ML20073B772
| ML20073B772 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinch River |
| Issue date: | 04/11/1983 |
| From: | Deitrich L, Meller A, Switick D JOINT APPLICANTS - CLINCH RIVER BREEDER REACTOR |
| To: | National Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8304120542 | |
| Download: ML20073B772 (41) | |
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uma UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS." ION,
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i In the Matter of
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
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Docket No. 50-537
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PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHCRITY
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l (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant)
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. I APPLICANT'S UPDATED RESPONSE TO NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.,
AND SIERRA CLUB INTERROGATORIES (THIRD, SEVENTH. EIGHTEENTH. AND NTNETEENTH SETS) i Pursuant to 10 CFR paragraph 2.740b, the United States Department of Energy, Project Management Corporation, and the Tennessee Valley Authority (the Applicants) hereby update their i
updated responses to the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
and the Sierra Club Third, Seventh, Eighteenth, and Nineteenth Sets of Interrogatories previously submitted by Applicants on April 28,1982; April 30,1982; May 4,1982; and June 15, 1982; respectively.
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THIRD INTERROGATORY SET ODESTION II (CENERAL)
Request for the following information is based on our concerns with respect to validation (iii) and (iv) above.
In the Applicant's answers to the generic questions (b) and c) below, the Applicant is requested to be responsive to these concerns.
With respect to each statement, assertion or assumption d
from Section F6.2 of the PSAR identified below, please provide the following information (unless noted otherwise).
(NOTE:
The following numbered Interrogatories are identified by the page and/or paragraph number from the PSAR in parenthesis.) (Where appropriate, the pa rts of the question have been restated to reflect the protocol for discovery agreed to by Applicants, i
Staff, and Intervenors NRDC et al.]
2 e) Explain whether Applicants are presently engaged in or intend to engage in any further research or work which may affect Applicants' answer.
This answer need be provided only in cases where Applicante intend to rely upon ongoing research not included in Section 1.5 of the PSAR at the LWA or construction permit hearings on the CRBR.
Failure to provide such an answer means that Applicants do not intend to rely upon the existence of any such research at the LWA or construction permit hearings on the CRBR.
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. ANSWER II (CENERAL)
(e) The Applicants have defined the areas of ongoing work in Section 1.5 of the PSAR and Appendix A of CRBRP-3.
No other work is in progress which is expected to change Applicants' answer in this area for the CP hearing.
QUESTION II-15 i
(F6.2-95, par. 2) Generic answers (a) and (b) are not required.
(c) Provide more detailed models of possible phenomena and events taking place b: 2 ween clad melting and f uel dispersal above the gas plenum region, giving estimates of the time sequence of events, material description, movements and l
relocations.
i ANSWER II-15fc)
Presently available models of the phenomena and events taking place between clad melting and fuel dispersal during the
^
initial stages of core disruption are those used by the Applicant in CRBRP-GEFR-00103, CRBRP-GEFR-00523, and J. E. Cahalan, et al.
analysial, i.e., SAS3D, PLUTO 1, and PLUTO 2.
The Applicants' 1
J. E. Cahalan, et al.,
"An Assessment of the Unprotected LOF Accident at EOC-4 in the CRBRP Heterogeneous Core Desi'gn,"
contained in HQ:S 82:162, J. R. Longenecker to P. S. Check,
" Additional Information on Energetics Analysis for the CRBRP," Dec. 23, 1982.
updated analysis of fuel penetration into assembly rod structure is given in Section 8.2.2 of CRBRP-GEFR-00523.
--._,,--.y---
SEVENTH INTERROGATORY SET NOTE:
Question 15 prtains to a postulated f uel assembly flow l
blockage accident.
i OUESTION 15fa)
Has this accident (with and without SCRAM) been analyzed (calculated) to determine the course it could take (see
- p. F3-19).
l ANRWER 15fa) i This event has not been analyzed since a complete flow bl'ockage is precluded by the design.
However, the consequences a
l are considered to be enveloped by the TOP and LOF events analyzed in detail in CRBRP-GEFR-00523.
Since the Fermi blockage incident, major changes have been introduced in the design of fuel assemblies and the inlet structures to preclude fuel assembly inlet blockage.
The design of the inlet nozzle of the fuel assembly and the inlet module and l
module liner are presented in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 of the i
l PSAR, res pe ctively.
i i
OUESTION 2Sfs)
What is the status of the computer investigation i
proposed by Boudreau, et al., at Los Alamos?
Have any been issued in report (including draft) form?
If so, please. provide these.
i
ANSWER 25fa)
The SIMMER code development suggested by Boudreau,JLt al, is still in progress.
Results have been published in NUREG-CR-3224, "An Assessment of CRBR Core Disruptive Accident Energetics," T. G. Theofanous and C. R. Bell, Los Alamos National Laboratory, March 1983.
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! i-EIGHTEENTH INTERROGATORY SET i
l I.
Contentions 1, 2, 3 i
INTERROGATORY ll The November 9,1978 letter from William P. Gammill of I
the NRC Staf f to Lochlin W. Caffey summarizes the Staff's position regarding the major unresolved CRBR safety issues at the time the CRBR licensing proceeding was suspended.
