ML20086U014
| ML20086U014 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 03/02/1984 |
| From: | Reynolds J AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED, CENTER FOR LAW IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8403070128 | |
| Download: ML20086U014 (23) | |
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- 1. . r 00CKETED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA USNRC p..
NUCLEAR REGULA'IORY COM4ISSIM
'84 in -6 1\13 :36 BEFORE 'INE A'IMIC SAFETY AND LIGNSING APPEAL BOARD t
)
In the Matter of )
)
PACIFIC GAS AND EIECTRIC ONPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-275 0.L.
.) 50-323 0.L.
(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power )
Plant, Units-1 and 2) )
)
)
JOINF INIERVENORS' SUPPIDENT
'IO FEBRUARY 22, 1984 MOTION
~ 'IO RECETN 'INE RECORD ON 'INE ISSUES OF CONSTRUCTION QUALITY ASSURANCE AND LICENSEE QiARACTER AND ONPEIENCE I.- INTRODUCTION f' On February 22, 1984, the Joint Intervenors filed a Motion to Reopen the
! Record on the Issues of Construction Quality Assurance and Licensee Character and L Ocupetence. That motion'is based primarily on significant new information recently obtained frczn past and present workers at Diablo Canyon through an
- investigation undertakert by the Government Accountability Project (" GAP") .
L The Joint-Intervenors hereby supplement that motion with additional' I information released by GAP yesterday, March 1, 1984, arising out of their y
continuing investigation of design, construction, and licensee conpetence i'
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A K0 5 O- PDR
r lt questions at Diablo Canyon. Based on four additional worker affidavits,
. interviews with nine additional Diablo Canyon whist 1sblowers (eight of whm still Lwork at the plant), and substantial additional documentation, this new information
- corroborates much of that previously submitted in support of the motion and
. supplements it with.significant additional evidence of major problems in 1
construction practices and management character and ocepetence, problems that have existed in the past and apparently continue unabated even today.
As in theiinitial motion, the information is set forth below in numbered paragraphs with citations to its sources. The new affidavits and other documentation upon which this information is based have been submitted by GAP to the NRC Staff for its investigation. 'Ihey have Nt yet been publicly released, however, in order to permit the Staff to determine whether continued confidentiality is necessary to facilitate its investigation or to protect the identity of any of the sources, virtually all of whom still work at the Diablo Canyon plant.
.The Joint Intervenors are filing this supplement now in order to provide j this Board and all parties maximum possible notice of the information and to ensure its consideration in support of the pending motion. The Joint Intervenors,
- of course, are seeking and. would welcme disclosure' of the underlying affidavits ,
i and-documentation as soon as possible, as long as such disclosure would not hinder the NRC Staff's investigation or endanger the anonymity of the plant-workers who
-have requested confidentiality.M.
l j .-
M The filing of this new information at this. time should cause no
- prejudice to any of the parties. As PGandE's counsel noted in its recent motion
(- - for an extension of time within which to file a response, PGandE will not be able to effectively start preparing a response to the [ motion to reopen on O @ and l' licensee. character and ocupetence] until March 6,~ 1984." Motion of Pacific Gas
'and Electric Ccapany for Extension of Time, at 3 (February 29, 1984).
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- II. ADDITIONAL NEW EVIIENCE The additional significant new information is set forth below. Briefly simnarized, it confiras the evidence previously submitted that a gener ci breakdown
- has occurred in construction quality assurance practices at Diablo Canyon, and it raises again the serious doubts about PGandE's competence to IEnage the Diablo
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Canyon project and its character and candor in dealing with the NRC, with plant workers, and with-the public. The information is clearly significant to safety, because it further1 undermines the assurances of proper construction and ocupetence
.- that are essential preconditions to issuance of an operating license. 'the information concerns deficiencies in welding procedures and practices, a breakdown
- in material cont.rol and maintenance, affirmative nondisclosure of @ violations, a oceplete absence of @/QC for paint and other protective coatings on safety-related ocuponents, an established policy of sanitizing records and destroying i
documents, and a practice of retaliation against, and intimidation and harassment of, workers who identify and pursue deficient QA/QC practices and procedures.
