ML20078H314

Simulator 4-Year Certification Rept Oct,1994

ML20078H314
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	10/25/1994
From:	NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO., NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20078H299	List: B15025, Forwards Millstone Unit 3 Simulator 4-Year Certification Rept,Oct 1994 ML20078H314
References
NUDOCS 9411170143
Download: ML20078H314 (65)

Text

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1. D) t MILLSTONE UNIT 3 SIMULATOR FOUR YEAR CERTIFICATION REPORT OCTOBER 1994

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TABLE OF CONTENTS U

Paec No.

Four Year Certification Summary 1

1.

Testing Goals, Methodology and Assumptions 4

2.

System Tests 5

3.

Nonnal Operation and Surveillance Testing 8

4.

Malfunction Testing 8

5.

Yearly Operability Testing 10 6.

Physical Fidelity 11 7.

Initial Conditions Testing 11 8.

Simulatoi Operating Limits Testing 12 Ig)

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9.

Instructor Station Testing 13 10.

Real Time Testing 14 11.

Ensuring Continued Performance of the MP3 Simulator 14 12.

Open Deficiency Report (DR) List 16 13.

Next Four-Year Schedule 16 Attachments 1.Open Deficiency Report List 2.Four-Year Schedule

3. Physical Fidelity Report O) t

FOUR YEAR CERTIFICATION

SUMMARY

The Millstone 3 simulator was initially certified on October 31,1990. Certification was accomplished through the Northeast Utilities Simulator Certification Progrr.m, which is also the vehicle for ensuring continued certification. Based on the results of the Performance Test, which was rerun in its entirety over the past four years, the Millstone 3 simulator continues to demonstrate excellent physical and functional 6delity when compared to the reference unit.

Our Simulator Certification Program contains a comprehensive testing program, as well as procedural controls to ensure that the Millstone 3 simulator retains its high fidelity.

This report contains the following thirteen sections and three attachments:

Section 1 provides a description of testing methodology and assumptions.

Sections 2 through 10 review and summarize the individual tests, which make up the Millstone 3 Simulator Performance and Operability Test.

Section i1 reviews and summarizes the procedural controls for maintaining certification of the Millstone 3 simulator.

Section 12 provides a list of open deficiencies on the Millstone 3 simulator (Attachment 1). As of October 11,1994, there are 42 open deficiencies on the Millstone 3 simulator. A total of 668 deficiencies were dispositioned over the past four years.

Section 13 discusses the testing sequence for the next four (4) year certification period (November 1994 through October 1998).

The Performance and Operability Tests described in sections 2 through 9 were all performed by NRC licensed SROs, SRO certified or previously certified instructors. Any deficiencies identified during the Performance and Operability Testing is being corrected through the Simulator Modification Control Procedure NSEM 5.01.

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SIMill ATOR CERTIFICATION PROGRAM OVERVIEW O

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V The mission of our certification program is to:

Ensure that the simulator has the capability to support the training program.

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Provide for certification in a timely, cost-effective manner, addressing the specific requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.149, NRC 10CFR55.45 (b) and NUREG 1258.

Ensure ongoing compliance with the requirements set forth in ANSI /ANS 3.5, 1985.

The effort required to accomplish this mission has been grouped into three main components:

Definition of the Scope of Simulator, Validation of the Scope of Simulation, and Configuration Management. NU has put in place a collection of formal procedures called the Nuclear Simulator Ennineerine Manual. to direct all aspects of the certification process and ensure compliance to the regulatory requirements. The NSEM is a controlled document.

The Scope of Simulation that NU is certifying is based upon the NU Simulator Training Guides, which encompass:

All events specified in ANSI /ANS-3.5,1985 and Regulatory Guide 1.149, 1987.

The training requirements as specified in the various plant start-up, operating and g

emergency procedures.

Outside events (e.g., selected LERs, plant design changes, etc.) that affect the training programs and/or the trainer configuration.

Validation of the defined Scope of Simulation consists of two main groupings of activities:

(1) Performance Testing and (2) Verification. A specific performance test was developed for the Millstone 3 simulator, which fulfills the testing requirements of ANS 3.5,1985; INPO 86-026, Guidelines for Simulator Training; and NUREG 1258. Included are the following test categories:

Systems Malfunctions (Major and Minor)

Normal Operations

. Instructor Interface

• Operability Real Time Simulation 2

There are also activities, which are requirements of certification, but do not fit neatly within the context of performance testing, namely:

. Defined Simulator Operating Limits Plant-Referenced Physical Fidelity

. Approved Initial Conditions The Millstone 3 Simulator Performance Test is a dynamic document and is the primary mechanism for validating simulator performance and fidelity. As such, it is updated to reflect modifications made to the simulator and/or new reference plant performance data. The entire performance test is repeated over a four year period at the rate of approximately 25 percent per year. The Operability Test and Physical Fidelity / Human Factor Evaluation are performed annually.

NU's Certification Program provides control over the connguration of the Millstone 3 simulator to ensure that it can effectively support the training mission and that regulatory commitments are satisfied.

i The main components of Configuration Management are: Design Data Base, Documentation, Modification Control and Scope of Simulation Expansion.

The intent of the Simulator Design Data Base is to have available the complete data on which the simulator is designed, and on which upgrading is based. The specine data which forms the design basis for the current Millstone 3 simulator hardware configuration and software models has been identified and velidated. It is NU's philosophy here not to create a separate, new data base, but to utilize existing controlled reference plant design data bases. As such, we utilize the latest revision plant documents and rely on the formal plant design change process for notification of modifications and transmittal of pertinent information. Open Simulator Design Changes constitute the Update Design Data Base described in ANS 3.5, l

1985. In addition, there is also simulator-specific documentation, which is needed for certification and/or maintenance of the simulator. While this documentation is controlled and updated, it is not considered to be part of the Simulator Design Data Base.

NU has in place a modification control process that manages the implementation of design changes on the Millstone 3 simulator and fully complies with NRC regulations and industry standards regarding configuration control. Procedures within the NSEM control the coordination, resolution and documentation ofidentified differences between the simulator and reference plant. A Simulator Configuration Control Committee has been established to be responsible for overall simulator design control and management of all Nuclear Training resources involved in the simulator modification effort. The SCCC is comprised of representatives from both the Operator Training and Simulator Technical Support Branches, and is chaired by the Manager of Simulator Technical Support. A computer-based data retrieval program is used to track the status of all identified simulator discrepancies.

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1.

Testine Goals Methodolony and Assumptions N

The NU simulator certification program, goals, methodologies and assumptions were established to ensure an efficient, effective and comprehensive approach to testing.

Certain elements of this testing philosophy are worthy of mention here:

Testing should be conducted during normal, abnormal and emergency conditions.

The Simulator response, as verified by testing, during normal, abnormal and emergency conditions shall meet the following criteria necessary to support the contents of the training curriculum:

Correct operator diagnosis is possible.

Capabilities for operator intervention to mitigate events exist.

Actions or inaction taken by operators result in similar response as in the reference plant.

Alarms and automatic system actuation shall occur such that operator diagnosis and response is not adversely affected.

0 Any deficiencies found during testing which violate these criteria shall be documented by generating a Deficiency Report (DR), to be dispositioned in accordance with the NSEM.

The requirements of ANS 3.5 shall be implemented.

All Simulator controls such as switches, annunciators, meters, controllers, recorders, lights, key locks, push buttons, etc., should be tested.'

Former Millstone 3 operators should be used, if possible, for Performance and Operability testing.

In the absence of finite data, a combination of operating experience, engineering judgment and analytical results shall be used to test the simulator response to Major Malfunctions such as Large Break LOCA, Steam Line Break, etc.

1 Two experienced observers should be used whenever possible to improve the observations made during testing.

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Provisions for the revision of NSEM procedures shall be available. Changes to (Vo) that manual will nat be forwarded to the NRC unless they significantly alter the intent of the test program.

Testing shall be conduct 3 whenever a modification is made to the simulator that effects its fidelity relative to the reference unit or its functional operation as a simulator. Modifications to the simulator design shall be validated through testing prior to use in training and examination.

During the development and conduct of specific testing it became necessary to establish additional guidance. This was done to more effectively apply the requirements of ANS 3.5 and respond to the unique attributes of each test. This additional guidance, or deviation from the general philosophy, is summarized:

SYSTEM TESTS Digital plant process computer points need not be included on the Simulation

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Diagrams. Their absence improves the clarity of the diagrams.

NORMAL OPERATIONS TESTING Testing of surveillance on redundant equipment or flow paths is not required if the primary piece of equipment or flow path is tested. For example, if the Train A (n)

Service Water Pump surveillance is performed, the Train B Service Water Pump U

surveillance need not be performed. Also, testing of surveillance which are strictly calculational is not required.

The simulator's capability of performing a reactor trip followed by recovery to rated (full) power (ANS 3.5, Section 3.1.1, Item 4) may be tested by testing:

an increase in power from 20% to 100%, followed by a reactor trip, then an increase in power to 20%

There is no need to test the power ascension to 100% twice.

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YEARIX OPERABILITY TESTING p

STEADY STATE TESTING Application of both instrument error and allowed tolerance is to be made as

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follows. The ANS 3.5 allowed tolerance (Section 4.l(3) or (4)) is to be applied as a function of the reference plant indicated value above the minimum scale value. The allowable instrument error is to be a function of the instrument range, not its reference plant indicated value, when the instrument error is given as a percentage.

