the ordi-nance is written so as to automatically go into effect in May; there is no justification for Brook Park's delay, particularly when, as Brook Park vell knew, Phase One of this proceeding was drawing to a close.

Counsel for Brook Park takes pride in its knowledge of the proceeding.1S' Apparently, then, in April, 1992, counsel for Brook Park fully appreciated the fact that in November, 1991, the Licensing Board had established a briefing schedule and in March, 1992, the Board established an oral argument schedule for comple-tion of.the first phase of this case.11# Brook Park still vould have missed the established briefing deadline for Applicants' opponents had it alerted the Board and the parties in April of 2/ -Brook Park Petition at 6-10, and Exhibit A (City of Brook Park Ordinance No. 7711-1992 (adopted April 21, 1992; effec-tive May.22, 1992)).

1S/' See Brook Park Petition at 19.

11/ Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), Orders of Nov. 14, 1991 and March 19, 1992, as modified by order of March 20, 1992.

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its intcrest in participating in the proceeding and had the Board permittedLBrook Park to do so. Nevertheless, it would have been much less burdensome to fold Brook Park into the process at that juncture than to endeavor to do so nov..

Briefing is complete; the oral argument is over. In that process, Applicants responded to the separate arguments of five parties opposed to the pending license amendment request. It is either naive or-disingenuous for Brook Pack to claim, as it does 12/ that it vould not be " inappropriately" disruptive -- at least to the Applicants -- for Brook Park nov, at this late date, to file papers on the bedrock legal issue.13/ -

In short, Brook Park's Petition does not satisfy the " good cause" requirement set.forth in 10 C.F.R. Section 2.714(a)(1).

Brook Park's unexplained two-month delay at this late stage of the proceeding is inexcusable.

12/ Brook Park Petition at 22.

12/ In Section II.D, infra, Applicants-address Brook Park's

. description of how it seeks to participate in' Phase One of this proceeding. See Brook Park Petition at 21.

._a.- .

l B. Existing Parties Will Protect Brook Park's Interest Beyond the absence of " good cause," there are in place over-lapping and redundant means by which Brook Park's interest in this proceeding is being amply protected.14/ There is no need to -

admit Brook Park.

Brook Park argues that its " interest in this proceeding is unique."15/ This simply is not true.16/

Brook Park's interest as a municipality with a potential electric utility company is virtually identical in all respects to the status of the City of Cleveland, one of the five party opponents in this case. Whether or not Brook Park and Cleveland li/ 10 C.F.R. SS 2.714(a)(1)(ii) and (iv).

15/ Brook Park Petition at 14. .

lE/ In Section II.C, infra, Applicants address Brook Park's repeated factual assertions about its ostensible ability to provide " live" proof of the continual need for the antitrust license conditions. See Brook Park Petition at 15. Whether the Brook Park situation might be material evidence in the second, and only, factual phase of this case -- a notion Applicant's show in Section II.C is erroneous -- is not sig-nificant in determining whether Brook Park should be permit-ted to intervene now. Any party can talk about Brook Park, or call upon Brook Park representatives as witnesses, during Phase Two. For purposes of late intervention, the question is whether Brook Park's concerns about and approach to the case are shared by other parties already admitted and actively participating in the proceeding.

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are " potential competitor (s),"17/ a point Brook Park seems to

. consider' relevant,-has nothing to do with the conviction with-which each municipality seeks.to retain the NRC's antitrust license conditions, their respective use of the conditions, the nature of each city's arguments in opposition to the conditions, and.the corresponding vehemence with which each city opposes Applicants' license amendment-requests. For example, Brook Park has not identified any legal position it would-take in Phase one of this case that has not been vell articulated and argued by tne City or Cleveland (among others). To the contrary, rrook Park suggesta that it vill adopt the arguments of Cleveland (and other opponents of the pending license amendment requests) in its "for-mal statement" submittal on Phase One.18/ Neither has Brook Park identified any divergence of interest between itself and Cleve-

. land that would result in T different approach to Phase Two of the proceeding, which primarily concerns the relative cost of power from Perry, Davis-Besse and alternative sources of electricity.1E! Obviously, Cleveland and Brook Park are not the ll/ Brook Park Petition at 17 18/ Brook Park Petition at 21. Brook Park does not mention the legal issue raised by Cleveland concerning the affirmative defenses of res judicata, collateral estoppel, laches and law of the case.

12/ Presumably, Phase Two also would include the so-called-

" agency bias" issues that were held in abeyance by the Com-mission-pending resolution of Phase One of this case. Brook

' Park does not address these issues.