Significantly, on February 22, 1984, the U.S. Department of Labor found
' that former QC. inspector Steve rockert, whose affidavit is attached to the Joint Intervenors' motion as Attachment 3, was illegally dismissed by Pullman Power ,
Products for writing a Discrepant Condition Notice concerning Diablo Canyon construction, and'_accordingly, it ordered that he be. reinstated. On February 9, m .1984,; two other Pullman employees - Harold Hudson and his partner - filed ocuplaints with the Labor Department challenging their lay-offs as retaliatory.
There can be no legitimate Ju tification for such conduct by a licensee in an findustry so dependent on adequate QA/QC practices to ensure safety.
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f A. Welding With a few exceptions, from the onset of construction Pullman's structural steel welding program essentially has been uncontrr;lled, in violation of quality assurance requirements. The welding program is a microcosm of the Diablo Canyon quality assurance breakdown. The techniques to circumvent QA included unqualified welde;s; unqualified welding procedures; use of welding procedures so irrelevant for the assigned work that, in effect, safety-related welding was widely conducted with "
out the required administrative review or distribution; falsification of records; failure to process and/or take adequate corrective action on internal reports of the violations; and harassment and intimidation of QA personnel who identified and attempted to obtain corrective action against the violations. The ab0ses occurred both during original construction, and during the current modification prompted by the Bechtel/PG&E seismic design review program. (See February 2 petition, allega-tions 1-57.) The allegations below supplement those presented on February 2.
a 171. Pullman does not comply with AWS conventions for the use of symoois m engineering drawings that refer to weld grinding. For example, in 1982 Pullman's QA/QC Manager Harold Karner told one of his QC inspectors to ignore the AWS
" break in arrow" convention that indicates which side of a weld fit-up is supposed to be " chamfered", or ground down, before being welded.' (See February 25, 1984 affidavit from an anonymous 2_/ former Pullman QC inspector, enclosed as Attach-
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ment 2, p. 3 and Exhibit 2.)
172. Pullman management instructed inspectors to violate contract specifica-tions for traceability of welds. For example, in a July 15, 1932 memorandum, Pullman QA/QC Manager Harold Karner states that a practice is acceptable if it isn't sp6cifically prohibited by Pullman's ESD engineering specifications, the installation procedures. As a result, since the relevant ESD does not reflect the PG&E specifications prohibiting identification stamping on the weld itself, Karner concluded that it was acceptable. (Id. , p. 4 and Exhibit 3.) This practice can introduce residual stresses on the welding and lead to cracks.
173. In November 1981 PG&E also accepted out-of-code practices when PG&E official Robert Torstrom overruled an inspector who found that engineering drawings spe:ified a weld not recognized by AWS. The drawing called for a fillet weld. Due to the fitup angle for the weld, however, AWS does not credit it as a fillet weld. Instead, contrary to the design, the weld can only be considered as a part;al penetration groove weld. In this instance, Karner backed the inspector, but Mr. Torstrom blocked corrective action with the unexplained conclusion that there was "no need" for it. (Id., p. 5 and Exhibit 4.) ,
174. A February 21, 1984 PG&E memorandum institutionalized the above viola-tion, by stripping Pullman QC inspectors of the organizational freedom to apply corrective action for weld symbol deficiencies on previ' usly-accepted o work.
That authority was reserved for PG&E construction department preinspection field engineers. (See February 26, 1984 anonymous affidavit, enclosed as Attachment 3,
- p. 11. )
175. The effects of not following AWS instructions can be illustrated through undersized welds for important safety-related stud welding on the contain-ment liner. Contrary to the AWS requirements in design commitments, a field engineer observed that the welds did not have the full throat filled in. ASME weld criteria had been substituted for that AWS requirement, without evidence of destructive testing to prove that these welds were still acceptable. (Id.,
at p. 4.)
176.. There was also a significant impact on weld quality from Pullman's failure to properly qualify a welding procedure as required by AWS, when contrary to code provisions copper backing strips were inserted behind certain welds.
