ML20078Q489
| ML20078Q489 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 04/17/1990 |
| From: | Mcburnett M HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18065B259 | List: |
| References | |
| ISEG-06, ISEG-6, NUDOCS 9502210276 | |
| Download: ML20078Q489 (45) | |
Text
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GOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION NO[
INDEPENDENT SAFETY ENGINEERING GROUP PAGE 1 OF 8
ASSESSMENTS AND INVESTIGATIONS EFFEcTavE
- 04-30-90 O
Approval:
4 Date:
Mariager, Nuclear Licensing Date:
- -/7-So Approval:
Directp,ISEG 4
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9502210276 950216 PDR ADOCK 05000499 P
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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION co.
i ISEG-06 1
INDEPENDENT SAFETY ENGINEERING GROUP PAGE 2 oF S
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ASSESSMENTS AND INVESTIGATIONS g,,gey,yg 04-30-90 1.O PURPOSI This procedure provides general requirements for the performance of Assessments and Investigations by ISEG.
l 2.0 SCOPE This procedure applies to the conduct of Assessments and l
Investigations performed by ISEG.
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3.0 DEFINITIONS l
3.1 Assessment / Investigation An in-depth evaluation of various Plant activities, incidents, work practices, and management controls for the purpose of identifying areas where improvements could be made or to identify causal factors of undesirable events to preclude recurrence.
4.0 REFERENCIS 4.1 ISEG-01, Organization and Responsibilities.
l 4.2 ISEG-03, Task Administration and Report Preparation.
5.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 5.1 The
- Director, ISEG is responsible for approving Assessment and Investigation Plans.
5.2 The Task Lead is responsible for proper performance and j
reporting of assigned Assessments and Investigations.
6.0 REOUIREMENTS 6.1 Administrative Processing of Assessments and Investigations is performed in accordance with ISEG-03, 3
Task Administration and Report Preparation.
6.2 Assessments e
6.2.1 Plan The Task Lead ensures that an Assessment Plan l
is prepared which provides structure and direction for the performance of the Assessment.
The plan includes the following minimum information-
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wuheen n E V, SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION co.
ISEG-06 1
INDEPENDENT SAFETY ENGINEERING GROUP PAGE 3 0F S
ASSESSMENTS AND INVESTIGATIONS gyrgeysyg 04-30-90 6.2.1.1 Purpose.
6.2.1.2 Scope.
6.2.1.3 Individuals to be interviewed.
6.2.1.4 Documents to be reviewed (includes technical references, procedures, design input / output, computer data, etc.)
6.2.1.5 Activities and hardware to be observed.
6.2.1.6 Tentative schedule.
The Director, ISEG approves the Assessment Plan.
The Task Lead ensures that the plan is revised when significant changes in the stated scope or schedule occur.
6.2.2 Preparation The Task Lead ensures that personnel assigned to the Assessment are prepared to perform the assessment through the following actions, as appropriate:
6.2.2.1 Review of the Assessment Plan and division of Assessment responsibilities among assigned personnel.
6.2.2.2 Familiarization with Plant systems / structures involved.
6.2.2.3 Review of relevant instructions, procedures and other controlling documents.
6.2.2.4 Familiarization with applicable industry practices and standards.
6.2.2.5 Development of checklists or assumptions to be verified and questions to be answered.
6.2.3 Performance ISEG personnel ensure that when conditions appear to present a potentially significant adverse Plant safety'and reliability concern, i
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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC CENERATING STATION co.
ISEG-06 1
INDEPENDENT SAFETY ENGINEERING GROUP PAGE 4 oF 8
I ASSESSMENTS AND INVESTIGATIONS E F FECTIVE 04-30-90 they are to immediately inform the Task Lead, the responsible organization management, and the Director, ISEG.
Such conditions include those that may involve entry into a Plant Technical Specification action svatement, or may involve showing the Plant to be in a condition outside the bounding assumptions of safety analyses, or may present an immediate and significant industrial safety hazard, or which may otherwise present an unjustifiable risk to Plant reliability.
The Task Lead ensures that appropriate management and supervision are informed of ISEG's intent to perform an Assessment.
Applicable guidance in Exhibit ISEG-06-A is utilized for the performance of the Assessment.
6.2.4 Reporting 6.2.4.1 The Task performers determine which preliminary conclusions are valid and significant and develop corresponding recommendations for areas where improvements could be made.
6.2.4.2 The Task Lead ensures that an Assessment report is prepared and processed in accordance with ISEG-03, Task Administration and Report Preparation.
