ML20085G083

Proposed Tech Specs Eliminating Rod Sequence Control Sys

ML20085G083
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	10/14/1991
From:	GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20085G081	List: HL-1619, Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-57 & NPF-5,changing Tech Specs to Eliminate Rod Sequence Control Sys to Make Unit 1 Specs Consistent W/Unit 2 Specs & to Correct Typos & Clarify Bases ML20085G083
References
NUDOCS 9110240103
Download: ML20085G083 (64)

Text

. - __ _- __ __

4.-

ENCLOSURE 3-PLANT HATCH - UNITS 1-AND 2

-NRC DOCKETS 50-321 AND 50-366 OPERATING LICENSES DPR-57 AND NPF-5 fdQUEST TO REVISLIECHNICAL SPECIFICfJ10MS -

TO ELIMINATE THE R0D SEqQENCE CONTROL SYSTEM PAGE CHANGE INSTRUCTIOH1' Unit 1 Removed Pace Inserted Pace iii iii 1.1-12 1.1-12 3.3-la- 3.3-la 3.3-5 3.3-5 3.3-6 3.3-6 3.3 3.3 3.3-15 3.3-15 3.3-16 3.3-16 3.3-17 3.3-17

=3.3-18 3.3-18

~3.3-18a -

13.3-19 3.3-19 V]lil_2

-IV- IV IX IX B 2 B 2-9

' 3/4 1-9 3/4 :1-9

-3/4~1-11 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-12 3/4 1-12

-3/4 1 3/4 1-14 3/4-1-15 3/4 1-15 3/4-1-16 3/4 1-16 3/4 10-2 3/4 10-2 8 3/4Ll-3 B 3/4:1-3

B.3/4 1-4 8 3/4 1-4 B 3/4 1-4a B 3/4 1-4a

-B 3/4 1-4b. D 3/4-1/4b B 3/4 10-1 8 3/4 10 L-l' l E3-1 9110240103 911oj4

-gDR ADOCK 05000321 PDR i

c.,, .

t , ll(

, ; itC11011 hEllD11 PMt

.. . LlH111NG CONDil10NS f 0R OPQQJON SUjiy[lliglji[QUIRIMIN15 ,,,,

3.3, REAC11VITY C0;4 TROL (CON 1') 4.3. RfAcilVl!Y CONTROL (CON 1')-

G,-RodWorth_Hinimiter(RWM)-l' 'G,' Rod Worth Minimiter (RWM) 3.3 5 l

.Ik Shutdown Requirements 3.3-7 3.4, STANDBY t! QUID CONTROL SYSitM 4,4. STAND 0Y L10010 CONTROL SYSilH 3.4 1 A. Normal System Availalility .A - Normal Operational Tests 3.4 1 B, Operating with inoperable- 8. Surveillance with- -3.4-2 Components inoperable Comporents.

,C, Sodium Pentaborate Solution C. Sodium Pentabt 3 3.4-2 Solution-D. Shutdown Requirements 3,4 3.

' 3.5. : CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING 4,5. CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING 3,5-1

. SYSTEMS SYST[HS

' A. -Core Spray (CS) System

. .A. : Core Spray (CS) System 3.5 1 B, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) 8. Residual licat Removal 3.5-Z System (LPCI and Containment. (RHR) System (LPCI and Cooling Mode) Containment Cooling Hooe)

C,_ RHR Service Water System C, RiiR 5ervice Water system 3.5 5 D. High Pressure Coolant-Injection D. High Pressure Coolant In- 3,5 6 (HPCI) System jection (HPCl) System E. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (, _ Reactor Core Isolation - 3.547 (RCIC) System Cooling (RCIC) System F. Automatic Depressurtration F. Automatic Depressurization 3.5 9-System (ADS) System (ADS)

G. Minimum Core and Contalnment G. Surveillance of Core.. 3 kl0 -

Cooling Systems Availability and Containment Cooling Systems tic Maintenance of filled Discharge H, Maintenance of Filled 1 010 Pipes- Olscharge Pipes I. Minimum River Flow I, Minimum River Flow 3.k11 J. Plant Service Water System J. Plant Service Water System 3.5-12 K, (ngineered Safety features K. Engineered Safety 3.5-13 Compartment Cooling Features compartment Cooling HATCH - UNIT 1 111 Prop IS/f0Cul. pro /129-168

w t

7 f

• BA5f 5 FOR LIMlitNG SME1Y $YSTEM SETTlhGL

- 2.1. A.I.a. ' llLM Flux Scram Trin Setting (Continued) tism was taken in this analysis by_ assuming that the IRM channel closest to the withdrawn rod is bypassed.- -The results of this analysis show that

-the reactor is scrammed and peak power limited to one percent of rated -

power, thus maintaining MCPR above the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit, Based on the above analysis, the IRM provides protection a l rod withdrawal errors and continues withdrawal.of control rods gainst local control in sequence and provides backup protection _for the APRM,

b. APRM Flux scram Trio Settina (Refuel or Start & Hot Stney Mode)

For operation.in the startup mode while the reactor is at low pressure, the APRM scram setting of 15 percent of rated power provides adequate thermal margin between the setpoint and the safety limit, 25 percent of

rated. The_ margin is adequate to accommodate anticipated maneuvers asso-ctated with power plant startup. Effects of increasing pressure at zero or low void content are minor, cold water from sources available'during

!startup is not much colder than that already in the system, temperature coefficients are small, and control rod patterns are constrained to be

, uniform by operating procedures backed up by the rod worth minimizer. l

-Worth of individual rods is very low in a uniform rod pattern. Thus, of all possible sources of reactivity input, uniform-control rod withdrawal is the most probable cause of significant power rise. Because-the flux distribution associated with uniform rod withdrawals does not involve high local peaks, and because several rods must be moved to change power by a significant percentage of rated power, the rate of

. power rise is very slow. Generally, the heat flux-is in near equilibrium _.

with the fission rate. In an assumed uniform rod withdrawal approach to

- the scram level, the rate of power rise is no more than 5 percent of rated power per minute, and the APRM system would be more than adequate _

to assure a: scram before the power could exceed the safety limit. The--

15 per ant APRM scram remains active until the mode switch is placed in the RUw position- This switch occurs whan reactor pressure is greater than 825 pstg.

p c. APRM Flux Scram Trio Settinas (Run Model L

The APPJi Flux scram trips in the run mode consist of the flow referenced;

. simulated thermal power monitor scram setpoint-and a fixed high-high y neutron flux scram setpoint, .. In the simulated thermal power monitor, '

the APRM flow referenced neutron flux signal is passed through a filter-ing network with a time constant which is representative of the fuel dy-namics. This provides a flow referenced signal that approximates the average heat-flux or thermal power thatcis developed in the core during transient or steady-state conditions._ This prevents spurious scrams, which have an adverse effect on reactor. safety because of the resulting thermal stresses. Examples of events which can result in momentary neutron flux spikes are momentary flow changes in the recirculation j system flow, and:small pressure disturbances during turbine stop valve and turbine control valve testing. These flux spikes represent no -

hazard to the-fuel since they are only.of a few seconds duration and-less than 120% of rated thermal power. The flow independent portion of this scram setpoint must be adjusted downward during single-loop opera-

, tion to account for lower core flow with respect to two-loop operation with the_same drive flow.

[

HATCH - UNIT I 1.1-12 K:\wp\techsp\H\l-lul. pro /039-141

_ -_a

~

c. -

1.-

< L,lM111NG (.OND1110H1,1QR OPERAllpN SUER (Mi(LB[QUIREMEN15

- 3. 3 _7-_ _(([b,(IIVITYCONTROL:

_B 10gggrable Control Rods JCont'd) li U232Y1m_tnLhy_Ggstrol Rod Drive Rttisure Kont'di-If:a partially or fully withdrawn-

.s- control r4 drive cannot be I "I"' moved with drive or scram pressure, the reactor shall be brought to

.the Cold Shutdown Condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and shall not be started unless (1) investigation has demonstrated that the cause of

- the feilure is not a..f alled control

. rod drive mechanism collet hot 'ing, and (2) adequate shutdown margin has been demonstrated as required -

by Speciftention 4.3.A. l If investigation demonstrates that

..the cause of control rod drive failure is a cracked collet.

. housing or if that' possibility cannot be eliminated, the reactor shall not be started until'the affected contro) rod drive has been replaced or repairedl HATCH - UNIT 1 3.3-la K:\wp\techsp\h\3-3ul. pro \042-0

, - _ . __ _ - -. m._ . . . _ _

=, :

.w LIMillNG C04Dlil0NS FOR OPERA 110N -SUPVEltLANtf REDVIREMENis 3.3 F. .fneration with 'a limitina Control- 4.3.f. Operation with a limitina Control BodPattern_._(forRodWithdrejl Rod Pattern (for Rod Withdrawgl _

Error. RWE1 Error. EWE)

A Limiting Rod Pattern for RWE Ouring operation when a limiting exists when the MCPR is less. Control Rod-Pattern for RWE exists than the value provided in the . arid only one RBM channel is:

• Core Operating Limits Report, operable, an instrument functional test ~of_the RBM shall be performed

'During operation with a Limiting prior to withdrawal of the control

. Control Rod Pattern for RWE and rod (s). A Limiting Rod Pattern for when core thermal power is 2 30%, RWE is defined by Specification either; 3.3.F.

~

'Both rod block monitor (RBM).

channels shall be OPERABLE, or-2, If only one RBM channel is

' OPERABLE,' control rod with-

"drawal shall be blocked within

-24 hours, or

3. - If neither RBM channel is OPER-ABLE, control rod withdrawal-shall be blocked.

G. 82d Worth Minimirer (RWM -l G. Rod Worth Minimirer (RWM) l 1,.Doerabilitv. l l-.

Operability- -l Whenever the reactor is in.the a. The RWM shall be demon-Start & Hot Standby

• or Run Mode strated OPERABLE in the below 10% rated thermal power, Start and Hot Standby the RWH shall be OPERABLE. Mode prior to withdrawal of control rods for the a, ' With the Rhti inoperable purpose of making the before the first 12 control reactor critical and in rods are withdrawn on a the Run Mode when the RWM

startup, one startup per is initiated during control

- calendar year may be per- rod insertion when reducing formed provided that THERMAL-P09ER by:

control rod movement and..

. compliance with the pre- ' (1) Verifying proper-scribed BPWS control rod annunciation of the-pattern are verified by a selection error of at second licensed operator least one control rod or qualified member of the which violates the pre-plant technical staff. scribed withdrawal sequence loaded into

b. With the RWM, inoperable the RWM, and after the first 12 control rods-have been fully with- (2) Verifying the rod block

~ drawn on a startup, opera-' function of the RWM by tion may continue provided attempting to move a-that control rod movement control rod that and compliance with the violates-the prescribed withdrawal sequence loaded tato the RWM.

• EniJy into the Start and Hot Standby Mode and withdrawal of selected "ontrol rods is permitted for the purpose of determining the OPERABILITY of the RWM prior to witMrawal of control rods for the purpose GT bringing the reactor to criticality.

HATCH - UNIT 1 3.3-5 K:\wp\techsp\h\3-3UI pro \042-168

-4 t

f '.

