Text

Proposed Tech Specs,Reflecting Implementation of 10CFR50,App J,Option B
	ML20094K383
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	11/10/1995
From:	; GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20094K381	List: HL-5051, Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-57 & NPF-5,revising TS to Reflect Implementation of 10CFR50,App J,Option B; ML20094K383;
References
	NUDOCS 9511160319
	Download: ML20094K383 (112)
	v • d • e

. .- -. - . - . - . - - . -. ~- . - . . -

Enclosure 4 1

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant l Request to Revise Technical Specifications: i Page Change Instructions and Revised TS Pages Unit i TS Pagg Instruction 1.1-3 Replace 3.6-2 Replace 3.6-7 Replace l 3.6-14 Replace

! 5.0-16 Replace 5.0-16a Add 5.0-16b Add Unit 2 TS Eagg Instruction 1.1-3 Replace 3.6-2 Replace 3.6-7 Replace 3.6-14 Replace 3.6-15 Replace 5.0-16 Replace 5.0-16a Add ,

5.0-16b Add !

HL-5051 E4-1 l 9511160319 951110 l PDR ADOCK 05000321 P PI R l

a Definitiens i

1.1 1.1 Definitions DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 ICRP 30, Supplement to Part 1, page 192-212, Table

(continued) titled, " Committed Dose Equivalent in Target

Organs or Tissues per Intake of Unit Activity."

END OF CYCLE The E0C-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP time interval from initial signal generation by (E0C-RPT) SYSTEM RESPONSE the associated turbine stop valve limit switch or TIME from when the turbine control valve hydraulic i

control oil pressure drops below the pressure switch setpoint to complete suppression of the 8 electric arc between the fully open contacts of the recirculation pump circuit breaker. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps

so that the entire response time is measured.

4 LEAKAGE LEAKAGE shall be:

a. Identified LEAKAGE

1. LEAKAGE into the drywell, such as that from pump seals or valve packing, that is captured and conducted to a sump or I collecting tank; or

2. LEAKAGE into the drywell atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE; I

b. Unidentified LEAKAGE i

All LEAKAGE into the drywell that is not '

identified LEAKAGE;

c. Total LEAKAGE Sum of the identified and unidentified LEAKAGE; I (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 1.1-3 PROPOSED - Revision J

i

Primary Containment !

s 3.6.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l 4 SR 3.6.1.1.1 Perform required visual examinations and In accordance i l 1eakage rate testing except for primary with the l' l

containment air lock testing, in Primary accordance with the Primary Containment Containment l

- Leakage Rate Testing Program. Leakage Rate Testing Program ;

a :

f

} SR 3.6.1.1.2 Verify drywell to suppression chamber. 18 months :

I i differential pressure does not decrease at a rate > 0.25 inch water gauge per +

~

AND minute tested over a 10 minute period at an initial differential pressure of -----NOTE------

- 1 psid. Only required -

after two l

. consecutive

tests fail and l

continues until i two consecutive l

tests pass 9 months 1

l l

HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-2 PROPOSED - Revision J

Primary Containment Air Lock 3.6.1.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i

~

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.2.1 ------------------NOTES------------------ ,

1. An inoperable air lock door does not l invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock ,

leakage test. <

2. Results shall be evaluated against ,

acceptance criteria applicable to SR 3.6.1.1.1. .

Perform required primary containment air In accordance '

lock leakage rate testing in accordance with the !

with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Primary Testing Program. Containment Leakage Rate ,

Testing. Program

)

SR 3.6.1.2.2 ------------------NOTE-------------------

Onl/ required to be performed upon entry or e.<it through the primary containment air lack when the primary containment is de-inerted.

Verify only one door in the primary 184 days containment air lock can be opened at a time.

HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-7 PROPOSED - Revision J

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.6 Verify the isolation time of each MSIV is In accordance 2: 3 seconds and s; 5 seconds. with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.6.1.3.7 Verify each automatic PCIV, excluding 18 months EFCVs, actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated isolation signal.

SR 3.6.1.3.8 Verify each reactor instrumentation line 18 months EFCV actuates to restrict flow to within limits.

SR 3.6.1.3.9 Remove and test the explosive squib from 18 months on a each shear isolation valve of the TIP STAGGERED TEST system. BASIS SR 3.6.1.3.10 Verify leakage rate through each MSIV is In accordance s 11.5 scfh when tested at 2 28.0 psig. with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-14 PROPOSED - Revison J

Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.10 Safety Function Determination Proaram (SFDP) (continued)

A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed. For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:

a. A required system redundant to system (s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable; or

b. A required system redundant to system (s) in turn supported by-the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or

c. A required system redundant to support system (s) for the supported systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable.

The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.

5.5.11 Technical Soecifications (TS) Bases Control Proaram This program provides a means for processing changes to the Bases of these Technical Specifications.

a. Changes to the Bases of the TS shall be made under appropriate administrative controls and reviews.

b. Licensees may make changes to Bases without prior NRC approval provided the changes do not involve either of the following:

1. A change in the TS incorporated in the license; or

2. A change to the FSAR or Bases that involves an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59.

c. The Bases Control Program shall contain provisions to ensure that the Bases are maintained consistent with the FSAR.

(continued) l HATCH UNIT 1 5.0-16 PROPOSED - Revision J

. - . . - - . . , - . - . - . - . . . - . - - - - . - . - . - . - . ~ . - - . - . . . - . . - . . - - . - .

Prograos and Manuals j 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.11 . Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Proaram (continued)

, d. Proposed changes that meet the criteria of b. above shall be.

reviewed and approved by the NRC. prior to implementation.

Changes to the Bases implemented without prior NRC approval shall be provided to the NRC on a frequency consistent with 10 CFR 50.71(e).

5.5.12 Primary Containment Leakaae Rate Testina Proaram A program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing of the primary containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions. This program shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163, " Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program," dated September 1995.

The peak calculated primary containment internal pressure for the design basis loss of coolant accident, P,, is 49.6 psig.

The maximum allowable primary containment leakage rate, L,, at P, ;

is 1.2% of primary containment air weight'per day..

i Leakage rate acceptance criteria are: l i

a. Primary contyinment overall leakage rate acceptance criterion t, ( l.0 L During the first unit-startup following ta ting-in'accordance with this program, the leakage rate acceptance criteria are s 0.60 L combinedTypeBandTypeCtests,and50.75I.,forthe for Type A tests; i

b. Air lock testing acceptance criteria are:

1) Overall air lock leakage rate is s 0.05 L, when tested at 1 P ,

2) For each door, leakage rate is 5 0.01 L when the gap between the door seals is pressurized t,o 1 10 psig for at least 15 minutes.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 do not apply to the test frequencies specified in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 5.0-16a PROPOSED - Revision J

..-y. -

c.%.-. ,,

Programs and Manuals 5.5 .

5.5 Programs and Manuals i

5.5.12 Primary Containment Leakaae Rate Testina Proaram (continued)

The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

l 3

P

. HATCH UNIT 1 5.0-16b PROPOSED - Revision J

1 i

\

Definitions l 1.1 i: 1.1 Definitions DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 ICRP 30, Supplement to Part 1, page 192-212, Table !

(continued) titled, " Committed Dose Equivalent in Target j Organs or Tissues per Intake of Unit Activity."

1 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING The ECCS RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval SYSTEM (ECCS) RESPONSE from when the monitored parameter exceeds its ECCS TIME initiation setpoint at the channel sensor until J the ECCS equipment is capable of performing its safety function (i.e., the valves travel to their i required positions, pump discharge pressures reach j their required values, etc.). Times shall include i diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays, where applicable. The response time may

. be measured by means of any series of sequential, j overlapping, or total steps so that the entire i j response time is measured.

END OF CYCLE The EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP time interval from initial signal generation by (EOC-RPT) SYSTEM RESPONSE the associated turbine stop valve l limit switch or l TIME from when the turbine control valve hydraulic l

control oil pressure drops below the pressure

! switch setpoint to complete suppression of the i electric arc between the fully open contacts of the recirculation pump circuit breaker. The response time may be measured by means of any I.

series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps

so that the entire response time is measured.

t i ISOLATION SYSTEM The ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that j RESPONSE TIME time interval from when the monitored parameter

exceeds its isolation initiation setpoint at the i channel sensor until the isolation valves travel i to their required positions. Times shall include i diesel generator starting and sequence loading

! delays, where applicable. The response time may l be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.

4 i

)

j (continued) i HATCH UNIT 2 1.1-3 PROPOSED - Revision J i

l .

Primary Containment E 3.6.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY a

SR 3.6.1.1.1 Perform required visual examinations and In accordance

leakage rate testing except for primary with the :

containment air lock testing, in Primary accordance with the Primary Containment Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Leakage Rate i 4 Testing Program t

i SR 3.6.1.1.2 Verify drywell to suppression chamber 18 months

differential pressure does not decrease i at a rate > 0.25 inch water gauge per ANQ minute tested over a 10 minute period at an initial differential pressure of -----NOTE------

I psid. Only required after two l consecutive 4 tests fail and continues until

two consecutive tests pass l g

9 months l l

1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-2 PROPOSED - Revision J

m. _ -_ _ __

l Primary Containment Air Lock !

3.6.1.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 1

l SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.2.1 ------------------NOTES-----------------

! 1. An inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful !

performance of the overall air lock !

leakage test.

2. Results shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria applicable to SR 3.6.1.1.1.

l Perform required primary containment air In accordance lock leakage rate testing in accordance with the with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Primary .

Testing Program. Containment l Leakage Rate Testing Program !

l l

SR 3.6.1.2.2 ------------------NOTE------------------- l Only required to be performed upon entry !

or exit through the primary containment l air lock when the primary containment is I de-inerted.

Verify only one door in the primary 184 days containment air lock can be opened at a time.

I 1

HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-7 PROPOSED - Revision J

_ . . _ __ . . . _ .. ._ ._ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ ._ _ _ .~. __ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _

i PCIVs 3.6.1.3 l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.6 Verify the isolation time of each MSIV is In accordance 2 3 seconds and s 5 seconds. with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.6.1.3.7 Verify each automatic PCIV, excluding 18 months EFCVs, actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated isolation signal.

SR 3.6.1.3.8 Verify each reactor instrumentation line 18 months EFCV actuates to restrict flow to within limits. !

SR 3.6.1.3.9 Remove and test the explosive squib from 18 months on a each shear isolation valve of the TIP STAGGERED TEST System. BASIS SR 3.6.1.3.10 Verify the combined leakage rate for all In accordance secondary containment bypass leakage with the paths is s 0.009 L, when pressurized to Primary a P, . Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-14 PROPOSED - Revision J

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT! (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.11 Verify leakage rate through each MSIV is In accordance i s 100 scfh, and a combined maximum with the !

pathway leakage s 250 scfh for all four Primary main steam lines, when tested at Containment 2 28.8 psig. Leakage Rate Testing Program However, the leakage rate acceptance criteria for the first test following discovery of leakage through an MSIV not meeting the 100 scfh limit, shall be s ll.5.sefh for that MSIV.

SR 3.6.1.3.12 Replace the valve seat of each 18 inch 18 months purge valve having a resilient material seat.

SR 3.6.1.3.13 Cycle each 18 inch excess flow isolation 18 months damper to the fully closed and fully open position.

l l

HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-15 PROPOSED - Revision J

- - . .l Progra2s and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.10 Safety Function Determination Proaram (SFDP) (continued)

A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed. For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:

a. A required system redundant to system (s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable; or

b. A required system redundant to system (s) in turn supported i by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or

c. A required system redundant to support system (s) for the supported systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable.

l The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LC0 in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be i entered.

5.5.11 Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Proaram '

This program provides a means for processing changes to the Bases of these Technical Specifications.

i

a. Changes to the Bases of the TS shall be made under appropriate administrative controls and reviews.

b. Licensees may make changes to Bases without prior NRC approval provided the changes do not involve either of the following:

1. A change in the TS incorporated in the license; or

2. A change to the FSAR or Bases that involves an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59.

c. The Bases Control Program shall contain provisions to ensure that the Bases are maintained consistent with the FSAR.

(continued) l HATCH UNIT 2 5.0-16 PROPOSED - Revision J

Programs and Manuals 5.5

- 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.11 Technical Soecifications (TS) Bases Control Proaram (continued)

d. Proposed changes that meet the criteria of b. above shall be reviewed and approved by the NRC prior to implementation.

Changes to the Bases implemented without prior NRC approval l shall be provided to the NRC on a frequency consistent with i 10 CFR 50.71(e). l 5.5.12 Primary Containment Leakaae Rate Testina Proaram A program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing of the primary containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions. This program shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163, " Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program," dated September 1995.

The peak calculated primary containment internal pressure for the i design basis loss of coolant accident, P,, is 45.5 psig.

The maximum allowable primary containment leakage rate, L , at P, is 1.2% of primary containment air weight per day.

