ML20094A046
| ML20094A046 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/02/1984 |
| From: | Rolfe R HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| OL-4, NUDOCS 8408030090 | |
| Download: ML20094A046 (59) | |
Text
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August 2, 1984
'T a-m UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CyMEIJD NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Commission '84 /20 -2 P1
-yy In the Matter of ) ' "
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LONG ISLAND-LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-4
) (Low Power)
(Shoreham' Nuclear" Power )
' Station, Unit-1) )
LILCO'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED CERTIFICATION OF THE LICENSING BOARD'S JULY 24, 1984 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART LILCO'S MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION ON PHASE I AND PHASE II LOW POWER TESTING On July 23, 1984, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board granted in part and denied in part LILCO's Motion for Summary Disposition on Phase I Low-Power Testing (Attachment A) and Motion for Summary Disposition on Phase II Low-Power Testing (Attachment B) (the Summary Disposition Motions). In those motions, LILCO contended that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact necessary to establish that no AC power
-would be needed to accomplish the functions specified in GDC 17 during Phases I and II of low power testing. Therefore, LILCO asserted no exemption for these two phases of low power testing
- was necessary inasmuch as LILCO has onsite TDI diesel generators and the capacity and capability of those TDI diesel a-8400030090 840002 PDR ADOCK 05000322 [{[i
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I c0 generators.is immaterial.1/
In its July 24, 1984 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part-LILCO's Motion for Summary Disposition on Phases I'and II of Low Power Testing (Attachment C), the .
Licensing Board substantially agreed with LILCO as to all facts material to the health and safety issues pertinent to Phases I and II. Among the material facts which the Board held to be admitted are the following: ,
(Phase I]
(7) During Phase I fuel loading and precriticality testing, there are no fission products in the core and no decay heat exists. Therefore, core cooling is not required. In addition, with no fission product inventory, there are no fission product releases possible. Rao, et al.,
Tr. 283-84; Sherwood Affidavit at 1 11; Hodges Affidavit st 14.
(8) Even a loss of coolant accident would have no consequences during Phase I since no core cooling is required. . . .
(9) No core cooling is required during Phase I and, therefore, no AC power is accessary during Phase I to cool the core.
1/ LILCO included Phases I and II of low power testing in its Application for Exemption. That inclusion does not, however, indicate LILCO's belief that an exemption is necessary during ttcse phases. In short, LILCO has exercised an abundance of caution in the event that the Commission disagrees with LILCO and believes that such an exemption is necessary.
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l Rao,'gt al., Tr. 285; Sherwood Affidavit at 1 13; Hodges Affidavit at 1.3. .
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[ Phase II]
(8). _Because ofxthe extremely low-power-levels reached during Phase II testing, .
fission product inventory in :the core will be only a small fraction of that assumed for the Chapter _15 analysis. The FSAR assumes operation at 100% power for 1,000 days in calculating fission product
' inventory; inventory during Phase II low-power testing will be less than.1/100,000
_(0.00001) of the fission product inventory assumed in the FSAR. Rao, et al., Tr. 295; Sherwood Affidavit at 1 17.
(9) If a LOCA did occur during the cold' criticality testing phase (Phase II),
there would be time on the order of months available to restore make-up water for core cooling. . . . With these low decay heat levels, the fuel cladding temperature would not exceed the limits of 10 CFR S 50.46 even after months without restoring coolant and eithout a source of AC power. Thus, there is no need to rely on the TDI diesel generators, or any source of AC power.
Rao, et al., Tr. 292-94; Sherwood Affidavit at 1 19; Hodges Affidavit at 1 8.
(10) During Phase II cold criticality testing conditions, there is no reliance on the diesel generators for mitigation of the loss of AC power event or the feedwater
. system piping break event. . . .
(12) None of the events analyzed in Chapter 15 could result in a release of radioactivity during cold criticality testing that would endanger the public health and safety. Rao, et al., Tr. 296; Sherwood Affidavit at 1 17.
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l (13) Even if AC power were not available for extended periods of time, fuel design' limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary would not-be approached or: exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences, and the core would be adequately cooled in the unlikely event of a postulated accident. .
Rao, et al.,.Tr. 295-96; Sherwood Affidavit -
at 1 22.
-Board Order at 11-13.
The' Licensing Board, nevertheless, denied the Summary Disposition Motions based on its interpretation of the Commission's May 16, 1984 Order (CLI-84-8) that:
GDC 17 means the same for low-power operations as for full-power operation, and it must be completely satisfied before any license (including low power) may be issued. Accordingly, the only recourse available tc. LILCO in this proceeding is to seek an exemption under the provisions of 10 CFR S 50.12(a), which is the subject of the instant evidentiary hearing.
Board Order at 9. Thus, the Licensing Board concluded that it had no power or jurisdiction to grant LILCO's Summary Disposition Motions "even though such activities do not require a qualified source of onsite AC power in order to perform the safety functions specified by GDC 17." Board Order at 9-10.
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LILCO now moves the Commission immediately to order direct certification of the' question of law, as described ..
above,-upon which the Licensing Board's denial of LILCO's Summary Disposition Motions is predicated and to clarify the intent of its May 16 Order.2/ Simply, the Commission's'May 16 Order does not clearly state whether the Commission intended its ruling to apply to fuel loading and precriticality testing and, by extension, to cold criticality testing where no AC power is needed.
This ambiguity arises from a number of factors.
First, the Commission in its Order pointedly did not address a fuel load and precriticality license. Second, LILCO filed with the Commission Summary Disposition Motions for Phases I and II similar to those filed with the Licensing Board. The 2/ Concurrently with this motion, LILCO has filed a Motion for Referral of Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part LILCO's Motions for Summary Disposition on Phase I and Phase II Low Power Testing with the Licensing Board.
Ordinarily, LILCO would not endorse this dual approach.
Nevertheless, in view of the Commission's response to Suffolk County's employment of this procedure with respect to potential security issues (Memorandum and Order, July 18, 1984), the Commission's apparent belief that its immediate intervention and guidance was necessary and appropriate to assure expeditious handling of this proceeding, and the Licensing Board's immediate involvement in hearings expected to last an additional several days, LILCO believes such concurrent filing is warranted in this limited instance.
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Commission did not address those Summary Dispo ition Motions in any fashion. .Had the Commission intended to apply its requirement of an exemption to Phases I and II, it could have, and likely would have, explictly denied tne Summary Disposition Motions on the grounds embodi'ed in-the Licensing Board's July 24, 1984 Order. C Third, and perhaps nost importan,t'ly, . the argument' befor'er,
,the,s commission o
on'May 7l 1984, which together with 1 ,
precedingflingsprecipitated'pheCommission'sMay16-Order, b -
primarily focused upon the nee? to harmonize GDC 17 with 10 CFR S 50.57(c)'.3/ The gist of much of th;at discussion was that a lower le' vel of AC power would be needed much less quickly duringtlow power testing up to 5% power than at full power w 4 operation. LILCo nfurther argued there that by permitting interim low power licensing, the' Commission]intendedtotake that lesser need for power into account. The Commission, in turn, was concerned about the precedential effect.of allowing the Staff, or a Licensing Board, to exercise unbridled discretion in applying such a standard without the invocation of a formal exemption process.
i l 3/ Commission % Meeting; Oral Argument on Shoreham, May 7, 1984, at Tr. 9, 13-16; 40-44, 49, 61-65, 71-75, 83-84, 87-89, 101-107, 119-129. '
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.i In contrast, during the May 7 argument, the Commission did not focus upon the lack of_any need for AC power during Phases I and II. Obviously, if no AC power is needed, there,is no discretionary application of the General Design Criterion involved. Indeed, GDC 17 is actually met because LILCO'has TDI diesels
.provided to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety . . S [and providing]
sufficient capacity and capability to assure that (1) specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not.
exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences and (2) the core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 17 (emphasis added). For Phases I and II, that necessary AC power is zero. Therefore, the degree of reliability of LILCO's onsite diesel generators is immaterial. There is no need for any diesel generator reliability to meet the " sufficient capacity and capability" standard.4/
4/ Similarly, since there is no need for AC power and no need for an exemption, there is no need to avait any subsequent proceedings concerning potential security issues. By (footnote continued)
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- v. The issue ,of whether
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' Ph.ases I and 'II;in,t,hese- cirbumstances shoilld be resolved er 1* t ]
quickly._,Predede'nt establiches certain criteria for a decision p6.. t 7 'j bv,a. licensing board to refsr or+ certify an issue to<the
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Commicgiori. The same standards ought to apply to th'e
'Commissjon'sconsiderationof~arequestfordirectedcertifi-e-
cation. They include: , ,
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']\ i Wher,h;er rev.iew shou;- be^ undertaken on d " certification" or.L7 eferral before the
- end of the case turrt, air whether a' failure
'to Udress,the issue;would seriously harm the,'p,ublic interest, result in unusual delf.1 or e,xpense, or affect the basic
- sEructure of the proceeding in some 2
pervasive or unusual manner.
