ML20062A255

Proposed Tech Specs Re Containment Structural Integrity Surveillance Spec 4.6.1.6.1

ML20062A255
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	10/01/1990
From:	Sieber J DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
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ML20062A251	List: ML20062A249 ML20062A255 ML20062C295
References
NUDOCS 9010190257
Download: ML20062A255 (60)

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. ATTACHMENT A-1 i Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 181 Revise the Technical Specifications as'follows:-

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS _

- CONfAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY LIMITING CONDIT!0NS FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.6 The structural integrity of the containment shall be maintained at a level consistent with the acceptance criteria in Specification 4.6.1.6.1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the structural integrity of the containment not confoming to the above requirements, restore the structural integrity to within the limits prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200*F.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS U flhCf- 4.6.1.6.1kinor Plate and Concrete The structural integrity of the W i T N -4f containment l' ner alate and concrete shall be determined during the '

shutdown for each 7ype A containment leakage rate test (reference -

g"i Specification 4.6.1., ) by:

a.

a visual inspection of the accessibre surfaces and verifying no apparent changes in appearance or other abnomal degradation, b.

a visual inspection of accessible containment liner test channels prior to each Type A containment leakage rate test. Any contain-ment liner test channel which is found to be damaged to the extant that channel integrity is impaired or which is discovered with a -

vant p ug removed, shall be removed and a protective coating shall be app ied to the liner in that area, c.

a visual inspection of the dome area prior to each Type A contain-

- ment coating. leakage rate test to insure the integrity of the protective Mf a loss of integrity of the protective coating is observed, any vent plug to a test channel which may be in the area where the protective coating has failed shall be seal welded and Q then the protective coating shall be repaired.

a 4.6.1.6.2 Recorts An initial report of any abnomal degradation of the containment structure detected during the above required tests and inspec-tions shall te made within 10 days after completion of the surveillance requirements of this specification, and the detailed report shall be submitted pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days after completion. This report shall include a description of the condition of the liner plate and concrete, the inspection procedure, the tolerances on cracking and the cor-rective actions taken. '

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Att'achment to dC ontainment structural Inteority#

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! Containment Vessel Surfaces The structural integrity of the exposed accessible interior and exterior surfaces of the containment vessel, including the liner plate, shall be dete2 mined during the shutdown for each Type A- containment leakage rate test (reference Specification 4.6.1.2) by a visual inspection of these surfaces.

This inspection shall be performed prior to the Type A containment leakage rate test to verify no apparent changes in appearance or other abnormal degradation.

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BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 (Proposed Wording)

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• ATTACHMENT A-2 i

Beaver Valley Power Station,. Unit No. 2 }

Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 45 Revise the Technical Specifications as follows: ,

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CO$TAINMENTSYSTEMS CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.6 The structural integrity of the containment shall be maintained at a level consistent with the acceptance criteria in Specification 4.6.1.6.1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. -

ACTION:

With the structural integrity of the containment not conforming to the above requirements, restore the structural integrity to within the limits prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200'F.

sunVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.6.1) Liner Plate and Concrete The structural integrity of the contain-Gent liner plate and concrete shall be determined during the shutdown for each Type A containment leakage rate test (reference Specification 4.6.1.2) by:

a. a visual inspection of the accessible surfaces and verifying no apparent changes in appearance or other abnomal degradation. .

b. a visual inspection of-accessible containment liner test channels prior to each Type A containment leakage rate test. Any containment liner test channel which is found to be damaged to the extent that channel integrity is impaired or which is discovered with a vent plug removed, shall be removed and a protective coating shall be applied

, to the liner in that area,

c. a visual inspection of the done area prior to each Type A containment leakage rate test to ' insure the integrity of the protective coating, 4.6.1.6.2 Reports An initial report of any abnomal- degradation of the contain-ment structure detected during the above required tests and inspections shall be made within 10 days after completion of the surveillance requirements of

.this specification, and the detailed report shall be submitted pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days after completion. This report shall int.!ude a description of the condition of the liner plate and concrete, the inspection procedure, the tolerances on cracking and the corrective actions taken.

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INSE RT b, BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 6-9 l

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• • Att'achment to # Containment Structural Intecrity" L

Insert "B" Containment Vessel Surfaces The structural integrity of the exposed accessible interior and exterior surfaces of the containment vessel, including the liner plate, shall be determined during the shutdown for each Type A containment leakage rate test (reference Specification 4.6.1.2) by a visual inspection of these surfaces.

This inspection shall be performed prior to the Type A containment leakage rate test to verify no apparent changes in appearance or other abnormal degradation.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 (Proposed Wording)

ATTACHMENT B

-Beaver Valley Power Station, Units No. 1 and 2 <

Proposed Technical Specification Changes No. 181 and 45 REVISION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4.6.1.6.1 A. DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENT REQUEST The proposed amendment would revise surveillance requirement 4r l

, 4.6.1.6.1 to reflect the wording contained in the Standard J Technical Specifications (STS). The specific details on the ,

required actions pertaining to test channels would be deleted from '

the surveillance requirement by this proposed amendment.

B. BACKGROUND The Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Units 1 and 2 containment buildings have a continuously welded carbon steel membrane, supported by and anchored to the inside of the containment structure. Its' function is to act as a leak tight membrane in the event of an accident. All welded seams are covered with continuously welded test channels which are zoned into test areas a by dams welded to the ends of the sections of.the channels.

Channels in the hemispherical dome and containment mat are covered with concrote while those on the cylindrical liner wall are exposed. These test channels were installed to facilitate leak testing of welds during the containment liner erection. . Test ports were provided for each zone of the leak chase channels and after completion of weld testing, 1/8 - inch NPT pipe plugs (vent ,

plugs) were installed in the test ports. These plugs remain in l place during subsequent Type A leak-rate testing. The lesign, analysis, and construction of the BVPS. Unit 1 and 2 containments '

are similar to VEPCO's Surry and North Anna containment l buildings. (

Reference:

Unit 2 UFSAR Section 3.8) The test i l channels in BVPS Unit 2 are constructed utilizing larger channel l but installed in a manner similar to BVPS Unit 1.

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There have been instances where several vent plugs have been found l missing which would necessitate extensive grinding and cutting  ;

inside containment in order to satisfy the existing surveillance requirement. This action was performed at BVPS Unit 1 in 1982 , j however, the cutting and grinding of the test channels was not l excessive. We have identified 25 vent plugs missing during the second refueling outage liner inspection on Unit 2 in preparation. i of conducting our Type A containment leakage rate test and are currently evaluating approximately 1500 feet of test channel against surveillance requirement 4.6.1.6.1.b. ,

l C. JUSTIFICATION I I

The proposed surveillance requirement is consistent with the l Standard Technical Specifications and 10 CFR 50 Appendix J. This i proposed change removes the specific details on the required I actions necessary if a test channel is found to be damaged or is I discovered with a vent plug removed. The test channels, as stated 1

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ATTACHMEN'$ B, ctntinund Proposed Technical Specification Changes No. 181 and 45 Page 2 in the- Stone & Webster Report prepared for BVPS 1 (See Attachment 1), are capable of withstanding all loads that might be imposed on them during normal test and upset conditions without any loss of function. The presence of the test channels do not in any way impair the performance of the containment liner itself. The NRC recently (1989) determined the acceptability of these test che.nnels as the containment pressure boundary at VEPCOs Surry and North Anna Power Plants.

An evaluation of condensation present in the' test channels due to a failed test channel fillet weld or a removed vent plug, which is the worst case scenario due to oxygen supply replacement, results in a corrosion allowance of 88 mils over a forty-year lifetime.

(Attachment 1) Any corrosion which would occur within the test channels would be general in nature. Corrosion within the test channels will not present a problem during the plant lifetime.

There is sufficient margin in the containment liner thickness to accommodate a total, worst case corrosion of 88 mils over the life of the plant.

The proposed wording for surveillance requirement 4.6.;.6.1 contains specific requirements to inspect the exposed accessible interior and exterior surfaces of the containment vessel. This inspection will verify that no apparent changes in appearance or other abnormal degradation have occurred.

The visual inspection will continue to include the accessible exposed test channels and associated vent plugs. This proposed change to the Technical Specifications does not relax the requirement to assure the containment liner remains capable of performing its' intended function. However, it is intended to remove the prescriptive nature of the surveillance requirement.