-0 LIMITING COND1110NS FOR_QfLRal10N SURVEILLANCE REQVIELMENTS 3.3.G.1.b. prescribed BPWS control 4.3.G.I.b. The RWM shall be demonstrated rod pattern are verified OPERABLE after a sequence of -

by a second licensed rod moves has been loaded into operator or qualified' the RWM by verifying that member of the plant sequence conforms to BPWS.

technical staff,

c. With RWM inoperable on a shutdown, shutdow may continue ,provided control rod movement and com-pliance with the prescribed BPWS control rod pattern are verified by a second licensed operator or

. Qualified member of the plant technical staff. _

HATCH - UNIT 1 3,3-6 K:\wp\techsp\h\3-3UI. pro \042-168

LLMlllNG C0N0111045 FOR OPERAILQN SURVE lt t ANfd_ELEVIELMENT S 3.3.G.2. Snecial Teit Exceptions 4.3.G,2. inttial Test targrifnns The BPWS rod pattern if the itWM or individual requirements of Specification rods in the RWM are bypassed, 3.3.G.1 may be suspended while a second licensed operator or in Startup and Hot Standby and qualified member of the plant Run Modes with thermal power technical staff shall verify less than 10% of rated to that movement of control rods allow performance of SHUT- is in compliance with the DOWN MARGIN demonstrations, approved control rod moves control rod scram time for the specified test, testi control rod friction test. or startup testing, prov.wvo the RWM is bypassed or individual rods in the RWH are Dypassed and con-formance to the approved control rod movement for the specified test is verified by a second licensed operator or qualified member of the plant technical staf f, H. Shutdown Reautrements If Specifications 3.3.A through 3,3.C are not met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor placed in the :old Shutdown Condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

HATCH - U41I 1 3.3-7 K:iwp\ techspih \ 3-301. pro \042 168

L BAji[5 f 0R LIMlllNG CONDlHQ16 IOR O_PiRATIQN AND SIL8y11Uf3(LMQMEllifd5

- 3.3.i. 06eration with a L'imitino Control Rod Pattern (for Rod Withdrawal f r,or. RWE)

Surveillance Requirements:

- A limiting control _ rod pattern for RWE is a pattern which, due to unrestricted withdrawal of sny single control rod,' could result in violation of the MCPR

-Safety Limit. Specification 3.3.F. defines a limiting control rod pattern for RWC, During use of such patterns when both RBM channels are not operable, it is judged that testing of the P31 system prior to withdrawal of control rods to assure its' operability will assure that improper withdrawal does not occur. Reference NEDC-30474-P (Ref. 17) for more information.

- G. Agi.b rth Minimiter (RWM)

1. Onttbility  :

Limiting Conditions for Operation:

The RWM restricts withdrawals and inserti. "

prespecified sequences that comply with f " lated with these sequences have the characterin *0rst single deviatten from the pattern, the drop o e the fully inserted position to the position of the cn ewld not cause the reactor to sustain a power excursio.. .esuitti t.]

pellet average enthalpy in excess of 280 calories per gram. A. unthalpy of 280 calories per gram is well below the level at which rapid fuel dispersal could occur (i.e., 425 calories per gram). Primary system damage in this accident is r.at possible unless a significant amount of fuel is rapidly dispersed. Reference Sections 3.6.6.4, 3.6.6, 7.14.5.3, and 14.4,2, and Appendix P of the FSAR, and NE00-21231. -

l The NRC requires the RWM to be highly reliable to minimize the need to depend on a second licensed operator or qualified member of the plant technical staff to verify compliance with BPW5 below 10% RTP. To accomplish this, RWM must be

-OPERABLE during the first 12 rod withdrawals during startup. The NRC-is

.willing to allow one startup per calendar year without the RWM to avoid delays -

that may occasionally occur. Below 10% RTP with the RWM inoperable, all control rod moverrents and compliance with the prescribed control rod patterns

-must be verified by a second licensed operator'or qualified member of the plant technical staff.

Abcve 10% RTP the RWM is not required to be OPERABLE nor 1.5 it required to be loaded with a sequence of rod moves that conforms to BPW$.

HATCil -' UNIT l 3.3-15 f.:twp\techsp\h\3-301. pro \042-169

,_ m,, . _ . .m. _ _ _ _ - . - - - _..

f' t [

Q.jg ;.

w BASES FOR LIMillNG CONDlll0NS FOR OPERAlION A_ND SURYfit t ANCE R[0VIREMENIS-i3.3.G.I. Deerability __ (Continued)

In performing the function described above, the RWM is not required! l to impose any restrictions at core power levels in-excess of- 10% ,

'of rated,< Material =in the cited references shows that it is impossible to reach 200 calories per gram in the event of a control rod drop occur-ring at power greater.than 10%, regardless of the rod pattern. This ts-true for all normal and abnormal patterns including those which raximize -

the individual control rod worth.

At power levels below 10% of_ rated,' abnormal control rod patterns could produce rod worths high enough to be of concern relative to the 280 cal-orie per gram rod drop limit. 'In this range, the RWM constrains the control rod sequences and patterns to those which involve only acceptable rod wort hs.

The RWM provides automatic supervision to assure that out of sequence  !

control rods.will not be withdrawn or inserted; i.e., it limits operator deviations from planned withdrawal sequences. It serves as a backup to procedural control of control rod sequences. which limit the maximum

[

reactivity worth of control rods. In the event that-the RWM is out of

service, when required, a second licensed. operator or qualified member' of-the plant technical staff _can manually fulfill the control rod .

pattern conformance functions of this system.-

The function of the RWM makes it unnecessary to specify a license limit on rod worth to preclude unacceptable consequences in the event of a l e

control rod drop. At low powers, below 101, this device forces -l-

. adherence to acceptable rod patterns. Above 10% of rated power, the

consequences of a rod drop event without RWM are acceptable. Power level for_ automatic cutout of the RWM function is sensed by feedwater

. and steam flow.

' Surveillance Requirements:

Functional testing of the RWM prior to_ the start of control rod withdrawal

-at startup and prior to attaining 10% of rated thermal-power during rod-insertion while shutting down will ensbre reliable operation.

l

2. Toecial Test Excentioni It, order to perform the tests required in the Technical Specifications, it is-necessary to bypass the BPWS restraints on control rod movement. The

additional surveiilanca requirements ensure the specifications on heat

. generation rates and shutdown margin requirements are not exceeded during the period when these tests are being performed,-and individual rod worths do not exceed the values assumed in the safety analysis.

H. Shutdown Reauirements Should circumstances be such that the limiting Conditions for -

Operation as stated in Specifications 3.3.A. through 3.3.G. cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor placed in the Cold Shutdown Condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

HATCH e UNIT 1 L3-16 K:\wp\techsph\3-3Ul. prot 042-168 2 - __

PASE5 FOR L1MI1ING C0rQL110NS FOR OERAT10ti_.MD_.SUPlLJMMCE riOQLPjf1LM

1. Scram Discharoe Volume ygnt and Drain Valves The scram discharge volume vent and drain valves are required to be OPERABLE. so that the scram discharge volume wtll be available when needed to accept discharge water from the control rods during a reactor scram and will isolate the reactor coolant system from the containment when required.

J. References

1. FSAR Section 3.4, Reactivity Centrol Mechanical Design.

2. FSAR Section 3.5.2, Safety Design Bases.

3. FSAR Section 3.5.4, Satety Evaluation.

4. FSAR Section 3.5, Control Rod Drive Housing Supports.

S. FSAR Section 14.4.3, loss-of-Coolant Accident.

6. FSAR Section 14.4.2. Control Rod Drop Accident.

7. .. J. Paone, ' Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence,"

NED0-21231, January 1977.

8. FSAR Section 3,6.5.4, Control Rod Worth.

9. FSAR Section 3.6.6, Nuclear Evaluations.

HATCH - UNIT 1 3.3-17 K:\wp\techsp\h\3-3UI. pro \C42-166

(This page intentionally lef t blank.)

i e

HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-18 Ki\wp\techsp\h\3-3dl.pr0\042-97

. . . . - - . - . . . ~ . ~ , . . . . _ . _ _ e . _ ..m . . ..- .._.. .

J

. go ; -

BASEE FOR LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURWEILLANCE RE00lREMENTS

- 3.3.J. - Referencei (Continued)

-10. FSAR Section 7.14.5.3, Rod Worth Minimizer function- ~

11. FSAR Section 3.6.4.1.- Control Rods

12. FSAR Question 3.6.7, Amendment 24

13. ' Average Power Range Monitor. Rod Block Monitor and Technical Specification

Improvement (ARTS)ProgramforEdwin1.HatchNuclearPlant. Units 1and2."

NEDC-30474-P, December 1983.

+-

3 P

1 L

b .

l l- _ _:

1.

i-( l..

HATCH - UNIT 1 3.3-19 K:\wp\techsp\h\3-3UI. pro \042-105 d - . . . , - . -

m er. ,

+ <w. < a -y. , 9

INDEf i LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION' PAGE 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY............................................... 3/4 0-1 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1: SHUTDOWN MARGIN.......................................... 3/4 1-1 3/4.1.2 REACTIVITY ANOMALIES...... ...................... ....... 3/4 1-2 3 /4.-l . 3 CONTROL RODS Control Rod Operability.................................. 3/4 1-3 Control Rod Maximum Scram Insertion Times................ 3/4 1-5 Control Rod Average Scram Insertion Times................ 3/4 1-6

. Four Control Rod Group Scram Insertion Times............. 3/4 1 Control Rod Scram Accumulators........................... 3/4 1-8 Control Rod Drive Coupling............................... 3/4 1-9 Control Rod Posi tion Indi cation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-11

• Control Rod Drive Housing Support........................ 3/4 1-13 3/4.1.4 CONTROL R00 PROGRAM CONTROLS Rod Worth M1nimizer.................. ................... 3/4 1-14 I

Rod Block Monitor....................... ................ 3/4 1-17 3/4.1.5 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM............................ 3/4 1-18 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE............... 3/4 2-1 3/4 2.2 APRM SETP0INTS........................................... 3/4 2-5 3/4.2.3 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATI0............................ 3/4 2-6 3/4.2.4 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE.................. ........... 3/4-2-8 HATCK-UNIT 2 IV Proposed TS/0448q/042-0 m

k INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE-REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 REACTOR MODE SWITCH 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4 9-3 3/4.9.3 CONTROL ROD POSITION 3/4 9-S 3/4.9.4 DECAY TIME 3/4 9-6 3/4.9.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT Refueling Floor 3/4 9-?

Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Dampers 3/4 9-8 Standby Gas Treatment System 3/4 9-10 3/4.9.6 COMMUNICATIONS 3/4 9-11 3/4,9.7 CRANE AND HOIST OPERABILITY 3/4 9-12.

3/4.9.8- CRANE TRAVEL--- SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL 3/4 9-13 3/4.9.9: WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL- 3/4 9-14 3/4.9.10 RATER LEVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE. POOL 3/4 9-15

-3/4.9.11 CONTROL R0D REMOVAL

' Single Control Rod-Removal 3/4 9-16 Multiple Control Rod Removal 3/4 9-18 3/4.9.12 REACTOR COOLANT CIRCUI*710N 3/4 9-20

'3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.2 R00 HORTH MINIMIZER 3/4 10-2 3/4.10.3 SHUTDOWN MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS 3/4 10-3 3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION LOOPS 3/4 10-4 HATCH-UNIT 2 IX Proposed T5/0448q/042-48

'l 2.2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS BASES 2.2.1 RfACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM IN11R WINTATIGH SETPOINIS The Reactor Protection System Instrumentation Setpoints specified in Table 2.2.1-1 are the values at which the reactor trips are set for each parameter. . The Trip Setpoints have been selected to ensure that the reactor

- core and reactor coolant system are prevented from exceeding their Safety Limits. Operation with a trip. set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint,-but within its specified Allowable Value, is acceptable on the basis that each Allowable Value is equal to oc less thar, the drif t allowance assumed for each trip in the safety analyses.

1. Intermediate Rance Monitor. Neutron Flux The IRM system consists of 8 chambers, 4 in each of the raactor trip systems. ;The IRM is.a 5-decade, 10-range instrument. The trip setpoint of 120 divisions of scale is active in each of the 10 ranges. Thus, as the

'IRM is ranged up to accommodate the increase in power level, the tria setpoint is also ranged up. The IRM instruments provide for overlap with botl the

• APRM and SRM: systems.