6.3 Investigations 6.3.1 Plan l
The Task Lead ensures that an Investigation Plan is prepared which provides structure and direction for the performance of the Investigation.
The plan includes the following minimum information:
6.3.1.1 Problem statement.
6.3.1.2 Purpose.
6.3.1.3 Scope.
6.3.1.4 Individuals to be interviewed.
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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION ca.
ISEG-06 1
INDEPENDENT SAFETY ENGINEERING GROUP l'
PAGE 5 oF ASSESSMENTS AND INVESTIGATIONS appger,yg 04-30-90 6.3.1.5 Documents to be reviewed (includes technical references, procedures, design input / output, computer data, etc.).
6.3.1.6 Activities and hardware to be observed.
t 6.3.1.7 Tentative schedule.
The Director, ISEG approves the Investigation Plan.
The Task Lead ensures that the plan is revised when significant changes in the stated scope or schedule occur.
6.3.2 Preparation f
The Task Lead ensures that personnel assigned to the Investigation are prepared to perform the investigation through the following actions, as appropriate:
6.3.2.1 Review of the Investigation Plan and division of investigation responsibilities among assigned personnel.
6.3.2.2 Familiarization with Plant systems / structures involved.
6.3.2.3 Review of relevant instructions, procedures and other controlling documents.
6.3.2.4 Development of checklists or assumptions to be verified and questions to be answered.
6.3.3 Performance ISEG's involvement with Investigationa is independent of line organization performance of IP-1.45Q, Station Problem Reporting, Problem Report (PR) investigations.
When prs are assigned to line organizations for investigation, ISEG may also be requested to investigate the event.
When this occurs ISEG investigates the event and submits an Investigation report in accordance with ISEG-03, Task Administration and Report Preparation, to the appropriate managers.
If the Problem Report has been investigated (and associated
me newa n SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC OENERATING STATION I'o*l ISEG-06 1
INDEPENDENT SAFETY ENGINEERING GROUP PAGE 6 0F 8
ASSESSMENTS AND INVESTIGATIONS gppger,yg 04-30-90 Station Problem Report completed) the Director, ISEG may have the Task assigned as a Review of the PR event and investigation and performed in accordance with ISEG-05, Observations and Reviews.
When conditions appear to present,,a potentially significant adverse Plant safety-ind-reliability
- concern, Investigation performers are to immediately inform the Task
- Lead, the responsible organization management, and the Director, ISEG.
The Task Lead ensures that appropriate management and supervision are informed that ISEG is performing an Investigation.
Applicable guidance in Exhibit ISEG-06-A is utilized for the performance of the Investigation.
6.3.4 Reporting 6.3.4.1 The Task Lead determines the sequence of events involve'd with the subject event.
The Task Lead ensures that appropriate causal factor, barrier and change analyses are performed.
The Investigation team determines the causal factors and develops corresponding recommendations to prevent future occurrence of similar events.
6.3.4.2 The Task Lead ensures that an Investigation report is prepared and processed in accordance with ISEG-l 03, Task Administration and Report 1
Preparation.
7.0 DOCUMENTATION 7.1 QA Records 7.1.1 As discussed in ISEG-03.
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SOU7d TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC CENERATING STATION wo.
ISEG-06 1
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INDEPENDENT SAFETY ENGINEERING GROUP PAGE 7 OF 8
i ASSESSMENTS AND INVESTICATIONS EFFECTIVE DATE 04-30-90 7.2 Working Documents i
7.2.1 As discussed in IS3G-03.
8.0 ATTACHMENTS I
8.1 ISEG-06-A - Guidance for Assessments and Investigations.
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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION N o.
ISEG-06 1
INDEPENDENT SAFETY ENGINEERING GROUP PAGE 8 OF 8
ASSESSMENTS AND INVESTIGATIONS EFFECTIVE 04-30-90 EXHIBIT ISEG-06-A G'.'IDANCE FOR ASSESSMENTS AND INVESTIGATIONS The guidance and/o.r requirements for assessment and investigation performance provided in IP-1. 4 5Q, in NTD041, Systematic Problem Solving Process (SPSP)
Training
- Program, and the following additional guidance is followed to the extent feasible given the conditions present.
a.
Ensure personnel being observed or interviewed are aware that the observer is from ISEG and that they are aware of ISEG's purpose in assessing or investigating activities.
b.
