ML20093H901
| ML20093H901 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 07/18/1984 |
| From: | Mittl R Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8407250372 | |
| Download: ML20093H901 (97) | |
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9 0 PS G Cornpany Pubhc Sennce E'ectnc and Gas 80 Park Plaza, Newark, NJ 07101/ 201430-8217 MAILING ADDRESS / P.O. Box 570, Newark, NJ 07101 Robert L. Mitti General Manager Nuclear Assurance and Regulation July 18, 1984 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, MD 20814 Attention:
Mr. Albert Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch 2 Division of Licensing Gentlemen:
HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-354 DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT OPEN ITEM STATUS is a current list which provides a status of the open items identified in Section 1.7 of the Draft Safety Evaluation Report (SER).
Items identified as " complete" are those for which PSE&G has provided responses and no confir-mation of status has been received from the staff.
We will consider these items closed unless notified otherwise.
In order to permit timely resolution of items identified as
" complete" which may not be resolved to the staff's satis-faction, please provide a specific description of the issue which remains to be resolved. is a current list which identifies Draft SER Sections not yet provided.
In addition, enclosed for your review and approval (see ) are the resolutions to those Draft SER open items listed in Attachment 3.
Should you have any questions or require any additional information on these open items, please contact us.
Very truly your 8407250372 840718 PDR ADOCK 05000354
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Attachments The Energy People L t d ] t V.9.1 s i
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Director of Nuclear i
Reactor Regulation 2
7/18/84 C
D..H.
Wagner USNRC Licensing Project Manager W. H. Bateman USNRC Senior Resident Inspector FM05 1/2
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DATE: 7/18/84 i
ATTACHMENT 1 DSER R. L. MITIL TO OPEN SBCTION A. SWWENCER ITEM NLMBER SUEk7ECT STATUS LETIER DATED l
t 1
2.3.1 Design-basis temperatures for safety-Open related auxiliary systems 2a 2.3.3 Accuracies of neteorological open measurements 2b 2.3.3 Accuracies of steorological Open measurements 2c 2.3.3 Accuracies of nete m ological Open measurements 2d 2.3.3 Accuracies of meteorological Open measurements 3a 2.3.3 Upgrading of onsite meteorological Open measurements progre (III.A.2) 3b 2.3.3 Upgrading of onsite metecrological open measurements program (III.A.2) 3c 2.3.3 Upgrading of onsite meteorological Open measurements program (III.A.2) 4 2.4.2.2 Ponding levels Open 5a 2.4.5 Waw impact and runup on service Cmplete 6/1/84 Water Intake Structure 5b 2.4.5 Wave impact and runup on service Open water intake structure Sc 2.4.5 Waw impact and runup on service water intake structure 5d 2.4.5 Wave impact and runup on service Cmplete 6/1/84 water intake structure 6a 2.4.10 Stability of erosion trotection open structures 6b 2.4.10 Stability of erosion protection Open structures 6c 2.4.10 Stability of erosion protection Open structures M P84 80/121-gs
r ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont'd)
DSER R. L. MITTL 10 OPEN SECIICN A. SCHWENCER ITEM NUMBER SUEL7ECT STATUS LETTER DATED 7a 2.4.11.2 Thermal aspects of ultimate heat sink Open 7b 2.4.11.2 Thermal aspects of ultimate heat sink Cmplete 6/1/84 8
2.5.2.2 Choice of maximum earthquake for New Open England - Piedmont Tectonic Province 9
2.5.4 Soil danping values Complete 6/1/84 10 2.5.4 Foundation level response spectra Complete 6/1/84 11 2.5.4 Soil shear moduli variation Complete 6/1/84 12 2.5.4 Ce bination of soil layer properties Cmplete 6/1/84 13 2.5.4 Lab test shear moduli values Complete 6/1/84 14 2.5.4 Liquefaction analysis of river bottm complete 6/1/84 sands 15 2.5.4 Tabulations of shear moduli Cmplete 6/1/84 16 2.5.4 Drying and wetting effect on Cmplete 6/1/84 Vincentown 17 2.5.4 Power block settlement monitoring Conplete 6/1/84 18 2.5.4 Maxim m earth at rest pressure Cmplete 6/1/84 coefficient 19 2.5.4 Liquefaction analysis for service Cmplete 6/1/84 water piping 20 2.5.4 Explanation of observed power block Cmplete 6/1/84 settlement 21 2.5.4 Service water pipe settlenunt records Complete 6/1/84 22 2.5.4 Cofferdam stability Cmplete 6/1/84 23 2.5.4 Clarification of FSAR Tables 2.5.13 cmplete 6/1/P4 and 2.5.14 M P84 80/12 2 - gs
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ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont'd)
DSER R. L. MITIL 'IO OPEN SECTION A. SCHVENCER HEM NUMBER SUBJECT STATUS IEITER DATED 24 2.5.4 Soil depth nodels for intake Cmplete 6/1/84 structure 25 2.5.4 Intake structure soil modeling Open 26 2.5.4.4 Int'ke structure sliding stability Open 27 2.5.5 Slope stability Cmplete 6/1/84 28a 3.4.1 Flood protection Open 28b 3.4.1 Flood protection Open 28c 3.4.1 Flood protection Open 28d 3.4.1 Flood protection Open 28e 3.4.1 Flood protection Open 28f 3.4.1 Flood protection Open 28g 3.4.1 Flood protection Open i
29 3.5.1.1 Internally generated missiles (outside Cmplete 7/18/84 containnent) 30 3.5.1.2 Internally generated missiles (inside Closed 6/1/84 containment)
(5/30/84-Aux.Sys.Mtg.)
31 3.5.1.3 Turbine missiles Cmplete 7/18/84 32 3.5.1.4 Missiles generated by natural phenmena Op3n 33 3.5.2 Structures, systems, and cmponents to Opn be protected frm externally generated missiles l
34 3.6.2 Unrestrained whipping pipe inside Cmplete 7/18/84 containment 35 3.6.2 ISI program fx pig welds in Cmplete 6/29/84 treak exclusion zone l
M P84 80/12 3 - gs j
f.
ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont'd)
DSER R. L. MITIL 'IO OPEN SECTICN A. SCHWENCER ITEM NUMBER SURIECT STA'IUS IEITER DATED 36 3.6.2 Postulated pipe ruptures Cmplete 6/29/84 37 3.6.2 Feedwater isolation check valve Open operability 38 3.6.2 Design of pipe rupture restraints Open 39 3.7.2.3 SSI analysis results using finite Open element method and elastic half-space approach for containment structure 40 3.7.2.3' SSI analysis results using finite Open element method and elastic half-space approach for intake structure 41 3.8.2 Steel containment buckling analysis Complete 6/1/84 42 3.8.2 Steel containment ultimate capacity Complete 6/1/84 analysis 43 3.8.2 SRV/IDCA pool dynamic loads Cmplete 6/1/84 44 3.8.3 ACI 349 deviations for internal Cmplete 6/1/84 structures 45 3.8.4 ACI 349 deviations for Category I Complete 6/1/84 structures 46 3.8.5 ACI 349 deviations for foundations Conglete 6/1/8A.
47 3.8.6 Base mat response spectra Cmplete 6/1/84 48 3.8.6 Rocking time histories Cmplete 6/1/84 49 3.8.6 Gross concrete section Cmplete 6/1/84 50 3.8.6 Vertical floor flexibility respense Conglete 6/1/84 spectra 51 3.8.6 Conpariscn of Bc:htel independent Open verification results with the design-basis results M P84 80/12 4 - gs
ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont'd)
DSER R. L. MITTL Tci OPEN SECTICN A. SCHWENCER ITEM NUMBER SUEL7ECT STA1US LETTER DATED 52 3.8.6 Ductility ratios due to pipe break Open 53 3.8.6 Design of seismic Category I tanks Cmplete 6/1/84 54 3.8.6 Cambination of vertical responses Cmplete 6/1/84 55 3.8.6 Torsional stiffness calculation Complete 6/1/84 56 3.8.6 Drywell stick model develognent Cmplete 6/1/84 57 3.8.6 Rotational time history inputs Complete 6/1/84 58 3.8.6 "O" reference point for auxiliary Cmplete 6/1/84 building model 59 3.8.6 Overturning mJment of reactor Complete 6/1/84 building foundation mat 60 3.8.6 BSAP element size limitations Cmplete 6/1/84 61 3.8.6 Seismic modeling of drywell shield Cmplete 6/1/84 wall 62 3.8.6 Drywell shield wall boundary Cmplete 6/1/84 conditions 63 3.8.6 Reactor building dome boundary Cmplete 6/1/84 conditions 64 3.8.6 SSI analysis 12 Hz cutoff fmquency Cmplete 6/1/84 65 3.8.6 Intake structure crane heavy load Complete 6/1/84 drop 66 3.8.6 Inpedance analysis for the intake Open structurc 67 3.8.6 Critical loads calculation for Conplete 6/1/84 reactor building dome 68 3.8.6 Reactor building foundation mat Complete 6/1/84 contact pressures M P84 80/12 5 - gs
ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont'd)
DSER R. L. MITIL 70 OPEN SECTICE A. SCHWENCER ITEM NUMBER SUR7ECT STATUS LETIER DATED 69 3.8.6 Factors of safety against sliding and Cmplete 6/1/84 overturning of drywell shield wall 70 3.8.6 Seismic shear for distribution in Complete 6/1/84 cylinder wall 71 3.8.6 overturning of cylinder wall Cmplete 6/1/84 72 3.8.6 Deep beam design of fuel pool walls Cmplete 6/1/84 73 3.8.6 ASHSD dome nodel load inputs Complete 6/1/84 74 3.8.6 Tornado depressurization Cmplete 6/1/84 75 3.8.6 Auxiliary building abnormal pressure Cmplete 6/1/84 76 3.8.6 Tangential shear stresses in drywell Cmplete 6/1/84 shield wall and the cylinder wall 77 3.8.6 Pactor of safety against overturning Complete 6/1/84 of intake structure 78 3.8.6 Dead load calculations Cmplete 6/1/84 79 3.8.6 Post-modification seismic loads for Cmplete 6/1/84 the torus 80 3.8.6 Torus fluid-structure interactions Cm plete 6/1/84 81 3.8.6 Seismic displacement of torus Complete 6/1/84 82 3.8.6 Review of seismic Category I tank Complete 6/1/84 design 83 3.8.6 Factors of safety for drywell Cmplete 6/1/84 buckling evaluation 84 3.8.6 Ultimate capacity of containment Complete 6/1/84 (materials) 85 3.8.6 tad cabination consistency Caplete 6/1/84 M P84 80/12 6 - gs 1
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ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont'd)
DSER R. L. MITIL 10 OPEN SECTION A. SOfWENCER ITEM NUMBER SUBJECT STATUS IEITER DATED 86 3.9'.1 cmputer code validation open 87 3.9.1 Information on transients Open 88 3.9.1 Stress analysis and elastic-plastic Cmplete 6/29/84 analysis 89 3.9.2.1 Vibration levels for NSSS pipirg Cmplete 6/29/84 systems 90 3.9.2.1 Vitration ponitoring program during Cmplete 7/18/84 testing 91 3.9.2.2 Piping supports and anchors Cmplete 6/29/84 92 3.9.2.2 Triple flued-head containment Cmplete 6/15/84 penetrations 93 3.9.3.1 Inad cmbinations and allovable Cm'plete 6/29/84 stress limits 94 3.9.3.2 \\ Desicp of SRVs and SRV discharge Cmplete 6/29/84
. piping 95 3.9.3.2 l'atigue evaluation on SRV piping Cmplete 6/15/84 and IDCA downcomers 96 3.9.3.3 IE Information Notice 83-80 Cmplete 6/15/84 97 3.9.3.3 Buckling criteria used for emponent Cmplete 6/29/84 supports 98 3.9.3.3 Design of bolts Cmplete 6/15/84 99a 3.9.5 Stress categories and limits for Cmplete 6/15/84 ccre support structures 99b 3.9.5 Stress categories and limits for emplete 6/15/84 core support structures 100a 3.9.6 10CFR$0.55a paragraph (g)
Cmplete 6/29/84 M P84 80/12 7 - gs i
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ATTACIMENT 1 (Cont'd)
DSER R. L. MITIL 70 OPEN SECTICN A. SClihTNCER ITDi NUMBER SUBJECT STATUS IEITER DATED 100b 3.9.6 10CFR50.55a paragraph (g)
Open 101 3.9.6 PSI and ISI programs for pumps and Open valves 102 3.9.6 Leak testing of pressure isolation Complete 6/29/84 valves 103a1 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualification of Open mechanical and electrical equignent 103a2 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualification of Open mechanical and electrical equipment 103a3 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualification of Open mechanical and electrical equipnent 103a4 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualification of Open mechanical and electrical equipment 103a5 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualification of open mechanical and electrical equipnent 103a6 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualification of Open mechanical and electrical equipnent 103a7 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualification of Open mechanical and electrical equipnent 103bl 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualificaticn of Open mechanical and electrical equipment 103b2 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualification of Open mechanical ard electrical equipnent 103b3 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualification of Open mechanical and electrical equipnent 103b4 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualification of Open mechanical and electrical equipmnt 103b5 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualificaticn of Open mechanical and electrical equipment M P84 80/12 8 - gs
1 ATIAGMDff 1 (Cont'd)
DSER R. L. MITIL 'IO s
OPEN
'SECTICN A. SGWENCER ITEM NUMBER SUBJECT STATUS IEITER IRTED 103b6
'3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualification of Open mechanical and electrical equipwnt -
103c1 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualification of Open mechanical and electrical equipment 103c2 3.10 Seismic ard dynamic qualification of open mechanical and electrical equipment 103c3 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualification of Open mechanical and electrical equipment 103c4' 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualification of Open
/ mechanical and electrical equipment 104
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3.11 Environmental qualification of NRC Action mechanical and electrical equipment 105 4.2 Plant-specific' mchanical fracturing Couplete 7/18/84 analysis 106
.4.2 Applicability of seismic andd LOCA Cmplete 7/18/84 loading evaluation 107 4.2 Minimal post-irradiation fuel Ccrplete 6/29/84 surveillance program 108
' 4.2 Gadolina thermal conductivity Cmplete 6/29/84 equatica w
109a 4.4.7
'IMI-2 Item II.F.2 Open 109b 4.4.7'
'IMI-2 Item II.F.2' Open 110a-4.6 Functional design of reactivity Open Sntrol systems -
110b 4.6 Functional desicy of reactivity Cmplete 6/1/84 control systems 111a 5.2.4.3 Preservice inspection program Cmplete 6/29/84 (cmponents within reactcr pressure boundary)
M P84 80/12 9 - gs
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DSER R. L. MITIL 10 opm SECTICN A. SODENCER ITm NUMBER SUBJECT STATUS LETTER DATED 111b 5.2.4.3 Preservice inspection gegram Cmplete 6/29/84 (cmponents within reacta pressure boundary) 111c 5.2.4.3 Preservice inspection program Cmplete 6/29/84 (cmponents within reacta gessure boundary) 112a 5.2.5 Peactor coolant gessure boundary open leakacy detectior.