For example:

For a pressure instrument with a range of 1500 to 2500 psig, reading 2250 psig in the reference plant, the simulator accuracy, as indicated on the instrument, is expected to be:

(2500-1500) (.01) + (2250-1500) (.02) = 25 psig This assumes an instrument accuracy of 1% and that this parameter is a critical parameter.

TRANSIENT TESTING a

All parameters required by ANS 3.5, Appendix B, B2.2 are to be tested at.5 second intervals In the case where the comparison between simulator response and refuence plant response results in a discrepancy, that discrepancy is resolved via the Deficiency Report process and an appropriate retest conducted. Replotting of the transient is not required until the next scheduled yearly testing of the transient.

Documenting the difference between the response of a simulator parameter and predicted reference plant response is not necessary for those differences of an obvious nature.

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2.

System Tests

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The Millstone 3 Simulator models 25* Plant Systems. A separate test was conducted for each of these Systems to ensure that all of the following operate correctly:

Control Board Hardware such as hand switches, meters, controllers, recorders, indicating lights, keylocks and push buttons Annunciators and PPC points Remote Functions (These are tasks performed by an instructor at the instructor station to simulate local actions; typically these are locally operated valves)

Flow paths, both normal and abnormal NSEM Procedure 4.01 " Verifying Simulator Capabilities via System Tests", is the generic procedure which governs the writing and performance of System Tests.

Each simulated plant system has its own performance test to ensure:

That all components of a specific system are checked for consistency.

That a consistent set of performance requirements are applied to each system.

That as Plant Design Changes are implemented, the System Test will act as a benchmark f:r proper system response.

Selected system tests or subsets of the systems test will be performed at the discretion of the individual unit ASOT or SOA as determined necessary due to plant modifications in areas that have the potential to impact the dynamics or logic of a particular system.

Due to the layout of the Millstone 3 control room and systems,it was judged easier to subdivide some systems into more than 1 test. IIence the difference between the number of tests (29) and the number of simulated systems (25).

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3.

Nonnal Opemtions and Smveillance Testing k/

ANSI /ANS 3.5 (1985) Section 3.1.1 requires the simulator to be capable of performing normal plant evolutions and surveillance.

The normal operations and surveillance required by ANS 3.5 Section 3.1.l(1), (2), (3),

(4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (10) were performed using controlled copies of Millstone 3 Operating Procedures and Survei!!ance. ANS 3.5, Section 3.1.1 (9) was tested in the reactor core system test. NSEM Procedure 4.10, " Normal Operations VeriGeation" contains the generic guidance used to write the Millstone 3 Simulator Normal Operations and Surveillance Test.

IJsina controlled conies of Millstone 3 O_peratine Procedures the following sequence of operations was tested on the Millstone 3 Simulator:

The Simulator was initialized to Cold Shutdown conditions.

A Plant lieat up was performed.

A Plant Start up was performed.

A Load increase to 100% power was performed.

A Reactor Scram was initiated.

A Reactor Trip recovery was performed.

A Nuclear Start up was performed.

A Plant Start up was performed.

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A Load Increase was performed (to 20% power).

The Simulator was reinitialized to 100% power.

A Plant Shutdown to hot standby was performed.

A Reactor Shutdown was performed.

A Plant Cool down was performed until Cold Shutdown was reached.

The Simulator was initialized to 43% power.

A Shift from 4 Loop to 3 Loop Operations was performed.

The specific Millstone 3 Operating Procedure and Surveillance Procedure titles and numbers used in this test are listed in the individual steps of the test procedure.

All Normal Operations and Surveillance Testing will be re-performed over a four-year interval.

4.

Malfunction Testine ANSI /ANS 3.5 (1985) Section 3.1.2 requires 25 specific malfunctions to be available on a simulator. The Millstone 3 Simulator is capable of all malfunctions that are applicable to PWRs.

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The Millstone 3 Simulator is certified for 252 malfunctions, which are listed in a

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l malfunction "Cause and Effects" document and are organized alpha-numerically by V

plant system. Each "Cause and Effect" description contains:

The malfunction description / title Whether or not it is a variable malfunction The "Cause" of the malfunction The initial Plant Status that the malfunction " Effects" are written for What the " Effects" of the malfunction are on plant operations References showing where information was obtained Each certified malfunction has its own test procedure. Guidance for writing malfunction test procedures and conducting tests is contained in:

NSEM Procedure 4.04, Major Malfunction Testing NSEM Procedure 4.05, Malfunction Testing

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Malfunctions which cause major integrated plant effects, such as Loss of Instrument Air, Loss of Normal Power, etc., have their respective malfunction test procedures written and tests conducted per the guidance in NSEM 4.04. For these " major" malfunctions, computer data, analytical data, or actual plant response data (if available) is typically used to verify correct malfunction response. Analytical data was obtained from the following documents / sources:

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Millstone 3 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

U Westinghouse WCAP-11145-P-A (NOTRUMP Best Estimate LOCA Analysis Millstone 3 Reference Plant Data Book Cycle 5 Reload Analysis Report Malfunctions which do not cause large integrated plant effects or are very similar in response to a major malfunction have their respective malfunction test procedures j

written and tests conducted per the guidance in NSEM 4.05. This type of malfunction is typically an instrument malfunction, a controller malfunction, a pump trip, etc.

Malfunction tests in this category are typically "Best Estimate" Analysis. "Best Estimate" Analysis means a Millstone 3 NRC licensed instructor or previously licensed indh Pical utilizes his experience, operating procedures, piping and instrument drat,ag3, elect.. sal drawings and possibly hand calculations to estimate proper simulator response.

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ANSI /ANS 3.5 (1985) Section 3.4.2 requires that provisions be available for

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incorporating additional malfunctions. As an example, malfunctions EGOS and EGl2 were added to the simulator to reflect changes in MP3 plant design.

All certified malfunctions will be retested over a four year interval, as described in Section 13 of this document.

5.

Yeady Operability Testing ANSI /ANS 3.5 (1985) Section 5.4.2 and Appendix B specify Annual Operability Testing requirements. The methodology used to write and conduct Yearly Operability Tests is described in NSEM Procedure 4.09, " Simulator Operability Testing" Using the guidance provided in NSEM 4.09, a Yearly Operability Test specific to the Millstone 3 Simulator was written. This Millstone 3 specific test procedure is not contained in this report, but is available for review on request.

Yearly Operability Testing consists of the following items:

Steady State Testing at 75% power and 100% power Stability Testing at 100% power Transient Performance Testing for ten (10) transients b

Reference Plant data obtained at 75% and 100% power during the various plant U

startups and power reductions was used as the basis for Steady State Testing

• Utilizing the Reference Plant data, comparisons were made between the Simulator and Reference Plant for approximately 50 selected critical and non-critical points. These 50 point:; include all those listed in ANS 3.5 Section B2.1.

A Stability Test was performed at 100% power for approximately 50 points over a one hour period. This test was in conformance with ANS 3.5 Section B2.1.

Acceptance criteria for the Steady State and Stability Tests were based on ANS 3.5 Section 4.1. No deficiencies were identified.

The ten transients described in ANS 3.5 Section Bl.2 were analyzed using the parameters indicated in ANS 3.5 Sections Bl.2.1,2, or 3, as appropriate.

• For the next four year cycle, a third point at approximately 25 percent power will be added.

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Physical Fidelity (7~ )

V ANSI /ANS 3.5 (1985) Sections 3.2 and 3.3.1 require sufficient panels and control simulation to conduct normal operations and malfunction response. Further, the simulator instrumentation and controls are required to duplicate the physical characteristics of the Reference Plant. In response to the issuance of 10 CFR 55.45, a two step evaluation process was employed for the existing Millstone 3 Simulator to ensure compliance with the ANS 3.5 Section 3.2 and 3.3.1 requirements.

NU has a strong commitment to maintain the Millstone 3 Simulator up to date with the Reference Plant Control Boards in a timely manner. NSEM Procedure 6.04,

" Major Plant Changes", addresses controls on major design changes (such as Control Room Design Review) that challenge a " plant referenced simulator" to remain an effective training tool. Minor plant changes are addressed within the time constraints of ANS 3.5 Sections 5.2 and 5.3.

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Initial Conditions Testine Initial Conditions Testing was performed in November 1988. NSEM Procedure 4.02,

" Initial Conditions", describes this process. The Millstone 3 Simulator has capabilities for storing 58 Initial Conditions.

All Certified Initial Conditions (ICs) were reviewed to ensure equipment alignments, (3

V) plant conditions, remote functions, etc., were reasonable for the stated IC conditions.

The number of certified ICs may vary between 25 and 58, depending on simulator training requirements. Forty-nine ICs have been designated as the " base" group ofICs that will be maintained certified. These 49 certified ICs cover a broad range of conditions such as:

Beginning of Core Life (BOL)

Middle of Core Life (MOL)

End of Core Life (EOL)

Different Operating Modes such as Cold Shutdown, IIot Standby, Power Operations, etc.

Different Power Levels Only certified ICs are used for training or exams and are maintained up-to-date as plant changes and procedure changes occur.

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Simulator Operatine Umits Testine j

L Simulator Operating Limits Testing was performed between September 1988 and May 1989. The purpose of this testing was to identify any areas of possible negative training and to take actions to prevent such negative training. The process used for identification and action concerning Simulator Operating Limits is described in NSEM Procedure 4.08, " Simulator Operating Limits".

Two methods are used to prevent negative training when Simulator Operating Limits are reached: a) freezing the simulator and, b) administrative controls. The Reference Plant design limits and/or Simulator model limits which cause the Simulator to " freeze" are listed below.