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same city. But'the experience of Cleveland in the retail market-place, for example, in contrast to the " emergence"29/ of Brook Park in:this' arena, does not change their " coterminous"21 inter-est-and vantage point in opposing Applicants in every respect possible, presumably, in both phases of this proceeding. In short, Cleveland can fully represent Brook Park's interest in this case.

Furthermore, four other parties share Cleveland and Brook Park's interest in convincing the NRC and any subsequent appel-

' late tribunal that the Applicants' license amendment requests

,. -should be denied. Brook Park's arguments about the differences between itself and these other parties do not address the funda-

-mental questions (1) whether.the party opponents' legal arguments and factual assertions vill diverge in any way from those advo-cated by Brook Park, and, consequently, (2) whether the existing party opponents vill adequately represent Brook Park. Thus, for example, while_ Brook Park may not be a member of AMP-0, like AMP-0, it. foresees itself as a competitor of one of the Appli-L cants. Brook Park's f actual' (albeit irrelevant)-assertions about how the sky vill fall in the absence of NRC's continued 2S/ Brook-Park Petition at 14.

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1 M/ M. at 17 12/ Brook Park Petition at 17 l-

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enforcementiof the license conditions,Section II. C, infra, are

. remarkably similar to the-factual (albeit_ irrelevant) assertions >

of AMP-0.22I Brook Park also fails tolshow Why "the efforts of (NRC) staff and DOJ to advance and defend the important questions of public policy at issue"1S# here prevents these parties, who share BrookJPark's_ position-in the case, from " properly _

represent [ing] the-direct-and unique interest of Brook Park."2E#

-This is not a self-evident proposition, and. Brook Park presents no facts or explanation to support it.

-C.- The Improbability'that. Brook Park Will Assist in Developina a Sound Record

-Based on Brook Park's contribution to date, there is no rea-son _to believe that Brook Park "may reasonably be expected to assist in developing a sound record," another criterion for untimely. requests for intervention. 5 111/ Compa re B rook L Pa rk _ Pe t i t i o n a t .14 -16 w i t h AMP-O B r i e f ,

March 9, 1992,-at-18-22. --

See-Applicants' Reply,- May 7,

, -1992, at 71-74. See also NRC Staff's Response to Brook Park's Supplement to Petition-to Intervene (Sept. 16, 1991)

-at 8-("there-is no reason-to-believe that Brook Park's

' interest' vill not be adequately protected and represented by AMP-Ohio or_other' parties to this proceeding").

21/ Brook Park Petition at 18.

21 / g..

25./ 10 C.F.R. $ 2.714(a)(1)(iii).

en __

_The issue of law-now;pending before the Doard concerns the meaning of_Section 105(c) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended _("the Act")._

Neither Brook Park nor its counsel purport to have any_ knovledge or expertise about the Act, the NRC's " par-ticularized" role in antitrust regulation under Section 105(c),

or any aspect of NRC's nuclear licensing responsibilities.27/ In -

fact, quite remarkably, the Brook Park Petition is utterly devoid of any mention of Section 105(c) of the Act, the statutory provi-sion that is the subject, and the only subject, of Phase one of this proceeding.28/ -

Brook Park also' fails to mention the nuclear power plants that are the focal point of the proceeding, much-less to suggest that it is knowledgeable about them. Yet the relative cost of'pover from these nuclear-powered plants and alternatives-to them is the subject, and the onlij subject of Phase Two of the proceeding.2S! '

Instead,1the Brook Park Petition is_ filled with unsubstantiated ^(and patently biased). factual assertions about the utility industry in Ohio, Brook Park's place in it, and the reliance Brook Park 1 intends to_ place on the NRC's license 21 7 See Brook Park Petition at 18-20.

2i/ Again, Cleveland's affirmative defense claims are not at issue-here. See-n.18,.sapra.

23/ Again, Applicants' ' agency bias claims are -not at issue here.

--See n.19, supra.

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conditions -- a reliance which,'not surprisingly, is designed to Linvoke essentially all of the conditions which. enable it to avoid the-nuclear facilities' high-cost power, and assiduously not to use the license conditions that provide access to Perry and b Daviu-Besse.2E This factual nonologue by Brook Park is inter-esting in that it_ proves the point Applicants have suggested is the case, namely, that the NRC's antitrust license conditions in fact are being used for a purpose antithetical to that for which they were intended. 'But, notvithstanding Applicants' anecdotal interest in this factual dissertion by Brook Park, none of this information is relevant to the. resolution of the case. It per-tains neither to-the legal issue that is the subject of Phase l One, nor to the factual issue that is the subject of Phase Two.