Leakage rate acceptance criteria are:

a. Primary containment overall leakage rate acceptance criterion is s 1.0 L,. During the first unit startup following testing in accordance with this program, the leakage rate acceptance criteria are s 0.60 L for the combined Type B and Type C tests, and s 0.75 [, for Type A j tests;

b. Air lock testing acceptance criteria are:

1) Overall air lock leakage rate is s 0.05 L, when tested at s P,,

2) For each door, leakage rate is 5 0.01 L when the gap between the door seals is pressurized t,o 210 psig for at least 15 minutes.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 do not apply to the test frequencies specified in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

(continued) i HATCH UNIT 2 5.0-16a PROPOSED - Revision J

Prograas and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.12 Primary Containment Leakaae Rate Testina Proaram (continued)

The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

l l

1 l

l l

l HATCH UNIT 2 5.0-16b PROPOSED - Revision J

-. -- . _ . .- = _ -.

Cefiniticns 1.1 '

l.1 Definitions DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 ICRP 30, Supplement to Part 1, page 192-212, Table (continued) titled, " Committed Dose Equivalent in Target Organs or Tissues per Intake of Unit Activity."

END OF CYCLE The E0C-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP time interval from initial signal generation by

' (EOC-RPT) SYSTEM RESPONSE the associated turbine stop valve limit switch or TIME from when the turbine control valve hydraulic control oil pressure drops below the pressure switch setpoint to complete suppression of the electric arc between the fully open contacts of the recirculation pump circuit breaker. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.

V nm u . .a _. ._ ,,,,. .u,,m 4_,.m ...+ A_--+ A .6 A !

R .":Z'?h :m"ruw 3'8_':"7 " ."+'E.Tlid

((jh[ Mh2iM1MM5W$+%M r....... v,,.

LEAKAGE LEAKAGE shall be:

a. Identified LEAKAGE

1. LEAKAGE into the drywell, such as that from pump seals or valve packing, that is captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank; or

2. LEAKAGE into the drywell atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE;

b. Unidentified LEAKAGE All LEAKAGE into the drywell that is not identified LEAKAGE;

c. Total LEAKAGE Sum of the identified and unidentified LEAKAGE; (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 -

1.1-3 Amendment No. 195

Primary Containment 3 . 6._1.1

+he P rimary C.on+a*n~ead M.%5e.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS R.4c 7.ne ~ P,o. m m SURVEILLANCE ENCY SR 3.6.1.1.1 Perform required visual examinations and -- -

'OT --

leakage rate testing.except for primary .0 i n containment air lock testino, in p i bl accordance with6.'" CP 50, ^.pp: dL J r - -- - - ----

2:

= dified by :ppravad avama+4aar g A In accordance eak e r te a ep nce cri- ria is 1 with+10 CT" 00,

.0 . weve , d in the ir u t App;r. dix J, :-

s rt f lowi g t ti p o d ::di'f ed by l

{ cc da- e wi 1 CF 0 pp di , :ppr:;;d '

mo f' d by ppr ve exe ti s, e ex;.T.pti :c a ge r e ce anc cr' er is

< .6 for hef yp B dT e te u nd .75 , (or e pe t . s]

l l

SR 3.6.1.1.2 Verify drywell to suppression chamber 18 months differential pressure does not decrease at a rate > 0.25 inch water gauge per AND minute tested over a 10 minute period at an initial differential pressure of -----NOTE------

1 psid. Only required after two consecutive tests fail and continues until l two consecutive tests pass :

l 9 months HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-2 Amendment No. 195

Primary Containment Air Lock 3.6.1.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.2.1 ------------------NOTES------------------

1. An inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test. @._lic.ble p to

2. Results shall be evaluated against acceptance criteria SR 3.6.1.1.1 --

a_

.._....~_...._.....mn f p,I'"' ?

^

- ;xff --~2, . n..J;T;- ., _ry....J g* 0 0 d ein m d

__________'_'____________________________ keekap Rge %+;,,3 Perform required primary containment air --/- E- - --

lock leakaae rate testing in accordance $ .2 sn with t0 Cr", 50, ^;pendiv 1 =e cdi'ied I a l'ca e by2pprc'!:d::=ptieng ------ -- -- --

The acccpter.x crite"i2 for 9 leck e In accordance t% tin; 2re with410 CT", 50, App = dix J, =

e. ^;;r:l' 9 inck la=k=ce "ste ir- =difi:d by

-d 0. 05 L. .in r. t a t ed : t - D, _ , ;ppy;j;j ex--atient

t. I;. e&ch dur, le2k:;; rate i: _

0. 01 L. .;h n t h a g=n hat:::= the Ana" ee21: i pr: cert:cd te 10 p-is fer et leiet 10 r.inuter.

SR 3.6.1.2.2 ------------------NOTE-------------------

Only required to be performed upon entry or exit through the primary containment air lock when the primary containment is de-inerted.

Verify only one door in the primary 184 days containment air lock can be opened at a time.

HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-7 Amendment No. 195

PCIVs !

3.6.1.3 l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR .3.6.1.3.6 Verify the isolation time of each MSIV is In accordance 2: 3 seconds and s 5 seconds. with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.6.1.3.7 Verify each automatic PCIV, excluding 18 months EFCVs, actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated isolation signal.

SR 3.6.1.3.8 Verify each reactor instrumentation line 18 months EFCV actuates to restrict flow to within limits.

SR 3.6.1.3.9 Remove and test the explosive squib from 18 months on a each shear isolation valve of the TIP STAGGERED TEST system. BASIS SR 3.6.1.3.10 Verify leakage rate through each MSIV is --/- E --

1 11.5 scfh when tested at 1 28.0 psig. jPR .2i nt ,

In accordance

% ePrimary with i10 CFR 50, C.entenmenf La. key ' p p;;;d 5 J , n Rate Tesen3 Prog ra m ?^ff ^j U

~

$$htI5m (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-14 Amendment No. 195

i i

~

Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.10 Safety Function Determination Procram (SFDP) (continued)

A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent l single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed. For the purpose of this program, a loss of !

safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, !

and- '

)

a. A required system redundant to system (s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable; or

b. A required system redundant to system (s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or

c. A required system redundant to support system (s) for the supported systems -(a) and (b) above is also inoperable.

The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.

5.5.11 Technical Soecifications (TS) Bases control Proaram This program provides a means for processing changes to the Bases of these Technical Specifications.

a. Changes to the Bases of the TS shall be made under appropriate administrative controls and reviews.

b. Licensees may make changes to Bases without prior NRC approval provided the changes do not involve either of the following:

1. A change in the TS incorporated in the license; or

2. A change to the FSAR or Bases that involves an l unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59. i

c. The Bases Control Program shall contain provisions to ensure that the Bases are maintained consistent with the FSAR.

d. Proposed changes that meet the criteria of b. above shall be reviewed and approved by the NRC prior to implementation.

Changes to the Bases implemented without prior NRC approval shall be provided to the NRC on a frequency consistent with 10 CFR 50.71(e).

5. 5. I2 L sEa t i HATCH UNIT 1 5.0-16 Amendment No. 195

i i

i i INSERT FOR TS PAGE 5.0-16 j

5.5.12 Primary Containment ' Leakage Rate Testing Program A program shall be established to implement the leakage-rate testing of the primary containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR !

50. Appendix J. Option B. as modified by approved exemptions. This ;

3rogram shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in :

legulatory Guide 1.163. " Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test l Program." dated September 1995.

The peak calculated primary containment -internal pressure for the '

design basis loss of coolant accident. P . is 49.6 psig.

The maximum allowable primary containment -leakage -rate. L,. at P, is 1.2% of primary containment air weight per day.

Leakage rate acceptance criteria are:

a. Primary containment overall leakage rate acceptance criterion is 5 1.0 L,. During .the first. unit startup' following testing in- !

accordance with this program the leakage rate acceptance criteria '

are 5 0.60 L, for the combined Type- B and Type C- tests. and .;

5 0.75 L, for Type A tests: .

a

b. Air lock testing acceptance criteria are:

1) Overall air lock leakage rate is 5 0.05 L, when tested at 2 P .

2) For each door leakage rate is 5 0.01 L, when the gap between the door seals is pressurized to 210 psig for at least 15 minutes.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 do not apply to the test frequencies spec 1fied in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

L l l

l l

HATCH UNIT 1 5.0-16a

~_ - .. . _ - - . . . . . . - - - - . - -

Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 ICRP 30, Supplement to Part 1, page 192-212, Table (continued) titled, " Committed Dose Equivalent in Target Organs or Tissues per Intake of Unit Activity."

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING The ECCS RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval SYSTEM (ECCS) RESPONSE from when the monitored parameter exceeds its ECCS TIME initiation setpoint at the channel sensor until the ECCS equipment is capable of performing its safety function (i.e., the valves travel to their required positions, pump discharge pressures reach their required values, etc.). Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays, where applicable. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.

END OF CYCLE The EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP time interval from initial signal generation by (E0C-RPT) SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME the associated turbine stop valve limit switch or from when the turbine control valve hydraulic control oil pressure drops below the pressure switch setpoint to complete suppression of the electric arc between the fully open contacts of the recirculation pump circuit breaker. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequer tial, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.

ISOLATION SYSTEM The ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be that RESPONSE TIME time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its isolation initiation setpoint at the channel sensor until the isolation valves travel to their required positions. Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays, where applicable. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire 1

response time is measured.

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wL TE".'.,'r ..17"..X.

..n L ..a. .LZ.T""

n - - - - -- YJ ' "

v......

3

r. g .

l (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 1.1-3 Amendment No. 135

,_ _ --- - ,-ea- - - , - - - - - - - < , , m , ,,

Primary Containment 3 .l.1

% e PrsmaryConlainmen+ Len Vsag e SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Rale Tesh fronram ~ I SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.1.1 Perform required visual examinations and -j, y " j----

leakage rate testing except for primary S y .g .

containment air lock testino, in accordance withfl0 "" 5", A;;r r J,

, ----- /- M,;7 .c!y > n M --fi' icd by :;;rn ed e,,;....A 6 6. '

g I cordance

~ "'TTh_ le ge at acc tan cri ria wit le CFR P i

.. o ver, uri the irs nit ";;:-di 2, ;*

st u ol win est' g pe orm in -- f "' ^f by or anc with 0C 50, ppe x a. , 7;r:"^d fie ya rov exe tio ,t - Mr ;t'^--

aka rat acc tanc cri ia s

<0 L rt Typ a Ty Ct t a < O'y 5 L or e Ty A est.

SR 3.6.1.1.2 Verify drywell to suppression chamber 18 months differential pressure does not decrease at a rate > 0.25 inch water gauge per M2 minute tested over a 10 minute period at

(

an initial differential pressure of -----NOTE------

1 psid. Only required after two consecutive tests fail and continues until two consecutive tests pass 9 months

\

HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-2 Amendment No. 135

1 l

l i

Primary Containment Air Lock 3.6.1.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3. 6.1. 2.1 ------------------NOTES-----------------

1. An inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.

2. Results shall be evaluated against g _

acceptance criteria sf SR 3.6.1.1. .

......m.....

.. :a.-

. ,n.._..,n, a.,-.

_. '4be fe; mary (owl 9;rrmm4 ,

i e y. b s A wg Y "

he .vb N 4 0 .

-.v tam- _

,LpT"' -

Perform required primary containment air -- --

TE -- -

lock leakana rata tactino in accordance S 3 .2 s at with*.0 CM 5^, a52i., J, :: ;.sdi ned p ica e hy 2;;r:::f ::::;ti:::. -- -- -- --- -

. w.

'h: ::::pt:r,;e c--ite . ie-f;r -ir h :L In accordance .

t:: ting re: withe 0 CFP 59, '

^;; :fi: J, --

n.....,.,. ,..u.,..., - . . - - ;s

_. . . ,__u - .

... _ a. ._.._- .__. . -_ a m a s.,..

1-4 O 9h [;_ .t Atid it 5 E...

ti: =:

b. h r d d d wiv-ie d e rese- 4

-si 0 A ' L. H et th:- gei,-t,et ... u,e- 1 4em .;;12m._ym.m4au-w !

> 10 p:tg f r :t ':::t 15 mir.ut::.

SR 3. 6.1. 2. 2 ------------------NOTE-------------------

Only required to be performed upon entry or exit through the primary containment air lock when the primary containment is i de-inerted. t Verify only one door in the primary 184 days ;

containment air lock can be opened at a '

time.

HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-7 Amendment No. 135

PCIVs 3.6.1.3

. SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (continued) t' SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.6 Verify the isolation time of each MSIV is In accordance a 3 seconds and s 5 seconds, with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.6.1.3.7 Verify each automatic PCIV, excluding 18 months EFCVs, actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated isolation signal.

SR- 3.6.1.3.8 Verify each reactor instrumentation line 18 months EFCV actuates to restrict flow to within limits. 1 i

SR 3.6.1.3.9 Remove and test the explosive squib from each shear isolation valve of the TIP 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST

(

System. BASIS l

SR 3.6.1.3.10 Verify the combined leakage rate for all -g-f-J8TP-/-j secondary containment bypass leakage fy;7.ygn a hs is s 0.009 L, when pressurized to 7 _

in acccrdance S fr W ry with*'O CFD W, do n la in ,n en + a;7 dix J, =

Lenko0 e Ro-Ic.

