ML20077A559

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Nonproprietary Ja FitzPatrick Cycle 12 ATRIUM-10A Lead Fuel Assembly Licensing Evaluation
ML20077A559
Person / Time
Site: FitzPatrick Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 11/16/1994
From:
SIEMENS POWER CORP. (FORMERLY SIEMENS NUCLEAR POWER
To:
Shared Package
ML19311B509 List:
References
NUDOCS 9411230322
Download: ML20077A559 (5)
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Atrium-10A Lead Fuel Assembly Licensing Evaluation Report for New York Power Authority James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Reload 11/ Cycle 12 1

(Non-Proprietary Version) 1 1

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l James A. FitzPatrick Cycle 12 ATRIUM -10A* Lead Fuel Assembly Licensing Evaluation l j

INTRODUCTICN The New York Pcwer Authority (NYPA) will include four Siemens Power Corporation-Nuclear Division (SPC) ATRIUM-10A Lead Fuel Assemblies (LFAs) in the reload core for James A. FitzPatrick Cycle 12. The assemblies will be inserted in ncn-limiting core locations. ,

SPC has evaluated the insertion of the fcur ATRIUM-10A LFAs in James A. FitzPatrick Cycie 12 )

and confirmed that the LFAs meet the acceptance criteria specified in Chapters 4 and 15 cf the Standard Review Plan (SRF), Reference 1. Adcitionally, the ATRIUM-10A LFAs will not affect and are bounded by the safety analyses performed for the co-resident fuel. The evaluations 1 performed by SPC inc!ude fuel mechanical design analysis, thermal-hydraulic design analysis, l nuclear safety analysis, evaluation of Anticipated Operational Occurrences (AOO), and evaluation of postulated accidents.

LEAD FUEL ASSEMBLY FROGRAM C8JECTIVES A normal and necessary function cf lead fuel assemblies for any fuel design is to extend the fuel design performance data base. The James A. FitzPatrick lead assemblies will provide in-reactor data for demonstration of the performance cf ATRIUM-10A fuel assemblies with SPC's advanced design fuel channel. This data will augment the cata base that has already been established by SPC for the ATRIUM-10A fuel assemcly cesign. The types of fuel performance data measurements wnich may potentially be cctained frcm the lead assemclies include:

MECHANICAL DESIGN ANALYSIS SPC has demonstrated that the mechanical design of the James A. Fit 2 Patrick ATRIUM-10A LFAs satisfies the acceptance criteria given in Section 4.2 cf Reference 1. Analyses performed using SPC's NRC-approved mechanical analysis methodology show that the SPC ATRIUM-10A LFAs can be handled in the same manner as the co-resident fuel and operated in the James A. FitzPatrick Cycle 12 core while maintaining adequate margin to the applicable mechanical design limits. These mechanical design analyses are documented in Reference 2.

The mechanical design evaluation demcnstrated that the LFAs will remain within the applicable design limits and meet the acceptance criteria for Fuel System Damage, Fuel Rod Failure, and

  • ATRIUM is a trademark of Siemens.

Page 2 I

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Fuel Coolability under conservative projected reactor conditions and operating history.

Acceptability of the LFAs under seismic /LCCA loading was demonstrated by l The structural response of the LFAs to accident loadings will be nearly J l

identical to that of the co-resident GE11 fuel assemblies.

THERMAL-HYDRAULIC DESIGN ANALYSIS The ATRIUM-10A LFAs are designed to be hydraulically compatible with the co-resident GE11 fuel assemblies in tne James A. FitzFatrick core. Discussion of the hydraulic compatibility design analysis is presented in Reference 3.

Analyses performed by SFC demonstrate that the ATRIUM-10A LFA steady-state MCFR performance is superior relative to the co-resident GE11 fuel assemblies The SFC analyses, presented in Reference 3, show that for the same reacter operating conditions, and assuming both assemblies are at a MCFR of 1.00, the ATRIUM-10A LFA has a higher bundle critical power than the co-resident GE11 fuel design.

The ATRIUM-10A LFAs will be monitored as GE11 fuel assemblies by the core monitoring system at FitzFatrick. Results of SFC analyses (Reference 4) snow that the ATRIUM-10A LFAs can be operated to the same MCFR operating limit as the GEli fuel assembly. Analyses performed by j SFC shcw that mcnitcrinc the LFAs as GE11 fuel assemclies will result in the monitoring system For bundle exposures ranging from GWd/MTU, the limiting full power results snown in Tacle 3.1 cf Reference 4 show that there is

. For buncle exposures greater than adequate margin The ATRIUM-10A LFAs may therefore be monitored as GE11 fuel assemblies and have adequate MCFR margin.