Brook Park relies upon its counsel's asserted knowledge and expertise.about Ohio municipalities and the application of FERC l an'titrust law to the utility industry.31/ -

However, neither the world of Ohio municipalities nor FERC's general antitrust author-ity-are central to this case;-in fact, _the former issue probably 10/ See1 Brook Park Petition at 12. Specifically, Brook Park intends to rely-on-Conditions 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 10, which concern sales and exchanges of wholesale power and coordina-

' tion services, interconnections, wheeling, short term power supplies,'and-full and partial wholesale power requirements.

Brook Park does not intend to use Conditions 4, 8 and 9, concerning CAPCO membership, reserve sharing,-and ownership in and access to Perry and Davis-Besse.

31 / Brook' Park Petition at 18-20.

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i has;noJrelevance at=all.-- In_any. event. both'of these subjects '

aiready havelbeen addressed by the opposition parties.32/ -

In suntmary, Brook Park has not distinguished itself f rom' the opposition in any way as for as its ability to provide additional assistance in' developing the_ record. To the contrary, the sub-ject with which-Erook Park is preoccupied -- its anticipated use of-the subject license conditions -- is irrelevant. Most impor-tantly,farook Park does not show any interest, knowledge or familiarity with the issues specified for resolution in this c a s e .'

D. Brook Park's Admission Will Cause Disruotion and Delay Brook Park states that it " vill not seek individually to ,

brief or argue summary dispcsition to the Board," but vill submit

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a " formal statement," which vill specify those " portions of the arguments _ advanced by (Cleveland, AMP-0, Alabama Electric Cooper-ative"and the Department of Justice) it wishes to adopt."E2/

Applicants are not sure what a " formal statement" is, or just vhat' Brook Park has_in mind, but'to the extent Brook Park is sim-ply repeating verbatim other opposition parties' assertions, its

-al/ See, ez ga, AMP-O 3rief at 18-20; Cleveland Motion at 26-28.

ll/ Brook Path Petition at 21.

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cr;ntributicr.; is nil and r.hould not be permitted for-that reason alone. On the other. hand, if Brook Park intends to use the other parties' " arguments" to formulate new arguments or place a dif-ferent slant'of. , iG arguments, its submittal vill delay Phase One of the proceeding, which is now complete (other than its resolu-tion by the Board). In short, any filing Brook Park makes which is not entirely redundant, and therefore meaningless, vill neces-sitate a response by Applicants, to whom Brook Park is opposed.

Obviously, this vill delay the ability of the Licensing Board to resolve Phase One, and if appropriate, to move on to Phase Two.

.Moreover,.since Brook Park apparently_ seeks to include in Phase Two the types of factual allegations contained in its Petition,34/ its participation there also would be meaningless because these allegations are irrelevant to the subject-matter of Phase Two. Alternatively, the admission of such issues would extraordinarily broaden the scope of Phase Two, which has been narrowly and precisely defined.

In short, the fifth " factor" considered u. evaluating a late petition to intervene also veighs against--Brook Park.1E#

11/ See Brook Park Petition at 22.

15/ See 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714(a)(1)(v).

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i In summary, rantimely intervention petitions will not'be entertained absen. proof by a petitioner that, on balance, the factors set forth in 10 C.F.R. Section 2.714(a)(1) overcome the presumption against the petitioner's admission. Brook Park fails-to. satisfy any of the f actors which it bears the burden of prov-

.ing weigh in its favor. Accordingly, its Petition should be denied.

III. -There is No Reason for the Board, in Its Discretion, to Admit Brook Park Each of-the reasons set .forth above, which weigh against Brook park's untimely intervention, similarly disf avor its dis-cretionary intervention. As the Commission stated in Pebble Sorings, the criteria for late intervention are analogous and useful factors to be considered in assessing the facts and cir-cumstances relevant to the consideration of whether to grant intervenor-stetus to a petitioner otherwise not entitled to participate.EE Moreover, Brook Park fails to make the particularly impor-tant showing that it has a "significant ability to contribute on 25/ See'CLI-76-27, 4 N.R.C. at 616.

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substantial-issues of law or fact vhich will not otherwise be-properly % raised or: presented. "El/ The issue of law that is the central subject' of this proceeding -- and which Brook Park acknowledges is the subject of this proceedingIE/ -- already has been properly-" raised" and " presented" by others. Brook Park gives no-indication _that it vill contribute meaningfully, much less "significant[1y)," on this issue.

As-to the issues of fact that are the subject of Phase Two -- _i.e., the relative cost'of

. Perry, Davis-Besse and alternative sources of power, and the issue of agency bias -- the_ Brook Park Petition is utterly devoid of any. discussion;about them or even discussion _particularly rel-

, evant to-them.