112b 5.2.5 Reacta coolant pressure boundary open leakage detection 112c 5.2.5 Reactor coolant gessure boundary opn leakage detection 112d 5.2.5 Reactcr coolant pressure boundary Open leakage chtection 112e 5.2.5 Reactor coolant gessure boundary own leakacy detection 113 5.3.4 GE p ocedure applicability Cmplete 7/18/84 114 5.3.4 cmplian with NB 2360 of the Summer Cmplete 7/18/84 1972 Addenda to the 1971 ASME Code 1 15 5.3.4 Drop weight and Charpy v-notch tests Cmplete 7/18/84 fcr closure flancy materials 116 5.3.4 Charpy v-notch test data for base Cmplete 7/18/84 materials as umd in shell course No. I 117 5.3.4 Cmplian with NB 2332 of Winter 1972 open Addenda of the ASME Code 118 5.3.4 toad factors and neutron fluen for open surveillan mpsules M P84 80/1210- gs
ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont'd)
DSER R. L. MITIL TO OPEN SECTION A. SGWENCER ITEM NUMBER SUBJECT STATUS L TcER DNTED
'119 6.2 TMI item II.E.4.1 Cmplete 6/29/84 120a 6.2
'IMI Item II.E.4.2 Open 120b 6.2
'INI Item II.E.4.2 Open 121 6.2.1.3.3 Use of NUREG-0588 Open 122 6.2.1.3.3
'Ibmperature gofile Open 123 6.2.1.4 Butterfly valve cperation (post Cmplete 6/29/84 accident) 124a 6.2.1.5.1 RPV shield annulus analysis Cmplete 6/1/84 124b 6.2.1.5.1 RPV shield annulus analysis Cmplete 6/1/84 124c 6.2.1.5.1 RPV shield annulus analysis Cmplete 6/1/84 125 6.2.1.5.2 Design drywell head differential Cmplete 6/15/84 gessure
'126a 6.2.1.6 Redundant position indicators for Open vacum breakers (and control rom r
alarms) 126b 6.2.1.6 Redundant position indicators for Open vacuun treakers (and control roam alarms) 1 27 6.2.1.6 Operability.testirg of vacuum treakers Cmplete 7/18/84 1 28 6.2.2 Air ingestion Open 129 6.2.2 Insulation ingestion Cmplete 6/1/84 1 30 6.2.3 Potential bypass leakage paths Cmplete 6/29/84 131 6.2.3 Adninistration of secondary contain-Cmplete 7/18/84 ment openings M P84 80/12 11-gs
ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont'd)
DSER R. L. MITIL 10 OPEN SECTION A. SG WENCER ITEM NUMBER SUBJECT STATUS IEITER DATED 132 6.2.4 Contairrnent isolation review Cmplete 6/15/84 133a 6.2.4.1 Containment purge system Open 133b 6.2.4.1 Contairunent purge system Open 133c 6.2.4.1 Containment purge system Open 134 6.2.6 Containment leakage testing Cmplete 6/15/84 1 35 6.3.3 LPG and LPCI injection valve Open interlocks 136 6.3.5 Plant-specific LOCA (see Section Cmplete 7/18/84 15.9.13) 137a 6.4 control rom habitability Opn 137b 6.4 control rom habitability Ogen 137c 6.4 Control rom habitability Open 1 38 6.6 Preservice inspection program for Cmplete 6/29/84 Class 2 and 3 cmponents 139 6.7 MSIV leakage control system Cmplete 6/29/84 140a 9.1.2 Spent fuel pool storage Open
'140b 9.1.2 Spent fuel pool storage Open 140c 9.1.2 Spent fuel pool storage Open 140d 9.1.2 Spent fuel pool storage Open 141a 9.1.3 Spent fuel coaling and cleanup Open system 141b 9.1.3 Spent fuel cooling and cleanup Open system 141c 9.1.3 Spent fuel pool cooling ard cleanup Cmplete 6/29/84 system i
1 M P84 80/1212-gs
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ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont'd)
DSER R. L. MITTL TO OPEN SECTICN A. SCHWENCER ITEM NUMBER SUBJECT STATUS LETTER DATED 141d 9.1.3 Spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup Open 6/29/84 system 141e 9.1.3 Spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup Open 6/29/84 system 141f 9.1.3 Spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup Open 6/29/84 systm 241g 9.1.3 Spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup Complete 6/15/84 system 142a 9.1.4 Light load handlirg system (related Closed 6/29/84 to refueling)
(5/30/84-Aux.Sys.Mtg.)
142b 9.1.4 Light load handling system (related Closed 6/29/84 to refueling)
(5/30/84-Aux.sys.Mtg.)
143a 9.1.5 overhead heavy load handling Open 143b 9.1.5 overhead heavy load handling Open 144a 9.2.1 Station service water system Open 144b 9.2.1 Station service water system Open 144c 9.2.1 Station service water system Open 145 9.2.2 ISI program and functional testing Closed 6/15/84 of safety and turbine auxiliaries (5/30/84- ~
cooling systems Aux.Sys.Mtg.)
146 9.2.6 Switches and wiring associated with Closed 6/15/84 HPCI/RCIC torus suction (5/30/84-Aux.Sys.Mtg.)
147a 9.3.1 Cmpressed air systerrs Open 147b 9.3.1 Cmpressed air systens Open M P84 80/12 13-gs
ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont'd)
DSER R. L. MITIL TO OPH4 SECTICN A. SCHhD4CER ITEM NUMBER SUBJECT STATUS LEITER DATED 147c 9.3.1 cmpressed air systems Open 147d 9.3.1 Cmpressed air systems Open 148 9.3.2 Post-accident sampling system Open (II.B.3) 149a 9.3.3 Equipnent and floor drainage system Open 149b 9.3.3 Equipnent and floor drainage systen Open 150 9.3.6 Primary containment instrtrnent gas Open system 151a 9.4.1 Control structure ventilation system Open 151b 9.4.1 Control structure ventilation system Open 152 9.4.4 Radioactivity monitoring elements Closed 6/1/84 (5/30/84-Aux.Sys.Mtg.)
153 9.4.5 Engineered safety features ventila-Open tion system 154 9.5.1.4.a Metal roof deck construction Complete 6/1/84 classificiation 155 9.5.1.4.b Ongoing review of safe shutdown NRC Action capability 156 9.5.1.4.c Ongoing review of alternate shutdown NRC Action capability 157 9.5.1.4.e Cable tray protection Open 158 9.5.1.5.a Class B fire detection systen Conplete 6/15/84 159 9.5.1.5.a Primary and secondary power supplies Complete 6/1/84 for fire detection system 160' 9.5.1.5.b Fire water pump capacity Open M P84 80/12 14-gs
ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont'd)
DSER R. L. MITIL 'IO q^;
OPD4 SECTION A. SGWENCER ITEM NUMBER SUBJECT STA'IUS IEITEP DATED 161 9.5.1.5.b Fire water valve supervision Cmplete 6/1/84 162 9.5.1.5.c Deluge valves Cmplete 6/1/84 163 9.5.1.5.c Manual hose station pipe sizing Cmplete 6/1/84 164 9.5.1.6.e Remote shutdown panel ventilation Cmplete 6/1/84 165 9.5.1.6.g Emergency diesel generator day tank Cmplete 6/1/84 protection 166 12.3.4.2 Airborne radioactivity monitar Cmplete 7/18/84 positioning 167 12.3.4.2 Portable continuous air nonitors Cmplete 7/18/84 168 12.5.2 Equipment, training, and Irocedures Cmplete 6/29/84 fcr inplant iodine instrumentation 169 12.5.3 Guidance of Division B Regulatory Cmplete 7/18/84 Guides 170 13.5.2 Procedures generation package Cmplete 6/29/84 sutrnittal 171 13.5.2
'IMI Item I.C.1 Cmplete 6/29/84 172 13.5.2 PGP Ccumitment Cmplete 6/29/84 173 13.5.2 Procedures covering abnormal releases Cmplete 6/29/84 of radioactivity 174 13.5.2 Resolution exphanation in FSAR of Cmplete 6/15/84
'IMI Items I.C.7 and I.C.8 175 13.6 Physical security open 176a 14.2 Initial plant test program open M P84 80/12 15 _gs
ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont'd)
DSER R. L. MITIL 70 OPEN SECTION A. SCHWENCER ITEN NUMBER SUBJECT STATUS IEITER DATED 176b 14.2 Initial plant test program open 176c 14.2 Initial plant test Irogram open 176d 14.2 Initial plant test Irogram open 176e 14.2 Initial plant test program open 176f 14.2 Initial plant test program open 176g 14.2 Initial plant test program Open 176h 14.2 Initial plant test Irogram Opn 1761 14.2 Initial plant test Irogram open 177 15.1.1 Partial feedwater heating Cmplete 7/18/84 178 15.6.5 LOCA resulting frm spectrum of NRC Action postulated piping breaks within RCP
'179 15.7.4 Radiological consequences of fuel NRC Action handling accidents 180 15.7.5 Spent fuel msk &cp accidents NRC Action 181 15.9.5 TMI-2 Item II.K.3.3 Cmplete 6/29/84 182 15.9.10 1MI-2 Item II.K.3.18 cmplete 6/1/84 183 18 Hope Creek DCRDR Opn 184 7.2.2.1.e Failures in reactor wssel level Open sensing lines 185 7.2.2.2 Trip system sensors and cabling in Cmplete 6/1/84 turbine building 186 7.2.2.3 Testability of plant grotection open systems at power M P84 80/12 16-gs k.
ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont'd)
DSER R. L. MITIL 'IO OPFN SECTION A. SWWENCER ITEM NUMBER SUBJECT STA'IUS IEITER DATED 187 7.2.2.4 Lif ting of leads to perform survei]-
Open lance testing 188 7.2.2.5 Setpoint methodology Open
'189 7.2.2.6 Isolstion devices Open 190 7.2.2.7 Regulatory Guide 1.75 Cmplete 6/1/84 191 7.2.2.8 Scram discharge volume Cmplete 6/29/84 192 7.2.2.9 Reactx mot switch Cmplete 6/1/84 193 7.3.2.1.10 Manual initiation of safety systems Open 194 7.3.2.2 Standard review plan deviations Cmplete 6/1/84 195a 7.3.2.3 Freeze-protection / water filled Open instrument and sampling lines and cabinet temperature control 195b 7.3.2.3 Freeze-protection / water filled Open instruent and sampling lines and cabinet temperature control 196 7.3.2.4 Sharing of ccmnon instrumnt taps Open 197 7.3.2.5 Microprocessa, multiplexer and Cmplete 6/1/84 cmputer systems 198 7.3.2.6
'IMI Item II.K.3.18-Ars actuation Open 199 7.4.2.1 IE Bulletin 79-27-Ioss of non-class Open IE instrumentation and control power system bus during operation 200 7.4.2.2 Remote shutdown system Cmplete 6/1/84 201 7.4.2.3 RCIC/HPCI interactions Open 202 7.5.2.1 Invel masurement errors as a result Open of environmental temperature effects on level instrumntation reference leg M P84 80/12 17-gs
ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont'd)
DSER R. L. MITIL TO OPEN SECTION A. SCHWENCER ITEM NUMBER SUBJECT STATUS LETTER DATED 203 7.5.2.2 Regulatory Guide 1.97 Open 204 7.5.2.3 TMI Item II.F.1 - Agcident monitoring Open 205 7.5.2.4 Plant process emputer system Cmplete 6/1/84 206 7.6.2.1 High pressure / low pressure interlocks Open 207 7.7.2.1 HELBs and consequential control system Open failures 208 7.7.2.2 Multiple control systs failures Open 209 7.7.2.3 Credit for non-safety related systems Complete 6/1/84 in Chapter 15 of the FSAR 210 7.7.2.4 Transient analysis recording system Conplete 6/1/84 211a 4.5.1 Control rod drive structural materials Open 211b 4. 5.1 -
Control rod drive structural materials Open 211c 4.5.1 Control rod drive structural materials Open 211d 4.5.1 Control rod drive structural materials Open 211e 4.5.1 Control rod drive structural materials Open 212 4.5.2 Reactor internals materials Open 213 5.2.3 Reactor coolant pressure boundary Open material 214 6.1.1 Engineered safety features materials Open 215 10.3.6 Main steam and feedwater syste Open materials 216a 5.3.1 Reactor vessel materials Open M P84 80/12 18-gs j
ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont'd)
DSER R. L. MITTL TO OPDi SECTION A. SCHh33CER ITEM NUMBER SUBJECT STATUS IETTER DATED 216b 5.3.1 Reactor vessel materials Open 217 9.5.1.1 Fire protection organization Open 218 9.5.1.1 Fire hazards analysis Cmplete 6/1/84 219 9.5.1.2 Fire protection administrative Open controls 220 9.5.1.3 Fire brigade and fire brigade Open training 221 8.2.2.1 Physical separation of offsite Open transmissicn lines 222 8.2.2.2 Design provisions for re-establish-Open ment of an offsite power source 223 8.2.2.3 Independence of offsite circuits Open between the switchyard and class IE buses 224 8.2.2.4 Ccenon failure node between onsite Open and offsite power circuits 225 8.2.3.1 Testability of autmatic transfer of Open power from the normal to preferred power source 226 8.2.2.5 Grid stability Open 227 8.2.2.6 Capacity and capability of offsite Open circuits 228 8.3.1.l(1) Voltage drop during transient condi-Open tions 229 8.3.1.l(2) Basis for using bus voltage versus Open actual connected load voltage in the voltage drop analysis 230 8.3.1.l(3) Clarificaticn of Table 8.3-11 Open M P84 80/1219-gs
ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont'd)
DSER R. L. MITTL TO OPEN SECTICH A. SCHWENCER ITEM NUMBER SUBJECT STATUS LETTER DATED 231 8.3.1.1(4) Undervoltage trip setpoints Open 232 8.3.1.l(5) Ioad configuration used for the Open voltage drop analysis 233 8.3.3.4.1 Periodic systen testing Open 234 8.3.1.3 Capacity and capability of onsite Open AC power supplies and use of ad-ministrative controls to prevent overloading of the diesel generators 235 8.3.1.5 Diesel generators load acceptance Open test 236 8.3.1.6 Ca pliance with position C.6 of Open 10 1.9 237 8.3.1.7 Decription of the load sequencer Open 238 8.2.2.7 Sequencing of loads on the offsite Open power system 239 8.3.1.8 Testing to verify 80% miniman Open voltage 240 8.3.1.9 Capliance with BIP-PSB-2 Open 241 8.3.1.10 Ioad acceptance test after prolonged Open no load operaticn of the diesel generator 242 8.3.2.1 Ctmpliance with position 1 of Regula-Open tory Guide 1.128 243 8.3.3.1.3 Protection or qualification of Class Open IE equipment from the effects of fire suppression systems 244 8.3.3.3.1 Analysis and test to demonstrate Open adequacy of less than specified separation i
M P84 80/12 20- gs L._
r-ATTACHMMT 1 (Cont'd)