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Lono Island Lichtino company (Shorehas, Nuclear Power Statior.,
Unit 1 ) ', LSP-43-21, 17 NRC 593, 598 (1983); Duke Power Company (Catawba Nucl^ ear f Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-387; 16 NRC 460, 9 w# 464 (1982); Consumers Poker t'ompany (Midland Plant, Uni'ts 1 and
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2), ALAB-634, 13 NRC 96, 99;(1981). Although only one of these 3 ,
(footnote continued)
( definition, such security contentions could not "arise. from the changes in configuration of the emergency electrical power system" or be " applicable to low power operation." Commission
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Memorandum and Order, June 18, 1984 at 3.
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-criteria need be satisifed to support directed certification, all three are satisfied here.
First, the public interest may be seriously harmed by permitting the ambiguity in-the Commission's May 16 Order to .
remain. The NRC Staff has already indicated its discomfort ~
with this ambiguity, as to this issue and in other respects, and a special Commission meeting has been held on the subject.5/ The public-interest would be furthered by affording the Ccamission an: opportunity to formally eliminate the ambiguity in its Order.
Second, failure to clear up this ambiguity will result in undue delay and expense. At a minimum, immediate referral may afford LILCO the opportunity to gain a license for Phases I and II without having to await conclusion of the present exemption proceeding and any subsequent proceeding concerning security issues thrugh LI'.CO believes there are no legitimate security issues. As a result, t he, parties and the Licensing Board may be spared the expense and delay of 5/ The Commission ordered that the transcript of its July 25, 1984 proceeding not be cited for any purpose.
Therefore, the substance of that meeting will not be discussed here. It is sufficient to note, however, that a meeting was held to address concerns which exist.
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1 litigating further over Phases I and II when LILCO's request for a license for those. phases may properly be smnmarily granted.
Third, resolution of this ambiguity will affect the ,
basic structure of the low power license proceeding in a pervasive manner. Issues pertaining to Phases I and II will be removed from the low power license proceeding and a license for those phases may be issued without additional licensing proceedings.
Accordingly, the question of law presented by the Licensing Board's July 24 Order, which is the sole impediment to'the Board's granting of summary disposition to LILCO for Phases I and II of its proposed low power testing, should be directly certified to and promptly considered by the Commission.
Respectfully submitted, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY By .
/ Rober t 'M.
Anthony F. Rolf e(/[fr.//
Earley, Jessine A. Monaghan Hunton & Williams Post Office Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: August 2, 1984
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ATTACHMENT A p LILCo, May 22, 1984 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensine Board In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING C0K"ANY } Docket No. 50-322-0L-4
) (Low Power)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
LILCO'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION ON PHASE I LOW POWER TESTING on March 20, 1984, LILCO filed its supplemental Motion for
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Low Power Operating License which requested the approval of a license to conduct four phases of low power testing. LILCo re-newed its March 20 motion and, pursuant to 10 CFR $ 2.749, sought summary disposition with respect to Phase I of the low power testing program in a motion filed with the Commission on May 4, 1984. Subsequently, the Commission's May 16 order va-l cated the Licensing Board's April 6 Memorandum and order to the extent it was inconsistent with the cot. mission's view that 0
'CFR l 50.57(c) did not make CDC 17 inapplicable to low powc l operation. The commission did not rule on LILCO's summary dis-position motions. LILCo, in a continuing effort to have the merits of its case engaged, renews its motion for summary dis-position on Phase I.
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I. Batis for Summary Disposition Phase I fuel load and procriticality testing involve both ,
fuel loading and core verification prior to the reactor's going critical. See attached Statement of Material Facts, Material Facts 1, 5. Initial core loading involves the placement of fuel bundles in specified locations within the reactor vessel. .
Material Fact 2. 1due following testing is associated with ini-tial core-loading:
.(a)- water chemistry surveillance testing (b)- control rod drive stroke time and friction tests (c) installation, calibration, and utilization of
( (d) special startup neutron instrumentation core verification instrument operability check Material Fact 3. Following placement of the fuel in the ves-sel, the following testing must be conducted:
(a) local power range monitor (LPRM) sensitivity data J
(b) zero power radiation survey for background readings (c) recirculation system instrument calibration checks (d) control rod drive scram tima testing i
(e) cold main steam isolation valve (MSIV) timing Material Fact 4.
4 For these procriticality activities, reliable diesel gen-erators are not necessary to satisfy the commission's I
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rives from GDC 17, which states in pertinent part: !
An onsite electric power system and an ,
offsite electric power system shall be pro- l vided to permit functioning of structures, ;
systems, and components important to safety.
The safety function for each system (assuming the other system is not functionina) shall be to provide sufficient capacity _and capability to assure that (1) specified acceptable fuel -
design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not ex-caeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences and (2) the core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital func-tions are maintained in the event of postu-lated accidents.
10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 17 (emphasis added). In other words, the onsite AC power source must be of sufficient ca-pacity and capability to assure the performance of the specified safety functions.
During Phase I fuel loading and procriticality testing, there are no fission products in the core and no decay heat. Therefore, core cooling is not required and, with no fission product invento-ry; fission product releases are not possible. Material Fact 7.
'In fact, during Phase I activities, most of the anticipated opera-tional occurrences and postulated accidents covered in Chapter 15 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) simply could not occur.
Even those Chapter 15 events that are possible would have no im-l pact on public health and safety, if they were in fact to occur.
' l Material Facts 6-8. Because no core cooling is required during 1 l
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4 Phase I, no AC power, either onsite or offsite, is needed. Mate-rial Fact 9. Thus the reliability of LILCO's onsite diesel gener-ators is not material. -
The license LILCO seeks with respect to Phase I testing (fuel load and procriticality testing) is identical to the low power ap-proval recently authorized by the Commission for the Diablo Ce.nyon plant. As the Commission noted in that decision:
The risk to public health and safety '
from fuel loading and pre-criticality testing is extremely low since no self-sustaining nu-clear chain reaction will taxe place under the terms of the license and therefore no ra-dioactive fission products will be produced.
, Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power P-lant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-27, 18 NRC 1146, 1149 (1983). Indeed, fuel loading and precriticality testing present no significant safety issue. Id.
The rationale for the Commission's grant of a license to Disblo Canyon applies with even greater force with respect to i Shoreham. At the time the Commission granted Diablo Canyon a low
' power testing license, quality assurance litigation concerning Diablo Canyon was still ongoing. In contrast, Shoreham has al-ready been the subject of a lengthy, favorable Partial Initial De-cision on all safety issues except those concerning those its ex-
- isting diesel generators. S2 e Long Island Lighting Co. (shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-57, 18 NRC 445 (1983) l 1
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5-C (Opinion) and unpublished Board Findings of Fact and Appendices.
Since there is no need for diesel generators or any AC power dur-ing Phase I, the assurance of no risk to public health and safety -
from Phase I activities is even greater at shoreham than at Diablo Canyon because all quality assurance issues at $horeham have been - -
favorably resolved.