Another witness described how the deficiency led to lack of fusion and cracked welds, due to "intergranular" copper contamination. ( Attachment 2, p. 5. )
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177. Although an inspector described the above problem and suggested that' Pullman ~should properly qualify the' procedure to make these welds, Pullman management took no corrective action.- (Id . , p. 5. )
178. Harold'rarner. reprimanded the inspector and threatened him with
" disciplinary action" when he continued to press his. concern by mentioning it to Pullman's' internal auditor, who considered the matter legitimate, and serious enough to include in his Internal ' Audit #32. At the time, the inspector concluded that "Karner didn't want to know about any problems that might be serious." (Id.,
p[5.) (See also, February 2 petition, Attachment 2, pp. 3-13, for a description of management's refusal to respond to Internal Audit #32.)
179.- Two weeks later, Karner fired the inspector who had pressed the issue.
(Id., p'. 5.)
180. On - December 28, 1983, Pullman modified installation procedure ESD 223
-- which also provides the acceptance criteria for QC inspectors -- by adding
- the following provision: "D. For existing installations, welding which was performed but-was not required as part of the design is acceptable . . ."
-(See ESD 223, " Installation and Inspection of Pipe Supports," enclosed as Attach-ment 4, at pp..I, V and 46.) This practice can create unaccounted residual stress on the corresponding pipe support.
(Infra, at p. 26.)
1 81. On December- 28,1983,' Pullman also amended ESD-223 with the following provisien: "E. For existing installations, welding which was not performed but was required as'part of the design is acceptable."- (Id.) This waiver suggests that faulty welds 'also would be acceptble, since they could be sacrificed entirely.
In other wor'ds, anything that does (or does not) exist is acceptable. This procedure revision suggests that quality assurance standards are not just deter-iorating; they have collapsed. ESD-223 governs safety-related pipe hangers throughout the plant.
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182. Both amendments were made with the full knowledge of PG&E, pursuant to a December 9,1983 meeting between Pullman and PG&E. (Id.,p.11.) The excuse offered for accepting these deviations from design was that through "as-built" drawings, further engineering analysis could determine whether the original design requirements were necessary. (Id., p. 46.) The excuse cannot wash. Valid QC -
1 inspection criteria are one mandatory step among many required for a mininum quality assurance program. They should aot be sacrificed because of another.
l independently-required safeguard. Second, the as-built reviews themselves are l 1
of questionable reliability. (Infra, p.19.) '
183. In 1981 PG&E neutralized a corrective action program by accepting welds that failed an MT (magnetic particle) test, based on results from previously-discredited tests that had accepted the same welds. The current selector switch on a testing machine had erroneously been installed backwards, to run at alter-nating current (AC) rather than on direct current (DC). AC, unlike DC, cannot detect subsurface cracks. Pullman and PG&E both require the use of DC for this reason. After 80 welds had been approved with the machine in an AC mode, the problem was discovered. When a sample of eight erroneously approved welds were retested, three failed because of subsurface flaws. Nonetheless, PG&E directed ,
i Pullman to accept these three welds, based on the earlier inadequate approvals t
with AC. (Attachment 2, pp. E-10 an cExhibits 15-19.) One such weld had " linear
. indications", suggesting possible cracks, as long as 3 inches. (Id., Exhibits 17 and 19.) .
184 In the same case, PG&E directed Pullman to accept welds that had never been properly tested. Rather than retesting the remainderof the 80 welds that had been erroneously accepted using an improper testing method, PG&E directed Pullaan to accept all of them without retesting, based on the AC tests. The reason PG&E ,J
gave for this was the cryptic statement that "the ability of DC to detect sub-surface defects is limited in our configurations." (Id., Exhibit 18.) As described above, PG&E offered this excuse in spite of the fact that a retest with DC had ' failed more than a third of the sample, a result that PG&E's Torstrom called " inconclusive." (Id. , p.10 and Exhibit 18. )
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185. Welding procedures are not applied consistently because most welders do not have copies of the welding procedures, such as ESD-223,that they are expected to follow. (See February 8,1984, affidavit of Charles Stokes, enclosed as Attachment 7, p. 8.)
186. The craft's ignorance of installation procedures was due to deliberate management policy. As !1r. Stokes explained, he knew of one " welder's helper f who_7 did have a bootleg copy of a procedure, but he told me not to tell anyone because he was afraid of being fired." (Id., p. 8.)