DSER R. L. MITTL m OPEN SECTION A. SCHWENCER ITEM NUMBER SURTECT STA'IUS LETTER DATED 245 8.3.3.3.2 The use of 18 versus 36 inches of Open separation betwen raceways 246 8.3.3.3.3 Specified separation of raceways by Open analysis and test 247~
8.3.3.5.1 Capability of penetrations to with-Open stand long duration short circuits at less than maximum or worst case short circuit 248 8.3.3.5.2 Separaticn of penetration primary Open and backup protections 249 8.3.3.5.3 The use of bypassed thermal overload Open protective devices for penetration protections 250 8.3.3.5.4 Testing of fuses in accordance with Open R.G. 1,63 251
-8.3.3.5.5 Fault current analysis for all Open representative penetration circuits 252 8.3.3.5.6 The use of a single breaker to provide Open penetration protection 253 8.3.3.1.4 Ca nitment to protect all Class lE Open equipment from external hazards versus only class lE equipnent in one division 254 8.3.3.1.5 Protection of class lE power supplies Open fran failure of unqualified class lE loads 255 8.3.2.2 Battery capacity Open 256 8.3.2.3 Automatic trip of loads to maintain Open sufficient battery capacity M P84 80/12 21-gs
ATTACHMENT 1 (Cont'd)
DSER R. L. MITTL TO OPEN SECTICN A. SCHWENCER ITEN NUMBER SUR7ECT STATUS LETTER DATED 257 8.3.2.5 Justification for a 0 to 13 second Open load cycle 258 8.3.2.6 Design and qualification of DC Open system loads to operate between minimtun and maxinun voltage levels 259 8.3.3.3.4 Use of an inverter as an isolation Open device 260 8.3.3.3.5 Use of a single breaker tripped by Open a IOCA signal used as an isolation device 261 8.3.3.3.6 Autmatic transfer of loads and Open interconnection between redundant divisions TS-1 2.4.14 Closure of watertight doors to safety-Open related structures TS-2 4.4.4 Single recirculation loop operation Open TS-3 4.4.5 Core flow monitoring for crud effects Cmplete 6/1/84 TS-4 4.4.6 Loose parts monitoring system Open TS-5 4.4.9 Natural circulation in normal Open operation TS-6 6.2.3 Secondary containment negative Open pressure TS-7 6.2.3 Inleakage and drawdown time in Open secondary containment TS-8 6.2.4.1 Isakage integrity testing Open TS-9 6.3.4.2 ECCS subsystem periodic ocuponent Open testing TS-10 6.7 MSIV leakage rate M P84 80/12 22-gs
ATTACHMENT 1 (Cbnt'd)
I DSER R. L. MITTL TO OPEN SECTION A. SCHhEJCER ITEM NUMBER SURTECT STATUS IEITER DATED TS-11 15.2.2 Availability, setpoints, and testing Open of turbine bypass system TS-12 15.6.4 Primary coolant activity II-l 4.2 Fuel rod internal pressure criteria Complete 6/1/84 II-2 4.4.4 Stability analysis subnitted before Open second-cycle operation M P84 80/12 23-gs
ATTACHMENT 2 DATE:
7/18/84 DRAFT SER SECTIONS AND DATES PROVIDED SECTION DATE SECTION DATE 3.1 3.2.1 11.4.1 3.2.2 11.4.2 5.1 11.5.1 5.2.1 11.5.2 6.5.1 13.1.1 8.1 13.1.2 8.2.1 13.2.1
- 8. t. 2 13.2.2 8.2.3 13.3.1 8.2.4 13.3.2 8.3.1 13.3.3 8.3.2 13.3.4 8.4.1 13.4 8.4.2 13.5.1 8.4.3 15.2.3 8.4.5 15.2.4 8.4.6 15.2.5 8.4.7 15.2.6 8.4.8 15.2.7 9.5.2 15.2.8 9.5.3 15.7.3 9.5.7 17.1 9.5.8 17.2 10.1 17.3 10.2 17.4 10.2.3 10.3.2 10.4.1 10.4.2 10.4.3 10.4.4 11.1.1 11.1.2 11.2.1 11.2.2 11.3.1 11.3.2 CT:db MP 84 95/03 01
DATE:
July 18, 1984 ATTACHMENT 3 DSER OPEN SECTION ITEM NUMBER SUBJECT 29 3.5.1.1 Internally Generated Missiles (Outside Contain-ment) 31 3.5.1.3 Turbine Missiles 34 3.6.2 Unrestrained Whipping Pipe Inside Containment 90 3.9.2.1 Vibration monitoring program during testing 105 4.2 Plant-specific mechanical fracturing analysis 106 4.2 Applicability of seismic and LOCA loading evaluation 113 5.3.4 GE Procedure Applicability 114 5.3.4 Compliance with NB 2360 of the Summer 1972 Addenda to the 1971 ASME Code 115 5.3.4 Drop Weight and Charpy V-Notch Tests for Closure Flange Materials 116 5.3.4 Charpy V-Notch Test Data for Base Materials as Used in Shell Course No. 3 127 6.2.1.6 Operability Testing of Vacuum Breakers 131 6.2.3 Administration of secondary containment openings i
MP 84 95 16 01-bp
l DATE:
July 18, 1984 i
ATTACHP,ENT 3 (Cont'd)
DSER OPEN SECTION ITEM NUMBER SUBJECT 136 6.3.5 Plant-specific LOCA (also Section 15.9.13) 166 12.3.4.2 Airborne radioactivity monitor positioning 167 12.3.4.2 Portable continuous air monitors 169 12.5.3 Guidance of Division 8 Regulatory Guides 177 15.1.1 Partial feedwater heating MP 84 95 16 02-bp
7 o
O ATTACIDiENT 4 i
u -,
O e
~
v--
=
HCGS 1
DSER Open Item No. 29 (Section 3.5.1.1)
INTERNALLY GENERATED MISSILES (OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT)
With respect to rotating equipment, the applicant has stated d
that tha pumps and fans were manufactured to the same industry standards as Palo Verde and therefore the results of.the Palo Verde's analysis for internally generated 2
missiles is applicable to Hope Creek.
In order to rely upon the analysis performed by Palo Verde, the applicant must verify that every rotating component (pumps, fans, motors, and turbines, except the main turbine-generator) is designed and constructed to exactly the same codes and standards (including addenda and editions), to be.of the same manufac-turer,' size, and materials as the analyzed components at Palo Verde.
Palo Verde relied mainly upon compartmentaliza-i tion as the meanc to protect the redundant equipment.
For i
each component where compartmentalization was relied upon at Palo Verde, the applicant must verify the identical components at Hope Creek provided with comparable compart-mentalization.
Similarly, the applicent must verify the use of barriers, separation and orientation as was used by Palo Verde.
For every component which is not identical with Palo Verde, the applicant must provide a discussion of the analysis which verifies that the casing would be capable of retaining the
' internally generated missile or.that the missile would not strike safety-related components or generate a secondary missile.
Unless the applicant either verifies comformance
.with the Palo Verde design (as outlined above) or provides the results of an analysis which shows that the casings
' will contain.the internally generated missiles, the appli-cant must provide protection by any one or a combination of compartmentalization, barriers, separation, orientation, and equipment design.- Safety-related systems must be verified to be physically separated from nonsafety-related systems and components of safety-related systems are physically separated from their redundant compartments.
e
,P 84 112 15 01-bp M
l l
e n
-w,,
--e-,e
-,,,-vv ww,-ms,,w,e,mwwv wn-~-w
--,-ev-~
-,+.m-mme n.,
--r.-
- - ---om--w>,,----,4er-----
~--<
BDecd on the above, wa cannot conclude that the design 10 in conformance with the requirements of General Design Criterion 4 as it relates to protection against internally generated missiles until the applicant provides an acceptable discussion concerning rotating components as potential sources of internally generated missiles.
We cannot determine that the design of the facility for providng protection from internally generated missiles meets the applicable acceptance criteria of SRP Section 3.5.1.1.
We will report resolution of this item in a supplement to this SER.
RESPONSE
FSAR Section 3.5.1.1 has been revised to include the results of an analysis of the internally generated rotational missilea outside containment.
MP 84 112 15 02-bp
)
DSER OPEN ITEM 8f
.w.
HCCS FSAR 12/83 CHAPTER 3 TABLES Table No.
Title 3.2-1 HCGS Classification of Structures, Systems, and Components 3.2-2 Code Requirements for Components and Quality Groups for GE-Supplied Components 3.2-3 Code Requirements for Components and Quality i
Groups for Public Service Electric and Gas /Bechtel-Procured Components 3.3-1 Design Wind Loads on Seismic Category I Structures 3.3-2 Tornado-Protected Structures, Systems, and Components 3.4-1 Flood Levels at Safety-Related Structures 3.4-2 Outside Wall / Slab Openings and Penetrations Located Below Design Flood Level Internally Generated Missiles Cufs/d'e. Pr;< nary Con /a/osen5 3.5-1 3.5-2 Target Parameters 3.5-3 Missile Characteristics I
3.5-4 Ejection Point Coordinates 3.5-5 Turbine Barrier Data 3.5-6 Target Barrier Data l
3.5-7 Computed Probabilities l
3.5-8 Summary Number of Operations 3.5-9 Crash Rates Per Mile and Effective Impact Area by Category of Aircraft 3.5-10 Aircraft Crash Density by Location / Route / Altitude l
3. ~5-1 1 Probability Summary l
oPf 3-ix Amendment 3 DSER OPmt ITEM 1
HCGS FSAR 12/83 CHAPTER 3 TABLES (cont)
Table No.
Title 3.5-12 Tornado Missiles CA* C
'"* 1 M". "1 Y
- 3. 5- /3 faternally Generaded AckNny 5'slc3 l
3.6-1 High Energy Fluid System Piping 3.6-2 Main Steam System Piping Stress Levels and Pipe Break Data (Portion Inside Primary Containment) 3.6-3 Main Steam System Piping Stress Levels and Pipe Break Data (Portion Outside Primary Containment) 1 3.6-4 Blowdown. Time-Histories for High Energy Pipe Breaks Outside Primary Containment 3.6-5 Pressure-Temperature Transient Analysis Results for High Energy Pipe Breaks Outside Primary Containment 3.6-6 Recirc.ulation System Piping Stress Levels and Pipe Break Data 3.6-7 Recirculation System Blowdown Time-History 3.6-8 Feedwater System Piping Stress Levels and Pipe Break Data (Portion Inside Primary Containment) 3.6-9 Feedwater System Piping Stress Levels and Pipe Break Data (Portion Outside Primary Containment) 3.6-10 RWCU System Piping Stress Levels and Pipe Break Data (Portion Inside Primary Containment) 3.6-11 RWCU System Piping Stress Levels and Pipe Break Data (Portion Outside Primary Containment) 3.6-12 HPCI System Piping Stress Levels and Pipe Break Data (Portion Inside Primary Containment) 3.6-13 HPCI System Piping Stress Levels and Pipe Break Data (Portion Outside Primary Containment) 3.6-14 RCIC System Piping Stress Levels and Pipe Break Data (Portion Inside Primary Containment)
.DSER OPEN ITEM ca? 9 1
3-x Amendment 3 i
t
3.5 MISSILE PROTECTION The Seismic Category I and safety-related structures, equipment, and systems are protected from postulated missiles through basic plant arrangement so that a missile does not cause the failure.of systems that are required for safe shutdown or whose failure could result in a significant release of radioactivity.
Where it is impossible to provide protection through plant layout, suitable physical barriers are provided to shield the critical system or component from credible missiles.
Redundant safety-related Seismic Category I components are arranged so that a single missile cannot simultaneously damage a critical system component and its backup system.
A tabulation of safety-related structures, systems, and components, their locations, seismic category, quality group classification, and the applicable FSAR sections is given in Table 3.2-1.
General arrangement drawings are included as Figures 1. 2-2 and 1.2-41.
3.5.1 MISSILE SELECTIDN AND DESCRIPTION I
3.5.1.1 Internally Generated Missiles (Outside Primary Containment)
, a nd 3.S - 1.3 The systems located outside the primary containment hav
'been I
examined to identify and classify potential missiles.
hese j
systems and missiles are listed in Tables 3.5-1 e undant systems are normally located in different areas of the plant or separated by missile-proof walls so that a single missile can not damage both systems.
" ;q: 7 ;:, ruch e Me residual heat removal (RHR) and core
.,spray pumps, are located.in separate missile-proof compartments W are not considered a potential missile source or hazard to other systems.
and their imp s/lers o.ve enclosed
'" o conwede.s+ractare a es-clore tMef Refer to Section 3.5.3 for barrier design procedure.
There are three general sources of postulated missiles:
l l
a.
Rotating component failure DSER OPEN ITEM o7f 3.5-1 Amendment 2
.. ~ _ _ _.., _. - _.
Pressurized component failure l
c.
Gravitationally generated missiles.
l 3.5.1.1.1 Rotating Component Failure Missiles pro to.ble.
Catastrophic failure of rotating equipment having synchronous
- motors, e.g., pumps, fans, and compressors, that could lead to the generation of missiles is not considered Massive and rapid failure of these components is improbable because of the conservative design, material characteristics, inspections, and quality control during fabrication and erection.
Also, the rotational speed is limited to the design speed of the motor, thereby precluding component failures due to runaway speeds.
Similarly, it is concluded that the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) pumps and turbines cannot generate credible missiles.
These pumps are not in continuous use, but are periodically tested and otherwise operate only in the unlikely event of a postulated accident.
They are classified as moderate energy systems.
Overspeed tripping devices ensure that the turbines do not reach runaway speed, where failure leading to the ejection of a missile could take place.