II. Conclusion consistent with the Commission's May 16 Order, ODC 17 re-quires an ensite power source during low power testing with suffi-cient capacity and capability to perform certain safety functions specified in the GDC. During fuel loading and procriticality
(( testing conducted during Phase I low power testing, no AC power is required to perform these safety functions. Thus, even assuming that LILCO's onsite diesel generators do not operate, the require-ments of GDC 17 are met. For the above stated reasons, LILCO's Motion for Summary Disposition on Phase I Low Power Testing should ,
- be granted.1/
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- 1/ If the Licensing Board believes the commission's May 16 Order requires an exemption from the regulations for all four phases of the low power testing, then the Board should treat
! this motion as a motion for summary disposition of all health and safety issues with respect to Phase I.
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Respectfully submitted, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY J+i Robert M. P 1fe ~ /['
Anthony F. Earley, Jr.
Jessine A. Monaghan Munton & Williams Post Office Box 1535 Richmond, Virgir 2 23212 DATED: May 22, 1964 1
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. C STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE TO BE HEARD ON PHASE I LOW POWER TESTING The following is the statement of material facts as to which I LILCO contends there is no genuine issue to be heard concerning Phase I low power testing:2/
- 1. Phase I Fuel Loading and Precriticality Testing involves placing fuel in the reactor vessel and conducting tests of reactor systems and support systems. Cunther, Tr. 201-02; Notaro Affida-vit at Y 6.
- 2. Initial core loading involves the placement of $60 fuel f bundles in specified locations within the reactor vessel. Id.
- (
- 3. The following testing is associated with initial core loading:
(a) water chemistry surveillance testing (b) control rod drive stroke time and friction tests (c) installation, calibration, and utilization of spe-
, cial startup neutron instrumentation
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, (d) core verification instrument operability check 2/ These facts appear in the record in the affidavits filed
, with LILCO's Supplemental Motion for Low Power License dated l March 20 and in the testimony of the seven witnesses who l testified on April 24 and 25 before the Licensing Board. Since
! these documents are readily available, copies have not been at-tached. Facts also appear in an affidavit of Wayne W. Hodges, dated April 4, 1984, which is attached.
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I ounther, Tr. 202; Notaro Affidavit at 1 6.
- 4. Following placement of fuel in the vessel, tests are ,
performed to verify the operability of systems. This ;
precriticality testing includes the following: . .
(a) local power range monitor (LPRM) sensitivity data (b) zero power radiation survey for background readings
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(c) recirculation system instrument to calibration check (d) control rod drive scram time testing (e) cold main stear isolation valves (MSIV) timing Gunther, Tr. 202; Notaro Affidavit at 1 7.
'f L4 5. During all of the activities in Phase I, the reactor will remain at essentially ambient temperature and atmospheric pressure. The reactor will not.be taken critical. Any increase in temperature beyond ambient conditions will be due only to ex-ternal heat sources such as recirculation pump heat. There will be no heat generation in the core. Rao, et al., Tr. 279; Sherwood Affidavit at 1 7; Hodges Affidavit at 1 3.
[ 6. Of the 38 accident or transient events addressed in FSAR Chapter 15, 18 of the events could not occur during Phase I be-cause of the operating conditions of the plant. An additional 6 i
events could physically occur, but given the plant conditions, would not cause the phenomena of interest in the Chapter 15 safety analysis. The remaining 14 events could possibly occur, although i
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vit at 1 4.
- 7. During Phase I fuel loading and precriticality testing, there are no fission products in the core and no decay heat ex-ists. Therefore, core cooling is not required. In addition, with no fission product inventory, there are no fission product re-leases possible. Rao, et al., Tr. 283-84; Sherwood Affidavit at 1 11; Hodges Affidavit at 1 4.
- 8. Even a loss of coolant accident would have no conse-
- quences during Phase I since no core cooling is required. No fis-sion products exist t.nd therefore no decay heat is available to heat up the core. The fuel simply would not be challenged even by a completa drain down of the reactor vessel for an unlimited peri-od of time. Rao, $ al. , Tr. 284; Sherwood Affidavit at 1 9; Hodges Affidavit at 1 4.
- 9. No core cooling is required during Phase I and, there-fore, no AC power is necessary during Phase I to cool the core.
Rao, ej a_1_., Tr. 285; Sherwood Affidavit at 1 13; Hodges Affidavit l at 1 3.
' >EOx TELEcCPIEP, 495; 1- 8-a4;12:54Pr1 : c0-76edild- 4042:e-1c1; C UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY, Docket No. 50-322 (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.
Unit 1)
AFFIDAVIT OF MARVIN W. H00GES CONCERNING THE SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR l LOW p0WER OPERATION, PHASE I AND II. AT 5HOREHAM l I, Marvin W. (Wayne) Hodges, being duly sworn, state as follows:
- 1. I am a Section Leader in the Reactor Systems Branch of the Office of Nuclea,r Reactor Regulation, A copy of my professional qualifications is attached.
- 2. LongIslandLightingCompany(LILCO)filedaSupplementalMotion for Low Power Operating License dated March 20, 1984. In that motion, LILCO proposed a phased program for low power operation at Shoreham. The four phases proposed are:
, a) Phase I: fuel load and precriticality testing, b) Phase !!: cold criticality testing, c) Phase III: heatup and low power testing to rated pressure / temperature conditions (approximately 1% rated power); and
.) p,.se IV. low powe, t.st,ng (1... ,ated pow.,1 p L -
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C 2-The purpose of this affidavit is to address the impact on the health and safety of the public of operation in Phases I and II.
- 3. In Phase I, fuel loading and precriticality testing, the reactor will not be taken critical. There will be no heat generation in the core. There will be no fission products. Because there will have been no power generation and, consequently, no decay heat, there will be no need for cooling systems to remove decay heat.
In its supplemental motion, LILCO examined the 38 accident and I( t.
transient events addressed in Chapter 15 of the FSAR. I have reviewed the 38 transients and accidents listed and I agree with LILCO that many of the events could not occur because of the operating conditions of the plant (e.g., a turbine trip or a load rejection transient cannot occur when the turbine is not in operation and there is no load on the generator). Of the events that could occur (e.g., loss of AC power), there are no safety concern's because of the absence of power generation.
- 5. phase II, cold criticality testing, will involve testing in the power range of .0001% to .001t of rated power at essentially ambient temperature and atmospheric pressure. Because of the low power level and the limited duration of testing, fission product inventory and decay heat will be very low.
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- 6. As for Phase 1. many of the Phase II transients and accident ~
For those analyaed in Chapter 15 of the FSAR cannot occur. - -
transients and accident which can occur, other than a loss-of-coolant accident, core cooling can be achieved, even I without AC power, using the existing core water inventory and Therefore, there would be no passive heat loss to the environment.
threat to the health and safety of the public.
- 7. Because of the low pressure conditions, it is not reasonable to postulate a loss-of-coolant accident during Phases I and II (f ~
operation. The NRC normally postulates breaks only in high energy lines; for Phases I and II, there are no high energy lines.
lioweve:, even if a loss-of-coolant accident should occur during l
Phase II operation, there is plenty of time available for restoring offsite power should o'nsite power not be available.
- 8. If a loss-of-coolant accident should occur during Phase II
- testing, LILC0 states that there would be time on the order of At the months available to restore make-up water for core ccoling.
decay heat levels which would exist under these conditions, heat transfer to the environment would remove a significant fraction of l
the decay heat. However, even if no heat transfer from the fuel rods is assumed and equilibrium fission products are assumed (i.e.,
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-4 inifinite operation at .001% power), then more than 9 days are ,
available to restore cooling prior to exceeding a temperature of 2200*F. Therefore, even assuming the unavailability of onsite power sources, there is a high probability of restoring AC power and cooling the core. -
(
44 hl ,/ T o .6M Marvin W. (Wayne) Hodges Subscribed and sworn to before me this d d day of April,1984 5L1 h u c.O h
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Marvin W. (Wayne) Hodges Profess _ional Qualifications R_eactor Systems Branch Division of Systems Integration ,
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I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission 1
I am employed as a Section t.eader in Section B of the Reactor Systems 1
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! graduated from Auburn University with a Mechanical Engineering Degree in 1965. I received a Master of Science degree in Mechanical ,
Engineering from Auburn University in 1967. I am a registered Professional Engineer in the state of Maryland (#13446).