Repairs, if any, to the line'r will be made in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

Therefore, this proposed change to surveillance requirement 4.6.1.6.1 does not affect the structural integrity or leak tightness of the containment vessel. The structural integrity of the containment vessel will still be verified by inspections and tests as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, to ensure the containment structure will remain capable of performing its' intendsd function.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS The st.ructural integrity and leak tightness of the containment vessel will continue to be maintained to the original design stundards for the life of the facility. The proposed change will not afisct the capability of the containment vessel to withstand the maximum pressure expected for any postulated accident. The proposed wording is consistent with STS and the inspection criteria ac stated in 10 CFR 50 Appendix J. The removal of the specific details pertaining to test channels and ,

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+'* ' ATIACHMENT B, S ntinu:d Proposed Technical Specification Changes No. 181 and 45 i Page 3 q vent plugs will not affect the ability of the containment vesa6;  !

to meet its design function. Any apparent changes in appearance or other abnormal degradation discovered during the required  :

inspection of the accessible interior and exterior surfaces of the l containment vessel will be corrected in accordance with the ASME  ;

Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code prior to plant start-up. This 1 inspection will continue to include accessible test channels, vent plugs and protective coatings. Therefore, this change is  :

considered safe based on the fact that the proposed amendment will .

continue to verify the structural integrity and leak tightness of i the containment vessel. This verification will'onsure that the original design standards, including the ability to withstand the maximum pressure expected in the event of a design basis accident, are being maintained for the containment vessel. i j

E. NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION j The no significant hazard considerations involved with the proposed amendment have been evaluated, focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:

The commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in paragraph 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under paragraph 50.21(b) or paragraph 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or l consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or l

(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of i accident from any accident previously evaluated; or l

(3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

E l The following evaluation is provided for the no significant L hazards consideration standards.

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously l evaluated?

The structural integrity and leak-tightness of the containment vessel will continue to be maintained. The I ability to withstand the maximum pressure assumed in the accident analysis for postulated accidents and the ability to provide a leak-tight barrier against the uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the environment remains unchanged.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident l

previously evaluated.

. ' ' ' ATThCHMENT B, dontinu d l' Proposed Technical Specification Changes No. 181 and 45 Page 4 ,

-2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different i kind of accident from any previously evaluated?

l There .would be no change to system configurations, plant equipment or analysis as a result of this proposed amendment. The containment structural integrity and leak-tightness will not be affected by this proposed change. '

Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility i of a new or different kind of accident previously evaluated. I

3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

The- containment steel liner and external concrete surfaces will continue to provide the same structural integrity and t leak-tightness assumed in the original design. Although not ,

required, the existence of the plugged / sealed test channels provide additional protection in the form of a redundant barrier to the steel liner welds. The proposed amendment will continue to require that an inspection is conducted on the exposed accessible surfaces to verify no apparent changes in appearance or other abnormal degradation has occurred. i I

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.  !

F. NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION l Based on the considerations expressed above, it is concluded that L

the activities associated with this license amendment request satisfies the no significant hazards consideration standards of 10 l CFR 50.92(c) and, accordingly, a no significant hazards  !

consideration finding is justified.

i G. ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION L The proposed changes have been evaluated and it has been determined that the changes do not involve (1) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed changes meet the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c) (9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22 (b), an environmental assessment of the proposed changes is not required.

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ATTACHMENT 1 Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No.1 1 and 2  ;

Proposed Technical Specification Changes No. 181 and 45- l Containment Liner Test Channel Report  !

Attached is a Stone &' Webster Engineering Report, dated March 1,  !

1979, which provides information relative to the evaluation of the function and the predicted performance of both the containment i liner and test channels to demonstrate that the existing containment system presently provides and will continue to provide a:1eak-tight enclosure.

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CONTAunlENT UNER Test CuNat AT SEAWER VALLEY POWER STATM . MT N. I i

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MARCH 1,1979 i

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'l PREPARED BY STONE & WERSTER EMNEERM CORPORAM fu WESNE LIGHT COMPANY l

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CONTEFTB SECT 10N ggggg  !

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1. Introduction 1

2. Design of Containment Tdnar and Test Channels 2-S i i

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3. Answers to NRC Questions 6-24 l i

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1. Details of Materials - Liner and Test Channels l (2 sheets) I

2. a. Liner Bottan - Test Channel Arrangemant

b. Liner Details l

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c. Liner Elevation

3. a. Test Channels - Floor Details (2 aheets) l I

b. Test Channels - Wall Details i

c. Test Channels - Dame Details

4. Roof Testing Details

5. Containment Liner - Strain curves L 6. Dome - Sectional Elevation '

, 7. Effect of pH on Corrosion of Mild Steel

8. Miscellaneous Sketches

1. Containment Wall - Typical Stress Distribution i

2. Liner Stress Combination '

3. Liner Elamant

4. Stress Summation '

5. Stress Tabulation i

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AT15hCABIENTS

1. Welding Procedure 205, 22ts

2. NDT Procedures

a. Pressure Testing

b. Liquid Penetrant Testing >

c. Radiographic Testing

'3. Protective coatings Within the' Reactor Contai - nt Structure - Specification BVS-493

4. Shop Fabricated and Field krection of Reactor conta4=mant Steel Plate Liner - Specification BVS-136  :

5. Testing of Protective Coatings Under Design Basis }

Accident Envirorment, April 1973, by the Franklin i Institute Research Iaboratories (referenced only) l- jggg: This report will consist of the text-which: includes -

Sections 1, 2 and 3. All the referenced figures .and a

' number of the referencod attachments were_ distributed in.'

a meeting with the NRC in Bethesda, Maryland on January 23, 1979. .

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Attachments 3 and 4 were not distributed because their use is only as a reference and because of their size.

Attachment 5, also a larger document, was not '

distributed since it had already been submitted- to the '

comunission under a different docket (50 -338). .

All the listed figures are reproduced and included in L this report for reference.

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I SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION This report has been prepared for Duquesne Light Company (DM) by Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (S&W) to document the presentation given to the Nuclear Regulatory Comunission (NRC) by -

DLC and S&W, on January 23, 1979, relative to the containment liner test channels at Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit No.1.

The purpose of the presentation and of this report is. to provide and the infornation relative to the evaluation of the. function aufficient predicted performance of both the containment liner and test channels to demonstrate that the existing oonemi=mant systesa )

presently provides and will continue to provide a leaktight i

i enclosure. '

Our evaluation shows that although the con 4minnant liner test 1 channels were provided primarily for the testing of the liner _ -

seam welds during construction, and although they were not designed as a part of the leaktight membrane, they are completely compatible with the liner.

The test channels are capable of withstanding all loads that might be iseposed on them during normal test and upset conditions without any loss of function and the presence of the test channels does not in any way i v ir the L

performance of the containment liner itself. >

Although the test channels vere not designed as a part of the pressure boundary, they clearly provide additional containment leak protection.

Section 2 of this report presents a general description of the containment system which includes the containment structure, the containment liner, and the related test channels. This section describes the configuration, materials, construction procedures,

• and the testa and inspections employed in construction of the containmaut system.

s Section 3 of this report presents responses to the NRC questions l which were received by DW on January 3, 1979.

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, 1 SECTICII 2

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DESIGN OF COtFFAIINENT LIllER AND TEST MAIOLELS j The containment liner is a continuously welded carbon steel l membrane, supported by and anchored to the inside of the containment structure. Its function is to act as a leak tight mestrane in the event of an accident. N liner is not a code i

vessel. ' '

The' basic shape of the containment structure consists of a ,

cylindrical portion, anchored at its base to the foundation mat  :

and closed at the upper end with a hemispherical dome. h reinforced concrete shell varies in thickness from 4.1/2.ft- on the cylinder to 2 1/2 it in the.done area. The inside diameter of the containment structure is 126 ft and the interior vertical height is 185 ft measured from the top of the foundation mat to the interior apex of the done. '

h cylindrical portion of the liner is 3/8 in thick, the hemispherical done liner is 1/2 in thick, tne ilat floor-covering the mat is 1/4 in thick, with the exception of areas where the l transfer of loads requires a reinforced thickness. N bottom mat liner plate is covered with 2 ft of reinforced concrete .that l

insulates it from transient temperature effects.

h 3/8 in thick liner served as the internal forr. for the concrete containment during construction. All liner seams are double butt welded, except for the lower 30 ft of the cylindrical. ,

shall liner plate where the liner plates are welded using a backing bar. The liner is continuously anchored to the concrete shell with concrete anchor studs.

The 1/2 in thick hemispherical carbon steel plate done liner. I served as an internal torm for the containment reinforced. .

concrete done during construction. All seams in the liner done '

are double butt welded. The liner dome also is continuously '

anchored to the reinforced concrete containment done with welded anchor studs.  !

h wall to dome liner junction is a double butt welded joint.

All welded seams in the mat, cylindrical liner wall, hemispherical done, and liner penetrations are covered with -

continuously welded test channels. The non-destructive examination of primary containment liner seam welds is described #

by Specification No. BVS-136 and by NDE procedures submitted by the Erector.