The Millstone 3 Simulator will go to " freeze" if any of the following conditions exist:

RCS Pressure 2735 psig Containment Pressure 60 psig S/G Pressure 1300 psig j

Fuel Temperature 4980*F Fuel Clad Temp 3300*F The simulator instructor can determine which of these operating limits caused the simulator to go to Freeze by reviewing a CRT display in the instructor station.

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Administrative Simulator Operating Limits are controlled by the simulator instructor.

These administrative limits are implemented through simulator instructor training and cautions placed in those Simulator Guides where such situations could occur.

The following simulator operating limits are dealt with administratively.

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The simulator model for the RCS is a single phase system model. Because of this modeling limitation, the following effects are seen on the simulator:

i The reactor vessel level indication system (RVLMS) does not respond properly during LOCA conditions.

The core exit thermocouple response is not correct during LOCA conditions.

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The RCS pressure response for small break LOCAs does not match the predicted response when the SI accumulators inject. The simulator model shows a greater pressure drop on accumulator injection that is expected. This 12 l

issue is covered under open DR 90-3-0026. This problem will hopefully be 7

(U) resolved with the installation of the new NSSS model in 1995.

3.

Increasing RCS activity using ISD point RCR0 to cause high containment radiation levels will cause radiation monitors SSR08 (SG blowdown sample flow monitor) and ARC 21 (Main condenser air ejector monitor) to alarm even if steam lines are isolated.

4.

Because of modeling limitations, the RPCCW surge tank is an active part of the RPCCW flow loop. This results in activity transport form one train to the other. On any malfunction causing activity inflow to the RPCCW system, the activity will eventually show up in both trains.

9.

Instmetor Station Testine During November 1993, Simulator Instructor Station Testing was performed as described in NSEM procedure 4.11, " Instructor Station". No deficiencies were identified.

Instructor Station testing verified correct operation of the following features of the Millstone 3 Instructor Station:

Backtrack g

Fastime

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Slowtime Boolean Trigger Composite Malfunction Variable Parameter Control Freeze Snapshot To verify the I/O override feature of the Millstone 3 Simulator, a small number of the following points were tested to verify proper operation.

Analog Outputs Analog Inputs Digital Inputs Digital Outputs "Crywolf" Annunciator feature Annunciator Override Q

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The purpose of the I/O override feature testing was to verify the feature itself, not i

cvery I/O override point. The Millstone 3 simulator has the ability to I/O override

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essentially every point in the simulator. While this is a great capability, there are therefore thousands ofI/O override points. Curriculum testing of a simulator lesson plan requires the testing of any individual I/O override point to be used in training or exams, thereby verifying the individual I/O override points to be used.

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Real Time Testine Real Time Testing was performed in 1992, per NSEM procedure 4.13, "Real Time Simulator Verification"'

The purpose of this test was to verify that all simulation models are running in real time. Verification was accomplished by:

Monitoring the operations of the internal Computer Clock and Interrupt Timers and comparing them against the vendor's specifications.

Ensuring that the spare time remaining in the simulation computer for each of the following complex scenarios was > 10%:

Turbine load reject / trip Steam line break

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RCS hot leg double-ended LOCA RCP locked rotor s

Installing software counters in the Reactor Core, RCS and Feed Water models and comparing their actual values to expected values for each of the above scenarios.

The results of these tests show that the Millstone 3 Simulator performs in real time.

In addition, an internal software timer continuously monitors computer usage and will automatically bump out any task that slips two consecutive frames.

No deficiencies were identified. This test will be repeated once every four years or at any time a question exists that the Millstone 3 Simulator is not running in real time.

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Ensurine Continuine Perfonnance of the MP3 Simulator To ensure that the MP3 Simulator performt,nce remains in compliance with ANSI /ANS 3.5 (1985), Reg Guide 1.149 and 10 CFR 55.45 the following procedural controls have been implemented:

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Maior Plant Modifications - The Millstone 3 Simulator was certified as a Plant Referenced Simulator. Significant Reference Plant Control Room changes, such as D

Control Room Design Review modifications, must receive special consideration due to their potential major impact on training.

NSEM Procedure 6.04, " Major Plant Modifications", addresses this concern. This procedure ensures that major plant modifications affecting the Reference Plant Control Room are reviewed and acted on in a timely manner. This ensures that training and exams continue to be performed on a valid plant referenced simulator.

Plant Design Channes/ Procedure Changes All Plant Design Changes and Procedure Changes are sent to the Training Department to be reviewed for training impact and simulator impact. This assures that both training and the simulator are continually evaluated and updated as plant changes occur. Procedural controls covering this review process are in Training Procedures.

Plant Design Changes requiring Simulator modifications are handled within the time allowed by ANS 3.5 Section 5.2 and 5.3.

Sludent Feedback - Student (licensee) feedback is an important input to simulator Fidelity. NSEM Procedure 6.01, " Student Feedback" describes how student feedback is obtained. Written feedback is requested by training staff from students on simulator training and fidelity as directed by NTM 6.01. This feedback is evaluated 3

by the ASOT and if appropriate forwarded to the unit SOA for simulator analysis and disposition.

Reference Plant Performance Data - As plant events occur, data will be retrieved and evaluated to validate Simulator Fidelity. NSEM Procedure 6.03, Collection of Plant Performance Data', covers the collection of reference plant performance data.

DevelopmenLof New Simulator Training Guides - Simulator CertiGcation Procedure NSEM 6.02, " Development of New Simulator Guides," covers requirements for new simulator training guides. This ensures that new simulator training guides use only certified remote functions, certified malfunctions, certified Initial Conditions and do not exceed any Simulator Operating Limits.

Simulator Certification Documentation - As the Millstone 3 Simulator is modified, appropriate simulator certification documentation needs to be updated. NSEM Procedure 5.02, " Retest Guidelines" covers updating of the Performance Test.

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Reference Plant Design Changes may result in simulator changes such as:

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I Adding or deleting remote functions V'

Adding or deleting malfunctions Changing remote functions or malfunctions Changing Performance Tests or their criteria a

It is Northeast Utilities' interpretation that simulator documentation may be modified as the Reference Plant changes without requiring the submittal of an NRC Form 474 update. Changes to simulator certification documentation will be made per the NSEM procedures. Updated materials will be sent upon NRC request.

12.

Open Deficiency Report (DR) Ust Simulator Modi 5 cation Control Procedure NSEM 5.01 fumishes guidance to establish controls for the coordination, resolution and documentation of identified differences between the simulator and its reference plant.

A Deficiency Report is a form used by the Operator Training Branch and the Simulator Technical Support Group to record all identified deficiencies and ensure that the requirements of ANSI /ANS 3.5 are satisfied. A current copy of the Millstone 3 Simulator Open Deficiency Report is attached.

DRs are resolved in accordance with NSEM-5.01 Simulator Modification Control Procedure and NSEM-6.04 Major Plant Modification Procedure.

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Next 4-Year Schedule. (November 1994 to October 1998)

The entire MP3 performance test will be repeated over a four-year interval as described in Attachment 9. The schedule shown in Attachment 9 has been written based on the guidance provided in NSEM Procedure 4.07, " Master Test Schedule".

This 4-year interval will start on the date of this submittal.

The following tests must be performed each year:

Annual Operability Testing Physical Fidelity Verification The following tests must be performed over a 4-year interval:

Normal Plant Evolutions and Surveillance Testing All Certified Malfunctions Instructor Station Testing Real Time Testing bQ 16

ATTACIIMENT 1 OPEN DEFICIENCY REPORT (DR) LIST i

This attachment is referenced by section 12 ohne Performance Test Summary

i tJnit 3 v tor Database CMS STATUS REPORT 10/11/94 09:18:59 i

Month and year of intereatt October 1994 f

Date of last DR database update is 10/11/94 Total number of open DR's is 42 4

a Total number of DR's written in October 1994 is 6 Total number of DR's closed in October 1994 is 6 Date of last SDC database opdate is 10/11/94 Total number of SDC's closed in October 1994 is 1 6

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l Unit 3 Simulator Database 10/11/94 DEFICIENCY TRACKING St2#4ARY (OPEN DG'S SY PRIORITY /DUE DATE/SIMSYS)

SIM DISCI ORIGIN DR NO SDC NO DATE DUE DATE ORIGINATOR SYS PLINE TITLE DISPOSITION

• • STATUS (OPEN=O) 0

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PRIORITY = 2 SF 94-3-0105 94-3-0105 10/07/94

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W LANDON IAS S IMPROPER OP CHILL WATER VALVES TO C TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON DURING IDSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR 10-7-94 SF 94-3-0106 94-3-0106 10/07/94

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W LANDON IAS S IMPROPER OP OF CHILL WATER TO C TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON VALVES DURING LOSS INSTRUMENT 10-11-94 AIR SF 94-3-0104 94-3-G104 10/07/94

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W IANDON INB S IMPROPER OP EHC PANEL TO C TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON INDICATING LIGHT DURING IDAD 10-7-94 LIMIT OPS OTH 90-3-0026 90-3-0026 06/26/90 09/30/92 W.LANDON RC S RCS PRESS AND MP RESPONSE TO TO GEORGE FOR EVALILATION SMALL BREAK 14CAS 10-6-92 PDC 94-3-0107 94-3-0107 10/07/94 04/07/96 W LANDON SWP S CHG CTRL IDGIC 3SWP*MOV130A & TO C TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON B 3SWP*P3A & B / MP3-94-099 10-11-94 FEIGEITY = 1 OTH 92 1 0;te v2 5 a se IJ CJ v4 e