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- ((f In my present work assignment at the NRC, I supervise the work of 6 graduate engineers; my section is responsible for the review of primary and safety systems for BWRs. I have served as principal reviewer in the area of boiling water reactor systems. I have also participated in the review of analytical models use in the licensing evaluations of boiling water reactors and I have the technical review responsibility for many of the modi.fications and analyses being implemented on boiling water rea'ctors post the Three Mile Island, Unit-2 accident.
As a member of the Bulletin and Orders Task Force which was formed after j the THI-2 accident. I was responsible for the review of the capability of BWR systems to cope with loss of feedwater transient and small break loss-of-coolant accidents.
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2 I have also served at the NRC as a reviewer in the Analysis Branch of ,
the NRC in the area of themal. hydraulic performance of the reactor core. I served as a consultant to the RES representative to the program management group for the BWR Blowdown / Emergency Core Cooling Program.
Prior to joining the KRC staff in March,1974 I was employed by E. I.
At SRL, DuPont at the Savannah River Laboratory as a research engineer.
I conducted hydraulic and heat transfer testing to support operation of I also performed safety limit the reactors at the Savannah River Plant.
calculations and participated in the development of analytical models for use in transient analyses at Savannah River. Fiy tenure at SRL was from June 1967 to March 1974
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I From September 1965 to June 1967, while in graduate school, I taught !
l courses in thernodynamics, statics, mechanical engineering measurements, j
computer programing and assisted in a course in the history of engineering. Ouring the sumer of 1966. I worked at the Savannah River Laboratory doing hydraulic testing.
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. XEROX TELECCPIEP.495; 1- 5-64;12:57FM ; 6047666215~ 2022iNidi;a17
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s7 ATTACHMENT B i LILCo, May 22, 1984
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ,
. 1 In the Matter of )
)
LONO ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-4
) (Low Power)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION ON PHASE II LOW POWER TESTING On March 20, 1984, LILCO filed its Supplemental Motion for Low Power Operating License which requested the approval of a li-conse to conduct four phas,es of low power testing. LILCO renewed its March 20 motion and, pursuant to 10 CFR I 2.749, sought summa-ry disposition with respect to Phase II of the low power testing program in a motion filed with the Commission on May 4, 1984.
Subsequently, the Commission's May 16 Order vacated the Licensing Board's April 6 Memorandum and Order to the extent it was incon-sistent with the Commission's view that 10 CFR 5 50.57(c) did not i
make GDC 17 inapplicable to low power operation.
The Commission did not rule on LILCO's summary disposition motions. LILCO, in a continuing effort to have the merits of its case engaged, renews
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its motion for summary disposition on Phase II. [
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2-I. _ Basis for_ Summary Disposition Phase II of low power testing includes cold criticality ,
testing of the plant at essentially ambient temperature and atmo-spheric pressure. See attached Statement of Material Facts, Mate-rial Fact 1. The testing involves a specified control rod with-drawal sequence that results in achieving reactor criticality at extremely low power levels,~1n the range of 0.0001% to 0.001% of rated thermal power. Material Fact 2. The primary purpose of Phase II testing is to verify the shutdown margin calculations.
Material Fact 4. In order to accomplish this, plant personnel must first install vessel internals and initiate all refuel floor
- constraints. Expansion and vibration instrumentation is installed and cold baseline data are obtained for later comparison to data obtained during heatup. Material Fact 3.
To obtain the shutdown margin test data, control rods are withdrawn in the proper sequence until criticality is achieved.
The necessary test data can be taken within 5 minutes of reaching criticality. The control rods are then reinserted and,the reactor l
is shut down. Material Fact 4.
The extremely low risk of conducting Phase II activities, even without onsite AC power sources available, is demonstrated by a review of the accident and transient events contained in Chapter 15 of' the Shoreham ESAR. Under plant conditions during Phase II, 23 of the 38 Chapter 15 events are possible. Material Fact 5-6.
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- of the 23 possible events, the standard safety analysic does not
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require the assumption of loss or unavailability of offsite AC power for 20 of them. Therefore, the consequences of these events '.
are unaffected by the unavailability of the TDI diesels. Material Fact 6.
For the three events that do assume loss or unavailability of offsite power (pipe breaks inside containment (loss of coolant ac-cident or LOCA), feedwater system piping break and the loss of AC power event), there are no consequences even assuming no onsite AC power source. Material Facts 7-10, 12.
As in Phase I, the lack of any accident consequences is at-tributable to the level of fission products in the core. The ex-tremely low power levels achieved during Phas4 II, and the ex-tremely short amount of time at those power levels result in essentially no f1seion products in the core and very little decay heat. Material Facts 4, 8-9. Accordingly, in the event a LOCA occurs,l/ only a small amount of decay heat is present to heat up the core. Essentially unlimited time is available before core cooling would have to be restored.. Thus, there is no need for any AC power, including the TDI diesels. Material Fact 9.
1/ Pipe breaks of the sort postulated in the LOCA or feedwater system break events are highly unlikely under Phase II conditions. Material Fact 11.
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, With respect to the feedwater system break event and the loss of offsite power event, the reactor coolant inventory is not lost.
This provides additional cooling capability and further ensures '.
Material Fact 10.
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that no AC power is needed for core cooling.
4 As in Phase I, reliable diesel generators are not necessary to satisfy the Commission's regulations. The legal requirement for diesel generaters derives from GDC 17, which states in parti-I nont part: '
An onsite electric power system and an offsite electric power system shall be pro-vided to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety.
, The safety function for each system (assuming flF (,
the other system is not functionina) _shall be to provide suffi:1ent capacity and capability to assure that (1) specified acceptable fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not ex-4 coeded as a result of anticipated operational
. occurrences and (2) the core is cooled and )
containment integrity and other vital func-tions are maintained in the event of postu-lated accidents.
/
10 C.f.R. Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 17 (emphasis added). In other words, the onsite AC power source must be of sufficient ca-pacity and capability to assure the performance of specified safe-ty functions.
As demonstrated above, the chapter 15 accident and transient events do not have any consequences, even assuming the unavailability of the TDI diesels. In fact, no Ac power is y, required to protect the core. Material Fact 13.
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. EF04 TEd?CPIER 455; 1- 6-6-;12:55FN I 20-7dddilo- 202.:.22-1:1; al 5-Thus, the Commission's analysis with respect to fuel load and procriticality testing for the Diablo Canyon plant is useful here.
As the Commission noted in that decision: .
The risk to public health and safety from fuel loading and pre-criticality testing is extremely low since no self-sustaining nu-clear chain reaction will take place under the terms of the license and therefore no ra-dioactive fission products will be produced.
Pacific Cas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-27, 18 NRC 1146, 1149 (1983). As already noted, self-sustaining nuclear reaction will be conducted at ex-tremely low power levels and for very short periods of time. The radioactive fission products produced under these circumstances are negligible. Thus, operation of the plant during Phase II presents no significant safety issue. See id.
The rationale for the Commission's grant of a license to Diablo Canyon also applies with respect to Phase II activities at Shoreham. At the t'ime the Commission granted Diablo Canyon a low power testing license, quality assurance t igation concerning Diablo Canyon was st,ill ongoing. In contrast, Shoreham has al-r6ady been the subject of a lengthy, favorable Partial Initial De-
.tu*cn er, all safety issues except those concerning those its ex-isting diesel generators. See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-57, 18 NRC 445 (1983)
(Opinion), and unpublished Board Findings of Fact and Appendices.
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since there is no need for reliable diesel generators during Phase ;
II, the assurance of no riska to public health and safety from Phase II activities is even greater at Shoreham than at Diablo .
Canyon because all quality aseurance issues at Shoreham have been favorably resolved.
II. Conclusion Consistent with the Commission's May 16 Order, GDC 17 re-quires an onsite power source during low power testing with suffi-cient capacity and capability to perform certain safety functions specified in the GDC, During cold criticality testing conducted during Phase II, no AC power is required to perform these safety functions. Thus, even assuming that LILCO's onsite diesel genera-tors do not operate, the requirements of CDC 17 are met. For the above stated reasons, LILCO's Motion for Summary Disposition on Phase II Low Power Testing should be granted.2/
Respectfully submitted, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPAhY l
Le .
Robert M. ife " ' '-
Anthony F. arley, Jr.