Briefly describe Applicants' position -
4 in regard to Items I A, B, C, D, J; II A, B, C, D; III i
A, B; IV C, H, I; V A, B; VI A; VII A, B, C, D; VIII A, l
j B,
C; IX A, B, C,D,F,G,H.
1 RESPONSE 11 I
j j
I.
GENERAL 4
i A.
Control Room Desian Conformance with CRBRP Criterion 17
- 2. PSAR Section 3.1.3.1 and Section 7.4.4 provided
^
(Amendment No. 32 and 75) functional requirements for j
remote control (Remote Shutdown System) which are j
believed to satisfy the remote reactor control I
requirements of NRC and CRBRP Design Criteria 17.
These sections were expanded further in the response-to NRC Question CS421.17 (Amendment No. 72).
i
i
. 3 III.
THERMAL-HYDRAULIC DESIGN j
- A. Natural Circulation and Low Sodium Flows 1
l The Project, in response to NRC Question 001.580 in i
Amendment No. 32, committed to analyses and testing which will confirm the natural circulation capabilities 4
of CRBAP.
Additionally, the Project has supplied pre-test predictions of natural circulation tests at FFTF in February 1981, using CRBRP methodologies and computer codes.
A report will be prepared consolidating these pre-test predictions and post-test analyses for l
submittal to NRC with the FSAR for review at the l
. Operating License stage.
PSAR Section 5.75, Natural Circula, tion," was added to the PSAR in Amendment 75 to i
discuss CRBRP natural circulation capabilities.
I IV.
MECHANICAL / STRUCTURAL DESIGN
/
l C. Eg: trol Rod Systema n
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The PSAR, a,nended in Atendment 76, reflects the current 4
i design of the SCRDMs.
i 1
VIII. SYSTEMS A. Fire Protection Evntem 2.^
The Project hat. made a preliminary determination of i'
g fire hazards which was submitted in Amendment No.
s l
- 4 8.
The Project is preparing a detailed fire i
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. hazards analysis which will be included in the FSAR.
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ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 4
G.
Instrumentation to Follow the Course of an Accident 1.
The Project has completed a detailed review and i
evaluation of Regulatory guide 1.97, Rev. 2.
This I
is documented in PSAR Section 7.5.11 and Q/R CS760.6.
j H.
Risk Associated with Nearby Industrial Activities j
The proposed Exxon f acility was removed f rom the NRC docket in 1980 and is no longer considered as having a potentibl impact on the CRBRP.
An updated discussion of nearby Industrial Facilities was provided in Section 2.2 of the PSAR in Amendment 76.
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NINTEENTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES i
ODESTION NINETEEN 19.
With respect to the following request for information, we are concerned with four distinct validations l
relative to the models and computer codes.
)
i)
Validation that the code's output is the correct j
numerical calculations that should result from a given i
set of input data and the model assumptions;
)
11)
Validation of the models against actual i
j experimental data;
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i iii)
Validation that the models can be extended to the CRBRP; and iv)
Validation that the input assumptions for the CRBR case are adequate with respect to the CDA analysis, i.e.,
are supported by experimental evidence.
By
" adequate" here and below, we mean that the calculations will not underestimate the CDA work potential (i.e.,
forces and resulting energetics of a CDA) or overestimate the containment capability of the' reactor with respect to a CDA.
I.
With respect to each of the following codes and each subroutine of each of the following codes:
l
{A)
SAS-3D 1
(B)
SAS-4A (C)
EPIC (if not included in SAS-3D or SAS-4A, please provide the following informations (1)
Complete, current documentation (i.e., a writeup) of the codes and the subroutines.
(2)
Identify, by name and af filiation, the author, or authors, of each model, subroutine, or portion of each subroutine, which each contributed or worked on.
(3)
Identify by name and affiliation (including organization, division, branch, title, etc.)
each Applicar.t employee or consultant that has intimate working knowledge of the code and each subroutine, or parts thereof, including its validity.
Where more than one person is involved, delineate which portion of the code or subroutine with which each has an intimate working knowledge.
(4)
Describe fully the procedures by which Applicants have assured themselves and continue to assure themselves, that the various computer programs (codes) accurately reproduce the models (age validation i)
- above, i
I i
. 1 (5)
Indicate which models (including subroutines, or portions of subroutines) have not been j
validated as described in Validation 1).
(6)
Indicate the models (including subroutines, 4
l or portions of subroutines) or assumptions that have not been validated as described in 1
Validation 1).
j (7)
For each model, portion of the model, or assumption that has been validated (against l
experimental (or other) data, Ana Validation
- 11) above, describe fully J
(a) the procedure oy which it was validated, (b) the results, including all uncertainties and limitations of the validation, (c) the source of the experimental or other data that was used in the validation.
(8)
Explain fully I
(a) all instabilities in the numerical performance in the models, (b) what causes them, (c) how they are avoided, and (d) the extent to which this introduces uncertainties in the calculations and limit the validity of the models.
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(9)
To the extent that any answers to the above questions are based on referenced material 1
not previously provided, please supply the i
references.
l (10)
Explain whether Applicants are presently
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engaged in or intend to engage in any further research or work which may affect the answer.
j Identify such research or work.
(11)
Identify the expert (s), if any, whom i
Applicants intend to have testify on the subject matter questioned.
State i
j qualifications of each such expert.
i 1
j II.
