Text

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 74 to License NPF-47
	ML20072C113
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	08/02/1994
From:	; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20072C096	List: ML20072C093; ML20072C113;
References
	NUDOCS 9408170086
	Download: ML20072C113 (92)
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2 UNITED STATES 7

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION' S[vSh.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 0001 SAFETY EVALVATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 74 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-47 ENTERGY OPERATIONS. INC.

f RIVER BEND STATION. UNIT l-DOCKET N0. 50-458 i

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated January 14, 1994, as supplemented July 15, 1994, Entergy-Operations, Inc. (the licensee) submltted a request for changes to the River Bend Station, Unit 1 (RBS), Technical Specifications (TSs).

The requested changes would revise TS Sections 3/4.3, Instrumentation," and 3/4.4.2,

" Safety / Relief Valves," and associated Bases to increase the surveillance test intervals (STIs) and allowed outage-times (A0Ts) for various instruments. The licensee stated in its request that the proposed changes are consistent with the NRC staff's previous approvals of several General Electric Company (GE)

Licen ing Topical Reports (LTRs) and with the guidance provided in NLREG-1434 (Reference 1).

The July 15, 1994, letterProperty "Letter" (as page type) with input value "RBG-40726, Forwards Proposed Clarifications to LAR 93-06 Submitted on 940114 Re Proposed Changes to TS to Extend AOT & Surveillance Test Intervals for Various Instrumentation" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process. provided clarifying-information that did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

2.0 EVALUATION l

The licensee proposed changes'to TS Sections 3/4.3 and 3/4.4.2 to increase A0Ts and STIs for various instrumentation TSs based on several GE LTRs (References 2 through 8).

The specific changes involved increasing STIs from monthly to quarteriy, and increasing A0Ts from 2 to 6' hours for testing and from 1 to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for repair.

The proposed changes also incorporate more recent guidance contained in Reference 1 concerning " loss-of-function" conditions.

During the development of Reference 1, the NRC staff identified concerns that the A0Ts provided in

.the approved LTRs could allow certain combinations of inoperable instruments to ' exist for up to 24' hours which would not provide the capability for automatic actuation of certain systems.

Clarifying language addressing these loss-of-function' conditions was developed by. the BWR Owners Group and the NRC staff and included in Reference 1.

The-licensee. incorporated the Reference I clarifications to eliminate the potential for such loss-of-function conditions to exist.

l The referenced LTRs provided an evaluation of the impact on safety system.-

failure frequencies caused by these changes. The LTRs concluded that, while the changes would-cause small increases in safety system failure frequencies, the increase in total risk would be insignificant, because the increased risk L

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_i i due to safety system failure is substantially offset by the reduction in risk due to the decreased frequency of testing-induced safety system actuations, i

equipment wear, and TS imposed shutdown transients.

The NRC staff reviewed these LTRs and issued safety evaluations (References 9 through 15) approving the proposed changes on a generic basis.

Each of the staff safety evaluations contains requirements for individual licensees to perform plant-specific evaluations to demonstrate that the LTRs are applicable to their facility.

Each of the staff safety evaluations indicated that, provided the LTR is demonstrated to be applicable to the licensee's. facility, proposals which a e consistent with the approved LTRs would be considered acceptable to the staff.

The licensee's evaluations regarding the applicability of the LTRs to RBS are discussed below:

1.

A BWR 6 RPS relay model plant was used for the generic analysis of Reference 2.

RBS is a BWR 6'with a standard RPS relay system.

Furthermore, the licensee's January 14, 1994, submittal included a copy of GE Report MDE-92-0485 (Reference 16), which concludes that the generic analysis in Reference 2 is applicable to RBS.

2.

The licensee has confirmed that the control rod block instrumentation configuration described in Reference 3 is identical to that at RBS.

3.

The licensee stated that the RBS configuration for isolation actuation instrumentation common to the RPS and ECCS is essentially the same as the generic configuration modeled in Reference 4.

Any differences are bounded by those differences specifically analyzed in Section 3.2 of Reference 4.

4.

The licensee stated that Section 5.5 and Appendix C of Reference 5 address RBS plant specific requirements.

The licensee verified the accuracy of the information contained in the LTR.

5.

A generic BWR 5/6 relay plant was modeled in Reference 6.

In addition, Section 5.5 of Reference 6 documented the analyses of three enveloping cases to model known differences in instrumentation logic or support system configuration.

The licensee's January 14, 1994, submittal included a copy of GE Report RE-029 (Reference 17), which indicated that there are four differences between the Reference 6 generic model and RBS.

Reference 17 indicated that two of the enveloping cases in Section 5.5 of Reference 6 bound these differences and concluded that the generic analyses in Reference 6 are applicable to RBS.

6.

The licensee stated that the specification changes proposed in accordance with References 7 and 8 are bounded by the analyses presented in

. References 2 through 6.

Based on the above information, the staff concludes that the licensee has satisfactorily demonstrated that the LTRs are applicable to RBS, and may be referenced to support proposed changes which are consistent with the approved l

LTRs.

_ In addition to the above required verifications, the staff's safety evaluation approving Reference 2 requires licensees to confirm that the differences between the parts of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) that perform trip functions-in their plants and those of the base case plant were evaluated in a plant-specific analysis using the procedures of Appendix K of Reference 2.

The RBS plant-specific analysis was documented in Reference 16. This report utilized the procedures of Appendix K of Reference 2 to identify and evaluate the RPS differences.

The results of this analysis indicated that while the RBS and base case RPS configurations have several differences, the differences do not have a significant impact on the generic conclusions.

The staff concludes that the licensee has satisfied the requirement of the staff's safety evaluation approving Reference 2 to evaluate RPS configuration differences.

The staff safety evaluations approving the LTRs also contain requirements for licensees to demonstrate that the drift characteristics for the applicable instrumentation are bounded by the assumptions used in the LTRs when the functional test interval is extended from monthly to quarterly. The licensee has reviewed current drift information provided by the equipment vendors and the applicable setpoint calculations for RBS instruments in response to these requirements.

The licensee stated that the RBS setpoint calculation methodology assumed 18-month trip unit calibration intervals and therefore is not affected by the proposed changes.

In addition, sensor calibration intervals for instrumentation affected by the proposed changes were verified by the licensee to be equal to or longer than once per quarter and are therefore unaffected by the proposed changes.

Therefore, the licensee concluded that the drift characteristics of the affected instrumentation are bounded by the assumptions used in the LTRs.

The staff agrees with this licensee conclusion since it is e

consistent with the clarification regarding instrument drift allowances provided in a letter from the NRC to the BWR Owners Group (Reference 18).

The staff concludes that the licensee has satisfied the requirements to-demonstrate that the LTRs are applicable to.RBS and verify that existing instrumentation drift characteristics are bounded by the LTR analyses.

The changes proposed by the licensee are consistent with the anproved LTRs, as modified by the staff's guidance contained in Reference 1 regarding loss-of-function conditions.

The affected instrumentation will continue to be able to

-perform its intended safety function with the revised TS requirements in effect. Therefore, the proposed changes are acceptable to the staff.

The i

licensee's specific proposed changes are presented below.

2.1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL-SPECIFICATION CHANGES TS 3/4.3.1 - Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation ACTIONS a. and b. for TS 3.3.1 specify actions to be taken in the event that the number of. operable RPS instrumentation channels is less than required by TS Table 3.3.1-1.

The licensee proposed changes to ACTIONS a. and b. to e

increase the allowed outage times for inoperable RPS instrumentation.

The proposed changes, would revise ACTIONS a. and b. to read:

a.

With one channel required by Table 3.3.1-1 inoperable in one or more Functional Units, place the inoperable channel and/or that Trip System in the tripped condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

b.

With two or more channels required by Table 3.3.1-1 inoperable in one or more functional Units; 1.

Within one hour, verify sufficient channels remain OPERABLE or in the tripped condition to maintain trip capability in the Functional Unit, and 2.

Within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , place the inope,rable channel (s) in one trip system and/or that Trip System in the tripped condition, and 3.

Within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , restore the inoperable channels in the other Trip System to an OPERABLE status or place the inoperable channels in the tripped condition.

Otherwise, take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.1-1 for the Functional Unit.

An inoperable channel or trip system need not be placed in the tripped condition where this would cause the Trip Function to occur.

In these cases, if the inoperable channel is not restored to OPERABLE status within the required time, the ACTION required by Table 3.3.1-1 for the Functional Unit shall be taken.

This ACTION applies to that Trip System with the most inoperable channels; if both Trip Systems have the same number of inoperable channels, the ACTION can be applied to either Trip System.

The proposed changes to ACTIONS a. and b. for TS 3.3.1 would increase and clarify the time permitted to place an inoperable RPS instrumentation channel in the tripped condition when the number of operable channels is less than required.

These changes are acceptable since they are consistent with Reference 2 and with current NRC staff positions and related guidance provided in Reference 1 to ensure that a loss-of-function will not exist if two or more channels are inoperable.

. The proposed change to Note (a) of TS Table 3.3.1-1 would revise the note to read:

(a) A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped condition provided at least one OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.

The change to Note (a) on TS Table 3.3.1-1 would increase the time permitted for an RPS instrumentation channel to be declared inoperable for surveillance purposes without placing the channel in the tripped condition from 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . This proposed change is consistent with the provisions of Reference 2 and is, therefore, acceptable.

The proposed changes to TS Table 4.3.1.1-1 would decrease the channel functional test interval requirement for Functional Unit 13, Manual Scram, from monthly to weekly and would increase the channel functional test interval requirement from weekly or monthly to quarterly for the following Functional Units:

2.

Average Power Range Monitor b.

Flow-Biased Simulated Thermal Power - High c.

Neutron Flux - High d.

Inoperative 3.

Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High 4.

Reactor Vessel Water level - Low, Level 3 5.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, level 8 6.

Main Steam Line Isolation Valve - Closure 7.

Main Steam Line Radiation - High 8.

Drywell Pressure - High 9.

Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High a.

Level Transmitter 10.

Turbine Stop Valve - Closure 11.

Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure - Low The proposed change to footnote (g) of TS Table 4.3.1.1-1 would revise the frequency of certain trip unit setpoint calibrations from at least once per 31 days to at least once per 92 days. This footnote is applicable to the following Functional Units:

3.

Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High 4.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 5.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, level 8

)

8.

Drywell Pressure - High 9.

Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High a.

Level Transmitter 10.

Turbine Stop Valve - Closure 11.

Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low The proposed changes to footnote (g) and to TS Table 4.3.1.1-1 are consistent with References 2 and 16 and are, therefore, acceptable.

TS 3/4.3.2 _Iyolation Actuation Instrumentation ACTIONS b. and c. for TS 3.3.2 specify actions to be taken in the event that the number of operable isolation actuation instrumentation channels is less than the minimum required by Table 3.3.2-1.

The proposed changes would revise ACTIONS b. and c. to read:

i

< b.

With the number of OPER.ABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirements for one Trip

System, 1.

Within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for trip functions 1.b, 2.b, 3.b, 6.c, 6.e, and 6.f, and 2.

Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for trip functions other than 1.b, 2.b, 3.b, 6.c, 6.e, and 6.f, place the inoperable channel (s) and/or that Trip System in the tripped condition.

c.

With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirements for both Trip Systems, 1.

Within one hour, place the inop,erable channel (s) in one Trip System and/or that Trip System in the tripped condition,

and 2.

Within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for trip functions 1.b, 2.b, 3.b, 6.c, 6.e, and 6.f, and within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for trip functions other than 1.b, 2.b, 3.b, 6.c, 6.e, and 6.f, place the inoperable channel (s) in the remaining Trip System in the tripped condition.

An inoperable channel or Trip System need not be placed in the tripped condition where this would cause the Trip Function to occur. In these cases, if the inoperable channel is not restored to OPERABLE status within the required time, the ACTION required by Table 3.3.2-1 for the Functional Unit shall be taken.

This ACTION applies to that Trip System with the most inoperable channels; if both Trip Systems have the same number of inoperable channels, the ACTION can be applied to either Trip System.

The proposed changes to Actions b. and c. for TS 3.3.2 would increase and clarify the time permitted to place an inoperable channel in the tripped condition when the number of operable channels is less than required.

These changes are acceptable since they are consistent with References 4 and 5 and with current NRC staff positions and related guidance provided in Reference 1.

j The proposed change to Note (a) of TS Table 3.3.2-1 would revise the note to read:

(a)

A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped condition provided at least one other OPERABLE channel in the same Trip System is monitoring that parameter.

The change to Note (a) on TS Table 3.3.1-1 would increase the time permitted for an isolation actuation instrumentation channel to be declared inoperable for surveillance purposes without placing the channel in the tripped condition from 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

This proposed change is consistent with the provisions of References 4 and 5 and is, therefore, acceptable.

The proposed changes to TS Table 4.3.2.1-1 would increase the channel functional test interval requirement for the following Trip Functions from monthly to quarterly:

1.

Primary Containment Isolation 2.

Main Steam Line Isolation 3.

Secondary Containment Isolation 4.

Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU) Isolation 5.

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) Isolation (Note: excludes item 5.n, Manual Initiation) l 6.

Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System Isolation The proposed change to footnote (a) of TS Table 4.3.2.1-1 would-revise the frequency of channel functional testing on circuitry associated with the RWCU isolation on standby liquid control system (SLCS) initiation from at least once every other 31 days per logic channel to at least once every other 92 days per logic channel.

The proposed change to footnote (b) of TS Table 4.3.2.1-1 would revise the frequency of certain trip unit setpoint calibrations from at least once per 31 days to at least once per 92 days.

This footnote is applicable to the following isolation signals:

1.

Primary Containment Isolation a.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Level 2 b.

Drywell Pressure - High 2.

Main Steam Line Isolation a.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low Level I c.

Main Steam Line Pressure - Low d.

Main Steam Line flow - High e.

Condenser Vacuum - Low f.

Main Steam Line Area Temperature - High (Turbine Building) 3.

Secondary Containment Isolation a.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Level 2 b.

Drywell Pressure - High 4.

RWCU Isolation e.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Level 2 5.

RCIC Isolation a.

RCIC Steam Line Flow - High c.

RCIC Steam Supply Pressure - Low d.

RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure - High 1.

RHR/RCIC Steam flow - High m.

Drywell Pressure - High 6.

RHR System Isolation c.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Level 3 d.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low Level 1 e.

Reactor Vessel (RHR Cut-in Permissive) Pressure - High f.

Drywell Pressure - High The proposed changes to TS Table 4.3.2.1-1 and footnotes (a) and (b) are consistent with References 4 and 5 and are, therefore, acceptable.

TS 3/4.3.3 - Emeraency Core Coolino System Actuation Instrumentation The proposed change to footnote (a) of TS Table 3.3.3-1 would increase the time permitted for an ECCS channel to be placed in an inoperable status for surveillance purposes without placing the trip system in the tripped condition from 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

This proposed change is consistent with the provisions of Reference 6 and is, therefore, acceptable.

The licensee proposed several changes to the Table 3.3.3-1 ACTION statements to increase allowed outage times and address potential loss-of-function conditions.

The specific changes are discussed below.

ACTION 30 currently applies to the following ECCS actuation instrumentation channels:

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low Level 1 Drywell Pressure - High Reactor Vessel Pressure - Low (LPCS/LPCI [ Low-Pressure Core Spray / Low-Pressure Coolant Injection] Injection Valve Permissive)

ACTION 30 currently requires that if one channel is inoperable and the number of operable channels is less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip function requirement, the inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within I hour or the associated system must be declared inoperabl e.

If more than one channel is inoperable, the associated system must be declared inoperable.

The proposed change to ACTION 30 would require verification within one hour that sufficient instrumentation is operable or in the tripped condition to maintain automatic actuation capability of at least one division of ECCS and automatic depressurization system (ADS), and would require that the inoperable channel (s) be placed in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

If a loss-of-function condition exists or it is not desirable to place the inoperable channel (s) in the tripped condition, the associated systems would be declared ' inoperable.

~

. ACTION 31 currently applies to the following ECCS actuation instrumentation channels:

i LPCI Pump Start Time Delay Relay LPCS Pump Start Time Delay Relay ADS Timer Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Level 3 (Permissive)

LPCS Pump Discharge Pressure - High (Permissive)

LPCI Pump Discharge Pressure - High (Permissive)

ADS Drywell Pressure Bypass Timer Reactor Vessel Water Level - High Level 8 ACTION 31 currently requires that if the number of operable channels is less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip function requirement, the associated ADS trip system or ECCS must be declared inoperable.

The licensee proposed to revise the ACTION requirement for the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Level 3 (Permissive) ECCS actuation instrumentation from ACTION 31 to ACTION 30.

As noted above, ACTION 30 provides the option of placing an inoperable channel in the tripped condition.

The licensee stated that this should be an acceptable alternative to declaring the associated ADS trip system inoperable for this instrumentation trip function.

Placing the inoperable channel in the tripped condition would still enable automatic initiation of ADS upon receipt of a Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low Level 1 signal.

The licensee proposed to revise the ACTION requirement for the Reactor Vessel Water Level - High Level 8 ECCS actuation instrumentation from ACTION 31 to.

ACTION 33.

A loss-of-function check is not required for this actuation instrumentation, since the loss of one channel results in a loss of the function (two-out-of-two logic). This loss was considered during:the development of Reference 6 and was considered acceptable for the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowed by the proposed' revision to ACTION 33 discussed below.

For the-remaining channels, the proposed change to ACTION-31 would require verification within one hour that sufficient instrumentation is operable or in

-the tripped condition to maintain automatic actuation capability.of at least one division of ECCS and ADS, and would provide a period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months before the associated ADS trip system or ECCS must be declared inoperable.

ACTION 32 applies to the Reactor' Vessel Pressure - Low (LPCS/LPCI Injection Valve Permissive)- actuation instrumentation channels in Operational Conditions 4.and 5 when the LPCS/LPCI systems are required to be operable. ' ACTION 32 currently requires that if the number of operable channels is less;than.

i required by the minimum ' operable channels per trip function requirement, the l

inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . -The l

proposed change to ACTION 32 would provide a period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months before the l

associated channel must.be placed in the tripped condition.

-l

, :- ~ ; -.

.- ACTION 33 currently applies to the following ECCS actuation instrumentation channels:

LPCS Pump Discharge Flow - Low (Bypass)

LPCI Pump Discharge Flow - Low (Bypass)

LPCS Manual Initiation LPCI Manual Initiation ADS Manual Inhibit Switch High-Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Pump Discharge Pressure - High (Bypass)

HPCS System Flow Rate - Low (Permissive)

HPCS Manual Initiatior.

ACTION 33 currently requires that if the number of operable channels is less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip function requirement, the inoperable channel must be restored to operable status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or the associated ADS valve or ECCS must be declared inoperable.

The proposed change to ACTION 33 would provide a period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to restore an inoperable channel.

The LPCS/LPCI Pump Discharge Flow - Low (Bypass) actuation instrumentation channels require verification that a loss-of-function condition does not exist;.however, the proposed ACTION 33 does not require a loss-of-function check.

Therefore, the licensee proposed to revise the action requirement for this instrumentation from ACTION 33 to new ACTION 38 "This new action statement would require verification within one hour that sufficient instrumentation _is operable or in the tripped condition to maintain automatic actuation capability of at least one division of ECCS,.and would require that the inoperable channel (s) be restored to operable status within 7 days.

If a loss-of-function condition exists or the inoperable channel (s) cannot be restored to operable status, the associated system (s) would be declared inoperable.

The licensee proposed to revise the ACTION requirement for the HPCS Pump Discharge Pressure - High (Bypass) and the HPCS System Flow Rate - Low (Permissive) ECCS actuation instrumentation from ACTION 33 to new ACTION 39.

ACTION 39 would provide a period of 7 days to restore an inoperable channel to operable status before requiring that'the HPCS system be declared inoperable.

ACTION 34 currently applies to the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low-Level 2 and Drywell Pressure - High ECCS actuation instrumentation channels that actuate HPCS. ACTION 34 currently requires that if the number of-operable channels is less than required by the minimum operable, channels per -

trip function' requirement for one trip system, that trip system must be placed in the tripped condition within I hour or the HPCS system must be declared inoperable; and if the number of operable channels is less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip function requirement for both trip system, the HPCS system must be declared inoperable.

Footnote'(e) of Table 3.3.3-1 clarifies the trip system boundaries for these inputs to the HPCS actuation logic, specifying that each of these functions uses a one-out-of-two taken twice logic, such that each one-out-of-two logic is defined as a separate trip system for this ACTION.