187. Mr. Karner prohibited QC personnel from researching the carbon content in A-490 bolts, which was necessary to evaluate whether the field practice of tack-welding those bolts was proper. Mr. Karner's position was that checking specifications was not part of an inspector's job, and that, in effect, inspectors should stay where they belong. ( Attachment 2, p.13.)
B. Generic Breakdown in Material Control and Maintenance Use of the wrong materials seriously compromised the Diablo Canyon welding program. Unfortunately, this same violation may be generic and leave the quality of all . construction indeterminate. The practices involved purchasing the wrong ,
material for the job, and sacrificing material traceability -- the equivalent of a metallurgical medical history that describes the material properties, and identifies both where it came from and where it has been installed in the plant --
through the simple trick of declaring that safety-related hardware does. not affect safety. -(See February 2 petition, allegations 105-09.)
The allegations below suggest that deficient practices have continued-through December 1983, at least. Similarly, the new evidence suggests that the quality of materials may have deteriorated further due to improper maintenance ,_
after they arrived on-site, through abuses such as the use of safety-related
plates for temporary " roads" on top of trenches. Construction crews drove heavy equipment over the plates. QA management winked at the practice.
188. In 1982 Mr. rarner fired an inspector ($179, supra) who had protested that certain welds were not adequately prepared for magnetic particle testing.
To illustrate the problem, despite claims on the paperwork, paint covering the welds was not fully removed. (Id., pp.13-14, and Exhibits 23 and 24.) When the inspector noted that the deficiency would hinder his ability to inspect properly he was confronted by his own leadman, the other inspectors' leadman, a QC supervisor, and Karner himself. Within two weeks Mr. Karner fired the ins pector. (Id . , p.14.)
189. Harassment of this individual did not stop after he was fired as a QC inspector, but continued in 1983 when he attempted to obtain a job as a welder.
During the welding test, someone twice tampered with his welding machine by increasing the amperage. This made it more difficult to weld. After the witness obtained a QC inspector to watch the welding machine until he finished the root pass, the welder passed the test. (Id. , p.14. )
190. After passing the test and coming to work as a welder, the same
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individual was transferred, on the same day as Harold Hudson, a pipe fitter who formerly was Pullman's Internal Auditor, to a fabrication shop where the decision to transfer workers is usually made by the Foreman or General Foreman.
This decision was not made by either, and presumably came from management officials. (Id.,p.-14.)
1 91 . On January 13, 1984, this individual was laid off, along with his job partner, Mr. Hudson, the day after Hudson finished a two-month series of dis-closures to the NRC. Contrary to usual procedures, their foreman was not allowed to retain them and lay off others, Pullman's Project Manager explicitly vetoed
the foreman's request to keep this individual. (Id. , p.15. )
192. PG&E may have _ received large quantities of stainless steel that are out of compliance with the relevant codes, due to a December 9,1983 purchase order specifying that materials received for use at Diablo must have a minimum carbon content of .04. -(See January 23, 1984 anonymous affidavit, enclosed as Attachment 5, pp. 7-8 and Exhibit 8.) .This specification should have limited carbon content to a maximum of .04. (Id. , p. 7. ) The vendor had an incentive to take advantage of this error, because high-carbon stainless steel is cheaper to manufacture than low-carbon stainless. (Id., p. 8, and transcript of January 5,1984 meeting with NRC inspectors (hereinafter "NRC Interview Transcript") at p. 48-51, 3/)
1 93. The safety significance of using high-carbon stainless steel in welded applications is that it increases the likelihood that carbide precipitation will cause the welded joint to lose its corrosion resistance and not last as long as the requirements referenced in the Final Safety Analysis Report. (Id.) The witness who raised this issue stated that this problem had occurred at the San Onofre plant, and all of the high-carbon stainless steel had to be replaced after only a few years of service because of extensive corrosion. (NRC Interview Transcript, p. 52.) ..
194. To date management has not responded to internal protest of the error reversing maximum and minimum requirements for the amount of carbon in stainless steel. (Attachment 5, at p. 8.) The time log would be understandable, except
~that PG&E claims the plant is ready to operate.
