ML20079F601

Tenth Request for Admissions to Nrc.Related Correspondence

ML20079F601
Person / Time
Site:	Clinch River
Issue date:	06/04/1982
From:	Finamore B, Weiss E HARMON & WEISS, National Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club
To:	NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD)
Shared Package
ML20079F592	List: ML20079F588 ML20079F595 ML20079F601 ML20079F611 ML20079F634 ML20079F655
References
NUDOCS 8206080104
Download: ML20079F601 (11)

Text

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l nF,tATEDCOlU O N' June;4, 1982 f

ITNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5 4 > 0 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICEdSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges:

Marshall E. Miller, Chairman Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr.

Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr.

)

In the Matter of )

)

) Docket No. 50-537 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY )

PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION )

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY )

)

(Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant))

)

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.

AND THE SIERRA CLUB TENTH REQUEST TO STAFF FOR ADMTSSIONS Pursuant to 10 CFR S 2.742, and in accordance with the Board's Prehearing Conference Order of February 11, 1982, Intervenors, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and the Sierra Club, request admission by Staff of the truta of the following matters of fact.

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ADMISSIONS l

General Admission

1. The FES statements underlined by Intervenors in the Appendix to Intervenors' Twentieth Set of Interrogatories to Staff are based solely on the materials presented or referenced in the FES, and the FES and its references reveal all of the facts, bases, and assumptions relied upon as a basis for these statements. (See updated response to Interrogatory 54 of Intervenors' Twentieth Set of Interrogatories to Staf f) .

Contention 1 l

2. The NRX reactor at Chalk River experienced a core disruptive accident (CDA) on or about December 12, 1952.

3. The No. 1 pile, an air-cooled graphite-moderated reactor at Windscale, UK, experienced a core disruptive accident on or about October 9, 1957.

4. The SL-1 reactor at NRTS (now INEL) experienced a CDA on or about January 3, 1961.

5. The HTRE-3 reactor at NRTS (now INEL) experienced a CDA on or about November 18, 1958.

6. The WTR reactor at Waltz Mill, PA, experienced a CDA on or about January 3, 1961.

7. The FERMI-l reactor experienced a CDA on or about October .

5, 1966.

8. EBR-1 reactor experienced a CDA, a core meltdown, on or about November 25, 1955.

9. The Three Mile Island Unit 2 reactor experienced a CDA on March 28, 1979.

10. Staff has not quantitatively determined that the probability of a CRBR CDA is less than one chance in 10 4 reactor-years with a confidence level greater than 90 percent.

11. Staff has not objectively determined that the probability 4

of a CRBR CDA is less than one chance in 10 reactor-years with a confidence level greater than 90 percent.

13. Considerably more operational experience and an extensive search for initiating events associated with actual reactor designs is required to demonstrate that a CDA in a reactor of the general size and type as the CRBR is incredible.

14. Staff has done no analyses to determine the relat.ionship between compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 and

-6 the safety goal of a 10 per year probability cf exceeding

~

the 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines.

15. Staff has received no correspondence (including questions or reports) related to the reliability assessments in the PSAR, NEDM-140 82, WARD-D-0118, or WARD-D-0127 since July 14, 1976.

16. The TMI-2 accident had significant safety implications.

17. If the information now available had been known when the Fermi reactor was constructed, design changes would have been made to take account of the currently known data.

18. If the information now available had been known when the TMI-2 reactor was constructed, design changes would have been made to take account of the currently known data.

19. With respect to a reactor of the general size and type as the CRBR, the determination by Staf f that a CDA need not be included in the spectrum of DBAs is a subjective determination.

20. With respect to a reactor of the general size and type as the CRBR, the determination by Staff that a CDA need not be included in the spectrum of DBAs is an objective determination.

21. With respect to a reactor of the general size and type as the CRBR, the determination by Staff that a CDA need not be included in the spectrum of DBAs is based upon qualitative judgments.

22. Staff is unable to state the probability of a CDA in a reactor of the general size and type as the CRBR in quantitative terms such as, for example, less than one chance 4

in 10 reactor years.

23. Staff is have not quantitatively determined that the probability of a CDA in a reactor of the general size and type 4

as the CRBR is less than one chance in 10 reactor years with a confidence level greater than 90 percent.

24. Staf f have not quantitatively determined that the probability of a CDA in a reactor of the general size and type as the CRBR is less than-one chance in 10 6 reactor years with a confidence level greater than 90 percent.

