ML20062E101

Forwards Resubmittal of Tech Spec Change Request 27 for Amend to App a of License DPR-72.Replaces 781031 Request Entirely.New Submittal Deletes Time Delay Relay & Clarifies Response Time in Safety Analysis.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20062E101
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	11/29/1978
From:	Stewart W FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 7812040199
Download: ML20062E101 (16)

Text

.

$ kh,

,/, ,

.. c)

Florida

.P.o. . .w. .e. . .r

. $#aaAsa'cW8a u November 29, 1978 Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

\ ( '

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• Washington, D.C. 20

SUBJECT:

Crystal ver Unit #3 -

j Docket N 50-302 l

( License D -72

Dear Sir:

Enclosed are three (3) originals and forty (40) copies of a resubmittal of Technical Specification Request Change Request No. 27 requesting an amendment to Appendix A of Operating License No. DPR-72. As part of this request, proposed replacement pages for Appendix A are enclosed.

This resubmittal is to replace Change Request No. 27 dated October 31, 1978 in its entirety. This new submittal is being made to reflect the most recent design change which deleted the need for a time delay relay. This submittal also provides clarification of the response time assumed in the safety analysis, as well as some general rewording for clarity.

FPC's licensing fee, in the amount of four thousand dollars ($4,000)

/

submitted on October 31, 1978, should be applied to this new Specification Change Request No. 27.

Very truly yours, FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION

- . k tgp , W.P. Stewart C

yy Enclosure C

py WPS/ECS/ hew /M05(11/27D12) m og cc: Office of Inspection and Enforcement k g% U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 90 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 ,Lfv) f SN Atlanta, GA 30303 c[0 File: 3-0-3-a-3 General Office 3201 Thiny.eunn street soum . P O Box 14042, st Petersourg Fcrca 33733 813-866-5151

-r m - -. ,-

g-

STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF PINELLAS W.P. Stewart states that he is the Director, Power Production, of Florida Power Corporation; that he is authorized on the part of said company to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the information attached hereto; and that all such statements made and matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

(

Af.D d)

W.P.' Stewart Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and County above named, this 29th day of November 1978.

- kukNotary Public

. i

• Notary Public, State of Florida at Large, My Commission Expires: July 25, 1980

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN IllE MATTER OF )

) DOCKET NO. 50-302 FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

, W. P. Stewart deposes and says that the followi:2g has been served on the Chief Executive of Citrus County, Florida by deposit in the United States.

mail, addressed as follows:

Chairman, Board of County Commissioners of Citrus County Citrus County Courthouse Inverness, Florida 32650

( An original copy of Technical Specification Change Request No. 27 requesting an amendment te Appendix A of Operating License No. DPR-72.

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION F

W. P. Stewart Director, Power Production SWORN 10 AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME THIS 29th DAY OF NOVEMBER 1978.

A N L Notary Pub'iic

[Q Notary Public State of Florida at Large My Commission expires: July 25, 1980 _

(NOTARIAL SEAL)

WPS/ hew /MOS (11/27D12)

) _ _

• CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT No. 3 DESIGN INFORMATION AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR REACTOR COOLANT PUMP POWER MONITORS The Reactor Coolant Pump Power Monitor (RCPPM) is designed to anticipate a loss or reduction of the reactor coolant flow by monitoriag reactor coolant pump power and detecting abnormal power conditions indicative of an inoperable pump. The status of each pump will be transmitted by the RCPPM to each of four Reactor Protection System (RPS) channels. Two RCPPMs will be supplied to provide redundant pump status information to each RPS channel. Logic in the RPS will act on the pump status information and take appropriate action as follows:

TABLE RPS ACTION No. of Pumps Inoperable 100% 78% 51.2%

1 Action by flux / flow None None Compa rator 2 (Diff. Loops) Trip Reactor Trip Reactor Trip Reactor 2 (Same Loops) Trip Reactor Trip Reactor Trip Reactor 3 Trip Reactor Trip Reactor Trip Reactor 4 ' rip Reactor Trip Reactor Trip Reactor As stated in the Accident Analyses of the CRf3 FSAR, in the event that a loss of reactor coolant flow due to failure of one or more of the RC pumps was to occur at the present licensed power level of 2452 MWe, the transient is terminated by the present RPS flux-flow trip. The present RPS action is quick enough to preclude the minimum DNB ratio from going below 1.30 for the four pump coastdown transient and below 1.00 for the locked rotor transient.