With respect to the Interrogatories identified above where final information was not provided, please provide l
the following information:
i)
What is Applicants' present (preliminary) assessment in these areas?
l ii)
What are the uncertainties that prevent Applicants i
from making a final assessment in these areas?
j iii)
What is the precise information that Applicants j
require to resolve these uncertainties?
iv) ire Applicants presently engaged in other research related to these areas?
Do Applicants intend to engage in such research in the future?
l.
III.
Please identify each and every routine in (1) the entire SAS-3D coder (2) the entire SAS-4A code; (3) the entire EPIC code (if not included in the SAS-3D l
or SAS-4D codes).
t Separately, for each routine identified above, please supply the following information:
(a)
Was the routine verified by comparison with other codes, or by comparison with the reLults of hand caleplations, or by comparison with what sound engineering judgment deemed to be physically reasonable?
(b)
If the routine was verified by comparison with other codes, how was the other code or codes verified?
Identify the other code or codes.
(c)
If the answer to (a) or (b) above is that the routine was verified by hand calculations, i
please supply the hand calculations or the appropriate documentation,
i.e.,
(i) the name(s) of the individual (s) who j
performed the calculations and made the l
comparison; and (ii) the laboratory notebook,_mencrandum, or other written record that documents the comparison.
1 1
(d)
If the answer.o (a) or (b) above is that the j
subroutine was verified by comparison with what sound engineering judgment deemed to be i
i physically reasonable, please describe in i
detail the nature of and basis for the l
engineering judgment.
In addition, supply:
i (i) the name(s) of the individual (s) who t
i rendered the judgment and made the 4
comparison; and j
(ii) the laboratory notebook, memorandum, or other written record that documents the 1
l comparison.
j (e)
Did the author (s) of the models actually l
perform the coding?
If not, identify the programmer (s).
(4)
How do Applicants continue to assure themselves that the overall code and its subroutines accurately reproduces the models as described in the PSAR and its references?
(5)
Please identify and provide all intra-laboratory memoranda generated by personnel in the Accident Analysis Section, the Coolant Dynamics Section, and
-other Sections oR the ANL Reactor Analysis and Safety Division that critique or otherwise evaluate the models developed by other personnel in these respective sections, limited to the development of i
any and all models and subroutines that are
i I.
f identified in 1) above.
Also provide all subsequent memoranda that are responses to criticisms or evaluations identified above or that j
represent a continuation of the dialogue related to j
the model evaluation.
)
ANSWER IfA) f (1)
References 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 on page 11-1 of i
CRBRP-GEFR-00523, "An Assessment of HCDA Energetics in the CRBRP
}
j He.terogeneous Reactor Core," S. K. Rhow, et al., describe the SAS3A code, the fuel-coolant interaction model, the clad motion model and the fuel motion model in the SAS3A code.
The SAS3A j
l sodium film motion model is documented in:
G. Hoppner, " Sodium Flow Motion Model of SAS3A," ANL/ RAS 74-22, 1974.
The SAS3A l
primary loop model is documented in:
Ref. 30 in
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CRBRP-GEFR-00103.
The SAS3D code, now being used, evolved from BAS 3A which evolved from the SAS2A code which evolved from the l
SASIA code.
Documentation for the SAS3A code is applicable to the SAS3D code.
The SAS2A code is documented in Reference.7 in i
i CRBRP-GEFR-00523, and SAslA is documented in ANL-7607, "SASIA, A Computer Code for the Analysis of Fast Reactor Power and Flow I
Transients," by D. R. MacFarlane, et al.
l A User's Manual for SAS3D Release 1.0, "A Preliminary User's Guide.to Version 1.0 of the SAS3D LMFBR Accident Analysis Computer Code," J. E. Cahalan, D. R. Ferguson, et al., ANL, July i
1977, describes the release code.
The SASBLOK algorithms used in 4
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the SAS3A and SAS3D codes are documented in CRBRP-GEFR-00103, "An Analysis of Hypothetical Core Disruptive Events in the Clinch
[
River Breeder Reactor Plant," J. L. McElroy, et al.
Modifications and additions to the SAS3D code made for specific CRBRP applications are documented in CRBRP-GEFR-00523 and in "An Assessment of the Unprotected LOF Accident at EOC-4 in the CRBRP Heterogeneous Core Design," J. E. Cahalan, et al., ANL, December, 1982.
(2)
The SAS3D code is a complex code system which has j
been developed over a period of years by the Reactor Analysis and Safety Division of Argonne National Laboratory.
The SASBLOK algorithm was developed by the General Electric Company.
The principal contributors to SAS3D code development are identified-as authors of the references in Response 1.
(3)
The following staff members of Argonne National Laboratory and General Electric have a working knowledge of the codes, including their range of applicability and the efforts that have been made to validate them:
L. Walter Deitrich, Associate Director, Reactor Analysis and Safety Division, Argonne National Laboratory; David P. Weber, Manager, Accident Analysis Section, Reactor Analysis and Safety Division, Argonne National Laboratory; Dennis M. Switick, Manager, Safety Analysis, General Electric Advanbed Reactor Systems Department.
(4)
The entire SAS3D code, including all subroutines, have been checked and rechecked to assure that the numerical algorithms which are implemented in them to sol.ve the equation sets, which constitute these codes, behave in a stable fashion
i
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l (both individually and collectively) and produce accurate 1
l solutions to the original equation sets.
