Text

Proposed Tech Specs Supplementing Amend Applications 137 & 121 to Licenses NPF-10 & NPF-15,respectively
	ML20078C592
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	01/19/1995
From:	; SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20078C582	List: ML20078C580; ML20078C592;
References
	NUDOCS 9501270012
	Download: ML20078C592 (144)
	v • d • e

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! ATTACHMENT "A" l i (Marked-Up Proposed Specifications) l 1 Unit 2 1 1 :

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9501270012 950119 POR ADOCK 05000361 PDR P

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3 1 1.1 Definitions (continued) 4

. OPERABLE-0PERABILITY equipment that are required for the system,

(continued) subsystem, train, component, or device to perform a its specified safety function (s) are also capable of performing their related support function (s).

PHYSICS TESTS PHYSICS TESTS shall be those tests performed to l measure the fundamental nuclear characteristics of the reactor core and related instrumentation.

l These tests are:

a. Described in Chapter 14, Initial Test Program of the SONGS Units 2 and 3 UFSAR;

) b. Authorized under the provisions of

! 10 CFR 50.59; or j c. Otherwise approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

PRESSURE AND The PTLR is the unit specific document that 3 l TEMPERATURE LIMITS provides the reactor vessel pressure and REPORT (PTLR) temperature limits, including heatup and cooldown rates, for the current reactor vessel fluence I 1 period. These pressure and temperature limits f shall be determined for each fluence period in

f 1 accordance with Specificatior 5.7.1.6. Plant

operation within these operating limits is j addressed in LC0 3.4.3, "RCS Pressure and / i Temperature (P/T) Limits," and LC0 3.4.12. " Low .

l i Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) )

System." -

RATED THERMAL POWER RTP shall be a total reactor core heat transfer (RTP) rate to the reactor coolant of 3390 MWt.

]

. REACTOR PROTECTIVE The RPS RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval SYSTEM (RPS) RESPONSE from when the monitored parameter exceeds its RPS trip setpoint at the channel sensor until

~

TIME

. electrical power to the CEAs drive mechanism is

interrupted. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or i total steps so that the entire response time is measured.

i (continued) i e SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 1.1-5 AMENDMENT N0.

y. .

1 I .

DG-Undervoltage Start !

[

i 3.3.7 l

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.7.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 24 months I SR 3.3.7.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

l SR 3.3.7.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION with setpoint 24 months Allowable Values as follows.

a. Degraded Voltage Function E 4181 V and 5 4275 V SCVS (Sustained Degraded Grid Voltage):

Time delay: r 135 ::: nds (respen : time i: ::::ured frc initi: tion of degr.d:d voltag '

pil27D"MKliB?ssE6has7snd"7sM""I2

^~"'"~~^~'""^*~~""' ~'

Weho6ds DEET n ana.

3 @ l62. n e %;TsE6K.ds~sii.d@l32I?:a":L'7] g .(

,.. ~

s.e_ con.

_ds;4 DGVSS (Degraded Grid Voltage with SIAS Signal):

l I Time delay: s 5.14 : cond:

(re:pon:: time i: ::::ured frc initiatica cf S!?S)

B ,n i, T'127_D~~m.l~.Bi.~i_st~66.n d57s.n~dS,?u?2 n

.n ..

2 secondsh .

l i'R$162SU (debhds3"W"4111[j"s'sE6hdWaHd"3?45749

^" " ~ "^~ ~^ ~"

tim s 3162TMero!85TssE6ha ffi~n~d Wr~65u eeto.nds#

L. o %.m a _ .m. _ ,w

! b. Loss of Voltage Function a 3554 V and 5 3796 V i

i Time delay: a 0.95 seconds and s 1.05 seconds at 0 V.

SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.3-34 AMENDMENT N0.

1

a <

RCS DNB (Pressure. Temperature, and Flor) Limits

. 3.4.1 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.1 RCS DNB (Pressure, Temperature, and Flow) Limits if 1

l

~

LCO 3.4.1 RCS parameters for pressurizer pressure, cold leg 3

temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be wit.hin the t :

limits specified below: ,

a. Pressurizer pressure a 2025 psia and s 2275 psia;

b. RCS cold leg temperature (T,):

% 1. For THERMAL POWER less than or equal to 30% RTP, R 522*F s T, s 558'F, MAL M -

% % RTP and. greater than

{ 2. For THERMAL POWER less than i' 30% RTP, 535 F s T, 5 558'F, e y

g 3. For THERMAL POWER greater than Er equal tp 70's RTP, 544 F s T, s 558'F.

{ i i $ c. RCS total flow rate a 14BE6 lbm/hr and 5177.6E6 lbm/hr. I 4

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

4 i ..-------------------------NOTE------------------------ l Pressurizer pressure limit does not apply during:

? l

a. THERMAL POWER ramp > 5% RTP per minute; or

' b. THERMAL POWER step > 10% RTP.

1 ACTIONS f COMPLETION TIME

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION i

A.1 Restore parameter (s) 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months

! A. Pressurizer pressure to within limit, or RCS flow rate not within limits.

d B.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

(continued) 3.4-1 AMENDMENT NO.

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 i

t

W RCS DNB (Pressure, Temperature, and Flon) Limits 3.4.1 l

ACTIONS (continued)

COMPLETION TIME REQUIRED ACTION

'l CONDITION C.1 Restore cold leg 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months C. RCS' cold leg l temperature not within temperature to within

{

limits. limits. .

I Reduce THERMAL POWER 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months D. Required Action and 0.1 associated Completion to 5 30% RTP. - !

I Time of Condition C

not met.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FREQUENCY SURVEILLANCE 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months I SR 3.4.1.1 Verify pressurizer pressure a 2025 ' psia and I 5 2275 psia.

l l

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.4.1.2 Verify RCS cold leg temperature:

, g 1. For THERMAL POWER less than orgl o l

g 30% RTP, 522 F 5 Tc 5 558'F F

2. For THERMAL POWER less thanW0*d RTP p_ and g greater than 30% RTP, 535'F s Tc 5 558*F s y

3. For THERMAL POWER greater than &F equa5 70% RTP, 544*F s Tc 5 558'F i

___.......__...__.........-N0TE ---------------ing. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Required to be met in MODE 1 with all RCPs runn SR 3.4.1.3 Verify RCS total flow rate a 148E6 Lbm/ hour and 5 177.6E6 lbm/ hour 3.4-2 AMENDMENT NO.

SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2

I RCS P/T Limits 3.4.3 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.3 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limite.

LC0 3.4.3 RCS ratespressure, RCS temperature, shall be maintained within and the RCS limitsheatup andincooldow @n specified z.upe - fjure s.tr.3-f Spa .r.o.s-r, si ewy v.r-x

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& fryr I.v.1-V, fifovv 3 V.1 .C o/ alle MS-/

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. ---------NOTE--------- A.1 Restore parameter (s) 30 minutes Required Action A.2 to within limits.

shall be completed whenever this AND Condition is entered.

A.2 Determine RCS is 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months acceptable for Requirements of LC0 continued operation.

not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.

l 1

B. Required Action and 8.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Tima of Condition A AfLD not met.

B.2 Be in MODE S with 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months RCS pressure

< 500 psia.

i (continued) .

i I

l SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.4-4 AMENDMENT NO.

I l

s l

RCS P/T Limits 3.4.3

! ACTIONS (continued)

CONDIT10N REQUIRED ACTION COMPLEI10N TI11E C. ---------NOTE--------- C.1 Initiate action to immediately l Required Action C.2 restore parameter (s) shall be completed to within limits.

whenever this Condition is entered. AND C.2 Determine RCS is Prior to Requirements of LC0 acceptable for entering MODE 4 not met any time in continued operation.

l other than MODE 1, 2, l 3, or 4.

1 i

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.3.1 -----------_-------NOTE--------------------

Only required to be performed during RCS l heatup and cooldown operations and RCS l

inservice leak and hydrostatic testing.

Verify RCS pressure, RCS temperature, and 30 minutes RCS heatup and cooldown rates within limits specified in gie Pitp.42L s

b fi are 2.4. E /s hfue 1. 4.1 - 2, Af"'* * ** '~ N f/fW/2 $. V. $* V, $/fM M $ V. S" N Q 97r6/e .3. 9.1- /

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SAN Of40FRE--UNIT 2 3.4-5 AMENDMENT NO.

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,,,,,,i 3500 ,,

HEATUP

INSERVICE TESTS jl

] LOWEST SERVICE TEMP = 209'F l' ;

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e Acceptable operating region .to the '!

rght of the inservce tests curve !

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(Applicable in rnodes other than I

Modes 1 and 2) a 2500 - # Acceptable cperating region . to the j -

7 rght of the heatup curve in all rnodes. l

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In addttion,in Modes 1 ard 2 the -

[ operating region is to the nght of the -! -

g" l e core enticalcurve. .

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100 150 200 o 50 INDICATED RCS TEMPERATURE (*F)-Tc I

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songs 2 HEATUP RCS PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE ~I

' LIMITATIONS FOR ' S UNTIL 20 EfPY i Normal Operation

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SAN ONOFRE-UNIT 2 h44-29 l

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O FIGUREh 3.4-4] J,$f-2 SONGS 2 COOLDO W RCS PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATIONS T0" ' S WTIL 20 EFPY Id j

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3/4 4-30 AMENDMENT N0.

SAN ONOFRE-UNIT 2 l,

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l EE: A MiV3NUM CDCLDGW RATE OF 100*F/HE IS ALLOWED j AT ANY TEMPERATURE ABOVE 160*F l<.

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FIGUREO.4-5) 3.y. I ~ .3 l: SONGS 2'RCS PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE' LIMITS i

! 1; j .MAXIML54 ALLOWABLE'.C00LDOW

^ Ncmal Operation RATES (UNTIL 20 EFPY) 4 (344-30a AMENDMENT H g SAff ONOFRE-UNIT 2

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LOWEST SERVICE COOT.DOWN TEMP = 209'F 1

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...i.,. .i. ...i.. i....i....i....i....< l 250 300 350 400 l 4 0 50 100 150 200 l

1 INDICATED RCS TEMPERATURE (*F)-Te ,

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SONGS 2'C00LDOWN RCS PRESSURE /TO WERATURE j '<

LIMITATIONS UNTIL 20 EFPY '

Remote Shutdown Operatica f 4

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N 3/4 4-30b AMENDHENT .

SAN ONOFRE-UNIT 2 , ,7 4

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/Ve$ LA IIAIDEN COOLNMI RATE OF 1M*F/5R T5 AllEdED AT Alfr TU&ERATURE A8WE.168aF lW l

FIGUR 3.4-7 3, Q,37 SONGS 2 RCS PRESSURE /TDtPERATURE' LIMITS

{ ..

MAXIMUM ALLOliABLE COOLDOWN RATES (talTIL 20 EFFT)~'

Resnte shutdown op m tten~ ~^

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4-30c~ AMENOMENT SAN OMOFRE-UNIT 2

( J</

4 I

i TfBl 3.4-3 3 h8-/

low Te'noerature RCS Overpressure Protection Rance q

I cold Leo Temperature, of Operatino Period. EFPY I

During During

HeatuD Cooldown l

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l s MG 256 s BM 238 i l

" tc 10 Until 20 (Normal Operation) 5,

\

5 238 l Until 20 (Remote Shutdown Operation) a i i i !

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- Heatip . operations' ~are not normally performed from the Remote Shutdown

- panels, i

4-30a<! AMENDMENT)

SAN ON0FRE-UNIT 2 ___

r Pressurizer Heatup/Cooldown Limits 3.4.3.1 1 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.3.1 Pressurizer Heatup and Cooldown Limits l LCO 3.4.3.1 Pressu M , , - upandcooldownratesshallbemaintained within thet imits.*ppecified in the PIL y _

Q ,

At all times.

MfY APPLICABILITY:

ACTIONS REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CONDITION A. ---------NOTE--------- A.1 Restore parameter (s) 30 minutes Required Action A.2 to within limits.

i shall be completed whenever this AND Condition is entered.

.------------ A.2 Determine Pressurizer 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is acceptable for Requirements of LC0 continued operation.

not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A AND not met.

B.2 Be in MODE 5 with 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months RCS pressure

< 500 psia.

1 (continued) l I

1 SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.4-6 AMENDMENT NO.

Pressurizer Heatup/Cooldown Limits 3.4.3.1 1

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i l

NOTE--------- C.1 Initiate action to Immediately i C. I Required Action C.2 restoreparameter(s)-

shall be completed to within limits. j 4

whenever this '

Condition is entered. AND C.2 Determine Pressurizer Prior to is acceptable for entering MODE 4 j Requirements of LC0 not met any time in continued operation, other than MODE 1, 2,

< 3, or 4.

)

I l

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY 1

\IL i

SR 3.4.3.1.1 -------------------NOTE--------------------

Only required to be performed during l 4 Pressurizer heatup and cooldown operations. l

.7 i Verify 3 ri_beatup aiid cooldown p

-30 minutes f -hf,M.T #

rates within imitsMSUcilled in the Pit o -

j (%

SR 3.4.3.1.2 The spray water temperature differential When less than shall be determined for use in the M 4 reactor ppg coolant pumps are operating l

4 and for each

) cycle of auxiliary spray operation.

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.4-7 AMENDMENT NO.

l

i

q i

k a

\ a. A manmum; hafup 2gg ,;, m y I hour perno ,

l 8. A madmum cooldeain e 200*f in l <

Q 3

ang I hair period.

A.

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1 RCE Loops-MODE 4 3.4.6

! M.f)4 M 4.M f l 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) j 3.4.6 RCS Loops-MODE 4 i

i LC0 3.4.6 Two loops or trains consisting of any combination of RCS loops j and shutdown cooling (SDC) trains shall be OPERABLE and at least

one loop or train shall be in operation.

i ............................N0TES---------------------------

1. All reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) and SDC pumps may be de-energized for s 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months period, provided:

1 a. No operations are permitted that would cause i reduction of the RCS boron concentration; and

b. Core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10*F i below saturation t erature.

2. No RCP shall [ s a ed with any RCS cold leg o

temperature s ghe Live enanie temperatuie specifiea a j e,rityxnless: 793

a. Pressurizer wate is < , or

b. Secondary side water temperature in each steam generator (SG) is < 100*F above each of the RCS cold I leg temperatures.

4 i

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4.

I.

j i

l 1

i SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.4-11 AMENDMENT NO.

C.4.c 246 72. -. 20 i 3

up h _

RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled 3.4.7 l J

NOTES 4.

(continued)-------- r/b f No reactor coolant pump (RCP) shall be sta rted with one i

4 6 or more of the RCS cold leg temperatures 570P enabled emen ETurrymiess: gy fuggeg

_ n -

a. The pressurizer waterhis <@ or g i b. The secondary side water temperature in eat team i

generator (SG)is<100*FaboveeachoftheRCScold leg temperatures.

?j 5. A containment spray pump may be used in place of a low l 1 pressure safety injection pump in either or both i l shutdown cooling trains to provide shutdown cooling flow l i provided the reactor has been subcritical for a period j > 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and the RCS is fully depressurized and vented

{ in accordance with LCO 3.4.12.1.

I i 6. All SDC trains may be removed from operation during

! planned heatup to MODE 4 when at least one RCS loop is

in operation.

1 i APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 with RCS loops filled.

j ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i

! A. Less than the required A.1 Initiate action to Immediately l SDC trains /RCS loops restore the required i OPERABLE SDC trains /RCS loops l to OPERABLE status. l i AND

! 9.8 4

Any SG with secondary side water level not A.2 Initiate action to Innediately i within limit. restore SG secondary l side water levels to 4

within limits.

(continued) 1 SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.4-15 AMENDMENT NO.

a 1

Pressurizer

^

3.4.9 A

3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 4 3.4.9 Pressurizer LCO 3.4.9 The pressurizer shall be DPERABLE with: 14 i VOLWM S. l

4. Pressurizer wate nd 4

b. Two groups of pressurizer heaters OPERABLE with the capacity of each group a 150 kW and capable of being a powered from an emergency power supply. ;

1 4

x g MODES 1, 2, and 3.

APPLICABILITY:

ACTIONS N CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I R 0 A. P A.1 Be in MODE 3 with 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months

] Q M_ressurizer not within water reactor trip breakers y g limit. open.

AND A.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months B. One required group of B.1 Restore required 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months

pressurizer heaters group of pressurizer inoperable. heaters to OPERABLE status.

C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition B AND not met

, C.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

)

i SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.4-19 AMENDMENT NO.

j

, Pressurizer 3.4.9 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.9.1 Verify pressurizer wate is s 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

' E NL SCCN i

SR 3.4.9.2 Verify capacity of each required group of 92 days

. pressurizer heaters a 150 kW.

i .

4 4

a 4

4 1

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l i SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.4-20 AMENDMENT N0.

1 A

LTOP System 3.4.12.1 4

3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) @

3.4.12.1 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System

}

cP 1

RCS Temperature LTOP Enable Temperaturd :: - /8[Y p p f le f N fi f l'd S N * $ ~ $.

LC0 3.4.12.1 No more than two high prc'ssure ety injection pumps shall i be OPERABLE, the safety injecti anks shall be isolated or depressurized to less than the limit, and at least one 1

of the following overpressure protection systems shall be OPERABLE. ;

a. The Shutdown Cooling System Relief Valve (PSV9349) with: l l

1) A lif t setting of 406 10 psig j j 2) Relief Valve isolation valves 2HV9337, 2HV9339, 2HV9377, and 2HV9378 open, l

' or,

b. The Reactor Coolant System depressurized with an RCS vent of greater than or equal to 5.6 square inches.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4 when the temperature of any one RCS cold leg is less than or equal to the enable temperatures specified in the

)

) , m >ra s i.

MODE 5, and x.s-i MODE 6 when the head is on the reactor vessel.

NOTE------------------- T- 5--

l I

j 1. SIT isolation or depressurization to less than the it limit is only required when SIT pressure is greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS cold leg temperature allowed by the P T imit curves ,

..... .. .. . . $..Y. ..... . .......?.!.

I l

l SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.4-23 AMENDMENT NO.

l

e .

LTOP System 3.4.12.1 l

l ACTIONS __

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 1

i A. With more than two A.1 Initiate action to Immediately j HPSI pumps capable of verify a maximum of injecting into the two HPSI pumps RCS. capable of injecting into the RCS l

l l

B. SIT pressure is B.1 Isolate affected SIT. I hour !

l greater than or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for existing 4 cold leg temperatur% -

m allowed i n toffiE P T W k [ft_rwr wa-/, p;pu sF.a-2.

I C. Required Action and C.1 Depressurize affected 12 bours associated Completion 511 to less than the i

l Time of Condition B maximum RCS pressure i not met. for existing cold leg l' temperature allowed l in @ e PlL @ _

D. With one or both SDCS D.1 Open the closed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Relief Valve isolation valve (s). l valves in a single SDCS Relief Valve OR isolation valve pair (valve pair 2HV9337 0.2 Power-lock open the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and 2HV9339 or valve OPERABLE SDCS Relief l i

pair 2HV9377 and Valve isolation valve 2HV9378) closed, pair.

(continued)

I SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.4-24 AMENOMENT NO.

o LTOP System 3.4.12.1

. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

=- -

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.12.1.1 ------------------NOTE-------------------

A HPSI pump is secured by verifying that 4

its motor circuit breaker is not racked-l in, or its discharge valve is locked

closed. The requirement to rack out the HPSI pump breaker is satisfied with the pump breaker racked out to its disconnected or test position.

i .........................................

t Verify a maximum of two HPSI pumps are 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months !

capable of injecting into the RCS.

i SR 3.4.12.1.2 ------------------NOTE-------------------

'1% Required to be performed when complying with LCO 3.4.12.1 Note 2.

Verify each SIT is isolated or 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months l J depressurized less than the it limjpg

~2

& f 'd b 'M f/ft&~t S.V I s SR 3.4.12.1.3 Verify RCS vent e 5.6 square inches is 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for open when in use for overpressure unlocked open

.! protection. vent valve (s)

AND 31 days for locked, sealed, or otherwise secured open vent valve (s),

or open flanged j RCS penetrations i i

< (Continued)

SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.4-26 AMENDMENT NO.

4

l l

6 e LTOP System 3.4.12.2 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.12.2 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System g RCSTemperature>(LTOPEnableTemperature) 2I N LCO 3.4.12.2 At least one of the following overpressure protection systems shall be OPERABLE:

a. The Shutdown Cooling System Relief Valve (PSV9349) with:

1) A lift setting of 406 10 psig

2) Relief Valve isolation valves 2HV9337, 2HV9339, 2HV9377, and 2HV9378 open, l

or,

b. A minimum of one pressurizer code safety valve with a lift setting of 2500 psia : 1%.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4 when the temperature of all RCS colds le r reatgr than the enable temperatures specified in M e t'TLP Rale 5F.F/

NOTES----------------------------

l

1. The lift setting pressure of the pressurizer code safety valve shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

2. The SDCS Relief Valve lift setting assumes valve temperatures less than or equal to 130 F.

l i

l l

l SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.4-28 AMEN 0 MENT NO.

3.5.1 i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l

l SR 3.5.1.1 Verify each SIT isolation valve is fully 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months open. l i

SR 3.5.1.2 Verify borated water volumeyach SIT i 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months a 1680 cubic feet (z u m. e) and 5 1807 cubic feet (84 ge). '

y ,

a j

+

l SR 3.5.1.3 Verify nitrogen cover pressure in each SIT 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is a 615 psia and s 655 psia.

1 SR 3.5.1.4 Verify boron concentration in each SIT is 31 days a 1850 ppm and s 2800 ppm.

l 88Q

NOTE------ ,

l Only required 1 to be performed l for affected SIT l ............... i Once within !

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months after each solution volume increase of a 1% of tank volume that is not the result of addition from the refueling water storage tank

! (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT Q 3.5-2 AMENDMENT NO.

l

l 3

l l

RWST 305.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVElLLANCE FREQUENCY l

SR 3.5.4.1 -------------------NOTE-------------------

Only required to be performed when ambient air temperature is < 40*F or > 100*F.

It Verify RWST borated water temperature is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months gl t 40*F and s 100*F.

k I

SR 3.5.4.2 Verify RWST boratcd water volume is 7 days a 362,800 gallons above the ECCS suction connection SR 3.5.4.3 Verify RWST boron concentration is 7 days a 2350 ppm and 5 2800 ppm.

l 1

I l

l SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.5-10 AMENDMENT NO.

-i o ,

i CST T-121 and T-120 l 3.7.6 i

i 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST T-121 and T-120)

% k inee{ @ l.t/M & N4 000Nll**S-i LCO 3.7.6 The CS T-T21 v hall be a and T-120 hall be

er"-

sr\ wW=W ***]

l& no,onpus I APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3 jg MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal.

I I ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 3 N I

A. CST T-121 or T-120 A.1 Verify OPERABILITY of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months l p vels not within backup aster supply.

1 limit. AND I W N' N O ##S A Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

. , thereafter

, AND l tt j A.2 Restore CS f-121 and 7 days

T-120 ve to j within imit.

i i

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion

. Time not met. AND 1

' B.2 Be in MODE 4 without 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months reliance on steam

. generator for heat 4 removal.

4 SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.7-16 AMENMtENT NO.

I A

? - .