The proposed change to ACTION 34 would

--. =.

require verification that a sufficient number of channels remain operable or i

are in the tripped condition to maintain automatic HPCS actuation capability, and would require that the inoperable channel (s) be placed in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

If a loss-of-function condition exists or it is not desirable to place the inoperable channel (s) in the tripped condition, the HPCS system would be declared inoperable.

Footnote (e) to Table 3.3.3-1 would be deleted, as the revised ACTION 34 eliminates the dependence.of the action to be taken on the number of trip systems affected, so the footnote is no longer necessary.

ACTION 35 applies to the Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low and Suppression Pool Water Level - High channels.

The current ACTION 35 requires that if the number of operable channels is less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip function requirement, at least one inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within I hour or the HPCS system must be declared inoperable. -The proposed change to ACTION 35 would require verification that the HPCS pump suction is aligned to or is capable of automatically realigning to the suppression pool and would require that the inoperable channel (s) be placed in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

If a loss-of-function condition exists or it is not desirable to place the inoperable channel (s) in the tripped condition (or to realign the HPCS pump suction to the suppression pool), the HPCS system would be declared inoperable.

Verification of sufficient operable or tripped instrumentation channels ensures that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels result in redundant automatic initiation capability being lost for the affected feature (s).

Provided that sufficient instrumentation is operable or tripped, Reference 6 demonstrated that an allowable out-of-service time'of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is acceptable to permit restoration of an inoperable channel L operable status.

The 7 day A0T of ACTIONS 38 and 39 is longer than the approved 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months A0T contained in Reference 6, but is consistent with the A0T provided in Reference'l.

The 7 day A0T proposed for these instrumentation trip functions is acceptable based on the remaining capability of the associated ECCS subsystems, the redundancy available in the ECCS design, and the low probability of a design basis accident occurring during this longer allowed out of service time.

If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to operable status within the allowed out-of-service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition.

Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore the capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue. Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as.in the case where placing the inoperable channel in. trip would result in an initiation), the associated system (s) must be' declared inoperable.

The. proposed changes to TS Table 3.3.3-1 are acceptable since they are consistent with References 6 and 17, and with current NRC staff positions and related guidance provided in Reference 1 to ensure that a loss-of-function condition will not exist if two or more channels are inoperable.

The proposed changes 1o TS Table 4.3.3.1-1 would extend the channel functional test interval requirement from monthly to quarterly for the Division I, Division II, and Division III Trip Systems, except for the Manual Initiation trip function for each trip system, which would remain at a frequency of once per cycle.

The proposed change to footnote (a) on Table 4.3.3.1-1 would revise the frequency of certain trip unit setpoint calibrations from at least once per 31 days to at least once per 92 days. This footnote is applicable to the following ECCS actuation instrumentation:

A.I.

RHR-A (LPCI Mode) and LPCS System a.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low Level 1 b.

Drywell Pressure - High c.

LPCS Pump Discharge Flow - Low d.

Reactor Vessel Pressure - Low (LPCS/LPCI Injection Valve Permissive) f.

LPCI Pump A Discharge Flow - Low A.2.

Automatic Depressurization System Trip System "A" a.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low Level I b.

Drywell Pressure - High d.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Level 3 e.

LPCS Pump Discharge Pressure - High f.

LPCI Pump A Discharge Pressure - High B.l.

F.HR-B and C (LPCI Mode) a.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low Level 1 b.

Drywell Pressure - High c.

Reactor Vessel Pressure - Low (LPCI Injection Valve Permissive) e.

LPCI Pump Discharge Flow - Low B.2.

Automatic Depressurization Sy. stem Trip System "B" a.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low Level 1 b.

Drywell Pressure - High d.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Level 3 e.

LPCI Pump B and C Discharge Pressure - High C.1.

HPCS. System a.

Reactor Vesse! Water Level - Low Low Level 2 b.

Drywell Pressure - High c.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - High Level 8 d.

Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low e.

Suppression Pool Water Level - High f.

Pump Discharge Pressure - High g.

HPCS System Flow Rate - Low The proposed changes to TS Table 4.3.3.1-1 are consistent with References 6 and 17 and are, therefore, acceptable.

TS 3/4.3.4 Recirculation Pump Trio Actuation Instrumentation The footnote on Table 3.3.4.1-1 currently states that one anticipated transient without scram recirculation pump trip (ATWS-RPT) trip system may be 1

placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for required surveillance provided the other trip system is operable.

The proposed change to this footnote would increase the allowable time for surveillance from 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

i The proposed revisions to TS Table 4.3.4.1-1 would change the channel functional test interval requirement from monthly to quarterly for the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Level 2 and the Reactor Vessel Pressure - High trip functions.

The proposed addition of footnote (a) to Table 4.3.4.1-1 would clarify that the trip unit setpoint calibration should be performed at an interval of at least once per 92 days.

This ensures consistency with other related changes proposed in this submittal.

The proposed changes to TS Tables 3.3.4.1-1 and 4.3.4.1-1 are consistent with Reference 7 and are, therefore, acceptable.

ACTION b. for TS 3.3.4.2 currently requires that the inoperable end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip (E0C-RPT) instrumentation channel (s) be placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months if the number of operable channels is one less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip system requirement for one or both trip systems.

The proposed change to ACTION b. would extend the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months for placing the inoperable channel (s) in the tripped condition to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

ACTION c.l. for TS 3.3.4.2 currently requires that both inoperable channels be placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months if the number of operable E0C-RPT channels is two or more less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip system requirement for one trip system and if the inoperable channels consist of one turbine control valve channel and one turbine stop valve channel.

The proprsed change to ACTION c.l. would extend the I hour period to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

The proposed 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months A0T for ACTIONS b. and c.l. is longer than the approved 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months A0T contained in Reference 7, but is consistent with the A0T provided in Reference 1.

The longer A0T is acceptable because of the diversity of sensors available to provide trip signals, the low probability of multiple inoperabilities affecting all diverse instrumentation trip functions, and the low probability of an event requiring the initiation of an EOC-RPT.

The proposed change to footnote (a) on Table 3.3.4.2-1 would revise the amount of time that an E0C-RPT trip system may be placed in an inoperable status for required surveillance from 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

This proposed change is consistent with Reference 7 and is, therefore, acceptable.

The proposed changes to TS Table 4.3.4.2.1-1 would revise the channel functional test interval requirement for the Turbine Stop Valve - Closure and the Turbine Control Valve - Fast Closure trip functions from monthly to quarterly.

i i

The proposed change to footnote # on Table 4.3.4.2.1-1 would revise the frequency of the first stage pressure transmitter trip unit setpoint calibration from at least once per 31 days to at least once per 92 days.

The propored changes to TS Table 4.3.4.2.1-1 are consistent with Reference 7 and are, therefore, acceptable.

TS 3/4.3.5 Reactor Core Isolation Coolina System Actuation Instrumentation Footnote (a) on TS Table 3.3.5-1 currently permits a RCIC system actuation instrument channel to be placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for required surveillance.

The proposed change to footnote (a) would extend the 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

The licensee proposed several changes to Table 3.3.5-1 ACTION statements to increase allowed outage times and address potential loss-of-function conditions.

The specific changes are discussed below.

Action 50 applies to the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Level 2 RCIC actuation instrumentation functional unit. ACTION 50 currently requires that if the number of operable channels is less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip function requirement for one trip system, that trip system must be placed in the tripped condition within I hour or the RCIC-system must be declared inoperable; and if the number of operable channels is less than roquired by the minimum operable channels per trip function requirement for both trip systems, the RCIC system must be declared inoperable.

Footnote (b) of Table 3.3.5-1 clarifies the trip system boundaries for these inputs to the RCIC actuation logic, specifying that each l

of these functions uses a one-out-of-two taken twice logic,'such that'each one-out-of-two logic is defined as a separate trip system for this action statement. The proposed change to ACTION 50 would require verification that a j

sufficient number of channels remain operable or are in the tripped condition l

to maintain automatic RCIC actuation capability, and would-require that the inoperable channel (s) be placed in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

If a loss-of-function condition exists or it is not desirable to place the inoperable channel (s) in the tripped condition, the RCIC system would be declared inoperable.

Footnote (b) to Table 3.3.5-1 would be deleted, as the revised ACTION 50 eliminates the dependence of the action to be taken on the number of trip systems affected, so the footnote is no longer necessary.

Action 51 applies to the Reactor Vessel Water Level - High Level 8 RCIC actuation instrumentation functional unit. ACTION 51 currently requires that 1

if the number of operable channels is less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip function requirement, the RCIC system must be declared inoperable.

The proposed change to ACTION 51 would provide an allowed outage time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months before requiring the RCIC system to.be declared inoperable. A loss-of-function check is not required for this actuation instrumentation, since the loss of one channel results in a loss of the function (two-out-of-two logic).

This loss was considered during the development of' Reference 6 and was considered acceptable for the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowed by the proposed revision to ACTION 51.

l Action 52 applies to the Condensate Storage Tank Water Level - Low and Suppression Pool Water Level - High RCIC actuation instrumentation functional units.

The current ACTION 52 requires that if the number of operable channels is less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip function requirement, at least one inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within I hour or the RCIC system must be declared inoperable. The proposed change to ACTION 52 would require verification that the RCIC pump suction is aligned to or is capable of automatically realigning to the suppression pool and would require that at least one inoperable channel be placed in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

If a loss-of-function condition exists or it is not desirable to place the inoperable channel (s) in the tripped condition (or to realign the RCIC pump suction to the suppression pool), the RCIC system would be declared inoperable.

Action 53 applies to the Manual Initiation RCIC instrumentation functional unit. Action 53 currently specifies that the inoperable channel must be restored to operable status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or the RCIC system must be declared inoperable if the number of operable channels is one less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip system requirement.

The proposed change to Action 53 would extend the 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Verification of sufficient operable or tripped instrumentation channels ensures that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels result in redundant automatic RCIC initiation capability being lost.

Provided that sufficient instrumentation is operable or tripped, Reference 6 demonstrated that an allowable out-of-service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is acceptable to permit restoration of an inoperable channel to operable status.

If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to operable status within the allowable out-of-service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition.

Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue.

Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an initiation), the RCIC system must be declared inoperable.

The proposed changes to TS Table 3.3.5-1 are consistent with Reference 8 and with current NRC staff positions and related guidance provided in Reference 1 and are, therefore, acceptable.

The proposed changes to TS Table 4.3.5.1-1 would revise the channel functional test interval requirement for the following RCIC trip functions from monthly to quarterly:

a.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Level 2 b.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - High Level 8 c.

Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low

{

d.

Suppression Pool Water Level - High The proposed change to footnote (a) on Table 4.3.5.1-1 would revise the frequency of certain trip unit setpoint calibrations from at least once per 31 days to at least once per 92 days.

This footnote is applicable to the same RCIC actuation instrumentation identified as trip functions a. through d.

above.

The proposed changes to TS Table 4.3.5.1-1 are consistent with Reference 8 and are, therefore, acceptable.

TS 3/4.3.6 Control Rod Block Instrumentation The licensee has proposed to add footnote (e) to TS Table 3.3.6-1 to allow a control rod block instrumentation channel to be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped condition, provided at least one other operable channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.

The licensee proposed to add new ACTION 63 to Table 3.3.6-1 to increase allowed outage times and address potential loss-of-function conditions.

ACTION 62 on TS Table 3.3.6-1 currently specifies that an inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months if the minimum number of operable channels is less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip system requirement. The proposed revision would change the action requirement for the Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High and the Reactor Coolant System Recirculation Flow Upscale trip functions from ACTION 62 to new ACTION 63.

The proposed ACTION 63 would require verification that sufficient channels remain operable to initiate a rod block by the associated trip function and would require that at least one inoperable channel be placed in the tripped condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

If a loss-of-function condition exists or it is not desirable to place the inoperable channel (s) in the tripped condition ACTION 63 would require that a rod block be initiated.

The proposed changes to TS Table 3.3.6-1 are consistent with Reference 7 and with current NRC staff positions and related guidance provided in Reference 1 and are, therefore, acceptable.

The proposed changes to TS Table 4.3.6-1 would modify the channel functional test interval requirement for the following control rod block trip functions from monthly to quarterly:

1.

Rod Pattern Control System 2.

Average Power Range Monitor 5.

Scram Discharge Volume 6.

Reactor Coolant System Recirculation Flow The proposed change to footnote # on Table 4.3.6-1 would revise the frequency of certain trip unit setpoint calibrations from once per 31 days to once per 92 days. This footnote is applicable to the Rod Pattern Control System and the Scram Discharge Volume control rod block instrumentation.

The proposed changes to TS Table 4.3.6-1 are consistent with Reference 3 and are, therefore, acceptable.

TS 3/4.3.7 Monitorina Instrumentation The proposed revision to TS Table 4.3.7.1-1 would change the channel functional test interval requirement for the Main Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitors from monthly to quarterly.

This proposed change is consistent with Reference 7 and is, therefore, acceptable.

TS 3/4.3.9 Plant Systems Actuation Instrumentation The licensee has proposed to add footnote (a) to TS Table 3.3.9-1.

This footnote would permit a single channel to be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped condition, provided at least one other operable channel in the same trip system is monitoring the trip function.

ACTION 150 currently applies to the Drywell pressure - High plant systems actua{ ion instrumentation channel.

ACTION 150 currently requires that if one channel is inoperable and the number of operable channels is less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip function requirement, the inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or the associated system must be declared inoperable.

The proposed change to ACTION 150 would require that the inoperable channel be placed in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

The proposed change to TS Table 4.3.9.1-1 would revise the channel functional test interval requirement for the Primary Containment Ventilation System -

Unit Cooler A and B and the Feedwater System / Main Turbine Trip System trip functions from monthly to quarterly.

The proposed change to footnote (a) on Table 4.3.9.1-1 would revise the frequency of certain trip unit setpoint calibrations from once per 31 days to once per 92 days.

This footnote is applicable to the following plant systems actuation instrumentation:

j 1.

Primary Containment Ventilation System - Unit Cooler A and B a.

Drywell Pressure - High b.

Containment-to-Annulus AP-High c.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low Level 1 The proposed changes to TS Tables 3.3.9-1 and 4.3.9.1-1 are consistent with Reference 7 and are, therefore, acceptable.

TS 3/4.4.2 Safetv/ Relief Valves The proposed change would revise TS 4.4.2.1.1 and TS 4.4.2.1.2 to change the channel functional test interval for the safety / relief valve acoustic monitors and the relief valve function pressure actuation instrumentation from at least once per 31 days to at least once per 92 days.

The proposed change would also add a footnote that would permit an acoustic monitor or pressure actuation instrumentation channel to be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped condition.

i i

_ The proposed changes to TS 4.4.2.1.1 and TS 4.4.2.1.2 are consistent with Reference 7 and are, therefore, acceptable.

The proposed change would revise TS 4.4.2.2.1 to change the channel functional test interval for the Safety / Relief Valve Low-Low Set Function instrumentation -

from at least once per 31 days to at least one.e per 92 days. The' proposed change would also add a footnote to TS 4.4.2.2.1 that would permit a Safety / Relief Valve Low-Low Set Function instrumentation channel to be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped condition provided all other Safety / Relief Valve Low-Low Set Function instrumentation channels are operable.

The proposed changes'to TS 4.4.2.2.1 are consistent with Reference 7 and are, therefore, acceptable.

The proposed changes would also modify the Bases for.TS 3/4.3.1, 3/4.3.2, 3/4.3.3, 3/4.3.4, 3/4.3.5, 3/4.3.6, 3/4.3.9, and 3/4.4.2 to reference the GE LTRs which justify the above proposed changes and provide bases for operator actions during surveillance and repair of instrument channels.

The NRC staff offers no objection to the proposed changes to the Bases.

The propose ~ changes would also modify TS Index pages xvi and xvii to reflect the changes to the Bases.

The conforming, administrative changes to the TS Index pages are acceptable.

t

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Louisiana official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment.

The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements.

The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (59 FR 21787). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c) (9).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be-prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

p

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:

(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance witn the Comnission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

6.0 REFERENCES

1.

NUREG-1434, " Standard Technical Specifications - GE BWR/6 Plants,"

September 1992.

2.

NEDC-30851P, " Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for BWR Reactor Protection System," dated March 1988.

3.

NEDC-30851P (Supplement 1), " Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Control Rod Block Instrumentation," dated October 1988.

4.

NEDC-30851P (Supplement 2), " Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation," dated March 1989.

5.

NEDC-3167?P, " Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation," dated July 1990.

6.

NEDC-30936P, "BWR Owner's Group Technical Specification Improvement Methodology (With Demonstration for BWR ECCS Actuation Instrumentation)

Parts 1 and 2," dated December 1988.

7.

GENE-770-06-01, " Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," dated February 1991.

8.

GENE-770-06-02, " Addendum to Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," dated February 1991.

9.

Letter and enclosed safety evaluatic-n approving NEDC-30851P dated July 15, 1987, from A. C. Thadani (NRC) te T. A. Pickens (BWR Owners Group).

10.

Letter and enclosed safety evaluation approving NEDC-30851P (Supplement

2) dated January 6, 1989, from C. E. Rossi (NRC) to D. N. Grace (BWR Owners Group).

11.

Letter and enclosed safety evaluation approving NEDC-30851P (Supplement

1) dated September 22, 1988, from C. E. Rossi (NRC) to D. N. Grace (BWR Owners Group).

12.

Letter and enclosed safety evaluation approving NEDC-31677P dated June 18, 1990, from C. E. Rossi (NRC) to S. D. Floyd (BWR Owners Group).

13.

Letter and enclosed safety evaluation approving NEDC-30936P dated December 9, 1988, from C. E. Rossi (NRC) to D. N. Grace (BWR Owners Group).

j 14.

Letter and enclosed safety evaluation approving GENE-770-06-01 dated July 21, 1992, from C. E. Rossi (NRC) to R. D. Bing IV (BWR Owners Group).

15.

Letter and enclosed safety evaluation approving GENE-770-06-02 dated September 13, 1991, from C. E. Rossi (NRC) to G. J. Beck (BWR Owners Group).

16.

GE Report MDE-92-0485 DRF A00-02119-D, April 1985 (Proprietary),

" Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for the Reactor Protection System for River Bend Station, Unit 1."

17.

GE Report RE-029 DRF A00-02558E, February 1987 (Proprietary), " Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for the Emergency Core Cooling System Actuation Instrumentation for River Bend Station, Unit 1."

18.

Letter dated April 27, 1988, from C. E. Rossi (NRC) to R. F. Janecek (BWR Owners Group).

Principal Contributor:

R. Schaaf Date: August 2, 1994

~

3/4.3' INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1 As a minimum, the reactor protection system instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

]

APPLICABILITY:

As shown in Table 3.3.1-1..

i ACTION:

a.

With one channel required by Table 3.3.1-1 inoperable in one or more i

Functional Units, place the inoperable channel and/or that Trip System in the tripped condition

within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

j b.

With two or more channels required by Table 3.3.1-1 inoperable in one or more functional Units; 1.

Within one hour, verify sufficient channels remain OPERABLE or in the tripped condition

to maintain trip capability in i

the Functional Unit, and 2.

Within six hours, place the inoperable channel (s) in one Trip System and/or that Trip System ** in the tripped condition *, and 3.

Within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , restore the inoperable channels in the other Trip System to an OPERABLE status or place-the

_ inoperable channels in the tripped condition *.

Otherwise, take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.1-1 for the Functional Unit.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.1.1 Each reactor protection system instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.1.1-1.#

4.3.1.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once'per 18 months.***

4.3.1.3 THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each required reactor trip functional unit shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months. Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing.

Each test shall include at least one channel per trip system such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the-total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip system.

An inoperable channel or Trip System need not be placed in the tripped condition where this would cause the Trip Function to occur.

In these cases, if the inoperable channel is not restored to OPERABLE status within the required time, the ACTION required by Table 3.3.1-1 for that Functional Unit shall-be taken.

- This Action applies to that Trip System with the most inoperable channels; if both Trip Systems have the same number of inoperable channels, the ACTION can be applied to either Trip System.

- - Logic System Functional Test period may be extended as identified by note

' p' on Tabl e 4.3.1.1-1.

Channel Calibration period may be extended as identified by notes 'o' and

'q' on Table 4.3.1.1-1.

RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-l Amendment No. 8,17,72,73,74

TABLE 3.3.1-1 5

g REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION g

APPLICABLE MINIMlM g

OPERATIONAL OPERABLE CHANNELS FUNCTIONAL UNIT CONDITIONS PER TRIP SYSTEM (a)

ACTION 1.

Intermediate Range Monitors:

-4 a.

Neutron Flux - High 2

3 1

w 3(b)4 3

2 5

3 3

b.

Inoperative 2

3 1

3, 4 3

2 5

3 3

2.

Average Power Range Monitor IC):

a.

Neutron Flux - High, Setdown 2

3 1

A 3(b)4 3

2 5

3 3

m b.

Flow Blased Simulated Thermal Power - High 1

3 4

c.

Neutron Flux - High 1

3 4

d.

Inoperative 1, 2 3

1 3, 4 3

2 5

3 3

3.

Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High 1, 2(d) 2 1

4.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 1, 2 2

1 5.

Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, 1,)

g Level 8 2

4 6.

Main Steam Line Isolation Valve -

Closure 1(,)

4 10 7.

Main Steam Line Radiation -

High

- 1,2(d) 2 5

8.

_De p il Pressure - High 1,2(I) 2 1

r-e a

w-

TABLE 3.3.1-1 (Continued)

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TABLE NOTATIONS (a) A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for I

required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped condition provided at least one OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.

(b) Unless adequate shutdown margin has been demonstrated per Specification 3.1.1, the " shorting links" shall be removed from the RPS circuitry prior to and during the time any control rod is withdrawn *.

(c) An APRM channel is inoperable if there are less than 2 LPRM inputs per level or less than 11 LPRM inputs to an APRM channel.

(d) This function is not required to be OPERABLE when the reactor pressure vessel head is removed per Specification 3.10.1.

(e) This function shall be automatically bypassed when the reactor mode switch is not in the Run position.

(f) This function is not required to be OPERABLE when DRYWELL INTEGRITY is not required.

(g) With any control rod withdrawn. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

(h) This function shall be automatically bypassed when turbine first stage pressure is s 187 psig,** equivalent to THERMAL POWER less than 40% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

Not required for control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

- To allow for instrumentation accuracy, calibration and drift, a setpoint of s 177 psig turbine first stage pressure shall be used.

RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-5 Amendment No. 74

Table 3.3.1-2 has been deleted.

RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-6 Amendment No. 42, 72,73

i TABLE 4.3.-l.1-1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL OPERATIONAL-CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL CONDITIONS IN WHICH~

FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK TEST CALIBRATION (*)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED j

1. Intermediate Range Monitors:

a.

Neutron Flux - High S/U,S,(b).

S/U(*), W

'R 2

S W

R 3,4,5 i

b.

Inoperative NA W

NA 2,3,4,5

2. Average Power Range Monitor:")

a.

Neutron Flux - High, S/U,S,(b)

S/U(*), W SA 2

Setdown S

W SA 3,4,5 b.

Flow Biased Simulated i

Cd d

Thermal Power - High S,0(h)

S/U(*), Q W "*),SA' "'),R

"')

I i

c.

Neutron Flux - High S

S/U(*), Q W

),

SA 1

.l f

Cd d.

Inoperative NA Q

NA 1,2,3,4,5 l

3. Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High S

Q R('"P"')

1, 2(i)

I t

4. Reactor Vessel Water Level -

l Low, Level 3 S

Q R(8) 1, 2

5. Reactor Vessel Water Level -

High, level 8 S

Q R(8)

I i

6. Main Steam Line Isolation j

Valve - Closure NA Q

R 1

7. Main Steam Line Radiation -

l High S

Q R.

1, 2(i)

8. Drywell Pressure - High S

Q R(S) 1, 2")

l RIVER BEND-- UNIT 1 3/4 3-7 Amendment No. 3,8,9,72,74 f

.I

~-.

TABLE 4.3.1.1-1 (Continued)

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS l

CHANNEL OPERATIONAL l

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL CONDITIONS IN WHICH l

FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK TEST CALIBRATION SURVEILLANCE RE0VIRED i

9. Scram Discharge Volume Water i

Level - High a.

Level Transmitter S

Q R('"P) 1, 2, 5("

l l

b.

Float Switch NA

-Q R

1, 2, 5("

10. Turbine Stop Valve - Closure S(*)

Q(")

R""")

1 l

11. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low S(*)

g(n)

R(8"")

1 l

12. Reactor Mode Switch 4

Shutdown Position NA R

NA 1,2,3,4,5

13. Manual Scram NA W

NA 1,2,3,4,5 I

(a)

Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

(b)

The IRM and SRM channels shall be determined to overlap for at least 1/2 decade during each startup after entering OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 and the IRM and APRM channels shall be determined to overlap for at least 1/2 decade during each controlled shutdown, if not performed within the previous 7 days.

(c)

Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months prior to startup, if not performed within the previous 7 days.

(d)

This calibration shall consist of the adjustment of the APRM channel to conform to the power values calculated by a heat balance during OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 when THERMAL POWER 225% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Adjust the APRM channel if the absolute difference is greater than 2% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

Any APRM channel gain adjustment made in compliance with Specification 3.2.2 shall not be included in determining the absolute difference.

(e)

This calibration shall consist of the adjustment of the APRM flow biased channel to conform to a calibrated flow signal.

l RIVER BEND. UNIT 1

'3/4 3-8 Amendment No. 7b74

TABLE 4.3.1.1-1 (Continued)

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (f)

The LPRMs shall be calibrated at least once per 1000 effective full power hours (EFPH) using the TIP system.

(g)

Calibrate Rosemount trip unit setpoint at least once per 92 days.

l (h)

Verify measured drive flow to be less than or equal to established drive flow at the existing flow control valve position.

(i)

This calibration shall consist of verifying the simulated thermal power time constant is within the limits specified in the COLR.

(j)

This function is not required to be operable when the reactor pressure vessel head is removed per Specification 3.10.1.

(k)

With any control rod withdrawn.

Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

(1)

This function is not required to be OPERABLE when DRYWELL INTEGRITY is not required per Specifica-tion 3.10.1.

(m)

Verify the Turbine Bypass Valves are closed when THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to 40% RATED THERMAL POWER.

(n)

The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall include the turbine first stage pressure instruments.

(o)

The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall exclude the flow reference transmitters; these transmitters shall be calibrated at least once per 18 months, except that this test may be performed during the fifth refueling outage scheduled to begin April 16, 1994.

(p)

The period may be extended to the completion of the fifth refueling outage scheduled to begin April 16, 1994.

(q)

CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be performed during the fifth refueling outage scheduled to begin April 16, 1994.

RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-9 Amendment No. 3,8,42,72,74

INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.2 The isolation actuation instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.2-2.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3.2-1.

ACTION:

a.

With an isolation actuation instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.2-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

b.

With the number of OPERABLE Channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirements for one Trip

System, 1.

Within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for Trip Functions 1.b, 2.b, 3.b, 6.c, 6.e, and 6.f, and 2.

Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for Trip Functions other than 1.b, 2.b, 3.b, 6.c, 6.e, and 6.f, place the inoperable channel (s) and /or that Trip System in the tripped condition *,

c.

With the number of OPERABLE Channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirements for both Trip

Systems, 1.

Within one hour, place the inoperable channel (s) in one Trip System and/or that Trip System ** in the tripped condition *, and 2.

Within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for Trip Functions 1.b, 2.b, 3.b, 6.c, 6 e, and 6.f, and within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for Trip Functions other than 1.b, 2.b, 3.b, 6.c, 6.e, and 6.f, place the inoperable channel (s) in the other Trip System in the tripped condition *.

An inoperable channel or Trip System need not be placed in the tripped condition where this would cause the Trip Function to occur.

In these cases, if the inoperable channel is not restored to OPERABLE status within the required time, the ACTION required by Table 3.3.2-1 for that Trip Function shall be taken.

This ACTION applies to that Trip System with the most inoperable channels; if both Trip Systems have the same number of inoperable channels, the ACTION can be applied to either Trip System.

RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-10 Amendment No. 4 h7h 74

TABLE 3.3.2-1 (Continued)

ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ACTION ACTION 20 -

Be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 2/ hours.

ACTION 21 Close the affected system isolation valve (s) within one hour or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

ACTION 22 Restore the manual initiation function to OPERACLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within tha next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

ACTION 23 Be in at least STARTUP with the associated isolation valves closed within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

ACTION 24 Be in at least STARTUP within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

ACTION 25 -

Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY OPERATING with the standby gas treatment system and Fuel Building Ventilation System (emergency mode) operating ACTION 26 -

Restore the manual initiation function to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or close the affected system isolation valves within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and declare the affected system incperable.

ACTION 27 -

Close the affected system isolation valves within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and declare the affected system inoperable.

ACTION 28 -

Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , initiate and maintain the Fuel Building Ventilation System in the emergency mode of operation.

ACTION 29 -

Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , initiate and maintain annulus mixing system with the reactor building annulus exhaust to at least one operating standby gas treatment train.

ACTION 30 Within I hour, lock the.lffected system isolation valves closed and declare the affected system inoperable.

1 RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-17

TABLE 3.3.2-1 (Continued)

ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ACTION NOTES When handling irradiated fuel in the fuel Building.

May be bypassed with reactor mode switch not in Run and all turbine stop valves closed.

The valve groups listed are designated in Tables 3.6.4-1'and 3.6.5.3-1.

(a) A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for l

required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped condition provided at least one other OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.

1 (b) Also actuates the standby gas treatment system.

(c) Also actuates the main control room air conditioning system in the emergency mode of operation.

(d) Also trips and isolates the air removal pumps.

(e) Also actuates secondary containment ventilation isolation dampers per Table 3.6.5.3-1.

(f) Manual initiation of SLCS. pump C001B closes 1G33*M0VF001, and manual initiation of SLCS pump C001A closes 1G33*MOVF004.

(g) Requires RCIC system steam supply pressure-low coincident with drywell pressure-high.

(h) Also starts the Fuel Building Exhaust Filter Trains A-and B.

(i) Also starts the Annulus Mixing System.

(j) Also actuates the containment hydrogen analyzer / monitor recorder.

(k) Manual initiation isolates the outboard steam supply isolation valve only and only following a manual or automatic initiation of the RCIC system.

(1) Valve IE22*MOVF023 does not isolate on the manual initiation.

l l

i l

l' l

l-RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-18 Amendment No. 74

l 1

1 Table 3.3.2-3 has been deleted.

I 1

)

RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-25 Amendment No. M,73 1

j

TABLE 4.3.2.1-1 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS CHANNEL OPERATIONAL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL CONDITIONS IN WHICH TRIP UNIT CHECK TEST CALIBRATION SURVEILLANCE RE0UIRED

1. PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION

a. Reactor Vessel Water level -

Low Low level 2 S

Q R(

1, 2, 3 l

b. Drywell Pressure - High S

Q R(

LL3 l'