Oth;; zet; ting ;;;ip :nt de;; n;t ;;;:titute : ei ile hs srd b;;;;;; cf it; :::11 si;; end/e; the salikeliheed th;t its
.etating coepenents seuld p;n trat; its h;;;ing.
J nser-+ 1.
xr 3.5.1.1.2 Pressurized Component Failure Missiles l
The following are potential internal missiles from pressurized equipment a.
Valve bonnets l
b.
Valve stems c.
Temperature detectors d.
Nuts and bolts DSER OPEN ITEM df 3.5-2 Amendment 2
1 1
INSERT 1 A tabulation of missiles generated by postulated failures of rotating components, their sources and characteristics, and a safety evaluation are provided in Table 3.5-13.
The evaluation identified one instance where a postulated missile, which could penetrate through the flexible connection of a vane-axial fan, could have the potential to damage safe-shutdown equipment in the room.
In order to prevent the postulated missile from damaging safety-shutdown equipment, a missile shield has been added to the design to withstand the impact of the postulated fan blade missile.
The formulas used to predict the penetration resulting from missile impact are provided in Reference 3.5-4.
The penetration and perforation formulas assume that the missile strikes the target normal to the surface, and the axis of the missile is assumed parallel to the line of flight.
The rotating components is assumed to fail at 120 percent overspeed.
These assumptions result in a conservative estimate of local damage to the target.
MP 84 112 15 03-bp osER OPEK ITD( g2 f
+
HCGS FSAR PRE 55uR/2Eb do#7MMIPage 1 of 2 TABLE 3.5-1 f
INTERNhLLY GENERATE MISSILES ours/DE CcWM/N#"ENT~
I Protection f
Evaluation
~
System F8AR Sectton Missile Description
/ __ Codestaa
?
j
,hPCI
(.3 Test e'.anection c
t Startup flange c
Pressure indicator (PI-R003) c-CRD hydraulic 4.6.1
=
Drains c
Pressure indicators (PI-R008, 4013 A, B) c Pressure indicators (PI-R021, PI-N00 5, c
l PI-R016, PI-R012, PI-R007, PI-R010, PI-R006)
Test indicatcre (T1-4014, TE-4014, TE-N018) c Test connections c
Vent d
Blind flange c
_/
/
Main steam 5.1 Test connections c
Temperature elements (TE-N040) c Pressure indicatoro (PP-3632 A, B, C, D) c i
Main steam 5.1 Temperature elements (M-N057 A, B, C, D, El c
/
i sealing Pressure transmitter (PT-5938) c Blind flange or Y-strainer c
Test connection c
1 Temperature element (TE-N060) c j
Feedwater 5.1
- Test connection c
- 5. 4. 8 Blind flange c
j Temperature sensors / elements (TE-N007, TE-N019, c
T4-N015, TE-N004, TS-169, TS-170, TS-247 A, B) j
~
Pressure transmitter (PT-N005) c i
Pressure coint (PP-3876 A, B3 PP-3875 A, B; c
i PP-3916 A, B; PP-3917 A, D) t' RWCU 5.4.8 Pressure indicators (PI-3377 A, B; PI-R009; c
PI-R004; PI-R008; PDIS-3987 A, B; PDIS-3988 A, B)
Pressure switches (PSL-N013, PSH-N0le) c Flow elements (FE-3986 A, B) c i
DSER OPEN ITEM J
TABLE 3.5-13 IlffERNALLY SNERATED RDTATING CGEPONENT MISSIIES OUFSIEE CDIFFAIDSEEIFF i
i I
l l
l lCArcuiaraD I l
l l nassna i
somCE l
l _nIssILE CnARACTEmIsTICs inAx. STEEL ICAsIMa l
1 i
l ICEtrFI-l OF l LOC ATION.l VELOCITY l DIA.
l 1EIGtT l PERF. DEPTHlTHEIGIESSl RBEAIWCS l
l FICATION l BRISSILE l
l (FT/S) l (IM.) l (LBs) l (IM.)
l l
l l
l l
l l
l 1
l l
l i
l Fan Blade lContairusentl Reactor l 19 9. 0 l 1.21 l 3.7 1 0.211 1 0.1406 l Fan blade may penetrate fan oneing.]
l l Pre-purge l Bldg l
l l
l l
l The surrounding concrete wall for l l
lCleanop Fan] El. 162' l 1
l
- l l
l the fan is 12" thick. The calcu-l I
l l
l l
l l
l l lated depth of fan blade penetre-l j
l l 10F-2 00 l
l l
l l
l l tion into the concrete well is l
l l(Centri-l l
1 l
l l
l 1.43*.
Therefore, miselle has no I l
l l fugal Fan)l l
l l
I l
l effect on plant asfe shastdown cap = l j
l l
l l
l l
l l
l ability. Therefore grotection is l
j l
l l
l l
l l
l l not needed.
l I
i l
l l
l l
1 l
1 l Fan BladelDiesel l Amt 31dg l 116.0 l 1.24 l 4.05 l 0.1066 l 0.0781 l Perforation of fan casing may l
l l
l Generator l SDG Area l I
l l
l l occur. Due to the orientation of I
l l
Itting Area i El. 178' l l
l l
l l the fans, the postulated fan blade l l
l lEnhaust Fan!
l l
l l
l l missile will not damage any esfe l
j l
l l
l l
l l
l l shutdown equipment in the rom.
I l
l1A,3-V414 l l
l l
l l
l Therefore, protection is not l
l l (Centri-l l
l l
l l
l neeaed.
l l l
l fugal Fan)l l
l l
l l
l l
I l
l l
l l
l 1
l 1
i l Fan BladelControl l Aux Bldg l 105.0 10.969 l 0.614 1 0.034 l 0.0781 l Casing perforation will not occurs !
4 l
l l Area l Control !
l l
l l
l however, fan blade may exit throught l
lEnhaust Fan l Area l
l l
l I
l the flexible connector on tN fan l 1
l l
l E1. 155' l l
l l
l l discharge. There is no safe shut-l i l
l1A,3-V402 l
l l
l l
l l shutdown equipment in the room.
l l
l(Centri-l l
l l
l l
l l
l 1
l fugal Fan)l l
1 l
l l
l l
l l
1 l
l l
l 1
l l
l l
1 I
l 1
I l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l I
I l
l l
l J
l l
1.
l 1
l I
osza cern Iran J7 I
I I
I I
I I
i
Ki TABLE 3.5-13
'q IfffERNALLY SHERATED ROTATING CG4PONENT MISSIIES OUfSIE CDiffAItMENT j
l l
l lCAI4UIATED l
.l l
l #ESSII2 l
SOMCE l
l MISSILE CHARACTERISTICS l MAX. STEEL"l CASING l
l l IDElrfI-l OF l LOCATION l VELOCITY l DIA.
l EIQtT l PERF. DEPTH lTHICENESSl RasARKS l
l FICATION !
MISSILE l
l (FT/S) l (IN.) l (LBs) l (IN.)
l l
l l
l l
l 1
l l
l l
l Fan Blade lFRVS Recir.l Reactor - l 248.0 l 1.4 l 5.42 l 0.318 l 0.1406 l Perforation of the fan casing or l
l l Fan l Bldg l
l l.
l l
l flexible cornector may occur.
l l
l l
l
. l l
l l
l However, due to the orientation of l.,
l f
l 1 A thru F-l El. 132',l l
l l
l l the fana,' only ceiling and floor l
j l
lV213 l 162' and l l
~l l
l l of the fan blade penetration on thol
_l l
l l may be hit. The calculated depth l l
l(Centri-l 17 8' l
l l
l fugal Fan)l l
l l
l l
l concrete is 3.61".
Sinc.e thers arel l
l l
l l
l l
l l no safe shutdown ccanmodities l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l impacted, protection is not nee 3ed.l l
l l
l
'l l
l l
l l
l l Fan Blade lFRYS Vent l Reactor l 144.0 l 1.02 l 1.99 l'0.108 l 0.1406
.l Casing parforation will not occurs l l
l Fan l Bldg l
'l_
l l
l
' l however, fan blade may exit through!
l l
l El. 145' l
,]
l i
l l the flexible connector on the fan l l
l1A a-V206. l l
l l
l
.l
[ dischargs. The calculated depth of f l
l (Csntri-l l
l l
l
' l the fan blade penetration into the l l
l fugal Fan)l l
l l
l l
l concrete is 1.138".
Due to the l
l l
l l
l l
l~
l l orientation of the fan, only the l
l l
l l
l l
l l
. l ceiling and floor could be hit.
l l
l l
l l
l
-l l
'l Therefore, protection is not' l
l' l
l l
l l
l l
1 needed.
l 1
1 I
I I
l l
l l
1 i
l Fan Bladelcontrol l Aux Bldg l 19 7 l 0.772 l 0.764 l 0.115 l 0.1406 l Casing perforation will not ocoars l l
l Room aserg.l control l l
l l
l l however, fan blade may exit throughl l
l l Filter Fan l Area l
l l
l
'l l the flexible connector on the fan l l
l l El. 155' l l
l l
l l discharge. The calculated empth ofl l
l l1A,B-V400 l
l l
l l
l l the blade penetration into t'io l
l l (Centri-l l
l l
l l
l concrete is 1.09".
There is no l
l l fugal Fan)l l
l l
l l
l safe shutdown equipment in the l
i l
l l
l l
l l
l l room. Therefore protection is not l l
l l
l l
l l needed.
I DSER OPEN ITEM 8f l
l
b 3
y TABLE 3.5-13 s
IlffERNALLY GENERATED RDTATING CO4PONENT MISSIZES OUfSIDE CDNTAlletElff g
l l
l l
lCAICUIATED l l
l l NESSIIA l SOURCE l
l MISSILE CHARACTERISTICS l MAX. STEEL l CASING l
l l IEElff1-l OF l LOCATION l VELOCITY l DIA.
l 15;IQiT l PERF. DEPTH lTH3CIQ4ESSl RBtARKS l
l FICATION l MISSILE l
l (FT/S) l (IN.) l (LBs) l (IN.)
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l
=
L l Fan Blade l Battery l hx Bldg l 81 l 0.846 1 0.23 l 0.014 l 0.0625 l Casing perforation will not occurs l I
l
. l Room l SOG Area l l
l l
l l however, fan blade may exit through!
l l Exhaust Fan l El.163' l l
l l
l l the flexible connector on the fan l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l discharge. The calculated depth off 1
l l1A thru D-l l
l l
l l
l the fan blade penetration in ths l
l lV406 l
l l
l l
l l concrete is 0.086".
Due to oriee-l l
l (Centri-l l
l l
l l
l tation of the fan, safe shutdown l
[
l l fugal Fan)l l
l l
l l
l equipment will not be impacted and l l
l l
l l
l l
l l protection is not needed.
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
1 l Fan Blade l Control l Aux Bldg l 143 l 0.834 l 0.206 l 0.029 l 0.0625 l Casing perforation will not occurs l Y
l l Area l Control l l
l l
l l however, fan blade may exit throughl
[
l l Battery l Area l
l l
l l
l the flexible connector on the fan l l
l l Exhaust Fanj El.178' l l
l l
l l discharge. The re are conduits thatl l
l l
l l
l l
l l belong to A, C, and D channels in l l
l1A,5-V410 l
l l
l l
l l the room that may be needed for l
l l(Centri-l l
l l
l l
l safe shutdown. However, the con-l l
l fugal Fan)l l
l l
l l
l duits are thicker than the calcu-l l
l l
l l
l l
l l lated maximum steel perforation l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l depth (0.029"), therefore, protec-l l
l l
l l
l l
l l tion is not needed.
l t
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
T l Fan Blade l Battery l Aux Bldg l 81 l 0.846 l 0.23 l 0.014 l 0.0625 l Casing perforation will not occurs l l
lRoca l SDG Area l l
l l
l l however, fan blade may exit throughl l
l Exhaust Fan! El. 178' l l
l l
l l the flexible connector on the fan l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l discharge. There are conduits thatl l
l1A,5-V416 l
l l
l l
l l belong to A, C, and D channels in l l
l (Centri-l l
l l
l l
l the room that may be needed for l
l l fugal Fan)l l
l l
l l
l safe shutdown. However, the con-l l
l l
l l
l l duits are thicket than the calcu-l l
l l
l~
l l
l lated maximum steel perforation l
^
DSER OPEN ITEM e7 l
1 l
l l depth (0.014"), therefore, protec-l I
I l
1 l tion is not needed.
l
TABLE 3.5-13 af INFERNALLY (ENERATED ROTATING CGGPONENT MISSILES OUFSIEE CDNFAIIStENT l
l l
l lCAECUIATED l l
1 l NESSIIA l
SOURCE l
l MISSILE CHARACTERISTICS l MAX. STEEL l CASING l
l I
l IEENFI-l OF I LOCATION l VELOCITY l DIA.
l tEIGHT l PERF. DEPTHlTHECitMESSl R BIAIUCS l
l FICATION l MISSILE I
l (FT/S) l (IN.) l (LBs) l (IN.)
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l FCn Bladel Aux Bldg l Aux Bldg l 78.5 l 0.984 1 0.792 l 0.027 l 0.0781 l Casing perforation will not occurr l l
l Battery l SDG Area l l
l l
I I however, fan blade may exit throught l
lBahaust Fan l El.178' I l
l l
l l the flexible connector on the fan l l
l l
I l
l l
l l
l discharge. There are conduite thatl i
l l1A,3-V417 l
l l
l l
l l belong to A, C, and D channels in l i
l
,t (Centri-l l
l l
l l
l the room that may be needed for l
l l fugal Fan)l l
l l
l l
l safe shutdown. Ilowever, the cow-l l
1 l
l l
l l
l l
l duite are thicker than the calce-l l
l 1
l l
l l
l l lated maximum steel perforation l
3 l
l l
l l
l 1
I l depth (0.027"), therefore, protec-l I
I l
l 1
I I
I l tion is not needed.
l I
l l
l l
l l
l I
l l Fan BladelControl I Aux Bldg l 235 l 1.68 l 8.8 l 0.341 l 0.25 l Perforation of fan casing may l
l l
l Equipment i SDG Area l l
l l
l l Occurs however, the fan is inside al l
l Supply Fan l El.178' I l
l l
l l filter housing that is 3/16" thick. l j
l l
l l
l 1
l l
l The calculated steel perforation l
l l
11 A,3-VH-4 07l l
l l
l l
l r.f ter the fan blade penetration l
l l(Centri-l 1
l l
1 l
l through the fan casing is 0.176".
l l
l fugal Fan)l l
l l
l l
l Therefore, the fan blade will not l
i l
l l
l l
l l
l l exit from the filter housing.