The most significant source of reactivity changes during the power increase Lare due to control rod withdrawal. -In order to ensure that the IRM provides Lthe required protection, a range of rod withdrawal accidents have been analyzed, -Section 7.5 of the FSAR. . The most- severe-case involves an initial condition'in which the reactor is just.subcritical, and the IRM's are not yet on scale. Additional conservatism was taken in this analysis by assuming the IRM' channel closest to the rod.being withdrawn is-bypassed. The results of-this analysis show that the reactor is shutdown and peak nower is limited to-l%

of RATED THERMAL POWER, thus maintaining MCPR above the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit. ' Based on this analysis,.the_lRM provides protection against local control rod errors and continuous withdrawal of control rods in sequence and

.provides backup protection for the APRM.-

2. Averace Power Rance Monitor For operation at low pressure and low flow during STARTUP, the APRM

. scram setting of -15/125 divisions of full scale neutron fiux provides

-adequate thermal margin between the setpoint.and the Safety Limits. The margin accommodates the anticipated maneuvers-associated with power plant startup. Effects of increasing pressure at zero or low void content are minor and cold water from sources available during startup is not much colder than-that already in the system. Temperature coefficients are small, and control rod patterns are constrained by the RWM. l HATCH - UNIT 2 B 2-9 K:\wp\techsp\h\BA52-002.prc\042-77

'.9 __.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS C_0NTROL ROD ORIVE COUPLING illM1 TING CONDITION FOR OPERATION _

3.1.3.6 All control rods shall be coupled to their drive mechanisms.

ApPtICABILITY: . COND1110NS 1, 2 and 5*.

ACTION:

-a. .in CONDITION 1 or 2, with one control rod not coupled to its associated drive mechanism, the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable, and operation may continue provided; 1.- If permitted by the _RWM, the-control rod drive mechanism- l is inserted to accomplish recoupling, and recoupling is verified by demonstrating that the control rod will not go to the overtravel position, or

2. If.recoupling.is not accomplished on the first attempt or if not permitted by the RWM,- the control rod is declared l.

inoperableLand fully inserted, and-the requirements of

-. Specification 3.1,3.1 are satisfied,

b. In CONDITION 5*, with-a withdrawn ~ control rod not coupled to its associated drive mechanism, within 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />s:

1 Insert the control rod to accomplish recoupling,- and -

verify: recoupling by demonstrating that the control rod will-not go to the overtravel position; or

2. If.recoupling is not accomplished, fully. insert the control' rod and either electrically. disarm the control rod or close the ' withdraw isolation valve.

3. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

• At least each withdrawn-control rod. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.3.11.1 or 3.9.11.2. l 11ATCH - UNIT 2 2/4 1-9 K:\wp\techsp\h\3_4-IV2. pro \042-0

. ~ . . _. . _ _ _ _

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD POSITION _lNDICATION-LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.7 All control. rod reed switch position indicators shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 5*.

ACTION:

a. in CONDITION 1 or 2, with one or more control rod reed switch position indicators inoperable, the provisions of Specification l 3.0.4 are not applicable, and operation may continue provided that within i hour:

1. The-position of the control rod is determined by an alternate method, or

2. The control rod is moved to a position with an OPERABLE reed switch position indicator, or

3. The control rod is declared inoperable and the requirements of Specification 3.1.3.1 are satisfied; Otherwise,.be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

b. In CONDITION 5*, I with a withdrawn control rod reed switch posi-tion indicator inoperable, move.the control rod to a position with an OPERABLE reed switch position indicator, or fully insert the control rod. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

L l-i

• At least each withdrawn control rod. Not applicable to control rods l

removed per Specification 3.9.11.1 or 3.9.11.2.

i HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 1-11 K:\wp\techsp\b\3_4-lV2. pro \042-0

REACT.ly1TY CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEltlANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.3.7.1 The control rod reed switch position indicators shall be determined OPERABLE by verifying:

a. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, that the position of the control rod is indicated,

b. That the indicated control rod position changes during the movement of the control rod when performing Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.1, and

c. That the control rod reed switch position indicator corresponds to the control rtd position indicated by the " full-out" reed switches when performing Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.6.b.

HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 1-12 K:\wp\techsp\h\3_4-lV2. pro \042-0

BEACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.4 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS POD WORTH MINIM 12ER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.4.1 The Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) shall be OPERABLE.

' APPLICABILITY: CONDITIONS 1 and 2*, when THERMAL POWER is less than 10%

-of RATED THERMAL POWER.

. ACTION:-

a. With the'RWM inoperable before the first 12 control rods are withdrawn on a startup, one startup.per calendar year may be performed provided control rod movement and compliance ~with the prescribed BPWS control rod pattern are verified by a second licensed operator or qualified _ member of the plant technical stiff,

b. - With the RWM inoperable af ter the first 12 control rods have been fully withdrawn on a startup, operation may continue provided that control rod movement-and compliance with the prescribed BPWS control rod pattern are verified by~a second licensed operator or qualified member of the plant technical staff. -

c. WithL RWM inoperable on a . shutdown, shutdown may continue provided control-rod movement and compliance with the prescribed BPWS control rod pattern-are. verified by a second licensed operator or qualified member of the plant technical staff.

l Ifntry into GPERAT19NAL CCND! TION 2 and withdrawal of selected control

= rods is piirmitted for the purpose of determining the OPERABILITY of the RWM prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of bringing the reactor to criticality.

L HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 1-14 K:\wp\techsp\h\3_4-lV2. pro \042-106

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.4 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS R0D WORTH MINIMlZER XVRVEILLANCE RE0VIREMfMTS 4.1.4.1 The RWM shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a, in CONDITION 2 prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of making the reector critical, and in CONDITION 1 when the RWM is initiated during control rod inser' tion when reducing THERMAL POWER, by:

1. Verifying proper annunciation of the selection error of at least one out-of-sequence control rod, and

2. Verifying the rod b'iock function of the RWh by moving an out-of sequence control rod.

b. By verifying the sequence of rod mo,es loaded into the RWM conforms to BPWS following the loading of that :,equence, i

HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 1-15 K:\wp\techsp\h\3_4-lV2. pro \042-106

(This page intentionally lef t blank.)

<n.on.<... rsi...ivr....

HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 1-16 K:\wp\techsp\h\3 4-lV2. pro \042-106

. o:

SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS ,

}/4.10.2 ROD WORTH MINIM 17ER.

'llMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION-3.10.2 The BPWS rod pattern requirements of Specification 3.1.4,1 may be suspended while in Conditions 1 and 2 with THERMAL POWER LESS THAN 10% of RATED to allow performance of SHUTDOWN MARGIN demonstrations, control rod scram time testing, control rod friction testing, or startup testing, provided the RWM is bypassed or individual rods in the RWM are bypassed and conformance to the approved control rod movement for the specified test is verified by a second licensed operator'or qualified member of the plant technical staff.

SURVEllLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.10.2 If the RWM or individual rods in the RWM are bypassed, verify proposed '

movement Hof control rods is in compliance with the approved control rod moves for the specified test.

HATCH.- UNIT 2 3/4 10-2 K:\wp\techsp\h\3_41002. pro \042-106

REACTLVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES _

CONTROL RODS (Continued) than has been analyzed even though control rods with inoperable accumulators may still be inserted with normal drive water pressure. Operability of the accumulator ensures that there is a means available to insert the control rods even under the most unfavorable depressurization of the reactor. l Control rod coupling integrity is required to ensure compliance with the analysis of the rod drop accident in the FSAR. The overtravel position feature provides the only positive means of determining that a rod is properly coupled, and therefore, this check must be performed prior to achieving criticality after each refuelirg. The subsequent check is performed as a backup to the initial demonstration.

In order to ensure that the control rod patterns can be followed and therefore that other parameters are within their limits, the control rod position ind', cation system must be OPERABLE.

The control rod housing support restricts the outward movement of a control rod to less than 3 inches in the event of a housing failure.

The amount of rod reactivity which could be added by this small amount of rod withdrawal is less than a normal withdrawal increment and will not contribute to any damage to the primary coolant system. The support is not required when there is no pressure to act as a driving force to rapidly eject a drive housing, The required surveillance intervals are adequate to determine that the rods are OPERABLE ar.d not so frequent as to cause excessive wear on the system components.

3/4.1.4 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS Control rod withdrawal and insertion sequences are established to assure that the maximum insequence individual control rod or control rod segments which are withdrawn at any time during the fuel cycle could not be worth enough to cause the peak fuel enthalpy for any postulated control rod accident to exceed 280 cal /gm. The specified requences are characterized by homogeneous, scattered patterns of control rod withdrawal . When THERMAL POWER is 2- 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER, there is no possible rod worth which, if dropped at the design rate of the velocity limiter, could result in a peak enthalpy of 280 cal /gm. Thus, requiring the RWM to be OPERABLE below 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER provides adequate control.

HATCH - l' NIT 2 B 3/4 1-3 wp\techsp\h\ BAS 3 4U2. pro \042-106

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES CONTRQL RODS PROGRAM CONTROLS (Continued)

The RWM provides automatic supervision to assure that out-of-sequence l rods will not be withdrawn or inserted.

The analysis of the rod drop accident is presented in Section 15.1.38 of the FSAR, and the techniques of the analysis are presented in a topical report, Reference 1.

The NRC requires the RWM be highly reliable to minimize the need to depend on a second licensed operator or qualified member of the plant technical staf f to verify compliance with BPWS below 10% RTP. s accomplish this, RWM must be operable during the first 12 rod withdrawals during startup. The NRC is willing to a410w one startup per calendar year without RWM in order to avoid delays that may occasionally occur. Below 10% RTP with the RWM inoperable, all control rod movements and compliance with the prescribed control rod patterns must be verified by a second licensed operator or -"'lified member of the plant technical staf f.

.,oove 10% of RTP, the RWM is not required te be OPERABLE nor is it required to be loaded with a sequence of rod moves that conforms to BPWS.

The RBM is designed to automatically prevent fuel damage in the event of erroneous rod withdrawal from locations of high power density during high power operation. The RBM is only required to be OPERABLE when the Limiting Condition defined in Specification 3.1.4.3 exists. Two channels are provided. Tripping one of the channels will block erroneous rod with-drawal soon enough to prevent fuei damage. This system backs up the written sequence used by the operator for withdrawal of control rods, Further dis-cussion of the RBM system and power dependent setpoints may be-found in NEDC-30474-P (Ref. 4),

4 HATCH - UNIT 2 8 3/4 1-4 wn\techsp\h\ BAS 3_4U2. pro \042-90

' RLA.GilyJJY TIUMLllSlDi!

i

< MSil. -

ILLL5_SJMDELu001Dl0till10L11518 i

The standby liquid control (StC) system provides a backup reactivity control capability to the control red scram system. The original design basis L for the standby liquid cont rol system is to provide a soleble boron I concentration to the reactor vessel sufficient to bring the reactor to a cold i

shutdown. In addition to meeting its oric'nal design basis, the system must also satisfy the requirements of the AlWS Rule 10 CFR 50.62 paragraph (c) (4),

which requires that the system have a control capacity equivalent to that for j a system with an injection rate of 86 gpm of 13 weight percent unenriched l

sodium pentaborate, normalized to a 251 inch diameter reactor vessel.

e lo meet its original design basis, the StC system was designed with &

sodium pentaborate solution tank, redundant pumps, and redundant explosive injection valves. The tank contains a sodium pentaborate solution of suf ficient volume, concentratica a .d B enrichment to bring the reactor to a cold shutdown, lhe solution is injected into the reactor vessel using one i of the redundant pumps.

The volume limits in figure 3.1.5-1 are calculated such that for a given concentration of sodium pentaborate, the tank contains a volume of solution adequate to bring the reactor to a cold shutdown, with margin. These volume limits are based on gross volume and account for the unusable volume of solution in the tank and suction lines.