""d "i"' bY

%*o3 Pmyn- ;;,gi=:-

(continued)

\

HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-14 Amendment No. 135

l PCIVs 3.6.1.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.11 Verify leakage rate through each MSIV is s 100 scfh, and a combined maximum --

"/ - fN0f 7- 7

. w i 6 pathway leakage s 250 scfh for all four .

i main steam lines, when tested at - -- - - ---

a 28.8 psig.

In accordance However, the leakage rate acceptance wit W O CT". 50, criteria for the first test following ^^a--dix J, !!

l discovery of leakage through an MSIV not c dified by meeting the 100 scfh limit, shall be aaa-a"=d-s 11.5 scfh for that MSIV. j "r^-"ti"""

b L d e '&sky

% P<og ra m l SR 3.6.1.3.12 Replace the valve seat of each 18 inch 18 month F purge valve having a resilient sterial seat. l

( SR 3.6.1.3.13 Cycle each 18 inch excess flow isolation 18 months damper to the fully closeJ and fully open position.

1 l

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l HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-15 Amendment No. 135 I I

i i

I l

Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.10 Safety Function Determination PFooram (SFDP)

(continued)

A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis canhot be performed. For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:

a. A required system redundant to system (s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable; or

b. A required system redundant to system (s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or

c. A required system redundant to support system (s) for the supported systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable.

The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in ,

which the loss of safety function exists are required to be j entered.

5.5.11 Technical Snecifications (TS) Bases Control Procram This program provides a means for processing changes to the Bases of these Technical Specifications.

a. Changes to the Bases of the TS shall be made under appropriate admir.istrative controls and reviews.

b. Licensees may make changes to Bases without prior NRC approval provided the changes do not involve either of the following:

1. A change in the TS incorporated in the license; or l

2. A change to the FSAR or Bases that involves an i unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59. i

c. The Bases Control Program shall contain provisions to ensure that the Bases are maintained consistent with the FSAR.

d. Proposed changes that meet the criteria of b. above shall be reviewed and approved by the NRC prior to implementation.

Changes to the Bases implemented without prior NRC approval shall be provided to the NRC on a frequency consistent with 5.lA m2nu )10 CFR 50.71(e).

m -

HATCH UNIT 2 5.0-16 Amendment No. 135

4

[

INSERT FOR TS PAGE 5.0-16 ,

i l

5.5.12 Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program !

A program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing of the primary containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR li

50. Appendix J Option B, as modified by approved exemptions. This' 3rogram shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide ~1.163, " Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test i' Program." dated September 1995.

The peak calculated primary containment internal pressure for the .

design basis loss of coolant accident, P. is 45.5 psig. l The maximum allowable primary containment leakage rate L., at P, is i 1.2% of primary coni.ainment air weight per day Leakage rate acceptance criteria are:

a. Primary coritainment overall leakage rate acceptance criterion is i 5 1.0 L,. During the first unit startup following testing in :

accordance with this program, the leakage rate acceptance criteria !'

are s 0.60 L, for the combined' Type B and -Type C tests, and-5 0.75 L, for Type A tests: i

b. Air lock testing acceptance criteria are:

1) Overall air lock leakage rate is 5 0.05 L, when' tested at 2 P., l i

2) For each door, leakage rate is 5 0.01 L, when the gap between the door seals is pressurized to 210 psig for at least 15 l minutes.

The , provisions of SR 3.0.2 do not apply to the test frequencies specified in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. l p

The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Primary Containment !

Leakage Rate Testing Program.

l F

HATCH UNIT 2 5.0-16a

l i

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Enclosure 5 Edwin L IIntch Nuclear Plant Request to Revise Technical Specifications: ;

Bases Channes i

SR Applicability B 3.0 BASES SR 3.0.2 (e.g., transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or (continued) maintenance activities).

The 25% extension does not significantly degrade the reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at its specified Frequency. This is based on the recognition !

that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the l SRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surve111ances for i which the 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency does not apply. These exceptions are stated in the individual Specifications. The requirements of regulations take precedence over the TS. Therefore, when a test interval is specified in the regulations, the test interval cannot be extended by the TS, and the SR includes a Note in the Frequency stating, "SR 3.0.2 is not applicable."

An example of an exception when the test interval is specified in the regulations is the Note in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, "SR 3.0.2 is not l applicable." This exception is provided because the program already includes extension of test intervals.

As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 25% extension also does not apply to the initial portion of a periodic Com)1etion Time that requires performance on a "once per..." 3 asis. The 25%

extension applies to each performance after the initial performance. The initial performance of the Required Action, whether it is a particular Surveillance or some other remedial action, is considered a single action with a single Completion Time. One reason for not allowing the 25%

extension to this Completion Time is that such an action '

usually verifies that no loss of function has occurred by checking the status of redundant or diverse components or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in an i alternative manner.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not intended to be used repeatedly, merely as an o)erational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals (otier than those consistent with refueling intervals) or periodic Completion Time intervals beyond those specified.

SR 3.0.3 SR 3.0.3 establishes the flexibility to defer declaring affected equipment inoperable or an affected variable outside the specified limits when a Surveillance has not been completed within the specified Frequency. A delay (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.0-12 PROPOSED - REVISION J

J Prinary Containment B 3.6.1.1 I

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.1.1 Primary Containment

, BASES i

! BACKGROUND . The function of the primary containment is to isolate and j

contain fission products released from the Reactor Primary System following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) and to i confine the postulated release of radioactive material. The 2

primary containment consists of a steel lined, reinforced concrete vessel, which surrounds the Reactor Primary System i and provides an essentially leak tight barrier'against an uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the l environment.

i The isolation devices for the penetrations in the primary i containment boundary are a part of the containment leak

tight barrier. To maintain this leak tight barrier

i.

a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident.

conditions are either:

1. Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment isolation system, or

, 2. Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in LCO 3.6.1.3, " Primary Containment Isolation j Valves (PCIVs)";

b. The primary containment air lock is OPERABLE, except i '

as provided in LCO 3.6.1.2, " Primary Containment Air Lock"; and I

c. All equipment hatches are closed.

j. This Specification ensures that the performance of the

, primary containment, in the event of a DBA, meets the i

assumptions used in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2. SR 3.6.1.1.1 leakage rate requirements are in !

conformance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B (Ref. 3), l as modified by approved exemptions.

i I

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l (continued) f HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-1 PROPOSED - REVISION J l

)

Primary Containment B 3.6.1.1 j l

j BASES (continued) i

APPLICABLE The safety design basis for the primary containment is that ,

SAFETY ANALYSES it must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the i limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate. !

The DBA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive !

) material within primary containment is a LOCA. In the l 1 analysis of this accident, it is assumed that primary 1 1 containment is OPERABLE such that release of fission !

products to the environment is controlled by the rate of l

priitary containment leakage. ;

Analytical methods and assumptions involving the primary i 4 containment are presented in References 1 and 2. The safety I analyses assume a nonmechanistic fission product release following a DBA, which forms the basis for determination of i

) offsite doses. The fission product release is, in turn, ,

based on an assum6d leakage rate from the primary I containment. OPERABILITY of the primary containment ensures that the leakage rate assumed in the safety analyses is not exceeded.

The maximum allowable leakage rate for the primary containment (L ) is 1.2% by weight of the containment air per24hoursal.thedesignbasisLOCAmaximumpeak l containment pressure (P,) of 49.6 psig (Ref.1).

Primary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy l Statement (Ref. 4). I LC0 Primary containmcnt OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting leakage to s L,, except prior to the first startup after performing a required Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (Ref. 5) leakage test. At this time, applicable leakage limits specified in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program must be met.

Compliance with this LC0 will ensure a primary containment configuration, including equipment hatches, that is i structurally sound and that will limit leakage to those !

leakage rates assumed in the safety analyses. I Individual leakage rates specified for the primary containment air lock are addressed in LCO 3.6.1.2.

i (continued) :

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-2 PROPOSED - REVISION J ,

I

Primary Containment B 3.6.1.1 BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment. ,

ACTIONS Ad In the event primary containment is inoperable, primary containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within I hour. The I hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring primary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where primary containment is inoperable is minimal.

B.1 and B.2 If primary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1.1 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining the primary containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the visual examinations and leakage rate test requirements of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Failure to meet air lock leakage testing (SR 3.6.1.2.1), or main steam isolation valve leakage (SR3.6.1.3.10), does not necessarily result in a failure of this SR. The impact of the failure to meet these SRs (continued)

HATCH UNIT I B 3.6-3 PROPOSED - REVISION J

Primary Containment B 3.6.1.1 BASES l

4 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1.1 (continued) l REQUIREMENTS must be evaluated against the Type A, B, and C acceptance criteria of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. The Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program is based on the guidelines in Regulatory Guide 1.163 (Ref. 6), NEI 94-01 (Ref. 7), and ANSI /ANS-56.8-1994 (Ref. 8). Specific acceptance criteria for as found and as left leakage rates, as well as the methods of defining the leakage rates, are contained in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. At all other times between required leakage rate tests, the acceptance criteria are

. At based 1.0 L,, onthean overall offsite doseType A leakageare consequences limit of 1.0 L,by the bounded assumptions of the safety analysis. The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leak Rate Testing Program.

SR 3.6.1.1.2 Maintaining the pressure suppression function of primary containment requires limiting the leakage from the drywell to the suppression chamber. Thus, if an event were to occur that pressurized the drywell, the steam would be directed through the downcomers into the suppression pool. This SR measures drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure during a 10 minute period to ensure that the leakage paths that would bypass the suppression pool are within allowable limits.

Satisfactory performance of this SR can be achieved by establishing a known differential pressure between the drywell and the suppression chamber and verifying that the pressure in either the suppression chamber or the drywell does not change by more than 0.25 inch of water per minute over a 10 minute period. The leakage test is performed every 18 months. The 18 month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this Surveillance be performed during a unit outage and also in view of the fact that component failures that might have affected this test are identified by other primary containment SRs. Two consecutive test failures, however, would indicate unexpected primary containment degradation; in this event, as the Note indicates, increasing the Frequency to once (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-4 PROPOSED - REVISION J

Primary Containment B 3.6.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS every 9 months is required until the situation is remedied as evidenced by passing two consecutive tests.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 5.2.

2. FSAR, Section 14.4.3.

3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B. l

4. NRC No.93-102, " Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

5. Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. '

6. Regulatory Guide 1.163, " Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program," September 1995.

7. NEI 94-01, " Industry Guideline for Implementing "

Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J," Pevision 0, July 26, 1995.

8. ANSI /ANS-56.8-1994, "American National Standard for Containment System Leakage Testing Requirements," ;

1994, i

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-5 PROPOSED - REVISION J ,

l

Primary Containment Air Lock B 3.6.1.2 BASES BACKGROUND containment leakage rate to within limits in the event of a (continued) DBA. Not maintaining air lock integrity ~ or leak tightness may result in a leakage rate in excess of that assumed in the unit safety analysis.

i APPLICABLE The DBA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive SAFETY ANALYSES material within primary containment is a LOCA. In the analysis of this accident, it is assumed that primary containment is OPERABLE, such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of primary containment leakage. The primary containment is designed with a maximum allowable leakage rate (L ) of 1.2%

byweightofthecontainmentairper24hoursatIhe calculated design basis LOCA maximum peak containment l pressure (P ) of 49.6 psig (Ref. 2). This allowable leakage rateformslhebasisfortheacceptancecriteriaimposedon the SRs associated with the air lock.

Primary containment air lock OPERABILITY is also required to minimize the amount of fission product gases that may escape primary containment through the air. lock and contaminate and pressurize the secondary containment.

The primary containment air lock satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4).

LC0 As part of primary containment, the air lock's safety function is related to control of containment leakage rates following a DBA. Thus, the air lock's structural integrity !

and leak tightness are essential to'the successful mitigation of such an event.

The primary containment air lock is required to be OPERABLE.

For the air lock to be considered OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE, the air lock must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test, and ;

both air lock doors must be OPERABLE. The interlock allows 1 only one air lock door to be opened at a time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of primary containment does not exist when primary containment is required to be (continued)

HATCH UNIT I B 3.6-7 PROPOSED - REVISION J

Primary Containment Air Lock B 3.6.1.2 j i

BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued) within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.2.1 REQUIREMENTS ,

Maintaining primary containment air locks OPERABLE requires compliance with the leakage rate test requirements of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (Ref. 3).

This SR reflects the leakage rate testing requirements with respect to air lock leakage (Type B leakage tests). The acceptance criteria were established as a small fraction of the total allowable containment leakage. The periodic '

testing requirements verify that the air lock leakage does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall primary containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

The SR has been modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.

This is considered reasonable since either air lock door is capable of providing a fission product barrier in the event ,

of a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR, requiring the results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria applicable to SR 3.6.1.1.1. This ensures that air lock leakage is properly accounted for in determining the combined Type B and C primary containment leakage. l SR 3.6.1.2.2 The air lock interlock mechanism is designed to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors in the air lock. Since both the inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed to withstand the maximum expected post accident primary containment pressure, closure of either door will support primary containment OPERABILITY. Thus, the interlock feature supports primary containment OPERABILITY while the (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-12 PROPOSED - REVISION J

l

. Prizary Containment Air Lock l B 3.6.1.2 l BASES 4

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.2.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS air lock is being used for personnel transit in and out of I the containment. Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock will function as designed and that simultaneous inner and outer door opening will not inadvertently occur. Due to the purely mechanical nature of

this interlock, and given that the interlock mechanism is l only challenged when the primary containment air lock door is opened, this test is only required to be performed upon entering or exiting the primary containment air lock, but is l not required more frequently than 184 days when primary containment is de-inerted. The 184 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view i of other administrative controls such as indications of l interlock mechanism status, available to operations l personnel.

l l

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 5.2.3.4.5.