CST T-121 and T-120 3.7.6 g SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS h Y SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY W

e,anks'ned M VekhndG SR 3.7.6.1 r 121 and T-120 e 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

.4 l

J l

l l

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.7-17 AMENDMENT NO.

*

CREACUS 3.7.11 l 1

i

,m SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) FREQUENCY SURVEILLANCE In accordance P'erfonn required CREACUS filter testing in with the VFTP SR 3.7.11.2 accordance with Ventilation Filter Testing l Program (VFTP). .

i j

24 months e

SR 3 . 7 .11. "

Verify each CREACUS train actuates on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

I T

s SR 3.7.11.4 a

Verify w

CREACUS train can maintain a 24 month

/PfAGGERED TEST na

" positive pressure of e 0.125 inches water RASIS /

h gauge, relative to the atmosphere during ~

the emergency radiation state of the emergency mode of operation. 9 l

v a

i i

1 AMENDMENT NO. ;

3.7-27 4 SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 1 1 !

1

i t Containment Penetrations 3.9.3

,. P.

e i6 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS i-l -;? 3.9.3 Containment Penetrations -

l' The containmerit penetrations shall be in the following LCO 3.9.3 .

1 status:

l; g

-% a. The equipment hatch closed and held in place by four o_ l l

l h F.

bolts; One door in each air lock closed, but both doors of thel I l hggp8g .7 a b containment personnel airlock may be open provided that L one personnel airlock door is OPERABLE and the plant is i

g g in MODE 6 with 23 feet of water above the fuel.

j %

l 3 \ Mg%k c. Each penetration providing direct access from t/) R g i

$g be either

1. closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve, l

h-(

blind flange, or equivalent, or l

1

2. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE Containment I l

{

, h Purge System.

b During CORE ALTEGTIONS, l

APPLICABILITY: During movemeid of irradiated fuel assemblies within 1

d containment.

ACTIONS COMPLETION TIME

' CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION l -

Suspend CORE Imediately A.1 A. .One or more ALTERATIONS.

containment penetrations not in required status. MD j Imediately

' A.2 Suspend movement of

- irradiated fuel -

assemblies within a containment.

l _

i AMENDMENT NO.

3.9-4 i SANONOFRE--UNITg

i w --. - ,y - ,-

\ Supptamen4 3 INSERT "A" @ l i

b. One door in each air lock closed d

j . . . . . .Both. . . . doors

. . . . . .of

. .the

. . . containment

. . . . . . . . . N 0T E - - - - -ainloc

- - - - - - - - - -:- - k m a y b e o p e n i

~

personnel l

provided: ,

a. one personnel airlock door is OPERABLE, WM I b.I the plant is in MODE#6 acueiueieu connaurauon, m,O

.ff.f**f.,,$a{eraovethefueJ 4

j

y s+ aaa, .c -

~ _- ES S 1

Con jurabkN W!O dtlueled l camas i.e., ,saz s n a 4y>e y( pacuna ,, apsa,j. y N

i l

1 1

i

~

d 4

k

$ad Opo're- (dhtb {

i 4

1

! 2 .

p Reporting Requirements

!. 5.7 i

{ 5.7 Reporting Requirements i 5.7.1.4 Monthly Operating Reports

Routine reports of operating statistics and shutdown experience,

! includin i valves, gshall documentation be submittedofon allachallenges acnthly basisto pressurizer to the U.S. safety Nuclear i

Regulatory Commission, Attention: Document Control Desk, Washington,

! D.C., with a copy to the Regional Administrator of the Regional Office of the NRC, no later than the 15th of each month following j the calendar month covered by the report.

1

! 5.7.1.5 CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR)

a. Core operating limits shall be established prior to each i reload cycle, or prior to any remaining portion of a reload 1

t cycle, anC shall me documented in the COLR for the following:

1. Specification 3.1.4, " Moderator Temperature

} Coefficient",

l

! 2. Specification 3.1.7, " Regulating CEA Insertion Limits",

a l 3. Specification 3.1.8, "Part Length Control Element Assembly Insertion Limits",

4. Specification 3.2.1, " Linear Heat Rate",

! 5. Specification 3.2.4, " Departure From Nucleate Boiling j Ratio", and j 6.

Specification 3.2.5, " Axial Shape Index."

I }

! b. The analytical methods used to detemine the core operating i

limits shall the

{ NRQ m be those yviousiv reviewed ma manroved b j gA,g,,p 4 (3,,p 4 ,j,gggg3 l c.

i The core operating a>plicable limits li (e.m g.,

hall be d M d such that all i fuel thermal-mechanical limits, core tiermal hydraulic limits, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) limits, nuclear limits such as SON, transient analysis limits, j and accident analysis limits) of the safety analysis are met.

4 i

d. The COLR, including any mid-cycle revisions or supplements,

! i shall be provided upon issuance for each reload cycle to the NRC.

7 1

4 i (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 5.0-17 Amendment No.

l

I i f~cA+ A-

{ (' ' S a 2 c 1f 2 --

l l 1. "The ROCS and DIT Computer Codes for Nuclear Design",

t CENPD-288-P-A, (Methodology for Specifications 3.1.4 for

! Moderator Temperature Coe"ficient, and 3.1.7 for

RegulatingCEAInsertionLimits).

i

2. "CE Method for Control Element Assembly Ejection p

! Analysis". CEMPD-0190-A, (Methodology for Specification g 3.1.7 for Regulating CEA Insertion Limits).

l 3. " Modified Statistical Combination of Uncertainties", E CEN-356(V)-P-A, (Methodology for Specifications 3.2.4 3 for Departure fre Nucleate Boiling Ratio).

1 4. " Calculative Methods for the C-E Large Break LOCA 2 Evaluation Model". CENPD-132P, (Methodology for Specifications 3.1.4 for Moderator Temperature

'i *i i

I Ccefficient and 3.2.1 for Linear Heat Rate). p.F; i 5. " Calculational Methods for the C-E Large Break LOCA '

Evaluation Model", CENPD-132P, Supplement 1, (dethodology for Specifications 3.1.4 for Moderator Temperature Coefficient and 3.2.1 for Linear Heat Rate).

6. " Calculational Methods fc,r the C-E Large Break LOCA

)

Evaluation Model" CENPD-132-P, Supplement 2-P, i (Methodology for Specifications 3.1.4 for Moderator l Temperature Coefficient and 3.2.1 for Linear Heat Rate).

i

7. " Calculative Methods for the C-E Large Break LOCA l Evaluation Model for the Analysis of C-E and W Designed

- NSSS", CEN-132 Supplement 3-P-A, (Methodology for Specifications 3.1.4 for Moderator Temperature j Coefficient and 3.2.1 for Linear Heat Rate.

4 I' 8. " Calculative Methods for the C-E Sm.11 Break LOCA l Evaluation Model", CENPD-137P, (Methodology for l Specifications 3.1.4 for Moderator Temperature ,

Coefficient and 3.2.1 for Linear Heat Rate). l

9. " Calculative Methods for the C-E Small Break LOCA Evaluation Model", CENPD-137, Supplement 1-P, (Methodology for Specifications 3.1.4 for Moderator 4.

Temperature Coefficient and 3.2.1 for Linear Heat Rate).

f

10. CESEC-Digital Simulation of a Combustion Engineering j

NuclearSteamSupplySystem",(Methodologyfor i Specifications 3.1.4 for Koderator Temperature l

Coefficient, 3.1.7 for Regulating CEA insertion Limits.

and 3.1.8 for Part Length Contro' Element Assembly j InsertionLimits).

3 1

I

l 1

EM4

! As L 4 L

! )

f i

11. Letter, O. D. Parr (NRC) to F.M. f, tem (CE), dated i

June 13,1975 (NRC Staff Review of the Combustion f Engineering ECCS Evaluation Modet). NRC approval for 5.7.1.5.b.4, 5.7.1.5.b.6, 5.7.1,5.b.8 methodologies.

g 12.

Letter, O. D. Parr (NRC) to A. E. Scherer (CE), dated o December 9,1975 (NRC Staff Review of the Proposed ).

Combustion Engineering ECCS Evaluation Model Changes).

NRC approval for 5.7.1.5.b.8 methodology. 'T 2

13. Letter, 2CNAD38403, dated March 20, 1984, J. R. Miller

~

j (NRC) to J. M. Griffin (AP&L), "CESEC Code i Verification" methodology. , NRC approval for 5.7.1.5.b.10

! 14.

Letter, K. Kniel (NRC) to A. E. Scherer (CE), dated September 27, 1977 (Evaluation of Topical Report CENPD-133 Supplement, 3-P and CENPD-137, Su approval for 5.7.1.5.b.10 methodology.pplement 1-P), NRC

! 15'

' PWR Reactor Physics Methodology Using CASMO-3/ SIMULATE-3, SCE-9001-A, (Methodology for Specifications 3.1.4 for Moderator Temperature Coefficient, and 3.1.7 Regulating d CEA Insertion Limits).

I i

J

Reporting Requireme,ts 5.7 1 f i

5.7 Reporting Requirements k la l I

5.7.1.6 S PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS REPORT (PTLR) T The RCS pressure and temperature limits, including heatup and D

l ' cooldown rates, criticality, and hydrostatic and leak test limits, ) {,

shall be established and documented in the PTLR for Specification '

3.4.3, "RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits." The analytical 7 methods used to determine the pressure and temperature limits including the heatup and cooldown rates shall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC. The reactor vessel pressure and -

i temperature limits, including those for heatup and cooldown rates, shall be determined so that all applicable limits (e.g., heatup and cooldown limits, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing limits)

\

of the analysis are met. The PTLR, including revisions or supplements thereto, shall be provided to the NRC upon issuance fo each reactor vessel fluency period.

3.7.1.7 Hazardous Cargo Traffic Report Hazardous cargo traffic on Interstate 5 (I-5) and the AT&SF railway shall be monitored and the results submitted to the NRC Regional ;

Administrator once every three years.

5.7.2 Special Reports Special Reports may be required covering inspection, test, and maintenance activities. These special reports are determined on an individual basis for each unit and their preparation and submittal are designated in the Technical Specifications.

Special Reports shall be submitted to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attention: Document Control Desk, Washington, D. C.

20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator of the Regional Office of the NRC, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.4 within the time l

period specified for each report.

i l

The following Special Reports shall be submitted: }

i l i

! a. Any abnormal degradation of the containment structure detected

! during the tests required by the Pre-Stressed Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance Program shall be reported to i

} the NRC within 30 days. The report shall include a t

! description of the tendon condition, the condition of the l

concrete (especially at tendon anchorages), the inspection 4 procedures, the tolerances on cracking, and the corrective l action taken.

I (continued) i a

5.0-18 Amendment No. !

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 l l

9

t 1

l l

I

' NPF-10/15-299 l

\

l l

i i

t 5~

1

! ATTACHMENT "B" !

i (Marked-Up Proposed Specifications) i Unit 3 1

d 4

i 1

l 4

l i

i

i f&k i

j 1.1 Definitions (continued) i i OPERABLE-0PERABILITY equipment that are required for the system, '

! (continued) subsystem, train, component, or device to perform

. its specified safety function (s) are also capable j of performing their related support function (s).

} PHYSICS TESTS PHYSICS TESTS shall be those tests performed to j measure the fundamental nuclear characteristics of I the reactor core and related instrumentation.

l These tests are:

i 1

a. Described in Chapter 14 Initial Test Program

! of the SONGS Units 2 and 3 UFSAR;

b. Authorized under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59; or

c. Otherwise approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

I PRESSURE AND The PTLR is the unit specific document that 3 i TEMPERATURE LIMITS prov1 dss the reactor vessel pressure and j REPORT (PTLR) temperature limits, including heatup and cooldown i rates, for the current reactor vessel fluence

} period. These pressure and temperature limits !

j shall be determined for each fluence period in f accordance with Specification 5.7.1.6. Plant-operation within these operating limits is i addressed in LCO 3.4.3, "RCS Pressure and i Temperature (P/T) Limits," and LCO 3.4.12, " Low i Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP)

{ System."

i RATED THERMAL POWER RTP shall be a total reactor core heat transfer l (RTP) rate to the reactor coolant of 3390 MWt.

1 I REACTOR PROTECTIVE The RPS RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval I from when the monitored parameter exceeds its RPS SYSTEM (RPS) RESPONSE l TIME trip setpoint at the channel sensor until i electrical power to the CEAs drive mechanism is j interrupted. The response time may be measured by j means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or j total steps so that the entire response time is j measured.

1 j (continued) i j SAN ONOFRE--UNIT Q 1.1-5 AMENDMENT NO.

i 1

l

=

~ '

DG-Undervoltage Start 3.3.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.7.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.3.7.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 24 months SR 3.3.7.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION with setpoint 24 months Allowable Values as follows:

a. Degraded Voltage Function a 4181 V and 5 4275 V SDVS (Sustained Degraded Grid Voltage):

Oi 1 Time delay: 5 135 seconds (respen:c time is mec ured frc:

4Mt4ation..cf degreded

ll!'il 27 D.N i i B.TssE bh_d sTind,is voltegN12 g.4

. ., n c w i h il62D' T .sWE6hdsFiiidM132?

" " " ^ " ~ * " "" O" sfc,ondsi

<- s DGVSS (Degraded Grid Voltage with SIAS Signal):

Time delay: s 5.14 ccends (rc pens; time is mecsured from initictica of SIAS)

i??"7127D W '~ ?lI8Tsed3n~dsiandfB

~ ~ " ' "2Y2

~

se'condsk i.1bg 1162S-

.g ~m g M T411131.6_Eondsta.hd z . ., . . . < m; W 47.4.9

%ll m_ nd. i ii M162TU*W~0

~~

" " " ~ ' '"~"

855sid6hdi?ifid

- ^

%'"1Y65

b. Loss of Voltage Function a 3554 V and 5 3796 V Time delay: a 0.95 seconds and 5 1.05 seconds at 0 V.

SANON0FRE--UNIT $ 3.3-33 AMENDMENT NO.

- . _ _ _ _ - _ - . _ _ . _ _ . .__.J

4 4 >

RCS DNB (Pressure, Temperature, and Flow) Licits i 3.4.1 l 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

.: 3.4.1 RCS ONB (Pressure, Temperature, and Flow) Limits 2

LCO 3.4.1 RCS parameters for pressurizer pressure, cold leg temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be within the i

limits specified below:

a. Pressurizer pressure a 2025 psia and s 2275 psia;

% b. ):

RCS cold leg temperature (T,han or equal to 30% RTP,

' - 1. For THERMAL POWER less t 522*F s T 5 558'F, # #femf4 * -

2. For THERMhl POWER less tianfD% RTP and greater than

=m 30% RTP, 535'F s T, s 558 F*

3. For THERMAL POWER greater than gir equal tp 70% RTP, 544* F s T, 5 558'F.

, N c. RCS total flow rate a 148E6 Lbm/hr and 5 177.6E6 Lbm/hr.

APPLICABILITY: H0DE 1.

i ---------------------------NOTE------------------------

Pressurizer pressure limit does not apply during:

a. THERMAL POWER ramp > 5% RTP per minute; or

b. THERMAL POWER step > 10% RTP.

(

ACTIONS 4

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 4

A. Pressurizer pressure A.1 Restoreparameter(s) 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months j or RCS flow rate not to within limit.

within limits.

d i

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

(continued) 3.4-1 AMENDMENT NO.

SANONOFRE--UNIT 3

. s RCS DNB (Pressure, Temperature, and Flow) Liaits 3.4.1 ACTIONS (continued)

REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CONDITION C. RCS cold leg C.1 Restore cold leg 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months temperature not within temperature to:within limits. limits. .

Required Action and 0.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months D.

associated Completion to s 30% RTP.-

! Time of Condition C

not met.

I l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.1.1 Verify pressurizer pressure a 2025 ' psia and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 5 2275 psia.

SR 3.4.1.2 Verify RCS cold leg temperature: 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months g 1. For THERMAL POWER less than or o4 i

30% RTP, 522 F s Tc 5 558'F

2. For THERMAL POWER less tha 0% RTP and i

y greater than 30% RTP, 535'F s Tc s 558'F a_ l

3. F r THERMAL POWER greater thant*JF equaF 70% RTP, 544*F s Tc 5 558'F i

.....................__...-N0TE----------------------.--.

Required to be met in MODE 1 with all RCPs running. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.4.1.3 Verify RCS total flow rate t 148E6 Lbm/ hour and 5 177.6E6 lbm/nour SANONOFRE--UNITj 3.4-2 AMENDMENT NO.

o k RCS P/T Limits

! 3.4.3

! l I

j 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.3 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits LC0 3.4.3 RCS l

ratespressure, RCS temperature, shall be maintained within and RCS heatup the limits specifiedandincooldow @n l

W hjuN S.!/.5-f bf M J.G.S~E k W/TSV.I*S

\

flyft E.V. SW, k 0/W f S V.S* $ CFMW 'F/$6S VSW APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTIONS l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME l

A. ---------NOTE--------- A.1 Restore parameter (s) 30 minutes l Required Action A.2 to within limits. !

I shall be completed l whenever this AND Condition is entered. l

A.2 Determine RCS is 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months I acceptable for Requirements of LC0 continued operation.

not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. ;

l l

8. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Tima of Condition A .AND not met.

B.2 Be in MODE 5 with 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months RCS pressure l

< 500 psia.

(continued) l l

3.4-4 AMEliDMENT NO.

SANOi10FRE--UNITJ

4 4 RCS P/T Limits 3.4.3 l ACTIONS. (continued) l COMPLETION TIME I CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION 1

C. ---------NOTE--------- C.1 Initiate action to Immediately Required Action C.2 restore parameter (s) shall be completed to within limits. -

l 4 whenever this 1 Condition is entered. AND C.2 Determine RCS is Prior to l Requirements of LC0 acceptable for entering MODE 4 not met any time in continued operation.

other than MODE 1, 2, l 3, or 4.

l i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY i

SR 3.4.3.1 -------------------NOTE--------------------

Only required to be performed during RCS l

heatup and cooldown operations and RCS inservice leak and hydrostatic testing.

r l Verify RCS pressure, RCS temperature, and 30 minutes l RCS heatup and cooldown rates within limits

specified in @e PIL]QO s

i

& are s. 4. t /, fi t V '~ '-

f,lfquee g. 41-f y, q ufmv 1.4. s-r," Af"""Y

} Wr6/e 3. 91- i' et J.9'.1~$~

k 4 @

SANONOFRE--UNITj 3.4-5 AMENDMENT N0.

I *4 4

6 - - -

/

sco , ..

.. ..,, ,,,,,,,,,.. i iii

INSERvlCE TESTS # HEATUP LOWEST SERVICE ' "

TEMP = 209'F

) -

3000 - i l

j - i

. s e

i -

1 - i

a

~

w 2500 - i j

C

Accepta' ole operating region to the

i ,

D nght of the inservce tests curve l j '

j $ ~

( Applicable in rnodes other than y

i Modes 1 and 2) i

?'

c. # Acceptable operating region to the i g poco w ,

nght of the heatup curve in all rnoc:s. l I b! In additon,in Modes 1 and 2 the i i

~ c operating regon is to the nght of the l

! $ core entcal curve. i j

1 m .t . ...a.... . .

g . .

j,- j i

a- is00 .

' I I

0- . . . . ~

i , )

i O !

w -

, s< .

l 9 -

l ioco .

ll

. # CORE CRITICAL - i 1

i l 4

500 . . .

, m;yyy . . - . .

BOLTUP TEMP = 66'? . . , _ . .

f ,

. ....A......

3 i i i i a i a 1 a ie I t a t e e e e ie i a e e e a a t a e A

250 300 350 400 i o to 100 150 200 4

r INDICATED RCS TEMPERATURE ('F)-Tc

. i k

4 FIGURE L V. 3 -l SONGS 3 HEATUP RCS PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE l 4

' LIMITATIONS FOR

3 UNTIL 20 EFPY g

- Mamal Operatica M

SAN ONOFRE-UNIT 3 @44-30 AMENC+ TENT NO.]

e

d ,

1 i a i

A '

i i i i -

LOWEST SERVICE COOLDOWN

' TEMP = 209'F .

t k 3000 - i. '

j $

m I. :

E l w e C

p 2500 -

e

e e

4 w

1 CC ,

- a. a tt "

! w *

, N 2000 C ;.

UnacceptW3 3

{. .. Operating

]

Region C -

1' c. Acceptabl3 I o 150c - f '

Operating

N . . . . . . . . . . . .

.. pq;on

. 4. . .

e i a ,

! Z 6 - . .

j 1000 .. .

1 -

1 4

I' 500 f

MINIMU M -

!, BOLTUP

TEMP . WF , _ , , , ,

..- . . . .. . h ........q........

. ...l.., ,t..,,!,,,,t,,,,t,,,,t,,,,l,,,,

,, 300 350 400 l toc 150 200 250

< 0 to i

'NDICATED RCS TEMPERATURE ('F)-Te 1

1

-_ d

' FIGURE g Y. 3-b SONGS 3 C0OLDOWN RCS PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE 9 LIMITATIONS FOP ' S UltTIL 20 EFPY

16omal Operation ,

1 )

AMENDMENTNO.]

SAN ONOFRE-UNIT 3 [3/44-31

d *

! Mi lA.)Of$ht6M

! ,,o l .

I no 1

' ,w -

4 -

! 9e '

i, . <

b f

u.,.

t I w 7o -

1 i cc z # ~

i

3; 1 o

O " ~

7 ,' -

8 - Q!

j O 40 -

30 1

4 m -

! to -

,g ,q I iI . I i 1 ' I ' I '

I

,,g , t .

i no e too no r20 130 1'o 15e iso tro iso too 2oo 210

! INDICATED RCS TEMPERATURE (*F)-Te l 1

i j

k y hTE: A NAXIML24 C00LDOWN RATE OF 100*F/HR 15 ALLOWED

w AT ANY TEMPERATURE ABOVE M6147'F FIGURE (fK-5 3h

! SONGS 3 RCS PRESSURF./ TEMPERATURE LIMITS g}'

l KAXIMUM ALLOWABLE Nomal Operation C00LDOWN RATES (--4-6 UNTIL 20 c -

AMFNrw NT SAN ONOFRE-UNIT 3 3/4 4-31a i

I

__ f M f /f 1

i , , .,g i ig

. . , , , ,, , , g 3500 ....gi g '

COOLDOWN LOWEST SERVICE f

TEMP = 209'F -

\

-

i i no - i i

i i

l .

2 g i a !

E:. 2sco - '

w i 4 c e D

a O I.

4 s e .

Unacceptable j Operatrg ;

1 2000 Regen I 1 @ .

Acceinbie y -

i Operating

' D -l- - Reg'on

$ g,

j.

w 35o0 ..

. (7

. . . . . . . . . - . . .. l

E .. .

.i...... - . . . . . . . . ............. <

O a -

w ... . . _

i .

r<

- . . . . . . 8

< o -

1 1 o ioco .

Z soo - i umuuu .

ecute . ........... .

TEuP . WF t 4 '!.

I,,, ,I,;;;I,,,,t,,,,i,,,.!,,,,t,,,, 4%

350

,, 200 250 300 50 100 150 i 0

y .

INDICATED RCS TEMPERATURE (*F)-Te i,

C7 FIGURE h,$,8 f 506GS 3 COOLDOWN RCS PRESSURE /TDLPERATURE LIMITATIONS UNTIL 20 EFPY l (l Remote Shutdown Operation 4-31b AMENDNENT NO.