195. In November 1981, PG&E's General Construction Department " borrowed" three Class One steel plates, meant to be used by Pullman, for pipe supports, and instead used them improperly to cover a trench so that equipment could be driven over them. (Attachment 2, p. 6.)
3/ This transcript is not here released for puDlic disclosure because the HRC
. already has a tape recording.
'196. After. an inspector rejected these plates for Class One use because of their improper use as a temporary " road", Pullman QA/QC Manager Karner convinced him to accept them anyway on grounds that the plates "were probably not injured."
(Id. , p. 7. ) That standard of quality is not sufficiently reliable for protection of- materials with the highest safety classification on-site.
C. Generic Breakdown in Disclosure System for QA Violations, On June 24, 1983, the NRC staff issued a Notice of Violation to PG&E for taking almost five months to notify the NRC through issuance of a Nonconformance Report (NCR) that an inspection had found ten welds whose quality could not be verified as required. Under contract specifications, the condition should have been reported to the NRC within 24 . hours. The staff routinely could have issued
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similar. Notices of Violation, because the practice was routine. Through a gauntlet of interim reports and required approvals, the Pullman QA program is structured to inherently block or delay disclosure to the NRC of nonconfoming
= conditions. When internal disclosures survived the formal institutional
. roadblocks, managers took another approach: " void" the reports and throw them in the trash. In most cases this was unnecessary,-bec.suse training for reporting
. violations was_ deficient. ' Not all inspectors weer even informed of their right to issue NCR's, or where the forms are located. (See_ February 2 petition, allegations 120-25.)
The new evidence summarized below suggests that abuses of the reporting process have continued through 1983. The new allegations also suggest certain new techniques to avoid accountability -- sitting on reports for a year or longer.
-ignoring them forever, and rewriting reports by censoring them without the originator'.s consent.
'197. - Pullman's QA Manager Harold Karner waited more than a year, from November ,,
1981 to December 1982, to respond to a Descrepant Condition Notice (DCN), and
then responded with an unexplained, misleading assertion. An inspector had written a DCH, because unmarked tools were being used on stainless steel work.
This practice violated procedures that require specially-marked, " separate tools for stainless work, so as not to contaminate the stainless steel with carbon s te el . " (Attachment 2, p. 11.) After waiting more than a year, during which time he fired the inspector, Karner dispositioned the DCN by asserting that "the inspector in charge of the wor.k" had verified use of the proper tools. The inspector who raised the issue had not changed his mind; and Karner did not identify any new inspector assigned to the DCN or the process used to verify acceptability of an unmarked tool a year later. (Id., p.11 and Exhibit 21.)
1 98. Management did not even permit the original inspector to temporarily halt the abuse described above. When he put a hold tag on the stainless steel work performed with unmarked tools, his leadman immediately " demanded to know whe.ther I knew what I was doing, and ordered him to remove the hold tag.
(&, p.11. ) -
199. In the summer of 1982, the same inspector raised but never received a response to a memorandum asking Mr. Karner about a potentially widespread problem with baseplates that are mounted over concrete with voids. The inspector believed a that the voids could affect the strength of the bearing surface for the baseplates.
(Id., p.12 and Exhibit 22.)
200. Mr. Karner completely rewrote a Discrepancy Report that a QC inspector submitted on studs made from unqualified materials that were welded on the containment liner and elsewhere. fir. Karner censored the DR to remove all references to two of the three, unqualified materials Pullman had used -- A-108 and A-307 material. In effect, two-thirds of the proposed DR improperly was verbally dispositioned. (Id. , p. 7. ) ._
_ __ - _____________._.-__._______________.____________.______________________________.f___.___ a
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202. On December 12, 1983, PG&E's Mr. C. Braf rebuked Pullman's QC representative in strong language, asserting that QC was " wasting time" in noting that shop-drilled holes did not match the design drawing, because the vendors "have their own QA/QC program and accepted the materials for shippment Ls.]