2. FSAR, Section 5.2.

3. Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. l

4. NRC No.93-102, " Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-13 PROPOSED - REVISION J

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS since the Required Actions for each Condition provide (continued) appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable PCIV.

Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable PCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

The ACTIONS are modified by Notes 3 and 4. Note 3 ensures that appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system (s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable PCIV (e.g., an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystem is inoperable due to a failed open test return valve). Note 4 ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken when the primary containment leakage limits are exceeded. Pursuant to LC0 3.0.6, these actions are not required even when the associated LCO is not met.

Therefore, Notes 3 and 4 are added to require the proper actions be taken.

A.1 and A.2 With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV '

inoperable except for inoperability due to leakage not within a limit specified in an SR to this LCO, the affected penetration flow paths must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active i failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, a blind flange, and a check valve with flow through ,

the valve secured. !

For a penetration isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available valve to the primary containment. The device must be subjected to leakage testing requirements equivalent to the inoperable valve.

For example: 1) if the inoperable valve is required to be Type C tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B (Ref. 4), l l the device chosen to isolate the penetration must also be ;

subjected to Appendix J, Option B, Type C testing; and 2) if l the inoperable valve is not subjected to Appendix J, Option B, testing (" " in Reference 2, Table T7.0-1, Test l Type column), the isolation device does not have to be subjected to Appendix J, Option B, testing. l i

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-18 PROPOSED - REVISION J

_ J

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued)

Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to isolation devices located in high radiation areas, and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means.

Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

IL1 With one or more penetration flow paths with two PCIVs inoperable except due to leakage not within limits, either the inoperable PCIVs must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within I hour. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange.

A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected '

i penetration. The device must be subjected to leakage testing requirements equivalent to the inoperable valve.

For example: 1) if the inoperable valve is required to be Type C tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, the l device chosen to isolate the penetration must also be subjected to Appendix J, Option B, Type C testing; and 2) if l the inoperable valve is not subjected to Appendix J, Option B, testing (" " in Reference 2, Table T7.0-1, Test l Type column), the isolation device does not have to be subjected to Appendix J, Option B, testing. l If a valve is inoperable due to isolation time not within limits or other condition that would not be expected to adversely affect leakage characteristics, the inoperable valve may be used to isolate the penetration. The I hour Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1.

Condition B is modified by a Note indicating this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two PCIVs.

For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-20 PROPOSED - REVISION J

PCIVs

] B 3.6.1.3 i BASES ACTIONS .

C.1 and C.2 l

(continued)

With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable, except due to leakage not within limits, the !

inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status or the !

i affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation i barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active

! failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a i

! closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual '

valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to

! isolate the affected penetration. The device must be

}

subjected to leakage testing requirements equivalent to the inoperable valve, except for inoperable valves in the Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) systems.

For example: 1) if the inoperable valve is required to be Type C tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, the l ;

device chosen to isolate the penetration must also be '

subjected to Appendix J, Option B, Type C testing; and 2) if l the inoperable valve is not subjected to Apper. dix J, Option B, testing (" " in Reference 2, Table T7.0-1, Test l Type column), the isolation device does not have to be 4 subjected to Appendix J, Option B, testing. 'For Core Spray l and LPCI system valve inoperability, the device chosen to isolate the affected penetration is not required to be l tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, leakage testing. l This exce) tion is based on the integrity of the system piping, wiich serves to minimize leakage into the secondary containment.

If a valve is inoperable due to isolation time not within limits or other condition that would not be expected to adversely affect leakage characteristics, the inoperable valve may be used to isolate the penetration.

Required Action C.1 must be completed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for lines other than excess flow check valve (EFCV) lines and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for EFCV lines. The Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3.

The Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is reasonable considering the instrument to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the small )ipe diameter of the affected penetrations.

In the event tie affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-21 PROPOSED - REVISION J

i l

PCIVs l B 3.6.1.3 i BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.8 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR requires a demonstration that each reactor instrumentation line excess flow check valve (EFCV) is OPERABLE by verifying that the valve reduces flow to within limits on an actual or simulated instrument line break condition. This SR provides assurance that the instrumentation line EFCVs will perform as designed. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unalanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with tie reactor at power.

i Operating experience has shown that these components usually l pass this Surveillance when performed at the 18 month i Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be l acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

3.6.1.3.9 SR The TIP shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive I charges. An in place functional test is not possible with this design. The explosive squib is removed and tested to provide assurance that the valves will actuate when required. The replacement charge for the explosive squib shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one-fired or from another batch that has been certified by having one of the batch successfully fired. The Frequency of 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is considered adequate given the administrative controls on replacement charges and the frequent checks of circuit continuity (SR 3.6.1.3.4).

SR 3.6.1.3.10 The analyses in References 1 and 3 are based on leakage that is less than the specified leakage rate. Leakage through each MSIV must be s 11.5 scfh when tested at 2: 28.0 psig.

l 1

(continued) ,

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-27 PROPOSED - REVISION J ,

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.10 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (Ref. 6).

SR 3.6.1.3.11 The valve seats of each 18 inch purge valve (supply and exhaust) having resilient material seats must be replaced every 18 months.~ This will allow the opportunity for repair before gross leakage failure develops. The 18 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment and operational experience which shows that gross leakage normally does not occur when the valve seats are replaced on an 18 month Frequency.

SR 3.6.1.3.12 The Surveillance Requirement provides assurance that the excess flow isolation dampers can close following an isolation signal. The 18 month Frequency is based on vendor recommendations and engineering judgment. Operating experience has shown that these dampers usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency.

Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 14.4.

2. Technical Requirements Manual

3. FSAR, Sectior 5.2.

4. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B. l

5. NRC No.93-102, " Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

6. Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. l HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-28 PROPOSED - REVISION J

)

SR Applicability l B 3.0 BASES I

SR 3.0.2 (e.g., transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or (continued) maintenance activities). !

The 25% extension does not significantly degrade the :

reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at I its specified Frequency. This is based on the recognition !

that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance I being performed is the verification of conformance-with the !

SRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surveillances for which the 25% extension of the-interval specified in the Frequency does not apply. These exceptions are stated in the individual Specifications. The requirements of regulations take precedence over the TS. Therefore, when a test interval is specified in the regulations, the test -

interval cannot be extended by the TS, and the SR includes a Note in the Frequency stating, "SR 3.0.2 is not applicable."

An example of an exception when the test interval is ,

specified in the regulations is the Note in the Primary l Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, "SR 3.0.2 is not i applicable. " This exception is provided because the program 1 already includes extension of test intervals.

As stated im SR 3.0.2, the 25% extension also does not apply )

to the initial portion of a periodic Completion Time that requires performance on a "once per..." basis. The 25%

extension applies to each performance after the initial !

performance. The initial performance of the Required Action, whether it is a particular Surveillance or some other remedial action, is considered a single action with a single Completion Time. One reason for not allowing the .25% 1 extension to this Completion Time is that such an action usually verifies that no loss of function has occurred by checking the status of redundant or; diverse components or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in an 1 alternative manner.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not intended to be used repeatedly, merely as an o>erational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals (otier than those consistent with refueling intervals) or periodic Completion Time intervals beyond those specified.

SR 3.0.3 SR 3.0.3 establishes the flexibility to defer declaring affected equipment inoperable or an affected variable ;

outside the specified limits when a Surveillance has not been completed within the specified Frequency. A delay (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.0-12 PROPOSED - REVISION J

- - :l -

n

Primary Containment B 3.6.1.1 B 3.6' CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS j B 3.6.1.1' Primary Containment BASES BACKGROUND The function of the primary ~ containment is to isolate and contain fission products released from the Reactor Primary ,

System following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) and to l confine the postulated release of radioactive material. The >

primary containment consists of a steel lined, reinforced ,

concrete vessel,- which surrounds the Reactor Primary System '

and provides an essentially leak tight barrier against an uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the ,

environment.

The isolation devices for the penetrations in the primary containment boundary are a part of the containment leak l tight barrier. To maintain this leak tight barrier: ;

a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident ;

conditions are either: i 4

1. Capable of-being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment isolation system, or j

2. _ Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or ,

de-activated automatic valves secured in their !

closed positions, except as provided in .!

LC0 3.6.1.3, " Primary Containment Isolation l Valves (PCIVs)";

b. The primary containment air lock is OPERABLE, except as provided in LC0 3.6.1.2, " Primary Containment Air '

Lock"; and

c. All equipment hatches are closed. i This Specification ensures that the performance of the primary containment, in the event of a DBA, meets the assumptions used in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2. SR 3.6.1.1.1 leakage rate requirements are in ,

conformance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B (Ref. 3), l as modified by approved exemptions. ,

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-1 PROPOSED - REVISION J !

Primary Containment B 3.6.1.1 BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE The safety design basis for the primary containment is that SAFETY ANALYSES it must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate.

The DBA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive material within primary containment is a LOCA. In the analysis of this accident, it is assumed that primary containment is OPERABLE such that release of fission prodw #s to the environment is controlled by the rate of primat* containment leakage.

i Analytical methods and assumptions involving the primary containment are presented in References 1 and 2. The safety analyses assume a nonmechanistic fission product release following a DBA, which forms the basis for determination of offsite doses. The fission product release is, in turn, based on an assumed leakage rate from the primary containment. OPERABILITY of the primary containment ensures

- that the leakage rate assumed in the safety analyses is not exceeded.

The maximum allowable leakage rate for the primary containment (L ) is 1.2% by weight of the containment air per24hoursalthedesignbasisLOCAmaximumpeak l containment pressure (P,) of 45.5 psig (Ref.1). ;

l Primary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy !

Statement (Ref. 4).

LC0 Primary containment OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting !

4 leakage to s L,, except prior to the first startup after performing a required Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (Ref. 5) leakage test. At this time, applicable leakage limits specified in the Primary

' Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program must be met. l Compliance with this LC0 will ensure a primary containment configuration, including equipment hatches, that is structurally sound and that will limit leakage to those leakage rates assumed in the safety analyses.

Individual leakage rates specified for the primary containment air lock are addressed in LC0 3.6.1.2.

4 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-2 PROPOSED - REVISION J

Primary Containment I B 3.6.1.1 BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of '

radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 !

-and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, primary containment is not required i to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 to prevent leakage of !

radioactive material from primary containment.

i ACTIONS Ad In the event primary containment is inoperable, primary containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within I hour. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring primary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where primary !

containment is inoperable is minimal. ;

B.1 and B.2 If primary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1.1 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining the primary containment OPERABLE requires compliance with the visual examinations and leakage rate test requirements of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Failure to meet air lock leakage testing (SR 3.6.1.2.1), secondary containment bypass leakage (SR 3.6.1.3.10), or main steam isolation valve (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-3 PROPOSED - REVISION J

Primary Containment B 3.6.1.1 t

I BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS leakage (SR 3.6.1.3.11) does not necessarily result in a failure of this SR. The impact of the failure to meet these SRs must be evaluated against the Type A, B, and C acceptance criteria of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. The Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program is based on the guidelines in Regulatory Guide 1.163 (Ref. 6), NEI 94-01 (Ref. 7), and ANSI /ANS-56.8-1994 (Ref. 8). Specific acceptance criteria for as found and as.left leakage rates, as well as the '

methods of defining the leakage rates, are contained in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. At all other times between required leakage rate tests, the acceptance criteria are based on an overall Type A leakage limit of 1.0 L,. At 1.0 L , the offsite dose consequences are bounded by the assumpt' ions of the safety analysis. The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. ,

SS 3.6.1.1.2 Maintaining the pressure suppression function of primary containment requires limiting the leakage from the drywell to the suppression chamber. Thus, if an event were to occur that pressurized the drywell, the steam would be directed through the downcomers into the suppression pool. This SR measures drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure during a 10 minute period to ensure that the leakage paths that would bypass the suppression pool are ,

within allowable limits.

Satisfactory performance of this SR can be achieved by establishing a known differential pressure between the drywell and the suppression chamber and verifying that the pressure in either the suppression chamber or the drywell ;

does not change by more than 0.25 inch of water per minute !

over a 10 minute period. The leakage test is performed every 18 months. The 18 month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this Surveillance be performed during a unit outage and also in view of the fact I that component failures that might have affected this test ;

are identified by other primary containment SRs. Two i consecutive test failures, however, would indicate ]

(continued) ,

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-4 PROPOSED - REVISION J l 1

l Primary Containment B 3.6.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS unexpected primary containment degradation; in this event, as the Note indicates, increasing the Frequency to once every 9 months is required until the situation is remedied as evidenced by passing two consecutive tests. -

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 6.2.