However, at thermal power levels greater than 2500 MWe, RPS action by the flux-flow comparator is not fast enough in event of loss of nore than one RC pump to preclude the minimum DNB ration from going below the acceptance criteria. Therefore, power levels above 2500 MWe, Nuclear Overpower based on Reactor Coolant Pump Power Monitors must be added to the RPS trip functions as this will reduce the response time of the Reactor Protection System f rom 1.4 sec. to .62 sec. and thereby terminate the transient quick enough to insure that the minimum DNB ratio limits are not violated. The attached table shows the assumptions used in determining these response times.

Figure 1 shova the proposed scheme for one RCPPM string. Two current transformers and two potential transformers measure the current and voltage on the RCP pump power feed lines. The transformers input into a watt transducer which produces an output signal proportional to real power.

'This power signal is fed into a bistable which provides a contact output for selected overpower and underpower setpoints. The bistable output con-tact actuates four separate relays. A contact from each relay is wired to its respective RPS channel. This, one pump monitor string provides status

-- ,- w

information for one pump to each of four RPS channels. An identical, redundant string (not shown in Figure 1) using separate transformers and monitoring equipment again provides status information for the same pump to the four RPS channels. In the event of a failure of one string, all four RPS channels would still have the necessary pump status information via the redundant string.

Figure 2 shows a block diagram of the complete RCPPM system. The system will be constructed such that equipment belonging to redundant strings will be in enclosures separated by barriers. Contact outputs from the RCPPM cabinets to the four RPS channels will be arranged to provide adequate pysical separation and electrical isolation between each channel.

i Separation of the cable and equipment for this installation will be in accordance with IEEE 384-1977 and Regulatory Guide 1.75. Where cable and 4 . equipment separation cannot be maintained, physical barriers will be I

included.

RCPPM cabinets and equipment specified will be seismically qualified and located in a Class I structure. All supports for engineered safeguards cable trays and conduits are designed for OBE and SSE using the

, acceleration floor response spectra developed for applicable levels of the containment building, auxiliary building, intermediate building and the control complex.

The current and potential transformers will not be seismically qualified.

However, spearation of the cables carrying redundant transformer outputs to the RCPPM cabinets will be provided in accordance with the separation

] criteria stated above. The current and potential transformers are not j seismically qualified because they are not required to safely shutdown the reactor. The loss of the current or potential transformers will result in -

a " pump inoperable' signal to the R?S system. Upon the receipt of two such signals, vhatever the cause, the RPS will trip the reactor.

Attached are the proposed revisions to the Technical Specifications for CRf3 as a result of the installation of Reactor Coolant Pump Power Monitors.

i

l i l C D iI g i l l I l l l g l .l l l

- S e S e

(>f P n P n Rn R n a a u4

._ # oh TC

.. # oh TC y

~

_ l l j u3 _ X R 3 X 4 R

_. e l

b _

a _ A B t

s u2 l l i

B _ S e P n S e P n Rn R n

_ a a

' oh oh .

TC ..

TC

'n 1 l I X X

_ _ R 1 R 2 s

t '

t a **

M I l i l

, ele 0" $ -

l l I l I l l !i l !I I l I  !' I l e

m a

T Pb T

h e

s P@ d t i

n h

T t C i m

u l V e r I ,,

a C I ,,

b p m

u d

w e

n 0 P1 nt i e 1

0 . -

V ,

"f 9 w 1,, C an E R t i R 0

0 6 S T

C h nb oa U G

9 C c I

- F 6 -

pBC((

Receter Coolant Pu:npa 3

9-

n M

N e n a >

N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N OO mm O

m O

m O

a O

m OO mm O

m O

m O

m O

m OO a m OO a m Pump M nitor #2 Monitor #1 N N N N ~ w w ~

c n w > c n es >

• 99 naa "aa CC E8 g.5 099 f4 O O EEE E ,r n

??

44

? "

?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?