This was carried out by l
comparing SAS3D results with the output from other codes, with 1
l the results of hand calculations, and with what mound engineering judgement deemed to be physically reasonable.
1 (5)
All models have been validated as discussed in (4)
I above.
(6) - (7)
The experimental basis for the SAS3A code as t
of Ap'ril 1974 has been documented in the paper, " Current Status l
and Experimental Basis of the SAS LMFBR Accident Analysis Code 1
System," Proc. Am. Nucl. Soc. Fast Reactor Safety Conf., Beverly j
Hills, California, CONF-740401, pp. 1303-1318.
Additional comparisons of the SAS3A code with experiments have been made since that time and are documented in the following references:
l (1)
Ref. 32 in CRBRP-GEFR-00103.
i
)
(2)
Ref. 59 in CRBRP-GEFR-00103.
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(3)
Ref. 8 in CRBRP-GEFR-00523, pp. 54-62.
1 (4)
Ref. 28 in CRBRP-GEFR-00103, pp.64-100.
i 1
(5)
L. W. Deitrich, " Analysis of Transient Fuel Failure Mechanisms, Selected ANL Programs," Presented at the International Working Group on Fast Reactors
]
Specialists' Meeting on Fuel Failure Mechanisms, 1
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Seattle, Washington, May 11-16, 1975.
l
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l (6)
E. Barts, at al.,
" Summary and Evaluation, Fuel Dynamic Loss-of-Flou Experiments (Tests L2,. L3, and L4)," ANL'75-57, September 1975..
j i
t i, The experimental basis for the SAS3A is applicable to SAS3D and additional experimental basis is documented in the followings i
i (1)
Ref. 35 in CRBRP-GEFR-00523.
(2)
" Final Report on the SLSF In-pile Experiment P3A,"
i T. E. Kraf t and L. R. Kelman, ANL/ RAS 81-20, June, 19 81.
(3)
W. A.,Ragland, "LMFBR Loss-of-Flow Simulations in the Sodium Loop Safety Facility," ASME Paper (80-C2/NE-22, presented at the Century 2 Nuclear Engineering Conference, San Francisco, August 19-21, 1980.
(4)
Documents cited on page AA-63 in Applicants' Response to Interrogatory Set III, Question II-5(C) (iii) as Numbers 5, 6, and 8 through 16.
It should be noted that many of the models used in SAS3D are parametric in nature.
Justification for the particular parameters used in the analysis is given in CRBRP-GEFR-00103, CRBRP-GEFR-00523, in PSAR Amendment 72 (Responses to Questions cS760.178A1, A2, and A3), and in "An Assessment of the Unprotected LOF Accident at EOC-4 in the CRBRP Heterogeneous Core Design," by J. E. Cahalan, et al.,
ANL, December, 1982.
Because of this parametric nature of the SAS3D code, it can be used to draw valid conclusions relative to the course of hypothetical accidents in an LMFBR even though each subroutine may not have l
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been completely validated by experiments, since parameters can be varied to determine the sensitivity of the results to variations in parameters.
(8)
Mathematically, practically all of the models in i
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SAS3D consist of sets of coupled ordinary differential or integro-differential equations in time or of coupled partial differential equations in space and time.
Numerically, these equation sets are solved by applying appropriate linearization j
and finite-differencing techniques.
Some of these temnoral finite-differencing techniques are fully implicit and are unconditionally stable.
Other models, such as that which treats l
the time-dependent radial heat transport from the fuel pin into i
l the coolant, have their equation sets solved by semi-implicit j
temporal finite-differencing techniques.
It is well known that solutions obtained by semi-implicit differencing can exhibit bounded oscillations if time steps which are too large are taken.
Thirdly, some equation sets, such as the SLUMPY compressible hydrodynamics equations, are solved with fully explicit methods.
Here, taking time steps that are too large can produce solutions which become unstable.
Throughout SAS3D, provisions have been made to insure i
that the time step sizes being used for advancing the various solutions in time are kept sufficiently small so that the solutions behave stably and are accurate.
These time step sizes are chosen by monitoring both the solutions and their rates of change and applying step size selection criteria based on both
-j f
known analytical constraints, where they are available, and. on
i.
.l 1
experience gained in applying the code to a variety of i
i situations.
These step size selection criteria are explained in detail in the references provided in part 1 above.
It is still possible, however, to occasionally force a model in the SAS3D j
code to utilize a time step size which is so large that stability i
problems result.
It is also possible for the user to try to
}
j utilize SAS3D to analyze cases which are not intended to be modeled by SAS3D.
In these cases, the results predicted by SAS3D i
may tend to become unrealistic and physically meaningless.
Both of these problems can and are generally dealt with by carefully 2
I scrutinizing the computer output and comparing it against i
1 engineering judgement.
I (9)
The reference documents have been or will be made i
]
available for inspection and copying.
(10)
The Applicants are currently analyzing this area and have documented the planned program of research in Appendix A to CRBRP-3, Vol. 1.
Applicants have not yet determined whether i'
they will rely on the results of future analysis.
(11)
At the tresent time, the Applicants have not 4
~
determined the experts, if any, whom they intend to have testify on the subject matter questioned at construction permit hearings.