I l
I I
l l
l l
l l
I j
l FCn Blade l Diesel I Aux Bldg l 149 l 1.37 l 3.16 l 0.115 l 0.1875 I Filter housing perforation will notl l
l Generator l 3DG Area l l
1 l
l( filter I occur.
l 2
l l
13tnel I El. 163' l l
l l
lhousing I
l A
I l Supply Unitj l
l l
l Ithicknese) l i
i IFan l
1 l
1 l
1 l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l I
l l
l 1 A, B-vu-4081 l
l 1
l l
l l
l l
l (Centri-l l
l l
l l
l l
I I fugal ran)I l
1 I
I l
l h
I 8
l 1
I I
l l
l DSER OPEN ITEM 8 f t
e
TABLE 3.5-13 g
INTERNALLY (ENERATED IDTATING CG4PONENT MISSIIES OtRSIII CDifrAIISLElff l
l l
l l
lCALCUEATED I l
l l MISSIIS l
SOURCE l
l NISSILE CHARRCTERISTICS lNAX. STEEL l CASING l
l l
l IDENTI-1 Or i LOCATIOtt l VELOCITY l DIA.
l lECIGtT l PERF. DEPTH lTHICRIESSl RBIARES l
I FICATION 9tISSII2 l
l (FT/S) l (IN.) l (LBs)
I (IN.)
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l Fan Bladelswitchgear l Aux Bldg l 157 l 3.31 1 8.09 I 0.094 l 0.1875 l Filter housing perforation will notl l
l lRoas Unit l SDG Area l l
l l
l(filter l Occur.
l l
l Coolers l El. 163' l l
1 l
l housing l
l j
l l
l l
l l
l l thickness) l i
l l 1 A, B-VM-4 01 l l
l l
l l
l l
l l(Centri-l l
l l
l l
l l
l l fugni Fan)l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l 1
l l
l Fan Blade l Control l Aux Bldg l 174 l 1.45 l 4.867 l 0.178 l 0.1075 l Casing perforation will not occur. l j
l l Roan Supplyl SDG Area l l
l l
l l Also, the fan is inside a filter l
l l Unit l El. 178' l l
l l
l l housing.
l 1
l l
l 1
l l
1 l
I I
i l
11 A, B-vu-403l l
l l
l l
l l
l l (Cen tri-l l
l l
l l
l 1
l 1 fugal Fan)l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l 1
l l
l l
l l
i l Fan BladelControl l Aux Bldg l 210 l 1.37 l 0.753 l 0.069 l 0.1875 l Casing perforation will not occur. I
)
l l Area Smoke ! Control l l
l l
1 l However, the fan blade may exit l
l l Vent Fan l Area l
l l
l l
l through the auction side flexible l
l l
l II. 178' l l
l l
l l connector. There is no safe shut-l l
l10-V408 l
l l
l l
l I down equipment within the room.
l 1
l(Vano-Axiall l
l l
l l Therefore, protection is not I
l l
l Fan) l I
l l
l l
l neeaed.
I i
l l
l 1
l l
l l
l 1
l Fan Blade l Diesel Areal Aux Bidg l 281 l 1.72 l 0.902 l 0.092 l 0.1875 l Casing perforation will not occur. l l
l Exhaust Fan! SDG Area l l
l l
l l However, the fan blade could exit l 4
l l
l El. 178' l l
l l
1 l through the auction side flexible l
j l
11A,8-V411 l
l l
l l
l l connector. A 1/4" thick steel l
I l(Vane-Axiall l
l l
l l
l barrier is provided to encices the l l
I Fan) l l
l l
l l
l section flexibleP connector.
l C R OPEN ITEM [ f 1
l f
TABLE 3.5-13 l
IlfrERNALLY SNERATED ROTATING CGt90NENT MIssius OursIm cowrAIsostier I
l l
l l
ICALCU M TED l l
l 1
I sassIra i
sounCE I
l nIssILE CnARACTEmIsTICs lnAx. STEEL l CASING l
l l
l InstrI-I OF l LOCATION l VELOCITYl DIA.
I 1ECIGIT I PERF. DEPTHITHECIGIEssi RIBEAIWts l
I FICATIOtt I nIssILE l
l (FT/s)'l (IN.) 1 (LBe)
I (IM.)
l l
l
{
l 1
1 1
l l
l l
l 1,
l l Fan Blade l Diesel I Aux Bldg l 260 l 3.33 l 23.9 l 0.383 l 0.25 l Fan blade will penetrate throu$
l I
IGenerator i sDG Area l l
1 l
l 1 the fan casing. However, there arel,
j i
IRoan Recir. l El. 77' l
l l
l l
l no safe shutdown equipment in the l
I IFan l
1 l
l l
l l room. Therefore protection is not l 1
l l
l l
l l
l 1 needed.
I i
l l1A thru H-1 l
l l
l 1
l 1
l l
lv412 I
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l(vaine-Axiall l
l l
1 l
l l
)
I l ran) l l
l 1
l l
l l
I I
I I
l l
l l
l 1
4 l
1 Fan Blade lContro1 l Aux Bldg i 362 l 1.26 l 0.72 1 0.151 1 0.1719 I casing perforation will not occer. l 1
l IRoom Return l Control l
l l
l l
l However, the fan blade may exit l
l-l l Air Fan l Area l
l 1
l l
l through the auction flexible con-l l
l l El. 155' l l
l l
l l nector. There are no safe shutdownI j
l l 1A,3-VH-4151 I
l l
l l
l equipment in the room. Therefore, I i
l l(Vano-Axial l l
l 1
l l
l protection is not needed.
l I
I ran) l l
1 l
l l
l l
l l
l l
1 l
l l
l l
4 l Fan BladelRCIC Non l Reactor i 205 l 1.36 l 0.758 l 0.0684 1 0.1875 I Ceeing perforation will not occur. I
]
l lCoolere i Bldg l
l 1
l l
l There le a wire screen on the l
{
l l
l E1. 54' l
l l
l l
l suction of the Fan Cooler which l
}
l l 1 A,5-VM-2 08l l
l l
1 l
l will prevent a fan blade from I
l l(Vano-Axiall l
l l
l l
l 1eaving the cooler at an oblique l
l l
Fan) 1 I
l l
1 l
l angla.
I I
I l
l I
1 1
I l
l l
l l
l 1
I l
1 l
l j
i l
l l
l l
l l
l l
i l
l l
l 1
l 1
l l
)
I l
1 l
l l
l l
I I
I I
l l
i I
I DSER OPEN ITEM 8 l
l I
l l
l l
I l
TAIE.E 3.5-13 9
IlrFERNALLY M NERATED IOTATING CCBtpONENT MISSIIAS OUFSIIE ODMTAll54ENT i
I l
l 1
IcALcuLAraD l l
l l sussIra i source I
l nISsIra cuARAcTERIsTIcs inAx. STzzo IcAsINo i
I l IDEstrI-l Or l LOCATION l VELOCITY l DIA.
I 1EEIGHT l PERF. DEPTH lTHIcENESSl RBIAIUtS I
4 i FIcATION mIssIts l (FT/s) l (IN.)
(LBs) l (In.)
l l
1 I
i 1
l l
l l
l I ran 314elRmR moca l Reactor l 281 l 2.12 l 4.59 l 0.220 l 0.25 l Casing perforation will not occur. I j ~
l l coolers l Bldg l
l l
l l
l There is a wire screen on the l
l l El. 54' l
l l
l l
l suction of the fan cooler which l
l l 1A thru M-l l
l l
l l
l will prevent a fan blade fram
(
)
l Ivu-210 l
l l
l l
l l 1eaving the cooler at an oblique 1
-l l
l(Vano-Axiall l
l l
l l
l angle.
l l
I ran) l I
I I
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l 1
l Fan Blade l SACS Rom l Reactor l 215 l 1.46 l 1.05 1 0.094 l 0.1875 l Casing perforation will not occur. l l
l Coolers l Bldg l
l l
1 l
l There is a wire screen on the 1
l l
l El. 102' l l
l 1
l l suction of the fan cooler which l
j{
l 11A thru D-l l
l l
l l
l will prevent a fan blade from i
l lvH-214 l
l l
l l
l l 1eering the cooler at an oblique i
1 l
l(vano-Axiall l
l l
l l
l angle.
l
)
l l Fan) i I
l l
l l
l l
1 l
l l
1 l
I I
l l
l j
l Fan BladelCore Spray l Reactor l 230 l 1.61 l 1.598 l 0.11 1 0.1875 l casing perforation will not occur. l i
l l Pump Roan I Bldg l
l 1
l l
l There is a wire screen on the l
'l l
l coolers l El. 54' l
l l
l l
l suction of the fan cooler which l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l will prevent a fan blade fram i
j l
l 1A thru H-l 1
l l
l l
l 1eaving the cooler at an oblique l
I Ivu-211 1
I l
l l
1 l angle.
l l
1(vano-Axiall l
l l
1 l
1 l
1 l
l ran) i I
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l 1
l 1
I I
I l
l l
1 I
l 1
l 1
1 I
l 1
I i
I i
I l
1 l
l l
l l
j l
l l
l l
1 l
l 1
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
14 DSER OPEN ITEM 8h
TABLE 3.5-13 IlffERNALLY WNERATED PDTATIhG COtPONENT MISSILES 'XFFSIGE 00NTAlletElff l
l l
l lCALCUIATED I l
l l NESSII2 i
SOURCE I
l MISSILE CHARACTERISTICS l MAX. STEEL l CASING l
1 l IDENTI-l OF l LOCATION IvELOCITYl DIA.
l IG!IQlT I PERF. DEPTHlTHICENESS]
RBEAltKS l
l FICATION l MISSILE I
l (FT/S) l (IN.) l (LBs) l (IN.)
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l
~l l
l Fan BladelIntake l Intake l 250 l 2.72 l 8.49 l 0.22 l 0.25 l Casing perforation will not occur. l
\\
l Structure l Structure l l
l l
l l There is a wire screen on the l
I l Supply Fan l El.122' l l
l l
l l suction of the fan cooler which l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l will prevent a fan blade from l
l l1A thru D-l l
1 l
l l
l 1eaving the cooler at an oblique l
)
l lV503 l
l l
l l
l l angle.
l l
l(vano-Axiall I
l l
l l
l 1
l l ran) l 1
l l
1 l
l l
I I
l l
1 l
l l
l l
l l Fan Blade l Intake l Intake l 250 l 2.72 l 8.49 l 0.22 l.025 l Casing perforation will not occur. l I
I Istructure l Structurel l
l l
l l There is no flexible connector on l l
l Exhaust Fant El.122' I l
l l
l l the suction or the discharge nide. l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l 1 A thru D-l l
l l
l l
l l
l lv504 l
1 I
l l
l l
l I
l(vane-Axiall l
l 1
l l
1 l
l l ran) l I
l l
1 l
l l
l l
I l
l 1
l l
l l
I I F n Blade l Traveling l Intake l 138 l 1.368 l 0.746 l 0.04 l 0.1875 l Casing perforation will not ocar. I l
l l Screen i Structural l
l l
l l The intake damper and vene guide l
l l Motor Roan i I
l l
l l
l On the suction of the fan prevente l l
l Fan l
l l
l l
1 l a fan blade from exiting in that l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l direction and the vano guide on thel j
l lOh,B-v558 I
l l
l l
l l discharge of the fan prevente a fan l l
l(vano-Axiall l
l l
l l
l blade frosi leaving the fan housing l l
l Fan) l l
l l
l l
1 on the discharge direction. There-I l
l l
l l
l l
l l fore, protection le not needed.
l l
l 1
l l
l l
l 1
I l
I l
l 1
I I
l l
1 f
I l
l l
1 l
I 8f DSER OPEN ITEM i
TABLE 3.5-13 9
IlfrERNALLY MNERATED ROTATING C M PONENT MISSIZEE OurSIEE ODirrAItetENT I
l l
l lCALCUIATED l 1
l l IESSII2 l
SOLEtCE l
l MISSILE CHARACTERISTICS l MAX. STEEL l CASING l
l l ItsterI-1 OF l LOCATION I VELOCITY l DIA.
l IdEIWT I PERF. DEPTHlTH3CIGGESSl RBtARES l
l FICATIOII l MISSILE l
l (FT/S) I (IN.) l (LBs)
I (IN.)
l 1
l l
l l
l l
l l
l 1
l Impeller l SACS Pumps l Reactor l 98.8 l 16. 1 l 1016.
l 0.267 l 0.62 5 l No casing perforation.
l l
I I midg l
l 1
l l
l l
l l
l l El. 102' l l
l l
l l
l l
I l
l l
1 l
l l
I l
l Impeller l Ptsel pool l Reactor l 121.6 l
5.3 1 46.4 l 0.136 l 0.59 l No casing perforation.
l 4
l l Cooling l sid, l
l l
l l
l l
l l Pump l El. 162' l l
1 l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
I l Impeller l BCCS I Reactor l
93.0 1
2.56 l 8.35 l 0.0629 l 0.43 l No casing perforation.
l l
l Jockey l Bldg I
l l
l l
l l
I l Pump l El. 54' l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
I I
I i
1 I
l Impeller l Torus l Reactor l 1 19. 9 l
5.3 l 44.6 l 0.132 l 0.59 l No casing perforation.
l l
l hter i sids I
l l
I l
l l
3 l
1 Clearmap l E1. 54' l
l l
l l
l 1
l l Pump l
l l
l l
l l
l I
I l
l 1
l l
l l
l i
l Impeller l Chnled i Anax Bldg l 82.8 l
5.97 l 79.75 l 0.104 l 0.63 i No casing perforation.
l l
l taiter P. map l Control l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l Area l
l l
l l
l l
l 1
l l E1. 155' l l
l l
l l
1 l
l l
l l
1 l
l l
t l
l Impeller l D/G 15 l Atax Bldg l 94.5 l
3.04 l 11.79 l 0.068 l
- 0. 39 l No casing perforation.
I l
l Panel i Diesel l
l l
l l
1 I
l 1 oiilled l Area l
l l
1 l
l l
l l hter Pump l El.178' l 1
l l
l l
l
}
l l
l I
I I
l l
I l
{
l Impeller l RACS Pump l Reacto:-
I 79.6 l
6.24 I 83.66 l 0.0976 l 0.77 l No casing perforation.
l l
l l
l Bldg l
1 l
l l
l l
)
1 I
l El. 77' l
l l
l l
l h
l l
l l
l~
l 1
l l
DSER OPEN ITEM 8f i
i TABLE 3.5-13 ge i'
IlfrERNaLLY SNERATE IDTATING CGt90NENT nrssIus oerstaE cowrAIIStENT l
1 l
I lenLcuLATED l l
l I sussIm l
source l
-l MISSILE cuAmacTERIsTIcs Inax. STEEL l casing l
1.