,e ,a ,e ,a ,a ,e ,a 5 ,e ,a ,e ,a ,e ,a ,s ,s e n is > c n w > c n a > c n a >

RPS Channel D RPS Channel C RPS Channel B RP5 Channel A l

Reactor Protection Response Times Nuclear Overpower Based on Pump Monitors Sensor delay 0.24 sec.

RPS delay 0.15 sec.

Breaker delay 0.08 sec.

CRD Relays delay 0.06 sec.

MARGIN 0.09 sec.

TOTAL 0.62 sec.

Nuclear Overpower based on RCS Flow and Axial Power Imbalance Total response time - 1.4 sec*

• This response time is comprised of the same factors as the response time for pump monitors (0.62 sec.) plus the delay time caused by the flow anubbers which have been added to the flow sensing lines. This response time was assumed in the safety analyses for CRf3. The response time of 0.62 sec., reflecting the addition of the pump monitors, will be used in the reanalysis of the Cour pump coast down and locked rotor cases, l

l l

l l

WPS/hev/M05

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REQUEST NO. 27 Replace pages 2-6, B 2-7, 3/4 3-2, 3/4 3-6, and 3/4 3-7 with the attached revised pages 2-6, B 2-7, B 2-8, 3/4 3-2, 3/4 3-6, and 3/4 3-7.

Proposed Change The above pages are being revised to include Reactor Coolant Pump Power Monitors (RCPPM) in the CRf3 Technical Specifications. The pump monitors will be installed during the first refueling outage of CRf3. It is requested that this technical specification change become effective upon completion of installation and testing of the monitors.

Reason for Proposed Change Florida Power Corporation is presently discussing with the NRC staff our intent to request that the power level of CR#3 be increased from 2452 MWt to the FSAR ultimate core power level of 2544 MWt. It is our intent to receive approval from the NRC for this power increase in order that the up-grade can be accomplished at the first refueling outage of CR#3. As part of this power upgrade, B&W has indicated that Reactor Coolant Pump Power Monitors (RCPPM) must be installed at CRf3 to preclude going below the min-imum DNB ratio limits in the event of a loss of coolant flow accident at CRf3.

The Reactor Coolant Pump Power Monitor is designed to anticipate a loss or reduction of reactor coolant flow by monitoring reactor coolant pump power and detecting abnormal power conditions indicative of an inoperable pump.

The status of each pump will be transmitted by the RCPPM to each of four Reactor Protection System (RPS) channels. Two RCPPMs will be supplied to provide redundant pump status information to each RPS channel. Logic in I

l the RPS will act on the pump status information and take appropriate action as follows:

TABLE RPS ACTION No. of Pumps Inoperable 100% 78% 51.2%

1 Action by flux / flow None None comparator 2 (Diff. Loops) Trip Reactor Trip Reactor Trip Reactor 2 (Same Loops) Trip Reactor Trip Reactor Trip Reactor 3 Trip Reactor Trip Reactor Trip Reactor 4 Trip Reactor Trip Reactor Trip Reactor As stated in the Accident Analyses of the CRf3 FSAR, in the event that a loss of reactor coolant flow due to failure of one or more of the RC pumps I

i was to occur at the present licensed power level or 2452 MWe, the transient is terminated by the present RPS flux-flow trip. The present RPS action is quick enough to preclude the minimum DNB ratio from going below 1.30 for the four pump coastdown transient and below 1.00 for the locked rotor transient.

t

~

l However, at thermal power levels greater than 2500 MWe, RPS action by the flux-flow comparator is not fast enough in event of loss of more than one RC pump to preclude the minimum DNB ratio from going below the acceptance criteria. Therefore, for power levels above 2500 MWt, Nuclear Overpower based on Reactor Coolant Pump Power Monitors must be added to the RPS trip functions as this will reduce the response time of the Reactor Protection System and thereby terminate the transient quick enough to insure that the minimum DNB ratio limits are not violated. The pump power monitors are being added in addition to the present flux-flow comparator.