Jessine A. Monaghan l 2/ If the Licensing Board believes the Commission's May 16
' / order requires an exemption from the regulations for all four
( phases of low power testin7, then the Board should treat this motion se a motion for summary disposition of all health and safety issues with respect to Phase II.
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Hunton & Williams Post Office Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: May 22, 1984 I
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STATEMENT OE MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE To BE HEARD ON PHASE II LOW POWER TESTING The following is the Statement of Material Facts as to which LILCO contends there is no genuine issue to be heard concerning Phase II low power testing:3/
- 1. Phase II of low power testing includes cold criticality testing of the plant at essentially ambient temperature and atmo-spheric pressure. Rao, et al., Tr. 285-86; Sherwood Affidavit at 1 14; Hodges Affidavit at i 15.
- 2. Phase II testing involves a specified control rod with-drawal sequence that results in achieving reactor criticality at
( extremely low power levels, in the range of 0.0001% to 0.0017. of rated thermal power. During this phase, reacter operators with-draw each of the 137 control rods and monitor the effect of its withdrawal in terms of neutron flux. By analysis and calculation, Reactor Engineering personnel are able to assign a " worth to each control rod, that is, the effectiveness of each rod in controlling reactivity." Gunther, Tr. 204-06; Notaro Affidavit at 1 8; Hodges Affidavit at 1 5.
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l 3/ These facts appear in the record in the affidavits filed with LILCO's supplemental Motion for Low Power License dated March 20 and in the testimony of the seven witnesses who testified on April 24 and 25 before the Licensing Board. Since these documents are readily available, copies have not been at-tached. Facts also appear in an affidavit of Wayne W. Hodges, dated April 4, 1984, which is attached.
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- 3. Cold criticality testing requires plant maintenance per-sonnel to install vessel internals in accor' dance with station pro-cedure and with all refuel floor constraints in place. Expansion :
and'. vibration instrumentation is also installed. Cold baseline data'-are obtained to determine pipe movement as heatup occurs
\q ,
' later in. the low power test program. - Gunther, Tr.'205; Notaro Af-fidavit at 'l 8.
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- 4. The primary purpose of Phase II testingxis to verify shutdown margin calculations. The shutdown margin is measured by withdrawing the analytically strongest rod or the equivalent and one or more additional rods until criticality is reached. This procedure is completed and the necessary data'obtained within 5
[( minutes after going critical. Aitar the conclusion of the proce-dure, the control rods are reinserted into the core, thereby stopping the reaction and returning the core to suberitical sta-f tus. Cunther, Tr. 205-06.
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- 5. Under the plant conditions present in Phase II, many events analyzed in FSAR' Chapter 15 could not occur or would be very unlikely. Even,the possible Chapter 15 events would have no impact on public health and safety regardless of the availability of the TDI diesels. Rao, og g., Tr. 286-89, 295; Sherwood Affi-davit at 11 15-17, 22; Hodges Affidavit at 1 6.
- 6. of the 23 possible Chapter 15 events reviewed, 20 do not
( re,m ue the a..um, tion o, toss or unavaitahitity o, o,f-site AC
4PJ3x TELE 0CPIEP. 435; 1- a-64; 1:01Ft1 ; 6047666216* 20ill2-. lei; nic 10 I(f power. Therefore, the consequences of these events are unaffected by the unavailability of the TDI diesels. Rao, et al., Tr. 291:
Sherwood Affidavit at 1 18. :
- 7. The three events that do assume loss or the unavailability of off-site AC power are pipe breaks inside the primary containment, feedwater system pipe break, and the loss of AC power event. Rao, et al., Tr. 292; Sherwood Affidavit at 1 19.
- 8. Because of the extremely low power levels reached during Phase II testing, fission product inventory in the core will be only a small fraction of that assumed for the Chapter 15 analysis.
The FSAR assumes operation at 100% power for 1,000 days in calcu-lating fission product inventory; inventory during Phase II. low power testing will be less than 1/100,000 (0.00001) of the fission product inventory assumed in the FSAR. Rao, et al., Tr. 295; Sherwood Affidavit at i 17.
- 9. If a LOCA did occur during the cold criticality testing phase (Phase II), there would be time on the order of months available to restore make-up water for core cooling. At the power levels achieved during Phase II, fission product inventory is very low. At most, the average power output will be a fraction of a l watt-per-rod, with no single rod exceeding approximately two l
I watts. With these low decay heat levels, the fuel cladding tem-i parature would not exceed the limits of 10 C.F.R. 5 50.46 even
/ after months without restoring coolant and without a source of AC
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' ors, or' any source of AC power. Rao, et al., Tr. 292-94; Sherwood Affidavit at T 19; Hodges Affidavit at 1 8. '.
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- 10. During Phasa II cold criticality testing conditions, l:
there is no reliance on the diesel generators for mitigation of the loss of AC power event or the feedwater system piping break event. For these events, no loss of coolant occurs and the decay heat is minimal. Core cooling can be achieved for unlimited peri-ods of time without AC power using the existing core water inven-tory and heat loanes to ambient. Rao, et al., Tr. 293-94; Sherwood Affidavit at i 20; Hodges Affidavit at U 6.
- 11. The LOCA and the feedwater system piping break postulate the double-ended ruptures of a piping system. Because the reactor will be at essentially ambient temperature and atmospheric pres-sure during Phase II, it is extremely unlikely thke such a pipe break would ever occur. The NRC Staff does not require double-ended ruptures to be postulated for low temperature and low pres-sure systems in safety analyses. Rao, et al., Tr. 294; Sherwood Affidavit at 1 21; Hodges Affidavit at 1 7.
- 12. None of the events analysed in Chapter 15 could result in a release of radioactivity during cold criticality testing that would endanger the public health and safety. Rao, et al., Tr.
305; Sherwood Affidavit at f 17.
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- 13. Even if AC power were not available for extended periods of time, fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary would not be approached or exceeded as a :
result of anticipated operational occurrences, and the core would ;
be adegaately cooled in the unlikely event of a postulated acci-l dent. Rao, et al., Tr. 296-96; Sherwood Affidavit at i 22. 1 f ~
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I C UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND t.ICENSING BOARD In the Matter of 1 LONG !$LANO LIGHTING COMPANY, h Docket No. 50-322 I
(ShorehamNuclearPowerStation, l Unit 1) .J AFFID_AVIT OF MARVIN W. H0DGES CONCERNING THE SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION F_0_R LOW p0WE.R OPERATIQt, PHA5E F AND II. AT Sh0REHAft I, Marvin W. (Wayne) Hedges, being duly sworn, state as follows:
I am a Section Leader in the Reacter Systems Branch of the Office (1. of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. A copy of ny professional qualifications is attached.
- 2. Long-Island Lighting Company (LILCO) filed a Supplemental fiction for Lew Power Operating License dated March 20, 1984. In that motion, LILCO proposed a phased pregram for low power coeration at -
Shoreham. The four phases proposed are:
a) Phase I: fuel load and precriticality testing, b) Phase II: cold criticality testing, c) Phase III: heatup and low power testing to rated i pressure / temperature conditions (approximately 15 rated power); and l d) Phase IV: low power tuting (1-5% rated power)
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2-The purpose of this affidavit is to address the impact on the health and safety of the public of operation in Phases I and II. 1
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- 3. In Phase I, fuel loading and precriticality testing, the reactor will not be taken critical. There will be no heat generation in the core. There will be no fission products. Because there will have been no power generation and, consequently, no decay heat, there will be no need for cooling systems to remove decsy heat.
l(k 1. In its supplemental motion, LILCO examined the 38 accident and transient events addressed in~ Chapter 15 of the FSAR. I have g, reviewed the 38 transients and accidents listed and I agree with LILCO that many of the events could not occur because of the [
operating conditions of the plant (e.g., a turbine trfp or a load rejection transient cannot occur when the turbine is not in
)
cperation and there is no load on the generator). Of the events that could occur (e.g., loss of AC power), there are no safety concerns because of the absence of power generation.
- 5. Phase II, cold criticality testing, will involve testing in the power range of .0001% to .001% of rated power at essentially ambient temperature and atmospheric pressure. Because of the low power level and the limited duration of testing, fission product inventory and decay heat will be very low, i~ - -. .