While observing, interviewing, and reviewing, take notes in sufficient detail such that specific hardware, documents and personnel involved can be sought out at a later date if additional questions arise.
As soon as possible after the interview, ?.eview, or observation clarify and summarize all notes, c.
While observing activities and interviewing personnel maintain an awareness of and note surrounding equipment status, work activity status, and possible industrial safety hazards.
d.
Do not prompt or lead those individuals being observed or questioned.
The mere presence of an observer influences the behavior observed.
Prompting further diminishes the validity that the observed performance resembles the usual performance.
e.
Maintain a central working file containing notes and supporting documentation.
f.
Keep the Task Lead informed of the progress of the task in terms of summaries of the information obtained, preliminary conclusions drawn, and additional time and actions necessary for completion.
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!i srR w RE taoE._orZ PART 6: REMEDIAI/COMPENSAMRY/CORRECITVE ACrlONS A REMEDIA1) COMPENSATORY ACTION COMPLETED (BEYOND PART 1.C) l SE THE A T r Ac aED PAC E5 I
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PART 8: CIASEOUT A CLDSEOUT
SUMMARY
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e Ii PART 4: EVENT DESCRIPTION j
A.
DESCRWTION l
t Motor Operated Valve (MOV) A2SIMOV0031 A allows the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) or i IAw Head Safety Injection (LHSI) system Train A alignment with cold leg of the Reactor !
Coolant System (RCS). This Westinghouse supplied 8-inch flexible wedge gate valve is normally,
open. It is located in the RHR system and is designated as XRiiOO31 A. The other two valves l which perform a similar function in B and C Trains of the RHR system are XRH0031B and XRH0031C.
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On 2/09/93, the RHR Train 2A was in operation. At 22:35, RHR Pump 2B was started. The ;
Low Pressure l_etdown was switched from Train 2A to Train 2B. A2SIMOV0031 A was closed at 22:51 to allow Train A removal from service and perform a scheduled surveillance testing.
At 23:06, A2SIMOV0031 A failed when stroked open from the control room for normal system )
alignment; the motor started to smoke and the breaker tripped due to thermal overload. The plant,
operator noticed an oily fluid leaking from the motor onto the lagging. The RHR and LHSI l Train A was declared inoperable. The plant operator confirmed the valve's clumi position by manual operation of the hand wheel.
The actuator was disassembled, cleaned, and inspected. The spring pack belleville springs were found to be filled with slightly hardened grease. The torque switch and limit switch assemblies I
were not damaged. The switch contacts properly operated from close to open and open to close actuation.
PART 5: SPR CAUSES AND GENERIC IMPLICATIONS DISCUSSION During a Design Basis Accident (DBA), the XRH0031 valves are closed to align flow from the LHSI pumps to the corresponding hot leg of the RCS for recirculation. Also, during initiation,
of the RHR system operation, XRH-0031 is closed to permit boron equalization within the RIIR system prior to delivering flow to the RCS.
During normal operation, when putting the RHR train in service, this MOV is closed prior to f starting the RIIR pump. Then the RHR pump is started to warm-up the system and equalize the boron concentration in the system. After the boron is equalized and the system is warrrwd up, i the MOV is opened to align the system with the RCS Cold Leg for cooldown process or maintaining the Mode 4 operation.
The investigation included a review of thermal binding and pressure locking scenario. The following summary is included for information:
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'Ihermal Binding i
l When subjected to rapid cool down, the valve body contracts a greater amount than the disc and pinches the disc in the seat; thus, causing the seat to bind the disc tightly. Excessive closing I
force also contributes to thermal binding phenomenon by driving the disc more into the seat, I h~
, on cooling, the thermal binding effect is increased. Several potential remedies have been suggested to alleviate this situation. They are:
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a.
Slightly opening and re-closing a valve during cooldown.
i b.
Limiting valve actuatof closing force.
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Changing the valve closure scheme femr torque to limit control to eliminate excessive c.
seating forces during closing.
I d.
Using Limitorque Model SB actuators with compensating spring pack.
Replacing the disc with a more flexible disc.
e.
I Pressure Locking l
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Pressure locking generally develops because of the rise in temperature of fluid trapped in the l bonnet cavity and the area between the discs. The fluid may enter during the normal valve cycling, or by leaking thmugh the seat of a closed valve with a delta-p across the disc. The ;
fluid's thennal expansion increases the bonnet cavity pressure and results in pressure locking the '
valve disc.