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CCP S CtdNERSION OF RPPCW SYSTDt TO TO CHI FOR ANALYSIS ON 12-7-92 F14WNET SF 94-3-0092 94-3-0092 09/21/94

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u LAND 0N CCP S ERROR IN RESPONSE OF TO C TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON 3CCP-FCV66B TO I4SS OF VIAC-2 9-26-94 SF 94-3-0100 94-3-0100 09/30/94

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W LANDON CDS S ERROR IN CTRL POWER SUPPLY FOR TO C TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON CDS SYSTEM COMPONENTS 9-30-94 SF 94-3-0087 94-3-0087 09/09/94

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W IANDON CES S MAIN BOARD LAMP TEST PUSH TV C. TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON BU" TONS DO NOT FUNC"rION 9-12-94 SF 94-3-0098 94-3-0098 09/30/94

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W LANDON CHS S IMPROPER RESPONSE OF TO C TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON ANNUNCIATOR MB3A(4-9) TO 9-30-94 BATTERY 1 IDSS OTH 94-3-0034 94-3-0014 02/11/94

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W IANDON CNM S INCONSISTENT RESPONSE OF TO TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON 2-14-94 HOTWELL MASS SF 94-3-0099 94-3-0099 09/30/94

/ /

W IANDON CWS S ADD AMPERAGE OSCILLATION MAIN TO C TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON CIRC H2O PUMPS ON HI SCREEN DP 9-30-94 SF 94-3-0083 94-3-0083 09/02/94

/ /

W IANDON DGS S INCORRECT OPERATION OF TO C. TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON 3DGS*CTV24 MB1 CONTROL SWITCH 9-6-94

,~

PAGE NO.

Unit 3 Simulator Database

\\s 10/11/94 DEFICIENCY TRACKING SO94ARY

{OPEN DR'S BY PRIORITY /DUE DATE/SIMSYS)

SIM DISCI ORIGIN DR NO SDC NO DATE DUE DATE ORIGINATOR SYS PLINE TITLE DISPOSITION SF 94-3-0057 94-3-0057 07/22/94

/ /

W IANDON EMS S IMPROPER OP EMERGENCY POWJED TV C. TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON EQUIPMENT BREAKERS 7-22-94 SF 94-3-0093 94-3-0093 09/23/94

/ /

W IANDON WS S ERROR IN THE PRESSURE RESPONSE TO C TAN % Alwa.TSIS ON OF MAIN FEED HEADER 9-26-94 SF 94-3-0094 94-3-0094 09/23/94

/ /

W IANDON FWS S ERROR RESPONSE MAIN CONDENSER TO C TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON VACUUM L/O GIAND SEALING STM 9-26-94 SF 94-3-0097 94-3-0097 09/30/94

/ /

W LANDON WSS UPDATE OF TDMW PUMPS TO LOSS TO C TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON OF DAHL COtfrROLLERS 9-30-94 SF 94 3-0103 94-3-0103 10/07/94

/ /

W LANDON HVC S ERROR IN CPERATION OF TO C TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON 3HVC*SOV74B 10-7-94 SF 94-3-0095 94 3-0095 09/23/94

/ /

W LANDON HVK S ERROR IN OPERATION CTRL BIDG TO C TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON CHILL WATER PUMPS FOLLOWING 9-26-94 14P SF 94-3-0078 94-3-0078 09/02/94

/ /

W LANDON IHA S RESPONSE OF MB4D PERMISSIVE TO C. TAN EtR ANALYSIS ON ANNUN INCORRECT BATTERY 1 14SS 9-6-94 OTH 94-3-0084 94-3-0084 09/09/94

/ /

W LANDON IHA S ANNUNCIATOR 10 OVERRIDES DO TO C. TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON NOT FUNCTION 9-12-94 OTH 94-3-0085 94-3-0085 09/02/94

/ /

W LANDON IHA S IMPROPER OPERATION OF THE TO C. TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON MASTER SILENCE FEATURE 9-12-94 SF 94-3-0086 94-3-0086 09/09/94

/ /

W LANDON IHA S MISOPERATION OF ANNUNCIATOR TO C. TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON SILENCE PUSH BtTrTONS 9-12-94 OTH 94-3-0089 94-3-0089 09/09/94

/ /

W LANDON IHA S ERRORS IN THE OPERATION OF MB8 TO C. TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON ANNUNCIATORS 9-12-94 SF 94-3-0091 94-3-0091 09/16/94

/ /

W LANDON IHA S ERROR IN OPERATION OF MAIN TO C TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON BOARD SILENCE PUSH BUTTONS 9-19-94 SF 94-3-0096 94-3-0096 09/30/94

/ /

W LANDON IHA S OPERATIONAL ERROR IN TO C TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON ANNUNCIATORS FOR MASTER 9-30-94 SILENCE SF 94-3-0102 94-3-0102 10/07/94

/ /

W LANDON IHA S ERROR IN CPERATION COMPUTER TO C TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON FAILURE ANNUNCIATOR 10-7-94 (MB4 C(1-11) )

OTH 93-3-0083 93-3-0083 09/24/93

/ /

W.

LANDON IHC S CONDUCT ANNUAL UPGRADE (TAPE TO TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON 9-28-93 SAVE) OF SIMULATOR MODCOMP

fr

(

(*)

PAGE NO.

k Unit 3 Simulator Database 10/11/94 DEFICIENCY TRACKING St.M4ARY (OPEN DR'S BY PRIORITY /DUE PATE/SIMSYS)

SIM DISCI ORIGIN DR NO SDC NO DATE DUE DATE ORIGINATOR SYS PLINE TITLE DISPOSITION OIH 92-3-0083 92-3-0083 12/02/92

/ /

W. LANDON MSS S CONVERSION OF THE MAIN STEAM M CHI FOR ANALYSIS ON 12-7-92 SYSTEM TO FIDWNET PDC 94-3-0045 94 3-0045 07/01/94

/ /

W LANDON MSS H ADD SWITCH COVER MBS MAIN HW MR8 A0424 STEAM LINE ISOLATION PUSH BUITON SF 94-3-0068 94-3-0068 08/19/94

/ /

W IANDON NA H CCRRECT METER LABELING ERRORS M ART FOR ANALYSIS ON 8-22-94 ON MB2 & MB4 OTH 93-3-0121 93-3-0121 12/10/93

/ /

W LANDON NHS H REPIACEMENT OF DEFECTIVE HW MR8 6779 DIGITAL VOLTMETER SF 94-3-0081 94-3-0081 09/02/94

/ /

W LANDON NMI S METER FACES FOR INTERMEDIATE TO C. TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON RANGE METERS ON MB4 ARE 9-6-94 REVERSE SF 94-3-0082 94-3-0082 09/02/94

/ /

W LANDON RCS S INCORRECT POWER SUPPLY TO C. TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON PRESSURIZER LEVEL & RECORDER 9-6-94 SEL SWCH SF 94-3-0080 94-3-0080 09/02/94

/ /

W LANDON RMS S SOURCE CHK DURATION DFCT VALUE TO C. TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON LWS70 INCORRECT IN RMS PRGRM 9-6-94 SF 94-3-0088 94-3-0088 09/09/94

/ /

W LANDON RMS S IMPROPER RESPONSE OF MSS-RE79 TO C. TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON M C SG TUBE RUPTURE 9-12-94 OTH 93-3-0069 93-3-0069 08/12/93

/ /

W.

LANDON RPS S ERROR IN OPERATION OF CONTROL TO TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON 8-12-93 BUILDIKi3 ISOLATION LOGIC OTH 93-3-0073 93-3-0073 08/25/93

/ /

W.

LANDON RPS S ERROR RESPONSE B/S STATUS LTS TO TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON 8-30-93 MB2D MB4F MB4G I4SS OF VIAC-4 SF 94-3-0090 94-3-0090 09/16/94

/ /

W LANDON RPS S ERROR STM FLOW MEASUREMEB IN TO C TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON RESPONSE TO LOSS OF COMP tAESS 9-19-94 SF 94-3-0101 94-3-0101 09/30/94

/ /

W LANIX)N RPS S ERROR IN OPERATION OF CTRL TO C TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON BUILDING ISOLATION ANNUNCIA%R 9-30-94 PDC 93-3-0036 93-3-0036 07/12/93 10/30/93 W.