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- 6. As for Phase I, many, of the phase II transients and accident
)
For those analyzed in Chapter 15 of the FSAR cannot occur.
trcnsients and accident which can occur, other than a i loss-of-coolant accident, core cooling can be achieved, even without AC power, using the existing core water inventory and Therefore, there would be no passive heat loss to the environment.
l threat to the health and safety of the public.
7.
Because of the low pressure conditions, it is not reasonaole to postulate a less-of-coolant accident during Phases I and 11 operation. The NRC norma 11f postulates breaks only in high energy lines; for Phases I and II, there are no high energy lines.
However, even if a loss-of-coolant accident should occur during Phase II operation, there is plenty of time available for restoring offsite power should onsite power not be available.
)
- 8. if a loss-of-coolant accident should occur during Phase II testing, LILCO states that there would be time on the order of At the months available to restore make-up water for core ecoling.
decay haat levels which would exist under these conditions, heat transfer to the environment would recove a significan. fraction of the decay heat. Howevar, even if no heat transfer from the fuel rods is assumed and equilibriun fission products are assumed (i.e., l
,/EF.Ox TELECGPIER 495; 1- 6-84; 1:CSR1 ; dC47565216- icie.c.5-;c;; a _c inifinite operation at .001% power), then more than 9 days are available to restore cooling prior to exceeding a temperature of 2200*F. Therefore, even assuming the unavailability of onsite power sources, there is a high probability of restoring AC power and cooling the core.
0 44. NI /1 $v fiarvin W. (Wayne) Hodges j
subscribed and sworn to before me this M day of April,1984 Od:s 0.0Lcw> ,
' , Notary Public My Comission Expires- y ', /f/d .
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F MarvinW.(Wayne)Hodges
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Professional Qualifications l Reactor Systems Branch Division of Systems Integration _
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission _
l I am employed as a Section Leacer in Section B of the Reactor Systems Branch,05I. !
I graduated from Auburn University with a Mechanical Engineering Degree in 1965. I received a Master of Science degree in Mechanical I am a registered Engineering from Auburn University in 1967.
r Professional Engineer in the state of Maryland (#13446). '
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In my present work assignment at the NRC, I supervise the work of 6 graduate engineers; my section is responsible for the review of primary and safety systems for BWRs. I have served as principal reviewer in the I have also participated in the area of boiling water reactor systems.
review of analytical models use in the Itcensing evaluations of boiling water reactors and I have the technical review responsibility for many of the modifications and analyses being implementer1 on boiling water reactors post the Three Mile Island, Unit-2 accident.
As a member of the Bulletin and Orders Task Force which was formed after the THI-2 accident, I was responsible for the review of the capability of BWR systems to cope with loss of feedwater transient and small break loss-of-coolant accidents.
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I have also served at the NRC as a reviewer in the Analysis Branch the NRC in the area of thermal-hydraulic performance of the reactor I served as a consultant to the RES representative to the program core.
management group for the BWR Blowdown / Emergency Core Cooling P Prior to joining the NRC staff in March,1974, I Atwas SRL, employed by E. I DuPont at the Savannah River Laboratory as a research engineer.
I conducted hydraulic and heat transfer testing to support operatio I also performed safety limit the reactors at the Savannah River Plant. l i l models
- alculations and participated in the developeent of ana yt ca My tenure at SRL was .
for use in transient analyses at Savannah Rivtr.
from June 1967 to March 1974.
From September 1965 to June 1967, while in graduate school, I taught courses in thermodynamics, statics, mechanical engineering measurem l
computer programming and assisted in a course in the history of During the summer of 1966. I worked at the Savannah River engineering.
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Laboratory doing hydraulic testing.
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P ATTACIDENT C A+
4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0PetISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges .
Marshall E. Miller, Chairman Glenn 0. Bright Elizabeth B. Johnson In the Matter of Docket No. 50-322-OL-4 (LowPower)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY (shoreham Nuclear Power Station, July 24, 1984 !
Unit 1) '
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART LILCO'S N0TIONS FOR Supt 4ARY DISPOSITION ON PHASE I AND PHASE !! LOW-POWER TESTING LILCO filed its supplemental application for a low-power license on
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March 20,1984. That application rettes upon supplemental emergency N power sources to compansate for the absence of an acceptable onsite emergency power source. However, the Connission issued an Order 1
(CLI-84-8) on May 16, 1984 holding that GDC 17 applied to low power ,
I GDC-17 states, in pertinent part, that:
"An onsite electric power system and an offsite electric power system shall be provided to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety. The safety function for each s stem (assuming the other system is not functionin )
s all be to provide sufficient capacity and capabf1 ty .
3 (Footnote Continued L .
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. operation and that if LILCO's appiteation did not demonstrate compliance .
with GOC-17 LILC0 would have to seek an exemption pursuant to 10 CFR .
550.12. LILC0 subsequently filed an exemption request with the Licensing Board.
On May 23,1984, LILC0 filed its " Motion for Suninary Disposition on Phase I Low-Power Testing", and " Motion for Sunnary Disposition on Phase II Low-Power Testing", pursuant to 10 CFR 12.749. This Board denied LILCO's motion for expedited responses to its motions for sunnary disposition, instead directing the parties to file answers within the time limits prescribed by regulations. Suffolk County, the State of New I
f L - York, and the NRC Staff filed answers to the summary disposition motions 'I on June 13, 1984.
LILC0's motions are based upon its assertion that even if the s
Shoreham facility lacks a qualified source of onsite AC power, the
(
-(FootnoteContin'Jed) to assure that (1) specified acceptable fuel design
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' conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are hot exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences and (2) the core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postriated accidents.
The onsite electric power suppites, including the batteries, and the onsite electric distribution system, shall have sufficient independence, redundancy, and l
testability to perfom their safety functions assuming a single failure" (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion A).
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l activities which would be performed during Phases I and II2 of its ,
Low-Power testing program require no such power to perform the safety functions specified by the General Design Criteria (GDC), specifically GDC-17.
LILCO argues that as to Phase I fuel loading and precriticality esting, there are no fission products in the core and no decay heat.
Thusno'corecoolingisrequired,andhencenoACpower(eitheronsite or offsite) is needed "to pemit functioning of structures, systems, and componentsimportanttosafety"(GDC-17). As to Phase II cold criticality testing, LILCO asserts that any self-sustaining nuclear reaction will be conducted at extremely low power levels and for very short periods of time, and that radioactive fission products produced will be negligible. A review of the accident and transient events contained in Chapter 15 of the Shoreham FSAR allegedly shows that there are no consequences even assuming no onsite AC power source, and in fact
) no AC power is required to protect the core. '
In essence, LILCD seeks sumary disposition as to Phases I and
- - II, because (a) no onsite or offsite AC power is necessary to perform i
the safety functions needed to protect the public health and safety, and Phase I: Fuel load and procriticality testing.
Phase II: Cold criticality testing.
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(b) since no AC power is needed, GDC-17 is said to be satisfied at Phasas I and II without an approved (or indeed any) onsite power source.
The Staff in its June 13 response to LILCO's motions for sumary disposition submitted that the motions should be granted in part and denied in part. It stated that the Comission's May 16 Ordar (CLI-84-8)
- stands for the proposition that GDC-17 means the same for low-power operation as for full-power operation and must be completely satisfied !
before any license (including low-power) may be issued. It therefore follows that, in the absence of a fully approved onsite power system, an exemption from GOC-17 is neeC&d before any license can be issued pursuant to 10 CFR 550.57(:). LILCO did not seek summary disposition of its exemption request nor address factual issues involved therein~, and accordingly the ultimate issues involved in phases I and II could not be !
sunnarily disposed of. However, the Staff stated that _ partial sumary "
disposition should be made as to some of the statements of material facts appended to the Phase I motion (Statements 5-9) and to the Phase v
II motion (Statements 5, 8, 9.10,11,12 and 13, and reworded 6 and 7),3 and that such statements should' be deemed admitted unless properly controverted.
l 3
These Statements of Material Facts are described and discussed l infra, at pages 9-14.
tL fl
, ,rew, mwr a:r. -n; i- e-e-; aea , cc ,cecc1e, zm22-lea cs 9
((. -s-t TheResponseofSuffolkCountyandtheStateofNewYork(with ,
attached affidavits and statement of material issues as to which it is alleged that there are facts in dispute) submits that the LILCO motion may not be granted because, first, the NRC allegedly lacks authority to grant what is characterized as a "no power" license. Second, because the LILC0 low-power license application which was considered by the Comission in its Order of May 16,1984 (CLI-84-8,19 NRC _) included .