SAM ONOFRE-UNIT 3

l i

t!\

f l 4 520 , , . , , , , , ,

110 * .

l 200 -

90 .

E n -

l u.

- 70 -

f Cc so .

Z E -

o w -

b k h -

o n -

30 .

20 10

\

i i . . . . . . i..

. . . ......i . .

o 80 93 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 1M 190 200 210 INDICATED RCS TEMPERATURE (*F)-Tc J

M fg,' C00LDOWN '1 ATE OF 100*F/NR 15 ALLOWED AT MY TDIPERATURE A80VE 155'F g g:

FIGUR 3. k,[-7 SONES 3' ACS PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS lA MAXIMUM ALLOWAELE COOLDOWN RATES (UNTIL 20 EFPY)

Remote Shutdown Operction l

0 AMENOMElfT SAM ONOFRE-UNIT 3 3/4 T-31c

UfbtMfd4tl Y TABL( k h, ["" !

l Low Temperature RCS Overpressure protection fance j

Operatino Period. EFPY Cold lea Temoerature. *F During During Heatup -

Cocidown I

s M2 246 s 262 225

4.-w4 Until 20 (Normal Operation)

5 225 ;

Until 20'(Remote Shutdown Operation) i l

I Heatup operations,are not normally performed from the' Remote Shutdown panels.

O 3/4 4-31h- d AMENDMENT NO.

SAN ONOFRE-UNIT 3

> e Pressurizer Heatup/Cooldown Limits l 3.4.3.1 ,

i f

l i 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) i 3.4.3.1 Pressurizer Heatup and Cooldown Limits

' l k

lleWI n LCO 3.4.3.1 Pressuriz heatup an cooldown rates shall be maintained i within the/ limits:(pecujed in the PM INSC RT " A'_'

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

I ACTIONS 4

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. ---------NOTE--------- A.1 Restore parameter (s) 30 minutes Required Action A.2 to within limits.

shall be completed whenever this AND j Condition is entered.

A.2 Determine Pressurizer 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is acceptable for Requirements of LC0 continued operation.

not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.

Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months

) B.

associated Completion i

Time of Condition A AND not met.

B.2 Be in MODE 5 with 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months RCS pressure 1

< 500 psia.

t (continued) 3.4-6 AMENDMENT NO.

SANON0FRE--UNIT 3

Pressurizer Heatup/Cooldown Limits 3.4.3.1 l ACTIONS (continued)

REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION T1HE CONDITION C.1 Initiate action to Immediately C. ---------NOTE---------

Required Action C.2 restoreparameter(s)'

shall be completed to within limits. :

whenever this Condition is entered. AND C.2 Determine Pressurizer Prior to is acceptable for entering MODE 4 Requirements of LCO not met any time in continued operation, other than MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY N L SR 3.4.3.1.1 ------- -----------NOTE--------------------

Only required to be performed during Pressurizer heatup and cooldown operations.

4 ........... ... ..............

.7 Verify r' _ ieatup aHd cooldown y rates within imi ts'drec i f i ed i n the P I Lni -- -30 minutes AGER.T*

SR 3.4.3.1.2 The spray water temperature differential When less than shall be determined for use in the M 4 reactor ggg coolant pumps are operating and for each cycle of auxiliary spray operation.

SANONOFRE--UNITj 3.4-7 AMENDMENT NO.

i c .

1 l

")"

i NSeRT a

i, i N l

Y a. A maximum l Aealup &2WF s'n any j i hour penoef,

$. k madmum coolofown e 200*f in '

l Q3 ang I hwr pen'ad.

L 1 l 1 !

i i l

4 i

l J

4 1

a e RCS Loops-MODE 4 Sara he.n + 4' 3.4.6

! 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) l

I 3.4.6 RCS Loops-MODE 4 l LCO 3.4.6 Two loops or trains consisting of any combination of RCS loops

, and shutdown cooling (SDC) trains shall be OPERABLE and at least j one loop or train shall be in operation.

! _____....__...______.-------NOTES---------------------------

1. All reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) and SDC pumps may be

de-energized for s I hour per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months period, provided

) a. No operations are permitted that would cause reduction of the RCS boron concentration; and I b. Core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10*F

! belowsaturationtgmjerature.

24 F No RCP shall [ siarted with any RCS cold leg I

i j$ 2.

temperature 5 ghe UUP enaDie tempeiawie spec 111ea a a

e; riLjxnless: g 3

a. Pressurizer water is < *

, or l { O b. Secondary side water temperature in each steam i generator (SG) is < 100*F above each of the RCS cold

leg temperatures.

4

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4.

i b l l

I a

i SANONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.4-11 AMENDMENT NO.

I

u h RCS Lo:ps-MODE 5, Lceps Filled 3.4.7 24(o'

NOTES 4.

(continued)--------[--------A No reactor coolant pump (RCP) shall be stap ed with one or _more of the RCS cold leg temperatures :sITOP enabiet empa nur y nless: g gg

a. The pressurizer water is < h

b. The secondary side water temperature in eltf steam

. generator (SG) is < 100*F above each of the RCS cold

! leg temperatures.

i 5. A containment spray pump may be used in place of a low pressure safety injection pump in either or both

, shutdown cooling trains to provide shutdown cooling flow i provided the reactor has been subcritical for a period i > 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and the RCS is fully depressurized and vented in accordance with LCO 3.4.12.1.

2 i 6. All SDC trains may be removed from operation during

! planned heatup to MODE 4 when at least one RCS loop is

in operation.

l i APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 with RCS loops filled.

i 1

ACTIONS 4

i CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME i A. Less than the required A.1 Initiate action to Immediately

< SDC trains /RCS loops restore the required OPERABLE SDC trains /RCS loops

{'

to OPERABLE status.

AND OR l Any SG with secondary side water level not A.2 Initiate action to Immediately within limit, restore SG secondary side water levels to within limits.

(continued)

SANON0FRE--UNITj 3.4-15 AMENDMENT N0.

l 8 i 4 Pressurizer 3.4.9 l

3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.9 Pressurizer LCO 3.4.9 The pressurizer shall begE A LE with:

l

a. Pressurizer wate nd l

b. Two groups of pressurizer heaters OPERABLE with the capacity of each group 2: 150 kW and capable of being powered from an emergency power supply.

1 t ;

g APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS I N CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME )

R U A. Pressurizer water A.1 Be in MODE 3 with 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months i $/) Q M not within y limit.

reactor trip breakers open.

^" '

1 \ \b A.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months I

B. One required group of B.1 Restore required 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ;

pressurizer heaters group of pressurizer !

inoperable. heaters to OPERABLE status.

C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition B AND not met l C.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SANON0FRE--UNIT 3 3.4-19 AMEN 0 MENT N0.

Pressurizer 3.4.9 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.9.1 Verify pressurizer wate is s 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ML NN

, SR 3.4.9.2 Verify capacity of each required group of 92 days

. pressurizer hesters a 150 kW.

i 1

l SANONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.4-20 AMENDMENT NO.

a .

LTOP System 3.4.12.1 (b 1 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

I 3.4.12.1 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System

~ cl:P _Ak8,N l RCS Temperature LTOP Enable Temperature]

, @ f d /N N f 6 SN*$~$

LCO 3.4.12.1 No more than two high pre:ssure ety injection pumps shall !

be OPERABLE, the safety i.njecti anks shall be isolated or depressurized to less than the limit, and at least one 1 of the following overpressure protection systems shall be l OPERABLE:

a. The Shutdown Cooling System Relief Valve (PSV9349) with:

1) A lift setting of 406 10 psig l

l 2) Relief Valve isolation valves 2HV9337, 2HV9339, 2HV9377, and 2HV9378 open, i i

or, l

b. The Reactor Coolant System depressurized with an RCS j vent of greater than or equal to 5.6 square inches.

i APPLICABILITY: MODE 4 when the temperature of any one RCS cold leg is less 1 than or equal to the enable temperatures specified in i fitble 3.W B-/ \

MODE 5, and MODE 6 when the head is on the reactor vessel.

NOTE------------------- T- 5-- -

j 1. SIT isolation or depressurization to less than the -

limit is only required when SIT pressure is greater than l

or equal to the maximum RCS pressure for the existing RCS cold leg temperature allowed by the P T i t curves

. . . . . .?. . . . . . .$?. . . l. . ... . . . .' . '. . .$. ! . . .Y. .

l l

3.4-23 AMENDMENT NO.

SANON0FRE--UNIT 3

i LTOP System 3.4.12.1

{

ACTIONS -.

~

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 1

A. With more than two A.1 Initiate action to Immediately HPSI pumps capable of verify a maximum of injecting into the two HPSI pumps RCS. capable of injecting into the RCS 1

l B. SIT pressure is B.1 Isolate affected SIT. I hour greater than or equal

, to the maximum RCS pressure for existing i 4 cold leg temperatur% -

m

! allowed inMTie PILha :

[ hfuM S V.3=l, irlfen K V.84 C. Required Action and C.i Depressurize affected 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months I

associated Completion SIT to less than the Time of Condition B maximum RCS pressure not met. for existing cold leg .

I temperature allowed ir' Gie PIL @ _

D. With one or both SDCS D.1 Open the closed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Relief Valve isolaticn valve (s).

valves in a single SDCS Relief Valve 0_R isolation valve pair (valve pair 2HV9337 D.2 Power-lock open the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and 2HV9339 or valve OPERABLE SDCS Relief pair 2HV9377 and Valve isolation valve 2HV9378) closed. pair.

(continued)

SANONOFRE--UNITj 3.4-24 AMENDMENT NO.

o o LTOP System 3.4.12.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l StaVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l

i SR 3.4.12.1.1 --------------..--NOTE-------------------

l A HPSI pump is secured by verifying that ;

l its motor circuit breaker is not racked- l in, or its discharge valve is locked i closed. The requirement to rack out the l HPS1 pump breaker is satisfied with the l l

pump breaker racked out to its j disconnected or test position. .

......................................... l l

l Verify a maximum of two HPSI pumps are 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months l

! capable of injecting into the RCS.

l i

SR 3.4.12. .2 ------------------NOTE-------------------

\ Required to be performed when complying with LC0 3.4.12.1 Note 2.

Verify each SIT is isolated or 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months !

depressurized less than the L 1 l

. .peupw.unyns.v.-z '

I

( SR 3.4.12.1.3 Verify RCS vent t 5.6 square inches is 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for open when in use for overpressure unlocked open protection, vent valve (s)

AND 31 days for locked, sealed, or otherwise secured open ventvalve(s),

or open flanged RCS penetrations (continued) 3.4-26 AMENDMENT NO.

l SANONOFRE--UNIT 3

LTOP System 3.4.12.2 l

l f 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) l 3.4.12.2 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System RCSTemperature>6TOPEnableTemperature Nd LCO 3.4.12.2 At least one of the following overpressure protection i K systems shall be OPERABLE:

a. The Shutdown Cooling System Relief Valve (PSV9349) with:

l l

N 1) A lift setting of 406 10 psig i

! 2) Relief Valve isolation valves 2HV9337, 2HV9339, 2HV9377, and 2HV9378 open, o r, y

b. A minimum of one pressurizer coCe safety valve with a lift setting of 2500 psia 14.

l MODE 4 when the temoerature of all RCS colds 1 reat r f APPLICABILITY:

l than the enable tem'peratures specified in /c54.F/

i j

l .........................--N0TES----------------------------

! , 1. The lift setting pressure of the pressurizer code safety ,

valve shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

2. The SDCS Relief Valve lift setting assumes valve i temperatures less than or equal to 130*F.

.... ....................................................... l l

l l \

l i I l l

3.4-28 AMENDMENT NO.

l SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3

l l SITS ,

3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.1.1 Verify each SIT isolation valve is fully 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months open.

l SR 3.5.1.2 Verify borated water volume in each SIT is h 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months P e 1680 cubic feet (T%'.mg,e) and 5 1807 cubic feet ( ge). T$p

't SR 3.5.1.3 Verify nitrogen cover pressure in each SIT 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is a 615 psia and s 655 psia.

SR 3.5.1.4 Verify boron concentration in each SIT is 31 days a 1850 ppm and 5 2800 ppm.

? bE

NOTE------

l Only required I to be performed for affected SIT Once within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months after each solution !

volume increase !

of a 1% of tank l volume that is not the result of addition from the refueling water !

storage tank (continued) l l

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.5-2 AMENDMENT NO.

l l

l RWST 3.5.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY l

1 1

SR 3.5.4.1 -------------------NOTE-------------------

Only required to be performed when ambient ,

air temperature is < 40*F or > 100*F. l

%' Verify RWST borated water temperature is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months l W a 40*F and s 100*F. '

k l

6 SR 3.5.4.2 Verify RWST borated water volume is 7 days I e 362,800 gallons above the ECCS suction connection J

l l SR 3.5.4.3 Verify RWST boron concentration is 7 days l 2 2350 ppm and 5 2800 ppm.

l SANON0FRE--UNIT 3 3.5 10 AMENDMENT NO.

i l

2 i

CST T-121 and T-120 l 3.7.6 l

3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST T-121 and T-120) O MkEntd&M& NM M Mll**S LC0 3.7.6 Th T-T21 hallbee and T-120 hall be

& no,oooy 6 s sr ** W' ***1 l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal.

4 l ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME N

A. CST T-121 or T-120 A.1 Verify OPERABILITY of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months i

%limit.

not within backup water supply.

AND Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

, , thereafter AND 0

A.2 Restore. CS -121 and 7 days T-120 Lve to within imit.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4 without 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months reliance on steam generator for heat removal.

SANON0FRh--UNIT 3 3.7-16 AMENDMENT N0.

1 o o CST T-121 and T-120 3.7.6 g SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Y SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY V

wn}eined & s/044tedG SR 3.7.6.1 r T 121 and T-120 e 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months d,

4 4

1 e

4 a

i 1

l 9

SANONOFRE--UNIT 3 3.7-17 AMENDMENT NO.

1

i CREACUS 3.7.11 f

^ SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Perform required CREACUS filter testing in In accordance SR 3.7.11.2 with the VFTP accordance with Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP).

i Verify each CREACUS train actuates on an 24 months SR 3.7.11.3 actual or simulated actuation signal.

$ I train can maintain a 24 mo na SR 3.7.11.4 Verif EA RE_D TEST positive pressure of e 0.125 inches water h gauge, relative to the atmosphere during ASIS I the emergency radiation state of the emergency mode of operation.

p 3.7-27 AMENDMENT NO.

SANONOFRE--UNITg

h_ . . . .

Crntainment Penetrations h- 3.3.3 6

3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

~

-f, 3.9.3 Containment Penetrations J

LC0 3.9.3 The containment penetrations shall be in the followvq

.g status:

a. ' The equipment hatch closed and held in place by four 4 g_

/ l f bolts; ll Mgp*g a7 F.b One door in each air lock closed, but both doors of the containment personnel airlock may be open provided that

{ .

one personnel airlock door is OPERABLE and the plant is

% (g in MODE 6 with 23 feet of water above the fuel.

Each penetration providing direct access from the 3 \ D k c.

containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall

%O t W- t gI be either:

O 1. closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve, h(- blind flange, or equivalent, or a 2. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE Containment Purge System.

(

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies w'ithin containment. ,

ACTIONS REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME CONDITION A.1 Suspend CORE Immediately A. 0ne or more containment ALTERATIONS.

penetrations not in required status. Algt A.2 Suspend movement of= Ismediately irradiated fuel .

assemblies within containment.

3.9-4 AMENDMENT NO.

SANON0FRE--UNITJ

l ph,*KCM i i l

i INSERT "A" @ i l

1 l l

l ,b . One door in each air lock closed i

..............................N0TE---------------------------------

j Both doors of the containment personnel airlock may be open j provided:

a. one personnel airlock door is OPERABLE, ##

f bJ the plant is in MODE 6#-r univeiea connauranon. - O 4

..h...tc. wnn z3 feet of water above the fuelf EE l , , a a p a ,1 - w n*Ha*i i e m eke va% or J i

W l R g ugg O n y k f* l' N ggf o.,, l w . a,,e s di. a. , fa d a ~ ";

r Q; paouns or W 'C Wh)~ -

e i

4 4

=

l i

J A o d o t4 # 3 1 _ _

6 i l Reporting Requirements 5.7 5.7 Reporting Requirements 5.7.1.4 Monthly Operating Reports Routine reports of operating statistics and shutdown experience,

) includin valves, gshall documentation be submittedofon allachallenges monthly bra tospcessurizer to the U.S. safety Nuclear ,

1 Regulatory Commission, Attention: Document Control Desk, Washington, i b.C., with a copy to the Regional Administrator of the Regional Office of the NRC, no later than the 15th of each month following 1 the calendar month covered by the report.

j 5.7.1.5 CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR)

a. Core operating limits shall be established prior to each i

' reload cycle, or prior to any remaining portion of a reload cycle, and shall be documented in the COLR for the following:

i

1. Specification 3.1.4, " Moderator Temperature Coefficient", i

2. Specification 3.1.7, " Regulating CEA Insertion Limits",

3. Specification 3.1.8, "Part Length Control Element Assembly Insertion Limits", )

1

4. Specification 3.2.1, " Linear Heat Rate",

j 5.

< Specification 3.2.4, " Departure From Nucleate Boiling Ratio", and i

6. Specification 3.2.5, " Axial Shape Index."

j b. The analytical methods used to determine the core operating

limits shall be tho evimaly reviaH =ad anaroved by the

] NRCg su :

! c.

q ,, 4 4 g g g]

The core operating such that all i

a >plicable limits (e.g., fuel thermal-mechanical limits, core tiermal hydraulic limits, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) 4 j

limits, nuclear limits such as SDN, transient analysis limits, and accident analysis limits) of the safety analysis are met.

1

d. The COLR, including any mid-cycle revisions or supplements, shall be provided upon issuance for eact reload cycle to the j NRC. '

4 4

I (continued)

SANONOFRE--UNIT \3 5.0-17 Amendment No.

i

}

b hi d ;

i W A W E - --

l

1. "The ROCS and DIT Computer Codes for Nuclear Design",

CENPD-288-P-A, (Methodology for Specifications 3.1.4 for Moderator Temperature Coefficient, and 3.1.7 for RegulatingCEAInsertionLimits).

2. "CE Method for Control Element Assembly Ejection Analysis", CENPD-0190-A, (Methodology for Specification 3.1.7 for Regulating CEA Insertion Limits).

3. " Modified Statistical Combination of Uncertainties",

CEN-356(V)-P-A, (Methodology for Specifications 3.2.4 for Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio).

4. " Calculative Methods for the C-E Large Break LOCA Evaluation Model", CENPD-132P, (Methodology for f Specifications 3.1.4 for Moderator Temperature Coefficient and 3.2.1 for Linear Heat Rate).

kp

5. " Calculational Methods for the C-E Large Break LOCA 3 Evaluation Model", CENPD-132P, Supplement 1 Y (Methodology for Specifications 3.1.4 for Moderator i Temperature Coefficient and 3.2.1 for Linear Heat Rate). i

6. " Calculational Methods for the C-E Large Break LOCA A Evaluation Model", CENPD-132-P, Supplement 2-P, (Methodology for Specifications 3.1.4 for Moderator TemperatureCoefficientand3.2.1forLinearHeatRate).

l t 7. " Calculative Methods for the C-E Large Break LOCA

! Evaluation Model for the Analysis of C-E and W Designed i

NSSS", CEN-132, Supplement 3-P-A, (Methodology for l Specifications 3.1.4 for Moderator Temperature ;

Coefficient and 3.2.1 for Linear Heat Rate.

8. " Calculative Methods for the C-E Small Break LOCA Evaluation Model", CENPD-137P, (Methodology for Specifications 3.1.4 for Moderator Temperature Coefficient and 3.2.1 for Linear Heat Rate).

9. " Calculative Methods for the C-E Small Break LOCA Evaluation Model", CENPD-137, S eplement 1-P, (Methodology for' Specifications 3.1.4 for Moderator Temperature Coefficient and 3 2.1 for Linear Heat Rate).

10. CESEC-Digital Simulation of a Combustion Engineering Nuclear $ team Supply System",(Methodology for Speu fications 1.1.4 for Moderator Temperature Coef#icient, L1.7 far Regulating CEA insertion Limits, and J.1.3 for # art .ength Control Element Assembly lhter'.M i :m10

< s l

l TNCas.'f~ A fx5e 24 z.-

11. Letter, O. D. Parr (NRC) to F.M. Stem (CE), dated June 13, 1975 (NRC Staff Review of the Combustion EngineeringECCSEvaluationModel). NRC approval for g 5.7.1.5.b.4, 5.7.1.5.b.6, 5.7.1.5.b.8 methodologies.

7 12.

Letter, 0. D. Parr (NRC) to A. E. Scherer (CE), dated kT December 9,1975 (NRC Staff Review of the Proposed Combustion En ineering ECCS Evaluation Model Changes).

NRC approval or 5.7.1.5.b.8 methodology. E

13. Letter, 2CNAD38403, dated March 20, 1984 (NRC) to J. M. Griffin (AP&L), "CESEC Code J. R. Miller Verification" ,

methodology. . NRC approval for 5.7.1.5.b.10 i 14.

Letter, K. Kniel (NRC) to A. E. Scherer (CE), dated September 27,1977 (Evaluation of Topical Report CENPD-l 133, Supplement, 3-P and CENPD-137, Su ,

approval for 5.7.1.5.b.10 methodology.pplement 1-P), NRC !

15.

l PWR Reactor Physic.; Methodology Using CASMO-3/ SIMULATE-3, SCE-9001-A, (Methodology for Specifications 3.1.4 for Moderator Temperature Coefficient, and 3.1.7 Regulating CEAInsertionLimits).

4 Reporting Requirements 5.7 l 1 l 5.7 Reporting Requirements 5.7.1.6 c5PRESSUREANDTEMPERATURELIMITSREPORT(PTLR) b EA l The RCS pressure and temperature limits, including heatup and

{ p I cooldown rates, criticality, and hydrostatic and leak test limits, shall be established and documented in the PTLR for Specification i D{

3.4.3, "RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits." The analytical P nethods used to detemine the pressure and temperature limits i

<neluding the heatup and cooldown rates shall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC. The reactor vessel pressure and

/> l l temperature limits, including those for heatup and cooldown rates, i shall be determined so that all applicable limits (e.g., heatup and cooldown limits, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing limits)

\

' of the analysis are met. The PTLR, including revisions or supplements thereto, shall be provided to the NRC upon issuance foh each reactor vessel fluency period.

i l

f 5.7.1.7 Hazardous Cargo Traffic Report i

Hazardous cargo traffic on Interstate 5 (I-5) and the AT&SF railway i shall be monitored and the results submitted to the NRC Regional ;

Administrator once every three years.

5.7.2 Soecial Reoorts

' Special Reports may be required covering inspection, test, and maintenance activities. These special reports are detemined on an individual basis for each unit and their preparation and submittal are designated in the Technical Specifications.

i l

Special Reports shall be submitted to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission, Attention: Document Control Desk, Washington, D. C.

20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator of the Regional Office of the NRC, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.4 within the time i: period specified for each report.