2. FSAR, Section 15.1.39.

3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B. l

4. NRC No.93-102, " Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

5. Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

6. Regulatory Guide 1.163, " Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program," September 1995.

7. NEI 94-01, " Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J," Revision 0, July 26, 1995.

8. ANSI /ANS-56.8-1994, "American National Standard for Containment System Leakage Testing Requirements,"

1994.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-5 PROPOSED - REVISION J

Primary Centainment Air Lock B 3.6.1.2 i

BASES BACKGROUND containment leakage rate to within limits in the event of a (continued) DBA. Not maintaining air lock integrity or leak tightness may result in a leakage rate in excess of that assumed in the' unit safety analysis.

APPLICABLE The DBA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive SAFETY ANALYSES material within primary containment is a LOCA. In the analysis of this accident, it is assumed that primary containment is OPERABLE, such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of primary containment leakage. The primary containment is designed with a maximum allowable leakage rate (L ) of 1.2%

byweightofthecontainmentairper24hoursatthe calculated design basis LOCA maximum peak containment l pressure (P ) of 45.5 psig (Ref. 2). This allowable leakage rateformslhebasisfortheacceptancecriteriaimposedon the SRs associated with the air lock.

Primary containment air lock OPERABILITY is also required to minimize the amount of fission product gases that may escape primary containment through the air lock and contaminate and pressurize the secondary containment.

The primary containment air lock satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4).

LC0 As part of primary containment, the air lock's safety function is related to control of containment leakage rates following a DBA. Thus, the air lock's structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to~ the successful mitigation of such an event.

The primary containment air lock is required to be OPERABLE.

For.the air lock to be considered OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE, the air lock must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test, and both air lock doors must be OPERABLE. The interlock allows only one air lock door to be opened at a time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of primary containment does not exist when primary containment is required to be (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-7 PROPOSED - REVISION J

Primary Containment Air Lock B 3.6.1.2 BASES ;

i 1

ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued) j within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are :

reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the '

required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

i SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.2.1

-REQUIREMENTS Maintaining primary containment air locks OPERABLE requires compliance with the leakage rate test requirements of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (Ref. 3).

This SR reflects the leakage rate testing requirements with respect to air lock leakage (Type B leakage tests). The acceptance criteria were established as a small fraction of :

the total allowable containment leakage. The periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock leakage does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall primary l containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

The SR has been modified by two Notes. Note 1 states that an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.

This is considered reasonable since either air lock door is .

i capable of providing a fission product barrier in the event of a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR, requiring the ,

results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteria applicable to SR 3.6.1.1.1. This ensures that air lock !

leakage is properly accounted for in determining the combined Type B and C primary containment leakage rate. l SR 3.6.1.2.2 The air lock interlock mechanism is designed.to prevent >

simultaneous opening of both doors in the air lock. Since both the inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed to withstand the maximum expected post accident primary containment pressure, closure of either door will support !

primary containment OPERABILITY. Thus, the interlock feature supports primary containment OPERABILITY while the {

i (continued) i HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-12 PROPOSED - REVISION J l

l

Prinary Containment Air Lock B 3.6.1.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE .58_3 6.1.2.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS air lock is being used for personnel transit in and out of the contr.inment. Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock will function as designed and that simultaneous inner and outer door opening will not inadvertently occur. Due to the purely mechanical nature of this interlock, and given that the interlock mechanism is only challenged when the primary containment air lock door is opened, this test is only required to be. performed upon entering or exiting the primary containment air lock, but is not required more frequently than 184 days when primary containment is de-inerted. The 184 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of other administrative controls such as indications of interlock mechanism status, available to operations personnel.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 3.8.2.8.2.2.

2. FSAR, Section 6.2.

3. Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. l

4. NRC No.93-102, " Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

t l

l I

l i

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-13 PROPOSED - REVISION J

l PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES l

ACTIONS since the Required Actions for each Condition provide d

(continued) appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable PCIV.

Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued i operation, and subsequent inoperable PCIVs are governed by

] subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

The ACTIONS are modified by Notes 3 and 4. Note 3 ensures that appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary,

if the affected system (s) are rendered inoperable by an i inoperable PCIV (e.g., an Emergency Core Cooling System i (ECCS) subsystem is inoperable due to a failed open test ;

i return valve). Note 4 ensures appropriate remedial actions 1 i are taken when the primary containment leakage limits are l

exceeded. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, these actions are not

{ required even when the associated LCG is not met.

! Therefore, Notes 3 and 4 are added to require the proper i

actions be taken.

i A.1 and A.2

With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV 4

inoperable except for inoperability due to leakage not j within a limit specified in an SR to this LCO, the affected 1 penetration flow paths must be isolated. The method of 4 isolation must include the use of at least one isolation i "oarrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a

closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual 3 valve, a blind flange, and a check valve with flow through j the valve secured.

i For a penetration isolated in accordance with Required

. Action A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration

. should be the closest available valve to the primary 5

containment. The device must be subjected to leakage testing requirements equivalent to the inoperable valve.

. For example: 1) if the inoperable valve is required to be j Type C tested per 10 CFR 50, A>pendix J, Option B (Ref. 5), l the device chosen to isolate tle penetration must also be ;

i subjected to Appendix J, Option B, Type C testing; and 2) if l

. the inoperable valve is not subjected to Appendix J,

Option B, testing (" " in Reference 2, Table T7.0-1, Test l 1

Type column), the isolation device does not have to be subjected to Appendix J, Option B, testing. l i

(continued) i HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-18 PROPOSED - REVISION J l 4

1

- y ._

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3

)

BASES l l

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued)

Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to isolation devices located in high radiation areas, and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means.

1 Allowing verification by administrative means is considered ;

acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment, once they have been verified to be a the proper position,

is low. :

1 With one or more penetration flow paths with two PCIVs i inoperable except due to leakage not within limits, either the inoperable PCIVs must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within I hour. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange.

A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. The device must be subjected to leakage testing requirements equivalent to the inoperable valve.

For example: 1) if the inoperrtie valve is required to be Type C tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, the l device chosen to isolate the penetration must also be subjected to Appendix J, Option B, Type C testing; and 2) if l.

the inoperable valve is not subjected to Appendix J, Option B, testing (" " in Reference 2, Table T7.0-1, Test l Type column), the isolation device does not have to be subjected to Appendix J, Option B, testing. l If a valve is inoperable due to isolation time not within limits or other condition that would not be expected to adversely affect leakage characteristics, the inoperable valve may be used to isolate the penetration. The I hour Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1.

Condition B is modified by a Note indicating this Condition i is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two PCIVs. ,

For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.

(continued) l HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-20 PROPOSED - REVISION J

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 l BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)

With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable, except due to leakage not within limits, the inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. The device must be subjected to leakage testing requirements equivalent to the inoperable valve, except for inoperable valves in the Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) systems.

1 For example: 1) if the inoperable valve is required to be Type C tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, the l device chosen to isolate the penetration must also be subjected to Appendix J, Option B, Type C testing; and 2) if l the it. operable valve is not subjected to Appendix J, Option B, testing (" " in Reference 2, Table T7.0-1, Test l Ty)e column), the isolation device does not have to be su)jected to Appendix J, Option B, testing. For Core Spray l and LPCI system valve inoperability, the device chosen to isolate the affected penetration is not required to be tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, leakage testing. l t This exception is based on the integrity of the system piping, which serves to minimize leakage into the secondary '

containment.

If a valve is inoperable due to isolation time not within limits or other condition that would not be expected to adversely affect leakage characteristics, the inoperable valve may be used to isolate the penetration.

Required Action C.1 must be completed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for lines other than excess flow check valve (EFCV) lines and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for EFCV lines. The Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed

, system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3.

The Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is reasonable considering the instrument to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the small pipe diameter of the affected penetrations.

In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-21 PROPOSED - REVISION J

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.10 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS leakage (leakage through the worse of the two isolation valves) unless the penetration is isolated by use of one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. In this case, the leakage rate of the isolated bypass leakage path is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If both isolation valves in the penetration are closed, the actual leakage rate is the lesser leakage rate of the two valves.

The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (Ref. 7).

1 SR 3.6.1.3.11 The analyses in References 1 and 4 are based on leakage that is less than the specified leakage rate. Leakage through each MSIV must be s 100 scfh, and a combined maximum pathway leakage s 250 scfh for all four main steam lines when tested at 2: 28.8 psig. In addition, if any MSIV exceeds the 100 scfh limit, the as left leakage shall be s 11.5 scfh for that MSIV.

The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

i i

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i (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-28 PROPOSED - REVISION J

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.12 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The valve seats of each 18 inch purge valve (supply and exhaust) having resilient material seats must be replaced every 18 months. This will allow the opportunity for repair before gross leakage failure develops. The 18 month .

Frequency is based on engineering judgment and operational experience which shows that gross leakage normally does not occur when the valve seats are replaced on an 18 month Frequency.

SR 3.6.1.3.13 The Surveillance Requirement provides assurance that the excess flow isolation dampers can close following an isolation signal. The 18 month Frequency is based on vendor recommendations and engineering judgment. Operating experience has shown that these dampers usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency.

Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Chapter 15.

2. Technical Requirements Manual.

3. FSAR, Section 15.1.39.

4. FSAR, Section 6.2.

5. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B. l

6. NRC No.93-102, ." Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

7. Primary Containment Leakge Rate Testing Program. l HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-29 PROPOSED - REVISION J

v SR Applicability >

B 3.0 l i BASES l

}

i I SR 3.0.2 (e.g., transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or i (continued) maintenance activities). >

! The 25% extension does not significantly degrade the

! reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at j its specified Frequency. This is based on the recognition !

? that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the SRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surveillances for l which the 25% extension of the interval specified in the

! Frequency does not apply. These exceptions are stated in

the. individual Specifications. An e;;;;.;;le ei hwi . 3 0.0.2

d: :: n:t :pply is _a Serve!'1:::: .;ith a freqsency ;f "in-3 aceerd:: e Mith 10 CF 50, Appendix J, :: = edified by

! S e e in .S e ry :: r:=d ex:= tion:." The requirements of regulations take precedence over the TS.* The TS cennet in end of th;;;;her

_..... . . . intery:1 specified i= the regel:ti:;r.

Th;r:fere, there-4s-a-Not: in the Treqeency statingc

""2a.2 i: ::t :ppli M ' ."

As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 25% extension also does not apply to the initial portion of a periodic Completion Time that requires performance on a "once per..." basis. The 25%

extension applies to each performance after the initial !

performance. The initial performance of the Required l Action, whether it is a particular Surveillance or some '

other remedial action, is considered a single action with a single Completion Time. One reason for not allowing the 25%

extension to this Completion Time is that such an action usually verifies that no loss of function has occurred by checking the status of redundant or diverse components or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in an alternative manner.

The provisions of SR 3.p.2 are not intended to be used repeatedly, merely as an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals (other than those consistent with refueling intervals) or periodic Completion Time intervals beyond those specified.

SR 3.0.3 SR 3.0.3 establishes the flexibility to defer declaring affected equipment inoperable or an affected variable outside the specified limits when a Surveillance has not been completed within the specified Frequency. A delay (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.0-12 REVISION 0

l l

INSERT FOR B 3.0-12 Therefore, when a test interval is specified in the regulations, the test ;

interval cannot be extended by the TS and the SR includes a Note in the Frequency stating, "SR 3.0.2 is not applicable." An example of an exception when the test !

interval is specified in the regulation is the Note in the Primary Containment i Leakage Rate Testing Program, "SR 3.0.2 is not applicable." This exception is !

provided because the program already includes extension of test intervals.

l l

I l

Primary Containment B 3.6.1.1 B 3.6 CONTAI! MENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.1.1 Primary Containment BASES BACKGROUND The function of the primary containment is to isolate and

' contain' fission products released from the Reactor Primary System following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) and to confine the postulated release of radioactive material. The primary containment consists of a steel lined, reinforced concrete vessel, which surrounds the Reactor Primary System and provides an essentially leak tight barrier against an uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the savironment.

~

The isolation-devices for the penetrations in the primary containment boundary are a part of the containment leak tight barrier. To maintain this leak tight barrier:

a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

i

1. Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment isolation system, or ;

2. Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provid*J in !

LC0 3.6.1.3, " Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)"; '

b. The primary containment air lock is OPERABLE, except as provided in LCO 3.6.1.2, " Primary Containment Air Lock"; and

c. All equipment hatches are closed.

This Specification ensures that the performance of the primary containment, in the event of a DBA, meets the assumptions used in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2. SR 3.6.1.1.1 leakage rate requirements are'in conformance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 3), as modified by approved exemptions. t

, Op%n 8 x

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-1 REVISION 0

i

! Prioary Containment j B 3.6.1.1 l BASES (continued)

! APPLICABLE The safety design basis for the primary containment is that l SAFETY ANALYSES it must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the j limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate.

! The DBA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive material within primary containment is a LOCA. In the analysis of this accident, it is assumed that primary

, containment is OPERABLE such that release of fission

products to the environment is controlled by the rate of j primary containment leakage.

s i Analytical methods and assumptions involving the primary containment are presented in References 1 and 2. The safety analyses assume a nonsechanistic fission product release i i following a DBA, which forms the basis for determination of i

offsite doses. The fission product release is, in turn, !