Safety Analysis Justifying Proposed Change The licensing submittal in support of the proposed power level increase will be submitted as part of the reload report for the first refueling for CRi3. Included in this licensing submittal will be a reanalysis of the loss of coolant flow accident due to four pump coastdown and the locked rotor cases. This safety analysis will demonstrate that the addition of the Reactor Coolant Pump Power Monitors at CRf3 will prevent violation of the minimum DNB ratio limits for the four pump coastdown and locked rotor cases.

i i

l l

l l

_2_

<~

n TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

n kEACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS FUNCTION UNIT TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES E 8. Reactor Containment Vessel

! $ Pressure liigh 1 4 psig 1 4 psig

9. Nuclear Overpower < 0.00% of RATED THERMAL POWER < 0.28% of RATED TilERMAL POWER based on Pump MonitorsII) with one pump operating in each loop with one pump operating in each loop

+

< 0.00% of RATED THERMAL POWER with < 0.28% of RATED TilERMAL POWER WITH two pump operating in one loop and Two pumps operating in one loop and no pump operating in the other loop no pump operating in the other loop

< 0.00% of RATED THERMAL POWER with < 0.28% of RATED THERMAL POWER with no pumps operating or only one pump no pumps operating or nnly one pump operating operating III rip T may be manually bypassed when RCS pressure 1 1720 psig by actuating Shutdown Bypass provided that:

a. The Nuclear Overpower Trip Setpoint is 1 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER

b. The Shutdown Bypass RCS Pressure - liigh Trip Setpoint of 1 1720 psig is imposed, and

c. The Shutdown Bypass is removed when RCS Pressure > 1800 psig.

1

LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS BASES Nuclear Overpower Based on Pump Monitors In conjunction with the power / imbalance / flow trips, the Nuclear Overpower Based On Pump Monitors trip prevents the minimum core ONBR from decreasing below 1.30 by tripping the reactor due to the loss of reactorcoolantpump(s). The pump monitors also restrict the power level for the number of pun.ps in operation.

/

l CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 B 2-7

, , - ,-c- - .,, , - ,, -- --

m e

2400 i.j.

. i i ,

l 14 ti;4;it

.. . .e e 3 , - -

.L lll f(

3 17 .. ,

2200 ff I 1' l '2 12I I

'i _3 1 ll}[ ;Ill

! f '

.e g

l

.f ..

.,. E ., l/. l 3'__,l , '

t

.t ..

. . [_- . .

, , 6 e

4-. -

..}.,. . .g i sp ; g

.. , - p.{ ..,. . .

6 ..

.l

. .y . p

.}. 9 1 lg, &l 1 I. .}. rei. -r

.7 4 6e } i iL.l I i. ,-i-{

a l t- J. i 1-* .t - }- - t ' - * - 't' -i- I - ,  ;

ct 2000 +, p.eL*..,,g4}i '

' -t i f 7 '--

4 r' j- t ' -l, j' '

l/Ljl',tl H , i o -- - I '-frt 'f',lj -

- t i r i-t- ,t tt

- F -

l ft t, t I d ',

' a.CCk_L I '-1{.']

Z7 t!TI 7. *_T  ;! a s+F+/ I[f 2

[!~l .- [_!

u 5 F

• tff rr ,,, f,

-t-- . H n-

, ;-r r f t-j+4

,y p , _3 l-, ; ;,[

j p,t '. Tj_+ , j T_[1gg,_4_.g . '-

l 1800 l .;t..,+ art..1_ .f .1I,.,Irtf t! Ip ,- 4 -t.;.t_ ; , L . s

.. I. . , t

, t.:

!_, r..,. ti i

} .L, -e.. .

l. -..F - .4 ,' . ,t !;Ii

..J_..p...u. , i. j .l. p, .[.l .

$L. . t . J. .

4.{

4. } .-.l

- . . _t .

ji ._rp,

,,,7,

,.l  ;: :-..L1 '

.!: 4 !.; 4.

H .,Lt_a !.M HLt s.e[

iL.

, ,f. .. . . ' .-).)T' L . .4 i . . . GM 6 i , . 6.

, . . . t l-l

,4

_, [ . f . . { 4. h f .1 t ! ,

. i l'{.ir. .'