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himer Materials The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 1, Nuclear Vessels, was used as a guide in the selection of materials and fabrication of the steel containment liner. i l The liner materials are: SA 537 Gr B (quenched and tesquared) for

! the first 30 ft, starting at the mat level of the cylindrical portion. The remainder of the liner is built with SA 516 Gr 60 (fine grain practice). The SA 537 Gr B quenched and tempered material has a specified =ia*=m tensile strength of 80,000 psi, a minaasua guaranteed yield strength of 60,000 psi, and a -i guaranteed minimum elongation of 22 percent in a standard 2 in specimen.

The SA 516 Gr 60 has a specified minimum tensile strength of 60,000 pai, a minimum guaranteed a guaranteed mini === elongation of 25 percent in a standard 2 in yield strength of 32,000 pai and specimen. The nil ductility transition temperature (NDFF) , for both materials, was tested not to exceed -20 F. The plates of ,

SA 516 Gr 60 are heat treated for improved notch toughness and ,

both materials are certified to the mechanical and chemical limits specified in the ASME code. Refer to Figure 1.

The test channels were fabricated of ASTN-131 Gr C material throughout. Impact tests were not specified ior the plate used because of its thickness: 3/16 in.

As- described, all three grades of carbon steel referenced above were purchased to fine grain practice with full mill test documentation (chemicals and physicals). All materials were -

required to be capable of being cold bent 180 degrees with no cracking. -

2e,g_ts and Insoections  !

A testing and surveillance program was in offect during construction and operation to establish that the containment can perform its intended function. The program consisted of construction-testing, a structural acceptance test, an initial leakage rate test, periodic leakage rate retesting, continuous subatmospheric pressure monitoring, and periodic surveillance tests.

.All applicable welding procedures and tests specified in Section IX of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code for Welding Qualifications 1968 were adhered to for qualifying the '

welding procedures, the performance of welding machines, and welding operators who were engaged in the construction of the containment liner including the test channels. The welding qualification included 180 dag band tests of weld material.

These procedures ensure that the ductility of welded seams is ,

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g omeparable to the ductility of material.

the contairement liner plate ,

Production quality control was exercised through randosi '

radiography per paragraph UN-52 of section VIII of the ASME i- Boiler and Pressure Vessel 1968. Code for Unfired-Pressure Wessels,  ;

l As shown in Figure 1 the radiography for the liner seems was 100 percent for the first 10 f t of  !

welder. Total RT exceeded 2 percent.

each posit. ion, each on Figure 1 - Additional Other NDT's are tabulated  !

l g penetrant and pressure testing.

tests of quality include visual, dye i t

construction testing included provisions for testing the leaktightness of all penetrations and liner construction.

welds during To facilitate construction testing, welded over all weld seams. These channels weretestsegmented, channels were steel ,

leak tests were performed section by section. and On the bottom and

cylindrical portions of the liner, the test channels are on the ,

inside of the liner. On the done portion of the liner, the test L

channels are on the outside (concrete side) of the liner.

Before halogen leak testing, all the test channel welds were soapsud tested by pressurizing the void with air to 50 psig and checking for visible leakage. After the air test and any  :

subsequent repairs, if required, the test channels were evacuated to a pressure of 1.0 to 0.5 paia by utilising a vacuusi pump.

This ensured a homogeneous test gas throughout the- channel when the channel is subsequently pressurized at 50 psig with Freon R-22. For the bottom and vertical-portions of the liner,-

where the test channels were placed on the inside, all test i

channel seal welds were leak. tested using a halogen leak detector.- After testing, the gas was vented from the channels and the threaded connections were plugged.

For the done portion of the liner, where the test channels are on the outside, the test channel welds, the liner seam welds and the dome plugs' were also leak tested using a halogen leak detector since all welds were accessible. -

The containment structure was subjected to structural acceptance test in accordance with Safety Guide 18 during which containannt internal pressure was 1. 15 the design pressure. This test was performed after the times the containment liner was completed, the last concrete placed, and all penetration sleeves and hatches installed and closed or blanked off. '

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Con *21 - t Laaksee Rate Tests The ocatalament leakage rate tests are performed in accordance -

with the guidelines of Appendix J of 10CFR50, " Primary Reactor Containment Leakage heting ior Water Cooled Power heactors,* as published in the Federal Register February 14, 1973.

The containment leakage testing program includes the performance of Type A tests, to measure the contain m t overall integrated leakage rate, Type a tests, to detect local leaks or to measure leakage of certain containment components, and Type c tests, to measure containment isolation valve leakage rate. ,

The measured. overall integrated leakage rate of the containment during Type A testing must not exceed 0.1 percent per 24 hr of ,

the weight of containment air at the calculated peak' containment

. pressure of 38.3 psig.

asaver Valley - Unit No.1 successfully passed the Type A' testa -

required by Tech. Sec. 3.6.1.2 and the Surveillance Requirements 4.6.1.2 during November 1978, in an identical manner.

to the original test performed in July-August 1975.

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' P SECTION 3 r

NRC OUESTIONS M RMADONSES i t'

I This section presents responses to the list of NRC questions *

-which were received =by DLC.on January 3, 1979 and which were' answered verbally at the meeting with the NRC in Bethesda on January 23, 1979.

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It- should be noted that- Sections A, B and C of tho' ~!

questions, which deal with the wall, dome and floor channels l(boxes) respectively, are all introduced ,with a statement to the offact that the information and- analyses which are requested are required to determine the acceptability of the test' channels as part of-the leakage barrier. :As indicated i in the introduction of this report, our evaluation shows that although.the test channels were not designed as a part of- the leakage barrier they are completely cogatible with i the liner in terms of materials, construction procedures and-tests and the- ability to withstand all of the' loads and associated differential movements Pmh might be imposed during all-normal, test and upset conaitions.

ci A. -Wall Boxes In' order to determine the acceptability of these channel

--boxes as part of the containment leakage barrier, the -

Jt following information and analyses are requested.

Question A.1 Materials-Identification-and Constructian-Procedures >

Provide the details of the materials used'and pr:::edures for. construction for all wall bczes and >

" specify by elevation or location rwhere differences occur. Provide procedure 205 used in the welding-of horizontal'and vertical test channels. Provide the procedures for welding the test connection . to the channel boxes and the procedures for tightening (torquing) the plugs.

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Response

A.1 The details of the materials used in the construction of the containment liner and test channel boxes

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are-listed on Figure 1, 2 sheets, attached. -The liner plate materials and the test channel material-were purchased with extensive mill documentation, chemicals and physicals, to assure the level of quality required for' fabrication -and design service.

Figures 3a, b,- and. c illustrate the different test channel types provided for the floor, shell, and dome sections.-

The ' material used forLthe liner is ASTM A537 Gr. B from'the.

bottom up to El. 720 ft-11 in on- the shell. Above .that elevation and including the dome, the material'is ASTM A516.

.Gr. 60.

Test- channels were ASTM A131 Gr. C material throughout'.

~0igure 2C shows where the differences in test channel cot. figurations occur.

Attachment No 1 is Procedure 205 used by Graver Tank,.the' Fabricator-Erector, which addresses manual welding performed

-on -the liner. plate of AS16 material and test channels. It also addresses the welding .used '.in attaching -the -test connections to the test channels. Procedure 224 addresses the welding of: test channels to A537 Gr. B plates..

Test channel plugs are 1/8 in NPT pipe plugs, with socket hex. heads.

There. was 'no written procedure for tightening or. torquing-the test' plugs.

Question A.2 Testina and-Inspection-Provide identification of the channel welds that were tested (pressure and nondestructive examination, e.g., penetrant or magnetic particle testing) and the procedures used in the test. List and describe any deviations from Reg. Guide'1.19 7

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.: 41 - .

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! (listed 'as Safety Guide 19 in Beaver valley- Unit No.=1 Final Safety Analysis. Report). -Describe _the

testing, if

any, of -the- leak tightness of. the s

installed plugs.

Response

.A.2 All test channel welds were 100% visually and dye-penetrant. inspected. Attachment No. 2 includes-the. pressure test and- dye-penetrant procedures used for_ testing _of the channel welds.. The, welds on the- test channels- were also pressure tested'aimultaneously.with the liner seam welds.

Safety' Guide 19 which ~ is Reg. Guide 1.19 was issued in 1972 after_the testing of test channel and liner seam welds- at Beaver Valley Unit No. 1.

The.;following is a list of deviations taken by Unit No.:1:-

Requirement a Radiography - minimum 2 percent including first ten feet'of weld for.each welder, each position'.