c. Containment Purge Isolation Radiation - High S

Q R

1, 2, 3 l

2. MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION

[

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level -

l Low Low Low level 1 S

Q R<c) 1, 2, 3

b. Main Steam Line Radiation -
High S
Q R(*)
1, 2, 3 l-
c. Main Steam Line Pressure -
Low S
-Q R<b) 3 l
d. Main Steam Line Flcw - High S
Q R<bxc) 1, 2, 3 l
e. Condenser Vacuum - Low S
Q R
1, 2.**, 3**
'l
f. Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature - High S
Q R
I, 2, 3 l
g. Main Steam Line Tunnel' ATemperature - High S
Q R
1, 2, 3 l
h. Main Steam Line Area S
Q Rcb>
1, 2, 3 l_
Temperature-High (Turbine Building)
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-26 Amendment No. 8 9 74 71
--~
i
TABLE 4.3.2.1-1 (Continued)
ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS CHANNEL OPERATIONAL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL CONDITIONS IN WHICH TRIP UNIT CHECK TEST CALIBRATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
3. SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Level 2 S
Q R
1 3
b. Drywell Pressure - High S
Q R(b>
1, 2, 3 l
c. Fuel Building Ventilation l
Exhaust Radiation - High S
Q R
d. Reactor Building Annulus Ventilation Exhaust l
Radiation - High S
Q R
1, 2, 3
4. REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM ISOLATION
a. A Flow - High S
Q R(')
1, 2, 3 l
b. A Flow Timer NA Q
Q")
1, 2, 3 l
c. Equipment Area Temperature -
High S
Q R")
1, 2, 3 l
d. Equipment Area A Temperature - High S
Q R")
1, 2, 3 l
e. Reactor Vessel Water i'
Level - Low Low Level 2 S
Q Rcb><c)
I, 2, 3
f. Main Steam Line Tunnel Ambient l
Temperature - High S
Q R")
1, 2, 3
g. Main Steam Line Tunnel l
A Temperature - High S
Q R")
1, 2, 3
h. SLCS Initiation NA Q(*)
NA")
1, 2, 3 l
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-27 Amendment No. 8 A 74
TABLE 4.3.2.1-1 (Continued)
ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL OPERATIONAL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL CONDITIONS IN WHICH TRIP UNIT CHECK TEST CALIBRATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
5. REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ISOLATION
a. RCIC Steam Line Flow - High S
Q R'b' 1, 2, 3 I
b. RCIC Steam Line Flow-High Timer NA Q
Q 1, 2, 3 i
c. RCIC Steam Supply Pressure -
Low S
Q R'b' 1, 2, 3 l
d. RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure - High S
Q Rcb>
1, 2, 3 l
e. RCIC Equipment Room Ambient Temperature - High 5
Q R
1,2,3 I
f. RCIC Equipment Room A Temperature - High S
Q R
1, 2, 3 l
g. Main Steam Line Tunnel Ambient Temperature - high S
Q R
1,2,3 l
h. Main Steam Line Tunnel l
A Temperature - High S
Q R
1, 2, 3 l
1. Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature Timer NA Q
Q 1, 2, 3 l
j. RHR Equipment Room Ambient Temperature - High S
Q R
1, 2, 3 l
k. RHR Equipment Room A l-Temperature - High S
Q R
1, 2, 3 l
1. RHR/RCIC Steam Line Flow-High S
Q Rcb>
1, 2, 3 I
l l
m. Drywell Pressure-High S
Q R'b' 1, 2, 3 l
n. Manual Initiation NA R
NA 1, 2, 3 i
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-28 Amendment No. 74 l
TABLE 4.3.2.1-1 (Continued)
.ISi)LATION A CTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL OPERATIONAL I:HANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL CONDITIONS IN WHICH TRIP UNIT
_ CHECK TEST CALIBRATION SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREQ
6. RHR SYSTEM ISOLATION
a. RHR Equipment Area Ambient Temperature - High S
Q R
1,2,3 I
b. RHR Equipment Area A Temperature - High S
Q R
1, 2, 3 l
c. Reactor Vessel Water level -
Low level 3 S
Q R(b) 1, 2, 3 i
d. Reactor Vessel Water Level -
Low Low Low Level 1 S
Q Rcb>
1 2, 3 l
e. Reactor. Vessel (RHR Cut-in Permissive) Pressure - High S
Q Rcbiccicd>
1, 2, 3 l
f. Drywell Pressure - High S
Q R(b' 1, 2, 3 1
7. MANUAL INITIATION NA Q
NA 1,2,3 l
When handling irradiated fuel in the Fuel Building.
When the reactor mode switch is in Run and/or any turbine stop valve is open.
(a) Each train or logic channel shall be tested at least every other 92 days.
(b) Calibrate trip unit setpoint'at least once per 92 days.
(c) May be performed during the fifth refueling outage scheduled to begin April 16, 1994.
(d) CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be performed during the fifth refueling outage scheduled to begin April 16, 1994.
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-29 Amendment No. 8,9,72, 74
INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION llMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3 The emergency core cooling system (ECCS) actuation instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.3-2.
APPLICABILITY:
As shown in Table 3.3.3-1.
ACTION:
a.
With an ECCS actuation instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.3-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value, b.
With one or more ECCS actuation instrumentation channels inoperable, take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.3-1.
c.
With either ADS trip system "A" or "B" inoperable, restore the inoperable trip system to OPERABLE status:
1.
Within 7 days, provided that the HPCS and RCIC systems are OPERABLE, or 2.
Within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , provided either the HPCS or the RCIC system is inoperable.
Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and reduce reactor steam come pressure to less than or equal to 100 psig within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.3.1 Each ECCS actuation instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCITONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.3.1-1.##
4.3.3.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months.##
Channel Calibration and Logic System Functional testing period may be extended as identified by note b on Table 4.3.3.1-1.
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-30 Amendment No. 9 72,73 7
TABLE 3.3.3-1 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION i
MINIMUM OPERABLE APPLICABLE CHANNELS PER OPERATIONAL TRIP' FUNCTION TRIP FUNCTION (*)
CONDITIONS ACTION A. DIVISION I TRIP SYSTEM
1. RHR-A (LPCI MODE) & LPCS SYSTEM a.
Reactor Vessel-Water Level - Low low Low Level 1 2 *)
1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
30 l
b.
Drywell Pressure - High 2(b) 1, 2, 3 30 c.
LPCS Pump Discharge Flow-low (Bypass) 1 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*-
38 1
- d.
Reactor Vessel Pressure-Low (LPCS/LPCI Injection 4
1, 2, 3 30 Valve Permissive) 4*, 5*
32 e.
LPCI Pump A Start Time Delay Relay 1
1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
31 f.
LPCI Pump A Discharge Flow-Low (Bypass) 1 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
38 l
g.
LPCS Pump Start Time Delay Relay 1
1, 2, 3, 4*,
5*
31 h.
Manual Initiation 1/ system 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
33
2. AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM TRIP SYSTEM "A""
a.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low Level 1 2"3 1,2,3 30 b.
Drywell Pressure - High 2""
1, 2, 3 30 c.
ADS Timer I
1,2,3 31 d.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low level.3 (Permissive) 1 1,2,3 30 l
e.
LPCS Pump Discharge Pressure-High (Permissive) 2 1,.2, 3 31
- f.
LPCI Pump A Discharge Pressure-High'(Permissive) 2 1,2,3 31 g.
ADS Drywell Pressure Bypass Timer.
2 1, 2, 3 31 h.
ADS Manual Inhibit Switch 1
1,'2, 3 33
i. Manual Initiation 2/ system 1, 2, 3 33 I
a 4
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1
-3/4 3 Amendment No. 74 2
L.
.u.
m
. s m-
.m m
m m----
TABLE 3.3.3-1-(Continued)
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM OPERABLE APPLICABLE l
CHANNELS PER OPERATIONAL TRIP FUNCTION TRIP FUNCTION (*)
CONDITIONS ACTION B. DIVISION II TRIP SYSTEM
1. RHR B & C (LPCI MODE) a.
Reactor Vessel Water level - Low Low Low Level 1 2(b) 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
30 b.
Drywell Pressure - High 2""
1, 2, 3 30 c.
Reactor Vessel Pressure-Low (LPCI Injection Valve 4
1,2,3 30 Permissive) 4*, 5*
32 d.
LPCI Pump B Start Time Delay Relay 1
1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
31 e.
LPCI Pump Discharge Flow - Low'(Bypass) 1/ pump 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
38 l
f.
LPCI Pump C Start Time Delay Relay 1
1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
31 g.
Manual Initiation 1
1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
33
2. AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM TRIP SYSTEM "B""
a.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low Level 1 2cb>
1, 2, 3 30 b.
Drywell Pressure - High 2"3 1, 2, 3 30 c.
ADS Timer 1
1,2,3 31 d.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Level 3 (Permissive) 1 1, 2, 3 ~
30 l
e.
LPCI Pump B and C Discharge Pressure - High 2/ pump 1,2,3 31 (Permissive) f.
ADS Drywell Pressure Bypass Timer 2
1,2,3 31 g.
ADS Manual-Inhibit' Switch 1
1,2,3 33 h.
Manual Initiation 2/ system 1, 2, 3 33 RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-32 Amendment No. 74 4.
~
TABLE 3.3.3-1 (Continued)
EHERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM OPERABLE APPLICABLE CHANNELS PER OPERATIONAL TRIP FUNCTION TRIP FUNCTION (*)
CONDITIONS ACTION C. DIVISION III TRIP' SYSTEM
1. HPCS SYSTEM a.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Lew Low Level 2 4cb>
1, 2, 3, 4*,
5*
34 b.
Drywell Pressure - High 4(b) 1, 2, 3 34 c.
Reactor Vessel Water Level-High level 8 2")
1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
33 d.
Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low 2"U 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
35 e.
Suppression Pool Water Level-High 2"U 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
35 f.
Pump Discharge Pressure-High (Bypass) 1 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
39 g.
HPCS System Flow Rate-Low (Permissive) 1 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
39 h.
Manual Initiation 1
1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
33 MINIMUM APPLICABLE
' TOTAL NO.
CHANNELS OPERABLE OPERATIONAL L
OF CHANNELS TO TRIP CHANNELS CONDITIONS ACTION D. LOSS OF POWER i
1. Division I and II a.
4.16 kv Standby Bus 3/ bus 2/ bus 3/ bus 1, 2, 3, 4**, 5**
36 Undervoltage (Sustained Undervoltage
b. '4.16 kv Standby Bus Under-3/ bus 2/ bus 3/ bus 1, 2, 3, 4**, 5**
36 voltage (Degraded Voltage)
2. Division III j
a.
4.16 kv Standby Bus Under-2/ bus 1/ bus 2/ bus 1, 2, 3, 4**, 5**
37 voltage (Sustained Undervoltage b.
4.16 kv Standby Bus Under-2/ bus 2/ bus 2/ bus 1, 2, 3, 4**, 5**
36 voltage (Degraded Voltage) l RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-33 Amendment No. 74
TABLE 3.3.3-1 (Continued)
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION (a)
A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months during periods of required I
surveillance without placing the trip function in the tripped condition provided at least one other OPERABLE channel in the same trip function is monitoring that parameter.
(b)
Also actuates the associated division diesel generator.
(c)
Provides signal to close HPCS injection valves only.
(d)
Provides signal to open HPCS suppression pool suction valve only.
g When the system is required to be OPERABLE per Specification 3.5.2 or 3.5.3.
Required when ESF equipment is required to be OPERABLE.
o
~,
i Not required to be OPERABLE when reactor steam dome pressure is less than or equal to 100 psig.
i l
r RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-34 Amendment No. 74 n
v a
TABLE 3.3.3-1 (Continued)
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ACTION l
ACTION 30 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, l
verify within one hour that a sufficient number of channels i
remain OPERABLE or are in the tripped condition to maintain automatic actuation capability of either Division I or Division II ECCS and either ADS Trip System "A" or Trip System "B", and place the inoperable channel (s) in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months *. Otherwise, declare the associated system (s) inoperable.
ACTION 31 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, j
verify within one hour that a sufficient number of channels l
remain OPERABLE or are in the tripped condition to maintain automatic actuation capability of either Division I or Division II ECCS and either ADS Trip System "A" or Trip System "B", and restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . Otherwise, declare the associated ADS trip system (s) or ECCS inoperable.
ACTION 32 -
With the aumber of OPERABLE channels less than the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
l ACTION 33 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within i
24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or declare the associated ADS valve or ECCS inoperable.
ACTION 34 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, verify within one hour that a sufficient number of channels remain OPERABLE or are in the tripped condition to maintain automatic HPCS actuation capability, and place the inoperable channel (s) in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months *.
Otherwise, declare the HPCS system inoperable.
ACTION 35 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, verify within one hour that the HPCS pump suction is either aligned or is capable of automatically realigning to the suppression pool, and place at least one inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months *. Otherwise, declare the HPCS system inoperable.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
1 RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-35 Amendment No. 74
TABLE 3.3.3-I (Continued)
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ACTION ACTION 36 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months *; operation may then continue until performance of the next required CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. Otherwise, declare the associated emergency diesel generator inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.8.1.1 or 3.8.1.2, as appropriate.
ACTION 37 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than-the Total Number of Channels, declare the associated emergency diesel generator inoperable and take the ACTION required by i
Specification 3.8.1.1 or 3.8.1.2, as appropriate.
!)
ACTION 38 -
With the ' number of OPERABLE channels less than required by I
the Minimum 0PERABLE Channels per. Trip Function requirement, verify within one hour that a sufficient number of channels remain OPERABLE or are in the tripped condition to maintain
.l automatic actuation capability of either Division I or l
Division II ECCS, and restore the inoperable channel (s) to i
OPERABLE status within 7 days. Otherwise, declare the associated system (s) inoperable.
ACTION 39 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requir'ement, restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days.
Otherwise, declare the HPCS system inoperable.
l
\\
The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-35a Amendment No. 74
IABLE 3.3.3-2 i
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION IN5TRl! MENTATION SETPOINTS El is TRIP FUNCTION ALLOWABLE TRIP SETPOINT VALUE A.
DIVISION I TRIP SYSTEM a
-d 1.
RHR-A (LPCI MODE) AND LPCS SYSTEM w
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low a.
Level I 2-143 inches
l-147 inches b.
Drywell Pressure - High LPCS Pump Discharge Flow-Low 5 1.68 psig i 1.88 psig c.
1 875 gpm 3 750 gpm d.
Reactor Vessel Pressure-Low (LPCS/LPCI 1 487 psig 3 472 psig, 5 502 psig Injection Valve Permissive)
LPCI Pump A Start Time Delay Relay e.
i 7 seconds 7 1 0.7 seconds u,
f.
LPCI Pump A Discharge Flow-Low 1 1100 gpm 2 900 gpm
)g g.
LPCS Pump Start Time Delay Relay u,
h.
Manual Initiation 5 2 seconds 2
0.2 seconds Os NA NA m
2.
AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM TRIP SYSTEM"A" Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low a.
Level I 1-143 inches
1-147 inches b.
Drywell Pressure - High c.
ADS Timer 5 1.68 psig 5 1.88 psig 5 105 seconds 5 117 secor.ds d.
Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Level 3 2 9.7 inches
1 8.7 inches LPCS Pump Discharge Pressure-High e.
1 145 psig, increasing 3 130 psig, increasing f.
LPCI Pump A Discharge Pressure-High 1 135 psig, increasing 1 120 psig, increasing g.
ADS Drywell Pressure Bypass Timer h.
ADS Manual Inhibit Switch 5 5 minutes 5 5.5 minutes NA i.
Manual Initiation NA NA NA
TABLE 4.3.3.1-1 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS CHANNEL OPERATIONAL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL CONDITIONS FOR WHICH TRIP FUNCTION CHECK TEST CALIBRATION SURVEILLANCE RE0VIRED A. DIVISION I TRIP SYSTEM
1. RHR-A (LPCI MODE) AND LPCS SYSTEM a.
Reactor Vessel Water Level -
Low Low Low l_evel 1 S
Q R(*)
1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
b.
Drywell Pressure - High S
Q R(')
1, 2, 3 c.
LPCS Pump Discharge Flow-Low S
Q R(*)
1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
d.
Reactor Vessel Pressure-Low S
Q R(*)
1, 2, 3, 4*,
5*
(LPCS/LPCI Injection Valve Permissive) e.
LPCI Pump A Start Time Delay Relay NA Q
Q(*)
1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
f.
LPCI Pump A Discharge Flow-low S Q
R 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
g.
LPCS Pump Start Time Delay NA Q
Q 1, 2, 3, 4*,
5*
Relay h.
Manual Initiation NA R(b)
NA 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
r
2. AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM TRIP SYSTEM "A"#
a.
Reactor Vessel Water Level -
Low Low Low Level 1 S
Q R(*)
1, 2, 3 b.
Drywell Pressure-High S
Q R(*)
1, 2, 3 c.
ADS Timer NA Q
Q 1, 2, 3 d.
Reactor Vessel Water level -
Low Level 3 S
Q R(*)
1, 2, 3 l
e.
LPCS Pump Discharge Pressure-High S
Q R(*)
1, 2, 3
{
f.
LPCI Pump A Discharge Pressure-High S
Q R(*)
1, 2, 3 g.
ADS Drywell Pressure Bypass NA Q
Q 1, 2, 3 Timer h.
ADS Manual Inhibit Switch NA Q
NA 1, 2, 3 I
i. Manual Initiation NA R
NA 1, 2, 3 RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-41 Amendment No. 9A74
TABLE 4.3.3.1-1 (Continued)
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS CHANNEL OPERATIONAL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL CONDITIONS FOR WHICH TRIP FUNCTION CHECK TEST CALIBRATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED B. DIVISION II TRIP SYSTEM
1. RHR B AND C (LPCI MODE) a.
Reactor Vessel Water Level -
low low Low Level 1 S
Q R(*'
1, 2, 3, 4 *, 5
b.
Drywell Pressure - High S
Q R(*)
1, 2, 3 c.
Reactor Vessel Pressure-Low S
Q R(*)
1, 2, 3, 4*,
5*
d.
LPCI Pump B Start Time Delay Relay NA Q
Q(*)
1, 2, 3, 4 *, 5*
e.
LPCI Pump Discharge Flow-Low S
Q R
1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
f.
LPCI Pump C Start Time Delay NA Q
Q 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
Relay R '"
NA 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
C g.
Manual Initiation NA
2. AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM TRIP SYSTEM "B"#
a.
Reactor Vessel Water level -
Low Low Low Level 1 S
Q R"
1, 2, 3 b.
Drywell Pressure - High S
Q R(*)
1, 2, 3 c.
ADS Timer NA Q
Q 1,2,3 d.
Reactor Vessel Water Level -
Low Level 3 S
Q R""
1, 2, 3
{
e.
LPCI Pump B and C Discharge R"
1, 2, 3
[
U Pressure-High S
Q f.
ADS Drywell Pressure Bypass Timer NA Q
Q 1, 2, 3 g.
ADS Manual Inhibit Switch NA Q
NA 1,2,3 h.
Manual Initiation NA R
NA 1, 2, 3 RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-42 Amendment No. 9 72r74 7
TABLE 4.3.3.1-1 (Continued)
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS CHANNEL OPERATIONAL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL CONDITIONS FOR WHICH TRIP FUNCTION CHECK TEST CALIBRATION SURVEILLANCE RE0VIRED C. DIVISION III TRIP SYSTEM
1. HPCS SYSTEM a.
Reactor Vessel Water Level -
R
1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
C Low Low Level 2 S
Q b.
Drywell Pressure-High S
Q R(
1, 2, 3 c.
Reactor Vessel Water Level-High Level 8 S
Q R(
1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
l d.
Condensate Storage Tank Level -
Low S
Q R(
1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
I e.
Suppression Pool Water Level - High S
Q R(*)
1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
j f.
Pump Discharge Pressure-High S
Q R(
1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
g.
HPCS System Flow Rate-Low S
Q Rca>cb>
1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
h.
Manual Initiation NA R
NA 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
D. LOSS OF POWER
1. Divisions I and II a.
4.16 kv Standby Bus Under-S M
R(
1, 2, 3, 4**, 5**
voltage (Sustained Under-voltage) b.
4.16kv Standby Bus Under-S M
R(b' 1, 2, 3, 4**, 5**
voltage (Degraded Voltage)
2. Division III a.
4.16 kv Standby Bus Under-S NA R
1, 2, 3, 4**, 5**
voltage (Sustained Under-voltage) b.
4.16kv Standby Bus Under-S M
R 1, 2, 3, 4**, 5**
voltage (Degraded Voltage)
Not required to be OPERABLE when reactor steam dome pressure is less than or equal to 100 psig.
When the system is required to be OPERABLE per Specification 3.5.2.
Required when ESF equipment is required to be OPERABLE.
(a) Calibrate trip unit setpoint at least once per 92 days.
l (b) May be extended to the completion of the fifth refueling outage, scheduled to begin April 16, 1994.
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-43 Amendment No. 9d h 74
JNSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.4 RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ATWS RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION j
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i
3.3.4.1 The anticipated transient without scram recirculation pump trip (ATWS-j RPT) system instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.4.1-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with values shown in the Trip Setpoint col umn of Table 3. 3.4.1-2.
APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1.
ACTION:
a.
With an ATWS-RPT system instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.4.1-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the channel trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
b.
With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for one or both trip systems, restore the inoperable channel to OP2RA3.2 tatus within 30 days or be in at least STARTUP within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .
c.
Otherwise, restore at least one inoperable channel in each trip system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least STARTUF within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS t
4.3.4.1.1 Each ATWS-RPT system instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.4.1-1.
4.3.4.1.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months.
t P
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-44
TABLE 3.3.4.1-1 ATWS RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS PER TRIP FUNCTION TRIP SYSTEM (*'
l. Reactor Vessel Water Level -
2 Low Low Level 2
2. Reactor Vessel Pressure - High 2
(a)
One channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for required surveillance provided l
the other channel is OPERABLE.
RIVER BEND - UNIT I 3/4 3-45 Amendment No. 74
TABLE 3.3.4.1-2 B
ATWS RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS g
TRIP ALLOWABLE 6
TRIP FUNCTION SETPOINT VALUE h
1.
Reactor Vessel Water Level -
->-43 inches *
>-47 inches j'i Low Low Level 2 a
2.
Reactor Vessel Pressure - High 5 1127 psig 5 1135 psig
See Bases Figure 83/4 3-1.
M.
2
TABLE 4.3.4.1-1 ATWS RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL TRIP FUNCTION CHECK TEST CALIBRATION
1. Reactor Vessel Water Level -
S Q
R(*)
i Low Low Level 2
2. Reactor Vessel Pressure - High S
Q R(*)
l i
i (a)
Calibrate trip unit setpoint at least once per 92 days.
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-47 Amendment No. 74
INSTRUMENTATION END-0F-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.4.2 The end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip (EOC-RPT) system instrumen-tation channels shown in Table 3.3.4.2-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.4.2-2 and with the END-0F-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME as shown in Table 3.3.4.2-3.
APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, when THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to 40% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
ACTION:
a.
With an end-of cycle recirculation pump trip system instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.4.2-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the channel setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value, b.
With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for one or both trip systems, place the inoperable channel (s) in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .
l c.
With the number of OPERABLE channels two or more less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirement for one trip system and:
1.
If the inoperable channels consist of one turbine control valve channel and one turbine stop valve channel, place both inoperable channels in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .
l 2.
If the inoperable channels include two turbine control valve channels or two turbine stop valve channels, declare the trip system inoperable.
d.
With one trip system inoperable, restore the inoperable trip system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 40% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .
e.
With both trip systems inoperable, restore at least one trip system to OPERABLE status within one hour or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 40% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-48 Amendment No. 74
INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.4.2.1 Each end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip system instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.4.2.1-1.
4.3.4.2.2.
LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months.
4.3.4.2.3 The END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months.
Each test shall include at least the logic of one type of channel input (turbine control valve fast closure or turbine stop valve closure) shown in Table 3.3.4.2-3 such
'l that both types of channel inputs are tested at least once per 36 months.
The measured time shall be added to the most recent breaker arc suppression time and the resulting END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be verified to be within its limits.
4.3.4.2.4 The time interval necessary for breaker arc suppression from energiza-tion of the recirculation pump circuit breaker trip coil shall be measured at least once per 60 months.
i i
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-49
TABLE 3.3.4.2-1 END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS TRIP FUNCTION PER TRIP SYSTEM (*)
1.
Turbine Stop Valve - Closure 2(b) 2.
Turbine Control Valve-Fast Closure 2 "')
l l
(a) A trip system may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for required surveillance provided l
that the other trip system is OPERABLE.
(b) This function shall be automatically bypassed when turbine first stage pressure is less than or equal to 187* psig, equivalent to THERMAL POWER less than 40% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
To allow for instrumentation accuracy, calibration and drift, a setpoint of s 177 psig turbine first stage pressure shall be used.
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-50 Amendment No. 74
r.
TABLE 4.3.4.2.1-1 END-OF-CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL TRIP FUNCTION TEST CALIBRATION 1.
Turbine Stop Valve-Closure Q*(*)
R#(*)
2.
Turbine Control Valve-Fast Closure Q*(*)
R#(')
Including trip system logic testing.
Calibrate the first stage pressure transmitter trip unit setpoint at least once per.92 days.
l (a) The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall include the turbine first stage pressure instruments.
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-53 Amendment No. 74
INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.5 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.5 The reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system actuation instrumenta-tion channels shown in Table 3.3.5-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip set-points set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.5-2.
APPLICABILITY:
OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure greater than 150 psig.
ACTION:
With a RCIC system actuation instrumentation channel trip setpoint a.
less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.5-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value, b.
With one or more RCIC system actuation instrumentation channels inoperable, take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.5-1.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.5.1 Each RCIC system actuation instrumentation channel shall be demon-strated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.5.1-1.
4.3.5.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months.
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-54
r-l l
TABLE 3.3.5-1 l
REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS FUNCTIONAL UNITS PER TRIP FUNCTION")
_A_QJ ION 1.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Level 2 4
50 l
s i
2.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - High Level 8 2")
51 d@
Pi l
~
3.
Condensate Storage Tank Water Level - Low 2")
52 W
2) 52 4.
Suppression Pool Water Level - High 5.
Manual Initiation 1")