To meet 10 CFR 50.62 Paragra;)h (c) (4), the system must have a reactivity control capacity equivalent to that of a system with an 86 gpm injection flow rate of 13 weight percent unenriched sodium pentaborate into a 251 inch diameter reactor vessel, lheterm"equivalentpeactivitycontrolcapacity" ,

4 refers ta the rate at which the boron isotope B " is injected into the reactor core, lhe standby liquid cortrol system meets this requirement by using a sodium pentaborate solution enriched with a higher concentration of the B'" isotope. The minimum concentration limit of f pentaborate solution is based on 60 atomic percent B'g.2 percent enriched boron in sodium sodium pentaborate and a flow rate of 41.2 gpm. The method used to show equivalence with 10 CfR 50.62 is set forth in NEDE-31096- P (Ref. 5).

Limiting Conditions for Operation are established based on the redundancy within the system and the reliability of the control rod scram system. With the standby liquid control system inoperable, reactor operation for short periods of time is justified because of the reliability of the control rod scram system. With one redundant component inoperable, reattor operation for longer periods of time is justified because the system could still fulfill its function.

IIATCil - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-4a wp\techsp\ll\ BAS 3 4U2. pro \042-90

REACTIVITY C0:4TR01 SYSIL!!S PASES __

STA@hY L10VID C0f41ROL SYSTEM (Continued)

Surveillance requirements are established on a frequency that assures a high system reliability. Thorough testing of the system each oparating cycle assures that the cystem can be actuated from the control room and will develop the flos rate required. Replacament of the explosive charges in the valves at regular intervals assures that these valves will not f ail due to deterioration of the charges, functional testing of the pumps is performed once per month to as:ure pump operability.

The sodium pentaborate selution is carefully monitored to assure its reactivity control capability is maintained. The enriched sodium pentaborate selution is made by mixing granular, enriched sodium pentaborate with water.

Isotopic tests on the granular sodium pentaborate are performed to verify the actual Bg enrichment, prior to mixing with water. Once the enrichment is established, unly the solution concentration, volume, and temperature tr.ust be m u'tored to insure that an ade-1a'.c amount of reactivity control is available. Detcrmining the se nion concentration once por 31 days verifies that the sulution has not t'een diluted with water. Checking the volume once each day will pt against noticeable fluid iosses or dilutions, and daily

• temperature chec ill prevent sodium pentaborate precipitation.

I C. J. Paone, " Banked Position Withdrawal sequence," NED0-21231, January 1977.

2. Deleted.

3. Deleted.

4. " Average Pow Range Monitor, Rod filock Monitor ano Technical Specifi-cation Improvement (ARTS) Program for Edwin 1 Hatch fluclear Plant, Units 1 and 2," flEDC-30474-P, December 1983.

5. " Anticipated Transients without Scram, Response to llRC ATWS Rule, 10 CFR 50.62", NEDE-31096-P, December 1985.

HATCH - UtilT 2 B 3/4 1-4b wp\techsp\H\ BAS 3_4U2. pro \042-90

. _ _ _ . _ _ . - - _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . - _ - ~ - _ - . . _ . _ . - . - -

e 3/4.10 SPECIA' TEST EXCEPTIONS -

i EASES _

2/jL.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INIfGRITY

)

The requirement for PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is removed during the period when open vessel tests _are being performed during low power i PilY3ICS TESTS.-

3/4.10.2 ROD WORTH MINIMIZER in order to perform the tests required in the Technical Spec.fications,

- it is necessary to bypass the sequence restraints on control rod mosement.

The additional- surveillance requirements ensure that the Specifications on  ;

heat generatior, rates and shutdown margin requirements tre not exceeded  ;

during-the period when these te:ts are_being performed.

3/4.10.3- SHUTDOWN MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS- ,

Performance of shutdown margin-damonstrations with the vessel head removed requires additional restrictions in order to ensure that criticality does not occur. These additional restrictions are specifieJ in this LCO.

1/jL)0.4 RECTRCULATION LOOPS This special~ test exception permits reactor criticality under no flow conditions and is required to perform certain startup and PliYSICS TESTS while. at low THERMAL POWER levels.

f HATCH - UNIT 2- B 3/4 10-1 wp\techsp\h\ BAS 3_4U2.prn\042-0 wvvy --+-wwr gwe-c -yer,re,--,--3+vy-g- wg,wyg,- y pm- +- y- My-'ai-9 $$q *'

iN wy+e ye,ep-- gy'? PP"F--V-

Section Stetion fug LIMillkG COND1110N5 FOR OPIRAil0N SURyllLLANC[ R[0UIR[MtN15 3.3. REAC11VITY CONTROL (CONI') 4.3. hCACTIVITY CONTROL (CONT')

n+e W a , ,, r, s i a r c L t.WA) rs e wtM a mw Wte n tvM G. G. {imiting-the-Worth of-e-timiting-the-%rth-ef-e-tentrel Aod-Selow 105 l {ontrel-Rod-Below-105- 3.3-$ l Reted-thermel-towee -Aated-Thermal-tower-H. $hutdown Requirements 3.3-1 3.4. STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL $YS1[M 4,4. STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL $YSitM 3. 4 -1 A. Nermal $ystem Availability A. Norwa) Operational Tests 3.4-1 B. Operating with inoperable B. Surveillance with Inoperable 3.4-2 Components Components C. Sodium Pentaborate Solution C. Sodium ientaborate Solution 3.4 2 0.* Shut down Requirements 3.4-3 3.5. CORC AND CONTAINM[NT COOLING 4.5. CORT AND CONTAldM[NT COOLING 3 $-1 SY5ftMS SYSitMS A. Core Spray (CS) System A. Core Spray (C$) System 3.5-1 B. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) 8. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) 3.5-2 System (LPCI and Containment System (LPCI and Coritainment Cooling Mode) Cooling Mode)

C. RHR Service Water System C. RHR Service Water system 3.5-5 D. High Pressure Coolant injection D. High Pressure Coolant in- 3.5-6 (HPCI) System jection (HPCI) System E. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling E. Reactor Core Isolation 3.5-7 (RCIC) System Cooling (RCIC) System F. Automatic Depressurization F. Automatic Depressurization 3.5 0 System (ADS) System (ADS)

G. Minimum Core and Containment G. Surveil 16 ace of Core and 3.5-10 Cooling Systems Availability Containment Cooling Systems H. Maintenance of filled Ditcharge H. Maintenance of Filled 3.5-10 Pipes Discharge Pipes

1. Minimum River Flow 1. Minimum River Flow 3.5-11 J. Plant Service Water System J. Plant Service Water System 3.5-12 K. Engineered Safety Features K. Engineered Safety Features 3.5-13 Compartment Cooling Compartment Cooling 9

HATCH - UNIT 1 til Amendment No. 160

BA5b FOR tlMlflNG SM (1Y SY$11M 5t111EGS 2.1.A.I.a. IRM Flur Scram Trio $tttinr (Continued) tism was taken in this analysis by assuming that the itM channel closest j to the withdrawn rod is bypassed. The results of this analysis show that the reactor is stranrned and peak power limited to one percent of rated power, thus maintaining MCPR above the fuel cladding integrity Saf ety Limit. l Based on the above analysis, the IRM provides protection against local control rod withdrawal errors and continues withdrawal of control rods in sequence and provides backup protection f or the APRM.

b. APRM Flux scram Trio Settina (Ref uel or Start & Hot Standby Model For operation in the startup mode while the reactor is at low pressure, the APRM scram setting of 15 percent of rated power provides adequate thernal margin betweth the setpoint and the safety limit, 25 percent of rated. The margin is adequate to acconrnodate anticipated maneuvers asso-cisted with power plant startup. Effects of increasing pressure at zero j or low void content are etnor, cold water f rom sources available during startup is not neuch colder than that already in the system, ternperature coef ficients are small, and control rod patterns are constrained to be uniforn by operating procedures backed up by the rod worth minimizer.end-the-Rod-Sequence 4 entre M ystoa. Worth of individual rods is very low in a uniform rod pattern. Thus, of all possible sources of reactivity input, uniforn control rod withdrawai is the most probable cause of sig-nificant power rise. Because the flux distribution associated with uniform rod withdrawals does not involve high local peaks, and because several rods must be moved to change power by a significant percentage of rated power, the rate of power rise is very slow. Generally, the heat flux is in near equilibrium with the fissisn rate. In an assumed uniforir rod withdrawal approach to the scram level, the rate of power rise is no more than 5 percent of rated power per minute, and the APRM system would be more than adequate to assure a scram before the power could exceed the safety limit. The 15 percent APRM scram remains active until the y mode switch is placed in the RUN position. This switch occurs when reactor pressure is greater than 825 psig,

c. APPM Flur Scram tric Settinos (Run Model The APRM Flux s; ram trips in the run mode consist of the flow referenctd simulated thermal power monitor scram setpoint and a fixed high-high nsutron flux scram setpoint. In tb9 simulated thermal power monitor, the APRM flow referenced neutron flux signal is passed through a filter-ing network with a time constant which is representative of the fuel dy-namics. This provides a flow referenced signal that approximates the average heat flux or thernal power that is developed in the core during transient or steady-state conditions. This prevents spurious scrams, which have an adverse ef fect on reactor safety because of the resulting thermal stresses. Examples of events which can result in momentary neutron flux spikes are momentary flow changes in the recirculation  ;

system flow, and small pressure disturbances during turbine stop valve and turbine control valve testing. These flux spikes represent no hazard to the fuel since they are only of a few seconds duration and less than 120% of rated thennal power. The flow independent portion et this scram setpoint must be adjusted downward during single-loop opera-tion to account for lower core flow with respect to two-loop operation with the same drive flow, j

HAT'CH bNIT 1 1.1 12 Amendment No. 27, 28, A2, 52, f), 105, 141

)

LIMlilNG CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION $URVLlLLANC[ R10VIRLMENf5 3.3 REACTIVITY CONTROL

8. Inonerable Control Rods (Cont'd)

1. No Movement by Control Rod Drive h Pressure (Cont'd)

If a partially or fully withdrawn control rod drive cannot be moved with drive or scram pressure, the reactor shall be brought to ,

the Cold Shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and shall not be started unless (1) investigation has demonstrated that the cause of the failure is not a f ailed control rod drive mechanism collet housing, and (2) adequate shutdown margin has been demonstrated as required by Specification 4.3/.j, If investigattin demonstrates that the cause of contro' rod drive f ailure is a cracLed collet housing or if that possibility cannot be eliminated, the reactor shall not be started until the af fected control rod drive has been replaced or repaired. I t

i

)

}

i HATCH - UNIT 1 3. 3-l a Amendment No. 28

, - -, - - ,-.,- J -. - . . . _ . - - _ - . . ~ . . , = - . - - - .. ~ , . , . - . . -

Llml11NG C0%Diflow1 FOR OPERA 11DN SURvilLLANCE Rt0UlkimlN15 3.3.F. 7ttiation with a .in g no Centrol 4.3.F. htration with e ,imit' no tonigl rod Pattren ffor tod w'thdrawal Led Pattryn f f or tod w' thdrawal'

.rror. RWL) :rror. RWL)

A Limiting Rod Pattern for RW[ exists During operation when a limiting when the MCPR is less than the value Control Rod Pattern for RWC exists

( provided in the Core Operating Limits and only one RBM thannel is Report, operable, an instrument functional test of the RBM shall be performed prior to withdrawal of the control rod (s). A Limiting Rod Pattern for During operation with a Limiting RWE is defined by Specification Control Rod Pattern for RWC and 3.3.F.

when tore thermal power is ?,30%.