DEVIATION - none-Requirement

b. In areas where radiography is not feasible or where the weld is located in- areas which will not be accessible after construction, entire length-of the weld should be examined by the ' magnetic particle

. method or the ultrasonic method.

DEVIATION -

Welds in this category were .1005 visually examined, 1005 dye penetrant examined, and 1005 pressure tested.

Reauirement-S' c. All linar seam-welds are to be tested using a soap solution with a vacuum box under a 5 psi differential.

8

I N .' ^: -

~l

, l 4,  ; 'q' , ..

, y, I- F DEVIATION - By:using welded test channels the liner  !

s seam welds'were subjected to an-air. pressure of 50 psig~ using.-a -soap . solution for leak detection.

c..

Each test channel section was also pamsped down to a.

1 psia -vacuum. Subsequently freon was-introduct.6'

]

up to a' pressure of 50 psig. All accessible welds' a were "snitted" for leakage.  !

7, Requirement

d. Where leak-chase systam channels are installed over l liner welds, channel to liner plate welds'should be i tested for leak -tightness by pressurizing the ichannels to containment design pressure and held for, 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br />. Leaks'are to be detected..with a soap

• solution.

DEVIATION ' - All test channels were pressure tested I to 5 psi-over containment design pressure with air -

and with a halogen. Channel to liner plate' welds  !

were checked with a soap solution and with halogen detection equipment.

After- the: . wall- channels were tested, the. test plugs were  ;

installed.- There was no means of testing the leak tightness- }

of'the plugs installed-in the wall channels. 3 Ouesti2E A.3. Structural IntecritY of channel'Hores (Fcr '

Maintainino Leak Tightness)

Provide' an . analysis which would demonstrate that-the channels and channel weldsiwill.be' capable = of carrying the differential ~ movement or' expansion of I the liner. Consider liner buckling or bulging' due to- Loss-of-Coolant Accident' (LOCA) : temperature and dynamic : pressure. effects and. seismic loads.

Provide a comparative analysis'to demonstrate leak-channels and their welds meet the- requirements of  !

the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section 3,'

Div 2, as appropriate.

f

Response

4 9

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.._----------_2__-_._.-_-_____--_.__.----------_.,-'-

w. . m ,

1 l e 0, ,3 3 ,; i 7 2 e 1 B' A.3- The- .reinforcod concrete containment structure is 1

k,r designed to withstand the combined effects of a DBA and DBE-occurring concurrently without any strength credit'being a '

taken for the-liner. Since the liner is anchored to the j contairsaant structure by closely spaced anchor studs, forces

on'the liner are displacement limited by the. structural K response 'of the containment structure. The liner materials were the displacements chosen to provide the necessary ductility to .withstand

' of the containment structure and perform their design function of providing a leaktight membrane. for the containment. The liner thicknesses were chosen toL facilitate construction, i.e., to act as a form for pouring _

concrete.. At the time the liner was designed, there were no >

directly applicable industry codes in effect, nor were there any industry codes available which recognized-displacement -

(strain) limits. The 1968 ASME Code, Sections III and VIII, was used as a- guide in establishing liner stress limits and I stress ' calculations were made 'to ascertain the .-design '

adequacy of the liner.

Stresses are calculated in the containment-liner in a very conservative manner.. A liner finite element model was i.

developed .by- representing the composite reinforcing steel- '

and liner steel' (Fig. 8.1) as an equivalent orthotropic I-shell, neglecting any strength contribution by the concrete.

p' This-' model .was~ subjected to the combined axisynsnetric l loadings of cisadweight, DBA pressure, and DBA temperature in o

order liner.;

to establish the membrane and bending stresses in- the The total seismic shear concrete containment wall (neglectingforce the in the reinforced.

strength of- the j

L liner) was then assumed to be totally applied to the liner in order to establish a very conservative estimate of liner- "

shear ' stress. The shear stress'was combined with the liner. '

-finite element- model membrane and bending -stresses- to -i determine. the maximum stress ~ intensity range (Fig. 8.2)'~.

i This stress range was compared to and found to'be less than. 1 t-the established ~allowables.

The ' ctarrent industry code applicable to the design of-containment liners is ASME Section III, Division 2. This i code: recognizes that liner forces are displacement limited

' and provides liner allowables:in inch / inch of - strain. In order to -compare stress  ;

' limits, the membrane- and bending' results-with current code strain  ;

stresses calculated by i elastic theory have been converted .to strain (by dividing stresses by the Modulus of Elasticity) and. are plotted in Figure 5, Curve No. 1. Since these strains are mostly '

membrane strain, they are conservatively compared in the figure' to the lower code allowable for membrane strain of 5 x.10-3 in/in. (The code allowable for membrane plus bending is 14 x 10-a in/in.)

10

~k

,  ;, ;( 3  :.

t i 1The- above' l approach wasi checked by consideration- of K Ldisplacement: compatibility :-between the liner and- the reinforced concrete wall using the resulting displacemente

from the analysis- of, the- reinforced concrete. structure.

This results -in lower liner strains as indicated by curve No. 2 in Figure 5.

In this . case, the seismic shear was-assumed to be totally

reacted by the_reinforcod concrete, since:it was a design requirement- to take no strength credit for the liner. -A-camparison of _ liner stiffness to . reinforced- concrete -

stiffness- used for Seismic Analysis indicates that 90, percent of the shear will-be carried by .the reinforced concrete, which shows that this assumption is reasonable.

Strain in=the mat liner is.also less than the allowables since_the mat liner strain peaks'at 1.15 x 10-8 in/in at the'-

corner knuckle region and then diminishes to less _than

-0.11 x 10-3 in/in on the mat floor.

Test channels - - (TC 's) were welded to the liner in order to leak test liner welds during . construction. They' are -not safety-related since the liner- itself is conservatively designed to provide the pressure boundary function, and the-reinforced concrete containment structure is' designed to-

-withstand all ' applied ~ forces, neglecting any strength' contribution of' the liner or of the TC's. The TC's, however, do inherently provide additional -containment leak protection -since they cover all liner seam welds and were fabricated with material and weld quality comparable to that of the liner.

The TC's,- similar to the liner itself, areideformation limited- by- the structural response of the containment structure,_ :and will continue to provide added leak protection for all design loads. This is particularly true for the design loads where the liner is in a general. state of compression -due to the DBA containment temperature effects. (Buckling or bulging for this condition is

_ precluded by. providing aufficient anchorage to the

, reinforced concrete.)- Any undetected flaws in the welds or elsewhere would not propagate in a state of compression. In i

this regard, the pressure testing of the containment provides a'much more severe environment for the liner than the DBE plus DBA design loads because the test pressure produces a general state of tension in the liner and TC's.

We know of no failure of liner seam welds due to pressute testing a containment.

In order to ovaluate the adequacy of the TC's, a conservative estimate of their overall ability to withstand the unlikely event of a DBA concurrent with a DBE can be 11 1

l

o . ,

's .- %  %

>w

-made by assuming that_the. strain in'the TC'is the same as:

that of the ; liner to.-which it is.

(This is

, (.

conservative since the liner strains . are.-very attached. conservatively

~ ' calculated.)' As indicated" in Figure No. 5,tliner' strains

-(and,^. therefore, TC . strains) are . w e l l ~. b e l o w ; ' t h e' ASME allowable membrane: strain of 5 x 10-0 in/in.: Calculations ,

y indicate that.the liner has a- factor of. safety.~of 1.8

• against buckling based on the very conservative liner stress-calculation. The' local presence of test' channels tendss to stiffen the- liner, .thereby further reducing-any potential for buckling.. Since bending- stresses- are small,- the- TC attachment . welds are subjectrad - primarily .to the. same membrane strains as -the liner and would.have:the same margin against the 5'x':10-a in./in. code strain allowable.

w y To- hrther quantify the adequacy of the dome test channel welds to the containment dome liner .(Figure'6) for- shear forces which may exist between the liner and reinforced concrete structure, a horizontal ring of dome- liner ~ was-isolated- and the' forces acting on this' ring identified as indicated'in Figure 8.3. The limits of the ring were ' chosen

-to be midway between adjacent horizontal. dome test channels. 3 Forces identifiedJas acting on this ring segment are:

T s, the membrane force acting on the bottom of the ring T ,, the membrane force acting on the top-of the ring q, the net radial pressure acting on the ting-V, the shear force acting'on the test channel Several other load- paths which share the' shear force'with the test channel were neglected in order to' simplify the analysis. This'provides a very conservative upper bound.for U

the shear force on the test' channel-- since .this -

approach' analytically requires the test channel ~to withstand all the-shear force between the liner and- reinforced concrete.