1600 '

i 580 600 620 640 660 l

Reactar Outlet Temperature, OF Reactor Coolant Flow Curve (LBS/HR) Power Pumps Operating (Type of Limit)

{ 1 131. 3 x106(100.i) 112% Four Pumps (DNBR Limit) 2 98.1 x 106 (74.7%) 84 % Three Pumps (DNBR Limit) 3 64.4 x 106 (49.0%) 57%

One Pump in each loop (Quality Limit)

Pressure / Temperature Limits at Maximum s

Allowable Power for Minimum DNBR BASES Figure 2.1 1

l l

I CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 B 2-8

TABLE 3.3-1 .-

Q REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION "1

2

' " MINIMUM  !

TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE  !

m FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION 7 1. Manual Reactor Trip 1 1 1 1, 2 and

• 8 E 2. Nuclear Overpower 4 2 3 1, 2 2f w 3. RCS Outlet Temperature-High 4 2 3 1, 2 3#

4. Nuclear Overpower Based on RCS Flow ',

and AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE 4 2(a) 3 1, 2 2f 1

5. RCS Pressure -- Low 4 2(a) 3 1, 2 3#

6. RCC Pressure ,- High 4 2 3 1, 2 3#

7. Variable Low RCS Pressure 4 2(a) 3 1, 2 3#

8. Reactor Containment Pressure -- High 4 2 3 1, 2 f

" 3#

• 9. Nuclear Overpower Based on Pump Monitor 4 2 3 1, 2 3#

w i A 10. Intennediate Range, Neutron Flux 2 0 2 1, 2 and

• 4 and Rate ,

11. Source Range. Neutron Flux and Rate A. Startup 2 0 2 2ff and

• i 5 l t

B. Shutdown 2 0 1 3, 4 and S 6 +

12. Control Rod Drive Trip Breakers 2 per trip 1 per trip 2 per trip 1, 2 and

• 7#  ;

system system system i

13. Reactor Trip Module 2 per trip 1 per trip 2 per trip 1, 2 and

• 7#

system system system i

14. Shutdown Bypass RCS Pressure-High 4 2 3- 3**

2**, 6f 4**, 5** t

TABLE 3.3-2 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION RESPONSE TIMES b! FUNCTIONAL UNIT RESPONSE TIMES 4

?? 1. Manual Reactor Trip Not Applicable

2. Nuclear Overpower

• 3,0.3 seconds

. 3. RCS Outlet Temperature--High Not Applicable C

EE 4. Nuclear Overpower Based on RCS Flow and AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE * < l.4 seconds

5. RCS Pressure--Low fL 0.5 seconds

6. RCS Pressure--High fL 0.5 seconds

7. Variable Low RCS Pressure Not Applicable j{ 8. Reactor Containment Pressure--High Not Applicable j' 9. Nuclear Overpower Based on Pump Monitor

• 5.0.62 seconds

• Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing. Response time of the neutron flux signal portion of the channel shall be measured from detector output or input of first

. electronic component in channel.

t i

)

4

m

., i i

TABLE 4.3-1 n

3 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i

o CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH CHANNEL CilANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT _ CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED a

1. Manual Reactor Trip N.A. N.A. S/U(1) N.A.

2. Nuclear Overpower S D(2) and Q(7) M 1, 2

3. RCS Outlet Temperature--High S R M 1, 2

4. Nuclear Overpower Based on RCS Flow and AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE S(4) M(3) and Q(7,8) M 1, 2 '

5. RCS Pressure--Low S R H 1, 2

6. RCS Pressure--High S R M 1, 2 g 7. Variable Low RCS Pressure S R H 1, 2 w 8. Reactor Containment Pressure-High S R M 1, 2 4

9. Nuclear Overpower Based on Pump t Monitor S R M 1, 2 i

10. Intermediate Range, Neutren Flux and Rate S R(7) 1,2 and

• S/U(1)(5)

11. Source Range, Neutron Flux and Rate S R(7)  !

S/U(1)(5) 2, 3, 4 and 5

12. Control Rod Drive Trip Breaker N.A. N.A. M and S/U(1) 1, 2 and

• i

13. Reactor Trip Module N.A. N.A. M 1, 2, and

• j

14. Shutdown Bypass RCS S R H Pressure-High 2**, 3**, 4**, S** i'

.-.