LANDON FWA B MDAFW PP TRIP CIRCUIT TO TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON 7-16-93 MODIFICATION PDCR MP3-92-109

- HW MR8 6414 PDC 94-3-0072 94-3-0072 08/19/94 02/19/96 W LANDON CCS S EDIFICATION OF TPCCW PUMP TO C. TAN FOR ANALYSIS ON TRIP CIRCUIT 8-22-94

A'ITACIIMENT 2 SCIIEDULE FOR NEXT FOUR YEARS OF TESTING O

This attachment is referenced by section 13 of the Performance Test Summary U(

=

=

=

n

ATTACHMENT 8.3 Millstone Unit 3 PERFORMANCE TEST SCHEDULE Performance Test:

Year One:

11/1/94 10/31/95 Year Two:

11/1/95 10/31/96 Year Three:

11/1/96 10/31/97 Year Four:

11/1/97 10/31/98 APPROVED:

ASOr i

Rev.: 1 l

Date: 5/3/94 Page: 8.3-1 of 23

]

NSEM-4.07

YEAR ONE TEST DATE INITIALS Annual Ooerability NSEM-4.09 75% Steady State Accuracy 100% Steady State Accuracy 100% Stability Transient #1: Manual Reactor Trip Transient #2: Simultaneous Trip of All Feed Water Pumps Transient #3: Simultaneous Closure of All Main Steam Isolation Valves Transient #4: Simultaneous Trip of All Reactor Coolant Pumps Transient #5 Trip of Any Single Reactor Coolant Pump Transient #6 Main Turbine Trip at Power Less than P9 Transient #7 Large Load Rejection Transient #8 Maximum Size LOCA with a Loss of Offsite Power Transient #9 Maximum Size Main Steam Line Rupture Inside Containment Transient #10 Reactor Coolant System Depressurization to Saturation Conditions Using PORV j

Physical Fidelity Verification NSEM-4.12 Approximately 25% steady State Accuracy Rev.: 1 Date: 5/3/94 Page: 8.3-2 of 23 NSEM-4.07

f YEAR ONE TEST DATE INITIAIE Remote Functions NSEM-4.03 o

RPCCW System Remote Function Test RHR System Remote Function Test o

o SI System Remote Function Test o

SW System Remote Function Test o

TPCCW System Remote Function Test Maior Malfunctions NSEM-4.04 o

ED01 o

FW10A(B)(C)(D)

(d o

MS01A(B)(C)(D)

Malfunctions NSEM-4.05 o

CC System Malfunctions i

CC01 - RPCCW Pump Trip CC02 - RHR HX CC VV Failure CC03 - Loss of RCP Cooling Water Supply CC04 - RPCCW Pipe Leak CC05 - RPCCW Surge Tk M/U VV Failure CC06 - RPCCW HX Outlet TCV Failure Rev.: 1 Date: 5/3/94 Page: 8.3-3 of 23

YEAR ONE TEST DATE INITIAIS CC07 - Safety Injection PP Clr Blockage CC08 - Charging PP Clg Wtr Sys Blockage o

CH System Malfunctions CH02 - CTMT Air Recirculation Fan Trip CH03 - Chilled Wtr Circulating PP Trip CH04 - Loss of CTMT Vacuum CH05 - Breach of CTMT Integrity CH06 - Control Rod Drive Cooling Fan Trip CH07 - Loss of Reactor Plant Chilled Water Ob o

CR System Malfunctions CR01 - Fuel Cladding Failure o

CS System Malfunctions CS01 - Quench Spray PP Trip CS02 - RWST Chem Add Tk Disch VV Fails to Open in Automatic CS03 - CTMT Recirc PP Trip CSO4 - RWST leak Rev.: 1 Date: 5/3/94 Page: 8.3-4 of 23 O

NSEM-4.07

'Q}

YEAR ONE i

t.

TEST DAIE INITIALS o

CV System Malfunctions CV01 - Letdown Leak Inside CTMT CV02 - Letdown Leak Outside CTMT CV03 - Letdown HX Tube Leak to RPCCW CV04 - Letdown Temp Transmitter Failure CV05 - Letdown Press Transmimr ??ailure i

CV06 - M/U Control Failure j

CV07 - RCS Uncontrolled Dilution CV08 - M/U Water PP Trip CV09 - Volume Control Tank Leak CV10 - VCT Lvl Transmitter Failure CV11 - Charging Pump Trip CV12 - Charging Line. Leak.Inside CTMT CV13 - RCP #1 Seal Failure CV14 - RCP #2 Seal Failure CV15 - RCP #3 Seal Failure CV16 - RCP Thermal Barrier Tube Failure CV18 - Charging Flow Control VV Failure Rev.: 1 j

Date: 5/3/94

'Page: 8.3-5 of 23 O

NSEM-4.07 l

(')

YEAR ONE

%.J TEST DATE INITIAlls CVl9 - BTRS TCV Failure o

CW System.Mr.lfunctions CW01 - Circulating Water PP Trip CWO2 - Main Condenser Tube Leak CWO3 - Station Vacuum Priming PP Trip CWO4 - Traveling Screen High DP CWO5 - Condes a Tube Sheet Plugging CWO6 - Main Londenser Tube Rupture o

ED System Malfunctions O

(/

ED02 - Unit Service Transformer Failure ED03 - Loss of 6.9 KV Bus ED04 - Loss of 4160 V Bus ED05 - Loss of 480 V Load Center ED06 - Loss of Emergency Bus MCC ED07 - Automatic Bus Fast Transfer Failure ED08 - loss of Instrument Bus ED09 - Loss of Battery Bus EDil - EDG Sequencer A Failure Rev.: 1 Date: 5/3/94 Page: 8.3-6 of 23 O'

NSEM-4.07

YEAR ONE TEST DATE INITIALS ED12 - EDG Sequencer B Failure ED13 - Loss of Selected Non-Vital MCC ED14 - Imss of Annunciator Panel Power Bus Normal Plant Evolutions NSEM-4.10 o

Plant Startup Normal Ops Test o

Nuclear Startup Normal Ops Test O

Rev.: 1 Date: 5/3/94 Page: 8.3-7 of 23 O

NSEM-4.07

Og YEA.R TWO TEST DATE INITIAIE Annual Operability NSEM-4.09 75% Steady State Accuracy 100% Steady State Accuracy 100% Stability Transient #1: Manual Reactor Trip Transient #2: Simultaneous Trip of All Feed Water Pumps Transient #3: Simultaneous Closure of All Main Steam Isolation Valves Transient #4: Simultaneous Trip of All Reactor Coolant Pumps Transient #5 Trip of Any Single Reactor Coolant Pump Transient #6 Main Turbine Trip at Power Less than P9 Transient #7 Imge Load Rejection Transient #8 Maximum Size LOCA with a Loss of Offsite Power Transient #9 Maximum Size Main Steam Line Rupture Inside Containment Transient #10 Reactor Coolant System Depressurization to Saturation Conditions Using PORV Physical Fidelity Verification NSEM-4.12 Approximately 25% Steady State Accuracy Rev.: 1 Date: 5/3/94 Page: 8.3-8 cf 23 O

NSEM-4.07

1 j

. /"

YEAR TWO TEST DATE INITIALS Remote Functions NSEM-4.03 o

CVCS System Remote Functions Test o

FW System Remote Functions Test Maior Malfunctions NSEM-4.04 o

MS02A(B)(C)(D) o MS03 o

RC02A(B)(C)(D)

Malfunctions NSEM-4.05 o

EG System Malfunctions EG01 - Main Generator Trip EG02 - Main Generator Voltage Regulator Fails to Manual EG03 - Main Generator Output Bkr Fail to Open EG04 - Main Generator Exciter Bkr Trip EG05 - SBO Diesel Output Bkr Trip EG06 - Diesel Generator Trip EG07 - Diesel Generator Fail to Start EG08 - Diesel Generator Load Limiter Failure EG09 - Main Gen Auto Voltage Regulator Swing Rev.: 1 Date: 5/3/94 Page: 8.3-9 of 23 i

O NSEM-4.07

YEAR TWO TEST DATE INITIALS EG10 - Main Gen Manual Voltage Regulator Failure EGil - Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer PP Trip EG12 - SBO Diesel Supply Bkr Trip o

FW System Malfunctions FW01 - Lowering Condenser Vacuum FWO2 - Condenser Hotwell Lvl Xmtr Failure FWO3 - Condensate PP Trip i

FWO4 - Condensate Recirc VV FV48 Failure O

s FW05 - Condensate Demin DP Increase FWO6 - LP Htr Byp VV MOV88 Fail open FWO7 - Feed Water PP Trip FWO8 - Feed Water Regulating VV Failure FWO9 - Feed Water Line Rupture Outside CTMT FWil - Feed Water Line Leak Inside CTMT FW13 - LP Heater Tube Rupture FW14 - HP Heater Tube Rupture j

FW15 - LP Heater Hi-Hi Lvl Switch Actuates Rev.: 1 Date:.5/3/94 Page: 8.3-10 of 23 NSEM-4.07

YEAR TWO TEST DATE INITIALS FW16 - Fourth Point Htr Drn PP Trip FW17 - Moisture Separator Drn PP Trip FW18 - MDAFW Pump Trip FW19 - TDAFW Pump Trip

]

FW20 - AFW Pump Fails to Auto Start FW21 - AFW PP Discharge VV Closed FW22 - AFW Pipe Rupture Inside CTMT FW23 - DWST Rupture FW24 - Condensate Storage / Surge Tk Leak FW25 - Condenser Air Removal PP Trip FW26 - LP Htr Byp VV MOV88 Leakage FW27 - Main FW PP Spd Control Fails in Auto FW28 - Main Feed PP Recirc VV Fails Open FW29 - Main Feed PP Recirc VV Fails Closed FW31 - Main Feed Reg VV Byp VV Failure FW32 - MSR Drn Tank Dump VV Failure FW33 - Condensate PP Coupling Shear FW34 - Hotwell Leakage Rev.: 1 Date: 5/3/94 i

Page: 8.3-11 of 23 O-NSEM-4.07

YEAR TWO IESI DATE INITIALS FW35 - Main Feed Reg VV Seat I2akage o

IA System Malfunctions IA01 - Service Air Compressor Trip IA02 - Instrument Air Compressor Trip IA03 - Loss of Instrument Air IA05 - CTMT Instrument Air Supply VV PV15 Fails Closed IA06 - Shutdown Instrument Air Compressor Trip o

MS System Malfunctions MSO4 - Reheater Stm Sply Press Controller Fail MS05 - Moisture Separator Reheater Tube Leak MS06 - Main Steam' Isolation VV Trip MS07 - Main Steam Safety VV Failure MS08 - Gland Seal Regulator Failure MSO9 - Pressure Relieving VV Failure MS10 - Extraction Stm NRV Fails In Position o