( either

1. both rod block monitor (RBM) l thannels shall be operable, or

2. If only one R94 channel is opera able, control rod withdrawal shall be blocked within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or

3. If neither RBM thannel is oper-able, control rod withdrawal shall be blocked.

G. simit4*e-the-Weri h-of-a CtSt r*I-Red- G t Mtith-et-e-f tmteol-+ed-eelow-10s-kateda t.eme 44 ewer j . 19mit tne_1h telow -105- Re t es-neme1-eewee l

( 1. ~ Pod Worth MinimiterD)MF -

-- lorthMinimiter(RM)y--~

-m__,_,- #C ~ r ., r~ n W^+y h

Whenever the reatter is in the Start (Prior to the start of control Q~~7' g*#..**"___ut V & Wot Standb/or Run Mode below 10%

rated thermal power, the RWM thall tod Withdrawal at startup ~*

f - lj si soon as automatic inttk in

~- be operable.w-e-setend-littesed of\theRWMoccursduringrod

-ope ra t or- s he l l-ve r i f y- t he t -t he- instrtion while shutting down, operatee-et-the reatter-40nsole-4s- the la obtlity of the RWM/to f el lowi ng -t hH en trol-red- prog ram.- prope' y fulfill its function shall e verified by the' followthe checks.

a. The rrectness of the w Banked \ Position / Withdrawal sequench input /to the RWM

<yY temputer shal,) be verified.

/

/ b. The RWM t diagnostic / st shall be uter on line

/'j N successfully erformed.

Propera/

b .) c. nnunti lon of the gtd

(, / p f-s',/, select,fonerror(pfatleast one ont-of-sequente control rod n each fully nserted f

gro shall be ver ed.

+

d. The rod block functioA of the RWM shall be vertfled by

1. withdrawingorinsertinkan out-of-sequence control d no more than to the block point.

HATCH - UNIT 1 3.3-5 Amendment No. ff. If, (f. $f. f#, fit.

168

INSERT '2'

a. With the RWM inoperable before the first 12 control rods are withdrawn on a startup, ona startup per calendar year may be performed provided-that control rod movement and compliance with the prescribed BPWS control rod pattern are verified by a second licensed operator or qualtfled member of the plant technical staff.

b. With the RWM inoperable after the first 12 control rods have been fully. withdrawn on a startup, operation may continue provided that

. control rod movement and compliance with the prescribed BPWS control rod pattern are verified by a second licensed operator or qualified member of the plant technical staff.

c. With RWM inoperable on'a shutdown, shutdown may continue provided that control rod movement and compliance with the prescribed BPWS control rod pattern are verified by a second licensed operator or qualified member of the plant technical staff.

• Entry into the_ Start and-Hot Standby Mode and withdrawal of selected

-control rods is permitted for the purpose of determining the OPERABILIT of the RWH prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of b the reactor to criticality.

l l.

L i

INSERT *1"

a. The RWM shall be demonstrated OPERABLE in the Start and Hot Standby Mode prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of making the reactor critical and in the Run Mode when the RWH is initiated during control rod insertion when reducing THERMAL POWER by:

(1) Verifying proper annunciation of the selection error of at least one control rod which violates the prescribed withdrawal sequence loaded into the RWM, and (2) Verifying the rod block function of the RWM by attempting to move a control rod which violates the prescribed withdrawal sequence loaded into the RWM.

b. The RWM shall be demonstrated OPERABLE after a sequence of rod moves has been loaded into the RWM by verifying that sequence conforms to BPWS.

l .

• l LIM 111hG (0%DillDNS FOR OMFAllDN syRv[lLLAACIFt0Ultikth15

~ ~'

.3.G.I. R od.. $ t a g e n t e C osiWi~$71'iiilf5051 2 /

a. Operability ~ 76T$ecitidsstro15viin

4. Operability (Psts)/

When the reactor is in the $ tart As 5001 as the group notch and Hot Standby or Run Mode below mode is entered during'esth 10% rated therw.a1 power and control l Rdeovementiswithinthegroup eestter startup and,4's soon as automatic initiation of g

n:tth mode after 50% of the the R$C5 occursA uring rod conth1 rods have been withdrawn, insertion whjle shutting theRoQequenteControlSystem down, the ppability of the shall be operable estept when Rod Sequerfte Control System perf orming 'it}e RWW surveillance to propfrly fulfill its tests. \N funt. tion shall be verified by 6ttempting to select and

\ p move an inhibited control rod,

\ / When the control rod movement

\N / is within the group notch

/ mode and as soon as automatte initiation of the R$C$ otturs

' \v' < during rod insertion wh11e

/

/N N shutting down, the operability of the notching restriction

/ \ shall be demonstrated by

) / \ attempting to move a control f

/ irst progranrted rod group.

/ 4{ rod more than one notch in the

/

[

b. Failed Position Switch b. Failed Position Switch f i

Contro V ods with a failed ' Full- A second licensed operator in' shall verify the conformance me[er be bypessed 'f ull-out' inposition the Rod switch to 5pecification 3.3.6.2.b equence Control System if the at- before a rod may be bypassed

/tualrodpositionisknown.

rods shall be moved in sequence to These in the Rod Sequence tontrol System. '\

i'

/ their correct politions (full in on \  !

j

/,/ insertion or f ull out on withdrawal). \

\

K p'

)

HATCH - UNIT 1 3.3-6 Amendment ho. fif, 169

LIMlflWG CONDifl0N$ IDR OPERA 11DN $URV[lLLANC[ RIOulktMik15

3. 3. G. I ./,. -Maceih/freces 4.3.G.2.p. ',Md= MaretWfrecee-1+me-me ratine- j 4easine-K{_n order to perTorn the Prior to control red with-f_peu r. d- -

r% quired shutdown mergin rewal for startup, verify deingnstrations subsequent te conformance to $pect.

' S *

• U' -

to ahy fuel Ioading opera- figation 3.3.G.t.b. before tions Nor to perform con- a red may be bypassed in .

drive strae an or the R$C5. The requirements i trol ro6hetting as spetified f riction use of the indi-in Surveillance Regu)tement to alp (od positten bypass vidual 4.3.C.! and he in)(141 start- switchesxwithth rod group s.

up test program, the relara- Att, A 34,\tr,or534 i of /

f tionofthefolfo,winfed. R$C$ the R$C$ dhrin shutdown restraints ilderalt The N rgin, scres ime or (tic-sequence restraints \taposed tion testing'gres on contro ' rod groups,Ai g,

/

A34,813)or934afterNot \ j i

, (1) R6m operable er per Spect-of tht/ control rods have'geen fication 3.'3. 5.1.

withfrawn may be removed for the /s test period by means of the\ (2) After the h(passing of fswit.(het._individualrodpositionbypas)\. therodsp1 Alt, th6 eq A34, 13, t$C5 s

groups 834 for 4 test purposes, it\shall be demonstrated that teovement -

efth/rodsinthe50sdens- .

ityAo 105 of rated thernal L

/,vy,,g 's poyer range is blockte or (k _f Y/ 11mited to the single de of withdrawal.

tch (3) A second licensed operators shall verify the conformanc to procedures and this '

Specification, i e-.

A/4 t% r "

H. Shutdown Renutrements

.If Specifications 3.3.A through' 3.3.6 are not met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor placed in the Cold

( Shutdown Condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

b HATCH - UN!i 1 3.3-7 Amendment No. 131, 168

~

a. _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _.._,_....._. _ ._ ,,_.___ _ .--_. __ ,_.-.._. - ._ _ . - - - . . _ .

IllSIRT '4" The BPWS rod pattern requirements of LCO 3.3.G.1 may be suspended in the Startup and Hot Standby and Run Modes with thermal power less than 10% of rated to allow performance of SHUTDOWN MARGIN demonstrations, control rod scram time testing, control rod friction testing, or startup testing, j provided the RWH is bypassed or individual rods in the RWM are bypassed and conformance to the approved control rod movement for the specified test is verified by a second licensed operator or qualified member of the plant technical staff, r

l l

l l . . _ - - .

INSERT '5' If the RWM or lndividual rods in the RWM are bypassed, a second licensed operator or qualified member of the plant technical staff JAtV 4hetrid verify that movement of control rods is in comp 11ence with the gjfp-9f approved control rod moves for the specified test.

I l

9 4

i BA5[5 FOR LIMITlhG CONDITlh5 FOR OPERA 110N AND SURVIILL ANCE RE0VIREM[h15 3.3 F. Doeration with a Limitina Control Rod Pattern (for kod Withdrawal trror. kWt1 Surveillance Requirements:

A Ilmiting control rod pattern for RWE is a pattern which due to unrestricted withdrawal of any single control rod, could result in violation of the MCPR

,I safety Limit. Specification 3.3.F. defines a limiting control rod pattern for RWC. During use of such petterns when both RBM channels are not operable it is judged that testing of the RBM system prior to withdrawal of control rods to assure its operability Will assure that improper withdrawa) does not occur. Reference NLDC-30474 P (Ref.17) for more infonnetton.

G. 34ettine W 5%+f+ Control Aed4elow-10s,,ggit(-1beme14ewee l 11_ _ ..

1.gdWorthMinimiter(RWM1) h ebib) Limiting Conditions for Operation: F

- q' 1he RWM **d-the-ned-&etwe*ee-Coetcel fyttemittt$t restrict withdrawals and insertions of control rods to pr specified sequences. All patterns l .

associated with these sequences hav4 the characteristic fthat, assuming the worst single dettation from the9tevence, the drop of any control rod from the fully inserted position to the position of the would not cause the reactor to sustain a power excurstor/:entrolresulting in any.rod drive pellet everage enthalpy in excess of 200 calories per gram. An enths1py '

of200caloriespergramiswellbelowthelevelatwh)chrapidfuel dispersal could occur (i.e., 425 calories per gram). Primary system, damage in this accident is not possible unless a sig ficant amount of fuel is rapidly dispersed. Reference sec+. tons 3.6.5 3.6.6. 1.14.5.3, and 14.4.2, and Appendix P of the F5AR, and NED0- .

/ zatM

/

( ^

7 " --

ClMESLT 1 w,n Qt nA B e W5, r

r f

e i

HA7CH - UN11 1 3.3-15 Amendment No. If, (f. (f. TH , 168

, i l

i INSERT '9" The NRC. requires the RWH to be highly reliable to minimize the need-to l depend on a second licensed operator or qualified member of the plant l technical.stafr to verify compliance with BPWS below 10% RTP. To

! accomplish th's, RWH must be operable during the first 12 rod withdrawals. .

I during startu). The NRC is willing to 311pw one startup per calendar year: j withcLtkWH i=* to avoid delays which may occasicnally occur.  ;

~

Below 10% R1i with the RWH inoperable, all control rod movements and  ;

compliance witti the prescribed control rod patterns must be verified by a  ;

second licensed operator or qualified member of the-plant technical staff. l 1

Above 10% RTP, the RWH is not required to be operable nor is it required to be loaded with a sequence of rod moves that conforms to BPWS.

t T

1 1

L E

l

, -+

i L

L y ='y ~ --W5'y-pg y +7-.s5-w>---4Tyfr -WPW

aAlti FOR LIMITING cDND1110Ns FOR OPERATION AND SURV[lLLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.3.6.1. , fed 4 der $-f64*4einee44hh (Continued) ,

F

,,., a, / in ,e,f ormin, the function described abo.e. the .nfm.,re not re-outred to imposo any restrictions at core power levels in estess of 105 l.

of rated. Material in the cited references shows that it is impossible to reach 200 colorits per gree in the event of a control rod drop occur-ring at power greater than 1M, regardless of the rod pattern. This is l b j true for all normal and abnormal patterns incicding those watch maximite W i the individual rentrol rod worth.

At power levels below 105 of rated, abnormal control rod patterns could l produce rod we'ths hig'6 enough to be of concern relative to the 200 cal-orie per gran rod drop Itatt. In this range ef tlei.end-4be46&& 3 con-strain.the tentrol rod sequentes and patterns testhose which involve only s disptable red worths.