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i Pressure locking phenomenon can delay the valve's stroke time or cause the vaive actuator motor !
to stall. The suggested methods to prevent pressure locking are:
[
l Drilling a small hole on the upstream side or dw valve disc to relieve pressure buildup '
a.
in the bonnet and between the discs.
b.
Installing a pressure relief or vent valve in the bonnet.
Installing an external bypass line with a manual valve from the bonnet to the upstream c.
side of the valve.
d.
Stopping the valve disc travel by position limit switches rather than by motor torque.
Generally, valve operators are not sized to actuate against the binding forces which are generated l by the thermal binding or by the pressure locking phenomena. Actuation in these conditions may result in locked-rotor current and rapid increase in temperature of the motor internals. Within,
10 to 15 seconds, the heat may damage the motor or degrade the motor's capability to deliver '
a specified torque.
Industry experience has shown that the double disc and flexible wedge gate valves in many safety applications have not been operable due to the pressure locking and thermal binding.
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CAUSE of EVENT l On 1/26/88, ISI-0031 A failure resulted in a motor burn out. "Ihe root cause investigation by SPR 88-0030 was inconclusive. Because the change in temperature was not significant, the thermal !
binding was not considered as'a' potential root cause.
On 7/31/88,2SI-0031 A failure resulted in a motor burn out. Subsequently, a temporary motor,
installed to continue the Hot Functional Testing (HPT) also burned out on 8/31/88. However, the valve was manually stroked four times with ease after the second motor's bumont. Based i on subsequent valve stroking the thermal binding was not considered a probable root cause. The temporary motor failure was caused by the motor bearing failure.
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On 4/09/89, 2S10031A again l failed to open and resulted in a motor bum out. The system opemtion data showed that within one minute the RHR system temperature had dropped 120*F.
There is no hard evidence of thermal binding, however, a possibility of thermal binding can not be completely discounted. Torque seating of the valve also could have been a contributing factor !
in thermal binding.
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Prior to the 2/09/93 motor failure, the MOV 2SI-0031 A was set for torque closure. Actuator inspection has revealed that the' spring pack was full of semi-hardened grease. This condition,
could have restrained the spring pack compression and caused the valve disc to travel with much !
higher torque into the seat. In addition, the RHR Train 2A experienced a rapid cooldown of '
120*F. Therefore, a potential of thermal binding exists.
Based on the above information DED has determined the primary root cause of SI 31A,
failure to be the hydraulic locking of the spring pack, resulting in excessive seating force '
and mechanical binding. Thermal binding may have been a contributing factor.
1 B.
GENERIC IMPLICATIONS l
Implications of this event were considered for the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) trains B and C in Unit 2, and Trains A, B, and C in Unit 1.
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l1 A comparison of the system layout in the RHR trains A, B, and C indicates that Train-A has the shortest distance between the RHR heat exchanger discharge and the Cold 12g Isolation valve.
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Train A l!
41 Ft. (Approximately) j Train B 55 Ft. (Approximately)
Train C ii 67 R (Approximately)
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The change in the system temperature during SI-31 valve closure is similar in magnitude. Since, I the temperature change in all RHR trains is similar and there is no history of any valve problems in trains B and C, it is concluded that root cause of SI-31 A failure in both units is not a result l of thermal binding.
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f The Unit 1 MOVs and the train A MOV in Unit 2 are set to close on limit thus decreases the I possibility of excessive force during valve closure and mechanical or thermal binding. The, MOVs in trains B and C in Unit 2 are scheduled to change from torque close to limit close in !
the current refueling outage to eliminate their potential of mechanical or thermal binding. In !
addition, the actuators installed on these valves aheady have a compensating spring pack installed on them. The compensating spring pack prevents hard seating of the limit close valves by absorbing the excess seating force in spring pack compression.
In high temperature systems, motor operated gate valves may fail due to thermal binding when subjected to rapid cooling just prior to the opening stroke. Also, torque closing of the gate valves could potentially contribute to the excessive seating load when the spring pack is full of,
grease.
l C.
CONCLUSIONS I
(
Based on the above infonnation DED has determined the primary root cause of SI 31A failure to be the hydraulic locking of the spring pack, resulting in excessive seating force and mechanical binding. Thermal binding may have been a contributing factor.
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PART 6: REMEDIAIJCOMPENSATORY/ CORRECTIVE ACTIONS i
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REMEDIAI1 COMPENSATORY ACTION COMPLETED r
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Service Request SI-178013 was written to change the closure scherne of the actuator from torque closed to limit closed. This activity was completed on 2/18/93.