NI System Malfunctions NIO1 - Source Range Channel Failure Rev.: 1 Date: 5/3/94 Page: 8.3-12 of 23 NSEM-4.07

YEAR TWO TEST DATE INITIALS NIO2 - Source Range Channel Noisy NIO3 - Incorrect Source Range Channel Response NIO4 - Source Range High Voltage Fails to De-Energize NIOS - Intermediate Range Channel Failure NIO6 - IRNI Channel Improper Compensation NIO7 - Power Range Channel Failure NIO8 - PRNI Upper Detector Failure i

NIO9 - PRNI Lower Detector Failure nil 0 - P6 Bistable Failure nil 1 - P10 Interlock Failure N112 - Power Range Channel Random Noise Normal Plant Evolution Tests NSEM-4.10 o

Turbine Startup and Generator Synchronization Normal Ops Test o

Power Ascension Normal Ops Test o

Reactor Trip and Recovery Normal Ops Test Real Time Simniation Verification NSEM-4.11 Rev.: 1 Date: 5/3/94 Page: 8.3-13 of 23 O

~

NSEM-4.07

\\

p YEAR THREE v

TEST DATE INITIALS Annual Operability NSEM-4.09 75% Steady State Accuracy 100% Steady State Accuracy 100% Stability Transient #1: Manual Reactor Trip Transient #2: Simultaneous Trip of All Feed Water Pumps Transient #3: Simultaneous Closure of All Main Steam Isolation Valves Transient #4: Simultaneous Trip of All Reactor Coolant Pumps Transient #5 Trip of Any Single Reactor Coolant Pump t

Transient #6 Main Turbine Trip at Power Less than P9 Transient #7 12rge Load Rejection Transient #8 Maximum Size LOCA with a Loss of Offsite Power Transient #9 Maximum Size Main Steam Line Rupture Inside Containment Transient #10 Reactor Coolant System Depressurization to Saturation Conditions Using PORV Physical Fidelity Verifiernon NSEM-4.12 Approximately 25% Steady State Accuracy Rev.: 1 Date: 5/3/94 Page: 8.3-14 of 23 NSEM-4.07

~

l

'(

YEA.R TIIREE TEST DATE INITIAIE Remote Functions NSEM-4.03 o

TC System Remote Functions Test o

IA System Remote Functions Test o

RX System Remote Functions Test RP System Remote Functions Test o

Maior Malfunctions NSEM-4.04 o

RC03A(B)(C)(D) o RC09A(B)(C)(D) o RC10A(B)(C)(D)

,P Malfunctions NSEM-4.05 o

PC System Malfunctions PC01 - Loss of Plant Computer o

RC System Malfunctions RC01 - RCS Crud Burst RC04 - Reactor Vessel. Head Flange Leak RC05 - Reactor Vessel Head Vent Leak RC06 - Pressurizer Safety Valve Leakage RC07 - Pressurizer PORV Leakage Rev.: 1 Date: 5/3/94 Page: 8.3-15 of 23 O

NSEM-4.07

YEAR TIIREE TEST DATE INITIAIE RC08 - Pressurizer PORV Fails Closed RCl2 - RCP Oil Leak, Upper Reservoir RCl3 - RCP Oil Lift PP Failure RC14 - RCP Upper Oil Reservoir Clg Wtr Leak RCIS - Pressurizer Safety VV Fails to Open o

RD System Malfunctions RD01 - Rod Bank Continuous Withdrawal RD02 - Rod Bank Continuous Insertion RD03 - Dropped Control Rod -

A i

V RD04 - Stuck Control Rod RDOS - Control Rods Fail to Move in Auto RD06 - Control Rods Fail to Move in Manual RD07 - Controlling Rod Bank Moves Opposite to Auto Demand Signal RDOS - Control Rod Speed Failure in Auto RD09 - Control Rod Block Failure to Block RD10 - Control Rod Position Failure Data A RD11 - Control Rod Position Failure Data B Rev.: 1 Date: 5/3/94 Page: 8.3-16 of 23

YEAR THREE TEST DATE INITIAIS RD13 - Broken Control Rod RD14 - Group Rod Position Failure RDIS - Step Cntrs Move One Half Normal Spd o

RH System Malfunctions RH01-Residual Heat Removal PP Trip RH02 - Loss of RHR PP Suction r;

RH03 - RHR Flow Transmitter Failure RH04 - RHR Heat Exchanger Tube Failure RHOS - RHR PP Seal Failure o

RM System Malfunctions RM01 - Area Rad Mon Failure (CTMT)

RM02 - Area Rad Mon Failure (Aux & ESF Bldg)

RM03 - Area Rad Mon Failure RM04 - Process Rad Mon Failure (Aux Bldg)

RM05 - Process Rad Mon Failure o

RP System Malfunctions RP01 - RCS Flow Transmitter Failure Rev.: 1 Date: 5/3/94 Page: 8.3-17 of 23 O

NSEM-4.07

A YEAR THREE U

TEST DATE INITIAIE RP02 - Reactor Trip Actuation RP03 - Phase A CTMT Isolation Actuation RM14 - CTMT Spray Actuation RP05 - Safety Injection Actuation RP06 - CTMT Spray Auto Actuation Failure RP07 - Safety Injection Auto Actuation Failure RP08 - Main Steam Line Auto. Actuation Failure f

RP09 - Manual Reactor Trip Failure RP10 - Auto Reactor Trip Failure RPil - Failure of Safety Systems to Auto Actuate RP12 - C5 Interlock Failure RP13 - P12 Interlock Failure Normal Plant Evolutions NSEM-4.10 o

Surveillance Testing Normal. Ops Test i

o Plant Operations with less Than Full Reactor Coolant Flow Normal Ops Test i

Rev.: 1 Date: 5/3/94 Page: 8.3-18 of 23 1

O

~

NSEM-4.07 l

A

- - ~

i YEAR FOUR TEST DATE INiTIAIE Annual Ooerability NSEM-4.09 75% Steady State Accuracy 100% Steady State Accuracy 100% Stability Transient #1: Manual Reactor Trip Transient #2: Simultaneous Trip of All Feed Water Pumps Transient #3: Simultaneous Closure of All Main Steam.

Isolation Valves Transient #4: Simultaneous Trip of All Reactor Coolant Pumps Transient #5 Trip of Any Single Reactor Coolant Pump Transient #6 Main Turbine Trip at Power I2ss than P9 Transient #7 Large lead Rejection Transient #8 Maximum Size LOCA with a Imss of Offsite Power Transient #9 Maximum Size Main Steam Line Rupture Inside Containment Transient #10 Reactor Coolant System Depressurization to Saturation Conditions Using PORV Physical Fidelity Verification NSEM-4.12 Approximately 25% Steady State Accuracy Rev.: 1 Date: 5/3/94 Page: 8.3-19 of 23 j

NSEM-4.07 l

4 G

YEAR FOUR O

TEST DATE INITIALS Major Malfunctions NSEM-4.04 o

RCll A(B)(C)(D) o RC17 o

RD12 o

SG01A(B)(C)(D)

Malfunctions NSEM-4.05 o

RX System Malfunctions RX01 - RCS Wide Range Press Xmtr Failure RX02 - RCS WR Cold Leg Temp Xmtr Failure RX03 - RCS WR Hot Leg Temp Xmtr Failure RX04 - RCS NR Cold Leg Temp Xmtr Failure RX05 - RCS NR Hot Leg Temp Xmtr Failure RX06 - Pressurizer Spray VV Auto Cont Failure RX07 - Pressurizer Heaters Fail RX08 - Failure of RCS Loop Isol VV Temp Interlock to Prevent Opening RXO9 - Pressurizer Press Xmtr Failure RX10 - Pressurizer Lvl Xmtr Failure Rev.: 1 Date: 5/3/94 Page: 8.3-20 of 23 O

NSEM-4.07

(3 YEAR FOUR w/

TEST DATE INITIALS RX11 - Steam Generator Press Xmtr Failure RX12 - Steam generator NR Lvl Xmtr Failure RX13 - Steam Generator Feed Flow Xmtr Fail RX14 - Steam Generator Stm Flow Xmtr Fail RX15 - Main Stm Hdr Press Xmtr Failure RX16 - Turbine 1st Stage Press Xmtr Failure RX17 - Loss of Condenser Available Permissive RX18 - Spurious Noise Pickup by RPS Xmtr RX19 - Failure of 3FWS-Fr508 o

SG System Malfunctions SG02 - SG Blowdown Isol VV Fails As Is SG03 - Steam Generator Tube Leak o

SI System Malfunctions SIO1 - Safety Injection Accumulator Level Inc SIO2 - Safety Injection Accumulator Level Dec SIO3 - SI Accumulator N2 Press Dec SIO4 - Safety Injection PP Trip SIO5 - Safety Injection Accumulator Press Inc Rev.: 1 Date: 5/3/94 Page: 8.3-21 of 23 NSEM-4.07

YEAR FOUR TEST DATE INITIAIS o

SW System Malfunctions SW01 - Service Water PP Trip SWO2 - Service Water PP Failure to Auto Start SWO3 - Imss of Cooling To Emergency Diesel-SWO6 - Service Water System Break SWO7 - Service Water Heat Exchanger Fouling o

TC System Malfunctions TC01 - Turbine Trip TC02 - Turbine Runback TC03 - Turbine Fails to Trip TC04 - Turbine Fails to Runback TC05 - EHC PP Trip TC06 - Turbine Stop VV Fails in Position TC07 - Turbine Control VV Failure TC08 - Ioad Sbed TC09 - Turbine Rate Failure TC10 - EHC Input Transmitter Failure Rev.: 1 Date: 5/3/94 Page: 8.3-22 of 23 O