' % _ _ __. J ], L ) -)-

The assi ^" ^^- "" provide automatic supervision to assure that out l of sequence control rods will not be withdrawn or inserted; i.e.. it limits operator deviations f rom planned withdrawal sequences. -They- M

• seryo.as a backup to procedural control of control rod sequentes, which llait the merimum reactivity worth of control rods, in the event that #

~

b[the RWM is out of service, when required, a second licensed operator orq j h *\ '.fl 4taer-goaltitod-teshattel-plent-emp1:g:: d=e-guellf teet(en*46e i::- +f Ik teviewed+r-the-AH can manually fulfill the control rod pattern 7 m c .d u conformance functions of this system. '"*

• Aff The functionf of the RWM *nd46M mak it unnecessary /to specify a license limit on rog worth to preclude unacceptable consequepces in the event of 0 control rod drop.

herence to acceptableAtrod low powers. below 105, 4hete*devicef forc(ad patterns. _C>'Above 105 of rated p fts..

sequences of e rod drop event without RWM er4M6 are acceptable. . I

+0 wee-Itvel-fee-estematicautout-of-the-RSCG fonetten i.- nn;My-f 4e*4 6-1tege-4erbine-pe+nvee, power level for automatic cutout of the R6ei f unction is sensed by f eedwater and steam flow,end4e-set-6e4e-4+*s46te*6 Mth-the #993 wt1%

~

i Survetilence Requirements: ,

functional testing of the RWM prior to the start of control rod withdrawal at startup, and prior to attaining 105 t,f rated thermal power during r6d in-l

- sortion whlle shuttine .10wng'will ensure reliable operation,end-e44talee-4he peobe64444y-of the-red-drop-eccidenti D N ted sanuence control Systes (R$tS) p a.. Ag,erabi ,

Limiting Conjittens~fo / ~~r Operatio n: %

Ae e or Technical Specification 3.3.6<1. Rod Worth iniziaery

)L . ,

t-HATCH - LINii 1 3.3-16 Amendment No. 132,168 i

,.;. ~/~...a,.._,_,---,..--a--------,,-~--~~-~~~~--""---~'-'"~~~

e i _ Basts FOR LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SVRVflLLANCE Rl0VIR[ MINTS' 3.3.G.P. Doerability

$urveillance Requiremenist /

The RSC$ can be functionally tested af ter 50% of the control rods have been withdrawn, by demonstrating that the continuous /

withdrawal mode for the control drives is inhibited.

N This demonstration is.made by attempting to withdraw a contr 1 rod more thanonenotchinthefirstprogrammedrodgroupsubsequenttoreaching the 50% rod density point. This restriction to the notch'ing mode of op-eration f or cont (o) rod withdrawal is automatically removed when the re-actor reaches theN tomatic initiation setpoint. /

During reactor shutdown, sin.ilar surveillance checks shall bt made with regard to rod group aYailability as soon as autpmatic initiation of the RSCS occurs and subsequ'ently at appropriate stages of the control rod insertion.

• 1, . Failed Position Switch '

Limiting Conditions for Operation:

7 In the event that a control rod haya failed ' Full-in' or ' Full-out' position switch, it may be bypassod in the Rod Seimence Control System l if its position is otherwise knpwn. ft is a safer and more desirable condition for such rods to occdpy their' proper pcsitions in the control l rod patterns during reactor startup or shu(down.

Surveillance Requirement t /

Having a second licent(d operator verify the acttyl rod position prior to bypassing a rod the Rod Sequence Control System provides assurance that Specificationg .3.G.2.b. is met.

. Shutdown Marcir/ scram Tinie Testina

/

Afterinitialfuelloadingandsubsequentrefuelingswhe\nqperatingabove g50 psig a)1 control rods shall be scram tested within the constraints imposed b To main.

tain the'p the RSCS and before the 40% power level is $redchedrequired reactor pre i or inferted rod should be withdrawn to its original position innediately l following testing of each rod. In order to select and withdraw the scram-l med or inserted insequence control rod (also to select and insert a\ fully i withdrawn insequence rod in case of friction testing) it will be neces-l /sarytosimulatealltheinsequenckwithdrawnrodsofthesucceedingR5(5 groupsasbeingatfullinpositionbyutt11ringtheindividualrodposig t

HATCH - UNIT 1 3.3-17 Amendment No. 132

, _ - . . . . __-m> .~.._._.mm_____.-____ __.m_... . . _ . _ . - _ _ -. _ _ _. _

• i

e.  ;

I 2 i r EA5L5 IDE LIMITINr. CDNDITIDN5 FDR DPItaTION-KirEnytlttAhti arDLIInrM[NT5

-~~-

flt. g . t . c . " 5h u ld own Ma r a i nilti~an WisiH 4 Tt oWin~uid) /'

urposes.

tion simulation Durjng the scramswitches time testing, provided reactorinconditions the R$C5w111for such he such that the'reetter rod pattern will be in R$C$ 8 group. All At atta ' l As rodi'w111 be fully withdrawn tiern wl I be in R$C$ group A And all

~

i alternatively t, and $ the rod.34rodswibe Ully b - withdrawn. To test A34 rods, it will be necesserr'to simulate F and for all withdrawn testing Agg rods,t rods all A344sand being at the full all withdrawn in position,beinf t rods as at the full-in position. Thisimulation-of already withdrawn control rods in the 1005 to 605 red density range (Agg and A34 or alternatively lit and 034) as 4eingsfull-in to perform the individual red test does Det violate the, intent of the R$C$ since; , (a) the single notch pode of red withdrawalsfer rods.in the 605 i density to 105 of rated thermal power range wit] remain in Jf f ect , until that powtrievel has been schieved and the' test procedure will require'that this te verified (t) no b group rods can be selected"either for withdrawal or insertion during the time that an,AjjerA1h'the y inserted ful)34position rod is fully inserted or is simulated as beingx y[when the Bswitch simulation soevente operations will isrbechosen verified byfo(similarly startup and (c) all rod posittorN a second for the A group rods y _ independent check. _ I,^ '

                                   - H.      Shutdown,Rtadtagagli
                                                                                                                                                                               ]
                                           . Should circumstances be such that the Limiting Conditions ist Dreration as stated in 5pecifications 3.3.A. thrcugh 3.3.G. tannot be                                                                        '

met, en orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor placed in the Cold $hutdown Condition within 24 hours,

                                                                                                                                                                                                            'l-

1. _ Scram Discharne Volume Vent thf Drain Valves

                                           .The stram discharge volume vent and drain valves are required to be OPERA 8Lt. 50 that the scram discharge volume will be available when Neded to accept discharge water from the control rods during a
                                           -reactor scram and will isolate the reactor (901 ant system from the                                                                     -

containment when required. J. Referentes

1. FSAR Section 3.4. Resttivity Control feethanical Design f

2. FSAR Section 3.5.2. Saf,ety Design Bases

3. FSAR Section 3.5.4.-$afety [ valuation

4. F$AR Section 3.5. Control Rod Drive Housing Supports '

4

                                  ,,        1.                                                                                                                                                                  1 k,

HATCH = UNIT 1 3.3 18 Amendment No, if, 168 _ _ _ _ a._._- _, . . - - _ - _ . _ _ - - - . . _ _ - , . . _ _ , _ . . - - 5_ _ - . _ -

4 L R$1AL.S E 3.3.G.2 }occial Test Exception 1 ' In order to perform the tests required in the Technical Specifications, it is necessary to bypass the BPWS restraints on control rod movert.cnt. The additional surveillance requirements ensure that the specifications on heat generation rates and shutdown margin requirements are not exceeded during the period when these tests are being performed end that individual r'.,d worths do not exceed the values assumed in the safety analysis. 1 ( I I l 1

l bat [$ FOR LIMlilNG CON 01110N5 FOR OPERA 110N AND SURytlllANC[ R[0glREN(NTS$_^ J. Referet al (Continued)

5. FSAR ! action 14.4.3. Loss-of-Coolant Accicant

6. FSAR Section 14.4.2, Control Rod Drop Accidstit 7 PSAR- Appendiu-Gr-+1 ant-huclear Saf ety Operational- Analysis

                      /,.A. 8.-t-~JrPaoner RrCr StirnrJ r Ar Woolleyr

• Rod-Orop Accident Analysis-f or-targe-Boiling Water Reactort',-NE00-10$27-Class -1, 44 arch;-197ih 91- R . - C c 5ti rnr C r J rPa one r R e- M i-Vount i-%44 rop-Acc id ent-

                !                       Analysis-f~or large-teiling Water Reactors- A#endum--No,                  f                      Stoltiple-(nrichment Ceres Hith An'eal Gadoliniestr59pplement-1 NE00-10527-Clas s-IrJuly 4972.

f.10.' FSAR Section 3.6.5.4. Coritrol Rod Worth

                         *t,)1$ FSAR Section 3.6.6. Nuclear tvaluations N

k_. - ~~ ~ - - -

                                                                                                                                                      ~ _ _

( C J. P ee , e , " 6 e d t.A i% . t a , uJ n u . . d J ., g ., e m , ) s ./ ( b Db E I l. b.i

                                                                ~ g y%_.
                                                                                                    . - - . . );tng4,q gg "g ]
                                                                                                                                                                     , ,7

( HATCH - UNIT 1 3.3-10a Amendment No. 97

l Basts FOR LIM!ilNG CONDITIONS FOR OPLRA110N AND $URVilLLANCE RLOUIRLMENTS U l 3.3.J.- Beferences (Continued) l t o, ,12'. FSAR Section 7.14.5.3, Rod Worth Ninimizer Function

                              '13r--fSAR-$ection-717:$r#*d-$etvence Centrol-Sy6 tee-n , .14 ~. FSAR Section 3.6.4.1, Control Rods

u. , 1 $'. FSAR Question 3.6.1, Amendment 24

                              +161-FSAA--Appentladraed $ewente-Control--$ystem-(R$CSF' 11, 17.             ' Average Power Range Monitor, Rod Block M/nitor and Technical Specification improvement (AR15) Program for Edwin 1. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2,*

Nt0C-30474-P, December 1983. ) I t

     /.

i i

l. . ,

1 l f-

                                                                                           %1\ .,Wf kedsp                      O f, p roh O R- ke l                     -{

HA1CH - UNIT 1 3.3-19 Amendment No.105 5 4

                     ,            ,..,....m.,.,,..__,+r     ,y   r ..y,_, . . , ,. , . , ,   ,.,..,r, ,,__,,,_,%%.,,,r,._,_c
                                                                                                                                 ,..,.7._,, ,,, , , _ , . , . , . , ,

 ~.

INDEX _l l1

       -LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

l SECTION PAGE ' _) 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY............................................... 3/4 0-1

       -3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1     SHUTOOWN  MARGIN..........................................                         3/4 1-1
                                                                                                                       )

3/4.1.2 REACTIVITY AN0MALIES..................................... 3/4 1-2 3/4.1.3 CONTROL 8005 Control Rod Operability.................................. 3/4 1-3 Control Rud Maximum Scram Insertion Times................ 3/4 1-5 Control Rod Average Scram Insertion Times................ 3/4 1-6 Four Control Rod Group Scram Insertion Times..... ....... 3/4 1-7 Control Rod Scram Accumulators........................... 3/4 1-8 ) Control Rod Drive Coup 11ng............................... 3/4 1-9 Control Rod Position In,d1 cation.......................... 3/4 1-11 Control Rod Drive Housing Support........................ 3/4 1-13 3/4.1.4 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS Rod Worth Minimizer...................................... 3/4 1-14 Rvd S vqtrence-ht eo bSynem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -3/4-Hir Rod Block Monitor............ ........................... 3/4 1-17 ) 3/4.1.5 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM............................ 3/4 1-18 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE............... 3/4 2-1 / 3/4 2,2 _APRM SETP01NTS........................................... 3/4 2-5 3/4.2.3 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATI0............................. 3/4 2-6* 3/4.2.4 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE.............................. 3/4 2-8 I HATCH-UNIT 2 IV 4 .