53 (a) A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for required surveillance without placing the trip function in the tripped condition provided at least one other OPERABLE channel in the same trip function is monitoring that parameter.
l (b) Deleted.
(c) One trip. system with two-out-of-two logic.
(d) One trip system with one-out-of-two logic.
(e) One trip system with one channel.
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-55 Amendment No. 74
TABLE 3.3.5-1 (Continued)
REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ACTION 50 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, verify within one hour that a sufficient number of low reactor vessel water level channels remain OPERABLE or are in the tripped condition to maintain automatic RCIC system actuation capability, and place the inoperable channel (s) in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months *.
Otherwise, declare the RCIC system inoperable.
ACTION 51 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE channels per Trip Function requirement, declare the RCIC system inoperable within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
I ACTION 52 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, verify within one hour that the RCIC pump suction is aligned or will automatically realign to the suppression pool, and place at least one inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . Otherwise, declare the RCIC system inoperable.
ACTION 53 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or l
declare the RCIC system inoperable.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-56 Amendment No. 74
s i
TABLE 3.3.5-2
~
REACTOR CORE ISOLATION C00LINC 3(STEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS oo ALLOWABLE ll FUNCTIONAL UNITS TRIP SETPOINT VALUE
[
1.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low level 2 1 -43 inches
1 -47 inches z
1 2.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - High Level 8 5 51 inches
5 52 inches 3.
Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low 1 0 inches 1
-4.5 inches 4.
Suppression Pool Water Level - High 5 6.5 inches 5 8 inches i
5.
Manual Initiation NA NA o
i
See Bases Figure B 3/4 3-1.
T 5
i t-4 k
TABLE 4.3.5.1-1 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL UNITS CHECK TEST CALIBRATION a.
Reactor Vessel Water Level -
Low Low Level 2 S
Q R(*)
l l
b.
Reactor Vessel Water l
Level - High Level 8 S
Q R(*'
I c.
Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low S
Q R(*)
{
d.
Suppression Pool Water Level -
High S
Q R(*)
l e.
Manual Initiation NA R
NA l
(a) Calibrate. trip unit setpoint at least once per 92 days.
l i
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-58' Amendment No. 74
nw INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.6 CONTROL R0D BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
~
3.3.6 The control rod block instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.6-2.
APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3.6-1.
ACTION:
With a control rod block instrumentation channel trip setpoint less a.
conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.6-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
b.
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.6-1.
SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.3.6 Each of the above required control rod block trip systems and instrumentation channels shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.6-1.#
l
Channel Calibration period may be extended as identified by notes 'c'.and
'g' on Table 4.3.6-1.
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-59 Amendment No. 72
TABLE 3.3.6-1 CONTROL R0D BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM APPLICABLE OPERABLE CHANNELS OPERATIONAL TRIP FUNCTION PER TRIP FUNCTION (')
CONDITIONS ACTION l
l 1.
R0D PATTERN CONTROL SYSTEM a.
Low Power Setpoint 2
1, 2 60 l
b.
High Power Setpoint 2
1 60 2.
APRM Flow Biased Neutron Flux -
a.
Upscale 6
1 61 b.
Inoperative 6
1,2,5 61 c.
Downscale 6
1 61 g
d.
Neutron Flux - Upscale, Startup 6
2, 5 61 3.
SOURCE RANGE MONITORS a.
Detector not full in (*)
3 2
61 2**
5 62 b.
Upscale (b) 3 2
61 2**
5 62 Inoperative (b) 3 2
61 c.
2**
5 62 l
d.
Downscale(*)
3 2
61 2**
5 62 4.
INTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITORS a.
Detector not full in 6
2, 5 61 l
b.
Upscale 6
2, 5 61 l
c.
Inoperative 6
2, 5 61 l
d.
Downscale(*
6 2, 5 61 l
5.
SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME a.
Water Level-High 2
1, 2, 5*
63 l
6.
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RECIRCULATION FLOW l
a.
Upscale 2
1 63 l
l RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-60 Amendment No. 74
z TABLE 3.3.6-1 (Continued)
CONTROL R0D BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION ACTION ACTION 60 -
Declare the RPCS inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.1.4.2.
ACTION 61 -
With the number of OPERABLE Channels:
a.
One less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days or place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within the next hour.
b.
Two or more less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, place at least one inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour.
ACTION 62 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour.
ACTION 63 -
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, verify within one hour that a sufficient number of channels remain OPERABLE to initiate a rod block by the associated Trip Function, and place at least one inoperable channel in the tripped condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Otherwise, initiate a rod I
block.
NOTES With more than one control rod withdrawn. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.
OPERABLE channels must be associated with SRM required OPERABLE per Specification 3.9.2.
(a) This function shall be automatically bypassed if detector count rate is 2100 cps or the IRM channels are on range 3 or higher.
(b) This function shall be automatically bypassed when the associated IRM channels are on range 8 or higher.
(c) This function shall be automatically bypassed when the IRM channels are on range 3 or higher.
(d) This function shall be automatically bypassed with the IRM channels are on range 1.
(e) A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for required surveillance without placing the TRIP SYSTEM in the tripped condition, provided at least one other OPERABLE channel in the same TRIP SYSTEM is monitoring that parameter.
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-61 Amendment No. 4h74
TABLE 3.3.6-2 CONTROL BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS g
TRIP FUNCTION TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUE h
1.
ROD PATTERN' CONTROL SYSTEM a.
Low Power Setpoint 27.5 i 3% of RATED THERMAL POWER 27.5 1 7.5% of RATED THERMAL
,g POWER o
b.
High Power Setpoint i 67.9% of RATED THERMAL POWER i 68.2% of RATED THERMAL POWER
[
2.
APRM 3
a.
Flow Biased Neutron Flux Upscale
[
1) Two Recirculation Loop Operation 1 0.66W + 42%*
i 0.66W + 45%*
2) Single Recirculation i
Loop Operation 1 0.66W + 36.7%*
1 0.66W + 39.7%*
l b.
Inoperative NA NA c.
Downscale 35% of RATED THERMAL POWER 1 3% of RATED THERMAL POWER d.
Neutron Flux'- Upscale l
Startup
$ 12% of RATED THERMAL POWER
$ 14% of RATED THERMAL POWER l
{
3.
SOURCE RANGE MONITORS a.
Detector not full in NA NA
{
b.
Upscale
$ 1 x 10 cps 5 1.6 x 10 cp, 5
5 l
N c.
Inoperative NA NA l
j d.
Downscale 2 0.7 cps 2 0.5 cps **
4.
INTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITORS I
a.
Detector not full in NA NA b.
Upscale 5 108/125 division of full 5 110/125 division of full scale scale c.
Inoperative NA NA y
d.
Downscale 2 5/125 division of full 1 3/125 division of full g
scale scale L
E 5.
SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME E
a.
Water Level-High - LISN602A
< 18.00"
< 21.12"
[
LISN6028 318.00" 321.60" P
6.
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RECIRCULATION FLOW a.
Upscale 5 108% of rated flow
$ 111% of rated flow U
The Average Power Range Monitor rod block function is varied as a function of recirculation loop flow (W).
The trip setting of this function must be maintained in accordance with Specification 3.2.2.
Provided signal to noise ratio is > 2, otherwise setpoint of 3 cps and allowable 1.8 cps.
TABLE 4.3.6-1 CONTROL R00 BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL OPERATIONAL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL CONDITIONS IN WHICH TRIP FUNCTION CHECK TEST CALIBRATION"'
SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
1. R0D PATTERN CONTROL SYSTEM
a. Low Power Setpoint S")
S['U(b"')
l Q '(b"*)
SA(*)
1, 2
b. High Power Setpoint S"'
S/U g(e)
SA(
1**
l h.-
2. APRM
a. Flow Biased Neutron Flux -
Upscale NA S/U(b',Q SA")
I tb
b. Inoperative NA S/U ),Q NA 1, 2, 5
c. Downscale NA S / U", Q SA 1
d. Neutron Flux - Upscale, Startup NA S/U(b),Q SA 2, 5
3. SOURCE RANGE MONITORS S/U(b) g S/U(63,W
a. Detector not full in NA SA 2, 5 S/U(b),W
b. Upscale NA n
S/U(b',W
c. Inoperative NA
,W SA
d. Downscale NA
4. INTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITORS
a. Detector not full in NA S/U<b) W NA 2 5
b. Upscale NA S/U(68,W SA 2',
5
c. Inoperative NA S/U<b),y g
d. Downscale NA S/U(b',W SA
5. SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME
a. Water Level-High NA Q
R#"'
1, 2, 5*
l
6. REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RECIRCULATION FLOW
a. Upscale NA S/U(b)A S A(
1 l
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-63 Amendment No. 3,23,72, 74
psp TABLE 4.3.6-1 (Continued)
CONTROL R0D BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS NOTES:
a.
Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
b.
Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months prior to startup, if not performed within the previous 7 days.
c.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be extended to the completion of the fifth refueling outage scheduled to begin April 16, 1994.
d.
[0ELETED]
e.
Includes reactor manual control multiplexing system input.
f.
Verify the Turbine Bypass valves are closed when THERMAL POWER is greater than 20% RATED THERMAL POWER.
g.
The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall exclude the flow reference transmitters; these transmitters shall be calibrated at least once per 18 months, except that this test may be extended to the completion of the fifth refueling outage scheduled to begin April 16, 1994.
With any control rod withdrawn. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.
Calibrate trip unit setpoint once per 92 days.
With THERMAL POWER greater than low power setpoint.
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-64 Amendment No. 3,23,72,74
TABLE 4.3.7.I-1 MON 1JORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CHANNEL CONDITIONS IN CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL WHICH SURVEILLANCE INSTRUMENTATION CHECK TEST CALIBRATION RE0VIRED
1. Main Control Room Ventilation Radiation 5d Monitor
a. Local Intake S
Q R
1, 2, 3, 5 and *
?
b. Remote Intake S
Q R
1, 2, 3, 5 and *
2. Area Monitor
a. Fuel Building Spent Fuel Storage Pool S
M R
3. Main Condenser Offgas Post-Treatment System Effluent Monitoring System
a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor -
(Providing Alarm and Auto-matic Termination of Release)
D Q
R
4. Condenser Air Ejector Pretreatment Radioactivity Monitor
a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor D
Q R
When irradiated fuel is being handled in the primary containment or the Fuel Building.
During operation of the main condenser air ejector.
With fuel in the spent fuel storage pool.
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-69 Amendment No. 74
4 INSTRUMENTATION SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRIJMENTATION I
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.7.2 The seismic monitoring instrumentation shown in Table 3.3.7.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
At all times.
ACTION:
a.
With one or more of the above required seismic monitoring instruments inoperable for more than 30 days, prepare and submit within the next 10 days a Special Report to the Commission, pursuant to Specifica-tion 6.9.2, outlining the cause of the malfunction and the plans for restoring the instrument (s) to OPERABLE status, b.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.7.2.1 Each of the above required seismic monitoring instruments shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNC-TIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.7.2-1.
4.3.7.2.2 Each of the above required seismic monitoring instruments actuated during a seismic event greater than or equal to 0.01g shall be restored to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION performed within 5 days following the seismic event.
Data shall be retrieved from actuated instruments and analyzed to determine the magnitude of the vibratory ground motion.
Within 10 days, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, describing the magnitude, frequency spectrum and resultant effect upon unit features important to safety.
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-70 Amendment No. 47
%6 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.9 PLANT SYSTEMS ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.9 The plant systems actuation instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.9-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.9-2.
APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3.9-1.
ACTION:
a.
With a plant system actuation instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.9-2, declare the channel inoperable and take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.9-1.
b.
With one or more plant systems actuation instrumentation channels inoperable, take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.9-1.
Eb4VEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.9.1 Each plant system actuation instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITTONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.9.1-1.#
l 4.3.9.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months.#
l l
i
Channel Calibration and Logic System Functional test period may be extended l
as identified by note (b) on Table 4.3.9.1-1.
I RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-107 Amendment No. 97 72
' TABLE 3.3.9-1 PLANT SYSTEMS ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM APPLICABLE OPERABLE CHANNELS OPERATIONAL TRIP FUNCTION PER TRIP SYSTEM ("
CONDITIONS ACTION l
1. PRIMARY CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM -
UNIT COOLER A AND B k
a. Drywell Pressure-High 2
1, 2, 3 150
b. Containment-To-Annulus oP High 3
1,2,3 151 1
c. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low Level 1 2
1,2,3 150
d. Timers 1
1, 2, 3 152
2. FEEDWATER SYSTEM / MAIN TURBINE TRIP SYSTEM
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-High Level 8 3
1 153 (a)
A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for required surveillance without placing the TRIP SYSTEM in the tripped condition, provided at least one other OPERABLE channel in the same TRIP SYSTEM is monitoring that parameter.
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-108 Amendment No. 74
TABLE 3.3.9-1 (Continued) l ACTION 150 -
a.
With one channel inoperable, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition # within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months or declare the l
associated system inoperable.
b.
With more than one channel inoperable, declare the
_4 associated system inoperable.
ACTION 10 -
a.
With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
b.
With the number of OPERABLE channels two less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels requirement, restore at least one of the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
ACTION 152 -
Declare the associated Containment Ventilation System inoperable.
ACTION 153 -
a.
With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least STARTUP within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .
b.
With the number of OPERABLE channels two less than required.
by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels requirement, restore at least one of the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at..least STARTUP within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .
Provided this does not actuate the system.
E RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-109 Amendment No. 4h 74
w.u TABLE 3.3.9-2 E
'g PLANT SYSTEMS ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS h
ALLOWABLE o
TRIP FUNCTION TRIP SETPOINT VALUE e
g 1.
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM -
q UNIT COOLER A AND 8 a.
Drywell Pressure-High 5 1.68 psig 5 1.88 psig
.. k b.
Containment-to-Annulus AP-High
-11.98 1 0.22" H O
-11.98 + 0.27, - 0.31" H O 2
2 c.
Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low Level 1
>-143 inches *
>-147 inches d.
Timer 500 1 35 seconds 500 1 45 seconds 2.
FEEDWATER SYSTEM / MAIN TURBINE TRIP SYSTEM a.
Reactor Vessel Water Level-High Level 8 5 51 inches
5 52.5 inches T
C o
"See Bases Figure B 3/4 3-1.
TABLE 4.3.9.I-1 PLANT SYSTEMS ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS CHANNEL OPERATIONAL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL CONDITIONS IN WHICH TRIP FUNCTION CHECK TEST CALIBRATION SURVEILLANCE RE0VIRED
1. PRIMARY CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM -
UNIT COOLER A AND B
a. Drywell Pressure-High D
Q R(*)'
1, 2, 3
b. Containment-to-Annulus AP High D
Q R(')
1, 2, 3
c. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low Level 1 D
Q R(')*
1, 2, 3
d. Timer NA Q
R 1, 2, 3
2. FEEDWATER SYSTEM / MAIN TURBINE TRIP SYSTEM
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-High level 8 0
Q R*)
1 (a) Calibrate trip unit setpoint once per 92 days.
(b)May be performed during the fifth refueling outage scheduled to begin April 16, 1994.
The specified 18 month interval during the first operation cycle may be extended to coincide with completion of the first refueling outage, scheduled to begin 9-15-87.
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 3-111 Amendment No. #rMr 74
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES SAFETY / RELIEF VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.2.1 The safety valve function of at least 5 of the following valves and the relief valve function of at least 4 additional valves of the following valves, other than those satisfying the safety valve function requirement, shall be OPERABLE with the specified lift settings:
Number of Valves Function Setpoint* (psig) 7 Safety 1165 (+)0(-)2%
5 Safety 1180 (+)0(-)2%
4 Safety 1190 (+)0(-)2%
1 Relief 1103 1 15 psig 8
Relief 1113 1 15 psig 7
Relief 1123 1 15 psig The acoustic monitor for eacb OPERABLE valve shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.
ACTION:
a.
With the safety and/or relief valve function of one or more of the j
above required safety / relief valves inoperable, be in at least HOT 55UT00WN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
b.
With one or more safety / relief valves stuck open, close the stuck open safety / relief valve (s); if suppression pool average water temperature is 105 F or greater, place the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position.
c.
With one or more safety / relief valve acoustic monitors inoperable, restore the inoperable monitor (s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTOOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
"The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valves at nomiral operating temperatures and pressures.
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 4-7 Amendment No.22
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.2.1.1 The acoustic monitor for each safety / relief valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE ** by performance of a:
I a.
CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 92 days, and l
b.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.*
4.4.2.1.2 The relief valve function pressure actuation instrumentation shall be demonstrated OPERABLE ** by performance of a:
I a.
CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, including calibration of the trip unit set-point, at least once per 92 days.
l b.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION, LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST and simulated automatic operation of the entire system at least once per 18 months.
The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable provided the surveillance is performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after reactor steam pressure is adequate to perform the test.
A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for i
required surveillance.
RIVER BEND UNIT 1 3/4 4-8 Amendment No.74 l
m REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SAFETY / RELIEF VALVES LOW-LOW SET FUNCTION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.2.2 The low-low set function of the following reactor coolant system safety / relief valves shall be OPERABLE with the following settings:
Low-Low Set Function Setooint* (osia) i 15 osi Valve No.
Qggn Close 1821*RVF051D 1033 926 IB21*RVF051C 1073 936 1B21*RVF051B 1113 946 1821*RVF051G 1113 946 IB21*RVF047F 1113 946 APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.
ACTION:
a.
With the low-low set function of one of the above required reactor coolant system safety / relief valves inoperable, restore the inoperable relief valve function and the low-low set function to OPERABLE status within 14 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , b.
With the low-low set function of more than one of the above required reactor coolant system safety / relief valves inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
c.
With either low-low set function pressure actuation trip system "A" or "B" inoperable, restore the inoperable trip system to OPERABLE status within 7 days; otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTOOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.2.2.1 The low-low set function pressure actuation instrumentation shall be demonstrated OPERABLE ** by performance of a:
l a.
CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, including calibration of the trip unit setpoint, at least once per 92 days.
[
b.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION, LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST and simulated automatic operation of the entire system at least once per 18 months.
The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valves at nominal operating temperatures and pressures.
A Safety / Relief Valve Low-Low Set function instrument channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for required surveillance provided all other Safety / Relief Valve Low-Low Set Function instrument channels are OPERABLE.
RIVER BEND UNIT 1 3/4 4-9 Amendment No. 74
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.3.1 The following reac' tor coolant system leakage detection systems shall be OPERABLE:
The drywell atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitoring system, a.
b.
The drywell and pedestal floor sump drain flow monitoring
systems, Either the drywell air coolers condensate flow rate monitoring c.
system or the drywell atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitoring system.
APPLICABILITY:
OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3.
ACTION:
With leak detection systems 'a' and/or 'c' inoperable operation may a.
continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples are obtained and analyzed at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for the inoperable radiatio.
monitors; otherwise, be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
b.
With the drywell floor and/or pedestal sump drain flow monitoring subsystem inoperable, operation may continue for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTOOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.3.1 The reactor coolant system leakage detection systems shall be demon-strated OPERABLE by:
Drywell atmosphere particulate and gaseous monitoring systems-a.
performance of a CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.
b.
The sump drain flow monitoring systems performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION TEST at least once per 18 months.
Drywell air coolers condensate flow rate monitoring system-c.
performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.
d.
Flow testing the drywell floor drain sump inlet piping for blockage at least once per 18 months.
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 3/4 4-10 Amendment No. 57
INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION The reactor protection system automatically initiates a reactor scram to:
a.
Preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding, b.
Preserve the integrity of the reactor coolant system, c.
Minimize the energy which must be adsorbed following a loss-of-coolant accident, and d.
Prevent inadvertent criticality.
This specification provides the Limiting Conditions for Operation necessary to preserve the ability of the system to perform its intended function even during periods when instrument channels may be out of service because of maintenance. When necessary, one -b nnel may be made inoperable for brief intervals to conduct required surve'ii. 2nce.
Action a of Technical Specification 3.3.1 is entered when one channel required by Table 3.3.1-1 in one or more Functional Units' are inoperable.
Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide trip signals and the redundancy of the RPS design, an allowable out of service time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months has been shown to be acceptable to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to operable status.
However, this out of service time is only acceptable provided the Functional Unit which contains the inoperable channel is in one trip system and this Functional Unit still maintains RPS trip capability, refer to Action b.
If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel or the associated trip system must be placed in the tripped condition.
Placing the inoperable channel in trip (or the associated trip system in trip) would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue.
Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel (or trip system) in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in a full scram), if the inoperable channel is not restored to OPERABLE status within the required time, the ACTION required by Table 3.3.1-1 for that Functional Unit shall be taken.
Functional Unit - A Functional Unit is defined as a specific condition required to cause a Trip Function to occur.
For instance, a High Neutron Flux i
condition from a Intermediate Range Monitor will cause a RPS Trip Function to i
occur. In this case, the Functional Unit is the IRM High Neutron Flux condition and the Trip Function is actuation of the RPS. Another example is High Drywell Pressure cr.dses Primary Containment Isolation.
The High Drywell Pressure condition is the Functional Unit and Primary Containment Isolation is the Trip Function.
]
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. 74
INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)
Action b of Technical Specification 3.3.1 is entered when two or more Channels required by Table 3.3.1-1 in one or more Functional Units are inoperable. When in this condition, prcvided at least one channel per trip system is OPERABLE, the RPS still maintains trip capability for that Functional Unit, but cannot accommodate a single failure in either trip system.
The Actions required by b.1 and b.2 are intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within one or more Functional Units results in the Functional Unit not maintaining RPS trip capability. A Functional Unit is considered to be maintaining RPS trip capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in TRIP (or the associated trip system is in trip), such that both trip systems will generate a trip signal from the given Functional Unit on a valid signal.
For the typical Functional Unit with one-out-of-two taken twice logic and the IRM and APRM Functional Units, this would require both trip systems to have one channel 0PERABLE or in trip (or the associated trip system in trip).
For Functional Unit 6 (Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure), this would require both trip systems to have each channel associated with the MSIVs in three MSLs (not necessarily the same MSLs for both trip systems), OPERABLE or in trip (or the associated trip system in trip).
For Functional Unit 10 (Turbine Stop Valve Closure), this would require both trip systems to have three channels, each OPERABLE or in trip (or the associated trip system in trip).
Actions b.1 and b.2 limit the time the RPS scram logic for any Functional Unit would not accommodate single failure in both trip systems (e.g., one-out-of-one and one-out-of-one arrangement for a typical four channel Functional Unit).
The reduced reliability of this logic arrangement was not evaluated in the USAR, Chapter 15, for the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Completion Time. The one hour Completion Time time of Action b.1 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities.
The I hour Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels. Within the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance provided in Action b.2, the associated Functional Unit will have all required channels either OPERABLE or in trip (or in any combination) in one trip system.