25. While some probabilistic criteria have been employed, the ultimate decision that a CDA for a reactor of the general size and type as the CRBR does not have to be considered as a DBA is based upon engineering judgment.

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26. The decision that a CDA for a reactor of the general size and type as the CRBR does not have to be considered as a DBA was made in a deterministic manner as distinguished from a probabilistic manner.

27. Since the decision that a CDA for a reactor of the general size and type as the CRBR does not have to be considered as a DBA was made in a deterministic manner, it is not possible to quantify the probability of the occurrence of a CDA.

28. Since the decision that a CDA for a reactor of the general size and type as the CRBR does not have to be considered as a DBA was made in a deterministic manner, the chance of occurrence of a CDA can only be stated in subjective terms such as highly improbable or extremely unlikely.

'7-Contention 2

29. The General Design Criteria for the CRBR are not final, since Staf f has not completed its review of Applicants' proposed criteria as reprinted in Appendix A of the Staff Site Suitabili ty Report.

30. The discussion of the consequences of Class 8.5 accidents in the FES is based on assumptions used in the Parallel Design only, which has been withdrawn by Applicants.

31. The discussion of the consequences of Class 9 accidents in l

l the FES is based on assumptions used in the iarallel Design only, which has been withdrawn by Applicants.

32. The General Design Criteria for the CRBR will be based in part upon design-specific information for the CRBR.

33. The General Design Criteria for the CRBR will be based in part upon analyses of potential accidents for the CRBR.

Contention 6

34. Please respond to Requests for Admission 1-10 cated August 17, 1976, based on Applicants' updated answers to earlier discovery and Applicants' revised Environmental Report Ssection 5.7.1, submitted to Staf f on May 3, 1982.

35. The transportation of SNM in the CRBRP fuel cycle will not comply with the provisions of 10 CFR Part 71.

36. The high-level waste from processing fuel at the Hanford PUREX plant would be classified as defense waste and managed in the same manner as other high-level defense waste at Hanford.

37. A comparison of the overall environmental impacts associated with the Hanford PUREX operation with the model reprocessing plant discussed in WASH-1535 and DOE /EIS-0085-D has not been made.

Contention 9

38. Staff cannot truthf ully admit or deny whether there will be sigt.ificant quantities of plutonium available to fuel the CRBR because the information necessary to make this determination is not available to Staff.

Contention 11

39. One or more British workers known to have been occupationally exposed to plutonium and known to have lung burdens of plutonium have died of lung cancer that may have been caused by the plutonium exposure.

40. When a tissue mass in the bronchial region of the lung is irradiated by an immobile particle of sufficient alpha activity, the probability of a lesion developing is high.

41. The probability of the lesion referred to in the previous question developing into a tumor is high.

I 42. When a tissue mass in the alveolar region of the lung is irradiated by an immobile particle of sufficient alpha activity, the probability of a lesion developing is high.

43. The probability of the lesion referred to in the previous question developing into a tumor is high.

44. When a tissue mass in the subplural region of the 1ung is irradiated by an immobile particle of sufficient alpha activity, the probability of a lesion developing is high.

45. The probability of the lesion referred to in the previous question developing into a tumor is high.

46. When a tissue mass in the bronchiolo-alveolar region of the lung is irradiated by an immobile particle of sufficient alpha activity, the probability of a lesion developing is high.

47. The probability of the lesion referred to in the previous question developing into a tumor is high.

48. Given that Staf f now admits that the histological description of the lesions produced by Pu microspheres immooilized in the periphery of rat and hamster lungs are suggestive of an incipient carcinogenic response (see response to Requests for Admissions 15 and 16 (Contention 7 renumbered as 11) , dated July 28, 1976), please respond to this Request for Admission:

e l

If a lesion similar to that produced in hamster and rat lungs by plutonium microspheres is produced by PuO 2 Particles and deposited in the periphery of human lungs, it is reasonable to assume that the lesion could develop into a pulmonary carcinoma as a consequence of the fact that the similar lesions produced in hamster and rat lungs are suggestive of an incipient carcinogenic response.

Respectfully suomitted,

, AdNaw W. n << s .. ~

Barbara A. Finamore S. Jacob Scherr 1725 I Street, N.W., #600 Washington, D.C. 20006 (202)223-8210 I

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Q $. Weiss HarmoT& Weiss 1725 I Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006 (202)883-9070 Attorneys for Intervenors Natural Resources Defense Council and Sierra Club Dated: June 4, 1982

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