Phases I and II, that are the subjects of the pending sumary disposition motions, they argue that the Comission's statement that LILC0 must obtain an exemption from applicable General Design Criteria (expressly G00-17) prior to the grant of its low-power proposal, includes the grant of any portion thereof. They further argue that LILCO's positio'n that the requirements of GDC-17 would be met during Phases I and II ignores the plain language of th&t criterion. Lastly, the Intervenors set forth issues of material fact which they say remain in dispute.
- I. L_EGAL STANDARDS FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION The Comission's Rules of Practice provide for sumary disposition l of certain issues where "the filings in the proceeding, depositions, !
answers to interrogatorics, and admissions on file, together with the statements of the parties and the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issus as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a decision as a matter of law" (10 CFR 52.749(d)). The Rules also provice for sumary disposition as to any portions of a
i 4F.0x TELEcCPIEF< 495: 1- 6-64; 1:0'ier1 ; 6047666216, 2022224161:a40 j
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I matter involved in a proceeding as to which there is no genuine issue of material fact (10 CFR 52.749(a)).
The Consnission and Appeal Board have encouraged the use of sumary ~
disposition to resolve contentions where an intervenor has failed to establish that a genuine issue exists.4 The "sumary disposition rule (10 CFR 12.749) provides an ample safeguard against an applicant or the... staff being required to expend time and effort at a hearing on any contention advanced by an intervenor which is manifestly unworthy of exploration."5 The Comission's policy is to encourage the use of summary disposition where no genuine issue of material fact exists "so that evidentiary hearing time is not unnecessarily devoted to such issues."
Statement of Policy in Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452, 457 (1981). Thus, a hearing on the questions raised by an 1 intervenor is not inevitable. Seg Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-654, 14 NRC 632 ;
(1981). The purpose of sumary disposition is to avoid hearings, 4
Northern States Power Co. (Prarie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-73-12, 6 AEC 241, 242 (1973), aff'd sub nom. BPI v.
AEC, 502 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir.1974); Houston Lighting and Power Co.
(Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590,11 NRC 542, 550-51(1980); Mississippi Power & Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2), ALAB-130, 6 AEC 423, 424-25 (1973).
5 Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-183, 7 AEC 222, 228 (1974).
L
, 4.Rox rd_u m -n; 1- e- w -1:aurn ; ee-ncecile, 202.:.s-le1; =,1 I
i unnecessary testimony and cross-examination in areas where there are not material issues to be tried.0 '
l The Supreme Court has very clearly stated that there is no right to !
a trial except so far as there are issues of fact in dispute to be i 1
detennined. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310 (1920). Under~ the Federal Rules the motion is designed to pierce the general allegations in the pleadings, separating the substantial from the insubstantial by utilizing depositions, interrogatories or other material of evidentiary value. 6 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 156.04[1](2ded.1976).
Mere allegations in the pleadings will not create an issue as against a f
4 I( motion for summary disposition supported by affidavits (10 CFR 1 l
, 52.749(b); Fed.R.Civ.P.56(c)). t The Commission's sunnary disposition procedures have been 3
analogized to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.7 Decisions arising under the Federal Rules thus may serve as guidelines l
to licensing boards in applying 10 CFR 12.749.8 Under both Federal and 0
A material fact is one that may affect the outcome of the
- litigation. Mutual Fund Investors Inc. v. Putnam Management Co., 553 F.2d 620, 624 (9th Cir. 1977).
7 Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., et al. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741 7 -54 (1977); Alabama Power Co. (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units ,1 and 2), ALAB-182, 7 AEC l 210, 217 (1974).
l 8 Perry, ALAB-443, su ra at 754; Public Service Co. of New Hampshire l l (SeabrookStation,Unis and 2), LBP-74-36, 7 AEC 877, 878-79 (1974). '
C . ,
_ _ _ . - - - - . - - - . . - - , . _ , - . , , - - , , - - . . - . - , - .c __---. . . _ - , ~ - , , . - - - , - - . , . - ...w. ., - --- -
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8-NRC rules, the record is to be reviewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.'
To draw on federal practice, the Supreme Court has pointed out that Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not permit plaintiffs to get to a trial on the basis of the allegations in the complaint coupled with the hope that something can be developed at trial in the way of evidence to support the allegations.10 39,9j,7)y, 3 party may not defeat a motion for sunnary judgment on the hope that on I t
cross-examination the defendants will contradict their respective 4
i affidavits. To permit trial on such a basis would nullify the purpose
- of Rule 56 which pennits the elimination of unnecessary and costly litigation where no genuine issues of material fact exist.11 All material facts adequately set forth in a motion and not ademately controverted by the responses thereto are deemed to be
.- l O
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962); Crest Auto Supplies. Inc. v. Ero Manufacturing Co., 360 F.2d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 1966) United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 22 v.
Roncco, 314 F.2d 186,188 (10th Cir.1963); Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. and Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Susquehanna Steam Electric
' Station Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-8, 13 NRC 335, 337 (1981), directed certification denied. ALAB-641, 13 NRC 550 (1981); Seabrook, L8P-74-36, '
m 7 AEC at 879.
10 First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391. U.S. l
- 25?, 289-90 (1968), rehearing den. , 393 U.S. 901 (1968).
II See Orvis v. Prickman, 95 F. Supp 605, 607 (1951), aff'd 196 F.2d 762 (U. Cir.1952), cited with approval in Gulf States TETTities Co. '
(River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2),1 NRC 246, 248 (1975).
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.g-adattted(10CFR92.749(a)). A party opposing the motion may not rely upon a simple denial of the material facts stated by the movant, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact remaining.12 However, the proponent of a motion must meet the burden of proof in establishing that thers is no genuine issue of material fact, even if the opponent fails to controvert the conclusions reached in the motions' supporting papers.
II. DENIAL AS TO ULTIMATE ISSUES The Comission's May 16 Order (CLI-84-8) stated that it "has determined that 10 CFR 50.57(c) should not be read to make General Design Criterion 17 inapplicable to low-power operation" (slip opinion, page1). That order therefore stands for the proposition that GOC-17 means the same for low-power operations as for full-power operation, and it must be completely satisfied before any license (including low-power) S may be issued. Accordingly, the only recourse available to LILCO in this proceeding is to seek an exemption under the provisions of- 10 CFR y 150.12(a), which is the subject of the instant evidentiary hearing.
The Board does not have the power or jurisdiction to grant LILCO's
, motion for summary disposition of Phases I and II of its low-power testing program, even though such activities do not require a qualified l
i 12 10 CFR 12.749(b), Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-584,11 NRC 451, 453 (1980).
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source of onsite AC power in order to perform the safety functions Specified by GOC-17. The Connission't order requires that the GDC-17 requirements be completely satisfied even for fuel loading and procriticeiity test!ing. In its motion LILCO cid not seek sunnary disposition of its exemption request, nor did it even address the factual issues involved therein. Accordingly, the ultimate issues involved in Phase I and II activities cannot be disposed of sunnarily, and that portion of the sunnary disposition motion is denied.
III. GRANTED AS TO CERTAIN STATEMENT $ 0F MATERIAL FACTS Some of the statements of, material facts appended to LILCO's Phase I motion (Statements 5-9) and to the Phase II motion (Statements 5, 8-13, and reworded 6 and 7) were not controverted and should be deemed to be admitted. Accordingly, the following statements of material fact are held to be admitted in this proceeding. '
Phase ! Statements 5-9:
(5) During all of the activities in Phase I, the reactor will .
remain at essentially ambient temperature and atmospheric pressure. The reactor will not be taken critical. Any increase in temperature beyond ambient conditions will be due only to external heat sources such as recirculation pump heat. There will be no heat generation by the core.