Because'there is no reason to believe Brook ~ Park vill make a significant contribution to this case, discretionary intervention i should be denied.

IV. . Conclusion -

Forithe reasons set-forth.above, Brook Park's untimely i

intervention petition should be denied. Brook Park i's not l

lL 21/ .14. at-617 L 31/'-Brook Park Petition at-22: as.previously noted,_see n.la, h supra,. Brook _ Park does'not mention-the Cleveland affirmative

[ -defense 1 issues.

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entitled.to intervene, and there is no reason for the Board, in its discretion, to grant Brook Park's Petition.

Respectfully submitted, James P. Murphy

ELL, 4 \'1Sc ~ h 1,2i s u.$ L Gerald Charnoff L' Colleen Conry Dchsrsh 3. Charnoff Mark A. Singley SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY 1201 Pennsylvanla Avenua, N.W. SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS &

Washington, D.C. 20044 TROWBRIDGE (202) 626-6600 2300 N Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20037 Counsel for The Cleveland (202) 663-8000 Electric Illuminating Company and The Toledo Edison Company Counsel for Ohio Edison Compenj Dated: June 30, 1992

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UbHRC NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION

'92 JL -1 P 3 :26 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD gwm:

yg ,,Mi{. Qpr. %i .. v ?

ifl

) H i. t ~ "

In the Matter of )

)

OHIO EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-440-A-

) 50-346-A '

(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, )

Facility Operating License )

No. NPF-58) ) (Suspension of THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING

) Antitrust Conditions)

)

COMPANY ) ASLBP No.91-644 ^1-A THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY )

)

(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, )

Facility Operating License )

No. NPF-58) )

(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1, Facility Operating License ) -

No.-NPF-3) )

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of June, 1992, a copy of the foregoing-Applicants' Answer in Opposition to the Amended Petition of the City of Brook Park, Ohio, for Leave to Intervene Out cf Time was served by first class mail postage prepaid on each ot the following:

Samuel J. Chilk Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attn: Docketing and Service Branch Charles Bechhoefer Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

-4350 East West Highway, 4th Floor Bethesda, Maryland 20814

G. Paul Bollwerk, III Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel '

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4350_ East West Highway, 4th Floor Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Marshall E. Miller, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1920 South Creek Boulevard Spruce Creek Fly-In Daytona Beach, Florida 22124 Joseph Rutberg, Esq.

Sherwin E. Turk, Esq.

Steven R. Hom, Esq.

Office of the General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike '

Rockville, Maryland 20852 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, . Maryland. 20852 Mark C. Schechter, Esq.,

Janet Urban, Esq.

Transportation, Energy and Agriculture Section Antitrust Division Department of Justice -

Judiciary Center Building 555' Fourth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20001 lI

-i JuneLW. Weiner,_Esq.,- '

Chief Assistant Director of Law William M. Ondrey Gruber, Esq.,

Assiatant Director of Law William T. Zigli, Esq.

Assistant Director of_Lav City Hall, Room 106 ,

601-Lakeside Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44114 4

Reuberi C9)dberg, Esq. .:

-Channing D. Strother, Jr., Esq.

.Goldberg, Fieldman & Letham, P.C.

1100 Fifteenth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. -20005 D. Biard MacGuineas, Esq.

Volpe, Boskey and Lyons ,

b 918-Sixteenth Street, N.W.-

Washington, D.C. 20006 1 Philip N. Ovetholt Office-of Nuclear Plant Performance Office'of Nuclear Energy U.S. -Department _of Energy,'NE-44

.19901; Germantown Road, Room F,-478

-Germantown, Maryland 20535'

~ Ke7neth 7... -Hegemarin, P. E.

President- .

American _ Muriicipa' Power-Ohio, Inc.

601 Dempsey Road F.O. Box 1549 Westerville, Ohio- 43001-DavidLR.iStraus,-Esq.

Spiegelr-& McDiarmid

~1350 New York Avenue, N.W.

Suite 1100

-Washington, DiC. 20005-4798 Anthony J.: Alexander, Esq.

Vice President and General Counsel chio-Ed.inon Company-

. 75 South Main Stree:

19th Floor.

Akron,; Ohio' 44308  ;

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I,,

(...

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Gregg D. Ottinger, Esq.

John P.'Coyle, Esq.

Duncan & Allen Suite 300 1575 Eye. Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005-1175 David A. Lambros, Esq.

Lav Director City of Brook Park 6161-Engle Road Brook Park, Ohio 44142 .

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,s SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE 2300 N Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C 20037 (202) 663-8000 i

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