ML20079L034

Proposed Tech Specs Change Request 204 Re Containment High Range Radiation Monitors

ML20079L034
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	10/23/1991
From:	GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20079L025	List: ML20079L019 ML20079L028 ML20079L034
References
NUDOCS 9111050326
Download: ML20079L034 (4)

Text

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0YSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENEPATING STATION FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-16 DOCKET NO. 50-219

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUES' NO. 204 Applicant hereby requests the Commission to change Appendix A of the captioned license as below, and purstant to 10 CFR 50.91, an analysis concerning the determination of no significant hazards considerations is also pra:;ented:

1. Egptions to be chanced Sectiod 3.13

2. Extent, of charLqg The subject change request incorporates an NRC requirement derived from the BWR Standard Technical Specifications to have available a preplanned alternate method to provide an estimate of radioactive material in containment under accident conditions if both l

Containment liigh Radiation Monitors are inoperable for 7 days or-

-more (References 1 and 2).

3. fbancas Recuested lne requested chage is indicated on the attached revised Technical !;pecification p, le 3.13-3 and 3.13-4 Paginat.on effects are included.

4. Discussion- ,

l The Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Technical

Specifications were revised by Licence Amendment 116 (Reference 1) to pecify requiromec for the containment high range radiation ll mnitors, includir9 the following

i (1) Two containment high-range radiation monitors shall be OPERABLE when PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is reouired.

(2) If a monitor is inoperable take action to restore the monitor to its o p rable capability, (3; If the monitor or mor.itors are not returned to the operable r .dition within 7 days, a special report is submitted to t

..2 within 14 days follow bg the event.

In the Safety Evaluation supportinc, f his amendment, GPUN was requested to propoce an additional Technical Specification

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requirement to initiate a preplanned alternate method capable of monitorir; containment r?.diation if both containment high range 9111030326 r1023

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rsdiation monitors are inancrable for more than 7 aays. This proposed ? vision to Tcchnical Specification 3.13 is in response to that request. Technical Specification 6.:~ currently requires a program to ensure the capability to obtain and analyze containment atmosphere samples under accident conditions.

Analyses of samples provide vital information concerning potential core damage and radiological e aditions within primary containment.

5. Determination GPU Nuclear has determined that operation of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station in accordance with the proposed Technical Specification does not involve a Significant Hazards Consideration. This change does not:

1. Involve an increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The propose 0 change documents that the post accident sampling system provides capability for monitoring post accident containment radioactivity, and represents no change to plant configuration or procedures. As such, there is no increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously cvaluated.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Because te i proposed Tech. Spec. change involves no change to the ,lant configuration or procedures, the possibility of a new or different kind of accident is a created.

3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Because the proposed Tech. Spec. change involves no change to the plar.t con. .juration or procedures, there is no ieduction in the margin of safety. '

6. References

1. NRC Letter, " Containment High Range Radiation Monitors (TSCR 152, TAC 64381 and 63015)", dated March 31, 1987.

2. NRC Letter, "0yster Creek Nuclear Generating Station -

Containment High Range Radiation Monitors - (TAC ilo 64381)",

dated June 24, 1991.

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2. With the number of operable channels less than the total number

. of channels shown in Table 3.13.1, restore the inoperable channel to operable status within 30 days or place the reactor in the shutdown condition within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

3. With the number of operable channels lest than the minimum channels operable requirements of Table 3.13.1, restore at least one channel to operable status within 7 days or place the reactor in the shutdown condition within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

G. Containment Hich-Ranae Radiation Monitor

1. Two containment high-range radiation monitors shall be OPERABLE when PRIMARY CONTAINHENT INTEGRITY is required.

2. With the number of OPERABLE monitors less than 2:

a. Take appropriate action to restore the inoperable monitor (s) to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.

b. Perform any actions required by Table 3.1.1.

c. Restore the inoperable monitor (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days of the failure or prepare and submit a Special Report within 14 days following the failure outlining the cause of inoperability, actions taken, and the planned schedule for resi.oring the monitors to OPERABLE status.

3. With the number of CPERAbu monitors less than 1, in addition to the actions of 3.13.G.2 above, restore at least 1 monitor to OPERABLE status within 7 days of the failure or have available a prepianned alternate method capable of being implemented to provide an estimate of the radioactive material in containment under accident conditions.

H. Hiah-Ranae Radioactive Noble bas Effluent Mo-f t_qr

1. The high range radinctive noble gas effluent mor.itors listed in Table 3.12.1 shall be OPERABLE during POWER OPERATION.

2. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the minimum channels OPERABLE requirements, restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days of the event or prepare and submit a Special Report within 30 days following the event ou'. lining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the equipment to OPERABLE status.

BASES The purpose of the safety / relief valve accident monitoring instrumentation is to alert the operator to a stuck open safety / relief valve which could result in an inventory threatening event.

0YSTER CREEK 3.13-3 Amendment 90. : J4', JT, S4', J.lif,13.

6-As the safety valves present distinctly different concerns than those related to relief valves, the technical specifications are separated as to the actions taken upon inoperability. Clearly, the actuation of a safety valve will be immediately detectable by observed increase in drywell pressure. Further confirmation can be gained by obscrying reactor pressure and water level. Operator action in response to these symptoms would be taken regardless of the acoustic monitoring system status. Acoustic monitors act only to ccnfirm the reseating of the safety valve. In actuality, the operator actions in response to the lif ting of a safety valve will not change whether or not the safety valve rescats. Therefore, the actions taken for inoperable acoustic monitors on safet) valves are significantly less stringent than that taken for those monitors associated with relief valves.

Should an acoustic monitor on a safety valve become inoperable, setpoints on adjacent monitors will be reduced to assure alarm actuation should the safety velve lif t, since it is of no importance to the operator as to which valves lif t but only that one has lif ted. Aaalyses, using very conservative blowdown forces and attenuation factors, show that reducing the alarm setpoint on adjacent monitors to less than 1.4g will assure alarm actuation should the adjacent safety valve lif t. Minimum blowdown force considered a' "'

was 30g with a maximum attenuation in actuality, a safety valve lift would result in considerably la. , wdown force, lhe maximum attenuat;on of 27dB was determined bas < aa actual testing of a similar monitoring system installed in a similar configuration.

The operability of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables during and following an accident. The capability is consistent with NUREGs 0578 and 0737.

The capability is provided to detect and measure concentrations of noble gas fission products in plant gaseous ef fluents and in containment during and following an accident. Two Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Systems (RAGEMS) are installed at Oyster Creek te perform this function; one to monitor releases at the main stack (RAGEMS 1) and one to monitor the turbine building vents (RAGEMS 11). Two high range radiation monitors are installed in the drywell . ihese monitors augment the capabilities provided by the Post h ' dent Sampling System (see Technical Specification 6.17 and FSAR Section 11.5) and the Offsite Thermoluminescent Dosimeter Pregram (see Emergency Plan section 7,5.2.2b.)

t OYSTER CREEK 3.13 4 Amendment No. J,[,[,)4$,137 d

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