NSEM-4.07

YEAR FOUR O

TEST DATE INITIALS o

TP System Malfunctions l

l TP01 - TPCCW PP Trip 1

TP02 - TPCCW PP Failure to Auto Start TP03 - Turbine Lube Oil TCV Failure TPO4 - Mn Gen Hydrogen Cooling Failure TP05 - Mn Gen Stator Coolant PP Trip o

TU System Malfunctions TUO! - Loss of Turbine Lube Oil Supply TUO2 - Turbine Bearing High Vibration

(,)

TUO3 - Turbine Oil PP Trips TUO4 - Shaft Driven Oil PP Failure i

Normal Plant Evolutions NSEM-4.10 o

Plant Shutdown Normal Ops Test o

Plant Cooldown to Cold Shutdown Normal Ops Test Instructor Station Verification NSEM-4.11 1

1 Rev.: 1 Date: 5/3/94 Page: 8.3-23 of 23 i

NSEM-4.07

O ATTACIIMENT 3 PIIYSICAL FIDELITY

SUMMARY

REPORT O

This attachment is referenced by section 6 of the Performance Test Summary t

O

Form 7.5 f

[

\\

SIMULATOR PHYSICAL FIDELITY / HUMAN FACTORS REPORT 1

UNIT: MILLSTONE 3 REVISION: 2

/

\\

d b

I Approved By:

Date:

SOT I

I bfMfiV Concurrence:

4kh1[

A Date:

MOT Concurrence:

85 Date: 9'd-4 Unit Operations Manager SCCC Mtg. No.

94 - c /4 Rev.: 4 Date: 6/6/94 Page: 7.5-1 of 1

Page 1 of 3 7

t Form 7.1 L

EXCEPTIONS - CONTROL ROOM LAYOUT UNIT: MP3 1.

The emergency plan communications console (radiopager), Tech Support Center (TSC) phone, Waterford Police phone, Operational Support Center (OSC) phone, Berlin phone, Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) phone, NRC red phone, Security phone and the Unit 1 phone are not present on the simulator. Push buttons are provided on the simulator control room SCO console and main board phones for all these lines except security and Waterford Police. As all communications from the operators will be to a limited number of simulator instructors in the instructor booth, there is no significant training impact on whether they communicate through the phone console at the SCO console or main boards versus the real TSC/ EOF /NRC/ Unit 1 phones on the communications console.

The simulator is not used to provide training on the radiopager. Radiopager operation is not a licensed operator task and is therefore not considered as a needed part of the simulator scope. Large scale emergency plan exercises are now done on the simulator but the necessary communications equipment is provided by mobil stations which support all 4 units. The absence of this console does not represent a hinderance to licensed operator training activities.

2.

The Shift Supervisor's (SS) office and the Plant Equipment Operator (PEO) toom are not included in the simulator control room. There is no training value and therefore no training impact to the omission of these areas on the simulator as they play no active part in control room licensed operator activities,

}

3.

The key locker on the simulator is not identical to the reference plant. The reference plant key locker g

is located in the SS office. The key locker In the simulator is located on the wall near toe door to the

\\

instructor console. The key numbers are not the same as the reference plant and nons of the keys required for locks outside the control room (except for keys for the ASP) are included in the simulator.

Location of the keys in the key locker is not an identified licensed operator task and therefore the differences in the two key lockers has no training impact.

4.

The auxiliary shutdown panel (ASP) on the simulator has no doors on the front of the panels. The reference plant ASP has removable doors for ease of access. There is no training value in having doors on the simulator ASP and there is no room for thern to be safely stored when they are removed.

This difference has no training impact.

5.

The Seismic Monitor and Fire Protection (Simplex) panels on the B train end of the Main ventilation panel (VP1)in the reference plant control room are not rnodeled in the simulator control room. There are no licensed operator tasks selected for training on these panels and therefore there is no significant training impact caused by their xclusion.,

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Page 2 of 3 (g}

Form 7.1 V

EXCEPTIONS - CONTROL ROOM LAYOUT j

UNIT: MP3 6.

The B train Safeguards Test Cabinet and B train Emergency Diesel Generator Esquencer panels are located in the instrument rack room in the reference plant and behind main boards 4 and 5 In the simulator. These components are located behind the control boards in the simulator to preclude the unreasonable expense of duplicating the instrument rack room. There are no differences in the panels on the simulator from the panels in the reforence plant and therefore no significant training impact from the differences in location is deemed to exist.

7.

The two oscillograph cabinets on the train A end of the main ventilation panel (VP1) are not modeled on the simulator. There are no licensed operator tasks identified for training associated with these panels and therefore their exclusion represents no significant training impact.

)

8.

The simulator and reference plant have chairs of different styles, manufacturers and colors. This difference has no training impact.

9.

There is a small space between the Kaman RMS panels and the nuclear instrument (NI) panels and also between the Ni panels and the flux mapping panels in the reference plant. This space does not j

exist in the simulator control room. This difference has no training impact.

10.

The plant process computer (PPC) printers in the SCO console in the reference plant are Texas p)

Instruments printers. The simulator uses Dataproducts printers. This difference represents no training

V impact as the operation of these printers by Econsed operators is not an identified training task.

11.

The reference plant control room has 3 five drawer file cabinets next to the RMS console while the simulator control room has 2 five drawer file cabinets. This difference represents no training impact.

12.

The reference plant control room has 3 desks which the simulator control room does not have. These desks play no activo part in the performance of licensed tasks at the main control boards and therefore represent no training impact.

13.

The reference plant control room has one storage cabinet while the simulator has two storage cabinets.

The reference plant cabinet is located next to the flux mapping console while the cabinets in the simulator control room are located behind the RMS console. These cabinets are not used in training and therefore this difference involves. tralning impact.

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V Form 7.1 EXCEPTIONS - CONTROL ROOM LAYOUT UNIT: MP3 14.

The 2 PPC printer cabinets behind the SCO console in the reference plant control room in the reference plant control room are brown;in the simulator these cabinets are gray. The color of these printer cabinets has no impact on training.

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Page 1 of 2 I(y Form 7.2 EXCEPTIONS - PANEL LAYOUT UNIT: MP3 1.

The rear of main board 8 has electrical prote'ction relays for the main generator and transmission lines, the simulator does not have these relays. These relays are not part of any licensed operator tasks identified for training. This difference has no significant training impact.

2.

The right hand maintenance Jack phone on the SCO console in the reference plant controi room is located approx!mately 6" to the right of the same phone in the simulator control room. The difference in location is minor and therefore has no significant training impact.

3.

The turbine supervisory panel at the plant is contained in 4 cabinets. The simulator turbine supervisory panelis in one cabinct. This difference does not effect the operator's ability to use the supervisory panel and therefore this difference does not represent a significant impact on training.

4.

The reference plant main board 7 rear contains the transmission line protection audio tone unit. This unit is not included on the simulator control panel. This equipment is not operated by the licensed operators in conjunction with any of the tasks identified for training. This difference does not represent an adverse impact to training.

5.

The recorder for outfall pH (3CWS-ARS6)is located on the rear of main board 2 in the reference plant.

This recorder is not included in the scope of simulation. The use of this recorder is not required for

(

any of the licensed operator tasks selected for training and therefore this difference has no training impact.

6.

The control switch and indicating lights for the steam generator drain pump (3BDG-P2) are located on the rear of main board 1 in the reference plant. This control switch and associated lights are not included in the scope of simulation. The draining of steam generators on the simulator is done by the use of remote functions (SGR01 - SGR04). This pump is not required to be operated in conjunction with any of the licensed operator tasks selected for training, therefore this difference has no training impact.

7.

In the reference plant, the safeguards test cabinet has large purple gravopty labels on the right and left sides of both panels with the letter"B" on them. These labels are to prevent confusion at the plant as to which train cabinet the operator or technician is in. The simulator does not have these labels.

The absence of these labels have no impact on training on the simulator and serve no function in the simulator environment as only i e B. train cabinet is installed.

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ASOT Rev.: 4 Date: 6/6/94 Page: 7.2-1 of 1 1

NSEM 4.12 y

Page 2 of 2 h

Form 7.2 EXCEPTIONS - PANEL LAYOUT UNIT: MP3 8.

On the system monitoring section of the turbine supervisory panelin the reference plant, the lower portion of the panel has a mimic of the 125 VDC and 24 VDC tripping circuits. On the same panel on the simulator there is no mimic and the space is occupied by DC voit meters. The mimic and the voit meters are not used in training and therefore this difference has no training impact.

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Form 7.3 EXCEPTIONS - COMPONENTS UNIT: MP3 1.

The reference plant has an annunciator panel (MB1F) on the rear of main board 1 that le not modeled on the simulator. This panel provides alarms for the loss of control power to various auxiliary circuits.

As these auxiliary circuits are not modeled and no identified training tasks exist for these annunciators, there is no training impact caused by the absence of this alarm panel.

2.

In the reference plant control room, the plant emergency alarm switch on the SCO console is of different appearance from the same switch in the simulator control room. Both switches are identical in operation and function and therefore this difference represents no significant impact on training.

3.

The pressure indicator controllers 3HVR*PIC104A and 3HVR*PIC104B on main ventilation panet VP1 in the reference plant control room do not have green pointers on the left hand side of the indicator face. These controllers on the simulator have green pointers which do not indicate any value (always at 0). These pointers are not used by the operators and as they never indicate a value their presence has no training impact.