, based on an assumed leakage rate from the primary ;

containment. OPERABILITY of the primary containment ensures i i that the leakage rate assumed in the safety analyses is not '

1 exceeded.

I l

. The maximum allowable leakage rate for the primary i containment (L ) is 1.2% by weight of the containment air j per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months al the maximum o peak containment pressure (P,)

of 49.6 psig (Ref. 1). g,y,Teur, fog l Primary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4). b bb Nake <

Rde %& $ re3P re,. Orf.5 LCO Primary containment OPERABILITY, is maintained by limiting C155 leakage to t :: th-- L excet$riortothefirststartup after performi.ng a req u, ired 7R ";0, 4;..Jh J, leakage test. At this time,ith: :n!--!::d Ty:: S ::d C in.k;;;: Mt

.::. ::: r.r = r:ll T;;: ^ 'crhr; =:t b;

[pitble (c k%p' e a " L,. , Compliance with this LCO will ensure a primary containment configuration, including equipment hatches, that I ', m ',t' #f , , .y, gg is structurally sound and that will limit leakage to those in M

P'N'*'Y leakage rates assumed in the safety analyses.

c on+.a m eat L*

ke$ a y , .7,gf,,3 Individual leakage rates specified for the primary containment air lock are addressed in LCO 3.6.1.2.

PayaW u +.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-2 REVISION 2

_ _. .. _ . _ _ _ . _ ~ . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

J.

t Primary Crntainment B 3.6.1.1 a

4 BASES (continued) l APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 j and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are i

reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, primary containment is not required i to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 to prevent leakage of

radioactive material from primary containment.

l l

l ACTIONS LJ.

4 1

In the event primary containment is inoperable, primary I

containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within l I hour. The I hour Completion Time provides a period of

time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance i

of maintaining primary containment OPERABILITY during i MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the

probability of an accident (requiring primary containment 3 f OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where primary w l containment is inoperable is minimal.

B.1 and B.2 If primary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The j allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating i experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

% Pe:.. q cad.t w a Le k ,p R e.4e T*es k Peu r. -

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1.1 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining the primary containmentOPERABLE requires !

compliance with the v4suallexaminations and leakage rate test requirements off a CFn r,n a----m y (n-y, 3) 7 =

Mifid by :p;r ":d =;.4ti=:, Failure to meet air lock leakage testing (SR 3.6.1.2.1), or main steam isolation valve leakage (SR 3.6.1.3.10), does not necessarily result (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-3 REVISION 0

Prizary Centainment B 3.6.1.1 4

BASES

(.g , uP,. ;b , y c,,,h

, r. . g,.. ,.

L< k.o

,, .,,4 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1.1 (continued REQUIREMENTS in a failure of this SR. The impact of the failure to meet these SRs must be evalq_at,,gdJfgainst the Type A, B, and C acceptance criteria ofA10 CFR 50, ?;;rdi: J, :: rii#w by eppie;;d e r ;ti;;; (R:f. 3). G e 1;ft '==k=ce M :r t: th-Ti..; et; rte; afte pe-fe-t:; e reqeires is En 50, ** L 5,,

5;: di: ,1:92;e test ie raquieM te b; < 0.5 L. f;r combir.e4 in,w erd 0 leek;;;, ;r.d < 0.75 f;r ;;;rell T;;; A

==6r;:. At all other times between required leakage rate tests, the acceptance criteria are based on an overall l Type A leakage limit of 1.0 L.. At 1.0 L., the offsite dose consequences are bounded by the assumptions of the _taf ety - i analysis. The Frequency is required by 10 CTR 50,(% i L 4 cent :- 4 '

,bp...dia 0 (Ref. 3), .. difi:d by 1;;re"M e- cti - te.k w %

W SR 3.0.2 (41ch ellew; Tregeer.;3 exter;ierie

-Tw;, %

,SR 3.6.1.1.2 Maintaining the pressure suppression function of primary ;

containment requires limiting the leakage from the drywell to the suppression chamber. Thus, if an event were to occur that pressurized the drywell, the steam would be directed through the downconers into the suppression pool. This ;

SR measures drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure during a 10 minute period to ensure that the "

leakage paths that would bypass the suppression pool are within allowable limits.

Satisfactory performance of this SR can be achieved by establishing a known differential pressure between the drywel: nd the suppression chamber and verifying that the pressure in either the suppression chamber or the drywell does not change by more than 0.25 inch of water per minute over a 10 minute period. The leakage test is performed every 18 months. The 18 month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this Surveillance be performed during a unit outage and also in view of the fact that component failures that might have affected this test are identified by other primary containment SRs. Two consecutive test failures, however, would indicate unexpected primary containment degradation; in this event, as the Note indicates, increasing the Frequency to once (continued)

HATCH UNIT I B 3.6-4 REVISION 0

l l li3 seat b 6 S.b-4, SR Sb. l. l. l l

The Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program is based on the guidelines in Regulatory Guide 1.163 (Ref.6), NEI 94-01 (Ref. 7), and ANSI /ANS-56.8-1994 '

(Ref.8). Specific acceptance criteria for as found and as left leakage rates, as well as the methods of defining the leakage rates, are contained in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

l l

l 1

j I

l i

NAT01\ LUER _L

l Primary Containment B 3.6.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS every 9 months is required until the situation is remedied as evidenced by passing two consecutive tests.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 5.2.

2. FSAR, Section 14.4.3.

3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. >

4. NRC No.93-102, " Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

( 5. Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

6. Regulatory Guide 1.163 " Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program " September 1995.

7. NEI 94-01 " Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of,10 CFR Part 50. Appendix J." Revision 0. July 26,1995.

8 ANSI /ANS-56.8-1994. "American National Standard for Containment

k. System Leakage Testing Requirements." 1994.

I HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-5 REVISION 0

Primary Centainment Air Lock B 3.6.1.2 BASES BACKGROUND containment leakage rate to within limits in the event of a (continued) DBA. Not maintaining air lock integrity or leak tightness may result in a leakage rate in excess of that assumed in the unit safety analysis.

APPLICABLE The DBA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive SAFETY ANALYSES material within primary containment is a LOCA. In the analysis of this accident, it is assumed that primary containment is OPERABLE, such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of primary containment leakage. The primary containment is designed with a maximum allowable leakage rate (L ) of 1.2%

by weight.of the containment air per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months at the d' SIS n h 5's - calculatedGuaximum peak containment pressure (P ) of L ocA 49.6 psig (Ref. 2). This allowable leakage rate forms the l

~_ basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on the SRs associated with the air lock.

Primary containment air lock OPERABILITY is also required to minimize the amount of fission product gases that may escape primary containment through the air lock and contaminate and pressurize the secondary containment.

The primary containment air lock satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4).

i LCO As part of primary containment, the air lock's safety function is related to control of containment leakage rates following a DBA. Thus, the air lock's structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to the successful {

mitigation of such an event.

The primary containment air lock is required to be OPERABLE. !

For the air lock to be considered OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE, the air lock must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test, and both air lock doors must be OPERABLE. The interlock allows only one air lock door to be' opened at a time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of primary containment does not exist when primary containment is required to be (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-7 REVISION 2

Primary Centainment Air Leck B 3.6.1.2

! BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued) within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are I

reasonable, based on operating experience to reach the required plant conditions from full power, conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.2.1 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining primary containment air locks OPERABLE requires compliance with the leakage rate test requirements of

?.^ 0T^. ;;, .'.;;xdi: 2 (Paf. 3), :: rfifi^d by =;;rs;d 4

P A aey ,tir9 This SR reflects the leakage rate testing ton u nm,4+

requirements with respect to air lock leakage (Type B leakage tests). The acceptance criteria were established as Le ka0 e Rafe, a small fraction of the total allowable containment leakage.

i The periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock

% son oj Prog ram leakage does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall

(,R et 3 ) . rimary containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required y w0 Of" 50, ^;;: ft: 2 (".;f. 2), n x difi;d by epp.;.;d

-- - ti- :. Th :, 5". ?_?.2 (d.ich :11 x: er :;::::y-

W :ierr) d=? =a+ ==;1y The SR has been modified by two Notes. Note I states that 4

4 " * 'Y an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous Ce fein n

tg g,,',,.dL,.k.3, .

successful performance of the overall air lock leakage test.

This is considered reasonable since either air lock door is

'"J capable of providing a fission product barrier in the eve f#

F" "' ' of a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR, requiring results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteri efapppe.bkfo SR 3.6.1.1.1. This ensures that air lock leakage is properly accounted,for n determining the ;;r- ry containment leakage.fmate. af a SR 3.6.1.2.2 The air lock interlock mechanism is designed to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors in the air lock. Since both the inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed to withstand the maximum expected post accident primary containment pressure, closure of either door will support primary containment OPERABILITY. Thus, the interlock feature supports primary containment OPERABILITY while the (continued)

HATCH UNIT I B 3.6-12 REVISION 0 t

I _. _ _ _ _ . _ - . _ - - . -

Primary Containment Air Lock B 3.6.1.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.2.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS l air lock is being used for personnel transit in and out of the containment. Periodic testing of this interlock i

I demonstrates that the interlock will function as designed and that simultaneous inner and outer door opening will not inadvertently occur. Due to the purely mechanical nature of this interlock, and given that the interlock mechanism is only challenged when the primary containment air lock door is opened, this test is only required to be performed upon entering or exiting the primary containment air lock, but is not required more frequently than 184 days when primary containment is de-inerted. The 184 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of other administrative controls such as indications of interlock mechanism status, available to operations personnel.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 5.2.3.4.5.

2. FSAR, Section 5.2.

3. M :T ^^ " :-- T. :. Prim n ry Can +< ; n med I.e k s s e R ..l e Te s41ns Peasre m.

4. NRC No.93-102, " Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

HATCH UNIT 1 8 3.6-13 REVISION 0

- . . ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _._ __ __ _ ._. _ .__..._.__ _ ._ _

i i,

PCIVs i

B 3.6.1.3

$ BASES l

. ACTIONS since the Required Actions for each Condition provide

! (continued) appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable PCIV.

Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued j

' operation, and subsequent inoperable PCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated j Required Actions.

The ACTIONS are modified by Notes 3 and 4. Note 3 ensures that appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary,

! if the affected system s i inoperable PCIV (e.g.,(an) are rendered Emergency inoperable Core Cooling System by an l (ECCS) subsystem is inoperable due to a failed open test t I return valve). Note 4 ensures appropriate remedial actions

are taken when the primary containment leakage limits are i

exceeded. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, these actions are not required even when the associated LCO is not met.

i Therefore, Notes 3 and 4 are added to require the proper j actions be taken.

I A.1 and A.2 With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV i

inoperable except for inoperability due to leakage not within a limit specified in an SR to this LC0, the affected i

penetration flow paths must be isolated. The method of j isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active i

failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, a blind flange, and a check valve with flow through i the valve secured.

! For a penetration isolated in accordance with Required i Action A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration 1

should be the closest available valve to the primary

! containment. The device must be subjected to leakage testing requirements equivalent to the inoperable valve..

For example: 1) if the inoperable valve is required to be ,

i TypeCtestedper10CFR50,AppendixJ,yEhidevicechosen b

! to isolate the penetration must also be subjected to (

Appendix JgT >e C testing; and 2) if the inoperable valve is i

' not subjectedito Anoendix Jatesting (" " in Reference 2, Table T7.0-1,(Test Type column), the isolation device does j not have to be subjected to Appendix J testing.

i hp4tonB (continued) i

~

} PATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-18 REVISION 1 i

i

e i

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 4

j BASES i

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) 1

' Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to isolation devices located in high radiation areas, and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means.

i Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

i

B.d J

' With one or more penetration flow paths with two PCIVs

' inoperable except due to leakage not within limits, either the inoperable PCIVs must be restored to OPERABLE status or i the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within i

I hour. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers i

that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated i

automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange.

A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected ,

penetration. The device must be subjected to leakage !

testing requirements equivalent to the inoperable valve. I For example: 1) if the inoperable valve is required to be t TypeCtestedper10CFR50,AppendixJ,*thedevicechosen]_gr%

to isolate the penetration must also be subjected to ge '

I

' Anoendix J. Type C testing; and 2) if the inoperable valve is !

not sub.iected to Annandix J. testing (" " in Reference 2, J D " 0) ~

Table T7.0-1, Test Type column), the isolation device does not have to be subjected to Appendix J, testing.

If a valve is inoperable due to isolation time not within limits or other condition that would not be expected to adversely affect leakage characteristics, the inoperable valve may be used to isolate the penetration. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LC0 3.6.1.1.

Condition B is modified by a Note indicating this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two PCIVs.

For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-20 REVISION 1

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.E (continued)

With one or more psnetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable, except due to leakage not within limits, the inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a clo:;ed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isoirte the affected penetration. The device must be subf.cted to leakage testing requirements equivalent to the inograble yk1ve, except for inoperable valves in the Core {

i Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) systems. ;

For example: 1) if the inoperable valve is required to be l Type C tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, the device chosen '

to isolate the penetration must also be subjected to

' Annandir J#ype C testing; and 2) if the inoperable valve is g p g' ;

r.nt sub; acted to Aa==Mr Jdesting (" " in Reference 2,

Op f o n 8.; Table Ti.0-1, Test Type column), the isolation device does j not have to be subjected to Anoendix 4 testing. For Core !