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to Diablo Canyon." This rebuke was instead of a reply on the merits to the legitimate question raised. (See December 9,1983 Memoranda, and December 12, 1983 Reply, enclosed as Attachment 5.) The brush-off also is suspect, because
- Pullman inspectors have been reporting QC violations since 1979 on purchases from the same vendors, Bostrom-Bergen and American Bridge, including welds so " pathetic" that they rip the inspectors' clothes. (SeeFebruary2 Petition,pp.24-6.)S/
D. Absence of Quality Control Coverage.
While there was only spotty or unreliable QC coverage for welding at Diablo Canyon, there was on_o_ quality control for paint and other protective coating according to a painter on-site.
203. Faulty quality-control for paint and other protective coverings can affect the safety of the plant. The use of improper paint or the correct paint under improper conditions can defeat the original. purpose of the covering, such as rust protection of carbon eteel components. (See February 6,1984 Interview _
Report with an anonymous Diablo Canyon painter enclosed as Attachment 8, p. ?.)
204. QA violations fo rpaint also have spillover effects on other safety-related work. For example, in a radioactive area, if the wrong paint is used, or if the proper paint is improperly applied, it may chip off. This can interfere with the proper working of other safety systems. Nuclear reactors require a clean environment to run. Further, paint chips from a radioactive area can help spread AI'This allegation also suggests that the vendor QA breakdown persisted through December 12, 1983, at PG&E's insistence.
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radioactivity to other equipment and to people. (Id., p. 2.)
205. Until December 1983, Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) had no quality control (QC) program of any kind for at least the previous five years to insure the quality of paint and other protective coating at Diablo Canyon. Diablo Canyon may, in fact, be the only plant in the nation with no QC for paint. An NRC inspector informed PG&E officials in December of 1983 that Diablo Canyon was the only such plant. This problem was discovered late in December of 1983 when NRC inspectors inspected the General Construction (GC) paint department which inspects the painting and' insulation work of contractors, originally the H.P.
Foley Company and now Bechtel, and which should have had a QC program.
(Id.,p.1.)
206. The discovery was also made in December of 1983 that the plant specifi-cations used by the paint- foreman did not conform to the specifications maintained
' by the records department of GC. When an NRC inspector reviewed the specifications that the-foreman said he had relied on, the inspector discovered that they conflicted with what the inspector had been told by the records department. (Id.)
207. Corrective action for the paint QC violations had been prospective only.
In the wake.of the NRC discovery, management has belatedly begun to dse a Daily gs
. Paint Report to record various data that can affect the ability of protective coatings to perform their safety-related functions, including the temperature and wetness of the surface that was coatec', the preparation of the surface, the type of protective coating applied, the manufacturer, the method of application, the thickness of the coating, etc. This program should be applied retroactively to all safety-related painting. (Id ._)
208. Because of the failure to record critical information or to adequately control the variables described above, the quality of an unknown percentage of _
the' paint and other protective. coatings at Diablo Canyon is indeterminate.
(Id.,p.2.)
209. The witness saw no evidence of any efforts by PG&E or any of its
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contractors 1to assess the safety significance of the non-existence of any quality
. control for paint. (Id.)
210. Paint inspectors have not been instructed that they can write a Non-confomance Report (NCR) .or any similar report. The only method to record problems is on the newly-instituted Daily Paint Record, or in the log boo'k maintained by the paint foremen. Neither approach is designed to provide resolutions for quality-control problems. (Id.)
E. Generic Crisis of Harassment and Retaliation Pullman QA management enforced its restrictions on organizational freedom by retaliating against those who did not know their place. Harassment, attempted. intimidation, and personnel reprisals permeated the entire-QA program, not-just.those activities concerning special processes. The pattern extended
- within other departments as well, such as PG&E construction. The. harassment
-has been occurring at least since 1978,'and has intensified during the last three months.. The methods. include such tactics as physical threats by "-
construction employees, threatened job actions, reprimands, denial of raises, isolation, and dismissal. It is an understatement to conclude that there has
-been a " chilling effect" from the reprisal crisis at Diablo Canyon. A quality
- assurance Ice Age would be'more accurate. Due to the pervasive repression, an unknown number of deficiencies have not been reported. (See February 2 petition, allegations 129-37.)