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DED initiated Service Request SI-179892,178305,178306 to inspect internals of the valves XRH0031 A/B/C for damage and wear. This activity is scheduled in 2RE03.
R3.
Service Request RH-2-170062 was written to replace the damaged motor with a new '
motor and to refurbish the actuator. The motor was replaced under WAN# 93006029.
disassembled, cleaned and rea(ssembled prior to installation.The act i
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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS C1.
Review operating procedures for the high temperature systems and identify the motor operated gate valves which, due pid cooling..are potentiali scgeible to thermal +
binding.
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DUE DATE 9/10/93 RESP. MANAGER M. Pacy DATE C2.
Provide corrective actions for the valves which are identified above in C1 as susceptible i l
l to thermal binding.
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DUE DATE 9/10/93 P. MANAGER M. Pacy DATE C3.
Perform failure analysis of the motor to determine root cause for the locked rotor condition. Provide corrective action, as appropriate.
DUE DATE 5/15/93 RESP. MANAGER M. Pacy DATE
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C4.
Provide the root cause a Final Investigation Report, and the Casual Factor Work Sheet after the completion of the above corrective and remedial actions.
DUE DATE 9/10/93 l RESP. MANAGER M. Pacy DATE ))
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i Date VERIFICATION DOCUMENTh SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR NRC RELATED ISSUES.
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PbRC Review Evaluation i
930V7D.
SPR Subject l
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Does the subject SPR est any of the following criteria:
I XRE EQ 1)
Concerns a REPORTABLE EVENT?
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2)
Concerns a sianificant operating abnormality or sianificant deviation j
from normal and expected performance of f
plant equipment or systems that affect nuclear safetv?
i 3)
Concerns unanticipated deficiencies in i
t the desian or SE2Bration of structures, i
systems, or components that affect nuclear safatv?
- 4)
- Concerns any acendental, unplanned, or uncontrolled radioactive release?
5)
Concerns the violation of:
Codes i
i Regulations.l j
Orders Technical spcifications i
+
Operating Licensing Requirements I
I' i
having nuclear safety significance?
t 6)
Concern the abnormal degradation of i
systems designed to contain radioactive material?
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If any of the above questions are answered YES, THEN the subject SPR SHATT e submitted to PORC.
TMAo 1 4 1 - 7 3 l
Evaluator Date I
c M C A ekI M be, M mid d M @ A e.4 4M 9'5 z417 win be.
- An SPR that concerns uncontrolled radioactive release requires review and approva by the Plant Manager.
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i SOER 84-007 1.) REVIEW stpnfamY, ooat.
I Recommendation 1..I Identify all gate valves in safety-related systems that are required to open for system operation and are potentially susceptible to the pressure locking of thermal binding phenomenon.
l.!
j Evaluation:
The review of all safety-related gate valves has been previously completed and included in the evaluation of l
OER item number SER 88-008, attached.
This review included all normally closed 2 1/2 inch and larger safety-related, i
actuator-driven NSSS and BOP gate valves which may be susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding due to j
process conditions.
The valves identified are as follows:
Valve #
j yalve Function j
RH0019 A,B,C
RHR pump suction isolation l
RHR letdown to CVCS isolation I
RH0066 A,B SI 008 A,B,C HHSI hot leg injection isolation i
i fl:
Each of these valves is supplied by Westinghouse (not Anchor-Darling as in the, subject SOER) and is provided with a valve stem leakoff connection.
These valves are not susceptible to I
thermal binding since the system temperature during valve closure is not significantly different from the conditions which will exist when the valve is required to perform its safety function..
Westinghouse performed a conservative analysis of the above valves to determine if the valve is capable of opening with consideration of pressure locking and j
thermal binding during all system operating modes.
The results of this analysis (ref. ST-HL-WN-200000, dated November 25, 1986) indicated that six of these valves [RH0060 A,B,C and RH0061 A,B,C) could be susceptible to pressure locking or j_
thermal binding and recommended that these valves be tested i
to demonstrate operabilj ty' during hot functional testing.
l This testing was successfully performed (ref. SFR 87-0367).
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SOER 84-007 l
Pressure locking o'r thermal binding of valves is an extremely i
unlikely event which requires an ideal combination of l
contributing factors.