These other shear force ~loao paths include: _,

a) The 5/8 in dia welded anchor studs on nominal 1 ft by 1 ft centers, which alone can. withstand the total shear force.  !

b) The-liner to concrete bond stress.

t c) The friction between the liner and concrete surfaces which are pressed together by containment pressure and temperature.

12

• i

-- . _ . _ . _ . ,_ __ _ _ .__.______ _ .~- _ . _ _

n j

., N j

+ . , ,

q df Additional -shear anchors provided at the dome to cylinder bend line and at the: dome apex.

Proceeding: with this- upper bound approach, vertical

components equilibrium'was satisfied by setting the sum-of the vertical of the four forces equal to zero and. solving for .

the: shear iniFigure.8.4.

force, V, acting on the test channel as- indicated .j i

4 Although the curr3nt ASME III, Div.' 2 code for containment l

' liners permits liner anchors to be derigned-to 50 percent of .)

their cultimate displacement- capacity - (Table CC-3730-1) , a l more conservative approach was chosen to evaluate the shear- ')

p J stress in the dame test channel wvida.

shear stresses were compared to the currentTest channel' weld code

.for liner brackets.and attachmente (CC-3750) whichallowable- provides design allowables as given in AISC Manual i for ' Steel- l Construction, Part 5, Specification for Design, Fabrication o

l; , and-Erection-of Structural Steel for Buildings for the Test o

Condition. . For. earthquake or accident loads, CC-3750 p

-permits the AISC allowable.to be increased by a . factor of 1.5.

For the materials and electrodes used- for test channel:

fabrication,'this results in weld shear stress allowables-of L '

-21 kai; -for; the Condition.. Test Condition and'31.5 kai for the Design h The results of the analysis of the dome test channel welds l is presented in Figure 8.5. For the- Test Condition, 'the l  : upper bound shear- force is shown to be 2,518 lb/in which

!: produces a weld shear stress of 9.50 kai and a . factor of  !

L safety of -2.21 when- compared to current--code limits.

Similarly for the Design Condition (DBA ~ + DBE), the upper bound: shear force is 5,367..lb/in which produces a weld shear i

stressLof 20.25 kai and a factor of safety of 1.56.

L The TC's' are attached j,'

fillet welds.

to the- liner with full (3/16 in)

Channel-to-channel weldstare full penetration groove welds. The pressure testing of the TC's p ovides ,

assurance that the liner seam welds and the TC welds are leaktight. This meets the minimum examination requirements of the ASME III,-Division 2, code for TC welds '(CC-5525). ,

TC Hwelds are- also- 100 percent dye penetrant and visually- -

examined to ensure weld integrity., These welds preclude any concernL for the TC's becoming detached from the liner for a any design or test loadings.

We have seen other containment designs which use external structural-angles instead of weld studs to anchor the dome F

liner to the concrete. These angles are welded to the liner using 3/16 in fillet welds skip welded 4 in out of 12 in on l- both . sides. The full length 3/16" fillet welds on the BV-1 13

m ,

, .  ; = a.

~

dome' test channels provide added aseurance of their' ability':

l, to' withstand'allitest and design loads..

The_ TC' material,= ASTM A-131: Gr C, . is al high quality-

. structural steel used;for ship' construction, and- is. very3 similarc to the -liner materials, SA-A516 Gr 60 and Sb537 Gr

-B,-which-are used;for pressure vessels for moderate- and

- lower _ : temperature . service. All 'three steels-are made to' fine grain- practice. The specifications for- the three-

. steels require that the material;be capable _of being bent cold through1190 deg'_without-cracking.on the outside of ~the bents portion. Although impact tests were not-required for the A-131 Gr.C material '(nor' are they ' required _ by the-current- ASME III, . Division 2,- code),= t.he - bend . test requirements', fine. grain practice, and~ similarity to S h516~

Gr.60..and' SA-537: Gr B, provide confidence that the TC material is sufficiently ductile to withstand the ' combined offects of~a'DBA and DBE.

Refer, to Figure 1(b) ' for a comparison of.the mechanical' and chemical' properties of the liner plate :and test channel materials.

Question

- A.4 . Surface Treatment Describe the surface treatment to the inside-walls of the containment on the wall channels, plugs', and-liner. Provide details of application,-inspection, -

periodic maintenance -and surveillance. Describe.

- any treatment to the-liner, welds, and interior of the channel. boxes.

Response

A.4 All exposed interior surfaces of the Beaver Valley Unit No.'1 reactor- containment- liner were ' coated in accordance with Stone & Webster Specification BVS-493,

" Protective Coatings Within the -Reactor Containment Structure." This specification incorporates the requirements of ANSI N101.2, " Protective Coatings for Light Water Reactor Containment Facilities and the draft ANSI 14 l

l

-o

,a.

-N101.5.7" Quality Assurance for Protective Coatings'_ applied to Nuclear, Facilities < (later published as ANSI N101.4) .*

j:

The surf ace preparation of the exposed carbon steel prior to j coating. was performed in accordance tStructures- Painting Council, SSPC-SP10, "Near White Blast .

with The - . Steel Cleaning." A prime coat, 3 mils thick, of Carboline carbo-Eine 11 ~ inorganic zine -primer was then. applied to the properly prepared substrate.= The finish coat consisted of 2 mils of Du Pont Corlar Epoxy Chemical Resistant Enamel.

When the liner plates were shop painted, the field weld:

preps were masked of paint within 2 in. of these edges.- :A temporary rust preventative coating was then applied to the unpainted areas. On site, during liner erection, preventative the- rust-coating, as;well as all oil, grease and-other contaminants were removed-prior to welding in accordance with tha approved welding procedures.

After welding, each reactor containment liner weld seam;was dye penetrant- inspected -in accordance with approved procedures. The approved procedures required that the weld seam and adjacent base metal be' solvent cleaned, utilizing Spotcheck SKC-NF- low halogen cleaner after completion of-weld inspection.; This cleaning would 'also remove any

-residual mill contamination from those portions of-the liner surface which would be later covered by test channels..

The test channel interior-surfaces were cleaned during;the installation process._ Cleanliness of the test channel material was-checked visually during erection in accordance with a specific step on the fabricator's " Erection Control Sheets"- entitled, " clean Test Channel." Cont ==4nants such as' road dirt, construction debris,- etc. were removed by appropriate methods ~at this time.-

After the test. channels-were. installed.and used for testing the liner seam welds, as previously described, the channel plugs were- installed and the channels contamination. The exterior surface of thewere sealed.from-and associated fillet welds, as well- as the channels - test adjacent uncoated liner plate, were cleaned of slag, weld spatter, etc. and prepared and painted with the Carbo Zinc 11/ Corlar Epoxy System detailed above.

The coating system described above should require little or no' maintenance during plant life. However, a visual examination is performed inside the containnient prior to each Type:A Integrated Leak Rate Test, at which time any significant coating iailures would be noted and appropriate remedial action taken. At this time, no specific inservice 15 1

1

- _ _ _ _ . .-... - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ^ - - ~ ~ ' ' - ~ ^ ^ ^ ^ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ - ' ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ' ~ ^ '

llr: ,

p r

w . ;, ,

F p> .

4/' , inspection requirements exist for- inspection of reactor-containment coatings. It should-be noted that the coating z,3 system applied' to the -interior exposed carbon steel and concrete surfaces of the Beaver Valley I- containment liner

-aids in decontamination only and is not required by any' existing code or standard.

Ouestion 9 A.5': Condensation and Corrosion Inside Boxes For -plugged boxes' with an undetected failed box weld or loose plug, provide analysis . - of -

condensationL inside the-box, chemical analysis of-any condensed liquid, and corrosion rates of the liner, welds.and channel boxes inside the boxes.

Response

A.5 During the testing of the liner' seam welds, each test channel was pressurized with air. If an in-line air dryer were; not used, or if the air dryer malfunctioned, moisture- carry-over into the test channel could -have occurred,- resulting in condensation forming within the channel.-

After erection- of the reactor containment, and postulating an undetected failed test channel- fillet weld' or removed -

. plug, condensation within the test channel could result from containment preasure/ temperature transients or from~ moisture produced by primary'or secondary system leakage:inside the reactor containment.

The fluid which could condense within the test ~ channels as a result of condensation from either of the above sources

.would be similar in-nature to normal power plant' condensate, which has a low lonic content and which is normally contained in carbon steel systems. As such, corrosion data o relating to condensate in carbonisteel piping was used in the evaluation of the potential corrosion within the test channels..

The effect of pH upon corrosion rate in the range of Q r fluida present within the reactor containment wac examined.

[ Fluida ranging in pH from 10.5 (reactor coolant high end and 16

)

+ '

4 7 ,

sodium hydroxide caustic, spray) to,4.2 (boric acid ini(th'e safety _ injection- ' accumulators: at 2,200 ppa boronL F concentration);are, or may be present within the- reactor contairunent. Figure 7,- extracted: from-.Uhlig?s CORROSION.