! IDENrt-l OF l LOCATIces IVELOCITYl DIA.
l tEIGHT l PERF. DEPTHlTHECIG0EsPI RBtAMES I
I FICATICII l MISSILE l (FT/s) 1 (IN.)
(LBs)
(IN.)
l l
l l
l l
1 l
1 I
l Impeller I service i Intake l
67.3 l
3.78 l 26.3 l 0.0596 1 0.51 l No casing perforation.
l 1
1 I meer i structure l l
1 l
l l
l l
l Booster IE1. 79'-s= 1 l
l l
l l
l l
l pump I
I l
1 l
I I
l 4
i I
l l
l l
I I
I I
I I
l Impeller I service i Intake i
97.6 l 15.2 l 1215.5 1 0.314 l 0.75 l No casing perforation.
l l
I I meer pump l structurel l
l l
l l
l
{
l i
I E1. 93' I
I I
I l
l l
I I
I l
1 I
l 1
I I
{
l Impeller l InfCU l Reactor i 158.1 l
4.79 l 48.2 l 0.219 1 1.125 I No casing perforation.
l j
l l Recir.
l Bldg l
l l
l l
l l
}
l l Pump l E1. 132' l l
l l
l l
l l
I I
I l
l l
l l
l I
l l Impeller i InfCU l Reactor i
62.4 l
4.31 1 31.8 l 0.053 l 0.5 I No casing perforation.
l l
l l Precoat l Bldg l
l l
l l
1 l
l l
l Pump i E1. 145' l I
I I
I I
l j
l l
1 I
I I
l 1
1 I
j l Impeller l InfCU l Reactor l
57.6 l
4.09 I 25.6 1 0.0439 l 0.801 l No casing perforation.
l 1
l l No1&sp l Bldg l
1 l
l l
l l
I l
l Pump '
l E1. 145' l l
l l
l l
l I
l I
I I
I I
I I
I,
I Impeller l IWfCU l Reactor l
70.4 l
4.04 l 15.9 l 0.0423 l 0.43 l No casing perforation.
I l
l Becktash l Bldg i
I l
l 1
l l
I l Pump i E1. 132' l l
l l
l l
l l
l 1
I I
I I
I I
I I Impeller l CID Pump l Reactor l 110.6 l
3.91 1 21.4 l 0.109 l 0.675 i No casing perforation.
l l
l I Bldg l
l l
l l
l l
1 l
1 I E1. 77' l
I I
l l
l l
l l
I l
l 1
l l
l l
\\ Impeller I service i Reactor l
64.1 1
3.98 i.
13.94l 0.0347 1 0.5 l No casing perforttion l
j l
l mter l Bldg l
l l
l l
l l
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THELE 3.5-13 INTERNALLY SNERATED ROTATING CGt3DNENT nISSIIa5 CUFSItX CDtrFAIISIENT 1
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I DSER OPEN ITEM
ECGS FSAR 1/84 OUESTION 410.11 (SECTION 3.5.1)
The FSAR states that fans are not considered as credible missile sources.
Recently (Palo Verde, 1982) a fan at a nuclear facility generated a missile which penetrated the fan housing and damaged a safety-related structure.
Provide a discussion of the effects of fan blades as a missile source and the means used to prevent damage of safety-related equipment for each fan.
RESPONSE
h/e,de.
f
-r*n 3ed n
"- discsssed in the. CGS response te Questien 410.12, we de n '
con er through-fan-housing missiles that would damage s y-relate ructures to be credible.
The condition tha isted at Palo Verde olved workmanship deficiencies as th ade locknut torque and bla angle did not meet the su ier's specification.
As a sult, the blade ex enced fatigue failure and was ultimate ropelled o of the fan housing at an angle that penetrated the f ble nnections of the fan and impinged the containment liner e.
HCGS has conducted a survey of vane-axial and c ifugal s in safety-related areas employing flexible con ors.
We identi ' d one instance where a postulated missil rough the flexible con tion of a vane-axial fan may h the potential to damage safe-s down equipment i e room.
In order to prevent the postu d
nissile om damaging safe-shutdown equipment, a missile ld has en added to the design to withstand the impact of the
,__tulated 91ccile.
~
INSERT j
l Section 3.5 has been revised to provide the results of an analysis which shows that internally generated rotating l
component missiles have no adverse effect on plant safe I
shutdown capability.
l l
l C7 DSER OPEN ITEM l
l l
410.11-1 Amendment 4 l
HCGS FSAR 10/83 QUESTION 410.12 (SECTION 3.5.1)
The FSAR states that rotating equipment which is not specifically identified does not constitute a missile hazard because of the "unliklihood" that a missile would penetrate the casing.
Provide the results of a quantitative analysis to verify this conclusion.
RESPONSE
I A S EA'r' s
vthecthentheesidentifi'[7ygg 745 pdeeibility that eni rum, e6 f.n ch in ion 3.5.1, will fail at HCGS and generate a missile has suf ent energy to penetrate a component casing remote.
A review of analyses of internally generated iles performed for Pa rde verified that postu d missiles from pumps and fans (e.g.,
mp impeller or blade) typically do not have sufficient energy enet the component casings.
The formulae used by Palo Verd redict the penetration resulting from missile im are pr ed in Reference 3.5-4.
Since HCGS uses s and fans which are desi and constructed in accordanc
- h the same recognized industry c and standar s those installed at Palo Verde, results of ri s analyses conducted for Palo Verde are indicative o
. ructu;el int;;rity of tr.: "C00 :Taip;;nt.
Y l
l INSERT i
i l
Section 3.5 has been revised to provide the results of an analysis which shows that internally generated rotating component missiles have no adverse effect on plant safe shutdown capability.
i i
DSER OPEN ITD4 d2f 410.12-1 Amendment 2
HCGS FSAR 10/83 OUESTION 410.13 (SECTION 3.5.1)
Provide a discussion of an analysis for each rotating component which verifies that the casing would be capable of retaining an internally generated missile.
For each rotating component whose casing cannot retain the internally generated missile, verify that no secondary missiles will be generated from any internally generated missile.
RESPONSE
,moner+ "t.fb;;i;f;rcen;ideringit.nlikelyforret:tingce: pen:nt; o
er than those identified in Section 3.5.1, to break throu th r casings and adversely impact safety-related equipmen are the 11owing:
d#
1.
A view of event reports on file at the Nuclear afety Info ation Center; Oak Ridge National Loborato concer ng failures of fans and missile gener ion indicated that no an failures have r.esulted in genera on of through-casing mi iles in safety-related areas of nuclear facility.
2.
Small pump fai res resulting in gener ion of missiles are considered less obable than fan fa ures resulting in generation of miss es because pum casings are generally thicker than fan ca 'ngs and pump peeds are generally slower than fan speed 3.
Even in the unlikely even t
t a rotating component does break through its casing, ch of the missile's kinetic energy would be dissipate i
moving through the casing; thereby decreasing the obabi ty of the missile damaging a safety-related compone Ther ore, generation of secondary missiles fr m the inter 11y generated missiles described above is t considered c dible.
4.
It is even a low probability that a tating component would adversel affect redundant safety-lated systems because redu ant equipment is generally 1 ated in different a as or separated by barriers.
5.
A review f a d'etailed analysis of internally g ersted missil performed by Palo Verde verified that po tulated missi s from pumps and fans (e.g. a pump impeller e fan bla
) typically do not have sufficient energy to pe trate th component casing.
Because Hope Creek uses pumps a ns that are designed and constructed in accordance wi he same recognized industry codes and standards as those
..v.
1 DSEROPENITEMskf 410.13-1 Amendment 2
HCGS FSAR 10/83 strectecel enelysis is iedicetive ef tt.e integrity ef "000 Mri;rcrt.
INSERT Section 3.5 has been revised to provide the results of an analysis which shows that internally generated rotating component missiles have no adverse effect on plant safe shutdown capability.
1 DSER OPEN ITEM 410.13-2 Amendment 2
DSER Op:n Itc:a 31 (Saction 3.5.1.3)
TURBINE MISSILES The staff considers the turbine missile issue as an open item until the applicant agrees to:
(1) submit for NRC approval, within three years of obtaining an operating license, a turbine system maintenance program based on the manufacturer's calculations of missile generation probabilities, or (2) volumetrically inspect all low pressure turbine rotors at the second refueling outage and every other (alternate) refueling outage thereafter until a maintenance program is approved by the staf f; and conduct turbine steam valve maintenance (following initiation of power output) in accordance with present NRC recommendations as stated in SRP Section 10.2 of NUREG-0800.
RESPONSE
HCGS will submit for NRC approval within three years of obtaining an operating license, A Turbine System Maintenance Program based on the manufacturer's calculations of missile generation probabilities.
This response assumes that by that time, the NRC will have approved the manufacturer's calculation methodology which has already been submitted to the NRC for approval.
MP 84 112 15 09-bp
HCGS DSER Open Item No. 34 (Section 3.6.2)
UNRESTRAINED WHIPPING PIPE INSIDE CONTAINMENT For high energy piping within the containment penetration area where breaks are not postulated, SRP Section 3.6.2 sets forth certain criteria for the analysis and subsequent augmented inservice inspection requirements.
Breaks need "not be postulated in those portions of piping within the containment penetration region that meet the requirements of the ASME Code,Section III, Subarticle NE-1120 and the additional requirements outlined in Branch Technical Position MEB 3-1 of SRP Section 3.6.2.
Augmented inservice inspection is required for those portions of piping within the break exclusion region.
RESPONSE
For the information requested above, see the response to Question 210.14.
MP 84 112 15 10-bp
HCGS DSER Open Item No. 90 (Section 3.9.2.1)
VIBRATION MONITORING PROGRAM DURING TESTING Piping vibration, thermal expansion, and dynamic effects testing will be conducted during a preoperational testing program.
The purpose of these tests is to assure that the piping vibrations are within acceptable limits and that the piping system can expand thermally in a manner consistent with the design intent.
During the Hope Creek plant's preoperational and startup testing program, the applicant will test various piping systems for abnormal, steady-state or transient vibration and for restraint of thermal growth.
Systems to be monitored will include (1) ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping systems, (2) high energy piping systems inside seismic Category I structures, (3) high energy portions of systems whose failure could reduce the functioning of seismic Category I plant features to an unacceptable safety level, and, (4) seismic Category I portions of moderate energy piping systems located outside containment.
Steady-state vibration, whether flow-induced or caused by nearby vibrating machinery, could cause 108 or 109 cycles of stress in the pipe during its 40-year life.
For this reason, the staff requires that the stresses associated with steady-state vibration be minimized and limited to acceptable levels.
The test program will consist of a mixture of instrumented measurements and visual observations by qualified personnel.
Additional information of the criteria to be used for determining acceptability of observed or measured vibration levers for NSSS piping systems need to be included in the FSAR.
RESPONSE
For the information requested above, see responses to Questions 210.29 and 210.30.
MP 84 112 15 11-bp u.
.DSER Open Items 105, 106 (Section 4.2)
PLANT-SPECIFIC MECHANICAL FRACTURING ANALYSIS APPLICABILITY OF SEISMIC AND LOCA LOADING EVALUATION 1.
The mechanical fracturing analysis is usually done as a part of the seismic and LOCA loading analysis (see Item (2)).
The staff has reviewed and approved the generic analytical method used by GE (described in NEDE-21175-3) to determine that fuel-rod mechanical fracturing will not occur as a result of combined seismic and LOCA load-ings.
However, the applicant has not demonstrated that this generic report is applicable to Hope Creek or presented an acceptable alternative.
In either case, we require a plant specific analysis.
2.
Earthquakes and postulated pipe breaks in the reactor coolant system would result in external forces on the fuel assembly.
SRP Section 4.2 and associated Appendix A state that fuel assembly coolability should be main-tained and that damage should not be so severe as to prevent control rod insertion when required during these low probability accidents.
The SRP recommends acceptance criteria to achieve these objectives.
The entire seismic and LOCA loading evaluation has been described by GE in the approved topical report NEDE-21175-3.
This item is similar to Item 1.
The applicant must demonstrate that NEDE-21175-3 is applicable to Hope Creek or provide an acceptable alternative along with a plant-specific analysis to show that the criteria given in SRP Section 4.2 Appendix A, are met.
RESPONSE
In accordance with the methods described in NEDE-21175-3
( LTR), the HCGS fuel design was analyzed for the plant unique seismic and annulus pressurization (AP) loadings.
However, the seismic and AP loadings for Hope Creek were calculated by a linear dynamic analysis using the HCGS reactor building model with GE's detailed RPV model.
To address the fuel lift, a screening assessment was perf ormed comparing the Hope Creek unique combined (seismic and AP) input loads at the top of the RPV support skirt (the M P84 _112/17 2-gs
HCGS DSER Open Items 105, 106 (Section 4.2) (Cont'd) load input point to the LTR model) with the input loads of other similar BWR plants for which plant-unique nonlinear LTR analyses were performed.
The screening assessment showed that the HCGS plant-unique input loads are well below the input loads of the comparison plants.
Since the nonlinear-analysis fuel lift values for these plants were well below the acceptable fuel-design limits, the HCGS fuel-lif t values are expected to be negligible, a
e M P84 112/17 3-gs
HCGS DSER Open Item No. 113 (Section 5.3.4)
GE PROCEDURE APPLICABILITY To demonstrate that the GE Procedure Y 1006A006 is applicable to Hitachi fabricated vessel, provide:
(a)
GE Procedure Y 1006A006 (b)
Test resulta and analysis of Hitachi fabricated materials and the supplier which show the GE Procedure will conservatively predict the RTNDT for the Hitachi forgings, plates, and welds.
The plate / forge materials, which form the data base for the analysis, must be melted, cross-rolled or forged, and heat treated to a condition equivalent to that of the Hitachi plate / forge material.
The weld materials, which form the data base for the analysis, must be fabricated using equivalent wire flux and heat treatment as the Hitachi weld materials.
RESPONSE
For the information requested above, see the response to Questions 251.2.
MP 84 112 15 12-bp i
HOPE CREEK FSAR 00ESTION 251.2 To demonstrate that the GE Procedure Y 1006A006 is applicable to Hitachi fabricated vessel, provide:
a.
GE Procedure Y 1006A006 b.
Test results and analysis of Hitachi fabricated materials and its supplier which shows the GE Procedure will conservatively predict the RT for the Hitacht forgings, plates, and welds.
NOT The plate / forge materials which forms the data base for the analy-sis, must be melted, cross-rolled or forged and heat treated to an equivalent condition as the Hitachi plate / forge material.
The weld material, which form the data base for the analysis must be fabricated using equivalent wire flux and heat treatment as the Hitachi weld materials.