Some of these contributing factors are near perfect seating of the wedge, insignificant valve packing
- leakage, system operating mode, and system pressure and temperature. Therefore, the prediction of exactly which valves have the potential' for this ~ problem cannot be made with The evaluation performed under SER 88-l absolute certainty.
r Ops,.. identified potentially isusceptible valves; however, (Ste opity.. valve found to be. inoperable due to possible pressure l
logking Ur % ernal binding was the. Unit 1 cV006 valve which was not identified in this evaluation.
The evaluation performed on this valve and discussions with the valve vendor, Westinghouse, indicate that"the failure of this valve was a highly unusual event which was due to a ideal, from the perspective of. ' pres sure locking and thermal
- binding, combination of contributing factors. This valve had extremely j
low packing leakage as demonstrated by test and a nearly 1
perfect seat.
This combination is postulated to have prevented the leakoff of fluid trapped in the valve bonnet i
which may have prevented the valve from operating.
The
~
identical valve in Unit 2 was tested and found to operate satisfactorily illustrating the random nature of this phenomenon.
The corrective action taken was a modification g(sthe. Unit 1 valve CV006, ref."FCN TGXm-10721, to-provide a pathway for pressure equalization acrosts'the wedge by drilling l
a.. hole in the v51vs~ disk as documented in the SER 88-008 ev,aluation.
An alternative,to this modification could have l
been a replacement of the existing wedge with a new wedge.
1 This would have prevented the near perfect seating of this i
valve and allowed lLhe valve to operate as required.
Short of I
)
I l
nodifying all gate va2ves to provide a relief pathway (by drilling the disk;or valve body) there is no method to assure that this phenomenon will never occur.
Actions on this scale i
are not justified based on the unlikely occurrence of this l
event.
In addition, there is no actions that can be taken l
during the design; procurement, installation, or maintenance i
of valves which !can absolutely preclude thic phenomenon.
Since there is no : satisfactory methodology for identifying l
which valves may be susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding, no further action is required for recommendation 1 l
i of SOER 84-007.
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SOER 84-007 i*;
Recommendation 2: For the valves identified in recommendation i1, take appropriate actions to ensure that these gate valves
'l will open when required.
II Evaluation: As discussed in the evaluation of recommendation
't actions to ensure valve operability have been taken.
All
~
1, valves are currently operable.
No additional action is required.
f Recommendation 3:
Operations and maintenance personnel training should include instructions on the valve failure mechanisms discussed in this SOER, including how to diagnose the failure mechanism and the action necessary to recover from l
the failure.
Evaluation:
The Westinghouse analysis and hot functional testing performed 'at STPEGS have demonstrated that all valves which may be susceptible to pressure binding are capable of
.l operating as designed.
The operability of these valves may l
be effected by manually seating the valve or by subsequent valve maintenance activities (wedge replacement or seat lapping). Operators should be trained regarding the potential for creating a pressure locked or thermally bound valve due to maintenance activities.
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PORC Review. Evaluation li SPR DkdC Subject 6fddOYO33d b.fd4 l
Does the subject SPR meet any of'the following criteria:
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l 1)
Concerns a REPORTABLE EVENT?
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2)
Concerns a sianificant operating abnormality or RISDificant deviation from normal and expected performance of
/
plant equipment or systems that affect V
nuclear safety?
l 3)
Concerns unanticipated deficiencies in j
the desian or operation of structures, i
/
systems, or components that affect l
nuclear safety?
4)
Concerns any accidental, unplanned, or
/
f uncontrolled radioactive release?
I i
V i
5)
Concerns the violation of:
Codec l
Regulations !'
i Orders i
Technical Spdcifications Operating Licensing Requirements having nuclear safety significance?
6)
Concern the abnormal degradation of systems designed to contain radioactive material?
7)
Should be otherwise reviewed by PORC?
Explain:
f i-If any of the above questions are answered YES, 211EH the subject l
SPR SHALL o submitted to PORC.
L Me 9-z3-es Evaluator Date i
Houston Ijghting & Power Company i
. OFFICE MEM AANDUM v4. %,
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Based on our review, the subject SPR =t:1^'24i has been reopened for the,
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L SPR#83-0470 Action item # (If Known):
NRC Related
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[ ] Yes MNo Priority Oede) Tnk
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VERIFICATION DOCUMENTS SH ALL BE PROVIDED FOR NRC RELATED ISSUES.