5 The following Special Reports shall be submitted

l '

ll il

a. Any ibnormal degradation of the containment structure detected during the tests required by the Pre-Stressed Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance Program shall be reported to

t' the NRC within 30 days. The report shall include a description of the tendon condition, the condition of the

! concrete (especially at tendon anchorages), the inspection procedures, the tolerances on cracking, and the corrective action taken. ,

2 i

,(continued) ,,

i i 5.0-18 ' Amendment No. j SAN ONOFRE--UNIT \ 3 1

s

1 e i

l NPF-10/15-299 l

l ATTACHMENT "C" (Marked-Up Proposed Bases)

Unit 2 i

l l

l

1 ,

RCS DNB (Pressure, Temperature, and Flow) Limits B 3.4.1 BASES l

APPLICABLE Limits"; LC0 3.1.8, "Part Length CEA Insertion Limits";

SAFETY ANALYSES LC0 3.2.3, " AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT (T )"; and x LC0 3.2.5, " AXIAL SHAPE INDEX (ASI)g The safety analyses !

V (continued) g are performed over the following range of initial values: i r

RCS pressure 2000 - 230( psia, core inlet temperature 542 -: (

g I #N E~ nee ] 560af (for 100% power),M 533 - 560*F (for < 70% power),4' !

and reactor vessel inlet coolant flow rate 95 - 120%. j l r 6 3Ohwer)

The RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow limits satisfy gh l Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.

l ,

LC0 This LC0 specifies limits on the monitored process variables-RCS pressurizer pressure, RCS cold leg l

temperature-to ensure that the core operates within the limits assumed for the plant safety analyses. Operating J l

within these limits will result in meeting the DNBR criterion in the event of a DNB limited transient.

The LC0 numerical values for pressure and temperature are ,

given for the measurement location but have not been adjusted for instrument error. The uncertainties for i pressure and temperature are accounted for in the CPC and )

COLSS overall uncertainty analyses. The RCS flow uncertainty must be applied to the values stated in this LCO.

APPLICABILITY In MODE 1, the limits on RCS pressurizer pressure, RCS cold leg temperature, and RCS flow rate must be maintained during steady state operation in order to ensure that DNBR criteria will be met in the event of an unplanned loss of forced coolant flow or other DNB limited transient. In all other MODES, the power level is low enough so that DNBR is not a concern.

A Note has been added to indicate the limit on pressurizer pressure may be exceeded during short term operational transients such as a THERMAL POWER ramp increase of > 5% RTP per minute or a THERMAL POWER step increase of > 10% RTP.

I These conditions represent short term perturbations where actior.s to control pressure variations might be counter-productive . Also, since they represent transients (continued) l SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 8 3.4-2 AMENDMENT NO.

hMdJth k B B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.3 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits l

BASES I I E II I I I BACKGROUND All components of the RCS are designed to withstand effects of cyclic loads due to system pressure and temperature changes. These loads are introduced by startup (heatup) and shutdown (cooldown) operations, power transients, and reactor trips. This LCO limits the pressure and temperature changes during RCS heatup and cooldown, within the design assumptions and the stress limits for cyclic operation.

l l

sureTand7 Temperature! Limit 1ReportT 7b P/T limitMrves"forhsathfcooldown,~and(PTLR) contains I

and hydrostatic (ISLH) testing, and data for theinserviceleak) maximum of change of reactor coolant temperature (Ref. IV l

Each P/T limit curve defines an acceptable region for normal

operation. The usual use of the curves is operational l guidance during heatup or cooldown maneuvering, when pressure and temperature indications are monitored and l compared to the applicable curve to determine that operation l is within the allowable region.

1 The LCO establishes operating limits that provide a margin to brittle failure of the reactor vessel and piping of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). The vessel is the component most subject to brittle failure, and the LCO limits apply mainly to the vessel. The limits do not apply to the pressurizer, which has different design characteristics and operating functions.

10 CFR 50, Appendix G (Ref. 2), requires the establishment of P/T limits for material fracture toughness requirements of the RCPB materials. Reference 2 requires an adequate l

margin to brittle failure during normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences, and system hydrostatic tests. It mandates the use of the ASME Code,Section III, Appendix G (Ref. 3).

The actual shift in the RTm of the vessel material will be established periodically by removing and evaluating the irradiated reactor vessel material specimens, in accordance with ASTM E185 (Ref. 4) and Appendix H of 10 CFR 50 l (Ref.5). The operating P/T limit curves will be adjusted, (continued) 1 SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-8 AMENDMENT NO.

s RCS P/T Liaits Supkand 4 l BASES BACKGROUND as necessary, based on the evaluation findings and the (continued) recommendations of Reference 3. O -

TheP/Tlimitcurves(inthePTLFarecompositecurves established by superimpu>my omits derived from stress analyses of those portions of the reactor vessel and head that are the most restrictive. At any specific pressure, temperature, and temperature rate of change, one location within the reactor vessel will dictate the most restrictive limit. Across the span of the P/T limit curves, different locations are more restrictive, and, thus, the curves are composites of the most restrictive regions.

The heatup curve represents a different set of restrictions than the cooldown curve because the directions of the thermal gradients through the vessel wall are reversed. The thermal gradient reversal alters the location of the tensile stress between the outer and inner walls.

The criticality limit includes the Reference 2 requirement that the limit be no less than 40*F above the heatup curve or the cooldown curve and not less than the minimum permissible temperature for the ISLH testing. However, the l' criticality limit is not operationally limiting; a more restrictive limit exists in LC0 3.4.2, "RCS Minimum l Temperature for Criticality."

1 The consequence of violating the LCO limits is that the RCS has been operated under conditions that can result in brittle failure of the RCPB, possibly leading to a nonisolable leak or loss of coolant accident. In the event these limits are exceeded, an evaluation must be performed to determine the effect on the structural integrity of the RCPB components. The ASME Code,Section XI, Appendix E (Ref. 6), provides a recommended methodology for evaluating an operating event that causes an excursion outside the limits.

l APPLICABLE The P/T limits are not derived from Design Basis Accident l SAFETY ANALYSES (DBA) Analyses. They are prescribed during normal operation l to avoid encountering pressure, temperature, and temperature l rate of change conditions that might cause undetected flaws l to propagate and cause nonductile failure of the RCPB, an I unanalyzed condition. Reference 1 establishes the l

(continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-9 AMENDMENT NO.

1

hhggtk RCS P/T Limits B 3.4.3 BASES I ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) l The Completion Time of " prior to entering MODE 4" forces the evaluation prior to entering a MODE where temperature and pressure can be significantly increased. The evaluation for

a mild violation is possible within several days, but more severe violations may require special, event specific stress analyses or inspections.

j Condition C is modified by a Note requiring Required

Action C.2 to be completed whenever the Condition is

! entered. The Note emphasizes the need to perform the

. evaluation of the effects of the excursion outside the j allowable limits. Restoration alone per Required Action C.1 is insufficient because higher than analyzed stresses may 4 have occurred and may have affected the RCPB integrity.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.3.1 C

} REQUIREMENTS \

Verification that operation is within the rit _ limits is 1 required every 30 minutes when RCS pressu nd temperature i conditions are undergoing planned changes. This Frequency i is considered reasonable in view of the control room

! indication available to monitor RCS status. Also, since

( temperature rate of change limits are specified in hourly

, increments, 30 minutes permits assessment and correction for i minor deviations within a reasonable time.

I Surveillance for heatup, cooldown, or ISLH testing may be i discontinued when the definition given in the relevant plant

procedure for ending the activity is satisfied.

i This SR is modified by a Note that requires this SR be perfonned only during RCS system heatup, cooldown, and ISLH

testing. No SR is given for criticality operations because l LCO 3.4.2 contains a more restrictive requirement.

f U_

j REFERENCES 1. (Pressure"and Temperature, Limit Report) hdk[

l 2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix G.

I (continued)

.! SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-14 AMENDMENT NO.

I

t /

Pressurizer Heatup and Ccoldown Licits B 3.4.3.1 BASES Mhh h Y I

. BACKGROUND in these analyses, the number of allowable themal fatigue (continued) cycles approaches infinity at differential temperatures of i 200*F or less. A small continuous flow is maintained ,

through the spray lines, by two 3/4" needle valves, l bypassing the mainspray control valves. The purpose of this !

flow is to hold spray line temperature above 450*F, in order j to reduce thermal shock to the spray nozzle and spray line when the spray control valves open. This limits the differential temperature to within the 200*F assumed in the ;

Code stress reports. This consideration is enforced by )

requiring bypass flow to be within 85af of RCL cold leg

temperature (Ref. 3).

The Pressurizer Spray nozzle has been evaluated for susceptibility to permanent component deformation during overcooling events exceeding the thermal transient limits of

, fg r The evaluation was perfonned applying the " thermal ratcheting" criteria of ASME Code Section III, articles NB-

] ,

M /h 3653.1, NB-3653.2, and NB-3653.7 (Ref.4). Limit curves to j permanent deformation are published that give the maximum j allowable temperature change as a function of transient l duration and system pressure.

The pressurizer surge line nozzle has been evaluated for i

susceptibility to permanent component deformation during overcooling events exceeding the thennal transient limits of

. The evaluation was performed applying the " thermal c eting" criteria of ASME Code Section III, articles NB-3653.1, NB-3653.2, and NB-3653.7. Limit curves are published for the Pressurizer surge line nozzles that check for deformation due to the ratcheting and these should be utilized to evaluate component operability following an overcooling event, and prior to return to operation.

APPLICABLE The limitations imposed on the pressurizer heatup and i SAFETY ANALYSES cooldown rates and spray water temperature differential are provided to assure that the pressurizer is operated within the design criteria assumed for the fatigue analysis i performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III, articles NB-3653.1, NB-3653.2, and NB-3653.7 requirements.

(continued)

SAN-0NOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-17 AMENDMENT NO

f)phM k Pressurizer Heatup and Cooldown Limits B 3.4.3.1 BASES /k&&M $M4' 45w r S LC0 This LCO is required to ensure that the thermal loading / unloading of the pressurizer was performed in accordance with heatup/cooldown rates specified in th TL Violation of this LCO could lead to the violation of ASME Code Section III requirements.

APPLICABILITY The pressurizer is designed to withstand the effects of cyclic loads due to system temperature and pressure changes.

y

These cyclic loads are introduced by normal load transients, reactor trips, and startup and shutdown operations.

During startup and shutdown, the rates of temperature and pressure changes are limited so that the maximum specified ,

heatup and cooldown rates are consistent with the design l assumptions and satisfy the stress limits for cyclic operation. Therefore, this LCO is applicable at all times. l l

ACTIONS A.1 and M ,

When Unit i n MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4 with the pressurizer O heatup_or oldown rates are not within the limits w ri'id g_.

e g

~

w. . --

, restore parameters to within limits in 30 l minutes d perform engineering evaluation in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to l determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the pressurizer.

CONDITION A is modified by a Note which requires to determine the pressurizer is acceptable for continued operation whenever the requirements of the LC0 not met in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

B.1 and B.2 l When the Required Action and Completion Times of Condition A

not met, the plant should be in MODE 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in l MODE 5 with RCS pressure less than 500 psig within following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

C.1 and C.2 l If requirements of the LCO are not met at any time in other

' than MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4, the Required Action C.1 requires to immediately initiate action to restore parameter (s) to (continued) l SAN-ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-18 AMENDMENT NO l

- h Pressurizar Heatup and Ccold:wn Liaits B 3.4.3.1 BASES

[

f

ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) l m-

< within limits specified in th TL Also, Required Action l

, C.2 requires to perfom enginee . g evaluation prior to )

J entering MODE 4 to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the pressurizer.

) CONDITION C is modified by a Note which requires to

' detemine the pressurizer is acceptable for continued

operation whenever the requirements of the LCO not met any j time in other than MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4.

i l

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.3.1.1 )

REQUIREMENTS <

To minimize the potential ermal stresses of the I i pressurizer during star p and shutdown, the rate of l temperatur! changes s uld be monitored during startup and 1 L shutdown. ii.e keri cation these rates are within limits

, specified in th ^ should be made every 30 minutes. This i FREQUENCY is base on operating experience and reflects the

, importance of the possible effect of temperature changes ,

rate during such Unit evolutions as startup and shutdown on !

j pressurizer and its components integrity. i J This SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT is modified by a Note which l requires to perform this SR during pressurizer heatup and

cooldown operations only.

SR 3.4.3.1.2 . O SR 3.4.3.1.2 requires to detemine for use in the the

! spray water temperature differential for each cycle of main j spray when less than 4 reactor coolant pumps are operating i The spray

and forthemal nozzle each cycle of auxiliary transients spray4-RCP) for normal (operation.

and auxiliary l spray operations are developed in the calculation package S-3 PEC-368, and are used as design input for the Pressurizer SR 3.4.3.1.2 f

Class-1 stress report. A maximum temperature differentia 1of 200*F is assumed for nomal spray operations. Of particular

concern is the potential for flow stratification in the

f pressurizer spray line during operations involving fewer (continuest)

SAN-ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-19 AMENDMENT NO

e 4 1

! RCS Loops-HODE 4 B 3.4.6 j

\ \

l l

BASES 1

LCO prohibits boron dilution when forced flow is stopped because '

(continued) an even concentration distribution cannot be ensured. Core !

, outlet temperature is to be maintained at least 10*F below '

l saturation temperature so that no vapor bubble may form and possibly cause a natural circulation flow obstruction. The response of the RCS without the RCPs or SDC pumps depends on the core decay heat load and the length of time that the l pumps are stopped. As decay heat diminishes, the effects on PCS temperature and 3ressure diminish. Without cooling by i i forced flow, higher 1 eat loads will cause the reactor l coolant temperature and pressure to increase at a rate proportional to the decay heat load. Because pressure can increase, the applicable system pressure limits (pressure and temperature (P/T) limits or low temperature overpressure protection (LTOP) limits) must be observed and forced SDC flow or heat removal via the SGs must be re-established prior to reaching the pressure limit. The circumstances for l stopping both RCPs or SDC pumps are to be limited to i situations where:

a. Pressure and temperature increases can be maintained well within the allowable pressure (P/T limits and LTOP)and10*Fsubcoolinglimits;or

b. An alternate heat removal path through the SGs is in j Q operation. og 4 Note 2 requires that/ither of the following two conditions be sat',fied beforeWh RCP may be started with any RCS cold l l_eg tem)erature 56he L10P enable temDerature sDealicu em U "" " "4.- #ow is ( 900g J ]

.g. d. PressurizerwaterQevelis<60f,or 4 ~4 j b. Secondary side water temperature in each SG is < 100*F above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures.

l Satisfying the above condition will preclude a large pressure surge in the RC? when the RCP is started.

An OPERABLE RCS loop consists of at least one OPERABLE RCP and an SG that is OPERABLE in accordance with the Steam Generator Tube Surveillance Program and has the minimum water level specified in SR 3.4.6.2.

(continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-31 AMENDMENT NO.

s o l

RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled B 3.4.7 1

l BASES l

. LCO Note 2 allows one SDC train to be inoperable for a period of I

(continued) up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months provided that the other SDC train is OPERABLE !

. and in operation. This permits periodic surveillance tests '

1 to be performed on the inoperable train during the only time when such testing is safe and possible. ;

l Note 3 allows one RCS loop to be inoperable for a period of j 4

up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months provided that the other RCS loop is OPERABLE i and in operation. This permits periodic surveillance tests !

D ,

to be performed on the inoperable loop during the only time when such testing is safe and possible.

j 4

f Note 4 requires that either of the following two conditions besatisfiedbeforeanRgagbestartjpg,H,y 1 i -3 a. Pressurizer water must be < or l

b. Secondary side water temperature in each SG must be 4 < 100'F above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures.

d l Satisfying either of the above conditions will preclude a low temperature overpressure event due to a thermal transient when the RCP is started.

Note 5 specifies that a containment spray (CS) pump may be used in place of a low pressure safety injection (LPSI) pump ,

in either or both shutdown cooling trains to provide !

shutdown cooling (SDC) flow based on the calculated heat l 4

load of the core 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after the reactor is sub-critical I with the reactor coolant system (RCS) fully depressurized and vented in accordance with TS 3.4.12.

Note 6 provides for an orderly transition from MODE 5 to i MODE 4 during a planned heatup by permitting removal of SDC i trains from operation when at least one RCP is in operation.

i An OPERABLE SDC train is composed of an OPERABLE SDC pump and an OPERABLE SDC heat exchanger.

SDC pumps are OPERABLE if they are capable of being powered and are able to provide flow if required. An OPERABLE RCS

loop consists of at least one OPERABLE RCP and an OPERABLE

SG. An OPERABLE SG can perform as a heat sink when it has an adequate water level and is OPERABLE in accordance with the SG Tube Surveillance Program.

(continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-37 AMENDMENT NO.

Pressurizer i B 3.4.9 '

B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEMS (RCS)

B 3.4.9 Pressurizer l 1

BASES BACKGROUND The pressurizer provides a point in the RCS where liquid and vapor are maintained in equilibrium under saturated conditions for pressure control purposes to prevent bulk boiling in the remainder of the RCS. Key functions include ;

maintaining required primary system pressure during steady state operation and limiting the pressure changes caused by reactor coolant thermal expansion and contraction during normal load transients.

The pressure control components addressed by this LCO include the pressurizer water level, the required heaters and their bar'up heater controls, and emergency power supplies. Prtswrizer safety valves are addressed by LC03.4.10,"PresgzgSafetyValves."

The maximum water W limit has been established to ensure that a liquid to vapor interface exists to permit RCS pressure control, using the sprays and heaters during normal operation and proper pressure response for anticipated design basis transients. lhe water imit serves two purposes: pse.

a. Pressure control during normal operation maintains I subcooled reactor coolant in the loops and thus in the l preferredstatefog ansport; and

b. By restricting theCQy,0 to a maximum, expected Y transient reactor coolant volume increases l

()ressurizer insurge) will not cause excessive Mc !

c1anges that could result in degraded ability for

{ pressurecogo N The maximum waterCF.e.d1 limit permits pressure control 1 equipment to function as designed. The limit preserves the

% steam space during normal operation, thus, both sprays and 3 heaters can opera to maintain the design operating pressure. The limit also prevents filling the pressurizer ( ter solid) for anticipated design basis transients, ius ensuring that pressure relief devices nehr WWL (continued)

SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-45 AMENDMENT N0.

Pressurizer B 3.4.9 BASES M m64rI/ud a c BACKGROUND (Pressurizer safety valves) can control pressure b

(continued) steam relief rather than water relief. If the limits

! were exceeded prior to a transient that creates a large pressurizer insurge volume leading to water relief, the maximum RCS pressure might exceed the Safety Limit of

, 2750 psig.

The requirement to have two groups of pressurizer heaters ensures that RCS pressure can be maintained. The

pressurizer heaters maintain RCS pressure to keep the i reactor coolant subcooled. Inability to control RCS pressure during natural circulation flow could result in loss of single phase flow and decreased capability to remove core decay heat.

APPLICABLE In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the LC0 requirement for a steam bubble SAFETY ANALYSES is reflected implicitly in the accident analyses. No safety analyses are performed in lower MODES. All analyses performed from a critical reactor condition assume the existence of a steam bubble and saturated conditions in the pressurizer. In making this assumption, the analyses neglect the small fraction of noncondensable gases normally present.

Safety analyses presented in the UFSAR do not take credit i for pressurizer heater operation; however, an implicit initial condition assumption of the safety analyses is that the RCS is operating at normal pressure.

Although the heaters are not specifically used in accident analysis, the need to maintain subcooling in the long term during loss of offsite power, as indicated in NUREG-0737 (Ref.1), is the reason for their inclusion. The requirement for emergency power supplies is based on

, NUREG-0737 (Ref. 1). The intent is to keep the reactor coolant in a subcooled condition with natural circulation at j

hot, high pressure conditions for an undefined, but extended, time period after a loss of offsite power. While loss of offsite power is a coincident occurrence assumed in i the accident analyses, maintaining hot, high pressure conditions over an extended time period is not evaluated in the accident analyses.

(Continued)

SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-46 AMENDMENT NO.

s

Pressurizer l B 3.4.9 1

BASES APPLICABLE The pressurizer satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

4 SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) gg[gw/ y/,

W - $50[/# WCume.

LCO The LC ir for the pressuriz to OPERABLE with i water < ensures that a ste le exists.

Limiting the maximum operating water preserves the steam space for pressure control. The LCO has been established to minimize the consequences of potential overpressure transients. Requiring the presence of a steam

bubble is also consistent with analytical assumptions.

, The LC0 requires two groups of OPERABLE pressurizer heaters, each with a capacity a 150 kW and capable of being powered from an emergency power supply. The exact design value of 150 kW is derived from the use of three heaters rated at 50 kW each. The amount needed to maintain pressure is

, dependant on the ambient heat losses. The minimum heater capacity cequired is sufficient to maintain the RCS near normal operating pressure when accounting for heat losses i through the pressurizer insulation. By maintaining the pressure near the operating conditions, a wide subcooling margin to saturation can be obtained in the loops.

APPLICABILITY The need for pressure control is most pertinent when core heat can cause the greatast effect on RCS temperature l resulting in the greate "ffect on pressurizer level and i

RCS pressure control. h.c,, Applicability has been l designated for MODES 1 and 2. The Applicability is also l provided for MODE 3. The purpose is to prevent solia water 4 RCS operation during heatup and cooldown to avoid rapid pressure rises caused by normal operational perturbation, l such as reactor coolant pump startup. The LC0 does not j apply to MODE 5 (Ioops Filled) because LC0 3.4.12, " Low '

Temperature Over essure Protection (LTOP) System," applies.

, The LC0 does not apply to MODES 5 and 6 with partial loop i operation.

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, there is the need to maintain the availability of pressurizer heaters capable of being powered from an emergency power supply. In the event of a loss of I offsite power, the initial conditions of these MODES gives (continued)

SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-47 AMENDMEN1 N0.

Pressurizer B 3.4.9 BASES APPLICABILITY the greatest demand for maintaining the RCS in a hot (continued) pressurized condition with loop subcooling for an extended period. For MODE 4, 5, or 6, it is not necessary to control pressure (by heaters) to ensure loop subcooling for heat transfer when the Shutdown Cooling System is in service and therefore the LCO is not applicable.

1 ACTIONS A.1 and A,2 Mm& l With pressurizer wate within the limit, action must be taken to restore the plant to operation within the bounds of the safety analyses. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to MODE 3, with the reactor trip breakers open, within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

This takes the plant out of the applicable MODES and restores the plant to operation within the bounds of the safety analyses.

j Six hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to

reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. Further pressure and temperature reduction to MODE 4 brings the plant to a MODE where the LC0 is not applicable. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months time to reach ;

l the nonapplicable MODE is reasonable based on operating '

experience for that evolution.

l L.1

, If one required group of pressurizer heaters is inoperable, i

restoration is required within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is reasonable considering that a demand l caused by loss of offsite power would be unlikely in this

! period. Pressure control may be maintained during this time using normal station powered heaters.

t C.1 and C.2 If one required group of pressurizer heaters is inoperable and cannot be restored within the allowed Completion Time of l Required Action B.1, the plant must be brought to a MODE in I

which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 4 (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-48 AMENDMENT NO.

4 i b l

Pressurizer Safety Valves !

l.