RESPONSE
A The applicability of General Electric Procedure Y 1006A revision 1 (attached) to the Hitacht-fabricated Hope Creek Unit I reactor pressure vessel (RPV) is demonstrated by Tables 251.2-1 and 251.
These tables compare the chemistries, heat treatments, and mechanical properties of the materials that form the data base for the application of Y1006A006 with the properties of the HCGS RPV materials. Table 251.2-1 provides data for plate materials, and Table 251.2-2 provides data for forgings.
The comparisons indicate that fnr both plates and forgings there are no significant differences in these properties between the Y1006A006 materials and the HCGS RPV materials.
i Further evidence of the compatibility of the HCGS RPV material is pre-sented in Tables 251.2-3 and 251.2-4, which compare Charpy V-notch test results.
As shown in Table 251.2-3, the plates fabricated by Japan l
Steel /Hitachi have toughness properties equivalent to the Y1006A006 l
data-base materials, although they were evaluated at test temperatures 10*F lower.
Similarly, as shown in Table 251.2-4, the Japan Steel /Hitachi forgings demonstrate a -10*F notch toughness comparable to results for the Y1006A006 forgings, which were tested at +50*F.
t Evidence of the equivalence of the Y1006A006 and Hitachi weld materials is given in 'able 251.2-5, which compares their respective chemistries, tensile proporties, and thermal treatments.
Except for the Ni content, these materials are very similar, although the Hitachi weld metals are generally lower in phosphorus and sulfur content.
Table 251.2-6 compares the Charpy V-notch impact-test results for Y1006A006 l
and Hitachi weld materials.
The Hitachi materials correspond well with the notch toughness values for the Y1006A006 materials and, in fact, are generally superior.
The submerged-arc weld materials used for l
DSER OPEN ITEM
//J t
~..--,,.,, _ -.-~ w -- - _ --- _ -_ m--,.
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--n---n,
HOPE CREEK FSAR fabrication of the MCGS RPV are not presented in this response because their toughness properties are suitable to meet the requirements of Appendix G of 10 CFR 50 for establishing reference temperatures, and it was not necessary to apply procedure Y1006A006.
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DSER OPEN ITEM //3 b/16/84
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Sech toe of dets repeesente a best of seterial need la the fabricaties of the les preesere core injection messlee for Espe Creek Welt 1 EFT 2
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(*p)
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+ 72 128, les 78, 81 90, 90 j
1 48800371/3544827&B 0
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+ 79 111, 197. 149 87, SS, 77 N,
90, N 402r3142/a626a27AR
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+ 40 M,
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68 64
+212 119, 122, 124 93, 90, 68 100, 100, les 492EA871/A421527&E e
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+ 4e 135, 137 M. M 90, Os 422E8511/G313&27As
- 2e 65, 74, 127 44, 44, 76 40, Se, 64
+ 25 107, ISS
- 74. N 00, 79
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481F2871/3430327&E S
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DSER OPEN ITEM //J
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BUSINESS OPERATIONS REVISION STATUS SEET E130DS FOR ESTABLISEING INITIAL RDERENG TFJIPERAWRES (ITg ) FOR BOCOMDfr TITLE HS**f ITWf E FOR 'TWTAIN PLANTS LEGEIS OR DESCRIPTION OF GROUPS TTFR DESIGN PROCEDURE FMF MPL ITEM NO.
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PRnrrS to MADE 1Y AFFROVALS DEFT IACATION JF CDFWIAND 12/19/78 RA PROEBSTLE 12/21/78 NID SAN JOSE 1/25/79 CONT ON m'T 2 SE NO. 1 R
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1.
SCDFE OF AFFLICATIONS AND STECTIVES 1.1 This procedure describes the method to be used for establishlag the laitial referesse temperstare (RTg ) for ferritie vessel steels'for older plaats where frastare toughness data may be insamplete. These methods represent a General R1estrie alternate position to the NRC Rogstation 10CFR50 Appendia S for these plants.
2.
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2.1 Wessel plate (SA-S33 Or. B C1.1);
Predisted limiting property - either NUT (Nil-Dactility Transition Temperature) or transverse CYN (Charyy Y-Notch) 50 f t-1b T.T. (Transition Temperature)
Usaal data available - M and/or leagitsdinal CYN at +10 or +40'F RT prediation method -
g Operate on lowest longitsdinal CYN ft-1b to get at least 50 ft-1b T.T. by adding 2*F per it-1b er by plotting a sarve (f t-1b versus temperature),
where possible.
Add additional 50*F to convert from lossitsdiaal to a
transverse 50 f t-1b T.T.
5 NOTE: There transverse Cm impact data are available, but the 50 ft T.T.. As not met, operate on the lowest CYN f t-1b to get at least 50 ft-lb T.T. by adding 5'F per f t-16 or by plottias a earve (f t-1b va temperstare), where possible.
This estrapolation is valid for CYN test temperatures only la the rasse (-258 to +5087).
Derive NDT, where missing, as egaal to longitudinal CVN SS f t-14 T.T.
ET is higher of M or transverse CYN 50 ft-16 T.T. -40*F ygg 2.2 Forlans (SA-SOS C1. 2);
Predisted limiting property - M or transverse CYN 50 ft-1b T.T.
Wasal data available - NDT and/or CYN at single temperstare RTNDT predistion method -
Derive CVN 50 f t-1b T.T. as for plate.
Then only CYN values are available, estimate NDT as the lower of +70*F or the CYN test temperstare where at least 100 ft-1b or 50 pereest sheer is achieved.
IT is higher of Mrr or transverse CYN 50 f t-1b T.T. -60*F.
yyy DSER OPEN ITEM //3
GENER AL $ ELECTRIC
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.NUOLEAR ENERGY OUSINESS OPERATIONS nev 1
FINAL 2.5 Weld Natal (Used to Jola SA-533 Gr. B CL.1 Plates and SA-508 CL. 2 Foralans):
Predicted limiting property - CYN 50 f t-lb T.T.
Usual data available - CYN valses at single or at several test temper.6 ares.
RTg 7 prediction method -
Operate os lowest CYN f t-lb to get at least 50 f t-lb T.T. by adding 2'F per it-lb or by plotting a surve (f t-1b versus temperature), where possible RTET (a the CVN 50 f t-lb T.T. - 60*F.
If NDI is available, it will be sossidered also.
In absence of NDT data, RT shall act be lower thaa NUT
-50'F.
2.4 Yessel Plate (SA-533 Gr. B C1.1) and Formian (SA-508 C1. 2) Teld RAZ:
RT assumed same as for base material.
Weld procedure goalification test NUT requiressats ladicate this assumption is ve114, 2.5 Baltian Material (SA-540 Gr. B24);
CVN 45 ft-1b and 25 M.E (Nils Lateral Expansion) are required at no higher than preload temperature or Lowest Servise Temperatste (LST)
Usual data available - CYN ft-1b sad MLE at +10*F LST prediction method -
If preceding CYN requirements are met at test temperature, them it is LST.
t If at least 30 ft-lb, but less than 45 f t-1b and 25 NLE, are met at test l
temperstare, them add 60*F to the test temperature for LST.
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HCGS DSER Open Item No. 114 (Section 5.3.4)
COMPLIANCE WITH NB2360 OF THIS SUMMER 1972 ADDENDA OF THE 1971 ASME CODE To demonstrate compliance with the qualification and calibration requirements of NB 2360 of the Summer 72 Addenda to the 1971 edition of the ASME Code, indicate the qualifi-cation and calibration program requirements that were used for the RCPB materials and indicate how these requirements satisfy the calibration and qualification requirements of NB 2360 of the Summer 72 Addenda to the ASME Code.
RESPONSE
For the information requested above, see the response to Question 251.3.
l MP 84 112 15 05-bp i
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HOPE CREEK FSAR QUESTION 251.3 To demonstrate compliance with the qualification and calibration requirements of N8 2360 of the Summer 72 Addenda to the 1971 edition of the ASME Code, indicate the qualification and calibration program requirements, which were used for the RCPS materials and indicate how these requirements satisfy the calibration and qualification requirements of N8 2360 of the Summer 72 Addenda to the ASME Code.
RESPONSE
As indicated in Section SA.3:
a.
The main steam piping material was tested in accordance with the Summer,1972 Addenda to the 1971 Edition of Section III of the ASME B&PV Code.
)
b.
The flued-head fitting material was tested in accordance with the Winter, 1973 Addenda to the 1971 Edition of Section III of
)
c.
The safety / relief valves were exempted from testing because of their 6-inch size.
i d.
The main steam isolation valves were also exempted from sosting j
at the time of purchase.
The reactor pressure vessel was procured to the Winter, 1969 Addenda to the 1968 Edition of Section III of the ASME B&PV Code.
Informa-tion from GETSCO, Tokyo, indicates that Hitachi impact tested the RPV material in accordance with paragraph N8 2360 of the Summer, 1972 Addenda of the 1971 Edition of the ASME B&PV Code.
i DSER OPEN ITEM //I 08J: rf: rm/G05161*-3 4 /1C /ea
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HCGS i
DSER Open Item No. 115 (Section 5.3.4)
DROP WEIGHT AND CHARPY V-NOTCH TESTS FOR CLOSURE FLANGE MATERIALS Provide drop weight test and Charpy V-notch test results from the closure flange region materials to demonstrate compliance with the closure flange requirements of Appendix G, 10-CFR 50.
RESPONSE
For the information requested above, see the response to Question 251.4.
MP 84 112 15 06-bp
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HOPE CREEK FSAR QUESTION 251.4:
Provide drop weight test and Charpy V-notch test results from the closure flange region materials to demonstrate compliance with the closure flange requirements of Appendix G, 10 CFR 50.
RESPONSE
Available drop-weight and Charpy V-notch test results for the Hope Creek Unit I closure flange materials are provided below:
NOT Test Lateral Material Orientation Temp.
Temp.
Absorbed Energy Expansion
(*F)
(*F)
(Ft-lbs)
(Mils)
SA508, C1.2 Longitudinal -20/
-40 64.1,70.6.20.8,77.1 48,51,11,58, (Head Flange)
-10
-10 93.1,114.7,106.6, 64,78,62,55, 9180*
87.8,97.1,71.9 64,49 AL'AY 10 81.1,108,133.6, 49,68,78,95, 137.6,165.1 68,74 40 157.4,121.5,137.6, 89,73,77,86, 134.9,144.3.137.6 79,85 60 199.9,154.8.159.9, 77,69,88,87, 195.4.144.3,170.1 82,73 SA508,C1.2 Longitudinal
-10 10 120.1,122.8,130.9, 77,81,83,81, (Shell Flange) 130.9,132.3,116.1 77,64
-10 120.1,95.8.128.2, 72,58,80,75, 109.3,101.2,87.8 59.57
+40 141.6,134.9,141.6, 81,77,84,82, 145.6,167.6,182.4 85,89
-40 13.4,69.3,59.0,55.2, 7,48,41,38, 74.5.101.2 54,68 e
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DSER OPEN ITEM //[
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HCGS DSER Open Item No. 116 (Section 5.3.4)
CHARPY V-NOTCH TESTS DATA FOR BASE MATERIALS AS USED IN SHELL COURSE NO. 3 Provide Charpy V-notch data and analysis from base materials that are similar to the base materials used in fabrication of shell course No. 3 to demonstrate that the upper shelf energy properties of the plates in shell course No. 3 exceed the requirements of Paragraph IV.A.1 of Appendix G, 10 CFR 50.
RESPONSE
For the information requested above, see the response to Question 251.5.
MP 84 112 15 07-bp i
HOPE CREEK FSAR 00ESTION 251.5 Provide Charpy V-notch data and analysis from base materials, which are similar to the base materials used in fabrication of shell course No. 3, to demonstrate that the upper shelf energy properties of the plates in shell course No. 3 exceed the requirements of Paragraph IV.A.1 of Appendix G, 10 CFR 50.
RESPONSE
Table SA-1 provides drop-weight NDT information and Charpy V-notch test results for the materials from shell courses 4 and 5 as well as informa-tion for the materials from shell course No. 3.
Table 5A-3 compares the heat treatments, the chemistries, and the mechanical properties of these shell course materiais and demonstrates that the materials from shell courses 4 and 5 should be considered equivalent to those from shell course No. 3.
This equivalence and the suitable upper-shelf energies for the plates from shell courses 4 and 5, as presented in Appendix SA, demonstrate that plates from shell course No. 3 should be considered to have upper, shelf energies that meet or exceed the requirements of Apppendix G of 10 CFR Part 30.
I
- l DSER OPEN ITEM //dp i
DSJ:rf/G05161"-5 rysvun.
'DSER Open Item 127 (Section 6.2.1.6) i OPERABILITY TESTING OF VACUUM BREAKERS Also, the vacuum breakers should be operability tested at monthly intervals to assure free movement of the valves.
To minimize the potential for steam bypass, we will require the applicant to commit to (1) perform operational testing of the torus to drywell vacuum breakers once each month; and (2) perform a leakage test of the drywell to torus vent system at the end of each refueling outage.
We will include these periodic tests in the technical specification.
RESPONSE
(1)
H.C.O will commit to perform operational testing of the torus to drywell vacuum breakers at a frequency of once per 31 days.
This requirement should be included in the HCGS Technical Specifi' cations.
(2)
A. leakage test of the drywell to torus vent system will be performed at the same frequency as the containment type A test required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix J.
O 6
MP 84 112 15 08-bp e
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HCGS DSER Open Item No. 131 (Section 6.2.3)
ADMINISTRATION OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT OPENINGS The applicant has identified in FSAR Table 6.2-14 the openings into the reactor building enclosure.
However, the I
applicant has not indicated whether the secondary contain-ment openings are provided with position indicators and alarms with local and main control room readout and/or are under administrative controls to prevent their impacting the secondary containment functional integrity.
We will require this information, and will report on this matter in a supplement to this SER.
RESPONSE
All openings listed in revised Table 6.2-14 and shown on Figures 6.2-20 thru 6.2-25 are alarmed and annunciated in the control room as indicated in revised Section 6.2.3.2.1.
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HCGS FSAR 1/84 and hadcbe.s jeopardize the integrity of the reactor building.
In addition, all the personal access doors to the reactor building are monitored and alarmed in the main control room.
6.2.3.2.2 Reactor Building Isolation System The reactor building isolation system is described in Section 9.4.2.
6.2.3.2.3 Containment Bypass Leakage
.Upon receipt of a LOCA or other high radioactivity signal, the 7RVS is actuated automatically and simultaneously with reactor building isolation and shutdown of the normal RBVS.
Radioactivity that exfiltrates the primary containment is collected and passed through the FRVS as described in Section 6.8.