ANSWER IfB)
Applicants have employed limited portions of the SAS4A code in recent licensing-related calculations for CRBRP.
These calculations involved using the PLUT02 code as it is incorporated into SAS4A as a module.
The PLUT02 code used in SAS4A is the-
4.
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i same physical and mathematical model as the PLUT02 code used previously as a stand-alone code for licensing calculations.
Answers to parts 1 through 11 of this question pertaining to i
PLUT02 as a stand-alone code were provided by Applicants in
" Applicants Updated Response il to Natural Resources Defense i
i Council, Inc., and Sierra Club Interrogatories (Second, Third, I
Fourth, Fif th, and Sixth Sets)" on pages AA-10 through AA-13.
1 j
Major portions of the SAS4A code have not been used in licensing calculations, including the LEVITATE, CLAP, PRIMAR-4, FLXSHP, GEOMAP, and TSBOIL modules, and material related specifically to th,ese modules is not included in this response, although these modules are included in documentation.
(1)
Interim documentation of SAS4A is available in:
"The SAS4A LMFBR Accident Analysis Computer Code --
A Phenomenological and Computational Summary,"
Reactor Analysis and Safety Division, ANL February, 1981.
"A Preliminary User's Guide to the SAS4A LMFBR Accident Analysis Computer Code," D.
P. Weber, ed.,
Reactor Analysis and Safety Division, ANL, Feburary, 1961.
H. U. Wider, et al.,
" Status and Validation of the SAS4A Accident Analysis Code System," Proc. LMFBR Safety Topical Mtg., Lyon, France, j
July 19-23,1982, pg.11-13.
(2)
The principal contributors to development of SAS4A are the authors and contributors to documentation cited above.
(3)
The following staff members'of Argonne National Laboratory have a working knowledge of the code, including its range of applicability and the efforts that hav,e been made to validate its L. Walter Deitrich, Associate Director, Reactor Analysis and Safety Division, and David P. Weber, Manager,
i l i.
l Accident Analysis Section, Reactor Analysis and Safety Division, i
Argonne National Laboratory.
(4)
The relevant parts of the SAS4A code have been i
checked and rechecked throughout their development to assure that j
the numerical algorithms which are implemented in them to solve the equation sets which consitute these codes beh' ave in a stable i
fashion (both individually and collectively) and produce accurate j
solutions to the original equation sets.
This was carried out by comparing results from SAS4A models with the output of other codes, with the results of hard calculations, and with what sound l
engineering judgement deemed to be physically reasonable.
(5)
All models of importance in Applicants' application of SAS4A to CRBRP have been validated as discussed above.
(6) - (7)
The experimental basis for the SAS4A code is i
summarized in:
H. U. Wider, et al.,
" Status and Validation of the SAS4A Accident Analysis Code System," Proc. LMFBR Safety Topical Mtg., Lyon, France, July 19-23, 19 82, pg. 11-13.
The major module used by the Applicant in CRBRP licensing is PLUT02.
The experimental basis for PLUT02 is summarized in " Applicants Updated Response il to Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., and Sierra Club Interrogatories i
(Second, Third, Fourth, Fif th, and Sixth Sets)," pages AA-11 and AA-12, and in PSAR Amendment 72, Response to Question CS760.178A1.
(8)
Mathematically, practically all of the models in SAS4A consist of sets of coupled ordinary differential or integro-differential equations in time or of coupled partial I
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differential equations in space and time.
Numerically, these equation sets are solved by applying appropriate linearization and finite-differencing techniques.
Some of these temporal finite-differencing techniques are fully implicit and are i
unconditionally stable.
Other models, such as that which treats 1
j the time-dependent radial heat transport from the fuel pin into the coolant, have their equation sets solved by semi-implicit temporal finite-differencing techniques.
It is well known that solutions obtained by semi-implicit differencing can exhibit bounded oscillations if time steps which are too large are taken.
Thirdly, some equation sets, such as the PLUT02 compressible hydrodynamics equation, are solved'with fully explicit methods.
l Here, taking time steps that are too large can produce solutions which become unstable.
Throughout SAS4A, provisions have been made to insure that the time step sizes being used for advancing the various j
solutions in time are kept sufficiently small so that the solutions behave stably and are accurate.
These time step sizes r
are chosen by monitoring both the solutions and their rates of change and applying step size selection criteria based on both l
known analytical constraints, where they are available, and on experience gained in applying the code to a variety of f
situations.
These step size selection criteria are explained in detail in the references provided in part 1 above.
It is stil1~
f possible, however, to occasionally force a model in the SAS4A i
code to utilize a time step size which is so large that stability problems result.
It is also possible for the user to try to
~
,t i.
utilize SAS4A to analyze cases which are not intended to be j
modeled by SAS4A.
In these cases, the results predicted by SAS4A l
may tend to become unrealistic and physically meaningless.
Both i
of these problems can and generally dealt with by carefully 1
i scrutinizing the computer output and comparing it against k
i engineering judgement.
1 (9)
The reference documents have been or will be made l
available for inspection and copying.
(10)
The Applicants are currently analyzing this area and have documented the planned program of research in Appendix A j
to CRBRP-3, Vol. 1.