The 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Completion Time is judged acceptable based on the remaining capability to trip, the diversity of the sensors available to provide the trip signals, the low probability of extensive numbers of inoperabilities affecting all l
diverse functions, and the low probability of an event requiring the initiation of a scram.
Completing one of these Actions restores RPS to an equivalent reliability l
I level as that evaluated in NEDC-30851-P-A* which justified a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allowable out of service time as presented in the condition for Action a.
When both trip systems are in a degraded condition, the trip system in the l
more degraded state should be placed in trip or, alternatively, all the l
NEDC-30851-P-A
" Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR l
Reactor Protection System", March 1988.
l l
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-2 Amendment No. 74
=-
INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) inoperable channels in that trip system should be placed in trip (e.g., a trip system with two inoperable channels could be in a more degraded state than a trip system with four inoperable channels, if the two inoperable channels are in the same Functional Unit while the four inoperable channels are all in different Functional Units). The decision as to which trip system is in the more degraded state should be based on prudent judgement and current plant conditions (i.e., what MODE the plant is in).
If this action would result in a scram or recirculation pump trip, it is permissible to place the other trip system or its inoperable channels in trip.
The reactor protection system is made up of four logic channels. The logic channels A(A1) and C(A2) comprise one trip system and the logic channels B(B1) and D(B2) comprise the other trip system for determining compliance with technical specifications.
Placement of either logic channel of a trip system in the tripped condition places the trip system in the tripped condition. The trip systems as defined above are independent of each other. There are usually four instrument channels (one in each logic channel) to monitor each parameter. The tripping of a logic channel in each trip system will result in a reactor scram.
The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective functions associated with each channel are com-pleted within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses.
No credit was taken for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable.
Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurement, provided such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either (1) inplace, onsite or offsite test measurements, or (2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.
3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION This specification ensures the effectiveness of the instrumentation used to mitigate the consequences of accidents by prescribing the OPERABILITY requirements, trip setpoints and response times for isolation of the reactor systems. When necessary, one channel may be inoperable for brief intervals to conduct required surveillance.
Some of the trip settings may have tolerances explicitly stated where both the high and low values are critical and may have a substantial effect on safety. The setpoints of other instrumentation, where only the high or low end of the setting has a direct bearing on safety, are established at a level away from the normal operating range to prevent inadvertent actuation of the systems involved.
Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide isolation signals and the redundancy of the isolation design, an allowable out of service time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , dependir.g on the Function, has been RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-3 Amendment No. 74
INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) shown to be acceptable per NEDC-31677-P-A* and NEDC-30851-P-A, Supplement 2" to permit restoration of inoperable channels to OPERABLE status. This out of service time is only acceptable provided the associated Function is still maintaining isolation capabil ty (refer to Action c Bases).
If the inoperable i
channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Action b.
Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue with no further restrictions. Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an isolation), the Action required by Table 3.3.2-1 shall be taken for that inoperable Trip Function.
Action c is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function results in redundant automatic isolation capability being lost for the associated flow path (s).
The one hour time limitation of Action c.1 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The one hour time limit is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.
The MSL isolation Functions are considered to be maintaining isolation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip such that both trip systems will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal. The other isolation Functions are considered to be maintaining isolation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip such that one trip system will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal. This ensures that one of the two Isolation Valves in the associated flow path can receive an isolation signal from the given Function.
The requirements of Action c do not apply to the Manual Initiation Functions (Functions 5n and 7), since they are not assumed in any accident or transient analysis.
Thus, a total loss of manual initiation capability for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (as allowed by Action b) is allowed.
Except for the MSIVs, the safety analysis does not address individual sensor response times or the response times of the logic systems to which the sensors are connected.
For D.C. operated valves, a 3 second delay is assumed before the valve starts to move.
For A.C. operated valves, it is assumed that the A.C. power supply is lost and is restored by startup of the emergency
NEDC-31677-P-A
" Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation", June 1989.
"NEDC-30851-P-A (Supplement 2)
" Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation", March 1989.
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-4 Amendment No. 74 i
INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) diesel generators.
In this event, a time of 10 seconds is assumed before the valve starts to move.
In addition to the pipe break, the failure of the D.C.
operated valve is assumed; thus the signal delay (sensor response) is concurrent with the 10 second diesel startup. The safety analysis considers an allowable reactor coolant inventory loss in each case which in turn determines the valve speed in conjunction with the 10 second delay.
It follows that checking the valve speeds and the 10 second time for emergency power establishment will establish the response time for the isolation functions.
However, to enhance overall system reliability and to monitor instrument channel response time trends, the isolation actuation instrumentation response time shall be measured and recorded as part of the ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME.
Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is equal to or less than the drift allowance assumed for each trip in the safety analyses.
3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION The emergency core cooling system actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate actions to mitigate the consequences of accidents that are beyond the ability of the operator to control. This specification provides the OPERABILITY requirements, trip setpoints and response times that will ensure effectiveness of the systems to provide the design protection.
Although the instruments are listed by system, in some cases the same instrument may be used to send the actuation signal to more than one system at the same time.
Action b directs entry into the appropriate Action referenced in Table 3.3.3-1 when one or more ECCS Actuation Instrumentation Channels are inoperable.
The applicable Action specified in the table is dependent on the Trip Function.
Each time a channel is discovered to be inoperable, Action b l
is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate Action stated in Table 3.3.3-1.
l Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months has been shown to be acceptable per NEDC-30936-P-A (Part 2),
to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status.
If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the subsequent action required by the individual Action Statement must be taken.
Placing the inoperable channel in trip or declaring it inoperable, as applicable, would conservatively compensate for the j
inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow
NEDC-30936-P-A (Part 2)
" Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for ECCS Actuation Instrumentation, Part 2",
December 1988.
i RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-5 Amendment No. 74
INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)
}
operation to continue.
These Actions are intended to ensure that appropriate i'
actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function (or in some cases, within the same variable) result in redundant I
automatic initiation capability being lost for the features (s).
I i
Operation with a trip set less conse.ative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is equal to or less than the drift allowance assumed for each trip in the safety analyses.
3/4.3.4 RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION The anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) recirculation pump trip system provides a means of limiting the consequences of the unlikely occurrence of a failure to scram during an anticipated transient.
The response of the plant to this postulated event falls within the envelope of study events in General Electric Company Topical Reports NED0-10349, dated March 1971, and NED0-24222, dated December 1979, and Section 15.8 of the FSAR.
With one or more channels inoperable, but with ATWS-RPT capability for I
each Function maintained (refer to Action c Bases), the ATWS-RPT System is l
capable of performing the intended function.
However, the reliability and
{
redundancy of the ATWS-RPT instrumentation is reduced, such that a single failure in the remaining trip system could result in the inability of the i
ATWS-RPT System to perform the intended function.
Therefore, only a limited time is allowed to restore the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status, i
Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide trip signals, the low probability of extensive numbers of inoperabilities affecting all diverse Functions, and the low probability of an event requiring the initiation of ATWS-RPT, 30 days is provided to restore the inoperable channel (Action b).
i Action b and c are intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in the Function not maintaining ATWS-RPT trip capability. A Function is considered to be maintaining ATWS-RPT trip capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip such that the ATWS-RPT System will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal, and both recirculation pumps can be tripped. This requires two channels of the Function in the same trip system to each be OPERABLE or in trip.
The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is sufficient for the operator to take corrective action (e.g., restoration or tripping of channels) and takes into account the likelihood of an event requiring actuation of the ATWS-RPT instrumentation during this period and the fact that one Function is still maintaining ATWS-RPT trip capability.
The end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip (E0C-RPT) system is a part of the Reactor Protection System and is an essential safety supplement to the RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-6 Amendment No. 74
INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4,3.4 RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) reactor trip. The purpose of the E0C-RPT is to recover the loss of thermal margin which occurs at the end-of-cycle. The physical phenomenon involved is that the void reactivity feedback due to a pressurization transient can add positive reactivity to the reactor system at a faster rate than the control rods add negative scram reactivity.
Each E0C-RPT system trips both recircu-lation pumps, reducing coolant flow in order to reduce the void collapse in the core during two of the most limiting pressurization events.
The two events for which the E0C-RPT protective feature will function are closure of the turbine stop valves and fast closure of the turbine control valves.
A fast-closure sensor from each of two turbine control valves provides input to the E0C-RPT system; a fast-closure sensor from each of the other two turbine control valves provides input to the second E0C-RPT system.
Similarly, a position switch for each of two turbine stop valves provides input to one E0C-RPT system; a position switch from each of the other two stop valves provides input to the other E0C-RPT system.
For each E0C-RPT system, the sensor relay contacts are arranged to form a 2-out-of-2 logic for the fast closure of turbine control valves and a 2-out-of-2 logic for the turbine stopvalves.
The operation of either logic will actuate the E0C-RPT system and trip both recirculation pumps.
With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required, but with E0C-RPT trip capability maintained (refer to Action b), the E0C-RPT System is capable of performing the intended function.
However, the reliability and redundancy of the EOC-RPT instrumentation is reduced such that a single failure in the remaining trip system could result in the inability of the E0C-RPT System to perform the intended function.
Therefore, only a limited time is allowed to restore compliance with the LCO.
Based on GENE-770-06-1-A*, the diversity of sensors available to provide trip signals, the low probability of extensive numbers of inoperabilities affecting all diverse Functions, and the low probability of an event requiring the initiation of an E0C-RPT,12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is allowed to restore the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status. Alternately, the inoperable channels may be placed in trip since this would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue.
Actions c.1 and c.2 are intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in the Function not maintaining E0C-RPT trip capabilit.
A Function is considered to be maintainir-E0C-RPT trip capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that the E0C-RPT System will generate a trip signal from the given Function on a valid signal and both recirculation pumps
GENE-770-06-1-A
" Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications", December 1992.
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-7 Amendment No. 74
INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.4 RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) can be tripped.
This requires two channels of the Function, in the same trip system, to each be OPERABLE or in trip.
Based on GENE-770-06-1-A, the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months time of Action c.1 and the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months time of Action c.2 is sufficient for the operator to take corrective action, and takes into account the likelihood of an event requiring actuation of the E0C-RPT instrumentation during this period.
With one trip system rendered inoperable, the inoperable trip system must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or if both trip systems are inoperable, at least one trip system must be restored to operable status i
within one hour or THERMAL POWER must be reduced to < 40% RTP within the-next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . Alternately, the associated recirculation pump may be removed from service since this performs the intended function of the instrumentation.
The allowed Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reduce THERMAL POWER to < 40% RTP from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
Each E0C-RPT system may be manually bypassed by use of a keyswitch which is administratively controlled.
The manual bynasses, and the automatic operating bypass at less than 40% of RATED THERMAL POWER, are annunciated in the control room.
The E0C-RPT system response time is the time assumed in the analysis between initiation of valve motion and complete suppression of the breaker electric arc, i.e.,
140 ms.
Included in this time are:
the response time of the sensor, the time allotted for breaker arc suppression and the response time of the system logic.
Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the dif-ference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is equal to or less than the drift allowance assumed for each trip in the safety analyses.
3/4.3.5 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION The reactor core isolation cooling system actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate actions to assure adequate core cooling, in the event of.
t reactor isolation from its primary heat sink and the loss of feedwater flow to the reactor vessel, without providing actuation of any of the emergency core cooling equipment.
Action b directs entry into the appropriate Action referenced in Table 3.3.5-1.
The applicable Action referenced in the Table is Function dependent.
Each time a channel is discovered to be inoperable, Action b is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Action of Table 3.3.5-1.
GENE-770-06-1-A
" Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications", December 1992.
j i.
RIVER BEND - UNIT I B 3/4 3-8 Amendment No. 74 1
INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.5 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)
Because of the redundancy of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the fact that the RCIC System is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months has been shown to be acceptable per GENE-770-06-2-A* to permit restoration of any
~ inoperable channel to OPERABLE status If the inoperable channel cannot be 1
restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service' time', the channel must be placed in the tripped condition or the.RCIC system declared inoperable per the applicable Action required by Table 3.3.5-1.
Placing the
_j inoperable channel in trip, where applicable, would conservatively compensate -
j for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue.
A risk based analysis, GENE-770-06-2-A*, was performed and determined that an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is acceptable to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. An Action for Action 51 (similar to Action 50), limiting the allowable out of service time if a loss of automatic RCIC initiation capability exists, is not required.
This Condition applies to the Reactor Vessel Water Level High, Level 8 Function, whose logic is arranged such that any inoperable channel will result in a loss-of automatic RCIC initiation capability. As stated above, this loss of automatic RCIC initiation capability was analyzed and determined to be acceptable. The Action does not allow placing a channel in trip since this action would not necessarily result in the safe state for the channel in all events.
Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the dif-ference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowaole Value is equal to or less than the drift allowance assumed for each trip in the safety analyses.
3/4.3.6 CONTROL R0D BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION The control rod block functions are provided consistent with the require-ments of the specifications in Section 3/4.1.4, Rod Pattern Control System, Section 3/4.2, Power Distribution Limits and Section 3/4.3, Instrumentation.
The trip logic is arranged so that a trip in any one of the inputs will result in a control rod block.
With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required, out with N,ntrol Rod Block trip capability maintained (refer to Actior. 62), the Control Rod Block Instrument Trip System is capable of performing the intended function.
However, the reliability and redundancy of the Control Rod Block instrumentation is reduced such that a single failure in the remaining trip
' GENE-770-06-2-A
" Addendum to Base:; for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation' Technical Specifications", December 1992.
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-9 Amendment No. 74 1
g y-
INSTRUMENTATION BASES.
-3/4.3.6 CONTROL R00 BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) system could result in the inability of the Control Rod Block System to perform the intended function.
Therefore, only a limited time is allowed to restore-compliance with the LCO.
Based on GENE-770-06-1-A, the diversity of sensors available to provide trip signals, the low probability of extensive numbers of inoperabilities affecting all diverse Functions, and the low probability of an event requiring the initiation of a Control Rod Block, 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is allowed to restore the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status.
i Alternately, the inoperable channels may be placed in the tripped condition since this would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, and restore i.
capability to accommodate a single failure.
i Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is equal to or less than the drift allowance assumed for each trip in the safety analyses.
3/4.3.7 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.7.1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring instrumentation ensures that; (1) the radiation levels are continuously measured in the areas served by the individual channels; (2) the alarm or automatic action is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is exceeded; and (3) sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variablesfollowing an accident.
This capability is consistent with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 19, 41, 60, 61, 63 and 64.
^
3.4.3.7.2 SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the seismic monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit prompt determination of the mag-nitude of a seismic event and evaluation of the response of those features important to safety.
This capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for the unit.
This instru-mentation is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12
" Instrumentation for Earthquakes", April 1974.
3/4.3.7.3 METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of.the meteorological monitoring-instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data is available for estimating potential radiation doses to.the public as a result of routine or accidental release of
" GENE-770-06-1-A
" Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical
. Specifications", December 1992.
j RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-10 Amendment No. 74
-~
INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.7.3 METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) radioactive materials to the atmosphere. This capability is required to permit evaluation of the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the public.
This instrumentation is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.23 "Onsite Meteorological Programs,"
February, 1972.
l 3/4.3.7.4 REMOTE SHUTDOWN MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the remote shutdown monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit shutdown and maintenance of HOT SHUTDOWN of the unit from locations outside of the control room.
This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost, and is consistent with General Design Criteria 19 of 10 CFR 50.
3/4.3.7.5 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to permit monitoring and assessment of important variables following an accident.
This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97,
" Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1975 and NUREG-0737,
" Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," November 1980.
3/4.3.7.6 SOURCE RANGE MONITORS The source range monitors provide the operator with information about the neutron level in the core at very low power levels during startup and shutdown. At these power levels, reactivity additions shall not be made without this flux level information available to the operator.
When the intermediate range monitors are on scale, adequate information is available without the SRMs and the SRMs can be retracted.
3/4.3.7.7 TRAVERSING IN-CORE PROBE SYSTEM l
The OPERABILITY of the traversing in-core probe system with the specified minimum complement of equipment ensures that the measurements obtained from use of this equipment accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the reactor core.
3/4.3.7.8 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION l
OPERABILITY of the fire detection instrumentation ensures both that ade-l quate warning capability is available for prompt detection of fires and that fire suppression systems, that are actuated by fire detectors, will discharge extinguishing agent in a timely manner.
Prompt detection and suppression offires will reduce the potential for damage to safety-related equipment and '
are integral elements in the overall facility fire protection program.
1 RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-11 Amendment No. 74
JNSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.7.8 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)
Fire detectors that are used to actuate fire suppression systems represent a more critically important component of a plant's fire protection program than detectors that are installed solely for early fire warning and notification. Consequently, the minimum number of OPERABLE fire detectors for fire suppression must be greater than the minimum number of detectors for fire warning.
The loss of detection capability for fire suppression systems, actuated by fire detectors, represents a significant degradation of fire protection for any area. As a result, the establishment of a fire watch patrol must be ini-tiated at an earlier stage than would be warranted for the loss of detectors that provide only early fire warning. The establishment of frequent fire patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is restored to OPERABILITY.
3/4.3.7.9 LOOSE-PART DETECTION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the loose-part detection system ensures that sufficient capability is available to detect loose metallic parts in the primary system and avoid or lessen damage to primary system components. The allowable out-of-service times and surveillance requirements are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.133, " Loose-Part Detection Program for the Primary System of Light-Water-Cooled Reactors," May 1981.
3/4.3.7.10 RADI0 ACTIVE LIOUID EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The radioactive liquid effluent monitoring instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in liquid effluent during actual or potential releases of liquid effluent.
The alarm / trip setpoints for these instruments shall be calculated and adjusted in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm / trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20.
The OPERABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63 and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.
i 3/4.3.7.11 RADI0 ACTIVE GASE0US EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The radioactive gaseous effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor l
and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluent during actual or potential releases of gaseous effluent. The i
alarm / trip setpoints for these instruments shall be calculated and adjusted in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM to ensure that 1
the alarm / trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20.
i This instrumentation also includes provisions for monitoring the concentrations of potentially explosive gas mixtures in the waste gas holdup system. The OPERABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63 and 64 of Appendix A to 1
RIVER BEND - UNIT I B 3/4 3-12 Amendment No. 74
INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.7.11 RADI0 ACTIVE GASE0US EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) 10 CFR Part 50.
In addition, the radioactive release paths of the Fuel Building Ventilation Exhaust, Main Plant Exhaust Duct, and the Radwaste Building Ventilation Exhaust include post-accident monitors.
3/4.3.8 TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION SYSTEM This specification is provided to ensure that the turbine overspeed protection system instrumentation and the turbine speed control valves are OPERABLE and will protect the turbine from excessive overspeed.