Penetrations that pass through both primary and reactor building barriers _and that have isolation valves, seals, gaskets, or welded joints are considered potential bypass leakage paths.
Potential leakage paths that could bypass the areas serviced by the FRVS have been evaluated.
Table 6.2-15 identifies those lines penetrating the primary containment that do not terminate inside the reactor building or in a closed system outside primary containment within the reactor building.
Section 6.2.4.3.5 provides an evaluation of closed systems outside primary containment.
Closed systems outside primary containment are considered effective bypass leakage barriers because they are dependable (i.e., Seismic Category I and Quality Group B) systems that are water filled by the use of the system jockey pumps.
The systems are maintained leak tight by periodic visual inspection and the leak detection provisions identified in Section 5.2.5.2.2.
The types of bypass leakage barriers employed by lines listed in Table 6.2-15 are:
a.
Redundant primary containment isolation valves
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HCGS FSAR TABLE 6.2-14 OPENINGS IN REACTOR BUILDING ENCLOSURE
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Near Column Openina Elev, ft Coordinates Type of Opening Number 313 102 0 44.2, l';
" 00 ure-tight deer C 4304 102-0 13.6, T Pressure-tight door 4323h 102-0 13.6, U Pressure-tight door -
4313A 102-0 21R, Md Pressure-tight door 132-0 21R, V Equipment hatch 132-0 16R, V Equipment hatch 132-0 18.9, W Equipment hatch 132-0 15R, P Equipment hatch 132-0 18.9, V Blowout panels 4501A 145-0 17R, P Pressure-tight door 145-0 18.9, V Blowout panels 162-0 18.9, V Blowout panels
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DSER OPEN ITEM 136 (Section 6.3.5, 15.9.13)
PLANT SPECIFIC LOCA ANALYSIS The LOCA analyses reported in the FSAR were for a lead plant The applicant has committed to supply representative of Hope Creek.
plant-specific LOCA analyses in a later amendment to the FSAR before fuel loading.
The NRC staff will report the results of its review
)
of the plant-specific analyses in a supplement to this report.
The applicant has included small-break LOCA calculations in FSAR Section 6.3.3 that were performed for a lead plant representative The applicant has committed to supply plant-of Hope Creek.
specific LOCA analyses in a later amendment before fuel load.
The staff will report on its review of the plant-specific analyses in a supplement to this report.
Response
The plant-specific LOCA analysis will be provided in July 1985 and will utilize the. evaluation model described in Reference 1 and accepted by the NRC staff in Reference 2.
References
' General Electric Company Analytical Model f or Loss-of-Coolant 1
Analysis in Accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix K," NEDE-20566P, November 1975.
2.
Letter to G.G. Sherwood (General Elecric) from R.L. Tedesco (NRC), " Acceptance for Referencing of Topical Reports-20566P, NEDO-20566-1 Revision 1, and NEDE-20566-4 Amendment 4,"
February 4, 1981.
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l HCGS DSER Open Item No. 166 (Section 12.3)
AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVITY MONITOR POSITIONING The applicant should clarify how he intends to use the ventilation monitors to accurately monitor plant iodine levels when the air being monitored by these monitors has been filtered through the plant HEPA and charcoal filter banko.
RESPONSE
FSAR Section 12.3.4.2.2 has been revised to address how HCGS intends to accurately monitor particulates and iodine from any compartment which has a possibility of containing airborne raoicactivity and which normally may be occupied by personnel, taking into account dilution in the ventilation system.
MP84 95/17 1
HCGS FSAR 8/83 taps are located in the ducts next to the detectors so that grab samples can be taken.
Additional mobile samplers with monitoring detectors that are displayed, controlled, and recorded by the CRP are provided for use if needed.
More details about airborne radioactive material sampling and monitoring are. included in Section 11.5.
The above described airborne radioactive material monitoring equipment and procedures are used to meet the applicable parts of Regulatory Guides 1.21, 1.97, 8.2, 8.8, 8.12, and ANSI N13.1-1969.
Acceptance Criteria II.B.17 of standard review plan 12.3 - 12.4 provides criteria for the establishment of locations for fixed continuous area gamma radiation monitors.
The specific document referenced is ANSI /ANS-HPSSC-6.8.1-1981.
The locations and numbers of monitors used at HCGS are not in full compliance with this standard.
The location of these monitors are in the vicinity of personnel access areas only.
These locations are based on the dose assessment and operating experiences from other nuclear power plants.
In addition, these locations were finalized prior to the issuance of this standard and provide an acceptable method of monitoring area radiation levels.
In s crd:
p
- ^ eptance Criiw6.vu II.
.'u.3 owyuit== venuilsiiGL Eeniivos le be pEagdupstreamoftheHEPAfilters.
HCGS design places the ventin ion monitors downstream of the HEPA filter in orde assess th lant's effluents.
This is achieved best at is location as:
a.
It is more eff ent to have a gle monitoring point rather than muldp int dd& L b.
The instrument i ufficiently nsitive to ensure compliance w technical specifi ion release limits.
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c.
T ventilation effluent monitors referred to ove and l
e HVAC in line monitors (see P& ids in Section are scintillation detectors.
These monitors are use j
to detect gress ectivity and es esch will indic&te i
12.3-43 Amendment 1 DSER OPEN ITD4 l(p6 a
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HCGS FSAR 8/83 d e_le h e l iner s in airborn radioactivity concentrations.
Maintenan of iodine concentration within 10
- ours will be assur y the use of several met including these monitors, i ant surveys, an etable particulate and iodine pling tors.
Grab samples may be obtained from the ystems or the room air by using the portable ers.
ese samples are then analyzed in the la tory by multi nel analyzer (MCA).
(See '
ion 12.5 for further ation about MCA).
T ore, particulate and iodine sa moni s are not provided upstream of the HEPA rs.
12.
3.5 REFERENCES
12.3-1 J.J. Martin and P.H. Blichert-Toft, " Radioactive Atoms, Auger Electrons, and X-Ray Data," Nuclear Data Tables, Academic Press, October 1970.
12.3-2 J.J. Martin, Radioactive Atoms Supplement 1, ORNL 4923, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, August 1973.
12.3-3 W.W. Bowman and K.W. MacMurdo, " Radioactive Decays Ordered by Energy and Nuclide," Atomic Data and Nuclear Data Tables, Academic Press, February j
1970.
12.3-4 M.E. Meek and R.S. Gilbert, Summary of X-Ray and Gamma-Ray Energy and Intensity Data, NEDO-12037, General Electric, January 1970.
13.3-5 C.M. Lederer, et al, Table of Isotopes, 6th edition, John Wiley, New York, 1967 (1st corrected printing March 1968).
12.3-6 D.S. Duncan and A.B. Spear, "Grac6 1 - An IBM 704-709 Program Design for Computing Gamma Ray Attenuation and Heating in Reactor Shields,"
Atomics International, NAA-SR-3719, June 1959.
12.3-7 D.S. Duncan and A.B. Spear, " Grace 2 - An IBM 709 Program for Computing Gamma Ray Attenuation and 12.3-44 Amen'dment 1 DSER OPDi ITE4 lQh L..
Insert Acceptance Criterion II.4.b.3 requires ventilation monitors to be placed upstream of HEPA filters.
The HCGS design places scintillation detectors in ducts that are tributary to the release vent in order to provide warning of increased releases within the plant.
These instruments detect increases in the gross noble gas concentrations of the l
effluent.
Hence, placement of the detectors relative to HEPA and/or charcoal filters does not significantly affect their response.
Since releases of iodines and particulates will be accompanied by much larger releases of noble gases, the changes in ventilation monitor readings provide indication of a change in airborne activity concentration in one or more of the plant's areas.
If an increase is detected, its source and magnitude will be determined using portable samplers.
Normally occupied non-radiation areas in the plant do not have potential for significant airborne concentrations of particulates and iodine during plant operation because:
a.
The ventilation systems are designed to prevent the spread of airborne radioactivity into norma]1y occupied areas.
b.
Highy radioactive piping / components are not located in norcally occupied areas.
Certain activities, such as refueling, solid waste handling, or turbine teardown may increase the possibility of encoun-tering significant airborne activities in some normally occupied areas.
Continuous local airborne monitoring will be provided during these activities, as needed.
Exposure of personnel to high concentrations of airborne activity in radiation areas will be prevented through in-plant surveys and these portable particulate and iodine sampling monitors prior to personnel entrance.
Continuous monitoring will be provided as required by area conditions and the nature of the entry.
Administrative control will prevent inadvertent entry of personnel into normally l
unoccupied areas (Zone III and above).
The provisions discussed above ensure that personnel will not be inadvertently exposed to significant concentrations of airborne activity.
Therefore, continuous ventilation radioactivity monitors capable of detecting 10 MPC-brs of particulate and iodine from any normally occupied compartments are not provided as permanently installed equipment.
4 D3ER OPEN ITEM l(p(o
HCGS 1
DSER Open Item No. 167 (Section 12.3.4.2)
PORTABLE CONTINUOUS AIR MONITORS 4
If portable continuous air monitors are used to monitor plant airborne radioactivity levels, the applicant should demonstrate that he has a suf ficient number of CAMS to con-tinuously monitor for both particulate and iodine radio-activity levels in all normally occupied locations where airborne radioactivity may exist (such as solid waste han-dling areas, the spent fuel pool area, the reactor operating floor, and the turbine building).
This is an open item.
RESPONSE
Based on the response to DSER Open Item 166, portable CAMS will not normally be used to continuously monitor particu-late and iodine activity in normally occupied areas.
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DSERsOpen Item No. 169 (Section 12.5.3)
DIVISION 8 REG GUIDES
-.1[Tf.e applicank has not address'ed how the guidance of the afolloiting Divipion 8 RGs,(as given in SRP Section 12.5, will be followed. 'If the guidancet of these guides will not be followed, the. applicant should describe the specific.
alternative-approaches to be used.
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RG 8.20 "Applica'tions of B'icassay for I'125 and I-131."
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RG 8.26, " Applications of Bioassay for Fission and Activation Products."
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(3)
RG 8.27, " Radiation'Protectior'. Training for Personnel at Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear ' Power Plants."
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RG 8.28, " Audible Al~ arm Dosin[eters. "
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RG 8.29, "In'struction Concerning RisksJrom i,* Occupational Padiat,lon Exposure."
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RESPONSE
5 h change to the FSAR will be made per the attached mark-up to 3 indicate HCGS commitment to the ' guidance contained in, the referenced Regulatory Guides.
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HCGS FSAR 8/83 To ensure adequate manpower at all times for radiation protection supervisory functions, the experience and qualification requirements of the senior ' radiation protection supervisor and radiation protection supervisor positions may be reduced on a temporary. b. asis.
The general manager - Hope Creek operations approves or disapproves such action following review of the radiation protection engineer's recommendations.
The qualifications of the radiation protection technicians meet or exceed the personnel requirements of ANSI 3.1-1981.
The technicians are supported by personnel in the radiation protecticn department in the assistant and worker classification.
12.5.2 FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT AND INSTRUMENTATION Radiation protection facilities, equipment, and instrumentation were designed and acquired to meet the requirements of Regulatory Guides 1.97, 8.3, 8.4, 8.8, 8.9, 8.12, 8.14,
.15 12.5.2.1 Radiation Protection and Radiochemistry Facilities l
12.5.2.1.1 Access Control HCGS has two general area classifications for radiological control purposes: the restricted area and the radiologically controlled area (RCA).
The restricted area is any area where access is controlled to protect all individuals from exposure to radiation or radioactive material.
In general, the HCGS restricted area corresponds to the area inside the station security fence (protected area).
The RCA, which is within the restricted area, features positive control over access, activities, and egress.
Access is limited in accordance with l
operational. requirements and individual training (in radiation protection).
The RCA may include radiation areas, high radiation areas, contaminated areas, radioactive material storage areas, and airborne radioactivity areas.
Entry to and exit from the permanent RCA is through two designated access control points.
The access control points, shown on Figures 12.5-2 and 12.5-3, are located at elevations 124 and 137 feet in the service and radwaste areas of the auxiliary building.
Self-survey personnel o
l monitoring equipment, such as hand and foot, portal, or Geiger-Mueller (G-M) type friskers, are located at the exit from the RCA.
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12.5.2.2.6'
' - Peisonnel Protective Equipment i
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Special protective equipm9nt such as coveralls, plastic suits, shoe covers, gloves; head covers, and respirators,oincluding approved air purifying respirators, self-contained breathing apparatus (pressure demand),.and airline respirators.and hoods, are stored in various plant' locations $nd~ cloth,ing; change areas.
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,This: equipment is used to prevent-both. deposition of~ radioactive
' mate;ial internal ^1y or on body surfaces and the spread of contamination.
Most, areas of the plant are kept free of contamination so that no special protective-equipment is needed.
Conta.minated area; are identified with
.Sted signs.' Radiation signs and radia.tdqrdesposeee permits.(
1s) are the priraary means of defining he equipment _reguired to pnt..
,these contaminated areas.
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prescribed.
Respirators are required if airborne hazards exist, or,if surface contamination could cause'an airbocne hazard as LdefingS in the radiation protection procedures.j'
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j 12.5.3 PROCEDURES e
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-Radiation pret'ection proceducep, as described in this.section, are implemented by Hope Creek" radiation protection instructions, administrative procedures, ALARA procedures, and emergency plan procedures.
The procedures are written to meet.the guidelines of Regulatory Guides 1.8, 1.16, 1.33,
- 1. 3.9, 8.2, B. 7,
8.8, 8.9, g.20, 8.p.6, 8 J 7 a.nd 9. 9 9,
/12.5.3.L RadiolocicalSuhvhys l
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' Area survey proceduces describe the purpose and techniques of
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detecting and measuring levels of radiation and contamination.
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' Contamination may be on~surfacessor airborne.
Area surveys are
'ccnducted throughout the plant.
Such surveys may be routine or may.be related to specific dobs.
An area survey may be performed i
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12.5-11 Amendment 1 is DSER OPDk ITDi lbh
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DSER Open Item 177 (Section 15.1.1)
PARTIAL FEEDWATER HEATING The applicant was asked to justify that operation with partial feedwater heating to extend the cycle beyond the normal end-of-cycle condition would not result in a more limiting change in minimum critical power ratio than that obtained using the assumption of normal feedwater heating.
The staff requires that analyses be provided before operation in this mode if a decision is made to operate in this mode.
Until such analyses are provided, the staff will condition the license from operation in this mode.
RESPONSE
. PSE&G will accept a license condition as described above until such time as a HCGS analysis is submitted.
4 MP84 95/17 2-db e-e 3+
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