HANDBOOK, Fifth Edition, is a plot. of_ corrosion rates :at '

-various : temperatures versus pH. The zone of-interest,,with: I a-pH ranging from.4 to 10.5, has ieen highlighted. . The curves demonstrate' that,. as pH 3s-increased fram 4, the corrosion increasing pH..

rate will either remain car. tant or decrease' with ~

l y The worst cast .of potential corrosion inside. the testi L

channels would occur where a~ failed fillet-weld or removed l

plug-' allowed oxygen . supply replenishment to the test- channel- H

!=

interior. -Since relative humidity in the channel ;would- be less than 100 percent, corrosion would occur only'in the portion of the test channel interior which was immersed- in- l

!. condensate. The condensate would be stagnant: (less than L

2. fps flow rate) and at a temperature of approximately-L 100 F.

L Corrosion allowances published by the General Electric p' Corporation which are-directly applicable- to carbon steel condensate; systems, with system conditions >the same as those present in- the worst-case test. channel scenario, (that'- is , - ,

t ' stagnant,- fully; oxygenated condensate at a temperature of 100-F, with full: oxygen supply replenishment),

corrosion allowance of 88 mila for a-forty-year specify lifetime.

a i

There is 'a sufficient margin in- the containment liner

' thickness; to easily accommodate a total, worst case s

1 corrosion of=88 mils over the' life of the plant.

'Any corrosion which would- occur within the test channels l would.be general in nature. Review of-technical literature and discussions 'with Professor--Emeritus- HHUhlig, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has~ determined that, given. the. nature of the condensed fluids described above  :

coupled with the material cleaning requirements described in-

-Response A--4, pitting corrosion will not. occur within the test channels. .

m l,

, In summary, corrosion within the Beaver Valley. Unit 1 '

-reactor containment test channels will not present a problem during the plant lifetime.

Question A.6 Surveillance and Removal of Failed Boxes i Describe the surveillance for failed channel boxes and loose plugs and provide procedures-for removal 17

- A- ____----N_ - _ _. *--

,;,  ;, , , 1

. a-

, y j

..e .. ,

+

of. damagedL boxes, inspection 'and. testing of the

. uncovered' liner. seam weld, and preparation of the .l

exposed: liner surface.

{

l j

, . Response- _.

J A.6 :As-described'in previous sections, the test channel d

materials, welds and workmanship are_such that they are .not i easily damaged. Routine-activities inside the containment would not result in failure of test- channels and if a channel were damaged during_-unusual-activity, the damage  ;

X would be reported. There have been notdamaged test channels E

or missiny plugs-reported at Beaver Valley - Unit No. 1.

Visual Laurveillance of interior containment liner surfaces' I is performed prior to periodic Type A= leakage testing.

A. visual- survey of the liner ~was-performed in October 1978  ;

prior:to'the recent Type A . test at -Beaver Valley.; No1 -I damaged test channels were found during this ' detailed '

survey. ,

-No procedures for-. repair 'of test channels' have l

i been developed. If a channel were found ' damaged, the :cause would.

be. evaluated. and the extent,of the-_ damage determined.. The affacted' test channel-could be removed, repaired,_ replaced, *

i. :or-accepted 1as is, depending on the nature of the damage.

l 3

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i:

i i' i

18

s ( 1 -, , . . .~, .

, - ' (

i

-a.y> , ,

A

;.y_.

-4 -4 B.- Dome Boxes -l In' order to determine. the acceptability of_the' dome: (

configuration as a- contairment- leak barrier -for the i

service. life.of.the plant, the following inforation and analyses.are requested..  ;

Question B.1- Mater:als Identification mad Construction.

Descr:.otion

-Provide as-built descriptions and drawings of the '!

-dome, channel details specifically the plug assembly in the liner seam welds.- Provide construction assembly procedures and address the inmediate -

surroundings ofL the channel boxes on the exterior 1 of the?1iner. Provide the basis for' assuring these  ;

a channel welds will hold against the shear forces if '

the liner moves against the concrete structure.- .

l t

Resoonse-i: B.1 Figures 3c, 4 and 6 illustrate the details of the

dome test channels.

O y The liner .was- erected in accordance with the' Fabricator's' f f approved procedures including approved welding and' q nondestructive ttest procedures. and work was supervised by

. Stone 8 Webster.

As discussed in the response to question A.3, the basis for  ;

assuring that done test channel welds .wi l l' hold against  !

shear forces isLan upper bound analysis which conservatively

• neglects assistance from welded . anchor. studs, liner to-p concrete bond strength, liner to. concrete friction, Land J additional' embedded anchors at the dome-bend 13ne and apex.

This conservative approach results in calculated = factors of- .

safety for the weld of 2.21 for test loads and 1.56 for - the '

combined effects of a DBA-acting concurrently with a DBE as "

L -indicated in Figure 8.5.

\'

1 L

+

19

4 '

he-p i 114 i se - '

.i $ '

[#7 Queation l

B.2- Testino and Inspection

, Provide the procedures -for tightening the plugs,-

including any torquing _ requirements, and subsequent, testing for leaks around-the plug.

Response

'B.2 There were no requirements for torquing or-for tightening of channel test plugs or the-plugs -in the dome liner.-

The domel test channel arrangement includes a test plug on-the liner seam as well .as on the test channel. The procedure _for_ leak testing provides for testing for leaks.

c

- around the-plug in the seam weld.

The dome ~'sean plugs were installed with sufficient torque to-prevent. leakage as indicated by sensitive _ halogen leak.

. testing performed by applying 50 psig to the test channel cavity /with Freon R-22 from the-exterior sockets in the test channels while the seam plugs were in place- (see Fig.c 6) .

This: test was more severe.on-the seam plugs than. the_ DBA--

environments since the test pressure in the. channel tended' to push the sean plug'out of. thes tapered' hole while : DBA-pressure would act on-the containment. side tending to retain t c _the plugs'in the tapered hole. The seam-plugs'in- the. dome

' liner were! covered with the Corlar Epoxy System coating when-the' liner was coated and they have not~.been moved since.they were leak tested.'

The' test plugs are pipe- plugs with tapered pipe threads which are self-locking.

O These -are unlike set screws with untapered machine threads which require'significant torque to remain in place.

In. industrial- applications, a release compound _is often:

applied-to be. subsequently pipe pluga prior to installation so that they_may removed.- No such release campound was specified for the dome liner plugs. The'done plugs are not subjected- to vibratory loadings since the mass of the containment structure is not excited by operating machinery 20 l

. smus .

s_,,. -.-.;

O ,;*:

and :a DBE would produce only'a few' cycles of strong mot.on-and these.cause negligible stresses (less than 1 kai) in; :he '

n dome liner.. -

Question 7

B.3 Structural Inteority of~ Dome Seam With Pluo

-Provide an analysis of the ability of the seam i welds in the dome with plugs to withstand LOCA  !

dynamic pressures and temperature' effects and P, seismic loads. .If the analysis does not' - support ,

welds with plugs in place,_ provide. procedures for-weld replacement of plugs, inspection and testing.

j 4

i

Response

B.3 As discussed in the response to question A.3,.when the' containment is subjected .to LOCA. pressure; and. q temperature. effects and seismic loads, the-liner is put into ,

a general-state of' compression. Any undetected flaws in the e dome seam- welds, or elsewhere, would'not propagate in-a p~ state of' compression. The presence of plugs in the- dome seam welds. also has no >significant effect on compressive L stresses in the weld.- The NDTT of -20*F for the dome liner L material' provides assurance:of its ability to. withstand the.

-small compressive strains indicatedsin Figure'5-particularly n.

!- as- the liner- temperature approached the 280*F design 1 temperature..

Question i

B.4 Dome Surface Preparation and Protective Coatino 1

Provide the details of the coating on the dome,  !

including the surface preparation, construction '

application,. and any testing or' qualification'of the coating to withstand operational atmospheres >

and LOCA . dynamic pressures and' temperatures.

' Provide information on the coating adhesion to 'the

' dome liner, welds, 'and specifically. the plugs.

Provide an analysis of the coating's ability to-

, seal leaks l and provide anti-rotational fix on the E dome plugs. Describe the surveillance requirements I

on the dome coating to assure its integrity-i; 21 i

g

, ::n g , e,+3 p yy .

s i

Response

B.4- The coating system applied to the reactor-containment liner dome at Beaver Valley Unit No. 1 is .the same as that applied.to the walls, as described in the-response to Question A-4 above.