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND_ SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS , SECTION PAGE 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 REACTOR MODE SWITCH 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4 9-3 3/4.9.3 CONTROL ROD POSITION 3/4 9-5 3/4.9.4 DECAY TIME 3/4 9-6 3h4.9.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT Refueling Floor 3/4 9-7 Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Dampers 3/4 9-8 Standby Gas Treatment System 3/4 9-10 3/4.9.6 COMMUNICATIONS 3/4 9-11 3/4.9.7 CRANE AND HOIST OPERABILITY 3/4 9-12 3/4.9.8 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL 3/4 9-13 3/4.9.9 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL 3/4 9-14 3/4.9.10 WATER LEVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL 3/4 9 15 3/4.9.11 CONTROL ROD REMOVAL Single Control Rod Removal 3/4 9-16 Multiple Control Rod Removal 3/4 9-18 3/4.9.12 REACTOR COOLANT CIRCULATION 3/4 9-20 I 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 >RIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY 3/4 10-1 an> ms om % ;o u t. u . 3/4.10.2 ROD-SEQUENCE-CONTROL-SYSTEM- 3/4 10-2 3/4.10.3 SHUTDOWN MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS 3/4 10-3 3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION LOOPS 3/4 10-4 HATCH-UNIT 2 IX i Amendment No. Afs, 48

2.2 W r*ING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS BASES c 2.2.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS The Reactor Protection System Instrumentation Setpoints specified in

                   -Table 2.2.1-1 are the values at which the reactor trips are set for each parameter. The Trip Setpoints have been selected to ensure that the reactor core and reactor coolant system are prevented from exceeding their Safety Limits. Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint, but within its specified Allowable Value, is acceptable on the basis that each Allowable Value is equal to or less than the drift allowance assumed for each trip in the safety analyses.

1. Intermediate Range Monitor. Neutron Flux The IRM system consists of 8 cha'nbers, 4 in each of the reactor trip systems. The IRM is a 5 decade 10 range instrument. The trip setpoint of 120 divisions of scale is active in each of the 10 ranges. Thus, as the IRM is ranged up to accommodate the increase in power level, the trip setpoint is also ranged up. The IRM instruments provide for overlap with both the APRM and SRM systems.

The most significant source of reactivity changes during the power increase are due to control rod withdrawal. In order to ensure that the IRM provides the required protection, a range of rod withdrawal acciJents have been analyzed, Sectiot, 7.5 of the FSAR. The most severe case involves an initial condition in which the reactor is just suberitical and the IRM's are not yet on scale. Additional conservatism was taken in this analysis by assuming the IRM channel closest to the rod being withdrawn is bypassed. The results of this analysis show that the reactor is shutdown and peak power is limited to 1% of RATED THERMAL POWER, thus maintaining MCPR above the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit. Based on this analysis, the IRM provides protection against local control rod errors and continuous withdrawal of control rods in sequence and provides backup protection for the APRM. ( 2. Average Power Range Monitor For operation at low pressure and low flow during STARTUP, the APRM scram setting of 15/125 divisions of full scale neutrnn flux provides adequate-thermal margin between the setpoint and the Safety Limits. The margin accommodates the anticipated maneuvers associated with power plant startup. Effects of increasing pressure at zero or low void content are minor and cold water from sources available during startup is not much colder,than that already in the system. Temperature coefficients are sma'll'and control rod patterns are constrained by the ASCS-and RWM. 1 HATCH - UNIT 2 B 2-9 Amendment No. H, 21, 77

l . REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD DRIVE COUPLING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.6 All control rods shall be coupled to their drive mechanisms. APPLICABILITY: CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 5*. ACTION:

a. In CONDITION 1 or 2 with one control rod not coupled to its associated drive mechanism, tie provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable and operation may continue provided;

1. If permitted by the RWM end-RSCE, the control rod drive mechanism is inserted to accomplish recoupling and recoupl- '

ing is verified by demonstrating that the control rod will not go to the overtravel position, or

2. If recoup 11ng is not accomplished on first attempt or if not permitted by the RWM ,rr-RSCS, the control rod is declared inoperable and fully inserted; and the require-ments of Specification 3.1.3.1 are satisfied.

b. In CONDITION 5*, with a withdrawn control rod not coupled to its associated drive mechanism, within 2 hours:

1. Insert the control rod to accomplish recoupling and verify recoupling by demonstrating that the control rod will not go to the ov2rtravel position, or

2. If recoupling is not accomplished, fully insert the control rod and either electrically disarm the control rod or close the withdraw isolation valve.

t

3. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

               +
    "At leist each withdrawn control rod. Not applicable                                                    to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.11.1 or 3.9.11.2.

HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 1-9

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD POSITION INDICATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATICN 3.1.3.7 All contri, rod reed switch position indicators shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: CONDITIONS 1, 2 and S*. ACTION-a. In CONDITION 1 or )24

4. With one or more control rod reed switch position in-dicators innperable, except for the " Full-in" or " Full-out" indicators, the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable and operation may continue, provided that within one houi:

L ,47 The position of the control rod is determined by an alternate method or 2.. , b)' The control rod is moved to a position with an OPERABLE reed switch position indicator, or

3. c)' The control rod is declared inoperable and the requirements of Specification 3.1.3.1 aro satisfied; Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours, bif.h one or nore control rod reed switch " Full-in" and "Fu1 D u " position indicators inoperable ,.the'1fffected cont to may4e bypassed in the Roddequence Control System, the provision (of Sp3cifMiftion 3.0.4 are not ontinue applicable and operation 7maysq \ , provided; i- The actus1'/ control rod position is% nown, and a) b),.Th6'affectedcontrolrodismovedtotheto t

                                  /               position in the proper sequence.                           '

b. In CONDITION S* with a withdrawn control rod reed switch posi-tion indicator inoperable, move the control rod to a position with an OPERABLE reed switch position indicator or fully insert

                                ,   the centrol rod. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not
                              ,. ' applicable.

f "At least each withdrawn control rod. Not applicable to control rods removed per Speci fication 3.9.11.1 or 3.9.11.2. HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 1-11

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.7.1 The control rod reed switch position indicators shall be I determined OPERABLE by verifying:

a. At least once per 24 hours, that the position of the control rod is indicated,

b. That the indicated control rod position changes during the movement of the control rod when performing Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.1, and

c. That the control rod reed switch position indicator corresponds to the control rod position indicated by the " Full-out" reed switches when performing Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.6.b.

                                   -==              - -

4.1.3.7 2' When the RSCS is required to be OPERABLE, the. position an3' bypassing of contro17ods with an inoserable " Full-in" ~or " Full-out" reed switch position indicator shall'i'e' verified.by a second licensed

                                           .g g ator or other qualifted member of the technical sYaffy ~.
                                                                                                                                 )
                                                                                                                                   )

I HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 1-12

1 l

                       ' REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.4 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS                                                                                                                                                i ROD WORTH MINIM 1ZER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.4.1 The Rod Worth Minimizer (RhH) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: CONDITIONS 1 and 2', when THERMAL POWER is less than 10% l of fiKfID THERMAL POWER. ) ACTION: I'pId$6"T i2).

                                                                                                ~s lithMbe RWlQnoperable, the provisions of Specification 3.LLare-net' applicable, ope ~ ration-tnay_ continue and control;od-covetnTnt is permitted provided that a second licesed3peratorfr'other qualified member of the technical stafff is-prest'nt at the reactD oontraLeonsole and verJDes-comp 1Tince with the prescribed control rod padirnW~%                                                               _

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i 4.1.4.1 The RhH sFall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. In CONDITION 2 prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of making the reactor critical, and in CONDITION 1 when the RhH is initiated during control rod insertion when reducing THERMAL POWER, by:

1. Verifying proper annunciation of the selection er + of at least one out-of-sequence control rod, and I. . Verifying the rod block function of the RbH by moving an out-of-sequence control rod.

b BDerifying-that_the Banked Position Withdrawal Siquence-input-ttrtTs~ RhH computer is coErTcUnilowingrar'loadWgTthe sequence program into-the-computFr7 ~ ' N ~_.

                                                                                               .m_                                                                                        %-
                                                                                          / H Wra r                                     [}
                                                                                         ~ . - ~                                       /                                                                     )

• Entry into OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 and withdrawal of selected control rods is permitted for the purpose of determining the OPERABILITY of the RhH prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of bringing the '

reactor to criticality. HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 1-14 Amendment No. 66', 106 rre . .

      -4
                                                                                                                                                              \
                                                            - Jh1ERT *12"_

a. With the RWM inoperable before the first 12 control rods are withdrawn

                     - on a startup, one startup per_ calendar year may be performed provided that control. rod movetent and compliance with the prescribed BPWS control rod pattern are verified by a second licensed operator or                                                                      !
                     - qualified member of the plant technical staff.                                                                                        'l Le                                                                                                                                                        l

b. . With the RWM inoperable after the fir't 12 control rods have been  ;

fully withdrawn on a startup, operation may continue provided~that

    "                 control rod movement and compliance with the presc'ribed BPWS control                                                                - '

n rod pattern are verified by a second licensed operator or qualified  : member of the slant. technical staff, c.- With RWM inoperable oi, a shutdown, shutdown may continue provided that I coitrol rod movement and compliance with the prescribed BPWS control I rod pattern are verified by a second licensed operator or qualified member of the plant technical staff. ' t

                                                                                                                                                              +
                                                                                                                                                              +

L e

                                        -=m
         *'                                 ery-g y +p,gr"-                  +*<T-g      1r-eveyv q*  vtat-Fr a,ge-.-9..g siy a -w--q<- , m ,,,y,   --ye-.

INSERT "13"

b. dy verify 49 the sequence d rod moves loaded into ths RWM conforms to BPWS following the loading of that sequence.

h __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - -- - - ' ' ^

p. -

            \
                $EACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS
                 \

ROD SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM

                     \

LIMIT NG CONDITION FOR OPERATION

                          \                                                                                                                                 /

3.1.4.I T Rod Sequence Control System (RSCS) shall be OPERABLE APPLICABILITY: CONDITIONS l' and 2*#, when THERMAL POWER is I s than 10% of RATED THERMA NPOWER and control rod movement is within th group notch

t. mode after 50% of\+he control rods have been withdrawn.

ACTION: With the RSCS inoperabic control rod movement shallt be

                                                                                           \                                                  n / permitted, except by a scram.
            ; SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS                                                                         s                    .

j \ / 4.1.4.2 The RSCS shail be demons rated OPIRABLE by:

                                                                                                                                /

Selectingandattemptingto\m / (

a. e an inhibited control rod:

1. As soon as the group not'cfumode is entered during each reactcr startup, and \

                                                                                                                              \

2. I Assoonasthero[d during control ro insertion. nhibitmodeisautomaticallyinitiated

                                                                                                                                 \
                                                                                                                                   \

i' j . - /'

              }"SeeSpecialTestException3.10.2.

i /

              ' #Er.try into CONDITION 2 and withdrawal of selected control rods is
       ;~          permitted for the purpose of determining the OPERABILITY of the RSCS jprior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of bringing the s              / reactor to criticality.