Protection from turbine excessive overspeed is required since excessive overspeed of the turbine could generate potentially damaging missiles.
3/4.3.9 PLANT SYSTEMS ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION The plant systems actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate action of the containment ventilation system and the feedwater system / main turbine trip system.
The containment ventilation system provides emergency containment heat removal as described in Bases 3/4.6.3.
The feedwater system / main turbine trip system is initiated in the event of failure of the feedwater controller under maximum demand.
With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than required, but with Plant Systems Actuation trip capability maintained (refer to Action 150.a),
the Plant Systems Actuation Instrument Trip System is capable of performing the intended function.
However, the reliability and redundancy of the Plant Systems Actuation instrumentation is reduced such that a single failure in the remaining trip system could result in the inability of the Plant Systems Actuation System to perform the intended function.
Therefore, only a limited, time is allowed to restore compliance with the LCO.
Based on GENE-770-06-1-A,
the diversity of sensors available to provide trip signals, the low probability of extensive numbers of inoperabities affecting all diverse Functions, and the low probability of an event requiring the initiation of a Plant Systems Actuation, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is allowed to restore the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status before declaring the associated trip system inoperable. Alternately, the inoperable channels may be placed in the tripped condition since this would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue.
I
GENE-770-06-1-A
" Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications", December 1992.
l RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-13 Amendment No. 74
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1 Bases Figure B 3/4.3-1 REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-14 Amendment No. 74
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES SAFETY / RELIEF VALVES (Continued)
Demonstration of the safety-relief valve lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Specification 4.0.5.
The low-low set system ensures that safety / relief valve discharges are minimized for a second opening of these valves, following any overpressure transient. This is achieved by automatically lowering the closing setpoint of 5 valves and lowering the opening setpoint of 2 valves following the initial opening.
In this way, the frequency and magnitude of the containment blowdown duty cycle is substantially reduced. Sufficient redundancy is provided for the low-low set system such that failure of any one valve to open or close at its reduced setpoint does not violate the design basis.
Because the failure of any reactor steam dome pressure instrument channels [providing relief SRV opening and LLS opening and closing pressure setpoints) in one trip system will not prevent the associated SRV from performing its relief and LLS function, 7 days is allowed to restore a trip system to OPERABLE status (refer to Action c of TS 3.4.2.2).
In this condition, the remaining OPERABLE trip system is adequate to perform the relief and LLS initiation function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE trip system could r w lt in a i
loss of relief or LLS function.
The 7 day Completion Time is considered appropriate for the relief and LLS function because of the redundancy of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the relief and LLS design.
In addition, the probability of multiple relief or LLS instrumentation channel failures, which renders the remaining trip system inoperable, occurring together with an event requiring the relief or LLS function during the 7 day Completion Time is very low.
If one SRV low-low set function cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 14 days (refer to Action a), or if more than one SRV low-low set functions are inoperable (refer to Action b), or if either low-low set pressure actuation trip system is inoperable and cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days (refer to Action c), then the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least H0T SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
The allowed 12 and 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Times referenced above are reascnable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
GENE-770-06-01-A
" Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," December 1992.
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-3 Amendment No. Gi'r 74
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM i
3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES I
3/4.4.3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE 3/4.4.3.1 LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS The RCS leakage detection systems required by this specification are provided to monitor and detect leakage from the reactor coolant pressure boundary. These detection systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.45, " Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems", May 1973.
In conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.45, the atmospheric gaseous radioactivity system will have a sensitivity of 4
10 pCi/cc.
The drywell and pedestal floor sump drain flow monitoring systems consist of 2 sumps with one level transmitter and two 100% pumps each.
The level transmitters feed Main Control Room level indicators as well as various automatic control systems.
Each of the automatic systems calculate leakage, control pumps and provide annunciation. The leak rate may be determined by the automatic t stem or a manual procedure through the use of the level indication and pump control switches located in the main control room.
The substitution of grab samples for the drywell particulate and gaseous monitors is to allow for continued monitoring of the function while normal components are ;noperable.
3/4.i.3.2 OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE The allowable leakage rates from the reactor coolant system have been based on the predicted and experimentally observed behavior of cracks in pipes. The normally expected background leakage, due to equipment design and the detection capability of the instrumentation for determining system leakage, was also considered.
The evidence obtained from experiments suggests that, for leakage somewhat greater than that specified for UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE, the probability is small that the imperfection or crack associated with such leakage would grow rapidly.
However, in all cases, if the leakage rates exceed the values specified or the leakage is located and known to be PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, the reactor will be shut down to allow further investigation and corrective action.
The Surveillance Requirements for RCS pressure isolation valves provide added assurance of valve integrity, thereby reducing the probability of gross valve failure and consequent intersystem LOCA.
Leakage from the RCS pressure isolation valves is IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE and will be considered as a portion of the allowed limit.
RIVER BEND - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-3a Amendment No. &7r 74
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 74 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0. NPF-47 ENTERGY OPERATIONS. INC.
RIVER BEND STATION. UNIT 1 DOCKET N0. 50-458
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated January 14, 1994, as supplemented July 15, 1994, Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the River Bend Station, Unit 1 (RBS), Technical Specifications (TSs).
The requested changes would revise TS Sections 3/4.3, " Instrumentation," and 3/4.4.2,
" Safety / Relief Valves," and associated Bases to increase the surveillance test intervals (STIs) and allowed outage times (A0Ts) for various instruments.
The licensee stated in its request that the proposed changes are consistent with the NRC staff's previous approvals of several General Electric Company (GE)
Licensing Topical Reports (LTRs) and with the guidance provided in NUREG-1434 (Reference 1). The July 15, 1994, letterProperty "Letter" (as page type) with input value "RBG-40726, Forwards Proposed Clarifications to LAR 93-06 Submitted on 940114 Re Proposed Changes to TS to Extend AOT & Surveillance Test Intervals for Various Instrumentation" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process. provided clarifying information that i
did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.
2.0 EVALUATION The licensee proposed changes to TS Sections 3/4.3 and 3/4.4.2 to increase A0Ts and STIs for various instrumentation TSs based on several GE LTRs 1
(References 2 through 8). The specific changes involved increasing STIs from monthly to quarterly, and increasing A0Ts from 2.to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for testing and from.1 to 24 ~ hours for repair.
The proposed changes also incorporate more recent guidance contained in Reference 1 concerning " loss-of-function" conditions.. During the development of Reference 1, the NRC staff identified concerns that the A0Ts provided in the approved LTRs could allow certain combinations of inoperable instruments to exist for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months which would not provide the capability for automatic actuation of certain systems.
Clarifying language addressing these loss-of-function conditions was developed by the BWR Owners Group and.the NRC staff and included in Reference 1.
The licensee incorporated the Reference I clarifications to eliminate the potential for such loss-of-function conditions to exist.
The referenced LTRs provided an evaluation of the impact on safety system failure frequencies caused by these changes.
The LTRs concluded that, while the changes would'c'ause small increases in safet.y system failure frequencies, the. increase in total risk would be insignificant, because the increased risk
.vuo
<v TV due to safety system failure is substantially offset by the reduction in risk due to the decreased frequency of testing-induced safety system actuations, equipment wear, and TS imposed shutdown transients.
The NRC staff reviewed these LTRs and issued safety evaluations (References 9 i
through 15) approving the proposed changes on a generic basis.
Each of the staff safety evaluations contains requirements for individual licensees to perform plant-specific evaluations to demonstrate that the LTRs are applicable to their facility.
Each of the staff safety evaluations indicated that, provided the LTR is demonstrated to be applicable to the licensee's facility, proposals which are consistent with the approved LTRs would be considered acceptable to the staff.
The licensee's evaluations regarding the applicability of the LTRs to RBS are discussed below:
1.
A BWR 6 RPS relay model plant was used for the generic analysis of Reference 2.
RBS is a BWR 6 with a standard RPS relay system.
Furthermore, the licensee's January 14, 1994, submittal included a copy of GE Report MDE-92-0485 (Reference 16), which concludes that the generic analysis in Reference 2 is applicable to RBS.
2.
The licensee has confirmed that the control rod block instrumentation configuration described in Reference 3 is identical to that at RBS.
3.
The licensee stated that the RBS configuration for isolation actuation instrumentation common to the RPS and ECCS is essentially the same as the generic configuration modeled in Reference 4.
Any differences are bounded by those differences specifically analyzed in Section 3.2 of Reference 4.
4.
The licensee stated that Section 5.5 and Appendix C of Reference 5 address RBS plant specific requirements.
The licensee verified the accuracy of the information contained in the LTR.
5.
A generic BWR 5/6 relay plant was modeled in Reference 6.
In addition, Section 5.5 of Reference 6 documented the analyses of three enveloping cases to model known differences in instrumentation logic or support system configuration.
The licensee's January 14, 1994, submittal included a copy of GE Report RE-029 (Reference 17), which indicated that there are four differences between the Reference 6 generic model and RBS.
Reference 17 indicated that two of the enveloping cases in Section 5.5 of Reference 6 bound these differences and concluded that the generic analyses in Reference 6 are applicable to RBS.
6.
The licensee stated that the specification changes proposed in accordance with References 7 and 8 are bounded by the analyses presented in References 2 through 6.
Based on the above information, the staff concludes that the licensee has satisfactorily demonstrated that the LTRs are applicable to RBS, and may be referenced to support proposed changes which are consistent witn the approved LTRs.
In addition to the above required verifications, the staff's safety evaluation approving Reference 2 requires licensees to confirm that the differences between the parts of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) that perform trip functions in their plants and those of the base case plant were evaluated in a plant-specific analysis using the procedures of Appendix K of Reference 2.
The RBS plant-specific analysis was documented in Reference 16.
This report utilized the procedures of Appendix K of Reference 2 to identify and evaluate the RPS differences.
The results of this analysis indicated that while the RBS and base case RPS configurations have several differences, the differences do not have a significant impact on the generic conclusions.
The staff concludes that the licensee has satisfied the requirement of the staff's safety evaluation approving Reference 2 to evaluate RPS configuration differences.
The staff safety evaluations approving the LTRs also contain requirements for licensees to demonstrate that the drift characteristics for the applicable instrumentation are bounded by the assumptions used in the LTRs when the functional test interval is extended from monthly to quarterly.
The licensee has reviewed current drift information provided by the equipment vendors and the applicable setpoint calculations for RBS instruments in response to these requirements.
The licensee stated that the RBS setpoint calculation methodology assumed 18-month trip unit calibration intervals and therefore is not affected by the proposed changes.
In addition, sensor calibration intervals for instrumentation affected by the proposed changes were verified by the licensee to be equal to or longer than once per quarter and are therefore unaffected by the proposed changes.
Therefore, the licensee concluded that the drift characteristics of the affected instrumentation are bounded by the assumptions used in the LTRs.
The staff agrees with this licensee conclusion since it is consistent with the clarification regarding instrument drift allowances provided in a letter from the NRC to the BWR Owners Group (Reference 18).
The staff concludes that the licensee has satisfied the requirements to demonstrate that the LTRs are applicable to RBS ar.d verify that existing instrumentation drift characteristics are bounded by the LTR analyses.
The changes proposed by the licensee are consistent with the approved LTRs, as modified by the staff's guidance contained in Reference 1 regarding loss-of-function conditions.
The affected instrumentation will continue to be able to perform its intended safety function with the revised TS requirements in effect.
Therefore, the proposed changes are acceptable to the staff.
The licensee's specific proposed changes are presented below.
2.1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES TS 3/4.3.1 - Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation ACTIONS a. and b. for TS 3.3.1 specify actions to be taken in the event that the number of operable RPS instrumentation channels is less than required by TS Table 3.3.1-1.
The licensee proposed c!anges to ACTIONS a. and b. to increase the allowed outage times for inoperable RPS instrumentation.
The proposed changes, would revise ACTIONS a. and b. to read:
a.
With one channel required by Table 3.3.1-1 inoperable in one or more Functional Units, place the incperable channel and/or that Trip System in the tripped condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .
b.
With two or more channels required by Table 3.3.1-1 inoperable in one or more functional Units; 1.
Within one hour, verify
sufficient channels remain OPERABLE or in the tripped condition to maintain trip capability in the Functional Unit, and 2.
Within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , place the inope,rable channel (s) in one trip system and/or that Trip System in the tripped condition, and 3.
Within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , restore the inoperable channels in the other Trip System to an OPERABLE status pr place the inoperable channels in the tripped condition.
Otherwise, take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.1-1 for the Functional Unit.
An inoperable channel or trip system need not be placed in the tripped condition where this would cause the Trip Function to occur.
In these cases, if the inoperable channel is not restored to OPERABLE status within the required time, the ACTION required by Table 3.3.1-1 for the functional Unit shall be taken.
This ACTION applies to that Trip System with the most inoperable channels; if both Trip Systems have the same number of inoperable channels, the ACTION can be applied to either Trip System.
The proposed changes to ACTIONS a. and b. for TS 3.3.1 would increase and clarify the time permitted to place an inoperable RPS instrumentation channel in the tripped condition when the number of operable channels is less than required.
These changes are acceptable since they are consistent with Reference 2 and with current NRC staff positions and related guidance provided in Reference 1 to ensure that a loss-of-function will not exist if two or more channels are inoperable.
The proposed change to Note (a) of TS Table 3.3.1-1 would revise the note to read:
(a) A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 
)
for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped condition provided at least one OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.
The change to Note (a) on TS Table 3.3.1-1 would increase the time permitted for an RPS instrumentation channel to be declared inoperable for surveillance purposes without placing the channel in the tripped condition from 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . This proposed change is consistent with the provisions of Reference 2 and is, therefore, acceptable.
The proposed changes to TS Table 4.3.1.1-1 would decrease the channel functional test interval requirement for Functional Unit 13, Manual Scram, from monthly to weekly and would increase the channel functional test interval requirement from weekly or monthly to quarterly for the following Functional Units:
2.
Average Power Range Monitor b.
Flow-Biased Simulated Thermal Power - High c.
Neutron Flux - High d.
Inoperative 3.
Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High 4.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 5.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 6.
Main Steam Line Isolation Valve - Closure 7.
Main Steam Line Radiation - High 8.
Drywell Pressure - High 9.
Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High a.
Level Transmitter 10.
Turbine Stop Valve - Closure
11. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip 011 Pressure - Low The proposed change to footnote (g) of TS Table 4.3.1.1-1 would revise the frequency of certain trip unit setpoint calibrations from at least once per 31 days to at least once per 92 days.
This footnote is applicable to the following Functional Units:
3.
Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High 4.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, level 3 5.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 8.
Drywell Pressure - High 9.
Scram Discharge Volume Water level - High a.
Level Transmitter 10.
Turbine Stop Valve - Closure
11. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low The proposed changes to footnote (g) and to TS Table 4.3.1.1-1 are consistent with References 2 and 16 and are, therefore, acceptable.
l TS 3/4.3.2 - Isolation Actuation Instrumentation i
ACTIONS b. and c. for TS 3.3.2 specify actions to be taken in the event that the number of operable isolation actuation instrumentation channels is less than the minimum required by Table 3.3.2-1.
The proposed changes would revise ACTIONS b. and c. to read:
_J b.
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirements for one Trip
System, 1.
Within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for trip functions 1.b, 2.b, 3.b, 6.c, 6.e, and 6.f, and 2.
Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for trip functions other than 1.b, 2.b, 3.b, 6.c, 6.e, and 6.f, place the inoperable channel (s) and/or that Trip System in the tripped condition.
c.
With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip System requirements for both Trip Systems, 1.
Within one hour, place the inop,erable channel (s) in one Trip System and/or that Trip System in the tripped condition,
and 2.
Within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months for trip functions 1.b, 2.b, 3.b, 6.c, 6.e, and 6.f, and within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for trip functions other than 1.b, 2.b, 3.b, 6.c, 6.e, and 6.f, place the inoperable channel (s) in the remaining Trip System in the tripped condition.
An inoperable channel or Trip System need not be placed in the tripped condition where this would cause the Trip Function to occur. In these cases, if the inoperable channel is not restored to OPERABLE status within the required time, the ACTION required by Table 3.3.2-1 for the Functional Unit shall be taken.
This ACTION applies to that Trip System with the most inoperable channels; if both Trip Systems have the same number of inoperable channels, the ACTION can be applied to either Trip System.
1he proposed changes to Actions b. and c. for TS 3.3.2 would increase and clarify the time permitted to place an inoperable channel in the tripped condition when the number of operable channels is less than required. These changes are acceptable since they are consistent with References 4 and 5 and with current NRC staff positions and related guidance provided in Reference 1.
The proposed change to Note (a) of TS Table 3.3.2-1 would revise the note to read:
(a)
A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped condition provided at least one other OPERABLE channel in the same Trip System is monitoring that parameter.
The change to Note (a) on TS Table 3.3.1-1 would increase the time permitted for an isolation actuation instrumentation channel to be declared inoperable for surveillance purposes without placing the channel in the tripped condition from 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .
This proposed change is consistent with the provisions of References 4 and 5 and is, therefore, acceptable.
The proposed changes to TS Table 4.3.2.1-1 would increase the channel functional test interval requirement for the following Trip Functions from monthly to quarterly:
1.
Primary Containment Isolation 2.
Main Steam Line Isolation 3.
Secondary Containment Isolation 4.
Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU) Isolation 5.
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) Isolation (Note: excludes item 5.n, Manual Initiation) 6.
Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System Isolation The proposed change to footnote (a) of TS Table 4.3.2.1-1 would revise the frequency of channel functional testing on circuitry associated with the RWCU isolation on standby liquid contro' system (SLCS) initiation from at least once every other 31 days per logic channel to at least once every other 92 days per logic char.nel.
The proposed change to footnote (b) of TS Table 4.3.2.1-1 would revise the frequency of certain trip unit setpoint calibrations from at least once per 31 days to at least once per 92 days. This footnote is applicable to the following isolation signals:
1.
Primary Containment Isolation a.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Level 2 b.
Drywell Pressure - High 2.
Main Steam Line Isolation a.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low Level I c.
Main Steam Line Pressure - Low d.
Main Steam Line Flow - High e.
Condenser Vacuum - Low f.
Main Steam Line Area Temperature - High (Turbine Building) 3.
Secondary Containment Isolation a.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Level 2 b.
Drywell Pressure - High 4.
RWCU Isolation e.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Level 2
e-l 5.
RCIC Isolation a.
RCIC Steam Line Flow - High c.
RCIC Steam Supply Pressure - Low d.
RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure - High 1.
RHR/RCIC Steam flow - High m.
Drywell Pressure - High 6.
RHR System Isolation c.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Level 3 d.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low Level 1 e.
Reactor Vessel (RHR Cut-in Permissive) Pressure - High f.
Drywell Pressure - High The proposed changes to TS Table 4.3.2.1-1 and footnotes (a) and (b) are consistent with References 4 and 5 and are, therefore, acceptable.
TS 3/4.3.3 - Emeroency Core Coolina System Actuation Instrumentation The proposed change to footnote (a) of TS Table 3.3.3-1 would increase the time permitted for an ECCS channel to be placed in an inoperable status for surveillance purposes without placing the trip system in the tripped condition from 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .
This proposed change is consistent with the provisions of Reference 6 and is, therefore, acceptable.
The licensee proposed several changes to the Table 3.3.3-1 ACTION statements to increase allowed outage times and address potential loss-of-function conditions.
The specific changes are discussed below.
ACTION 30 currently applies to the following ECCS. actuation instrumentation channels:
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low Level 1 Drywell Pressure - High Reactor Vessel Pressure - Low (LPCS/LPCI [ Low-Pressure Core Spray / Low-Pressure Coolant injection) Injection Valve Permissive)
ACTION 30 currently requires that if one channel is inoperable and the number of operable channels is less than required by the minimum operable channels j
per trip function requirement, the inoperable channel must be-placed in the tripped condition within I hour or the associated system must be declared inoperable.
If more than one channel is inoperable, the associated system must be declared inoperable.
The proposed change to ACTION 30 would require verification within one hour that sufficient instrumentation is operable or in 1
the tripped condition _to maintain automatic actuation capability of at least one-division of ECCS and automatic depressurization system (ADS), and would require that the inoperable channel (s) be placed in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
If a loss-of-function condition exists or it is not desirable to place the inoperable channel (s) in the tripped condition, the associated systems would be declared inoperable.
.i
_g-ACTION 31 currently applies to the following ECCS actuation instrumentation channels:
LPCI Pump Start Time Delay Relay LPCS Pump Start Time Delay Relay ADS Timer Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Level 3 (Permissive)
LPCS Pump Discharge Pressure - High (Permissive)
LPCI Pump Discharge Pressure - High (Permissive)
ADS Drywell Pressure Bypass Timer Reactor Vessel Water Level - High Level 8 ACTION 31 currently requires that if the number of operable channels is less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip function requirement, the associated ADS trip system or ECCS must be declared inoperable.
The licensee proposed to revise the ACTlaN requirement for the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Level 3 (Permissive) ECCS actuation instrumentation from ACTION 31 to ACTION 30.
As noted above, ACTION 30 provides the option of placing an inoperable channel in the tripped condition.
The licensee stated that this should be an acceptable alternative to declaring the associated ADS trip system inoperable for this instrumentation trip function.
Placing the inoperable channel in the tripped condition would still enable automatic l
initiation of ADS upon receipt of a Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low Level 1 signal.
The licensee proposed to revise the ACTION requirement for the Reactor Vessel-Water Level - High Level 8 ECCS actuation instrumentation from ACTION 31 to ACTION 33. A loss-of-function check is not required for this actuation instrumentation, since the loss of one channel results in a loss of the function (two-out-of-two logic).
This loss was considered during the-development of Reference 6 and was considered acceptable for the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowed by the proposed revision to ACTION 33 discussed below.