Events of .the last month have confimed the credibility of these allega-tions. On February 22, 1984 the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) issued an order
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to reinstate QC inspector Steve Lockert, after finding that he was illegally dismissed in reprisal for writing a Discrepant Condition Notice. (See February 2 petition, allegations 32-3, 131-32.) The Department of Labor order is enclosed as Attachment 9. The pace of legal challenges to the repression also is intensifying. On February 9,1984, Mr. Harold Hudson filed a D0L complaint challenging his January 1984 temporary layoff as retaliatory.
_ (February 2 pctition, allegations 129-30, 133.) The same day Mr. Hudson's partner (Attachment 2, supra) filed a DOL complaint similarly challenging his continuing layoff. The complaints are enclosed as Attachments 10 and 11.
Under 10 CFR 50.7 of Commission regulations, patterns of retaliation can be decisive for licensing de-isions when they reach the intensity of the Diablo Canyon abuses. Licensing revocation or suspension is a possible remedy. 47 Fed .
Reg. 30452-58 (July 14,1982). As the Commission reminded licensees on February 14 of this year, there can be no question that public health and safety require that employees be free to raise safety issues to licensee management and to the NRC. (NRC IE Information Notice No. 84-08 is enclosed as Attachment 12.)
211,. In 1982, a QC inspector was told by his own leadman that he would no
~ 1onger be allowed to occasionally act as a temporary leadman, because he was not sufficiently " production oriented." (Attachment 2, p. 7.) Such criterion is improper, since a QC inspector's mission is to be quality-oriented. Indeed, 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion I guarantees QA personnel will have freedom from cost and scheduling pressures that could compromise quality. At Diablo Canyon, the priorities were reversed.
212. In 1983, Mr. Karner tore up a DCN that a QC inspector had written to protest harassment by Superintendant Rich Babineau. Mr. Karner also threw away a supporting statement signed by another inspector. Further, a production foreman
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0-told a pipefitter and welder who witnessed the original harassment that if they signed a supporting statement they would be fired. (Attachment 5, p.10, and NRC Interview Transcript, p. 47.)
F. Lack of Corporate Character and Competence i
The most immediate cause for the QA breakdown appears to be subordination of i quality to cost and scheduling pressures. Management has not had the necessary commitment to quality. (See February 2 petition, allegations 138-41.) The underlying cause for this attitude appears to be lack of corporate character and competence. This management breakdown has been accompli,shed in part by dis-torting the record for NRC review of construction quality assurance, through '
false and/or misleading statements, and destruction of documents. Under Commission precedents, deficient corporate character and competence represents an independent basis to deny an operating license. Houston Lighting and Power Co.
(South Texas Nuclear Project, Units 1 and 2), CLI-80-32,12 NRC 281 (1980).
The allegations below cast further doubt both on the integrity of manage-ment and the integrity of the record that exists at Diablo Car. yon. As with the' retaliation issues, they must be resolved for the Commission to make an informed decision on the plant's license.
213. When some QC inspectors were tests to be certified,for weld inspections, the answers to the tests were lying on the table. In theory, the test was closed-book. (See Attachment 5, p. 9.)
2f4 At least since 1976 PG&E has actively attempted to minimize account-ability by establishing a policy of document destruction, and creation of sanitized records. This policy is reflected in a January 27, 1976 memoranda which advises PG&E employees that they should not attribute comments to specific people, that they should minimize files, minimize minutes of meetings, and minimize ' -
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copy distribution, and that they should cull files regularly. The memo states that "nothing should be put in writing which could later prove to be detrimental or embarassing to the Company." (See January 27, 1976 PG&E memorandum, enclosed as Attachment 13.) Since disclosure of regulatory violations is at,least embarassing, the policy itself represents an illegal gag order.
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III. CONCLUSICN This information, together with that previously subnitted in support of this motion, is far too significant to be dismissed on the basis of PGandE's contrary assurances. For all the reasons outlined in the Joint Intervenors' motion itself, reopening of the record is essential to learn the true extent of any deficiencies and to determine what corrective action is needed to restore the level of assurance required for licensing.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein and in their February 22, 1984 motion papers, the Joint Intervenors respectfully request that this motion be t'
granted.