The coating system was qualified by special testing to resist ' damage . caused by design basis loss- of coolant accidents.' Coating sample panels were prepared in accordance with a Stone & Webster specification entitled

'" rest Panels for Design Basis Accident Environment. Test,a and tested in- accordance- with a Stone & Webster specification entitled - " Testing of Protective Coating for Design Basis Accident Environment." 'Desting was performed by the Franklin Institute Research Laboratories.

The ' test samples were placed in a special environment.

chamber-and exposed to heat, caustic spray, and radiation simulating: the exposure it would receive during a loss of coolant accident.- During the first hour, the samples -were exposed' to -2800F, caustic spray of a pH of~10.5 and'about 1 x'106 roentgens of-gamma radiation. After the first hour and continuing through 7 days,-the samples were exposed to

'150*F caustic spray of a pH of 8.0 and about 9.9 x 107 roentgens-of gamma radiation.

After testing, the samples were evaluated agairist ASTM-criteria for chalking, blistering, . flaking,- scaling, checking, .and cracking, as -well as for other detrimental effects-such as delamination. ,

The Franklin Institute Research Laboratories a report and the Stone & Webster. test specifications were filed with the NRC previously under Docket 50-338.

Adhesica testing of the Beaver Valley Unit No. 1 containment liner dome coating performed innediately prior to cessnercial operation : indicated adhesion strength in excess of 500 pai.

, No quantitative data are available, to our knowledge, concerning the antivibrational or leak sealing properties of a

the Beaver Valley I containment liner coating system.

22

.q f^c. ,

.L

e.;

1 4

~

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=

3

~~Although: . ' we . 'are' all' familiar with the sealing-ability of epoxy paintLand the-difficulty in. moving. fasteners- which.

have..been:. painted,- were. have -no quantative claiming credit for the sealing'and retention of'basis' for plugs by-the: 5' mils of prime and finish ^ painting applied after the dome plugs were installed and' leak-tested.

.a , I s

l --

L 1.;

o j l

I e

R t

i 23

e b 7 :,7 j y -

+ (

4 C.- Floor Mat Boagg:

Assuming' nothing further is done to the boxes beneath the floor and on. top.of the mat liner, the following- l information is requested.

t Ouestion

.y C.1- Describe the provisions to prevent, water seepage

-through the plugs or plug extensions 1

' into the

~

channel 4 boxes..  !

Describe the. Lsurveillance--

'~

procedures in effect or contemplated to assure ;the plugs or extensions remain intact.- ,

NOTE: In all of.the above where procedures are requested but may not: exist, describe .the t information or process in sufficient detail'to

permit NRC evaluation. '

L ,

l'i l

t

!. Response L

' C.1 Plugs are installed in test channel. test port

-panels to prevent seepage into the channels. These clusters of test connections are located in regions-of the mat away.

from low trap water. spots -inside containment and consequently would-.not  ;

Figure 2a locates the various test panels-in the floor.

The' floor of-the containment is sloped.to one corner where a -

sump provides. entrapment of any moisture or condensation.

Pumps are provided to remove any accumulation.

i Approximately 80 percent of the test channel test connections are terminated in test port panels on vertical i L

concrete surfaces 2-3 ft above the concrete floor.

i The test channel their-location areextensions protectedarefrom under.no load and because of damage. As previously discussed,- even- if water were introduced, corrosion not pose a problem.

would o-24 i

1 .,

CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE-  !

- BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION-UNIT NO.1  !

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY LINER PLATE TEST CHANNEL l MATERIAL SPECIFICATION (e) - EL l690'-il." T0 720'-11" ASTM- A537, GR. 8 ASTM- A131, GR. C

^(SHELL)- QUENCHED E TEMPERED IMPACT TEST ON THE AB0VE - MIN NOT T- 50 ' F N/A CHEMICALS AND PHYSICALS YES YES' 5 1

(b)' EL- 720'-il" TO 813' (SNELL ASTM-A516, GR. 60, FINE. ASTM-A131, GR.0-00ME AND BOTTOM PLATE) GRAINED AND NORMALIZED -

lWPACT- TESTS WIN NOTT-20'F N/A ,

CHEMICALS AND PHYSICALS YES. YES o.

2. WELDING - '

(s). METHOD FULL PENETRATION SUTT FILLET i

' (b) CODE (WELDING OUALIFICATIONS) 8 OILER & PRESSURE VESSEL 80lLER 8 PRESSURE CODE, SECT. IX, SEC.lll VESSEL CODE, SECT. IX, SEC.111

-(c) PROCEDURE N0.~ (SNELL' RING 4) 1 - VERTICAL 205 205 2 - HORIZONTAL, 137 205 i

3. TESTING AND INSPECTIONS i (a) VISUAL - 100% YES YES-(b) MA6. PARTICLE NO N0 (c) - DYE PENETRANT- 1008/o YES YES (d) - RAD 10WtAPH - 2 % (PLUS FIRST PARA . UW52, SECT. Vill N/A 10 FT EACH WELDER FOR EACH PRESSURE VESSEL CODE r  ;

POSITION-l0O %) '

(e) AIR PRESSURE TEST - 50 PSI YES YES (f)' HALO 6EN LEAK TEST-50 PSI YES (ABOVE EL 720'-11") YES FIG.1 SHEET I OF 2 DETAILS OF MATERIALS LINER AND TEST CHANNELS n -iz,es7 -

- . - , _ ;s-* ,

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MATE RI AL PROPERTIES BEAVER-VALLEY' POWER S TATI ON-UN I T NO. I ASTM .

ASTM SA) AS TM~ -( 5 A )'

~

C HEMIS T RY/ PROPER T Y  ::'A 131-GRC A - _5 3 7 (- G R B ' A .5 16 _ G R . 6 0 L _ ,

CARBON, MAX,% 0.23 10 .2'4 :0 .~2 lH

' MANGANESE,%

0.60-O.90- 0.70-I.35 'O ~. 6 0.- 0 ". 9 0 PHOSPHORUS, MAX,% - O '. 0 54

'0.035 0.035 5ULFUR, MAX,% 0.05- 0 .014 'O' 04 l S I L I r. O N , % 0.15-O'.30 0 .15-0::.50 ~ 0. I 5 0 . 30 TENSILE STRENGTH,KSI' 58-71 80-1GO 60 72.

YIELD POINT, MIN,KSI - 32 60 32 E LONG A T ION IN 8 IN., MIN,%. .21 - ---

'21 ELONGATION IN 2 I N . , M I N ,%- 2 t+ 22 25-

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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY-

i T

, y-i I Y

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• N .

m n J _ . . . . _

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p ]. [ m - u si n ,

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.o iwan- --

= CHANNELS.

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,-: , - WITHOUT : \

l 1 BACMING BARS N. j-l A6L tueLL SGA mAtevi 5

, , To MAv4 Tat? cuawwgLt 67tH.* DeY 3 ,

IO l AT $61817 e * % $4L>w

.hAkb6etLLStAM4

l. 1. vo Avs vast cuA4msts nAco a esAt ts-y Ott 19 4

WALL TEST CHANNELS a WITH :

l BACKING BARS  ;

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LINER ELEVATION DOME

' :9

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1. 4 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE . __

- SEAVER VALLEY POWER ' STATION-UNIT N0;1

> ; DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY:

}

4

-+ i-q RECESS TYP  ;

L

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CAJON OR EQUAL .

] .__ SOC WELD FEMALE ' CONN ,.

---. - T

i. YPE Sib S,S,T .

0 -

F g PlPC. TO g OD TUBE 4

FACE OF CONCRE.TE O . ,..,. -- .

2 st-- n, 6 - --

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50C HD; PIPE PLUG 3 .  !

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_ / k CONNCC. TOR, TYPE 316 J

/ ----

k MPT HA\.F CouPL\WaTYP

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• ' FIG.3(o) '

SHEET I 0F 2 TEST CHANNELS-FLOOR DETAILS l

/,

.+ i ,- . . . . , - . - + . . .

. ;- v. .

+ ;a

~3 -CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE?

BEAVER VALLEY- POWER; STATION-UNIT NO.1:

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY.

1 1

y 1

63 - o R .REr--. l l- .

! .C AUON OR E O SOC WCLD i q

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L 9EC M  %

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% j c-3CH so NIPPLCS REMOVE.

AFTER CONC (REPLACE

[lil/- CONC FLOOR t

n WITH PLuos) Nu

% ' SUFFACE.

i i  != g E L*9 E,- l -

g

?'W I i-YM__ 94 c.=ng [) . .

l l- I n 93C I%

a

{ g%

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' f NPT-TYP HALF COUPLING .

l:.