Development of the SAS4A code, together with l
verification and validation activities, is expected to continue l
under the LMFBR base technology program, and Applicants will remain cognizant of these activities.
Applicants have not yet
]
determined whether they will rely on the results of future i
analysis or developments related to SAS4A.
j (11)
At the present time, the Applicants have not determined the experts, if any, whom they intend to have testify on the subject matter questioned at construction permit hearings.
l t
}
ANRWER IfC) (1 throuch 11) r The EPIC code has not been used by the Applicants nor are there any hlans to use the code in the future.
A comparison of EPIC with PLUT02 was carried out (Reference 25 of CRBRP-GEFR-00523) which showed that the codes show good agreement if several of the advanced PLUT02 features are not used.
f
.,. ~ ~
4
! i ANRWER II fi throuah iv) l This part of question 19 makes reference to the j
i preceding part of question 19, namely 19 (I), which relates i
principally to code validation.
Validation of the SAS code is an ongoing, continuous process as more data and analyses become
{
available.
The Applicants' planned research program, docume%ted i
in Appendix A to CRBRP-3, Vol.1, partly relates to SAS.
In i
addition, in the normal course of its ongoing evaluation, the I
j Applicants maintain awareness of other research and development l
work related to phenomena and models in the SAS3D and SAS4A 1
l codes.
Results from these R&D programs are factored into code 1
validation and application to the extent that the results are applicable.
With respect to validation of the SAS3D code, the Applicants' present assessment is that the code is adequately 4
1 validated.
With respect to validation of the SAS4A code, the applicants' present assessment is that the code is adequately I
validated for the use to which it has been put in CRBRP licensing.
f ANRWER III(1)
]
A list of subroutines in the SAS3D code was provide 6 by Applicants in " Applicants Updated Response il to Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., and Sierra Club Interrogatories (Sacond, Third, Fourth, Fif th, and Sixth Sets)" in the response to Set VI, Question I(A) (1), pages AA-114 through AA-121.
No i
change to this list is required.
However, in the course of l
studies reported in PSAR Amendment 72 (Responses to Questions a
CS760.178), and in "An Assessment of the Unprotected LOF accident of EOC-4 in the CRBRP Heterogeneous Core Design," J. E. Cahalan, at al., ANL, December,1982, modifications to several subroutines were made.
These subroutines are:
FISGAS TSC6 BLOWUP SLUMP 2 PRIMAR TSC83 TSCINT TSOV50 PRIMUP TSC84 TS CSET TSPLOT TSCA INPUT 2 FALLON CLAZAS TSCB TSC8 FALL 2 FBKCLZ TSC3 TSPRINT MAPDRV TSHTR TSC4A TSOV45 DE?ORM TSC41A TSC43A INPOT1 FK GETRDY TSC5 TSOV47 KFUEL REZONE Parts (a), (b), (c), and (d) of this interrogatory are being responded to as a whole.
Any checkout of new or extencively-modified coding does not generally proceed on a subroutine-by-subroutine basis.
Rather, it is carried out at the very lehat on a model-by-model basis, where each model (fuel motion, clad motion, coolant dynamics, etc., in the case of SAS3D) could consist of a number of whole subroutines plus parts of others (where it is coupled to the rest of the code).
The collection of subroutines comprising one of these models is generally referred to in the SAS vernacular as a module.
- Thus, in the case of SAS3D as in the case of many other large-scale codes, the checkout proceeded on a module-by-module basis.
Comparisons of the output of SAS3D modules and the entire code with the output of other codes, with simple hand calculations, and with what engineering judgement deemed to be reasor.ible have been and continue to be carried by the model and 4
e -
i code developers.
However, except as explained in the next paragraph, such efforts are not formally or informally documented.
The documentation that exists is in the form of the references provided in the updated response to interrogatory i
i 7 (A) (1) of the Nineteenth Set of Interrogatories.
These reports serve to document the mathematical bases and provide a broad overview of the computational algorithms associated with each of the models and the code as a whole.
It is implicit in the publication of these reports that the authors have satisfied themselves that the FORTRAN programming in the code is correct.
Applicants note that code comparison activities have been carried out by the Whole Core Accident Comparative Calculations (WAC) Group over the past four years.
Several codes or parts thereof have been included in these comparisons.
SAS3D has been included in the ccmparisons, principally as used by the NRC representatives (SAS3D/ EPIC) and by the FRG (KFK) representatives.
The relevant WAC activities are documented in items 275 through 283 of the listings of Argonne National Laboratory memoranda submitted with " Applicants Supplemental Updated Response 91...," dated April 30, 1982; " Applicants Second Supplemental Updated Response fl...," dated May 24, 1982, and j
" Applicants Response to NRDC, Inc., and Sierra Club Nineteenth Set of Interrogatories," pg. 21.
Applicants have not relied on these calculations as part of their verification and validation of SAS3D.
However, Applicants maintain cognizahce cf these.
activities.
i
-,. ~.,
4
! I-(e)
It is standard practice within the Accident analysis section of the Reactor Analysis and Safety Division of Argonne National Laboratory that the authors of the SAS3D models, 1
j as identified by the authors listed in the documents referenced i
l in the above paragraph, do their own coding and subsequently i
]
actually perform or directly supervise any subsequent
)
l modifications to that coding.