Supp%entN *

1*

l BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, OPERABILITY of two valves is required i because the combined capacity is recuired to keep reactor coolant pressure below 110% of its cesign value during certain accidents. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition 4 which might occur during MODE 4 with RCS cold leg

, temocrature greater than the enable temperature pecifie in asaperature;uanknepoA

~

T i

the@ ss... Wy'-5 A-si d

The Note allows entry into MODE 3 with the lift settings outside the LCO limits. This permits testing and examination of the safety valves at high pressure and

) temperature near their normal operating range, but only

after the valves have had a preliminary cold setting. The i cold setting gives assurance that the valves are OPERABLE near their design condition. Only one valve at a time will be removed fr a service for. testing. The 36 hour4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months exception is based on 16 hour1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months outage time for each of the two valves. !

The 18 hour2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months period is derived from operating experience that I hot testing can be performed within this timeframe. I i

ACTIONS A.1 With one pressurizer safety valve inoperable, restoration

! must take place within 15 minutes. The Completion Time of i 15 minutes reflects the importance of maintaining the RCS 4

overpressure protection system. An inoperable safety valve coincident with an RCS overpressure event could challenge i the integrity of the RCPB.

B.1 and B.2 f

j If the Required Action cannot be met within the required

, Completion Time, or if two safety valves are inoperable, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be

brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 4

within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

1 (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-52 AMENDMENT NO.

)

1 I

ESED F l RCS Temperature (LTOP Enable m erat B 3.4.12.1 i

i B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.12.1 LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LgP) System

' g g Y

~

RCS Temperature ( LTOP Enable Temperatu m j

' I BASES a BACKGROUND The LTOP System controls RCS pressure at low temperatures so the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary i (RCPB) is not com I temperature (P/T) promised by violating the pressure andlimits of 1 The reactor vessel is the limiting RCPB component for

] demonstrating such protection. LCO 3.4.3, "RCS Pressure and i Temperature (P/T) Limits," provides the allowable combinations for operational pressure and temperature during 2

cooldown, shutdown, and heatup to keep from violating the ,

4 Reference 1 requirements dering the LTOP MODES. l l The reactor vessel material is less tough at low

. temperatures than at normal operating temperatures. As the

vessel neutron exposure accumulates, the material toughness i decreases and becomes less resistant to pressure stress at low temperatures (Ref. 2). RCS pressure, therefore, is maintained low at low temperatures and is increased only as

temperature is increased.

The potential for vessel overpressurization is most acute 3

when the RCS is water solid, occurring only during shutdown; a pressure fluctuation can occur more quickly than an operator can react to relieve the condition. Exceeding the i RCS P/T limits by a significant amount could cause brittle

! cracking of the reactor vessel. LCO 3.4.3 requires administrative control of RCS pressure and temperature

! during heatup and cooldown to prevent exceeding the P/T limits.

The design basis of the LTOP assumes unrestricted flow from j

two HPSI

! capacity) without pumps letdown.

and three Because chargingthere pumps are (full threecharging HPSI J

pumps and three charging pumps, the limitation on the number l '

of HPSI pumps to be maintained OPERABLE during the specified l MODES, aleng with isolating the Safety Injection Tanks, ensures that a mass addition to the RCS that exceeds the design basis assumptions of the LTOP will not occur. This limitation on the number of HPSI pumps that can provide

makeup and injection to the RCS implements the guidance ,

provided in Generic Letter 90-06.

i Ii i

(Continued) i SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-54 AMENDMENT NO.

i

LWF RCS Temperature s/LIUP Enable T er B 3.4. 2.1 BASES BACKGROUND With minimum coolant input capability, the ability to (continued) provide core coolant addition is restricted. The LCO does not require the makeup control system deactivated or the safety injection (SI) actuation circuits blocked. Due to the lower pressures in the LTOP MODES and the expected core decayheatlevels,themakeiifsystemcanprovideadequate flow via the makeup control valve and, if needed, until the HPSI pump is actuated by SI.

j Shutdown Coolina System Relief Valve Reauirements l The Shutdown Cooling System relief valve has adequate relieving capability to protect the RCS from overpressurization when the transient is limited to either (1) the start of an idle RCP with the secondary water temperature of the steam generator less than or equal to 100*F above the RCS cold leg temperatures or (2) inadvertent safety injection actuation with two HPSI pumps injecting into a water-solid RCS with full charging capacity and l letdown isolated.

l l

RCS Vent Reauirements Once the RCS is depressurized, a vent exposed to the containment atmosphere will maintain the RCS at containment ambient pressure in an RCS overpressure transient, if the relieving requirements of the transient do not exceed the capabilities of the vent. Thus, the vent path must be capable of relieving the flow resulting from the limiting LTOP mass or heat input transient and maintaining pressure below the P/T limits. The required vent capacity may be provided by one or more vent paths.

The OPERABILITY of an RCS vent opening of greater than 5.6 square inches ensures that the RCS will be protected from pressure transients which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 when one or more of the RCS (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-55 AMENDMENT NO.

l . . 25G*F P D RCSTemperaturesNTOPEnable pera M ts .$ .4.12.1 l

l ,

! BASES J

1 BACKGROUND RCS Vent Reauirements (continued) i co egs is less than or equal to that specified in the l i The vent path (s) must be above the level of reactor l i coolant, so as not to drain the nec a -- gr.

b

~

L fd6%I i WY hY i s

! APPLICABLE Safety analyses (Ref. 3) demonstrate that the reactor vessel i SAFETY ANALYSE is adequately protected against exceeding the Reference 1

+ P/T limits during shutdown. The relief capacity of a single i safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure i condition which could occur during shutdown with RCS cold, ,

j leg temperature greater than that specified in the it in )

i , the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE and fo S

! cold e temperature less than or equal to that specified in !

h T the operating shutdown cooling relief valve,

! n ed to the RCS, provides overpressure relief j capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization. When the RCS is depressurized, an RCS vent to atmosphere sized i 5.6 inches or greater may be used as an alternative to the

SDCS Relief Valve.

l The actual temperature at which the pressure in the P/T j limit curve falls below the pressurizer safety valve

setpoint increases as the reactor vessel material toughness i decreases due to neutron embrittlement. Each time the P/T limit curves are revised, the LTOP System will be i re-evaluated to ensure its functional requirements can still

! be satisfied using the relief valve method or the

! depressurized and vented RCS condition. l 1

l Reference 3 contains the acceptance limits that satisfy the ,

j LTOP requirements. Any change to the RCS must be evaluated i

+

against these analyses to determine the impact of the change {

l on the LTOP acceptance limits.

Transients that are capable of overpressurizing the RCS are categorized as either mass or heat input transients, i

examples of which follow: '

, Mass input Tvoe Transients 1

a. Inadvertent safety injection; or

) b. Charging / letdown flow mismatch.

I (continued) i j

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-56 AMENDMENT NO.

i l

4

! [)pkM44h It LTOP System m,S Temperature GTOP Enable Temperat"-?

B 3.4.12.1 l BASES a

e APPLICABLE Heat Input Tvoe Transients SAFETY ANALYSES

, (continued) a. Inadvertent actuation of pressurizer heaters; 1

b. Loss of shutdown cooling (SDC); or i

l c. Reactor coolant pump (RCP) startup with temperature 1 asymmetry within the RCS or between the RCS and steam

<anerators.

l The following are required during the LTOP MODES to ensure j that mass and heat input transients do not occur, which

either of the LTOP overpressure protection means cannot i handle:

l a. No more than two HPSI pumps OPERABLE.

Presc<=4 Q i

) b. Deactivating the SIT discharge isolation valves S their closed positions when SIT pressure equals or l exceeds the maximum RCS pressure for existing RCS cold leg temperature allowed by thediu r/ i umu cui vu.

Y Shutdown Coolina System Relief Valve Performance One SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve pair is capable of

! mitigating an LTOP event that is bounded by the limiting j SDCS pressure transients. When one or both SDCS Relief

Valve isolation valve (s) in one isolation valve pair becomes j INOPERABLE, the other OPERABLE SDCS Relief Valve isolation

valve pair is placed in a power-lock open condition to i preclude a single failure which might cause undesired mechanical motion of one or both of the OPERABLE SDCS Relief Valveisolationvalve(s)inasingleisolationvalvepair and result in loss of system function. This power-lock open 4

condition of the OPERABLE SOCS Relief Valve isolation valve j pair is consistent with the guidance provided in Branch i Technical Position ICSB 18 (PSB), " Application of the Single Failure Criterion to Manually-Controlled Electrically-Operated Valves."

l 4

RCS Vent Performance The RCS vent size will be re-evaluated for compliance each time the P/T limit curves are revised based on the results 1

of the vessel material surveillance.

4 (continued)

! SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-57 AMENDMENT NO.

i

. . bpp4m f 4, #r AST'F i TOP System RCS Temperature t LTOP Enable Temperatur 4 t5 3.4.12.1 l

J BASES j APPLICABLE RCS Vent Performance (continued)

. SAFETY ANALYSES l

The RCS vent is passive and is not subject to active failure.

i LCO This LCO is required to ensure that the LTOP System is

OPERABLE. The LTOP System is OPERABLE when the minimum

coolant input and pressure relief capabilities are OPERABLE.

4 Violation of this LCO could lead to the loss of low

] temperature overpressure mitigation and violation of the Reference 1 limits as a result of an nnerational transient.

j UMSf6WF/FkhtpSHtf8F d'8W77 To limit the coolant input capani nty, i.ne tw s ey6Tres at most two HPSI pumps capable of injecting into the RCS d t the SITS isolated or depressurized to less than th TL M

. LCO 3.5.3, "ECCS-Shutdown," defines the pump OP ABILITY requirements. LC0 3.3.2, " Engineered Safety j Feature Activation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation," defines j SI actuation OPERABILITY for the LTOP MODE 4 small break LOCA, as discussed in the previous section.

l The elements of the LC0 that provide overpressure mitigation through pressure relief are:

, a. The Shutdown Cooling System Relief Valve; or

b. The depressurized RCS and an RCS vent.

The SDCS is OPERABLE for LTOP when both trains of isolation I valves are open, its lift setpoint is set at 406 2 10 psig l or less and testing has proven its ability to open at that 2

' [ setpv.nt. An RCS vent is OPERABLE when open with an area a 5.6 square inches.

i i Each of these methods of overpressure prevention is capable j of mitigating the limiting LTOP transient.

i g.s6*F i

APPLICABILIT This LCO is applicable in MODE 4 when the temperature of any RC old leg is s ene enauic u ... . . . _ _ . . -,,,m .n L%

, in MODE 5, and in MODE 6 wien the reactor vessel head on. The pressurizer safety valves provide overpressure protection that meets the Reference 1 P/T limits above the (continued)

SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-58 AMENDMENT NO.

d

b , ITOP System RCS Temperature s [ TOP Ennhle TemneratonaAP -

B 3.4.12.1 BASES bMUN @bb-8 ko '

APPLICABILITY When the (continued) enable reactor temperatures vessel head isspecified in the @ tion cannot occur.

off, overpressuriza LC0 3.4.3 provides the operational P/T limits for all MODES. '

LCO 3.4.10 " Pressurizer Safety Valves," requires the -

OPERABILITY of the pressurizer safety valves that provide l overpressure protection during MODES 1, 2, and d MODE 4 above the enable temperatures specified in th TL ?_

l Low temperature overpressure prevention is most critical during shutdown when the RCS is water solid, and a mass or heat input transient can cause a very rapid increase in RCS pressure when little or no time allows operator action to mitigate the event. O 1

The Applicability is modified by a Note statin a T isolation or depressurization to less than the li Y only required when the SIT pressure is greater an o al to the RCS pressure for the existing tem ature allowed i by the P/T limit curves provided in the T his Note I permits the SIT discharge valve survei ce performed only under these pressure and temperature nditions.

s ACTIONS A.1 With more than two HPSI pumps capable of injecting into tt

. RCS, overpressurization is possible.

The immediate Completion Time to initiate actions to store restricted coolant input capability to the RCS refl ts the importance of maintaining overpressure protection f the RCS.

B.1 i

When the SIT pressure is ter than or equal to the maximum RCS press the existing cold leg temperature allowed in th LR an unisolated SIT requires isolation 1

within I hour.

(continued)

SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-59 AMENDMENT NO.

W WhY LTOP System RCS Temperature s LTOP Enable lemoeratured B 3.4.12.1 BASES fMgfy/E gdthM dhsth ACTIONS p_d (continued)

By isolating the SIT (s), the RCS is protected ag inst the SIT tanks pressurizing the RCS in excess of the L f0P limits.

The Completion Time is based on operating experie lce that this activity can be accomplished in this time pe riod and on engineering evaluation indicating that an event equiring LTOP is not likely in the allowed time.

l l C.1 If the Required Action and associated Com le n Time of condition B is not met, the affected SIT (p)s st be depressurized to less than the maximum RCS p ure for the existing cold leg temperature allowed in th within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

de urizing the SIT (s) below the LTOP limit stated in t t the RCS is protected against the SIT (s) pressurizing the RCS in excess of the LTOP limits.

The Completion Time is based on operating experience that l this activity can be acco'nplished in this time period and on engineering evaluation indicating thtt an event requiring LTOP is not likely in the allowed time.

I D.1 and D.2 l

, The 24-hour Allowable Outage Time (A0T) for a single channel SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve (s) increases the availability of the LTOP system to mitigate low temperature overpressure transients especially during MODES 5 and 6 when the potential for these transients are highest (RCS temperatures between 80*F and 190*F and the RCS is water-

, solid). The 24-hour A0T implements the guidance provided in Generic Letter 90-06 (Ref. 6).

f.d If the SDCS Relief Valve is inoperable, or if a Required Action and the associated Completion Time of Condition A, (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-60 AMENDMENT NO.

. __ 2, % C);"

LTOP System RCS Temperature (TOP Enyble Tempernc- m M

_ B 3.4.12.1 BASES ACTIONS f.d (continued)

C, or D are not met, or if the LTOP System is inoperable for any reason other than Condition A, C or D, the RCS must be depressurized and a vent established within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . The vent must be sized at least 5.6 square inches to Ensure the flow capacity is greater than that required for the worst case m ss input transient reasonable during the applicable l MODES. This action protects the RCPB from a low temperature )

overpressure event and a possible brittle failure of the reactor vessel.

The Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months to depressurize and vent the

. RCS is based on the time required to place the plant in this condition and the relatively low probability of an overpressure event during this time period due to increased 1 operator awareness of administrative control requirements. I i

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.12.1.1 and SR 3.4.12.1.2 REQUIREMENTS 4 To minimize the potential for a low temperature overpressure event by limiting the mass input capability, not more than two HPSI pumps are verified OPERABLE with the other pump locked out with power removed and the SIT discharge isolation valves are verified closed and dea ivated or SIT (s) are depressurized to less than th L li .

The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months interval considers op ing practice to regularly assess potential degr ation and to verify operation within the safety a le.

SR 3.4.12.1.3

&#s/h SR 3.4.12.1.3 requires verifying that the RCS vent is open a 5.6 square inches is proven OPERABLE by verifying its open condition either:

a. Once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for a vent valve that is unlocked open; and

b. Once every 31 days for a valve that is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured open and once every 31 days for open flanged RCS penetrations.

(continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-61 AMENDMENT NO.

- f u p nl.s m e & N a5%*F i __

LTOP Systen l RCS Temperature GTOP Enanie irmuriaiui l B 3.4.12.1 ,

1 l BASES 1 i

l i

l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.12.1.3 (continued) l REQUIREMENTS The passive vent arrangement must only be open to be OPERABLE. This Surveillance need only be perfomed if the vent is being used to satisfy the requirements of this LCO.

l The Frequencies consider operating experience with

! mispositioning of unlocked and locked vent valves, respectively.

l l

l SR 3.4.12.1.4 and SR 3.4.12.1.5 When one or both SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve (s) in one isolation valve pair becomes inoperable, the other OPERABLE SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve pair is verified in a ,

power-lock open condition every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to preclude a l single failure which might cause undesired mechanical motion l of one or both of the OPERABLE SDCS Relief "n.1ve isolation valve (s) in a single isolation valve pair anu result in loss of system function.

This surveillance requirement, SR 3.4.12.1.4, is modified by two notes. Note I requires to perfom this SR when the SDCS l

Relief Valve isolation valve pair is inoperable. Note 2 specifies that the power lock-open requirement is satisfied either with the AC breakers open for valve pair 2HV9337 and 2HV9339 or the inverter input and output breakers open for l valve pair 2HV9377 and 2HV9378, whichever valve pair is OPERABLE.

When both pairs of SDCS Relief Valve isolation valves are I OPERABLE and the SDCS Relief Valve is used for overpressure protection, the isolation valves are verified open every l

72 hcurs.

SR 3.4.12.1.6 The SDCS Relief Valve Setpoint is verified periodically in l accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

I i (continued)

SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 8 3.4-62 AMENDMENT NO.

9 254'F ITOP System j RCS Temperature s [T0F enaole Temperat Q

e a.*.ic.1 BASES (continued) i REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix G.

2. Generic Letter 88-11.

3. UFSAR, Section 15.

4 l 4. 10 CFR 50.46.

5. 10 CFR 50, Appendix K.

] 6. Generic Letter 90-06.

5 i

i 1

l i

j 4

l 4

d SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-63 AMENDMENT NO.

4

^[3[ M MHTO g

* " ' " " LTOP System D'.S Temperature >(tTDP Enable lemocrawa d B 3.4.12.2 i

1 4

8 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) i l I

j B 3.4.12.2 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP RCS Temperature 4 .or tnaose semperature M) SystemW8C j 4 BASES l

BACKGROUND The LTOP System controls RCS pressure at low temperatures so )

! the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary ,

l (RCPB) is not com temperature (P/T) promised by vie!ating the pressure andlimits o The reactor vessel is the limiting RCPB component for i demonstrating such protection. LCO 3.4.3, "RCS Pr::,sure and Temperature (P/T) Limits," provides the allowable combinations for operational pressure and temperature during cooldown, shutdown, and heatup to keep from violating the Reference 1 requirements during the LTOP MODES.

The reactor vessel material is less tough at low temperatures than at nomal operating temperatures. As the

vessel neutron exposure accumulates, the material toughness decreases and becomes less resistant to pressure stress at lowtemperatures(Ref.2). RCS pressure, therefore, is maintained low at low temperatures and is increased only as temperature is increased.

The potential for vessel overpressurization is most acute when the RCS is water solid, occurring only during shutdown; a pressure fluctuation can occur more quickly than an operator can react to relieve the condition. Exceeding the RCS P/T limits by a significant amount could cause brittle cracking of the reactor vessel. LCO 3.4.3 requires administrative control of RCS pressure and temperature during heatup and cooldown to prevent exceeding the P/T limits.

In MODE 4 when the temperature of any RCS cold leg is greater than the enable temperatures specified in the TLR, the LC0 does not require the makeup control system 1 deactivated or the safety injection (SI) actuation rcuits !

blocked.

The LTOP System consists of the Shutdown Co ng System Relief Valve with both pairs of SDCS Reli Valve isolation !

valves open, or a minimum of one press zer code safety valve OPERABLE. l ffg6LM hf" $

(continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-64 AMENDMENT NO.

e s htAhp *1%k Y g g O g LTOP System l

RCS Temperature @P Enable Temperatur-2

- - , B 3.4.12.2 BASES MN EN N Y I

, BACKGROUND Shutdown Coolina System Relief Valve Reauirement (continued )

i The Shutdown Cooling System relief valve has ade ate

relieving capability to protect the RCS from l overpressurization when the transient is limited ) the ,

! start of an idle RCP with the secondary water tem) trature of 1 l the steam generator less than or equal to 100*F a> ,ve the

! RCS cold leg temperatures.

I \

Pressurizer Code Safety Valve Reauirements i The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prev' nt the i RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit af 2750

psia. Each safety valve is designed to relieve 4. 5 x 10 5

Ibs per hour of saturated steam at the valve setp int plus

! 3% accumulation. The relief capacity of a sing 1 safety )

valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure co ition i which could occur during shutdown with RCS co temperature greater than that specified in th -

4 APPLICABLE Safety' analyses (Ref. 3) demonstrate that the reactor vess l SAFETY ANALYSES is adequately protected against exceeding the Reference 1 P/T limits during shutdown. The relief capacity of a s le i

safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown with RCS j leg temperature greater than that specified in the d .

j e event that no safety valves are OPERABLE and for (CS

! 1d temperature less than or equal to that specified in t the operating shutdown cooling relief valve, j

nnec ed to the RCS, provides overpressure relief 3 capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization. When i

the RCS is depressurized, an RCS vent to atmosphere sized

! 5.6 inches or greater may be used as an alternative to the SDCS Relief Valve.

i

} The actual temperature at which the pressure in the P/T l limit curve falls below the pressurizer safety valve

! setpoint increases as the reactor vessel material toughness

! decreases due to neutron embrittlement. Each time the P/T 4

limit curves are revised, the LTOP System will be re-evaluated to ensure its functional requirements can still

{ be satisfied using the relief valve method or the depressurized and vented RCS condition.

j (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-65 AMENDMENT NO.

MN [ LTOP System 8

RCS Temperature >u iOP Fnable Iamnaratur 6 i B 3.4.12.2

BASES APPLICABLE Reference 3 contains the acceptance limits that satisfy the 3 SAFETY ANALYSES LTOP requirements. Any change to the RCS must be evaluated (continued) sgainst these analyses to detemine the impact of the change on the ,LTOP acceptance limits.

Shutdown Coolina System Relief Valve Performance One SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve pair is capable of mitigating an $TOPJevent that is bounded by the limiting SDCS pressere transients. When one or both SDCS Relief

. Valve isolation valve (s) in one isolation valve pair becomes

INOPERABLE, the other OPERABLE SOCS Relief Valve isolation valve pair is placed in a power-lock open condition to

} preclude a single failure which might cause undesired

mechanical motion of one or both of the OPERABLE SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve (s) in a single isolation valve pair i and result in loss of system function. This power-lock open

- condition of the OPERABLE SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve

pair is consistent with the guidance provided in Branch i Technical Position ICSB 18 (PSB), " Application of the Single Failure Criterion to Manually-Controlled Electrically-Operated Valves."

t

LC0 This LCO is required to ensure that the LTOP System is OPERABLE. The LTOP: System is OPERABLE when~the minimum

pressure relief capabilities are OPERABLE. Violation of i this LCO could lead to the loss of low temperature l

! overpressure mitigation and violation of the Reference 1

! limits as a result of an operational transient.

The elements of the LC0 that provide overpressure mitigation i through pressure relief are:

i

a. The Shutdown Cooling System Relief Valve; or

b. A minimum of one pressurizer code safety valve.

1 The SDCS is OPERABLE for LTOP when both trains of isolation valves are open, its lift"setpoint is set at 406 i 10 psig 4

or less and testing has proven its ability to open at that setpoint. A pressurizer code safety valve is OPERABLE when its lift setting is 2500 psia i 1% and testing has proven its ability to open at that setpoint.

(continued)

S/.N ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-66 AMENDMENT N0.