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SCALC: NONE. >

FIG.3(a)

SHEET 2 OF 2 TEST CHANNELS-FLOOR DETAILS g .~

( & ,;-.  ;- w ~ ~ m; -

wr, y

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CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE

~

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION-UNIT NO.1 d DUQUESNE UGHTLCOMPANY -- P::

u,

j

= 126*- 0" 0. D. = '

126'- 0". O. D.

g

\ _LmER _uMER: '

N s c. ,I.- c.,,

N m 1-  ;

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TYPICat. TEST CONIGECTIOII

(- %DOOLS. SCREWED StaLF COUPLHIS WITH PIPE PLUG

\

{ -

[ _

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l TYPICAL WALL JOINT - TYPICALWALL JOINT l wiTHOUT sacunes PLATE WiTu sacusses PLATE FIG. 3 (b) i ;

TEST CHANNELS-WAL.L DETAILSi ,

4

. , _ . ._ _ _ _ _ - - . _ , _ . . . . _ _ _. .. . _ . . _ __ 1

~

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CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE'

. BEAVER' VALLEY POWER STATION-UIST NO.1 DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY:

1-i TEST ~ CH A N NEL j

PLUG - l LINER '

j SEALWELDED .' '

4 I

• TYP. TEST CONNECTION  !

{ spo Las. scREwEo nntP

// =

couPune warn secuEr >

DRILg AND TA'P THROUGH SEAM-HEAD PIPE PLUS

'FOR g NPT PIPE PLUG

\.

ASTM- A350 GR LFZ ,

ONE EACH TEST SESM

\\-

1 f..

2 TYPICAL DOME JOINT

. FIG.! 3(c)-'

TESTLCHANNELS-DOME DETAILS.

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,- 1 l

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BEAVER VALLEY-POWER STATION ~ UNIT NO.1 i DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 190 18 0 - 1 CURVE NO.I e 170 - LINER STRAIN '

o 160 -

[ LINER - MODEL 150 -

l 140 - A LLOWABLE STRAIN DOME 150 -

ASME SECT. EDIV. 2, N TABLE CC-5720-1 i L , , 120 -

1 i

CYLINDER ll0 -

l CONTAIN.100 i  ;

HEIGHT, 90 -

l F T. . I 80 . CURVE NO.2 l LINER STR AIN 70 -

l DISP L. COM PAT. 8 METHOD 8 60 -

l 50 -

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40 -

l 8

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30 -

g 20 10

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FIGURE 5 CONTAINMENT LINER-STRAIN CURVES 7s ir,ese

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s i' I a l y R ig-s' l CHANNELS ~  !

TYP. ALL I l

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h. NPT SOCKET-

'N yp SEAL WELD AFTER TEST HD PLUG -

S

, 'l

, / 6ffeq y-6000 HALF COUrUNG WITH

[NPT SOCKET "18 REBAR HD PLUG y

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FIGURE 6 i DOME - SECTIONAL ELEVATION CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE BE AVER VALLEY POWER STATION- UNIT NO.1 '

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY l

l t

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l I

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0009 f I f I /

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He EVOLUTION

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14 13 12 11 to 9 8 7 6 S 4 3 2 pH l

F FIGURE 7 EFFECT OF pH ON CORROSION OF MILD STEEL CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE BE AVER VALLEY POWER STATION-UNIT NO.1 DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

(-

~

= c-e = 1 m, .

t i

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FIGURE 8.1 CONTAINMENT WALL TYPIC AL STRESS DISTRIBUTION CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION-UNIT NO.i DUQUESNE L!GHT COMPANY i

l i

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N #C T, SEISMIC SHE AR STRESS, DOE '

F t& F ,LONGITUDIN C AL & CIRCUMFERENTI AL MEMBR ANE AND SENDING STRESSES DUE-TO DBA PRESSURE & TEMPER ATURE MOHR' S CIRCLE FC+#L / #c #L \ 2 WAX.F : g .t. r EQUATION l-l' l' FIGURE 8.2 LINER STRESS COMBINATION CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE BEAVER VALLEY POW'dR STATION-UNIT NO.1 OUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

.l

/\ \

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+,-

N

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+ _

+,.

7 e

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f O Reinp g T +,

FIGURE 8 3 LINER ELEMENT CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE BE AVER VALLEY POWER STATION-UNIT NO.1 DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

.w ..

l FROM VERTICAL EQUILIBRIUM ( E Fv = O ),

I OzVy + F2 ,- Fiy + Fq ,

WHERE, Fi = 2 r R t sint $ a, F

tv = 2r R t sini fg e4  !

r Fq

= [ *2 w R (Tg +T4) sin $ cosp dp i

8 Vy

=2wR sinz ITc V DIVIDING E ACH TERM BY 2 w R AND SOLVING FOR V, V= x ,I8In h i#{tO" ft F(, 4 (Tg+ T4) sin $ cos p d p )

\ . ;. l L

l i

FIGURE 8.4 '

STRESS SUMM ATION

CONTAIN MENT STRUCTURE p

BE AVER VALLEY POWER STATION-UNIT NO 1 OUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

! ~

i i

! DOME TEST CHANNEL WELD STRESSES TEST TEST CONDITION DESIGN CONDITION CHANNEL l LO CATION ' SHEAR WELD ALLO'kABL E F SHEAR WELD ALLOW 48LE l FORCE S M SS OF 4,,,,, MRESS ORCE STRESS STRESS FACTOR OF SAFETY SAFETY V,1b/m. Msi. Msi.

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13.5 265 1.00 21.O 21.0 t513 5.71 31.5 552 l

l 23.0 2518 950 21.0 2.21 l

5367 20.25 31.5 1.56 31 O 1968 743 21 0 2.83 2907 10.97 31 5 247 39.0 1005 379 21 0 554 2203 8.31 31.5 3.79 48.0 784 2.96 21.0 7.09 1746 6 59 31 5 4.78 56 0 906 342 210 6.1 4 1890 7.1 3 31.5 442 73.0 472 1.78 21.0 t 1.8 942 3.55 31 5 8.87 ,

81 0 6 31 238 21.0 8.82 624- 2.35 31.5 13.4 BASED ON ASME RI, DIV. 2. CC- 3750 FIG URE 8.5 i

STRESS TABULATION CONTAIN MENT STRUCTURE BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATlON-UNIT NO.1 DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

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o ATTACHMENT C-1 .1 i

Beaver Valley Power' Station, Unit No. 1 Proposed Technical Specification change No. 181

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS V .

CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.6 The structural integrity of the containment shall be maintained at a level consistent with the acceptance criteria in

-Specification 4.6.1.6.1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With~ the structural integrity of the containment not conforming to the above requirements, restore the structural integrity to within the limits prior to increasing tLe Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200*F.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.6.1 Csptainment Vessel Surfaces The structural integrity of the exposed accessible interior. and exterior surfaces of the containment vtssel, including the liner plate, shall be determined during the shutdown for each Type A containment leakage rate test (reference Specification 4.6.1.2) by a visual inspection of these surfaces. This inspection shall be performed prior to the Type A j containment leakage rate test to verify no apparent changes in appearance or other abnormal degradation. 1 4.6.1.6.2 Reports An initial report of any abnormal degradation of j the containment structure detected during the above required tests and inspections shall be made within 10 days after completion of the

! surveillance requirements of this specification, and the detailed

, report shall be subinitted pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days after completion. This report shall include a description of l the condition of the liner plate and concrete, the inspection ,

l procedure, the tolerances on cracning and the corrective actions taken, j i

i BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 6-10 (Proposed Wording)

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ATTACHMENT C-3 t

Beaver Valley Power. Station, Unit No. 2 ,

Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 45 i

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0- CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

-CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i 1

3.6.1.6 The structural integrity of the containment shall be maintained at a level consistent Otth the acceptance criteria in j Specification 4.6.1.6.1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

i ACTION:

1 With the struc'e aral integrity of the containment not conforming to j the above requirements, restore the structural integrity to within i the limits prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200*F. ,

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l 4.6.1.6.1 ' Containment Vessel Surfaces The structural integrity of 1 the exposed accessible interior and exterior surfaces of the containment vessel, including the liner plate, shall be determined ,

during the shutdown for each Type A containment _ leakage rate test l (reference Specification 4.6.1.2) by a visual inspection of these j surfaces. This inspection shall be performed prior to the Type A containment leakage rate test to verify no apparent changes in appearance or other abnormal degradation.

4.6.1.6.2 Reports An initial report of any abnormal degradation of j the containment structure detected during the above required tests and inspections shall be made within 10 days after completion of the ,

l surveillance requirements of this specification, and the detailed report shall be submitted pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days _after completion. This report shall include a description of the condition of the linor plate and concrete, the inspection procedure, the tolerances on cracking and the corrective actions taken.

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BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 6-9 (Proposed Wording) v j

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