1 ANSWER III(2) i i
The list of subroutines in the entire SAS4A code is i
giyen in Table 1.
These subroutines make up the modules which l
are the units on which verification and validation procedures are generally carried out, although in some cases it is possible and desirable to work with smaller units within the modules.
Parts (a), (b), (c), and (d) of this interrogatory are being responded to as a whole.
Checkout of the coding for SAS4A i
i does not generally proceed on a subroutine-by-subroutine basis.
Rather, it is carried out at the very least on a model-by-model i
basis, where each model could consist of a number of whole subroutines plus parts of others (where it is coupled to the rest of the code).
The collection of subroutines comprising one of j
these models i generally referred to in the SAS vernacular as a module.
In some cases, it is possible and useful to verify SAS4A i
code performance on smaller units than modules, but in general, l
the checkout has proceeded at the level of modules or substantial l
portions of modules.
t m
i!.
I
- f.
- l l
Comparisons of the output of SAS4A modules and portions i
j thereof with the output of other codes, with simple hand calculations, and with what engineering judgement deems to be l
reasonable have been and continue to be carried out by the model j
and code developers.
However, except as explained in the next f
paragraph, such efforts are not formally or informally l
documented.
i Documentation which presently exists is in the form of the references provided in the updated response to interrogatory 1(B)1 of the Nineteenth set of Interrogatories.
These reports l
serve to document the mathematical bases and provide a broad overview of the computational algorithms associated with each j
SAS4A module and the code as a whole.
In addition, performance' j
of analysis using the SAS4A code and its modules is documented.
It is implicit in publication of analyses cited in these reports that the authors have satisfied themselves that the FORTRAN programming in the code is correct.
Applicants note that code comparison activities have 4
been carried out by the Whole Core Accident comparative Calculations (WAC) Group over the past several years.
Several codes or parts thereof including SAS4A, have been included in these comparisons.
Documentation of these activities may be found in:
P.lC. Cacciabue, et al.,
" Comparative Analysis of Fuel Characterizatio-Approaches and Transient Evaluation of a Hypothetical TOP Accident. in an Irradiated LMFBR,"
Proc. LMFBR Saf tey Topical Meeting, Lyon, France, July 19-23, 1982, pg. 11-25.
4
. 1 1
(e)
It is standard practice within the Accident Analysis Section of the Reactor Analysis and Safety Division of Argonne National Laboratory that the authors of the SAS4A models, as identified in the documents referenced in the above paragraph and in Answer I(B) above, do their own coding and, subsequently, actually peform or directly supervise any subsequent modifications to that coding.
ANSWER IIIf3)
The EPIC code has not been used by the Applicants nor are there any plans to use the code in the future.
A comparison of EPIC with PLUT02 was carried out (Reference 25 of CRBRP-GEFR-00523) which showed that the codes show good agreement if several of the advanced PLUT02 features are not used.
ANSWER IIIf4)
The Applicant continues to assure itself that the overall code and its subroutines accurately reproduce the models as described in CRBRP-GEPR-00523, in the responses to Questions cS760.178A1, A2, and A3, and in "An Assessment of the Unprotected LOF Accident at EOC-4 in the CRBRP Heterogeneous Core Design," by J. E. Cahalan, et al., ANL, December,1982, and their references by caref ul ins' ection of the output results for every case p
analyzed and by comparison of the output results for each case analyzed with the results of previous cases which are similar in part or in whole to the particular caseJanalyzed.
In addition,
?
. i-
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the computer system messages are checked to assure that the job i
1 l
was properly executed, without error, by the computer system.
1
- i
)
ANRWER IIIf5) i j
A list of memoranda applicable to SAS3D and its l
predecessors was provided in " Applicants Supplemental Updated I
Response
91...," dated April 30, 1982, " Applicants Second Supplemental Updated Response fl..., dated May 24, 1982, and
" Applicants Response to Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
l and Sierra Club Nineteenth Set of Interrogatories," Sierra Club l
Nineteenth Set of Interrogatories," page 21.
This list is being updated to include recent memoranda applicable to SAS3D and those applicable to SAS4A.
Documents referred to in the update will be made available for inspection and copying at Argonne National Laboratory.
t i
e 4
s 4
. J Table 1.