Spray and LPCI system valve inoperability, the device chosen to isolate the affected penetration is not reouired to be tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J,41eakage testing. This exception is based on the integrity of the system piping, which serves to minimize leakage into the secondary containment.

If a valve is inoperable due to isolation time not within limits or other condition that would not be expected to adversely affect leakage characteristics, the inoperable valve may be used to isolate the penetration.

Required Action C.1 must be completed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for lines other than excess flow check valve (EFCV) lines and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for EFCV lines. The Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3.

The Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is reasonable considering the instrument to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the small pipe diameter of the affected penetrations.

In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected (continued)

HATCH UNIT I B 3.6-21 REVISION 1

h PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.8 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR requires a demonstration that each reactor instrumentation line excess flow check valve (EFCV) is OPERABLE by verifying that the valve reduces flow to within limits on an actual or simulated instrument line break condition. This SR provides assurance that the instrumentation line EFCVs will arform as designed. The 18 month Frequency is based on tie need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power.

Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass this Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.6.1.3.9 The TIP shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. An in place functional test is not possible with this design. The explosive squib is removed and tested to provide assurance that the valves will actuate when required. The replacement charge for the explosive squib shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch that has been certified by having one of the batch successfully fired. The Frequency of 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is considered adequate given the administrative controls on replacement charges and the frequent checks of circuit continuity (SR 3.6.1.3.4).

SR 3.6.1.3.10 The analyses in References 1 and 3 are based on leakage that is less than the specified leakage rate. Leakage through each-,,oMSIV,must m_ ..c... be

m. s 11.5

_m schF when2t 2sted at a: 28.0 psig.

.. v , ,, ,,,% p

'ZxW c.

. n % z. :..,'_il x -_T r "d,i'!? d ' 9 s K -- ' Vl i /

X'M L 7.L"'1 ' 2" "' _ 'K "_"' n E '""'K ",'_' 2'i;;iJ ~ _

_m. _ _ u _x_

r ~ -

2' _ ""_ .X.n' , "iz_ _ . ,' ".'"2. .". .' ' '.i.,f. . 1.' _,"...Z. . . ' "

(continued)

HATCH UNIT I B 3.6-27 REVISION 1

- - - ~. - - . - - . - .. . . - . . - - - - - - - . _ - - - - . . _ . . .

9 1

1 J

i PCIVs i B 3.6.1.3 1

I !

{ BASES '

- n -

4 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.10 (continued)

f"'"Y M *'"a " + kaka 5e

! REQUIREMENTS j Rs.te Tese Pasr*~ (Rd. 6 s

-The Frequency is required by .. ..P M , W ,'i ").

difid by =pp-e=M entient; thes, SR ?.0 ? ("ich

ltz Fr:; :::y ::t;;;ie,ie) Le r.;,t ;; ply.

i SR 3.6.1.3.11 The valve seats of each 18 inch purge valve (supply and exhaust) having resilient material seats must be replaced 4

every 18 months. This will allow the opportunity for repair

' before gross leakage failure develops. The 18 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment and operational experience which shows that gross leakage normally does not occur when the valve seats are replaced on an 18 month j Frequency.

SR 3.6.1.3.12 The Surveillance Requirement provides assurance that the i

excess flow isolation dampers can close following an

! isolation signal. The 18 month Frequency is based on vendor recommendations and engineering judgment. Operating i

experience has shown that these dampers usually pass the i

Surveillance when perfomed at the 18 month Frequency.

]

Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from i

i a reliability standpoint.

l REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 14.4.

{ 2. Technical Requirements Manual i 3. FSAR, Section 5.2.

i 4. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J

5. NRC No.93-102, " Final Policy Statement on Technical S i ve "J 3, 1993.

i G. Prin.ru con % :,- ed uc. k.c a n<1e was+;~ f i

4 1

h VM I

a HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-28 REVISION 1 i

i

- _ _ _ _ 4 -. -- _ , _ , _ _ - _ -

SR Applicability B 3.0 i

BASES SR 3.0.2 (e.g., transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or (continued) maintenance activities). ,

The 25% extension does not significantly degrade the reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at its specified Frequency. This is based on the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the SRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surveillances for which the 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency does not apply. These exceptions are stated.in the individual Specifications. An m.ple of there SR 3.0.2 dess net ;ppiT-i3 ; Surveill:nes with a Tr:;::::y Of "in

--accord;nce with 10 GFR 50, App:r. dix J, as w,edifi:d by eppreved ex;..pti:::.-" The requirements of regulations take i

S e e. .in. serf precedence over the TS3 The TS ;;nact i :nd of th relve:-

ext:ad a test interval pecif t:d in th; r:;;1:ti:::. l Therefere, th;r: 1: : Net in the Tr;;;:::y staHnh

'l "3R 3.0.2 is act epplicable."

As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 25% extension also does not apply to the initial portion of a periodic Completion Time that requires performance on a "once per..." basis. The 25%

extension applies to each performance after the initial performance. The initial performance of the Required Action, whether it is a particular Surveillance or some other remedial action, is considered a single action with a l single Completion Time. One reason for not allowing the 25%

extension to this Completion Time is that such an action usually verifies that no loss of function has occurred by checking the status of redundant or diverse components or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in an alternative manner.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not intended to be used repeatedly, merely as an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals (other than those consistent with refueling intervals) or periodic Completion Time intervals beyond those specified.

SR 3.0.3 SR 3.0.3 establishes the flexibility to defer declaring affected equipment inopertsble or an affected variable outside the specified limits when a Surveillance has not been completed within the specified Frequency. A delay (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.0-12 REVISION 0

INSERT FOR B 3.0-12 Therefore, when a test interval is specified in the regulations, the test interval cannot be extended by the TS and the SR includes a Note in the Frequency stating "SR 3.0.2 is not applicable." An example of an exception when the test interval is specified in the regulation is the Note in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program "$R 3.0.2 is not applicable." This exception is provided because the program already includes extension of test intervals.

l

l i

Primary Containment B 3.6.1.1 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.1.1 Primary Containment i

, BASES i

l BACKGROUND The function of the primary containment is to isolate and -

contain fission products released from the Reactor Primary System following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) and to confine the postulated release of radioactive material. The primary containment consists of a steel lined, reinforced 1

concrete vessel, which surrounds the Reactor Primary System !

and provides an essentially leak tight barrier against an 'I uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the environment.

The isolation devices for the penetrations in the primary containment boundary are a part of the containment leak tight barrier. To maintain this leak tight barrier:

a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident i conditions are either:

1. Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment isolation system, or

2. Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in LCO 3.6.1.3, " Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)";

b. The primary containment air lock is OPERABLE, except as provided in LCO 3.6.1.2, " Primary Containment Air Lock"; and

c. All equipment hatches are closed.

i This Specification ensures that the performance of the i primary containment, in the event of a DBA, meets the l

assumptions used in the ~ safety analyses of References I l and 2. SR 3.6.1.1.1 leakage rate requirements are in conformance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 3), as modified by approved exemptions. _l l

(continued) ,

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-1 REVISION 0

Prirary Centainment B 3.6.1.1 i i BASES (continued) I APPLICABLE The safety design basis for the primary containment is that SAFETY ANALYSES it must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the 1

limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate. j l

The DBA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive l material within primary containment is a LOCA. In the l analysis of this accident, it is assumed that primary !

containment is CPERABLE such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of primary containment leakage.

Analytical methods and assumptions involving the primary l containment are presented in References I and 2. The safety !

analyses assume a nonsechanistic fission product release following a DBA, which fonns the basis for determination of offsite doses. The fission product release is, in turn, based on an assumed leakage rate from the primary containment. OPERABILITY of the primary containment ensures that the leakage rate assumed in the safety analyses is not exceeded.

The maximum allowable leakage rate for the primary containment (L per24hoursal)themaximumis 1.2% c by weightpressure aimpent_ of the containment (P,) air of 45.5 psig (Ref. .

gp Q [g l Primary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy I Statement (Ref. 4).

i m ./ v '

LCO Primarv containment OPERABIL Y is maintained by limiting b a age to l : th:a L , ex t prior to the first startup after performina a req,uired ^ "" '^ " = " ' l eakage es . At this tim 7e th ~^M Tpe S : d C 1;;i;b A

[ M < 0.5 L nd th: re:r:ll T3 e ." '_;:2;: -":t M bg %'ed

. < 0.'" L,. , Compliance with this LCO will ensure a primary containment configuration, including equipment hatches, that M hycyt b g- s structurally sound and that will limit leakage to those p Qg eakage rates assumed in the safety analyses. 1 MMN

ndividual leakage rates specified for the primary j containment air lock are addressed in LCO 3.6.1.2. 1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-2 REVISION 2

Primary Containment B 3.6.1.1 '

BASES (continued)

I APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of '

radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment.

l ACTIONS A.l '

In the event primary containment is inoperable, primary containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The I hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring primary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where primary containment is inoperable is minimal.

i B.1 and B.2 l

If primary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be- l brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To I achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. i SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1.1 MM b WSE O REQUIREMENTS M Maintaining the prim on (;.. ;.6 E requires compliance with the sual examinations and leakage rate

.!d i 5. a5 et t irIock l$akagetesting(SR3.6.1.2.1),secondarycontainmentbypass leakage (SR 3.6.1.3.10), or main steam isolation valve (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-3 REVISION 0

i-Primary Containment B 3.6.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS leakage (SR 3.6.1.3.11) does not necessarily result in a failure of this SR. The impact of the failure to meet these '

SRs must be evaluated against the Type A, B, and C r acceptance criteria oP20 CFR 50, ^;;: di J, .; ; d;fied by

( 2;;r:::d ;;. ti;;; (Ref. ?). ^: left le i g; pri., ^. i.he

irst :t:rt;p eft:r p:rf:=in, ; -: cci... ;; 07; ;0,

^;;::di J, l..h_ ; t::t i:

ca=hi-M Ty;; " ;;.4 0 1.a.v.,;...d 4 0.75 fer :r: ; ired 11_t: " <T,,,.

0. ~ A" ,"~__ ,

2: N ;;. At all other times between required leakage rate hg tests, the acceptance criteria are based on an overall Type A . leakage limit of 1.0 L . At 1.0 L c4d

consequences are bounded by the assimotio., ns ofthethe offsite dose safety analysis.

Tgl - ^-

ine trequency is requirec by114 4PlH+;-

"d h 3 (.9:f. 2), :: rdi#4-d by ;;- r:f cr-;th :. l t

Th= , SR ?.0.2 (d.ich elle ; fr:;::::y extert h :) f::: =et 4 915 DIM j SR 3.6.1.1.2 Maintaining the pressure suppression function of primary containment requires limiting the leakage from the drywell to the suppression chamber. Thus, if an event were to occur that pressurized the drywell, the steam would be directed through the downcomers into the suppression pool. This SR measures drywell to suppression chamber differential ;

pressure during a 10 minute period to ensure that the !

leakage paths that would bypass the suppression pool are within allowable limits.

Satisfactory performance of this SR can be achieved by establishing a known differential pressure between the drywell and the suppression chamber and verifying that the pressure in either the suppression chamber or the drywell does not change by more than 0.25 inch of water per minute '

over a 10 minute period. The leakage test is performed every 18 months. The 18 month Frequency was developed considering it is prudent that this Surveillance be performed during a unit outage and also in view of the fact that component failures that might have affected this test are identified by other primary containment SRs. Two consecutive test failures, however, would indicate unexpected primary containment degradation; in this event, as the Note indicates, increasing the frequency to once (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-4 REVISION 0

N W* b 3.lo-4, SR 3.6. I. (. I i

1

! The Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program is based on the guidelines in Regulatory Guide 1.163 (Ref.6). NEI 94-01 (Ref. 7), and ANSI /ANS-56.8-1994 l (Ref.8). Specific acceptance criteria for as found and as left leakage rates. '

as well as the methods of defining the leak. age rates, are contained in the ,

Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Nogram. j 1

I i i

4 Primary Containment i B 3.6.1.1 i BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS every 9 months !s required until the situation is remedied i as evidenced by passing two consecutive tests.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 6.2.

2. FSAR, Section 15.1.39.

, Ophan B.

3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J

4. NRC No.93-102, " Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

e,n ---

I.5 Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

6. Regulatory Guide 1.163. " Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program." September 1995.

7. NEI 94-Oh " Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based !

Option or 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix J." Revision 0. July 26,1995. '

8. ANSI /ANS-56.8-1994 "American National Standard for Containment System Leakage Testing Requirements." 1994, i

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-5 REVISION 0 L

l

}l Primary Containment Air Lock j B 3.6.1.2 3

j BASES

} BACKGROUND containment leakage rate to within limits in the event of a i (continued) DBA. Not maintaining air lock integrity or leak tightness ,

j may result in a leakage rate in excess of that assumed in the unit safe.ty analysis.