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Temocrature Monitorine of the RIIR Systen r1Ei 07.RH-000) and Stroke Test of SI.MOV 0031B Rev.0 Page 9 of 9 I'
2HR TES'QNG DATA SHEET ITEP07-RH 0001-1 l
(Page 1 of 1)
SIEE I
5.1 Shift Supervisor perinLasion to start test:
2 **i -Vfb 1
/[] 7 Shlft Supervisor 7
Timc '
Date
]
5.5 RTD data taking commenced:
12 2 o 2'7-9T 4
l Tirne Date 5.9 Step 9.18 of OPOP02-RH-0001 complete:
/ '73'7 2 '7-7 '/
i Time Date l
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5.10 RTD Data taking completed:
2 o'3z.
> 7-9y i
'nmc Date
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i 5.13 Shift Supervisor notified test complete:
2.o32 2 7-79 Coordinator Ttme Date i
5.14 Test ults: (Attach RTD temperature data and ERFDADS data).
Remarks.
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[,t Test Coo'rdinator Date This t'orm, uten completed. Sil L tiietained for die life of the plant.
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l'1EF07-RH-000i DATA SHGT CON 1Q;UATION f
Initialassessment!cfrawdataindicatesthatbycooling down RH-0031B f rst (using the pump " jog") the volve will attain This uniform uniform temperatures prior to its closure.
temperature would help in solving the thermal binding problem.
j The system was cooled passively by allowing it to sit idle with cooling to the heat exchanger.
Although, large temperature transients were still seen at the pump suction and discharge
[
RTDs. An evaluation will'be performed as to the effectiveness of 8
this procedural revision.
Relevent facts and observations that might effect this evaluation are listed below.
i Much additional time elapsed between the initial jogging of l
1.
of OPOP02-RH-0001. and the closing of (step 9.7 the pump Instead of a 70 minute expected time duration.
MOV-00318.
This allowed additional i
it was about 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, 45 minutes.This time lapse occurred due passive cooling of the system.
to having to wait for MOVATs test equipment to be installed on MOV-0031D.
The first The pump jogs were longer than had been planned.
2.
and second jogs as observed by the test coordinator at the This would act to pump were 6 and 8 seconds respectively.
cool the whole cystem down uniformly.
Prior to closing Mov-0031B in step 9.11, the valve had to be 3.
manually closed to provide clearance for the installation of strain gage instrumentation.
No abnormally high torgue was It was then experienced during this manual stroke.
electrically opened to ensure proper positioning prior to its closed stroke.
The pump sesl cavity and casing joint were obcorved during 4.
the pump cocidown portion of the procedure OPOP02-RH-0001, i
STEP 9.13.
No leakage was seen.
The slight seal leakage normally seen at higher temperatures, stopped.
5.
The Fluke paper jammed up at 1604.
The feeder had to be Data printing was recommenced at 1613.
This was j
adjusted.
during a thermally static portion of the procedure so it j
will have little impact.
(stop 9.17) had to be i
6.
The open stoke of the valve On the first attempt the data connection into reperformed.
The valve the computer came loose and no data was obtained.
l was then electrically closed in order to perform opening stroke for VDT data.
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I I l il! w f i l l 1 i l 1 i 1 i l i i PRESSURE LOCKING AND THERMAL BINDING I I I I l REPORT t I I !I i l' July 21,1994 l \\ i l i e l I l .i i ii I 5 i i i
{ l l July 21,1994 w I i l
Subject:
Pr-re 1~hl== =ad Ther==1 Bladine Sentus Paaa t as of June 28. 1994. I Reference Documeggs; i
- 1) (Draft / Not issued) Pressure twkine / Thermal Binding Evaluation Program dated 1/18/94, see attachment 1. For Information Only.
l'
- 2) (Draft / Not issued) Westinghouse Gate Valve Data / Calculation Study for STP's GNL 89-10 Program; dated 2/10/94, see attachment l
- 2. For Information Only.
I
- 3) Engineering Instruction EI 4.06. entitled "MOV Design Basis i
Review",' rev. 2, see attachment 3. l
- 4) (Draft l Not issued) Calculation Binder No. MC-6441, entitled
" Pressure locking / Thermal Binding", rev. O. i 1
- 5) "STP Pressure Imeking / Thermal Binding Order of Magnitude" Calculation, dated 1/29/94, see attachment 4.
l I i
- 6) Correspondence from L. Battaglia, to R. Kersey, dated 2/9/94; i
subject: "Effect of Line Imads on MOV requirements". See attachment 5. f
- 7) Calculation No. MC-6442, section 3.24, rev. 0; entitled " Phase II GL 89-10 Justifications".