4

b%hbE50 ggof LTOP System i RCSTemperature[TOPEnania Ta - =+"- 4 4

8 3.4.12.2 BASES U N LCO Each of these methods of overpressure prevention is capable (continued) of mitigating the limiting LTOP transient.

i i

APPLICABILITY This LCD licable in MODE 4 when the temperature of all 2

RCS co gs are above the enable temperatures specified i When the temperature of any RCS cold leg is i to o ,)elow the enable temperatures specified in the j the Shutdown Cooling System Relief valve is used for overpressure protection or if the RCS is also depressurized, i then an RCS vent to atmosphere sized 5.6 inches or greater j can be used for overpressure protection. When the reactor i vessel head is off, overpressurization cannot occur.

j LCO 3.4.3 provides the operational P/T limitr, for all MODES. l 1

LCO 3.4.10. " Pressurizer Safety Valves," requires the

OPERABILITY of the pressurizer safety valves that provide

overpressure protection during MODES 1, 2, and 3.

j Low temperature overpressure prevention is most critical during shutdown when the RCS is water solid, and a mass or j heat input transient can cause a very rapid increase in RCS f pressure when little or no time allows operator action to

mitigate the event.

ACTIONS A.1

With no pressurizer code safety valves OPERABLE and the SDCS j Relief Valve INOPERABLE overpressurization is possible.

The 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Completion Time to be in MODE 5 and vented i through a greater than or ' equal to 5.6 inch vent reflects j the importance of maintaining overpressure protection of the i RCS.

! B.1 and 8.2 The 24-hour Allowable Outage Time (A0T) for a single channel

, SDCSReliefValveisolationvalve(s)increasesthe

availability of the LTOP system to mitigate low temperature overpressure transients during MODE 4.

(continued) 4 SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-67 AMENDMENT NO.

e 6 gff LTOP System , ;

RCS Temperature >rcive enaDie Temnerattii, 1 B 3.4.12.2 I

BASES 1

ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued) j 1

The 24-hour A0T implements the guidance provided in Generic l Letter 90-06.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.12.2.1 REQUIREMENTS When the SDCS Relief Valve is being used for overpressure protection, then at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months both pairs of SDCS Relief Valve isolation valves are verified open to ,

preclude a single failure condition that might occur if only l one pair of isolation valves are open. I l

SR 3.4.12.2.2 The SDCS Relief Valve Setpoint is verified periodically in I accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. l l

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix G. ;

2. Generic Letter 88-11.

3. UFSAR, Section 15.

4. 10 CFR 50.46.

5. 10 CFR 50, Appendix K. '

6. Generic Letter 90-06.

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.4-68 AMENDMENT NO.

i

. 6 SITS 3 B 3.5.1 i

BASES

.i APPLICABLE faibre proof; therefore, whenever the SIT isolation valves SAFETY ANALYSES are open, power is removed from their operators and the (continued) switch is key locked open. In addition, whenever the SITS '

are required to be operable, power is removed from the SIT !

vent valves by removing the vent valve fuses or placing the ,

disconnect switch in the open position. )

These precautions ensure that the SITS are available during l

an accident (Ref. 4). With power supplied to the valves, a l 1

single active failure could result in a valve closure, which ,

. would render one SIT unavailable for injection. If a second l j SIT is lost through the break, only two SITS would reach the '

core. An active failure that could affect the SITS would be

! the closure of a motor operated outlet valve or opening of a

, SIT vent valve. The requirement to remove power from these valves eliminates these failure modes. The surveillance

] requirement to ensure power is removed from the SIT vent valves is controlled by the Licensee Controlled j

Specification (LCS).

4 The minimum volume requirement for the SITS ensures that j three SITS can provide adequate inventory to reflood the

core and downcomer following a LOCA. The downtomer then remains flooded until the HPSI and LPSI systems start to i deliver flow.

i

{ '

The maximum volume limit is based on maintaining an adequate gas volume to ensure proper injection and the ability of the

% SITS to fully discharge, as well as limiting the maximum amount of boron inventory in the SITS.

d -

, A minimum of 51.9% narrow rance level,_ corresponding t m

} 1680 cubic feet of borated water, ana a maximum of ,

4 ,..r. naiiv- ianye sevei. correspondino im'1807 cubic feet 4 i corated water, are used in the safety analyses as the volume in the SITS. The analyses are based upon the cubic feet requirements; the percentage figures are provided for operator use because the level indicator provided in the

{ ,

control room is marked in percentages, not in cubic feet.

I The minimum nitrogen cover pressure requirement ensures that l the contained gas volume will generate discharge flow rates during injection that are consistrat with those assumed in

! the safety analyses.

l (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.5-4 AMENDMENT N0.

4 1

4 l

! . 6

// ECCS -Shutdown Q k d.M 7 B 3.5.3 BASES i

I LCO During an event requiring ECCS actuation, a flow path is

(continued) required to supply water from the RWST to the RCS via the

! HPSI pumps and their respective supply headers to each of the four cold leg injection nozzles. In the long term, this

. flow path may be switched to take its supply from the

containment sump and to deliver its flow to the RCS hot and

cold legs.

! With RCS pressure < 400 psia, one HPSI pump is acceptable without single failure consideration, based on the stable

! reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core i cooling requirements. The low pressure safety injection

} (LPSI) pumps may therefore be released from the ECCS train j ] for use in shutdown cooling (SDC). In MODE 4 with RCS colt'.

i hggg . le temperature less than or equal to those specified in the

, a maximum of two HPSI pumps are allowed to be OPERABLE l

M accordance with LCO 3.4.12.1, " Low Temperature j

i i

( g'g Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System - RCS Temperature 5 j$"g,f,,,

p ur tnauie semperature i

! APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3 with RCS pressure a: 400 psia, the

OPERABILITY requirements for ECCS are covered by LC0 3.5.2.

! In MODE 3 with RCS pressure < 400 psia and in MODE 4, one

! OPERABLE ECCS train is acceptable without single failure

! consi<hration, based on the stable reactivity condition of l the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

i i In MODES 5 and 6, unit conditions are such that the i probability of an event requiring ECCS injection is i extremely low. Core cooling requirements in MODE 5 are j addressed by LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled,"

and LC0 3.4.8, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled."

MODE 6 core cooling requirements are addressed by LCO 3.9.4, j " Shutdown Cooling (SDC) and Coolant Circulation-High Water 1 Level," and LC0 3.9.5, " Shutdown Cooling (SDC) and Coolant Circulation-Low Water Level."

I ACTIONS A.1 i

~

With no HPSI pump OPERABLE, the unit is not prepared to respond to a loss of coolant accident. The I hour i

! (continued) 1 SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.5-22 AMENDMENT NO.

4

o o RWST B 3.5.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.4.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS

, With ambient temperatures within this range, the RWST 1

g temperature should not exceed the limits. :

4

\pq SR 3.5.4.2 i

i A minimum RWST water volume level above the ECCS suction connection of 362,800 gallor.se wrrm m " mm4 irvu E meariona shall be verified every 7 days. The percentage l figure is provided for operator use because the level '

indicator provided in the control room is marked in ,

percentages not in gallons. This 7 day Frequency ensures

- that a sufficient initial water supply is available for )

{f injection and to support continued ESF pump operation on l Vg recirculation. Since the RWST volume is normally stable.and is provided with a Low Level Alarm, a 7 day Frequency is appropriate and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. )

2

SR 3.5.4.3 Boron concentration of the RWST shall be verified every 7 days to be within the required range. This Frequency ensures that the reactor will remain subcritical following a LOCA. Further, it ensures that the resulting CES pH will be maintained in an acceptable range such that boron

precipitation in the core will not occur earlier than 4

predicted and the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components will be minimized. Since the RWST volume is normally stable, a l 7 day sampling Frequency is appropriate and has been shown through operating experience to be acceptable.

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR Chapter 6 and Chapter 15.

4 SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 B 3.5-29 AMENDMENT NO.

o o CST T-121 and T-120

, B 3.7.6 BASES i

LCO The combined volume of CST ensures that sufficient water is (continued) available to maintain the unit in MODE 3 for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months including cooldown to shutdown cooling initiation. ,

OPERABILITY of the CST is determined by maintaining the tank level at or above the uinimum required level.

i j

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, and in MODE 4, when steam generator is

being relied upon for heat removal, the CST is required to be OPERABLE.

! In MODES 5 and 6, the CST is not required because the AFW System is not required.

1 I

ACTIONS A.I and A.2 # #k If the C g not within the limit, the OPERABILITY of the backup water supply must be verified by administrative h means within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

! OPERABILITY of the backup feedwater supply must include 1

i verification of the OPERABILITY of flow paths from the i backup supply to the AFW pumps, and availability of the re uired volume of water in the backup supply. The CST

, J must be returned to OPERABLE status within 7 days, as i the backup supply may be performing this function in !

addition to its normal functions. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion '

Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to verify the OPERABILITY of the backup water supply. The 7 day

Completion Time is reasonable, based on an OPERABLE backup

water supply being available, and the low probabi'ity of an i event requiring the use of the water from the CST occurring i during this period.

i l

B.I and B.2 I If the CST cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a (continued) j SANON0FRE--UNIT 1 B 3.7-35 AMENDMENT NO.

4 9

I 2, O CST T-121 and T-120 B 3.7.6 BASES l

l ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)

MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 4, without reliance onsteam generator for heat removal, within 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

N\ SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.6.1 REQUIREMENTS -

"f This SR verifies that the CST contains the r uired volume of cooling water. The required volume o ooling water in CST T-121 is 144,000 gallons. a nat corresoonas to 960 The required volume of cooling water in C5T 1-120 is 280,000 11 m . unat corresponas to u m. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Frequency is ased on operating experience, and the need for operator awareness of unit evolutions that may affect the CST k '

inventory between checks. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to abnormal CST level deviations.

A l

l REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 9.2.6.

2. UFSAR, Chapter 6.

3. UFSAR, Chapter 15.

i SAN ONGFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.7-36 AMENDMENT NO.

l

a e Containment Penetrations B 3.9.3 BASES 4

LC0 exhaust penetrations and the containment personnel airlock.

i (continued) For the containment personnel airlock, this LC0 ensures that f the airlock can be closed after containment evacuation in __

o~

. the event of a fuel handlino accident) p e requirement tnatj "7 & plant De In MUDt b or ceTue teo cont 1guration W1thM

.J.MSO2I yAit et of water above the fuelrensures that there is su time to close the personnel airlock following a g loss of shutdown cooling before boiling occurs. ;

i This LC0 is modified by Note wich allows to keep both doors !

of the containment personnel airlock open provided:

pg g*"

a. one personnel airlock door is OPERABLE dnk y

f b.l ,the plant is in MODE 6 pr oetueled configuratiBr,a"

{w PN l S4TY / h.2.#@ th 23 feet of water above the fu M Q+; The OPERABILITY requirements ensure that the airlock door is capable of performing its function, and that a designated i individual located outside of the affected area is available b to close the door. For the OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust penetrations, this LC0 ensures that these

penetrations are isolable by the Containment Purge isolation System. The OPERABILITY requirements for this LCO ensure that the automatic purge and exhaust valve closure times specified in the UFSAR can be achieved and therefore meet the assumptions used in the safety analysis to ensure

< releases through the valves are terminated, such that the

radiological doses are within the acceptance limit.

APPLICABILITY The containment penetration requirements are applicable during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel i assemblies within containment because this is when there is i j a potential for a fuel handling accident. In MODES 1, 2, 3, l and 4, containment penetration requirements are addressed by LC0 3.6.1, " Containment." In MODES 5 and 6, when CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment are not being conducted, the potential for a fuel handling accident does not exist. Therefore, under these conditions no requirements are placed on containment penetration status.

l l

l (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 B 3.9-13 AMENDMENT N0.

j c r l !

lA!. Set 2 T "$)"

l The repairen,as As ya ptairse >

in M0966 wNA 23faf ofwe/er l

abae Mefez a de araererarsel )

\y. Grde/aeM GyaraAlco wt4 farl i A L/auaspa ca ,&

6ere/aedkg Machke ob. hder) 3 x

N 1use e r " b "

w,u 22 p s 4 + 4,a na fas 4

in 4fte uac/or Vettel, or j y L

l. NSe2T "C "

\

M y M o N M h *

1V L au w g e, faci a %

Madine or yder).

l l

o a \

l l

NPF-10/15-299 1

l I

l i

i I

I ATTACHMENT "D" ;

(Marked-Up Proposed Bases) l Unit 3 !

I l

1 l

l

. I

a

RCS DNB (Pressure, Temperature, and Flor) Limits B 3.4.1 BASES 1 APPLICABLE Limits"; LCO 3.1.8, "Part Length CEA Insertion Limits";

SAFETY ANALYSES LC0 3.2.3, " AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT (T )"; and k (continued)

LC0 3.2.5, " AXIAL SHAPE INDEX (ASI)I. Th.e safety analyses are perfomed over the following range of initial values:

g rM @og' RCS pressure 2000 - 230 psia, core inlet temperature 542 -

560*F (for 100% power), 533 - 560aF (for < 70% power),4 and reactor vessel inlet coolant flow rate 95 - 120%. j

[er 6 SO%f)

The RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow limits satisfy Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.

1

, LCO This LC0 specifies limits on the monitored process

, variables-RCS pressurizer pressure, RCS cold leg l temperature-to ensure that the core operates within the limits assumed for the plant safety analyses. Operating within these limits will result in meeting the DNBR criterion in the event of a DNB limited transient.

The LC0 numerical values for pressure and temperature are

~

given for the measurement location but have not been adjusted for instrument error. The uncertainties for pressure and temperature are accounted for in the CPC and COLSS overall uncertainty analyses. The RCS flow uncertainty must be applied to the values stated in this LCO.

APPLICABILITY In MODE 1, the limits on RCS pressurizer pressure, RCS cold 4

leg temperature, and RCS flow rate must be maintained during steady state operation in order to ensure that DNBR criteria will be met in the event of an unplanned loss of forced coolant flow or other DNB limited transient. In all other MODES, the power level is low enough so that DNBR is not a concern.

A Note has been added to indicate the limit on pressurizer pressure may be exceeded during short term operational transients such as a THERMAL POWER ramp increase of > 5% RTP per minute or a THERMAL POWER step increase of > 10% RTP.

These conditions represent short term perturbations where actions to control pressure variations might be counter-productive . Also, since they represent transients (continued)

SANON0FRE--UNITJ B 3.4-2 AMENDMENT N0.

MdJlh k B B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.3 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits BASES BACKGROUND All components of the RCS are designed to withstand effects !

of cyclic loads due to system pressure and temperature changes. These loads are introduced by startup (heatup) and shutdown (cooldown) operations, power transients, and reactor trips. This LC0 limits the pressure and temperature changes during RCS heatup and cooldown, within the design assumptions and the stress limits for cyclic operation.

e Pressure a dl Temperature: Limit:lReportf(PTLR) contains 3b

P/T limit"cupves"for heat ~uftooldown,~and inservice leak

- I and hydrostatic (ISLH) testing, and data for the maximum e of change of reactor coolant temperature (Ref. 1)

, Each P/T limit curve defines an acceptable region for normal operation. The usual use of the curves is operational guidance during heatup or cooldown maneuvering, wher.

pressure and temperature indications are monitored and compared to the applicable curve to determine that operation

, is within the allowable region.

The LC0 establishes operating limits that provide a margin 4 to brittle failure of the reactor vessel and piping of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). The vessel is the component most subject to brittle failure, and the LCO limits apply mainly to the vessel. The limits do not apply I

to the pressurizer, which has different design ,

characteristics and operating functions. l

10 CFR 50, Appendix G (Ref. 2), requires the establishment J

of P/T limits for material fracture toughness requirements of the RCPB materials. Reference 2 requires 2 adequate j margin to brittle failure during normal operation, 1

anticipated operational occurrences, and system hydrostatic 4

tests. It mandates the use of the ASME Code,Section III, 4

Appendix G (Ref. 3).

The actual shift in the RTuor of the vessel material will be

. established periodically by removing and evaluating the irradiated reactor vessel material specimens, in accordance with ASTM E185 (Ref. 4) and Appendix H of 10 CFR 50 (Ref.5). The operating P/T limit curves will be adjusted, I

(continued)

J SANONOFRE--UNITj B 3.4-8 AMENDMENT N0.

> s 1 RCS P/T Limits m s_

/)/) b LH BASES BACKGROUND as necessary, based on the evaluation findings and the (continued) recommendations of Reference 3. M The P/T limit curves (in the PTLyare composite curves established by superimpusim o mits derived from stress i 4 analyses of those portions of the reactor vessel and head that are the most restrictive. At any specific pressure, temperature, and temperature rate of change, one location i

, within the reactor vessel will dictate the most restrictive 1

- limit. Across the span of the P/T limit curves, different locations are more restrictive, and, thus, the curves are composites of the most restrictive regions. l The heatup curve represents a different set of re< actions i than the cooldown curve because the directions c' .e thennal gradients through the vessel wall are re sed. The

, thermal gradient reversal alters the location of ine tensile i, stress between the outer and inner walls.

~

The criticality limit includes the Reference 2 requirement that the limit he no less than 40=F above the heatup curve

or the cooldov1 cirve and not less than the minimum permissible ter.purature for the ISLH testing. However, the criticality lirait is not operationally limiting; a more ;

restrictive limit exists in LC0 3.4.2, "RCS Minimum j Temperature for Criticality." l l The consequence of violating the LC0 limits is that the RCS )

has been operated under conditions that can result in ;

, brittle failure of the RCPB, possibly leading to a nonisolable leak or loss of coolant accident. In the event these limits are exceeded, an evaluation must be performed to determine the effect on the structural integrity of the RCPB components. The ASME Code,Section XI, Apnendix E l (Ref. 6), provides a recommended methodology for evaluating

, an operating event that causes an excursion outside the l limits.

4 k

! APPLICABLE The P/T limits are not derived from Design Basis Accident SAFETY ANALYSES (DBA) Analyses. They are prescribed during normal operation 1

to avoid encountering pressure, temperature, and temperature rate of change conditions that might cause undetected flaws to propagate and cause nonductile failure of the RCPB, an unanalyzed condition. Reference 1 establishes the (continued)

SH ON0FRE--UNIT 5 B 3.4-9 AMENDMENT NO.

l

% b fat B l

BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)

The Completion Time of " prior to entering MODE 4" forces the evaluation prior to entering a MODE where temperature and l pressure can be significantly increased. The evaluation for l a mild violation is possible within several days, but more severe violations may require special, event specific stress analyses or inspections.

Condition C is modified by a Note requiring Required Action C.2 to be completed whenever the Condition is entered. The Note emphasizes the need to perform the i evaluation of the effects of the excursion outside the allowable limits. Restoration alone per Required Action C.1 is insufficient because higher than analyzed stresses may have occurred and may have affected the RCPB integrity.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.3.1 O l REQUIREMENTS \

Verification that operation is within the __ limits is IL required every 30 minutes when RCS pressu nd temperature ,

i conditions are undergoing planned changes. This Frequency )

l is considered reasonable in view of the control room l l indication available to monitor RCS status. Also, since i temperature rate of change limits are specified in hourly increments, 30 minutes permits assessment and correction for j minor vcviations within a reasonable time. l Surveillance for heatup, cooldown, or ISLH testing may be discontinued when the definition given in the relevant plant procedure for ending the activity is satisfied. l This SR is modified by a Note that requires this SR be performed only during RCS system heatup, cooldown, and ISLH testing. No SR is given for criticality operations because LC0 3.4.2 contains a more restrictive requirement.

U-REFERENCES 1. [ Pressure and~ Temperature Limit Report) hg[gk[

l 2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix G.

l l

(continued)

! SANON0FRE--UNITg B 3.4-14 AMENDMENT NO.

. s Pressurizer Heatup and Coold:wn Limits B 3.4.3.1 BASES (AhhY 4 BAL M 0VND In these analyses, the number of allowable thermal fatigue 1 (continued) cycles approaches infinity at differential temperatures of

200*F or less. A small continuous flow is maintained

through the spray lines, by two 3/4" needle valves, bypassing the mainspray control valves. The purpose of this ;

flow is to hold spray line temperature above 450*F, in order !

to reduce thermal shock to the spray nozzle and spray line l when the spray control valves opan. This limits the !

differential temperature to within the 200*F assumed in the 1 Code stress reports. This consideration is enforced by requiring bypass flow to be within 85'F of RCL cold leg i

temperature (Ref. 3). I The Pressurizer Spray nozzle has been evaluated for suscept.ibility to permanent component defomation during overcooling events exceeding the thermal transient limits of fg The evaluation was performed applying the " thermal atcheting" criteria of ASME Code Section III, articles NB-Ont/h 3653 d , NB-3653.2, and NB-3653.7 (Ref.4). Limit curves to j permanent defomation are published that give the maximum ,

allowable temperature change as a function of transient duration and system pressure.

The pressurizer surge line nozzle has been evaluated for susceptibility to permanent component defomation during

. overcooling events exceeding the thermal transient limits of The evaluation was performed applying the " thermal c eting" criteria of ASME Code Section III, articles NB-3653.1, NB-3653.2, and NB-3653.7. Limit curves are

, published for the Pressurizer surge line nozzles that check for defomation due ta the ratcheting and these should be utilized to evaluate component operability following an overcooling event, and prior to return to operation.

APPLICABLE The limitations imposed on the pressurizer heatup and SAFETY ANALYSES cooldown rates and spray water temperature differential are provided to assure that the pressurizer is operated within the design criteria assumed for the fatigue analysis performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III, articles NB-3653.1, NB-3653.2, and NB-3653.7 requirements.

(continued)

SAN-0NOFRE--UNITg B 3.4-17 AMENDMENT NO

pf)hgMd h Pressurizer Heatup and Cooldown Licits B 3.4.3.1 l

BASES

( [/'fMWW' $M /I' 4 r

1 l LCO This LC0 is required to ensure that the thermal !

loading / unloading of the pressurizer was performed in accordance with h.3atup/cooldown rates specified in thei .LT Violation of this LC0 could lead to the violation of t ASME Code Section III requirements.

APPLICABILITY The pressurizer is designed to withstand the effects of cyclic loads due to system temperature and pressure changes.

i These cyclic loads are introduced by nonnal load transients, y reactor trips, and startup and shutdown operations.

During startup and shutdown, the rates of temperature and

. )ressure changes are limited so that the maximum specified leatup and cooldown rates are consistent with the design

, assumptions and satisfy the stress limits for cyclic !

operation. Therefore, this LC0 is applicable at all times.

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 I

When Unit i n MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4 with the pressurizer a heatu tor oldown rates are not within the limits g ui @ \ )

-m; , restore parameters to within limits ih 30 minutes d perform engineering evaluatien in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to determine the effects of the cut-of-limit condition on the )

structural integrity of the pressurizer. '

CONDITION A is modified by a Note which requires to 1 determine the pressurizer is acceptable for continued )

operation whenever the requirements of the LC0 not met in 1 MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. I l

B.1 and B.2

, When the Required Action and Completion Times of Condition A not met, the plant should be in MODE 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in MODE 5 with RCS pressure less than 500 psig within following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

C.1 and C.2 If requirements of the LC0 are not met at any time in other than MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4, the Required Action C.1 requires ,

to immediately initiate action to restore parameter (s) to ;

(continued)

SAN-ONOFRE--UNITj B 3.4-18 AMENDMENT NO l

OM Pressurizer Heatup and Cooldown Licits B 3.4.3.1 BASES

[

ACTIONS ' C.1 and C.2 (continued) within limits specified in th Also, Required Action C.2 requires to perform engine ng evaluation prior to entering MODE 4 to detennine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the pressurizer.

CONDITION C is modified by a Note which requires to l determine the pressurizer is acceptable for continued

' operation whenever the requirements of the LC0 not met any time in other than MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4.