Rao, g a_1, . Tr. 279; Sherwood Affidavit at 17; Hodges Affidavit at 13.
(6) Of the 38 accident or transient events addressed in FSAA.
Chapter 15,18 of the events could not occur during Phase I becau:e of the operating conditions of the plant. An additional six events could
. . , , . , , , - , ,_. . , - . ,..-.- - ~n -,. , . ~ . , , - - . . - . . . . . - ,_
4 4FfJx TELECCPIER 495; 1- 6-o- ; 1 : 1ct-11 ; co-.7ececie , cecces loi; a-. :i 11 physically occur, but given the plant conditions, would not cause the phenomena of interest in the Chapter 15 safety analysis. The remaining 14 events could possibly occur, although occurrences are highly unlikely given th's plant conditions. The potential consequences of these 14 events would be trivial. Rao, g al., Tr. 279-84; Sherwood Affidavit at 118-11; Hodges Affidavit at 14.
(7) During Phase I fuel loading and precriticality testing, there
, are no fission products in the core and no decay heat exists. .
Therefore, core cooling is not required. In addition, with no fission product inventory, there are no fission product releases pussible. Rao, att d., Tr. 283-84; Sherwood Affidavit at til: Hodges Affidavit at 14 (8) Even a loss of coolant accident would have no consequences during Phase I since no core cooling is required. No rission products exist and therefore no decay heat is available to heat up the core. The y fuel simply would not be' challenged even by a complete drain down of the reactor vessel for an unlimited period of time. Rao, g al,., l Tr. 284; Sherwood Affidavit at 19; Hodges Affidavit at 14.
(g) No core cooling is required during Phase I and, therefore, no
'AC power is necessary during Phase I to cool the core. Rao,et,al.,
Tr. 285; Sherwood Affidavit at 113; Hodges Affidavit at 13.
Phase II Statements 5, 8-13:
(5) Under the plant conditions present in Phase !!, many events analyzed in FSAR Chapter 15 could not occur or would be very unliikely.
l Even the possible Chapter 15 events would have no impact on public
xEFQx m.EcGPIER *n; 1- o-o*; 1:1#H '; cd Jcociic* 2022234161 n*6
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health and safety regardless of the availability of the TDI diesels.
Rao, et d., Tr. 286-89, 295; Sherwood Affidavit at 1115-17,22; Hodges Affidavit at 16.
(8) Because of the extremely low-power levels reached during Phase
!! testing, fission product inventory in the core will be only a small fraction of that assumed for the Chapter 15 analysis. The FSAR assumes operation at 100% power.for 1,000 days in calculating fission product i
inventory; inventory during Phase !! low-power testing will be less than 1/100,000(0.00001) of the fission product inventory assumed in the FSAR. Rao, et 1,.,
1 Tr. 295; Sherwood Affidavit at 117.
(9) If a LOCA did occur during the cold criticality testing phase N
(PhasaII),therewouldbetimeontheorderofmonthsavailable'to restore make-up water for core cooling. At the power levels achieved during phase II, fission product inventory is very low. At most, the s average power output will be a fraction of a watt-per-rod, with no single rod exceeding approximately two watts. With these low decay heat Y l 1evels, the fuel cladding temperature would not exceed the limits of 10 CFR 550.46 even after months without restoring coolant and without a source of AC power. Thus, there is no need to rely on the TDI diesel generators, or any source of AC power. Rao, .el al . Tr. 292-94; Shencood Affidavit at 119; Hodges Affidavit at 18.
(10) During Phase II cold criticality testing conditions, there is no reliance on the diesel gene 4 tors for mitigation of the loss of AC power event or the feedwater system piping break event. For these
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- 13 events, no loss of coolant occurs and the decay heat is minimal. Core cooling can be achieved for unlimited periods of time without AC power using the existing core water inventory and heat losses to ambient. Rao, g d., Tr. 293-94; Sherwood Affidavit at 120; Wodges Affidavit at 16.
(11) The LOCA and the feedwater system piping break postulate the double-ended ruptures of a piping system. Because the reactor will be at essentially ambient temperature and atmospheric pressure during Phase II, it is extremely unlikely that such a pipe break would ever occur. The NRC Staff does not require double-ended ruptures to be postulated for low temperature,and low pressure systems in safety analyses. Rao, gd., Tr. 294; Sherwood Affidavit at 121; Hodges Affidavit at 17. '
(12) None of the events analyzed in Chap.ter 15 could result in a release of radioactivity during cold criticality testing that would i endanger the public health and safety. Rao, g d., Tr. 296; Sherwood Affidavit at 117. .
1(13) Even if AC power were not available for extended periods of time, fuel design limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant
. pressure boundary would not be approached or exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences, and the core would be adequately cooled in the unlikely event of a postulated accident. Rao, g d .,
Tr. 295-98; $herwood Affidavit at 122.
, c on TELECCPig =re; 1- c4; IWn ; 604e6a m - 20222241olin48 Phase !! Statements 6 and 7:
(6) Of the 23 possible Chapter 15 events reviewed, 20 would not be adversely affected by the loss or unavailability of offsite AC power.
Therefore, the consequences of these events aro unaffected by the unavailability of the TDI diesels. Hodges Af fidavit at 110.
(7) The three events that are adversely affected by the loss or unavailability of offsite AC power are: pipe breaks inside the primary containment, feedwater system pipe break, and the loss of AC power
- event. Hodges Affidavit at 110.
It is so ORDERED.
(
FOR THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND
, LICENSING BOARD C Y f.
) Mas lall E. Miller, chiitmanAbu ADNINISTRATIVE JUDGE Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 24th day of July, 1984.
4 1
~LILCO, August 2, 1984 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ,
I I
In the Matter of LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-4 (Low Power) .
I hereby certify that copies of LILCO'S MOTION FOR DI-RECTED CERTIFICATION OF THE LICENSING BOARD'S JULY 24, 1984 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART LILCO'S MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION ON PHASE I AND PHASE II LOW POWER TESTING vere served this date upon the following by U.S. mail, first-class, postage prepaid or by hand as indicated by an asterisk.
Chairman.Nunzio J. Palladino* Judge Marshall E. Miller
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Atomic Safety and Licensing Commission Board 1717 H Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20555 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Commissioner James K. Asselstine* Judge Glenn O. Bright
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Atomic Safety and Licensing Commission Board 0717 H Street, N.W. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20555 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Commissioner Lando W. Zech, Jr.*
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Judge Elizabeth B. Johnson
- Commission Oak Ridge National Laboratory 1717 H Street, N.W. P.O. Box X, Building 3500 Washington, D.C. 20555 Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Eleanor L. Frucci, Esq.
Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal* Atomic Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regul.atory Board Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 1717 H Street, N.W. Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Honorable Peter Cohalan Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts
- Suffolk County Executive U.S. Nuclear Regulatory County Executive /
Commission Legislative Building 1717 H Street, N.W. Veteran's Memorial' Highway Washington, D.C. 20555 Hauppauge, New York 11788
l l
Fabian G. Palomino, Esq.* Edwin J. Reis, Esq.*
Special Counsel to the Office of the Executive Governor Legal Director Executive Chamber, Room 229 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory State Capitol Commission Albany, New York 12224 Washington, D.C. 20555 Herbert H. Brown, Esq.* Stephen B. Latham, Esq. .
Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq. Twomey, Latham & Shea Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Hill, 33 West Second Street Christopher & Phillips P. O. Box 398 1900 M Street, N.W., 8th Floor Riverhead, New York 11901 Washington, D.C. 20036 Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq.
Mr. Martin Suubert Suffolk County Attorney c/o Congressman William Carney H. Lee Dennison Building 113 Longworth House Office Bldg. Veterans Memorial Highway Washington, D.C. 20515 Hauppauge, New York 11788 James Dougherty, Esq. Docketing and Service Branch 3045 Porter Street, N.W. Office of the Secretary Washington, D.C. 20008 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Jay Dunkleberger, Esq. Washington, D.C. 20555 New York State Energy Office Agency Building 2 Empire State Plaza Albany, New York, 12223 -
/ ilobert M. Rolf W /'[/
Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street Post Office Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: August 2, 1984
)