APPLICABLE The DBA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive SAFETY ANALYSES material within primary containment is a LOCA. In the ,

analysis of this accident, it is assumed that primary containment is OPERABLE, such that release of fission

' products to the environment is controlled by the rate of primary containment leakage. The primary containment is

_ designed with a maximum allowable leakage rate (L ) of 1.2%

d % n g,3 .

byweightafthecontainmentairper24hoursatIhe bf calculated %iaximum peak containment pressure (P,) of 45.5 psig (Ref. 2). This allowable leakage rate forms the l basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on the SRs associated with the air lock.

Primary containment air lock OPERABILITY is also required to minimize the amount of fission product gases that may escape primary containment through the air lock and contaminate and pressurize the secondary containment.

The primary containment air lock satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4).

LCO As part of priscary containment, the air lock's safety function is related to control of containment leakage rates following a DBA. Thus, the air lock's structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to the successful mitigation of such an event.

The primary containment air lock is required to be OPERABLE.

For the air lock to be considered OPERABLE, the air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE, the air lock must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test, and both air lock doors must be OPERABLE. The interlock allows only one air lock door to be opened at a time. This provision ensures that a gross breach of primary containment does not exist when primary containment is required to be (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 8 3.6-7 REVISION 2

Primary Containment Air Lock 8 3.6.1.2 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued) within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.2.1 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining primary containment air locks OPERABLE requires compliance with the leakage rate test requirements of

& Pc;,nacy 10 0F: 50, ".;;n.di; J-(Reb-aps -aM f_te44y-approved "4 " -atteh This SR reflects the leakage rate testing Lc. ky , Rd e requirements with respect to air lock leakage (Type B leakage tests). The acceptance criteria were established as Pro a small fraction of the total allowable containment leakage.

T, U". Win) 3 )3 c ,nThe periodic testing requirements verify that the air lock leakage does not exceed the allowed fraction of the overall s primary containment leakage rate. The Frequency is required byy0 C3% "W5 2 '".cf. 3), :: ::dif t:d by Eg , ....

.g ILd!)

-.... 35N, b b_ ,[',f N, s I"

}lA'@t M@ cgm

he SR has been modified by two Notes.

an inoperable air lock door does not invalidate the previous Note I stat t that successful perfomance of the overall air lock leakage test.

This is considered reasonable since either air lock door is capable of providing a fission product barrier in the event I of a DBA. Note 2 has been added to this SR, requiring "

results to be evaluated against the acceptance criteri #nppitcm%

ft 3.6.1.1.1. This ensures that air lock leakage is properly accounted for in determining the : :r:11 primary containment leakage

ate.

e m b e d Typ e 6 ,od c SR 3.6.1.2.2 The air lock interlock mechanism is designed to prevent simultaneous opening of both doors in the air lock. Since both the inner and outer doors of an air lock are designed to withstand the maximum expected post accident primary containment pressure, closure of either door will support primary containment OPERABILITY. Thus, the interlock feature supports primary containment OPERABILITY while the (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-12 REVISION 0

Prinary Containment Air Leck 8 3.6.1.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.2.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS air lock is being used for personnel transit in and out of the containment. Periodic testing of this interlock demonstrates that the interlock will function as designed and that simultaneous inner and outer door opening will not inadvertently occur. Due to the purely mechanical nature of this interlock, and given that the interlock mechanism is only challenged when the primary containment air lock door is opened, this test is only required to be performed upon entering or exiting the primary containment air lock, but is not required more frequently than 184 days when primary containment is de-inerted. The 184 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of other administrative controls such as indications of interlock mechanism status, available to operations personnel.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 3.8.2.8.2.2.

2. FSAR, Section 6.2.

3. av urn av,.+ ,_...._ fe. ma c g; res u yPew re.,,_ ,,j p.,p , g,4,

4. NRC No.93-102, " Fin i rulic n Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-13 REVISION 0

.- ~ _ -

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 l BASES ACTIONS since the Required Actions for each Condition provide (continued) appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable PCIV.

Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable PCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

The ACTIONS are modified by Notes 3 and 4. Note 3 ansures that appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system inoperable PCIV (e.g.,(s) are rendered an Emergency Coreinoperable by an Cooling System l (ECCS) subsystem is inoperable due to a failed open test l !

return valve). Note 4 ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken when the primary containtant leakage limits are excueded. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, these actions are not required even when the associated LCO is not met. I Therefore, Notes 3 and 4 are added to require the proper actions be taken.

i A.1 and A.2 With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV ;

inoperable except for inoperability due to leakage not within a limit specified in an SR to this LCO, the affected penetration flow paths must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that' meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed ==="-

valve, the valve a secured.

blind flange, and a check valve flowTh5 ugh l gg For a penetration isolated in accordan a w ee;'

Action A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration >

should be the closest available valve to the primary containment. The device must be subjected to leakage testing requirements equivalent to the i noperable valve.

For example: 1) if the inoperable valvel.is required to be Type C tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J Wthe device chosen to isolate the penetration must also be subjected to Opc4 i appendix Jny e C test < e nd 2) if the inoperable vaive is not subjected to Appendix esting (" " in Reference 2, Table T7.0-1, Test Type c ), the isolation device does not have to be subjected to Appendix testing.

w (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-18 REVISION 1

PCIVs ,

B 3.6.1.3 '

I BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) l If a valve is inoperable due to isolation time not within limits or other condition that would not be expected to adversely affect leakage characteristics, the inoperable

valve may be used to isolate the penetration. .

The Required Action must be completed within the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months i Completion Time (8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for main steam lines). The Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. For main steam lines, an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Completion Time is allowed. The Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for the main steam lines allows a period of time to restore l the MSIVs to OPERABLE status given the fact that MSIV 4 closure will result in isolation of the main steam line(s) and a potential for plant shutdown.

For affected penetrations that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the affected penetration flow path must be verified to be isolated oa a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, and no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. This Required Action does not require any testing or '

device manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those devices outside containment and crpable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. The Completion Time of "Once per 31 days for isolation devices outside primary containment" is appropriate because the devices are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. For the devices inside primary containment, the time period specified " Prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4, if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days" is tased on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the devices and other administrative controls ensuring that j device misaligris.sr.t is an unlikely possibility.

Condition A i.s modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two PCIVs. For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.

l l (continued) l HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-19 REVISION 1

e PCIVs j B 3.6.1.3 l l

l BASES ACTIONS l

A.1 and A.2 (continued) !

Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to ;

3 d

isolation devices located in high radiation areas, and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means.

l Allowing verification by administrative means is considered j acceptable, since access to these areas is typically 4 j

restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment, '

l once they have been verified to be in the proper position,

is low.

i M

! With one or more penetration flow paths with two PCIVs j inoperable except due to leakage not within limits, either

the inoperable PCIVs must be restored to OPERABLE status or i

the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within I hour. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely i affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated ;

!' automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange.

A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected i

penetration. The device must be subjected to leakage testing requirements equivalent to the inoperable valve. l

~ For examnle: 1) if the inanerable valve is required to be

~

i lype C tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J,fthe device chosen 4

to halate the penetration must also be subjected to Appendix $ ype C testing d 2) if the inoperable valve is y (T not subiected to Appendix esting (" " in Reference 2,

) Table T7.0-1, Test Type c ), the isolation device does

{ nothavetobesubjectedtoAppendixgesting.

If a valve is inoperable due to isolation time not within limits or other condition that would not be expected to adversely affect leakage characteristics, the inoperable valve may be nsed to isolate the penetration. The I hour Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1.

Condition B is modified by a Note indicating this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two PCIVs.

For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-20 REVISION 1

1 PCIVs

, B 3.6.1.3 i

i BASES i ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic

}' basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following d

an accident are isolated.

The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration is isolated is appropriate because the

' valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.

Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one PCIV. For penetration flow paths with two PCIVs, Conditions A and B provide the appropriate Required Actions.

Required Action C.2 is modified by a Note that applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of adcinistrative means.

Allowing verification by administrative means ic considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of mi'; alignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.

IL1 With the secondary containment bypass leakage rate or MSIV leakage rate not within limit, the assumptions of the safety analysis tasy not be met. Therefore, the leakage must be restored to within limit within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . Restoration can be accomplished by isolating the penetration that caused the limit to be exceeded by use of one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. When a penetration is isolated, the leakage rate for the isolated penetration is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If two isolation devices are used to isolate the penetration, the leakage rate is assumed to be the lesser actual pathway leakage of the two devices.

The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to restore the leakage by isolating the penetration and the relative importance to the overall containment function.

(continued) 4 HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-22 REVISION 1

i PCIVs :

B 3.6.1.3 !

BASES

( !

l ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)

With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable, except due to leakage not within limits, the inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status or the l affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method !

of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation ,

barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active !

failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. The device must be ,

i subjected to leakage testing requirements equivalent to the '

inoperable valve, except for inoperable valves in the Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) systems.

For example: 1) if the inoperable valve is required to be '

Type C tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J,ldEe aevice chosen M.

to isolate the penetration must also be subjected to ,

Appendix AIype C testing; and 2) if the incperable valve is '

1 not subdeYfed to AppendixrJatesting (" " in Reference 2, Table Tr.0-1, Test Type ccTunn), the isolation device does not have to be subjected to Appendix A testing. For Core Spray and LPCI system valve inoperaomty, the device chosen to Leelate the affected oenetration is not required to be 06bnB> \ tested per 10 CFR 50, Appendix J,Meakage testing. This exception is based on the integrity of the system piping, which serves to minimize leakage into the secondary containment.

If a valve is inoperable due to isolation time not within limits or other condition that would not be expected to adversely affect leakage characteristics, the inoperable valve may be used to isolate the penetration.

Required Action C.1 must be completed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for lines other than excess flow check valve (EFCV) lines and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for EFCV lines. The Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) tc act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPE.%81LITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3.

The Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is reasonable considering the instrument to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the small pipe diameter of the affected penetrations.

In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected l

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-21 REVISION 1

= ' -

i PCIVs l B 3.6.1.3 l

BASES 1

i l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.10 (continued) j REQUIREMENTS

leakage (leakage through the worse of the two isolation j valves) unless the penetration is isolated by use of one

! closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual

! valve, or blind flange. In this case, tha leakage rate of f

the isolated bypass leakage path is assumed to be the actual 3 pathway leakage through the isolation device. If both isolation valves in the penetration are closed, the actual i

i leakagerateisthelesserleakagerateofthetwovajves.#

__T h < , --+ kad a f .u n nt 4 f u 4 == - - > - - - - - ^ * ' - - - ' - ' - ' - -

i _i&t m x , n 7:= "/' - A' ""P.. ',Z.'K . X. "".I

g;z " r cv '"'r *"D ' = > . "etr"~

.., . Z._._.a....ryg y. _ , . . _ _ . . _ _ . ,

{^.[_..g,.f.iperawuequn6ise=u 9 es 4 /rfore .: ./th M. mE >py/+pprv2v

, . - - --4 e a en

u exl gi.sv/a'.douThe

-- ^ ' -

!~ 'AM'~',E I n,44.,n/ ein/. +h. J.3 4 Z TJ~ L TI T>'

< i /i , e6 4

. _ - - _ ,6,,, 4_4.,

___Z _". .a. ...I<--20'"%^L'_ ,._.._ 'y#. . T'_ . 7. ~ " _

! e, b WCIU b n M 16WChi SR 3.6.1.3.11 ppjeTighog h (tm (fd7 ,

! The analyses in References 1 and 4 are asecoDeaka ta j is less than the specified leakage rate. L<eakage through each MSIV must be s 100 scfh, and a combined maximum pathway i

leakage s 250 scfh for all four main steam lines when tested i at at 28.8 psig. In addition, if any MSIV exceeds the 100

! scfh limit, the as left leaka')e shall be s 11.5 scfh for i

l that g,,zjj!i MSIV., Th. ass!v A.=M[

"l.*I^'Ef/"- T2?S-

t .,,.;; .i'ir_;I_t,. ,, ; T;M 'u ' ' '9 f

sw,;L.M %l&*C3" "'LC"7":'m2" />-

d46 suda'-f M._. 27 . :J, M;di.1/.:.~iiMM '" l l i E-i..- -"

\

I The Frequency r- N. b. 'l'^f+u,C,ca%'47,O required "" '" "c - n il< ,./4 /

' T _ r 2 . 'Z, './~ ~ ~ r' ' ~

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HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-28 REVISION 1

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 I

BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.12 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The valve seats of each 18 inch purge valve (supply and exhaust) having resilient material seats must be replaced i every 18 months. This will allow the opportunity for repair i before gross leakage failure develops. The 18 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment and operational experience which shows that gross leakage normally does not occur when the valve seats are replaced on an 18 month Frequency.

SR 3.6.1.3.13 The Surveillance Requirement provides assurance that the excess flow isolation dampers can close following an isolation signal. The 18 month Frequency is based on vendor recommendations and engineering judgment. Operating experience has shown that these dampers usually pass the Surveillance when perfomed at the 18 month Frequency.

Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

l REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Chapter 15.

2. Technical Requirements Manual.

l

3. FSAR, Section 15.1.39.

4. FSAR, Section 6.2.

5. 10 CFR 50, Appendix ) O PMo n 6 .

6. NRC No.93-102, " Final Policy Statement on Technical S c 9

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,w HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-29 REVISION 1

ML20094K383

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