For the remaining channels, the proposed change to ACTION 31 would require verification within one hour.that sufficient instrumentation is operable or in the tripped condition to maintain automatic actuation capability of at least one division of ECCS and ADS, and would provide a period of P.4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months before the associated ADS trip system or ECCS must be declared inoperable.
-)
ACTION 32 applies to the Reactor Vessel Pressure - Low (LPCS/LPCI Injection Valve Permissive) actuation instrumentation channels in Operational Conditions 4 and 5 when the LPCS/LPCI systems are required to be operable. ACTION 32 currently requires that if the number of operable channels is less.than required by the minimum operable channels per trip function requirement,.the inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . The proposed change to ACTION 32 would provide a period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months before the associated channel must be placed in the tripped condition.
1
-,,s_
~~
l
i ACTION 33 currently applies to the following ECCS actuation instrumentation channels:
LPCS Pump Discharge Flow - Low (Bypass)
LPCI Pump Discharge Flow - Low (Bypass)
LPCS Manual Initiation LPCI Manual Initiation ADS Manual Inhibit Switch High-Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Pump Discharge Pressure - High (Bypass)
HPCS System Flow Rate - Low (Permissive)
HPCS Manual Initiation ACTION 33 currently requires that if the number of operable channels is less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip function requirement, the inoperable channel must be restored to operable status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or the associated ADS valve or ECCS must be declared inoperable.
The proposed change to AC110N 33 would provide a period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to restore an inoperable channel.
The LPCS/LPCI Pump Discharge Flow - Low (Bypass) actuation instrumentation channels require verification that a loss-of-function condition does not exist; however, the proposed ACTION 33 does not require a loss-of-function check.
Therefore, the licensee proposed to revise the action requirement for this instrumentation from ACTION 33 to new ACTION 38.
This new action statement would require verification within one hour that sufficient instrumentation is operable or in the tripped condition to maintain automatic actuation capability of at least one division of ECCS, and would require that the inoperable channel (s) be restored to operable status within 7 days.
If a loss-of-function condition exists or the inoperable channel (s) cannot be restored to operable status, the associated system (s) would be declared inoperable.
The licensee proposed to revise the ACTION requirement for the HPCS Pump Discharge Pressure - High (Bypass) and the HPCS System Flow Rate - Low (Permissive) ECCS actuation instrumentation from ACTION 33 to new ACTION 39.
ACTION 39 would provide a period of 7 days to restore an inoperable channel to operable status before requiring that the HPCS system be declared inoperable.
ACTION 34 currently applies to the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Level 2 and Drywell Pressure - High ECCS actuation instrumentation channels that actuate HPCS.
ACTION 34 currently requires that if the number of operable channels is less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip function requirement for one trip system, that trip system must be placed in the tripped condition within I hour or the HPCS system must be declared inoperable; and if the number of operable channels is less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip function requirement for both trip system, the HPCS system must be declared inoperable.
Footnote (e) of Table 3.3.3-1 clarifies the trip system boundaries for these inputs to the HPCS actuation logic, specifying that each of these functions uses a one-out-of-two taken twice logic, such that each one-out-of-two logic is defined as a separate trip system for this ACTION.
The proposed change to ACTION 34 would require verification that a sufficient number of channels remain operable or are in the tripped condition to maintain automatic HPCS actuation capability, and would require that the inoperable channel (s) be placed in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
If a loss-of-function condition exists or it is not desirable to place the inoperable channel (s) in the tripped condition, the HPCS system would be declared inoperable.
Footnote (e) to Table 3.3.3-1 would be deleted, as the revised ACTION 34 eliminates the dependence of the action to be taken on the number of trip systems affected, so the footnote is no longer necessary.
ACTION 35 applies to the Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low and Suppression Pool Water Level - High channels. The current ACTION 35 requires that if the number of operable channels is less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip function requirement, at least one inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or the HPCS system must be declared inoperable.
The proposed change to ACTION 35 would require verification that the HPCS pump suction is aligned to or is capable of automatically realigning to the suppression pool and would require that the inoperable channel (s) be placed in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
If a loss-of-function condition exists or it is not desirable to place the inoperable channel (s) in the tripped condition (or to realign the HPCS pump suction to the suppression pool), the HPCS system would be declared inoperable.
Verification of sufficient operable or tripped instrumentation channels ensures that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels result in redundant automatic initiation capability being lost for the affected feature (s).
provided that sufficient instrumentation is operable or tripped, Reference 6 demonstrated that an allowable out-of-service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is acceptable to permit restoration of an inoperable channel to operable status.
The 7 day A0T of ACTIONS 38 and 39 is longer than the approved 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months A0T contained in Reference 6, but is consistent with the A0T provided in Reference 1.
The 7 day A0T proposed for these instrumentation trip functions is acceptable based on the remaining capability of the associated ECCS subsystems, the redundancy available in the ECCS design, and the low probability of a design basis accident occurring during this longer allowed out of service time.
If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to operable status within the allowed out-of-service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition.
Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore the capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue. Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.o., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an initiation), the associated system (s) must be declared inoperable.
The proposed changes to TS Table 3.3.3-1 are acceptable since they are consistent with References 6 and 17, and with current NRC staff positions and related guidance provided in Reference 1 to ensure that a loss-of-function condition will not exist if two or more channels are inoperable.
The proposed changes to TS Table 4.3.3.1-1 would extend the channel functional test interval requirement from monthly to quarterly for the Division I, Division II, and Division 111 Trip Systems, except for the Manual Initiation trip function for each trip system, which would remain at a frequency of once per cycle.
The proposed change to footnote (a) on Table 4.3.3.1-1 would revise the frequency of certain trip unit setpoint calibrations from at least once per 31 days to at least once per 92 days. This footnote is applicable to the following ECCS actuation instrumentation:
A.I.
RHR-A (LPCI Mode) and LPCS System a.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low Level I b.
Drywell Pressure - High c.
LPCS Pump Discharge Flow - Low d.
Reactor Vessel Pressure - Low (LPCS/LPCI Injection Valve Permissive) f.
LPCI Pump A Discharge Flow - Low A.2.
Automatic Depressurization System Trip System "A" a.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low Level I b.
Drywell Pressure - High d.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Level 3 e.
LPCS Pump Discharge Pressure - High f.
LPCI Pump A Discharge Pressure - High B.I.
RHR-B and C (LPCI Mode) a.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low Level I b.
Drywell Pressure - High c.
Reactor Vessel Pressure - Low (LPCI Injection Valve Permissive) e.
LPCI Pump Discharge Flow - Low B.2.
Automatic Depressurization System Trip System "B" a.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low Level I b.
Drywell Pressure - High d.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Level 3 e.
LPCI Pump B and C Discharge Pressure - High C.I.
HPCS System a.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Level 2 b.
Drywell Pressure - High c.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - High Level 8 d.
Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low e.
Suppression Pool Water Level - High f.
Pump Discharge Pressure - High g.
HPCS System Flow Rate - Low The proposed changes to TS Table 4.3.3.1-1 are consistent with References 6 and 17 and are, therefore, acceptable.
TS 3/4.3,4 Recirculation Pumo Trio Actuation Instrumentation The footnote on Table 3.3.4.1-1 currently states that one anticipated transient without scram recirculation pump trip (ATWS-RPT) trip system may be
l placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for required surveillance provided the other trip system is operable.
The proposed change to this j
footnote would increase the allowable time for surveillance from 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to i
6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .
The proposed revisions to TS Table 4.3.4.1-1 would change the channel functional test interval requirement from monthly to quarterly for the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Level 2 and the Reactor Vessel Pressure - High trip functions.
The proposed addition of footnote (a) to Table 4.3.4.1-1 would clarify that the trip unit setpoint calibration should be performed at an interval of at least once per 92 days.
This ensures consistency with other related changes proposed in this submittal.
The proposed changes to TS Tables 3.3.4.1-1 and 4.3.4.1-1 are consistent with Reference 7 and are, therefore, acceptable.
ACTION b. for TS 3.3.4.2 currently requires that the inoperable end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip (E0C-RPT) instrumentation channel (s) be placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months if the number of operable channels is one less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip system requirement for one or both trip systems.
The proposed change to ACTION b. would extend the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months for placing the inoperable channel (s) in the tripped condition to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .
T10N c.l. for TS 3.3.4.2 currently requires that both inoperable channels be placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months if the number of operable E0C-RPT channels is two or more less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip system requirement for one trip system and if the inoperable channels consist of one turbine control valve channel and one turbine stop valve channel.
The proposed change to ACTION c.l. would extend the I hour period to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .
The proposed 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months A0T for ACTIONS b. and c.l. is longer than the approved 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months A0T contained in Reference 7, but is consistent with the A0T provided in Reference 1.
The longer A0T is acceptable because of the diversity of sensors available to provide trip signals, the low probability of multiple inoperabilities affecting all diverse instrumentation trip functions, and the low probability of an event requiring the initiation of an E0C-RPT.
The proposed change to footnote (a) on Table 3.3.4.2-1 would revise the amount of time that an E0C-RPT trip system may be placed in an inoperable status for required surveillance from 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .
This proposed change is consistent with Reference 7 and is, therefore, acceptable.
The proposed changes to TS Table 4.3.4.2.1-1 would revise the channel functional test interval requirement for the Turbine Stop Valve - Closure and the Turbine Control Valve - Fast Closure trip functions from monthly to quarterly.
The proposed change to footnote # on Table 4.3.4.2.1-1 would revise the frequency of the first stage pressure transmitter trip unit setpoint calibration from at least once per 31 days to at least once per 92 days.
The proposed changes to TS Table 4.3.4.2.1-1 are consistent with Reference 7 and are, therefore, acceptable.
TS 3/4.3.5 Reactor Core Isolatian Conlina System Actuation Instrumentation Footnote (a) on TS Table 3.3.5-1 currently permits a RCIC system actuation instrument channel to be placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for required surveillance.
The proposed change to footnote (a) would extend the 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .
The licensee proposed several changes to Table 3.3.5-1 ACTION statements to increase allowed outage times and address potential loss-of-function conditions.
The specific changes are discussed below.
Action 50 applies to the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Level 2 RCIC actuation instrumentation functional unit.
ACTION 50 currently requires that if the number of operable chmnels is less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip f unction requirement for one trip system, that trip system must be placed in the tripped condition within I hour or the RCIC system must be declared inoperable; and if the number of operable channels is less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip function requirement for both trip systems, the RCIC system must be declared inoperable.
Footnote (b) of Table 3.3.5-1 clarifies the trip system boundaries for these inputs to the RCIC actuation logic, specifying that each of these functions uses a one-out-of-two taken twice logic, such that each one-out-of-two logic is defined as a separate trip system for this action statement.
The proposed change to ACTION 50 would require verification that a sufficient number of channels remain operable or are in the tripped condition to maintain automatic RCIC actuation capability, and would require that the inoperable channel (s) be placed in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
If j
a loss-of-function condition exists or it is not desirable to place the
)
inoperable channel (s) in the tripped condition, the RCIC system would be l
declared inoperable.
Footnote (b) to Table 3.3.5-1 would be deleted, as the revised ACTION 50 eliminates the dependence of the action to be taken on the number of trip systems affected, so the footnote is no longer necessary.
Action 51 applies to the Reactor Vessel Water Level - High Level 8 RCIC actuation instrumentation functional unit. ACTION 51 currently requires that if the number of operable channels is less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip function requirement, the RCIC system must be declared inoperable.
The proposed change to ACTION 51 would provide an allowed outage time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months before requiring the RCIC system to be declared inoperable.
A loss-of-function check is not required for this actuation instrumentation, since the loss of one channel results in a loss of the function (two-out-of-two logic). This loss was considered during the development of Reference 6 and was considered acceptable for the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowed by the proposed revision to ACTION 51.
. _. _ Action 52 applies to the Condensate Storage Tank Water Level - Low and Suppression Pool Water Level - High RCIC actuation instrumentation functional units.
The current ACTION 52 requires that if the number of operable channels is less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip function requirement, at least one inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or the RCIC system must be declared inoperable.
The proposed change to ACTION 52 would require verification that the RCIC pump suction is aligned to or is capable of automatically realigning to the suppression pool and would require that at least one inoperable channel be placed in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
If a loss-of-function condition exists or it is not desirable to place the inoperable channel (s) in the tripped condition (or to realign the RCIC pump suction to the suppression pool), the RCIC system would be declared inoperable.
. Action 53 applies to the Manual Initiation RCIC instrumentation functional unit.
Action 53 currently specifies that the inoperable channel must be restored to operable status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or the RCIC system must be declared inoperable if the number of operable channels is one less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip system requirement.
The proposed change to Action 53 would extend the 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
Verification of sufficient operable or tripped instrumentation channels ensures that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels result in redundant automatic RCIC initiation capability being lost.
Provided that sufficient instrumentation is operable or tripped, Reference 6 demonstrated that an allowable out-of-service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is acceptable to permit restoration of an inoperable channel to operable status.
If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to operable status within the allowable out-of-service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition.
Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensare for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue.
Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an initiation), the RCIC system must be declared inoperable.
The proposed changes to TS Table 3.3.5-1 are consistent with Reference 8 and with current NRC staff positions and related guidance provided in Reference 1 and are, therefore, acceptable.
The proposed changes to TS Table 4.3.5.1-1 would revise the channel functional test interval requirement for the following RCIC trip functions from monthly to quarterly:
a.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Level 2 b.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - High Level 8 c.
Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low d.
Suppression Pool Water Level - High The proposed change to footnote (a) on Table 4.3.5.1-1 would revise the frequency of certain trip unit setpoint calibrations from at least once per 31 days to at.least once per 92 days.
This footnote is applicable to the same
i RCIC actuation instrumentation ioentified as trip functions a. through d.
above.
The proposed changes to TS Table 4.3.5.1-1 are consistent with Reference 8 and are, therefore, acceptable.
TS 3/4.3.6 Control Rod Block Instrumentation The licensee has proposed to add footnote (e) to TS Table 3.3.6-1 to allow a control rod block instrumentation channel to be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped condition, provided at least one other operable channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.
The licensee proposed to add new ACTION 63 to Table 3.3.6-1 to increase allowed-outage times and address potential loss-of-function conditions.
ACTION 62 on TS Table 3.3.6-1 currently specifies that an inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months if the minimum number of operable channels is less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip system requirement.
The proposed revision would change the action requirement for the Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High and the Reactor Coolant System Recirculation Flow Upscale trip functions from ACTION 62 to new ACTION 63.
The proposed ACTION 63 would require verification that sufficient channels remain operable to initiate a rod block by the associated trip function and would require that at least one inoperable channel be placed in the tripped condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .
If a loss-of-function condition exists or it is not desirable to place the inoperable channel (s) in the tripped condition ACTION 63 would require that a rod block be initiated.
The proposed changes to TS Table 3.3.6-1 are consistent with Reference 7 and with current NRC staff positions and related guidance provided in Reference 1 and are, therefore, acceptable.
The proposed changes to TS Table 4.3.6-1 would modify the channel functional test interval requirement for the following control rod block trip functions from monthly to quarterly:
1.
Rod Pattern Control System 2.
Average Power Range Monitor 5.
Scram Discharge Volume 6.
Reactor Coolant System Recirculation Flow The proposed change to footnote # on Table 4.3.6-1 would revise the frequency
- of certain trip unit setpoint calibrations from once per 31 days to once per
' 92 days.
This footnote is applicable to the Rod Pattern Control System and the Scram Discharge Volume control rod block instrumentation.
The proposed changes to TS Table 4.3.6-1 are consistent with Reference 3 and
)
are, therefore, acceptable.
l l
,My w+w e
2 e
--,49--i-w-
ta T TS 3/4.3.7 Monitorina Instrumentation The proposed revision to TS Table 4.3.7.1-1 would change the channel functional test interval requirement for the Main Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitors from monthly to quarterly. This proposed change is consistent with Reference 7 and is, therefore, acceptable.
TS 3/4.3.9 Plant Systems Actuation Instrumentation The licensee has proposed to add footnote (a) to TS Table 3.3.9-1.
This footnote would permit a single channel to be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped condition, provided at least one other operable channel in the same trip system is monitoring the trip function.
ACTION 150 currently applies to the Drywell Pressure - High plant systems actuation instrumentation channel. ACTION 150 currently requires that if one channel is inoperable and the number of operable channels is less than required by the minimum operable channels per trip function requirement, the inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within I hour or the associated system must be declared inoperable.
The proposed change to ACTION 150 would require that the inoperable channel be placed in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .
The proposed change to TS Table 4.3.9.1-1 would revise the channel functional test interval requirement for the Primary Containment Ventilation System -
Unit Cooler A and B and the Feedwater System / Main Turbine Trip System trip functions from monthly to quarterly.
The proposed change to footnote (a) on Table 4.3.9.1-1 would revise the frequency of certain trip unit setpoint calibrations from once per 31 days to once per 92 days.
This footnote is applicable to the following plant systems actuation instrumentation:
1.
Primary Containment Ventilation System - Unit Cooler A and B a.
Drywell Pressure - High b.
Containment-to-Annulus oD-High c.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low Level 1 The proposed changes to TS Tables 3.3.9-1 and 4.3.9.1-1 are consistent with Reference 7 and are, therefore, acceptable.
i TS 3/4.4.2 Safetv/ Relief Valves The proposed change would revise TS 4.4.2.1.1 and TS 4.4.2.1.2 to change the channel functional test interval for the safety / relief valve acoustic monitors and the relief valve function pressure actuation instrumentation from at least once per 31 days to at least once per 92 days.
The proposed change would also add a footnote that would permit an acoustic monitor or pressure actuation instrumentation channel to be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped condition.
. The proposed changes to TS 4.4.2.1.1 and TS 4.4.2.1.2 are consistent with Reference 7 and are, therefore, acceptable.
The proposed change would revise TS 4.4.2.2.1 to change the channel functional test interval for the Safety / Relief Valve Low-Low Set Function instrumentation from at least once per 31 days to at least once per 92 days.
The proposed change would also add a footnote to TS 4.4.2.2.1 that would permit a Safety / Relief Valve Low-Low Set Function instrumentation channel to be placed in an inoperable status for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped condition provided all other Safety / Relief Valve Low-Low Set Function instrumentation channels are operable.
The proposed changes to TS 4.4.2.2.1 are consistent with Reference 7 and are, therefore, acceptable, The proposed changes would also modify the Bases for TS 3/4.3.1, 3/4.3.2, 3/4.3.3, 3/4.3.4, 3/4.3.5, 3/4.3.6, 3/4.3.9, and 3/4.4.2 to reference the GE LTRs which justify the above proposed changes and provide bases for operator actions during surveillance and repair of instrument channels.
The NRC staff offers no objection to the proposed changes to the Bases.
The proposed changes would also modify TS Index pages xvi and xvii to reflect the changes to the Bases. The conforming, administrative changes to the TS Index pages are acceptable.
3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Louisiana official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment.
The State official had no comments.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (59 FR 21787).
Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c) (9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
5.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded,-based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
6.0 REFERENCES
1.
NUREG-1434, " Standard Technical Specifications - GE BWR/6 Plants,"
September 1992.
2.
NEDC-30851P, " Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for BWR Reactor Protection System," dated March 1988.
3.
NEDC-30851P (Supplement 1), " Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Control Rod Block Instrumentation," dated October 1988.
4.
NEDC-30851P (Supplement 2), " Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation," dated March 1989.
5.
NEDC-31677P, " Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation," dated July 1990.
6.
NEDC-30936P, "BWR Owner's Group Technical Specification Improvement Methodology (With Demonstration for BWR ECCS Actuation Instrumentation)
Parts 1 and 2," dated December 1988.
7.
GENE-770-06-01, " Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," dated February 1991, 8.
GENE-770-06-02, " Addendum to Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," dated February 1991.
9.
Letter and enclosed safety evaluation approving NEDC-30851P dated i
July 15,- 1987,- from A. C. Thadani (NRC) to T. A. Pickens (BWR Owners Group).
10.
Letter _ and enclosed safety evaluation approving NEDC-30851P (Supplement
2) dated January 6,.1989, from C. E..Rossi (NRC) to D. N. Grace (BWR Owners Group).
11.
Letter and enclosed safety evaluation approving NEDC-30851P (Supplement
1) dated September 22, 1988, from C. E. Rossi (NRC) to D. N. Grace (BWR Owners Group).
.. 12.
Letter and enclosed safety evaluation approving NEDL-31677P dated June 18, 1990, from C. E. Rossi (NRC) to S. D. Floyd (BWR Owners Group).
13.
Letter and enclosed safety evaluation approving NEDC-30936P dated December 9, 1988, from C. E. Rossi (NRC) to D. N. Grace (BWR Owners Group).
14.
Letter and enclosed safety evaluation approving GENE-770-06-01 dated July 21, 1992, from C. E. Rossi (NRC) to R. D. Bing IV (BWR Owners Group).
15.
Letter and enclosed safety evaluation approving GENE-770-06-02 dated September 13, 1991, from C. E. Rossi (NRC) to G. J. Beck (BWR Owners Group).
16.
GE Report MDE-92-0485 DRF A00-02119-D, April 1985 (Proprietary),
" Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for the Reactor Protection System for River Bend' Station, Unit 1."
17.
GE Report RE-029 DRF A00-02558E, February 1987 (Proprietary), " Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for the Emergency Core Cooling System Actuation Instrumentation for River Bend Station, Unit 1."
18.
Letter dated April 27, 1988, from C. E. Rossi (NRC) to R. F. Janecek (BWR Owners Group).
Principal Contributor:
R. Schaaf Date: August 2, 1994

ML20072C113

Contents

Text

1.0 INTRODUCTION

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

5.0 CONCLUSION

6.0 REFERENCES

1.0 INTRODUCTION

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

5.0 CONCLUSION

6.0 REFERENCES

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ML20072C113

Text

1.0 INTRODUCTION

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

5.0 CONCLUSION

6.0 REFERENCES

1.0 INTRODUCTION

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

5.0 CONCLUSION

6.0 REFERENCES

Navigation menu

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