SAS4h Subroutines Library B32490.SAS4A.JAN83. SOURCE with Additional Routines aLPHC EGFUTE LQGSFM ALPHF EGSETE L6HGAP AOUT EKT L6LEMO 4
AP ERROR L6PREA AVGVAL EXPAND L6 RUTS j
BIGTO FAILUR L7LEMO BLKPRM FEEDBK L8LEMO BS FEQUAT MAIBM BYPSTM FGASL6 MAIN i
CAVITY FK MOMEN l
CCLAD FLTSET NAPROP CFUEL FOUT NODEPR l
CG FSIGMA NUCHEK i
CHIN FSWELL OUTNGF CKVLFL FUINIT OUTPLF CL GRGROW OUTPLN CLADSW GRVHED OUTPT2 CLDFAL HBFND OUTPT3 j
CLDFALA HBSMPL OUTPUT CMCOPY HGAP PAR COREFL HVAP PIPEFL CRAKER IHXSHF PIPTMP CRDTMP IHXTBF PKPAGE CRED INCPVF PKSTEP l
CROEF INITST PLCOOL CSIGMA INPDRV PLFREZ j
CUTBAK INPEDT PLHTR CVTEMP INPLNF PLIF DATMOV INTIRP PLINPT DATOUT INTRP PLMACO DEFINI INTSET PLMISC DEFORM INVRT3 PLMOCO DENSIT IOUT
'PLNAEN DFORM3 KCLAD PLOTIX DOPC KFUEL PLOUT DRACSF LEABLA PLREZO DRACTF LECLIN PLSAIN DTCFND LEDISR PLSET DTHFND LEFREZ PLSET2 DTMFND LEFUVA PLSTR I
DTNFND LEGEOM PLTECS DTPPND LEIF PLUDRV DUMDEF LEMACO PLVOFR DUMMY LEMISC PLlPIN DYNALL LEMOCO PL2 PIN DYNALL2 LENAEN PMCHEK
i ECLADF LEPLIN PMPBLF I
EDTCOO LEREZO PMSTRT EDTGEO LESAIN POINEX EDTIPM LESET2 POINST EDTIPN LESEVA POOLFL EDTOPC LESRME PORMIG EDTPMC LEVDRV POWINT EDTPMH LEVOFR PREA EDTPRI LElPIN PRESDR EDTPNA LE2 PIN PRESPL EDTPMC LINES PRIMAR EFUELF LIQCV PRIMR1 LIQFIN PRIMUP LOCHEX PRMADJ PRMEND SSPRPL TSC86 PRMPRT SSPRSR TSC9 PRSRZF SSPUMP TSDRCS PRSTEP SSP 4CV TSDRIV PSAT SSP 4PR TSGRAF PSHORT SSP 4TH TSHTN1 PUMPFL SSSCLP TSHTN2 PUMPFN SSSTDR TSHTN3 PUTB SSSTGN TSHTN4 PUTM SSSTG1 TSHTN5 PUTPNT SSTHRM TSHTRN P4EDT SSVALV TSHTRV READEC START TSIHX READIN STATCF TSIHXC REED STEPFN TSILLB REINIT STEPGS TSINIT RELAX STEPLQ TSNEUT RELGAS STEPTM TSOV45 REMFOR STGNFL TSPK REMSTR SUBSIZ TSPLOT RESTAR TABFIS TSPRNT RHOEND TBSCAN TSPRPL RHOF TEFUEG TSSTGN RHOL TENA TSSTG1 RHOLNA TESEEG TSTHRM RHOS TIMER T4A3D RHOV TSAT T41A3D RNGPOS TSBOIL T42A3D RUPSKF TSCA UTS RUPSRF TSCA1
.VALVAJ SDRCST TSCA2 VALVFL SEEK TSCBUB VISC SELECT TSCC WRITEC SHAPE TSCINT WTSC84 SIGFRA TSCLD1 XKL SIOERR TSCLD2 YELDPT-SIONU6 TSCLO YLDCF SODFRC TSCMPO LETRAN t
SOLID TSCMP1 LESOEN SSADHX TSCNV1 LELUME
1
' l
- 4 i
SSARDX TSCNV2 PLSETl SSBYPS TSCNV3 SSCKVL TSCNV4
^
SSOOOL TSCNV5 SSDRAC TSCNV7 j
SSDRIV TSCNV8 i
SSFUEL TSCSET SSHTR TSC2 i
SSIHX TSC21 i
SSIHXC TSC3 i
SSINIT TSC31 j
SSIN01 TSC43A l
SSLQSG TSC5 SSNEUT' TSC6 SSPK TSC7 i
SSPLOT TSC8 i
SSPMLP TSC82 SSPRIM TSC83 i
SSPRM4 TSC84 SSPRNT TSC85 I
l 4
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1 UNITED STATES OF AML'RICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENY OF' ENERGY
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DOCKET NO. 50-537 PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
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AE/JDAVIT OF ALVIN R.
MELLER Alvin R. Meller, being duly asorn, deposes and says as follows:
1 That he is employed as Chief, Licensing Branch, Public Safety Division, CRBRP Project, and that he is duly authorized to answer Interrogatory 11 in the Eighteenth Set of Interrogatories.
I, 2.
That the above-mentioned and attached answers are true and correct to the best of his~ knowledge and belief.
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UNITFD STAits or AMERICA NUCIT'AR REGULATORY CON 915510N Iri tJe atter or UN' ITED STATFS'DLPARTMENT Of tJIERGY )
DDCKET NO. 50-537 PRMCCT MAMGi! MENT CORI@ATION
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TElfNESSEE VALLEY AU1HORITY
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j ArrIDAvir OF DE,NNTS M. SWI.T.I.Cf I
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Dennis M. Switick, being duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:
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That he is emp1nyed by the General Electric company as Marwoer,
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Safety Audlysis. Advanced Rector Systems Department, 310 De rwigne Drive.
Sunnyvale. California 94000.
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That he is dul
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L That the above-sentioned and 4ttached answers are true *1d correct to 3
the best of his kowledge and he11cf.
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Subtcribed and sworn to before am+ this 4th day of April,1983 l
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ' ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
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In the Matter of
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1TNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
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PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
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Docket No. 50-537
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TENNEUSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
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(Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Service has been effected on this date by personal delivery or first-class. mail to the following:
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tRorgG. E Attorney for L
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