1 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.3.1.1 l i l REQUIREMENTS To minimize the potential ermal stresses of the i pressurizer during star p and shutdown, the rate of f temperature changes s uld be monitored during startup and L shutdown. The geri cation these rates are within limits specified in th ML should be made every 30 minutes. This :

FREQUENCY is base on operating experience and reflects the l importance of the possible effect of temperature changes 1 rate during such Unit evolutions as startup and shutdown on i j pressurizer and its components integrity. j This SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT is modified by a Note which i requires to perform this SR during pressurizer heatup and i cooldown operations only.

SR 3.4.3.1.2 - b

SR 3.4.3.1.2 requires to determine for use in the the

spray water temperature differential for each cycle of main

, spray when less than 4 reactor coolant pumps are operating i and for each cycle of auxiliary spray operation. The spray nozzle thermal transients for normal (4-RCP) and auxiliary l spray operations are developed in the calculation package S-PEC-368, and are used as design input for the Pressurizer

SR 3.4.3.1.2 Class-1 stress report. A maximum temperature differentialof 200af is assumed for normal spray operations. Of particular concern is the potential for flow stratification in the pressurizer spray line during operations involving fewer (continued)

SAN-0NOFRE--UNITg 8 3.4-19 AMENDMENT NO

RCS Loops-MODE 4 l 1 B 3.4.6 i (A, $lt BASES _

l LCO prohibits boron dilution when forced flow is stopped because (continued) an even concentration distribution cannot be ensured. Core

, outlet temperature is to be maintained at least 10*F below saturation temperature so that no vapor bubble may form and possibly cause a natural circulation flow obstruction. The !

response of the RCS without the RCPs or SDC pumps depends on the core decay heat load and the length of time that the j pumps are stopped. As decay heat diminishes, the effects on RCS temperature and pressure diminish. Without cooling by forced flow, higher heat loads will cause the reactor .

j coolard temperature and pressure to increase at a rate i proportional to the decay heat load. Because pressure can i increase, the applicable system pressure limits (pressure

. and temperature (P/T) limits or low temperature overpressure l protection (LTOP) limits) must be observed and forced SDC 4

flow or heat removal via the SGs must be re-established prior to reaching the pressure limit. The circumstances for stopping both RCPs or SDC pumps are to be limited to

, situations where:

) a. Pressure and temperature increases can be maintained well within the allowable pressure (P/T limits and j LTOP) and 10*F shbcooling limits; or

b. An alternate heat removal path through the SGs is in

. operatian, g pg I Note 2 requires at either of the following two conditions

be satisfied be e an RCP may be started with any RCS cold , y

, leg temperature- w ee LTOP enable temperature specified in N

( Luc rILM.

i

! votw 4. DW l i a. F. - ssurizer water 9e%+4-is <%%L; or '

5

, b. Secondary side water temperature in each SG is < 100*F above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures. i Satisfying the above condition will preclude a large

pressure surge in the RCS when the RCP is started. i

i l An OPERABLE RCS loop consists of at least one OPERABLE RCP and an SG that is OPERABLE in accordance with the Steam Generator Tube Surveillance Program and has the minimum J water level specified in SR 3.4.6.2.

(continued)

SANON0FRE--UNITg B 3.4-31 AMENDMENT NO.

i

\ o e RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled B 3.4.7 i BASES I l

l LCO Note 2 allows one SDC train to be inoperable for a period of i (continued) up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months provided that the other SDC train is OPERABLE !

and in operation. This permits periodic surveillance tests to be performed on the inoperable train during the only time when such testing is safe and possible.

Note 3 allows one RCS loop to be inoperable for a period of

' up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months provided that the other RCS loop is OPERABLE l and in operation. This pennits periodic surveillance tests '

to be performed on the inoperable loop during the only time when such testing is safe and possible.

1 k Note 4 requires that either of the following two conditions i 4 be satisfied before an RCP may be started:

a. Pressurizer wate vek t. 3 O[f3 must be < 0 or j

d b. Secondary side water temperature in each SG must be l 4 < 100'F above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures.

fn Satisfying either of the above conditions will preclude a low temperature overpressure event due to a thermal I . transient when the RCP is started.

J \

{

Note 5 specifies that a containment spray (CS) pump may be used in place of a low pressure safety injection (LPSI) pump in either or both shutdown cooling trains to provide shutdown cooling (SDC) flow based on the calculated heat load of the core 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after the reactor is sub-critical j with the reactor coolant system (RCS) fully depressurized i and vented in accordance with TS 3.4.12.

Note 6 provides for an orderly transition from HODE 5 to ,

l MODE 4 during a planned heatup by permitting removal of SDC l

, trains from operation when at least one RCP is in operation.

, An OPERABLE SDC train is com)osed of an OPERABLE SDC pump and an OPERABLE SDC heat exc1 anger.

i SDC pumps are OPERABLE if they are capable of being powered i and are able to provide flow if required. An OPERABLE RCS j loop consists of at least one OPERABLE RCP and an OPERABLE SG. An OPERABLE SG can perform as a heat sink when it has an adequate water level and is OPERABLE in accordance with

the SG Tube Surveillance Program.

, (continued)

SANONOFRE--UNITg B 3.4-37 AMENDMENT NO.

, e Pressurizer B 3.4.9 l B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEMS (RCS)

B 3.4.9 Pressurizer BASES BACKGROUND The pressurizer provides a point in the RCS where liquid and vapor are maintained in equilibrium under saturated conditions for pressure control purposes to prevent bulk boiling in the remainder of the RCS. Key functions include maintaining required primary system pressure during steady ;

state operation and limiting the pressure changes caused by reactor coolant thermal expansion and contraction during !

- normal load transients.

1 1

4 The pressure control components addressed by this LCO l include the pressurizer water level, the required heaters

and their backup heater controls, and emergency power supplies. Pressurizer safety valves are addressed by LC0 3.4.10, " Pres z Safety Valves."

The maximum water @ limit has been established to ensure

, that a liquid to vapor interface exists to permit RCS

pressure control, using the sprays and heaters during normal operation and proper pressure response for anticipated design basis transients.

purposes: The water Mye, Qvimit serves two

a. Pressure control during normal operation maintains subcooled reactor coolant in the loops and thus in the preferredstatefog ansport; and

b. By restricting the@ to a maximum, expected transient reactor coolant volume increases

} (pressurizer insurge) will not cause excessive changes that could result in degraded ability for Ang, pressurecog N The maximum water & limit permits pressure control R equipment to function as designed. The limit preserves the

% steam space during normal operation, thus, both sprays and D heaters can opera to maintain the design operating pressure. The limit also prevents filling the pressurizer ( ter solid) for anticipated design basis i transients, us ensuring that pressure relief devices swr /tr WlMML (continued)

SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 8 3.4-45 AMENDMENT NO.

Pressurizer B 3.4.9 l

)

l l

BASES War tW,pc BACKGROUND (Pressurizer safety valves) can control pressure b (continued) steam relief rather than water relief. If the limits .

were exceeded prior to a transient that creates a large '

pressurizer insurge volume leading to water relief, the maximum RCS pressure might exceed the Safety Limit of '

2750 psig. l The requirement to have two groups of pressurizer heaters ensures that RCS pressure can be maintained. The i pressurizer heaters maintain RCS pressure to keep the reactor coolant subcooled. Inability to control RCS l pressure during natural circulation flow could result in '

loss of single phase flow and decreased capability to remove ;

core decay heat.

l 1

APPLICABLE In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the LC0 requirement for a steam bubble SAFETY ANALYSES is reflected implicitly in the accident analyses. No safety analyses are performed in lower MODES. All analyses performed from a critical reactor condition assume the existence of a steam bubble and saturated conditions in the pressurizer. In making this assumption, the analyses neglect the small fraction of noncondensable gases normally present.

Safety analyses presented in the UFSAR do not take credit for pressurizer heater operation; however, an implicit initial condition assumption of the safety analyses is that i the RCS is operating at normal pressure.

Although the heaters are not specifically used in accident analysis, the need to maintain subcooling in the long term during loss of offsite power, as indicated in NUREG-0737 (Ref.1), is the reason for their inclusion. The requirement for emergency power supplies is based on NUREG-0737 (Ref. 1). The intent is to keep the reactor coolant in a subcooled condition with natural circulation at hot, high pressure conditions for an undefined, but extended, time period after a loss of offsite power. While loss of offsite power is a coincident occurrence assumed in the accident analyses, maintaining hot, high pressure conditions over an extended time period is not evaluated in the accident analyses.

(continued)

SANONOFRE--UNIT 3 8 3.4-46 AMENDMENT NO.

1 4 . .

Pressurizer 4 B 3.4.9 '

d BASES

, APPLICABLE The pressurizer satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy ,

SAFETY ANALYSES Statement. h !

(continued) gpp/gp/ y V9 SG W A vuCume.

LCO The LC 1re for the pressuriz to OPERABLE with water < ' ensures that a ste i le exists. j Limiting the maximum operating water preserves the l steam space for pressure control. The LC0 has been established to minimize the consequences of potential overpressure transients. Requiring the presence of a steam bubble is also consistent with analytical assumptions.

The LC0 requires two groups of OPERABLE pressurizer heaters, each with a capacity a 150 kW and capable of being powered from an emergency power supply. The exact design value of 150 kW is derived from the use of three heaters rated at 50 kW each. The amount needed to maintain pressure is dependant on the ambient heat losses. The minimum heater capacity required is sufficient to maintain the RCS near normal operating pressure when accounting for heat losses through the pressurizer insulation. By maintaining the pressure near the operating conditions, a wide subcooling margin to saturation can be obtained in the loops.

APPLICABILIT) The need for pressure control is most pertinent when core heat can cause the greatest effect on RCS temperature resulting in the greatest effect on pressurizer level and RCS pressure control. Thus, Applicability has been designated for MODES 1 and 2. The Applicability is also provided for MODE 3. The n"enose is to prevent solid water RCS operation during hcatup and cooldown to avoid rapid pressure rises causer'. by normal operational perturbation, such as reactor cooiant pump startup. The LC0 does not

apply to MODE 5 (Loops Filled) because LC0 3.4.12 " Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System," applies.

The LC0 does not apply to MODES 5 and 6 with partial loop operation.

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, there is the need to maintain the availability of pressurizer heaters capable of being powered from an emergency power supply. In the event of a loss of offsite power, the initial conditions of these MODES gives (continued)

SANON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.4-47 AMENDMENT NO.

e Pressurizer B 3.4.9 i

BASES l APPLICABILITY the greatest demand for maintaining the RCS in a hot !

l (continued) pressurized condition with loop subcooling for an extended ,

period. For MODE 4, 5, or 6, it is not necessary to control l pressure (by heaters) to ensure loop subcooling for heat i transfer when the Shutdown Cooling System is in service and therefore the LC0 is not applicable.

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 Mm&

With ressurizer wate within the limit, action must e taken to restore the plant to operation within the bounds of the safety analyses. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to MODE 3, with the reactor trip breakers open, within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

This takes the plant out of the applicable MODES and restores the plant to operation within the bounds of the j safety analyses. l l Six hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. Further pressure and !

temperature reduction to MODE 4 brings the plant to a MODE I l where the LCO is not applicable. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months time to reach the nonapplicable MODE is reasonable based on operating experience for that evolution.

i 16 1 If one required group of pressurizer heaters is inoperable, restoration is required within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is reasonable considering that a demand l

caused by loss of offsite power would be unlikely in this period. Pressure control may be maintained during this time using normal station powered heaters.

C.1 and C.2 If one required group of pressurizer heaters is inoperable and cannot be restored within the allowed Completion Time of Required Action B.1, the plant must be brought to a MODE in

which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the i

plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 4 i

(continued)

SANONOFRE--UNIT 3 B 3.4-48 AMENDMENT NO.

1

t Pressurizer Safety Valves Supplemal N "

1*

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, OPERABILITY of two valves is required because the combined capacity is re1uired to keep reactor coolant pressure below 110% of its cesign value during certain accidents. The relief capacity of a sing!e safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which might occur during MODE 4 with RCS cold leg temperature greater than the enable temperature pecifie in the p ssuiy enu i+raturepait ;apoK The Note allows entry into MODE 3 with the lift settings outside the LCO limits. This permits testing and examination of the safety valves at high pressure and temperature near their normal operating range, but only after the valves have had a preliminary cold setting. The cold setting gives assurance that the valves are OPERABLE near their design condition. Only one valve at a time will be removed from service for testing. The 36 hour4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months exception is based on 18 hour2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months outage time for each of the two valves.

The 18 hour2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months period is derived from operating experience that

! hot testing can be performed within this timeframe.

ACTIONS A.1 With one pressurizer safety valve inoperable, restoration must take place within 15 minutes. The Completion Time of 15 minutes reflects the importance of maintaining the RCS overpressure protection system. An inoperable safety valve coincident with an RCS overpressure event could challenge the integrity of the RCPB.

B.1 and B.2 If the Required Action cannot be met within the required Completion Time, or if two safety valves are inoperable, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the requirement does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 4

within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

(continued)

SANONOFRE--UNIT) B 3.4-52 AMENDMENT NO.

AWS MM RCS Temperature (TTOP Enable moera B 3.4.12.1 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.12.1 LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(L3P) System ,

j RCS Temperature ( UOP Enable Temperatury - - - " gg8f l BASES A

BACKGROUND The LTOP System controls RCS pressure at low temperatures so the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) is not com temperature (P/T) promised by violating the pressure andlimits The reactor vessel is the limiting RCPB component for demonstrating such protection. LCO 3.4.3, "RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits," provides the allowable combinations for operational pressure and temperature during cooldown, shutdown, and heatup to keep from violating the Reference 1 requirements during the LTOP MODES.

j The reactor vessel material is less tough at low

temperatures than at normal operating temperatures. As the vessel neutron exposure accumulates, the material toughness decreases and becomes less resistant to pressure stress at low temperatures (Ref. 2). RCS pressure, therefore, is maintained low at low temperatures and is increased only as temperature is increased.

1

The potential for vessel overpressurization is most acute l 1 when the RCS is water solid, occurring only during shutdown; a pressure fluctuation can occur more quickly than an operator can react to relieve the condition. Exceeding the RCS P/T limits by a significant amount could cause brittle cracking of the reactor vessel. LC0 3.4.3 requires administrative control of RCS pressure and temperature during heatup and cooldown to prevent exceeding the P/T limits.

The design basis of the LTOP assumes unrestricted flow from two HPSI pumps and three charging pumps (full charging j capacity) without letdown. Because there are three HPSI i pumps and three charging pumps, the limitation on the number of HPSI pumps to be maintained OPERABLE during the specified MODES, along with isolating the Safety Injection Tanks, 2

ensures that a mass addition to the RCS that exceeds the design basis assumptions of the LTOP will not occur. This limitation on the number of HPSI pumps that can provide makeup and injection to the RCS implements the guidance provided in Generic Letter 90-06.

(continued)

} SANONOFRE--UNIT,g B 3.4-54 AMENDMENT NO.

1

Wf RCS Temperature 5[u uP Enable T mner tu 8 3.4.12.1 BASES 1

BACKGROUND With minimum coolant input capability, the ability to 2

(continued) provide core coolant additian is restricted. The LCO does not require the makeup control system deactivated or the safety injection (SI) actuation circuits blocked. Due to

. the lower pressures in the LTOP MODES and the expected core decay heat levels, the makebp~ system can provide adequate flow via the makeup control valve and, if needed, until the HPSI pump is actuated by SI.

i Shutdown Coolina System Relief Valve Reauirements The Shutdown Cooling System relief valve has adequate relieving capability to protect the RCS from overpressurization when the transient is limited to either (1) the start of an idle RCP eith the secondary water temperature of the steam generator less than or equal to 100*F above the RCS cold leg temperatures or (2) inadvertent safety injection actuation with two HPSI pumps injecting 1 into a water-solid RCS with full charging capacity and letdown isolated.

RCS Vent Reauirements Once the RCS is de)ressurized, a vent exposed to the containment atmospiere will maintain the RCS at containment ambient pressure in an RCS overpressure transient, if the relieving requirements of the transient do not exceed the capabilities of the vent. Thus, the vent path must be capable of relieving the flow resulting from the limiting LTOP mass or heat input transient and maintaining pressure below the P/T limits. The required vent capacity may be provided by one or more vent paths.

The OPERABILITY of an RCS vent opening of greater than 5.6 square inches ensures that the RCS will be protected from pressure transients which could exceed the limits of

, Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 when one or more of the RCS (continued)

SANON0FRE--UNITj B 3.4-55 AMENDMENT NO.

tl5 P 0

P D RCSTemperaturesdTOPEnable per M u J.4.12.1 BASES 1

BACKGROUND RCS Vent Reauirements (continued) I i

co egs is less than or equal to that specified in the The vent path (s) must be above the level of reactor o ant, so as not to drain the are 'Ar: ;r, UfdL4%UthWWOL YYh L / f / 1 APPLICABLE Safety analyses (Ref. 3) demonstrate that the reactor vessel SAFETY ANALYSE is adequately protected against exceeding the Reference 1

, P/T limits during shutdown. The relief capacity of a single

safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure

condition which could occur during shutdown with RCS co 1

leg temperature greater than that specified in the the event tl:at no safety valves are OPERABLE and f S cold e temperature less than or equal to that specified in

. h T the operating shutdown cooling relief valve, n ed to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization. When the RCS is depressurized, an RCS vent to atmosphere sized 5.6 inches or greater may be used as an alternative to the

SDCS Relief Valve.

The actual temperature at which the pressure in the P/T limit curve falls below the pressurizer safety valve setpoint increases as the reactor vessel material toughness decreases due to neutron embrittlement. Each time the P/T limit curves are revised, the LTOP System will be re-evaluated to ensure its functional requirements can still be satisfied using the relief valve method or the I depressurized and venteri RCS condition.

, Reference 3 contains the acceptance limits that satisfy the 1 LTOP requirements. Any change to the RCS must be evaluated against these analyses to determine the impact of the change on the LTOP acceptance limits.

Transients that are capable of overpressurizing the RCS are

, categorized as either mass or heat input transients, examples of which follow:

i Mass Input Type Transients

a. Inadvertent safety injection; or

b. Charging / letdown flow mismatch.

(continued)

SANON0FRE--UNITY B 3.4-56 AMENDMENT NO.

hghgh A Nb LTOP System HLS Temperature M 0P Enable TemDera LM _

B 3.4.m2.1 l l

l BASES APPLICABLE Heat Input Tvoe Transients SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) a. Inadvertent actuation of pressurizer heaters; I

b. Lossofshutdowncooling(SDC);or

( c. Reactor coolant pump (RCP) startup with temperature asymmetry within the RCS or between the RCS and steam generators.

The following are required during the LTOP MODES to ensure l that mass and heat input transients do not occur, which l either of the LTOP overpressure protection means cannot handle:

a. No more than two HPSI pumps OPERABLE. h/W5(4M j

, b. Deactivating the SIT discharge isolation valves S their closed positions when SIT pressure equals or exceeds the maximum RCS pressure for existing RCS cold leg temperature allowed by the@tu r/ i umn m vu.

l Y

! Shutdown Coolina System Relief Valve Performance l

One SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve pair is capable of ;

mitigating an LTOP event that is bounded by the limiting l SDCS pressure transients. When one or both SDCS Relief l Valveisolationvalve(s)inoneisolationvalvepdrbecomes INOPERABLE, the other OPERABLE SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve pair is placed in a power-lock open condition to preclude a single failure which might cause undesired l mechanical motion of one or both of the OPERABLE SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve (s) in a single isolation valve pair l and result in loss of system function. This power-lock open l condition of the OPERABLE SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve pair is consistent with the guidance provided in Branch l Technical Position ICSB 18 (PSB), " Application of the Single Failure Criterion to Manually-Controlled Electrically-Operated Valves."

RCS Vent Performance The RCS vent size will be re-evaluated for compliance each time the P/T limit curves are revised based on the results of the vessel material surveillance.

(continued) l SANON0FRE--UNITg B 3.4-57 AMENDMENT N0.

%pphu4 4 246'F l TOP System l

RCS Temperature [LTi)P Enable Temperatuic;D ti 3.4. IZ.1 BASES i

i l APPLICABLE RCS Vent Performance (continued) !

SAFETY ANALYSES The RCS vent is passive and is not subject to active failure.

i LCO This LC0 is required to ensure that the LTOP System is !

OPERABLE. The LTOP System is OPERABLE when the minimum !

l i coolant input and pressure relief capabilities are OPERABLE.

< Violation of this LCO could lead to the loss of low 1 temperature overpressure mitigation and violation of the Reference 1 limits as a resu11 nf an anarational transiect. l l G ) t e t6 t 1 9) & ," n tt W r k w r;> l To limit the coolant input capani nty, tne u.v requires at '

most two HPSI pumps capable of injecting into the RCS d i ,

the SITS isolated or depressurized to less than th TL /d !

3

. LCO 3.5.3, "ECCS-Shutdown," defines the pump '

OP ABILITY requirements. LC0 3.3.2, " Engineered Safety Feature Activation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation," defines

SI actuation OPERABILITY for the LTOP MODE 4 small break j LOCA, as discussed in the previous section.

The elements of the LC0 that provide overpressure mitigation through pressure relief are:

1

a. The Shutdown Cooling System Relief Valve; or i b. The depressurized RCS and an RCS vent.

i The SDCS is OPERABLE for LTOP when both trains of isolation valves are open, its lift setpoint is set at 406 i 10 psig

j or less and testing has proven its ability to open at that

[ setpoint. An RCS vent is OPERABLE when open with an j area a 5.6 square inches.

Each of these methods of overpressure prevention is capable of mitigating the limiting LTOP transient.

]

246 F

[ APPLICABILIT This LC0 is applicable in MODE 4 when the temperature of any RC .old leg is s mie enavic m .. ......, m -i,,m .n u~

! , in MODE 5, and in MODE 6 w1en the reactor vessel head i on. The pressurizer safety valves provide overpressure .

protection that meets the Reference 1 P/T limits above the (continued) 4 _

1 SANONOFRE--UNIT 3 B 3.4-58 AMENDMENT NO.

4 e

WM,4.Wh M$0f 1 TOP System RCS Temperature s CT7P Enahla Temneratum.# -

B 3.4.12.1 BASES bMN 8Mb 7 N

Yn APPLICABILITY When the (continued) enable reactor temperatures vessel head isspecified in the @ tion cannot occur.

off, overpressuriza LC0 3.4.3 provides the operational P/T limits for all MODES.

LC0 3.4.10, " Pressurizer Safety Valves," requires the OPERABILITY of the pressurizer safety valves that provide overpressure protection during MODES 1, 2, and d MODE 4 above the enable temperatures specified in th TL Low temperature overpressure prevention is st critical during shutdown when the RCS is water solid, and a mass or -

l heat input transient can cause a very rapid increase in RCS

! pressure when little or no time allows operator action to '

mitigate the avent. _

C j )

l The Applicability is modified by a Note statin

T l isolation or depressurization to less than the l l only required when the SIT pressure is greater an o al l to the RCS pressure for the existing tem ature o allowed by the P/T limit curves provided in the T his Note l permits the SIT discharge valve survei ce performed only under these pressure and temperature nditions.

l l '

ACTIONS A.1 With more than two liPSI pumps capable of injecting into t RCS, overpressurization is possible.

The immediate Completion Time to initiate actions to store restricted coolant input capability to the RCS refl ts the importance of maintaining overpressure protection f the RCS.