HATCH - UNIT ' *e<344 1-1.5 Amendment No. 66, 106 A _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ __ _._ ._ _________._._.______a

s > REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 1 S RVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) /_

               \                                                                                       /

b. ttempting to mave a control rod more than one notch as soop as e group notch mode is automatically initiated during co trol ro :

1.- thdrawal each reactor startup, and

2. Insertion. j/ )

c. Performance of the comparator check of the group'/notch circuits prior to con ol rod; /

                                                                               /

1. Movement wi inthegroupnotchmododyringeachreactor startup, and f

2. Insertion to re gee THERMAL POWER t less than 10% of RATED THERMAL POWB .

                                                                       /'
                                                            /
                                                               /

4 7

                                                          /'.s
                                                      /
                                                    ,           \
                                                  /                  s
                                             /
                                               /                          x
                                           /                                'N
                                    /
                                     /                                        \      \
                            /                                                              x
                          /
                       /                                                                      \x              .
                                                                                                  'x \
                                                                                                        \
                                                                                                            \

l HATCH - UNIT 2 m3/4.1-4 Amendment No. 66, 106

l

 ..                                                                                                                )

SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS

a. . c wo o u e m s e a-3/4.10.2 909-SEQUENGS-GOMTROL-4Y&TLES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

                                                                                                               )

The sequence constraints imposed on control rod groups Al p, y 3.10.2_ \nd B A34 B12 34 by the Rod Sequence Control System per Specificatij 3.1.4.2 may be-suspended by means of the individual rod position bypast, v switches, provided that at least the requirements of Specification . 3.1.3.1 and 3.1.471 are satisfied, for the following testy N

a. Shutdown ma n' demonstrations,Specificat4[4,1,1,

b. Cont'ol rod scram ecj fication j 4 l a, ,

N ,- l' -

c. Control rod friction measuryme'nts, and

                                               ,/       N L

d. Startup Test Program,41th the THERmL PO!'5R < 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER' APPLICABILITY:

                                   /

CONDITIONS I and 2. x\

                            ./

ACTION:

                      /-

1 Wit [h thii tha the RSCSrequirements is OPERABLEof the perabove specification Specification not saticfied, ver 3.1.4.2. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

                                                                                            /

4.10.2 When the sequence constraints of control rod groups A12 47 B12 and'834 4re bypassed, verify; [4

a. That the RhisJPERABLE per Specificatior3.

4.1, N <

b. That movement of the coritrolqro~ds from 50% ROD DENSITY to 10*4 of RATED THERMAL notch mode, and/,BOWElfis bloQed or limited to the single

                                                                                                        ,j-(/

! c. Corifem/ ance with this specification and procedurerb ga second sed operator or other qualified member of the tec 1 e l HATCH - UNIT 2 I/41@2 Amendment No. 106

                                                     ~ INSERT "14" The BPWS ' rod pattern requirements of LCO 3.1.4.1 may' be suspended 'in the g           Conditions 1 and 2 with THERMAL POWER LESS THAN 10% OF RATED to allow                                                ;

performance of SHUTDOWN MARGIN demonstrations,- control rod scram time-

                -testing, control . rod friction testing, or startup testing, provided the RWH is' bypassed or individual rods in the RWM are bypassed- and conformance to
               - the approved. control rod movement for the specified test is verified by a-

second licensed operator or qualified member of.the plant technical staff.

i l-1 N

• y .

P 4 - ,e .+-er, . _ , . , ,.-

                                                                                                . , ,                             +

INSERT "15" If the RWM or individual rods in the RWH are bypassed, verify proposed movement of control rods is in compliance with the approved control rod moves for the specified test. t l

1 ) REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES _ I CONTROL RODS (Continued) than has been analyzed even though control rods with inoperable accumulators may still be inserted with normal drive water pressure. Operability of the accumulator ensures that there is a means available to insert the control rods even under the most unfavorable depressurization of the reactor /. Control rod coupling integrity is required to ensure compliance with the analysis of the rod drop accident in the FSAR. The overtravel position feature provides the only positive means of determining that a rod is properly coupled and therefore this check must be performed prior tb achieving criticality after each refueling. The subsequent check is performed as a backup to the initial demonstration. In order to ensure that the control rod patterns can be f611 owed and therefore that other parameters are within their limits, the control rod oosition indication system must be OPERABLE. The control rod housing support restricts t5e outward movement of a ( :ontrol rod to less than 3 inches in the event of a housing failure. The amount of rod reactivity which could be added by this small amount of rod withdrawai is less than a normal withdrawal increment and will not contribute to any damage to the primary coolant system. The support is not required when there is no pressure to act as a driving force to rapidly eject a drive housing. The required surveillance intervals are adequate to determine that the rods are OPERABLE and not so frequent as to cause excessive wear on the system components. 3/4.1.4 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS ( Control rod withdrawal and insertion sequences are established to assure that the maximum insequence individual control rod or control rod segments which are withdrawn at any time during the fuel cycle could not be worth enough to cause the peak fuel enthalpy for any postulated control rod accident to exceed 280 cal /gm. The specified sequences are characterized by homogeneous, scattered patterns of control rod withdrawal. When ( THERMAL POWER is 2.10% of RATED THERMAL POWER, there is no possible rod l worth which, if dropped at the design rate of the velocity limiter, could'resylt in a peak enthalpy of 280 cal /gm. Thus, requiring the RWM to be OPERABLE below 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER and-the-RSchto-be4PERABLE-from.

              /contr -ntrol-rod-density-to     10Lof_ RATER _THERMALP0WER4(rovides-adequatFN
              %-f              f

_ R 3 -7 GT yr G HATCH - UNIT 2  % B,3/4 k3 Amendment No. 66, 106 l

 .   .- . - . .             -      .   -    ---- - _ ~ - . - .            - -         - - - . -        . -   - - . _ .         - .
                ; REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS                                                                                         ,

BASES-CONTROL RODS PROGRAM CONTROLS (Continued)

                           . The 4tSC&-and RWM provide automatic supervision to assure that out-of-                     )

sequence rods will not be withdrawn or inserted.

                            -The analysis of the rod drop accident is presented in Section 15.1.38 of the FSAR and the techniques of the analysis are presented in a to cal report, Reference' 1, and--two-supplementsr -References 4 ami-3.                    <wsfir o t/

The RBM is designed to automatically prevent fuel. damage in the event of erroneous rod withdrawal from locations of. high power density during high power operation. The RBM is only required to be operable when the Limiting Condition defined in Specification 3.1.4.3 exists. Two channels ,

                -are provided. Tripping one of the channels will block erroneous rod with-drawal soon enough to prevent fuel damage. This system backs up the written sequence used by the operator for withdrawal of control rods. Further dis-cussion of the RBM system and power dependent setpoints may be found in NEDC-30474-P-(Ref. 4).-                                                           -

3/4.1.5 STANDBY LIOUID CONTROL SYSTEM The standby liquid control (SLC) system provides a backup reactivity i control capabi_lity to the control rod scram system._ The original design basis for the standby: liquid control system is to provide a soluble boron

                 . concentration to the reactor vessel sufficient to bring the reactor to a cold shutdown. In addition to meeting its original design basis, the system must.

also- satisfy the requirements of the ATWS _Rul_e 10 CFR 50.62 paragraph. (c) (4),_ 4 which requires that the system have a control capacity equivalent to that for

                 -a system with an injection rate of 86 gpm of 13 weight percent unenriched sodium pentaborate, normalized to a 251 inch diameter reactor. vessel.

To meet its original design basis, the SLC system was designed with a sodium pentaborate solution tank, redundant pumps, and redundant explosive injection _ valves. .The tank contains a sodium pentaborate solution of sufficient volume, concentration and B" enrichment to bring the reactor to a cold' shutdown. . The solution is injected into the reactor vessel using one

                -- o -_f the redundant pumps.

The _ volume _-limits in- Figure 3.1.5-1 are calculated such that for a given

                , concentration of sodium pentaborate, the tank contains a volume of solution adequate to bring the ' reactor to a cold shutdown, with margin. These volume
                 -limits are based on gross-volume and account-for the' unusable volume of solution in the tank and suction. lines.

T,o' meat _10 CFR' 50.62' Paragraph (c) (4), the system must have a reactivity control capacity equivalent to that of a system with an 86 gpm injection flow

                  -rate of'13 weight percent unenriched sodium pentaborate into a 251-inch
                = diameter reactor vessel. The' term  equivalent reactivity control capacity" refers to the rate at which the boron isotope B" is injected into the reactor core. 'The standby liquid control system meets this requirement HATCH -' UNIT 2                              4 3M 1-1         Amendment No, M, 90 f
      ~                                                                                                                            -
                 -,--n--             ,              ,r    ,    ,   -    ,     ,    , . - - -       n                      m,1-

INSERT "17" The NRC requires the RWM to be highly reliable to minimize the need to depend on a second licensed operator or qualified member of the plant technical staff to verify compliance with BPWS below 10% RTP. To accomplish this, RWM must be operable during the first 12 rod withdrawals during startup. The NRC is willing to allow one startup per calendar year without-RWM in order to avoid delays which may occasionally occur. Below 10% RTP with the RWM inoperable, all control rod movements and compliance with the prescribed control rod patterns must be verified by a second licensed operator or qualified member of the plant technical staff. Above 10% of RTP, the RWM is not required to be operable nor is it required to be loaded with a sequence of rod moves that conforms to BPWS. ___- _- ~ ^

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES S_TANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM (Continued) by usin 4 the B"g aisotope. sodium pentaborate solution enriched with a higher concentratior, of The minimum concentration limit of 6.2-percent scritum pentaborate solution is based on 60 atomic percent B" enriched boron in sodium pentaborate and a flow rate of 41.2 gpm. The method used to show equivalence with 10 CFR 50.62 is set forth in NEDE-31096-P (Ref 5). Limiting Conditions for Operation are established based on the redundancy within the sin-m and the reliability of the control rod scram system. With the standby liquid control system inoperable, reactor operation for short periods of time is justified because of the reliability of the control rod scram system. With one redundant component inoperable, reactor operation for longer periods of time is justified because the system could still fulfill its function. Surveillance requirements are established on a frequency that assures a high system reliability. Thorough testing of the sy5 tem each operating cycle assures that the system can be actuated from tha control room and will develop the flow rate required. Replacement of tne explosive charges in the valves at regular intervals assures that these valves will not fail due to deterioration of the charges. Functional testing of the pumps is performed once per month I to assure pump operability. The sodium pentaborate solution is carefully monitored to assure its reactivity control capability is maintained. The enriched sodium pentaborate soluti:n is made by mixing granular, enriched sodiu.n pentaborate with water. Isotopic tests on the granular sodium pentaborate are performed to verify the actual B' enrichment, prior te mixing with water. Once_the enrichment. is established, only the solution concentration, volume and temperature must be monitored to insure that an adequate amount of-reactivity control is available. Determining the solution concentration once per 31 days verifies that the solution has not been diluted with water. Checking the volume once each day will guard against noticeable fluid losses or dilutions, and daily temperature checks will prevent sodium pentaborate precipitation. ( -- C A Pa.o w [ D u h l Penh u .m u 3 ,%, y e 3 g 3,,,,, g

                          ~~      --

a

   .(      1 # G. A -PaonerA-C. Stirn-andA A._Woodley "Rodaro;LAccident an,1ys4s
                 -fee-Large-BWRs/LGE-Topical Report NEDG-10527.,J,ard-197e.

2. .6drPaoney-L-Cr-Stirn-4nd R. E Yound,-Supptement-1-to-NE90-10527; duly-1973. n h1

( 3. dr A.-HauerCr-Jr-P ana-and R. C. StirnJddendum 2, " Exposed 4orefr o. l Supplement 4to-NEDO-10527 7 January-19% l Dc hi s d HATCH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-4a Amendment No. 39, 90

l 't l o 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS i BASES I 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY The requirement for PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is removed during the period when open vessel tests are being performed during low power PHYSICS TESTS. i n,e o va ms % m m cit-3/4.10.2 -ROO-SEQUENCE-M0l:--SV& TEM-In order to perform the tests required in the technical specifications it is necessary to bypass the sequence restraints on control rod movement.

               . The additional surveillance requirements ensure that the specifications on heat generation rates and shutdown margin requirements are not exceeded during the reriod when these tests are being performed.

3/4.10.3 SHUTDOWN MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS Performance of shutdown margin demonstrations w hh the vessel head ( removed requires additional restrictions in order to ensure that criticality does not occur. These additional restrictions are specifiid in this LCO. 3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION LOOPS This special test exception permits reactor criticality under no flow conditions and is required to perform certain startup and PHYSICS TESTS while at low THERMAL POWER levels.  ! l a s

     ~

HATCH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 10-1 i _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _}}