4.

The hot water heating va!ves 3HVK*TV68A through 3HVK*TV75A and 3HVK*TV68B through 3HVK*TV758 have different control switch handles on the simulator ventilation panel VP1 than the same switches have in the reference plant. The switch style used in the plant is no longer available.

pI The switches on the simulator function identically to the ones in the plant and therefore there is no significant training impact represented by the switch handle difference.

5V 5.

There are numerous General Electric type CR2940 switches on the reference plant control boards which have hexagonal collars. All of these type switches on the simulator have round collars. The hexagonal collars are no longer an available stock item. The difference represented by these different collars results in no significant training impact.

6.

The knob for the rod group selector switch on main board 4 in the reference plant is larger than the same knob on the simulator. The switch positions and functions of the switches in the plant and on the simulator are identical. This difference represents no significant training impact.

7.

The control valve position meters on main board 5 for the turbine driven main feed water pumps A &

B in the reference plant are General Electric meters. On the simulator these meters are Sigma meters.

These meters are the same si;:e and have the same scales, therefore this difference represents no significant training impact.

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Page 2 of 2 f

Form 7.3 EXCEPTIONS - COMPONENTS UNIT: MP3 8.

The reference plant control room has a Tracor Westronics recorder on the back of main board 7 to monitor the main normal and reserve transformers for hot spots (3STX-TR20). This recorder is not included on the simulator. There are no licensed operator tasks selected for training which require the use of this recorder. Because this recorder is not used in training its absence represents no significant training impact.

9.

In the reference plant, the switches S913, S935 and S947 on the safeguards test cabinet are not I

installed. These switches are installed on the simulator's safeguards test cabinet. As these switches are not referenced in any procedures used to operate the test cabinet, their presence in the simulator's cabinet does not represent a signific.W impact on training.

10.

In the reference plant, the Westinghouse Operator Interface Modules (OlMs) have white back lit increase and decrease push buttons. On the simulator, a number of these OlMs have red back lit increase push buttons and green back lit decrease push buttons as follows:

MB1 - 3BDG-PIC24 - B/D tk pressure controller MB5 - 3FWS-FK510 - SG 1 Fd r(g W controller MB1 - 3BDG-LIC25 - B/D tk level controller MBS - 3FWS-FK520 - SG 2 Fd reg W controller MB1 - 3CDS-FIC77 - RP chill wtr recirc flow cont MB5 - 3FWS-FK530 - SG 3 Fd reg W controller MB2 - 3RHS-FK618 - RHR Trn A flow controller MBS - 3FWS-FK540 - SG 4 Fd reg W controller MB2 - 3RHS-FK619 - RHR Trn B flow controller MB5 - 3FWS-LK550 - SG 1 Byp W controller MB3 - 3RCS-LK459 - PZR master level controller MB5 - 3FWS-LK560 - SG 2 Byp W controller MB3 - 3CHS-LK185 - VCT level controller MB5 - 3FWS-LK570 - SG 3 Byp W controller MB3 - 3CHS-TK381 A ' O rtn HX out temp com MB5 - 3FWS-LK580 - SG 4 Byp W controller MB3 - 3CHS-TK381B - LD rtn HX out temp cont MB5 - 3 MSS-HV28A - MSIV A byp W controller MB3 - 3CHS-TK386 - CHS rtn hdr temp controller MB5 - 3 MSS-HV28B - MSIV B byp W controller MB3 - 3CHS-FK375 - BTRS chlr hdr flow cont MB5 - 3 MSS-HV28C - MSIV C byp W controller MB5 - 3 MSS-HV28D - MSIV D byp W controller These push buttons are clearly labeled with up and down arrows and the OlM configuration is the same as the pbot's. The difference in back lighting color does not represent any significant impact on training.

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I Page 1 of 2 n

Form 7.4 v

EXCEPTIONS - AMBIENT ENVIRONMENT UNIT: MP3 1.

The reference plant computer console (to the right of the SCO console) has a phone monitor for the SNET control room phones. The simulator does not have this monitor. This does not represent an item of training impact as this device is not needed for the use of any of the plant procedures selected for simulator training.

2.

The desk set phone on the SCO console in the reference plant is a different model from the one on the simuhtor SCO console. The operation of this phone is not an identified training task for licensed operators, therefore this difference does not represent a significant trainine impact.

3.

In the reference plant there is a steady background noise of the control building ventilation (HVC). Any change in the status of HVC equipment is reflected in a change in this background noise. At the simulator there is no appreciable background noise and therefore no audio cue of deliberate or non-de%erate changes to HVC. This difference does not represent a significant training impact.

4.

N phone system in the simulator has no background noise as is experienced at the reference plant.

The absence of this background noise does not represent a significant adverse training impact.

5.

The outside speaker indicating lights, controls, switch and labels on the SCO console in the reference plant are not simulated. These devices are not used in any of the licensed operator tasks selected for training. Therefore the absence of these components does not represent a significant impact on training.

6.

The maintenance jack phone volume control on the SCO console in the reference plant control room is of different appearance from the same volume controlin the simulator control room. The volume controls are identicalin function and operation. Therefore the difference in the volume control does not represent a significant training impact.

7.

The radio phone speaker on the SCO console in the reference plant control room is not simulated.

This equipment is not used in any licensed operator tasks selected for training. Therefore this difference represents no significant training impact.

8.

The maintenance Jack phone line selector switch on VP1 at the reference plant control room has a different label plate from the one on the simulator VP1 panel. This difference represents no significant training impact.

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e Page 2 of 2 Form 7.4 EXCEPTIONS - AMBIENT ENVIRONMENT UNIT: MP3 9.

The SNET (dial) phone at the ASP in the reference plant is not included at the ASP on the simulator.

This equipment was not deemed to be cost effective based on the following considerations: (1) the relatively small amount of training done on this panel, (2) the small amount of communications with remote locations required for the students to perform the training tasks at the ASP and (3) the sufficiency of the existing maintenance jack phone already installed on the simulator ASP. The abnence of this phone does not represent a significant training impact.

10.

Control room lighting - the following lighting level values (in foot candles) show the differences between the reference plant control room and the simulator control room. The students recognize the difference but do not find these differences to constitute a problem (based on the responses of the students in the simulator physical fidelity survey).~ These differences have only a minimal training impact.

Reference Plant Simulator o MB1 - Illumination level = 25 foot candles o MB1 - Illumination level = 33 foot candles o MB2 - Illumination level = 25 foot candles o MB2 - Illumination level = 36 foot candles o MB3 -Illumination level = 25 foot candles o MB3 -Illumination level = 48 foot candles o MB4 - Illumination level = 35 foot candles o MB4 -lliumination level = 45 foot candles o MB5 - Illumination level = 40 foot candles o MB5 -Illumination level = 48 foot candles o MB6 - Illumination level = 50 foot candles o MB6 -Illumination level = 64 foot candles o MB7 - Illumination level = 40 foot candles o MB7 - Illumination level = 55 foot candles o MB8 - lliumination level = 40 foot candles o MB8 -Illumination level = 42 foot candles o VP1 -Illumination level = 45 foot candles o VP1 - Illumination level = 30 foot candles o NI - Illuminatinn level = 30 foot candles o NI - Illumination level = 37 foot candles NOTE: All light readings were taken at the surface of the bench board section for each main board and at 3 feet in front and 3 feet from the floor for the NI cabinets and VP1.

11.

The carpeting in the reference plant control room has been changed to a pale blue (general area) and a vibrant red (control area). The original carpet in the simulator control room was not changed. The 2

difference in colors between the two control rooms does not represent a significant training impact.

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Page: 7.4-1 of 1

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NSEM 4.12

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- Summary of Revision 1 Changes -

% ) (1 Form 7.1, page 1 item 1 - Reworded the last sentence of item one to reflect the new practics of running emergency plant drills from tho simulator control room vice the plant control room. Also eflecting the addition of the mobile communications equipment on the simulators to wpport emergency plant drills.

(2)

Form 7.1, page 2 item 8 - Revision 0 item eight deleted - the installation of carpeting has eliminated the differences between the simulator and plant control room tile. Remaining items on form 7.1 renumbered.

(3)

Form 7.1, page item 14 - Revision 0 item fourteen deleted - the simulator has installed three more

'Planhold' cabinets to store the reference drawings (ESKs, LSKs, EEs and P&lDs)in the same manner as the plant. Remaining items on form 7.1 renumbered.

(4)

Form 7.3, page 2 item 10 - Added item ten to make note of the difference between the simulator and the plant caused by the presence of colored back lit push buttons on some of the simulator's O!Ms (red and green "UP" and "DOWN" push buttons). These push buttons in the plant are all white back lit.

It was decided to take this difference as an exception rather than correct the difference due to the following factors:

o Cost - the push buttons are of such a design that conversion from colored back lighting to white back lighting requires the complete replacement of the push buttons. This represents a significant capital outlay (46 push button units), and o

Training impact - Because the buttons on the simulator are engraved with "UP" and "DOWN"

{gV) arrows (as are the plant's) and because the back lighting enhances the recognition of the function of the push buttons (green - close/ decrease and red - open/ increase) this difference is not viewed as having significant training impact. This is further supported by thy fact that the push buttons on the simulator are in the same location, are the same size and have the same spring return action as the push buttons on the controllers in the plant.

- Summary of Revision 2 Changeu -

(1)

Fonn 7.4, page 2 item 11 -Item 11 was added to disposition the oWirence in carpeting colors between the simulator and the reference plant control room. This differerna arose as a result of the change of the reference plant's carpet from the originalinstallation.

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