L1 l

When the SIT pressure is ter than or equal to the i maximum RCS press the existing cold leg temperature allowed in th LR an unisolated SIT requires isolation within I hour.

(continued)

SANONOFRE--UNITg B 3.4-59 AMENDMENT NO.

NW>t: CKk N ggog LTOP System RCS Temperature s LTOP Enable lemnerature d B 3.4.12.1 BASES Presserge.=Arn 4k.<wA ACTIONS LJ,(continued)

By isolating the SIT (s), the RCS is protected ag inst the SIT tanks pressurizing the RCS in excess of the L f0P limits.

The Completion Time is based on operating experie lce that this activity can be accomplished in this time pe riod and on engineering evaluation indicating that an event 1 equiring LTOP is not likely in the allowed time.

C.1 If the Required Action and associated Comple n Time of s conditionBisnotmet,theaffectedSIT(s) st be depressurized to less than the maximum RCS p ure for the existing cold leg temperature allowed in th within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

de urizing the SIT (s) below the LTOP limit stated in 4

t L the RCS is protected against the SIT (s) pressurizing the RCS in excess of the LTOP limits.

The Completion Time is based on operating experience that this activity can be accomplished in this time period and on engineering evaluation indicating that an event requiring LTOP is not likely in the allowed time.

, D.1 and D.2 The 24-hour Allowable Outage Time (A0T) for a single channel SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve (s) increases the availability of the LTOP system to mitigate low temperature J overpressure transients especially during MODES 5 and 6 when i the potential for these transients are highest (RCS

. temperatures between 80*F and 190*F and the RCS is water-

solid). The 24-hour A0T implements the guidance provided in Generic Letter 90-06 (Ref. 6).

L1

) If the SDCS Relief Valve is inoperable, or if a Required Action and the associated Completion Time of Condition A, (continued)

SANON0FRE--UNIT,3 B 3.4-60 AMENDMENT NO.

4

_ 2//g Ofl" LTOP System

! RCS Temperature ( T0P Enable TemDer b B 3.4.12.1 BASES l

ACTIONS L1 (continued)

C, or D are not met, or if the LTOP System is inoperable for any reason other than Condition A, C or D, the RCS must be depressurized and a vent established within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . The j vent must be sized at least 5.6 square inches to ensure the flow capacity is greater than that required for the worst 1 case mass input transient reasonable during the applicable MODES. This action protects the RCPB from a low temperature

, overpressure event and a possible brittle failure of the reactor vessel.

1 The Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months to depressurize and vent the 4 RCS is based on the time required to place the plant in this

, condition and the relatively low probability of an

overpressure event during this time period due to increased operator awareness of administrative control requirements.

i

. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.12.1.1 and SR 3.4.12.1.2 i REQUIREMENTS To minimize the potential for a low temperature overpressure i

event by limiting the mass input capability, not more than two HPSI pumps are verified OPERABLE with the other pump a locked out with power removed and the SIT discharge isolation valves are verified :losed and dea ivated or SIT (s) are depressurized to less than th li ~ .

The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months interval considers op ing practice to

regularly assess potential degr ation and to verify a operation within the safety a 1"+.

q i

SR 3.4.12.1.3 fft$$M fWN geg SR 3.4.12.1.3 requires verifying that the RCS vent is open

. E 5.6 square inches is proven OPERABLE by verifying its open j condition either:

i a. Once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for a vent valve that is unlocked open; and

b. Once every 31 days for a valve that is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured open and once every 31 days for open flanged RCS penetrations.

(continued)

SANONOFRE--UNITg B 3.4-61 AMENDMENT NO.

I

~ '

Lp dsmed 4 2WP LTOP System RCS Temperature d iOP Enan w muum atu ~

B 3.4.12.1 BASES l

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.12.1.3 (continued) i REQUIREMENTS The passive vent arrangement must only be open to be OPERABLE. This Surveillance need only be performed if the vent is being used to satisfy the requirements of this LCO.

The Frequencies consider operating experience with mispositioning of unlocked and locked vent valves, respectively.

I SR 3.4.12.1.4 and SR 3.4.12.1.5 l WhenoneorbothSDCSReliefValveisolationvalve(s)inone l isolation valve pair becomes inoperable, the other OPERABLE l SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve pair is verified in a l power-lock open condition every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months to preclude a single failure which might cause undesired mechanical motion of one or both of the OPERABLE SDCS Relief Valve isolation

! valve (s) in a single isolation valve pair and result in loss of system function.

This surveillance requirement, SR 3.4.12.1.4, is modified by two notes. Note 1 requires to perfom this SR when the SDCS l Relief Valve isolation valve pair is inoperable. Note 2 specifies that the )ower lock-open requirement is satisfied either with the AC 3reakers open for valve pair 2HV9337 and 2HV9339 or the inverter input and output breakers open for valve pair 2HV9377 and 2HV9378, whichever valve pair is OPERABLE.

When both pairs of SDCS Relief Valve isolation valves are OPERABLE and the SDCS Relief Valve is used for overpressure protection, the isolation valves are verified open every 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

SR 3.4.12.1.6 The SDCS Relief Valve Setpoint is verified periodically in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

(continued)

SANON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.4-62 AMENDMENT N0.

2[ LTOP System RCS Temperature sg.iuP Enable semperatu2s t o a.9.12.1 BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix G.

2. Generic Letter 88-11.

3. UFSAR, Section 15.

4. 10 CFR 50.46.

5. 10 CFR 50, Appendix K.

6. Generic Letter 90-06.

SANONOFRE--UNIT) B 3.4-63 AMENDMENT NO.

& Cnk & op

_ LTOP Systea , i RCS Temperature >(tTUP Enable lemocratura -

B 3.4.12.2 l

i l

! B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) l

< i i B 3.4.12.2 LTOP !

Low Temperature RCS Temperature Overpressure

-C..or Protection ( M) System /,,/$ 'f tname iemperature BASES i BACKGROUND The LTOP System controls RCS pressure at low temperatures so the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary 1 (RCPB) is not com !

temperature (P/T)promisedbyviolatingthepressureandlimits of 10 '

4 The reactor vessel is the limiting RCPB component for demonstrating such protection. LCO 3.4.3, "RCS Pressure and

! Temperature (P/T) Limits," provides the allowable l

combinations for operational pressure and temperature during

cooldown, shutdown, and heatup to keep from violating the i Reference 1 requirements during the LTOP MODES.

l The reactor vessel material is leS tough at low l temperatures than at normal opere tine i,C-Aperatures. As the vessel neutron exposure accumulates, _he material toughness J

decreases and becomes less resistant to pressure stress at 3

low temperatures (Ref. 2). RCS pressure, therefore, is )

i maintained low at low temperatures and is increased only as l temperature is increased.

i t The potential for vessel overpressurization is most acute when the RCS is water solid, occurring only during shutdown;

, a pressure fluctuation ca occur more quickly than an

. operator can react to relieve the condition. Exceeding the RCS P/T limits by a significant amount could cause brittle

cracking of the reactor vessel. LCO 3.4.3 requires l administrative control of RCS pressure and temperature during t.eatup and cooldown to prevent exceeding the P/T lioits.

In MODE 4 when the temperature of any RCS cold leg is -O -

j greater than the enable temperatures specified in the TLR, i the LCO does not require the makeup control system i

deactivated or the safety injection (SI) actuation rcuits blocked.

i The LTOP System consists of the Shutdown Coo ng System j Relief Valve with both pairs of SDCS Reli Valve isolation valves open, or a minimum of one press ' zer code safety valve OPERABLE.

N gGLMM df* (continued)

]

l 4

SANONOFRE--UNIi3 B 3.4-64 AMENDMENT NO.

1

'SubpGr.mem.4 M m.p l LTOP System RCS Temperature h0P Enable TemperatQ {

_ B 3.4.12.2 BASES MN "M N Y BACKGROUND Shutdown Coolina System Relief Valve Reauiremen l 1

i (continued )

The Shutdown Cooling System relief valve has ade ate relieving capability to protect the RCS from

overpressurization when the transient is limited 3 the start of an idle RCP with the secondary water temp trature of i the steam generator less than or equal to 100*F ab. ive the RCS cold leg temperatures.

i Pressurizer Code Safety Valve Reauirements The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prev. nt the 1 RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit af 27505 l' psia. Each safety valve is designed to relieve 4. 5 x 10 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve setp int plus 3'4 accumulation. The relief capacity of a sing 1 safety l valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure co ition which could occur during shutdown with RCS cold temperature greater than that specified in th d Y - l i

APPLICABLE Safety analyses (Ref. 3) demonstrate that the reactor vess i SAFETY ANALYSES is adequately protected against exceeding the Reference 1 P/T limits during shutdown. The relief capacity of a s' le

safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure i

condition which could occur during shutdown with RCS leg temperature greater than that specified in the d .

e event that no safety valves are OPERABLE and for RCS ld temperature less than or equal to that specified in

t the operating shutdown cooling relief valve, 1'

onnec ed to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization. When the RCS is depressurized, an RCS 7t to atmosphere sized i 5.6 inches or greater may be use as an alternative to the

SDCS Relief Valve.

1 The actual temperature at which the pressure in the P/T limit curve falls below the pressurizer safety valve setpoint increases as the reactor vessel material toughness decreases due to neutron embrittlement. Each time the P/T limit curves are revised, the LTOP System will be re-evaluated to ensure its functional requirements can still

. be satisfied using the relief valve method or the depressurized and vented RCS condition.

(continued)

SANON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.4-65 AMENDMENT NO.

MN '

]N b . TOP System l

( RCS Temperature >CTOP Enable Iannaratur 4 l B 3.4.12.2 l

BASES APPLICABLE Reference 3 contains the acceptance limits that satisfy the SAFETY ANALYSES LTOR requirements. Any change to the RCS must be evaluated (continued) sgainst these analyses to determine the impact of the change on the g0P acceptance limits.

Shutdown Coolina System Relief Valve Performance One SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve pair is capable of mitigating an LTOPlevent that is bounded by the limiting SDCS pressure tfarisients. When one or both SDCS Relief l

Valve isolation valve (s) in one isolation valve pair becomes

! INOPERABLE, the other OPERABLE SDCS Relief Valve isolation i valve pair is placed in a power-lock open condition to l preclude a single failure which might cause undesired mechanical motion of one or both of the OPERABLE SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve (s) in a single isolation valve pair and result in loss of system function. This power-lock open condition of the OPERABLE SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve pair is consistent with the guidance provided in Branch l Technical Position ICSB 18 (PSB), " Application of the Single l

Failure Criterion to Manually-Controlled Electrically-Operated Valves."

LC0 This LCO is required to ensure that the LTOP System is OPERABLE. The LTOP.' System is OPERABLE whsn"the minimum pressure relief cap a~bilities are OPERABLE. Violation of this LC0 could lead to the loss of low temperature overpressure mitigation and violation of the Reference 1 limits as a result of an operational transient.

The elements of the LCO that provide overpressure mitigation through pressure relief are:

a. The Shutdown Cooling System Relief Valve; or

b. A minimum of one pressurizer code safety valve.

The SDCS is OPERABLE for LTOP when both trains of isolation valves are open, ity lift ~setpoint is set at 406 t 10 psig or less and testing has proven its ability to open at that setpoint. A pressurizer code safety valve is OPERABLE when its lift setting is 2500 psia i 1% and testing has proven its ability to open at that setpoint.

(continued)

SANONOFRE--UNIT) B 3.4-66 AMENDMENT N0.

r Y j jf&

LTOP System I

RCS Temperature (LTOP Enable Ta=~""""4 B 3.4.12.2 BASES U 1

LCO Each of these methods of overpressure prevention is capable j (continued) of mitigating the limiting LTOP transient.

l APPLICABILITY This LCO licable in MODE 4 when the temperature of all l RCS co gs are above the enable temperatures specified i

When the temperature of any RCS cold leg is i

to o aelow the enable temperatures specified in the

the Shutdown Cooling System Relief valve is used for overpressure protection or if the RCS is also depressurized, j then an RCS vent to atmosphere sized 5.6 inches or greater ;

j can be used for overpressure protection. When the reactor !

vessel head is off, overpressurization cannot occer. '

l i LCO 3.4.3 provides the operational P/T limits for all MODES. 1 LC0 3.4.10. " Pressurizer Safety Valves," requires the l i OPERABILITY of the pressurizer safety valves that provide

overpressure protection during MODES 1, 2, and 3.

l Low temperature overpressure prevention is most critical 1 during shutdown when the RCS is water solid, and a mass or

heat input transient can cause a very rapid increase in RCS pressure when little or no time allows operator action to mitigate the event.

l 1

A.1

) ACTIONS

! With no pressurizer code safety valves OPERABLE and the SDCS Relief Valve IN0PERABLE overpressurization is possible.

. The 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Completion Time to be in MODE 5 and vented through a greater than or equal to 5.6 inch vent reflects

the importance of maintaining overpressure protection of the

! RCS.

B.1 and B.2 i The 24-hour Allowable Outage Time (A0T) for a single channel

. SDCS Relief Valve isolation valve (s) increases the j availability of the LTOP system to mitigate low temperature overpressure transients during MODE 4.

I (continued)

SANONOFRE--UNITj B 3.4-67 AMENDMENT NO.

k Af( 2 //g# g L TOP Svste2, RCS Temperature >rour enan te Temnaratum -

, B 3.4.12.2 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)

The 24-hour A0T implements the guidance provided in Generic Letter 90-06.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.12.2.1 REQUIREMENTS When the SDCS Relief Valve is being used for overpressure a protection, then at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months both pairs of f SDCS Relief Valve isolation valves are verified open to i preclude a single failure condition that might occur if only '

one pair of isolation valves are open.

- l SR 3.4.12.2.2 The SDCS Relief Valve Setpoint is verified periodically in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

1 i !

l l

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix G.

i

2. Generic Letter 88-11.

i

3. UFSAR, Section 15.

4. 10 CFR 50.46.

5. 10 CFR 50, Appendix K.

6. Generic Letter 90-06.

SANON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.4-68 AMENDMENT NO.

4 n r

! SITS l 8 3.5.1 l l

l BASES l APPLICABLE failure proof; therefore, whenever the SIT isolation valves SAFETY ANALYSES are open, power is removed from their operators and the j (continued) switch is key locked open. In addition, whenever the SITS '

are required to be operable, power is removed from the SIT 4 vent valves by removing the vent valve fuses or placing the )

, disconnect switch in the open position.

\

These precautions ensure that the SITS are available during l 1 an accident (Ref. 4). With power supplied to the valves, a i single active failure could result in a valve closure, which ,

would render one SIT unavailable for injection. If a second 4

i' SIT is lost through the break, only two SITS would reach the core. An active failure that could affect the SITS would be i

the closure of a motor operated outlet valve or opening of a SIT vent valve. The requirement to remove power from these valves eliminates these failure modes. The surveillance i

. requirement to ensure power is removed from the SIT vent I 1

valves is controlled by the Licensee Controlled Specification (LCS).

The minimum volume requirement for the SITS ensures that i

. three SITS can provide adequate inventory to reflood the !

l core and downcomer following a LOCA. The downcomer then a remains flooded until the HPSI and LPSI systems start to deliver flow.

The maximum volume limit is based on maintaining an adequate j gas volume to ensure proper injection and the ability of the g SITS to fully discharge, as well as limiting the maximum i amount of boron inventory in the SITS.

d _

i A minimum of 67.9% narrow range level, corresponding tD 1680 cubic feet of borated water. ana a maximum of a 7.F. naiiv. .onge sevei. correspondino ts 1807 cubic feet

( I oorated water, are used in the safety analyses as the volume in the SITS. The analyses are based upon the cubic feet requirements; the percentage figures are provided for 3 operator use because the level indicator provided in the j control room is marked in percentages, not in cubic feet.

The minimum nitrogen cover pressure requirement ensures that the contained gas volume will generate discharge flow rates during injection that are consistent with those assumed in the safety analyses.

(continued)

, SANONOFRE--UNIT 3 B 3.5-4 AMENDMENT N0.

1 i

a 1

// ECCS -Shutdown 4

Q k 4M 7 8 3.5.3 BASES s

LCO During an event requiring ECCS actuation, a flow path is (continued) requh ed to supply water from the RWST to the RCS via the !

HPSI pumps and their respective supply headers to each cf the four cold leg injection nozzles. In the long term, this flow path may be switched to take its supply from the containment sump and to deliver its flow to the RCS hot and j cold legs. !

l With RCS pressure < 400 psia, one HPSI pump is acceptable l without single failure consideration, based on the stable !

reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core l cooling requirements. The low pressure safety injection l (LPSI) pumps may therefore be released from the ECCS train i

] for le use in shutdown cooling (SDC). In MODE 4 with RCS cold hgt,,4 /* , temperature less than or equal to those specified in the

. , a maximum of two HPSI pumps are allowed to be OPERABLE .

EM accordance with LC0 3.4.12.1, " Low Temperature , , , o y ,,

I

( g.g Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System - RCS Temperature 5_

pue Enause iemperature 4

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3 with RCS pressure a: 400 psia, the OPERABILITY requirements for ECCS are covered by LC0 3.5.2.

In MODE 3 with RCS pressure < 400 psia and in MODE 4, one OPERABLE ECCS train is acceptable without single failure ;

consideration, based on the stable reactivity condition of I the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements. j In MODES 5 and 6, unit conditions are such that the l probability of an event requiring ECCS injection is l extremely low. Core cooling requirements in MODE 5 are !

addressed by LC0 3.4.7, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled,"

! and LCO 3.4.8, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled."

! MODE 6 core cooling requirements are addressed by LC0 3.9.4,

" Shutdown Cooling (SDC) and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level," and LC0 3.9.5, " Shutdown Cooling (SDC) and Coolant Circulation-Low Water Level."

ACTIONS A.1 With no HPSI pump OPERABLE, the unit is not prepared to respond to a loss of coolant accident. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (continued)

SANON0FRE--UNIT { B 3.5-22 AMENDMENT NO.

^. r.

RWST l B 3.5.4 j BASES l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.4.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS

, With ambient temperatures within this range, the RWST

temperature should not exceed the limits.

t SR 3.5.4.2 A minimum RWST water volume level above the ECCS suction 4

connection of 362,800 gallonse correym>mm mm im Ao4 ieva , ? -

nicanon ]shall be verified every 7 days. The percentage j figure is provided for operator use because the level indicator provided in the control room is marked in percentages not in gallons. This 7 day Frequency ensures

- that a sufficient initial water supply is available for

{p injection and to support continued ESF pump operation on 4

V' recirculation. Since the RWST volume is normally stable and is provided with a low Level Alarm, a 7 day Frequency is j aporopriate and has been shown to be acceptable through l

operating experience.

~

SR 3.5.4.3 i

Boron concentration of the RWST shall be verified every i 7 days to be within the required range. This frequency I i ensures that the reactor will remain subcritical following a LOCA. Further, it ensures that the resulting CES pH will be l j maintained in an acceptable range such that boron '

precipitation in the core will not occur earlier than predicted and the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components will be minimized. Since the RWST volume is normally stable, a 7 day sampling Frequency is appropriate and has been shown through operating experience to be acceptable.

4 4

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR Chapier 6 and Chapter 15.

j I

l SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.5-29 AMENDMENT NO.

1 i

1

i e ^ CST T-121 and T-120 l B 3.7.6 i

f BASES l

l l LCO The combined volume of CST ensures that sufficient water is i

(continued) available to maintain the unit in MODE 3 for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months including cooldown to shutdown cooling initiation. ,

OPERABILITY of the CST is detemined by maintaining the tank i level at or above the minimum required level. l l l l l l l

! APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, and in MODE 4, when steam generator is I i

being relied upon for heat removal, the CST is required to be OPERABLE.

In MODES 5 and 6, the CST is not required because the AFW System is not required.

i l i I ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 # 4 If the CST dfnotwithinthelimit,theOPERABILITYof l the backup water supply must be verified by administrative

% means within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

OPERABILITY of the backup feedwater supply must include verification of the OPERABILITY of flow paths from the l ,

backup supply to the AFW pumps, and availability of the re uired volume of water in the backup supply. The CST J must be returned to OPERABLE status within 7 days, as the backup supply may be performing this function in addition to its normal functions. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to verify 4

the OPERABILITY of the backup water supply. The 7 day

Completion Time is reasonable, based on an OPERABLE backup water supply being available, and the low probability of an event requiring the use of the water from the CST occurring during this period, i

B.1 and B.2 l

If the CST cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a I

(Continued)

SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.7-35 AMENDMENT N0.

e '

CST T-121 and T-120

, B 3.7.6 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)

MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this 4

status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 4, without reliance onsteam generator for heat removal, within 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit j systems.

f SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.6.1 REQUIREMENTS

"' f This SR verifies that the CST contains the g uired volume of cooling water. The required volume ef,4ooling water in g CST T-121 is 144,000 gallons. (Jnat corre5Donas to 96D The 4 required volume of cooling water in CSI T-120 is 280,000 gal ' Tim corresponas to um. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Frequency is ased on operating experience, and the need for operator awareness of unit evolutions that may affect the CST

inventory between checks. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Frequency is l

considered adequate in view of other indications in the 1 control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to

abnormal CST level deviations.

1 REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 9.2.6.

2. UFSAR, Chapter 6.

l

3. UFSAR, Ciiapter 15.

]

i 4

SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 3 B 3.7-36 AMENDMENT NO.

I

e e, Containment Penetrations l B 3.9.3 l

BASES i

i LC0 exhaust penetrations and the containment personnel airlock. !

(continued) For the conte.inment personnel airlock, this LCO ensures that I

the airlock can be closed after containment evacuation in o~

l the event of a f el handlina accidentJ p e requirement Inatj 2

T

,,4MSf/2T ,Np % plant ce in puut b or aeTueseu contiguration with W i

get of water above the fueirensures tnat there is suhent time to close the personnel airlock following a j k loss of shutdown cooling before boiling occurs.

I a

This LC0 is modified by Note wich allows to keep both doors g of the containment personnel airlock open provided:

{

l g a. one personnel airlock door is OPERABLE d4M f

{g b.l the plant is in MODE 6 or aerueleo configuratioJ,

~

2

)

h54TY / h.1kTTith 23 feet of water above the fuM l The OPERABILITY requirements ensure that the airlock door is Q+a capable of performing its function, and that a designated L individual located outside of the affected area is ave.ilable !

to close the door. For the OPERABLE containment purge and !

' exhaust penetrations, this LC0 ensures that these j

penetrations are isolable by the Containment Purge Isolation System. The OPERABILITY requirements for this LLO ensure that the automatic purge and exhaust valve closure times specified in the UFSAR can be achieved and therefore meet the assumptions used in the safety analysis to ensure !

releases through the valves are terminated, such that the I radiological doses are within the acceptance limit.

'1

! APPLICABILITY The containment penetration requirements are applicable

! during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment Orcause this is when there is a potential for a fuel handling accident. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, containment penetration requirements are addressed by

' LC0 3.6.1, " Containment." In MODES 5 and 6, when CORE

ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within

containment are not being conducted, the potential for a fuel handling accident does not exist. Therefore, under these conditions no requirements are placed on containment '

penetration status.

(continued)

SANON0FRE-UNIT $ B 3.9-13 AMENDMENT NO.

g e. J, *'4*"'-V - - " - - * * " ' - - ~ -

- - - " - + - ' ' - - ' ' - ~ - '

+

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