Figure 4.1 cf Reference 2 provides the steady state LHGR limit for the SFC ATRIUM-10A LFA The SPC LHGR limit shown in Reference 2 is ' cased on planar exposure. SPC has determined, through a conservative ccmparison using the "least limiting" MAFLHGR limit value for the co-resident GE11 fuel, that the ATRIUM-10A LHGR lidt will not be exceeded if the LFAs are monitored to the GE11 planar MAFLHGR limit.

The impact of the four ATRIUM-10A LFAs on reactor stability is determined by the thermal hydraulic characteristics ci the LFAs compared to the co-resident fuel since the dominant core neutronic characteristics are determined by the co-resident fuel. Single channel model evaluations of the ATRIUM 10A LFA and co-resident GE11 fuel under similar operating conditions resulted in insignificant differences in channel decay ratio. Results of this evaluation are presented in Reference 4. Operating restrictions implemented to protect stability margins for the GE11 core will remain adequate for a core containing the LFAs. ,

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NUCLEAR SAFET/ ANALYSIS The enrichment distribution and gadclinia content of the ATRIUM 10A LFA were selected to maten the hot operation neutronic performance of the co-resident fresh GE11 fuel assemblies in the Cycle 12 reload being replaced by the LFAs. The cold controlled, and cold and het standby uncontrolled, reactivity of the ATRIUM-10A LFA is not significantly different from that of the co-resident GE11 fuel assemblies. Standby Liquid Control System, Cold Shutdown Margin, and Fuel I

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Storage Fool Criticality analyses performed for the co-resident fuel will remain adequate for the -

LFA.

SFC design criteria require an overall negative power coefficient for fuel designs in crder to assure compatibility with reactor control systems. Reference 3 shows that the LFA design wiil provide a negative power coefficient at all operating ccnditions throughout the life of the fuel.

ANTICIPATED OPERATIONAL OCCURRENCES Core-wide transients, including Over Pressurizatien, will not be significantly affected by the presence of four LFAs in the Cycle 12 core. SFC has performed analyses which demonstrate that the LFAs will meet acplicable design limits during potential core wide transients if they are mcnitored as the co-resident GE11 fuel assemblies. The results of these evaluations are presented in Reference 4 Localized AOOs evaluated by SFC are Centrcl Roc Withdrawal Error, Fuel Assembly Misiccation Error, and Fuel Assembly Miscrientation Error. Reference a shows that the comparable reactivity characteristics of the LFA and co-resident GE11 fuel resuit in comparable consequences for these ACOs. The LFAs, being in non-limiting ccre locations, will have more margin to limits than the co-resident GE11 fuel, and therefore the ACO analyses for the co-resident refcad fuel are bounding for the LFAs.

POSTULATED ACCICENTS The LOCA performance cf the SFC ATRIUM-10A LFA is comparable to that cf the cc4esicent GE11 fuel. The larger number cf rods in the LFA results in a lower initial temcerature and in less stored energy than the cc4esident GE11 fuel at the same planar power. Additional margin is provided because of the non-limiting core locaticns of the LFAs. As a resuit of these factcrs, the existing LOCA analysis will be bounding for the LFAs.

The ceposited enthalpy resulting from a Control Rod Crop Accident is determinec by the In Reference 3, SFC showed that there is no significant difference for these parameters for the LFA and GE11 fuel assemblies in the Cycie 12 core. The LFA maintains a similar margin to the enthalpy limit as the co-resident GE11 fuel and the reload safety analysis is applicable to the LFAs. 9 SPC analysis discussed in Reference 4 indicates that the amount of radioactivity released to the environment from a fuel handling accident involving 10x10 fuelis essentially the same as that for 9x9 cr 8x8 fuel assemblies. Therefore, the existing fuel handling accident analysis remains -

3 appropriate.

CONCLUSION SPC has evaluated the insertion of the four ATRIUM-10A LFAs in James A. FitzPatrick Cycle 12.

The evaluation confirmed that the LFAs meet the acceptance criteria specified in Chapters 4 and 15 of the Standard Review Flan (SRP) and that the LFAs will not affect and are bounded by the safety analyses petictmed for the co-resident reload fuel.

Page 4 REFERENCES 1.

NUREG-0800, " Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants. LWR Edition," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuc!eer Reactor Regulation, July 1981,

2. EMF 94-128(P), Revision 1, " Mechanical Design Report for James A. Fitzpatrick ATRIUM 10A Lead Fuel Assemblies," Siemens Power Corporation-Nuclear Division, November 1994
3. EMF-94-140(P),"Neutronic Design & Thermal-Hydraulic Compatibility Report for James A.

Fitzpatrick ATRIUMm10A Lead Fuel Assemblies," Siemens Power Corporation-Nuclear Division, Ncvember 1994 4 EMF-94-141(P)," Safety Analysis Report for James A. FitzPatrick ATRIUM 10A Lead Fuel Assembly," Siemens Power Corporation-Nuclear Division, November 1994 heii u

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