Dated: March 2, 1984 Respectfully subnitted, JOEL R. REYNOLDS, ESQ.
JOHN R. PHILLIPS, ESO.
Center for Law in the Public Interest 10951 W. Pico Boulevard Los Angeles, CA 90064 (213) 470-3000 DAVID S. FLEISCHAKER, ESQ.
P.O. Box 1178 Oklahoma City, OK 73101 3
Byb m OEL R. REY $/ LIM Attorneys for Joint Inter-venors SAN LUIS WISPO MOTHERS MR PEACE SCENIC SHORELINE PRESERVATION CONFERENCE, INC.
EOOLOGY ACTION CLUB SANDRA SILVER ELIZABETH APFFTRERG JOHN J. MRSTER 20 -
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BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD
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In the Matter of 't ,' )
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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY') Docket Mos. 50-275 O.L.
) 50-323 0.L.
'(Diablo Canyon Nuclear'FoweiI )s Plant, 4Units 1 and 2) )
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE s
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I hereby certify tiiat'on this 3rd day of March, 1984, I have served copies df'the foregoing JOINT INTERVENORS' SUPPLEMENT TO L' , s >;
FEBRUARY 22,,1984 MOTION'TO REOPEN THE RECORD ON THE ISSUES OF
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1 CONSTRUCTION QUALITY 4A,SSURANCE ,- AND LICENSEE CHARACTER AND
% R s hk ' y' COMPETENCE, mail ling them th' rough the U'.S. mails, first class, postr.ge prepaid.
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. Thomas S.I Moore, Cha'irman A D r.,.W... .
Reed Johnson
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Atomic Safety & Licensing ,
x Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board 4 Appeal Board
'U.S. Nuclear Regulatory s ,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ' Commission Washington,fD.C. 20555 ,g Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. John H. Buck ,Docketzand Service Branch Atomic Safety &~. Licensing Office.of the Secretary Appeal Board ,
O.S. , Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory '
Commission Commission .
. . Cdashington, D.C. 20S55 Washington, D.C. 2055" Lawrence Chandler, Esq. . .
Office of the Executlye LegaljDirector - BETH 042 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissi'o'n -s Washington, D.C. 2055,5
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Mr. Harold Denton Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Herzel Plaine, Esq.
Office of General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Malcolm H. Furbush, Esq.
. Vice President & General Counsel Philip A. Crane, Esq.
Pacific Gas & Electric Company Post Office Box 7442 San Francisco, CA 94120 Mr. Fredrick Eissler Scenic Shoreline Preservation Conference, Inc.
4623 More Mesa Drive Santa Barbara, CA 93105 Janice E. Kerr, Esq.
-Lawrence Q. Garcia, Esq.
J. Calvin Simpson, Esq.
California Public Utilities Commission 5246 McAllister Street San Francisco, CA 94102 John Van de Kamp, Attorney General Andrea Sheridan Ordin, Chief Attorney General Michael J. Strumwasser, Special Counsel to the
-Attorney General State of California 3580 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 800 Los Angeles, CA 90010 David S. Fleischaker, Esq.
Post Office Box 1178 Oklahoma City, OK 73101 Richard Hubbard MHB Technical Associates 1723 Hamilton Avenue, Suite K San Jose, CA 95125 Bruce Norton, Esq.
Norton, Burke, Berry & French, P.C.
P.O. Box A0569 Phoenix, AZ 85016
Arthur C. Gehr, Esq.
Snell & Wilmer 3100 Valley Center Phoenix, AZ 85073 P
'Maurice Axelrad, Esq.
Lowenstein, Newman, Reis & Axelrad, P.C.
1025 Connecticut-Avenue, N.W. '
Washington, D.C. 20036 .
Virginia and Gordon Bruno Pecho Ranch Post Office Box 6289 Los Osos, CA 93402 Sandra and Gordon Silver 176L Alisal Street-San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 Nancy Culver 192 Luneta San Luis Obispo, CA' 93402 Carl Neiburger Telegram Tribune
' Post Office Box 112 San Luis Obispo, CA- 93402 Betsy Umhoffer 1493 Southwood San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 il b & AW8l/K / ,
Christina Concepcion
- Delivered via Express Mail. ,
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