l i 1 Executive Sunmaarv i The potential valve inoperability' caused by the phenomena of Pressuit IAcking / Thermal I Binding ("PL / TB") is a common-mode failure mechanism that can prevent a gate valve from opening, and could render redundant trains of safety systems or multiple safety systems inoperable. As a result, STP has developed a "PL / TB" Program and related documents (refs. I thru 6) for: l l l 1 f i i k
~ e 1 Executive Summarv (cont'd) Identifying and evaluating the spectrum of GNL 89-10's MOV's, if any, that have been or that may be subjec:ed to "PL / TB" Determining what conditions may introduce the failure mechanism under both normal and accident conditions. l Providing a uniform and standard technical approach for all MOV related work. Proposing corrective actions as necessary. I i The scope of this program has identified, specifically thm the Design Basis Review (DBR) f package preparation racess, approximately sixty six MOV's which are susceptible to 'PL / I TB*, see table 1. From this group, thirty six MOV's had calculations (ref. 4) performed on a stand alone basis which applied analytical tools to quantify the additional 11uust due to "PL / TB", as applicabic. Twelve of these MOV's (1,2-RH40 and 61 A,B,C) needed reconciliation as a resr!! of thennal binding. See attachment 1 for more details. I: Since none of the thirty six MOV's which had in-depth analysis performed produced any operability concerns, analysis for the thirty pending MOV's is being delayed until further industry and NRC thermal binding guidance exists. l' l
== Conclusion:== i corrective Action C2 requested that corrective actions be i initiated for the 66 valves identified as being susceptible to Thermal Einding (TD). An engineering evaluation and corrective actions were performed fo the SI 31 MOVs (6 MOVs total)with l subsequent testing validatang the effectiveness of the l operational procedure changus. 30 additional MOVs had engineering i evaluations performed with no additional. corrective actions recommended. Based on the evaluations to date and the imminent issuance of an NRC Generic Letter on the subject, no further j actions are being taken at this time and this corrective action should be closed. In addition, outside the MOV31's, STP has no evidence of an inoperability due to a Thermal Binding event. l' l Based on the corrective actions to the SIMOV31's, and the engineering evaluations completed to date Corrective Action C2 is conoidered complete. l !l l l i 'I } l
s 1 { f TABLE I ) w l 'hL / TB' SUSCEPTIBLE MOV's l MOV ID(s) ' DRAFT CALC. No. ACCEPT. AS IS7 COMMENTS 1,2 - CV - 0003 MC-6441, rev. 0 Yes l 1,2 - CV - 0006 MC-6441,'rev. 0 Yes j i f 1,2 - RH - 0060A MC4441, rev. 0 Yes See Attehment 1 i 1,2 - RH 0060B MC-6441, rev. 0 Yes See Attachment I l.2 - RH - 0060C MC4441, rev. 0 Yes See Attachment I i 1,2 RH - 0061 A MC4441, rev. 0 Yes See Attachment I l.2 - RI! - 0061B MC-6441,'rev. 0 Yes See Attachment i 1.2 - RH - 0061C MC-6441,'rev. 0 Yes See Attachment 1 MC-644', 'rev. 0 Yes j I 2 - SI - 0008A l l i 1,2 - Si - 00088 MC-6441, rev. 0 Yes j* l e 1,2 - SI 0008C MC-6441, rev. 0 Ya j 1,2 - SI 0019A MC-644', rev. 0 Yes l { t 1,2 - SI 0019B MC-6441, rev. 0 Yes ^ l .w 1,2 - SI 0019C MC-6441, rev. 0 Yes i 1,2 - SI -0031 A MC-6441, rev. 0 Yes .' 0031B MC-6441, rev. 0 Yes , 'eepv. O.- SI -0031C MC-6441, rev. 0 Yes 2 - RC - 0001 A MC-6441, rev. 0 Yes 2 - RC - 0002 B MC4441, rev. 0 Yes { i 1,2-RH 0066 A B.C PENDINO 1,2 RH 0067 A B.C PENDING i 1,2-51-0016 A,B,C PENDING t 1,2 - CV - 0465 PENDING ' ~ - t' 1,2 - CV - 0468 PENDiNG l [ c
o TABLE I f 'PL / TB" SUSCEPTIBLE MOV's j ! l' I MOV ID(s) DRAFT Calf. No. ACCEPT. AS IS? COMMENTS 1,2 - CV - Oll2A PENDINGl 1,2 - CV - 0112B PENDIMG' l.2 - CV - 0112C PENDING i 1.2 - CV - 0113A PENDING 1,2 - CV - 01138 PENDING I i
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