ML20127D321

Summary of ACRS 388th Meeting on 920806-08 Re Insps,Tests, Analyses & Acceptance Criteria Program for GE ABWR Design. Design

ML20127D321
Person / Time
Site:	05200001
Issue date:	08/12/1992
From:	Ward D Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:	Selin I, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
ACRS-R-1480, NUDOCS 9209140217
Download: ML20127D321 (4)

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August 12, 1992 The Honorable Ivan Selin Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT:

INSPECTIONS, TESTS, ANALYSES, AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA PROGRAM FOR THE GE ABWR DESIGN During the 388th meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, August 6-8, 1992, we reviewed a sample *f the Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) which are being prepared by GE Nuclear Energy (GE) as a part of its application for certification of the ABWR design. This topic was also reviewed at a joint meeting of our Subcommittees on Decay Heat Removal Systems and Advanced Boiling Water Reactors on August 5, 1992. During these meetings, we ha'l the benefit of presentations by members of the NRC staff and by representatives of GE. Our review has been in response to a request by the Commission made at our meeting with them on March 5, 1992, and confirmed in a Staff Requirements Memorandum dated April 1, 1992. We also had the benefit of the documents referenced.

ITAAC are an important part of Tier 1 submittals which the NRC requires of applicants for design certification under Part 52.

They are intended to abstract from the more voluminous source, the Standard Safety Analysis Report (SSAR), the information needed by the NRC staf f to make its final safety determination and to ensure that this information i agreed to at the time of design certification and verified in the completed plant. The form and content of individual ITAAC are still being developed by an iterative process between GE and the NRC staff.

There are several types of ITAAC, es described by the staff:

Systems Generic Interface Design Acceptance Criteria (DAC)

Combined Operating License (COL) 9209140217 920812 PDR ACRS R-1480 PDR

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The Honorable Ivan Selin 2 August 12, 1992 Nr present review has been confined to the general program and to the first type, which includes the largest nutaber of individual ITAAC. We were told that the entire plant design can be-described in terms of ' about 140 systems. Of these, GE has proposed that about 85 have sufficient safety significance to be covered by individual ITAAC. These comprise the " Systems ITAAC." We have reviewed S of these 85 in some detail, as a means for evaluating the ITAAC process.

We intend to continue our-review by investigating examples of the Generic and Interface ITAAC. We were told there are nine Generic ITAAC for the ABWR, covering subjects which apply to many or all systems, such as welding and equipment qualification requirements.

We have commented on DAC in an interim report of June 16, 1992.

The COL ITAAC, which will be concerned with such matters as operator training, will be developed by a COL applicant after the

' design certification. We would expect to review these in the future when appropriate.

We conclude from our review that the ITAAC process appears to be generally well founded and can be made to work as 'the staff and GE visualize. The' general form and scope of the individual ITAAC we studied were satisfactory. There is, however, a problem witn content of the ITAAC. Although the examples we examined were a part of what was described as the final Stage 3 GE submittal, there was'a significant lack of consistency, accuracy, and completeness.

We were informed by both the staff and GE that this is a problem beyond the five examples we selected for our review. Both are individually committed to major efforts to improve the quality of the content of'all ITAAC.

We were t'old by the Director of NRR that he plans ~an extensive and in-depth review cf the submitted ITAAC and will not recommend approval of a Final Design Approval (FDA) until the results of the review are fully satisfactory. This could mean a delay in the presently. projected date for the FDA issuance. For its part, GE expressed its commitment to respond to problems indicated by the staff review and to conduct its own quality review in parallel. GE intends to er..sure consistency among ITAAC and other Tier 1 and Tier 2 documents. In addition, we were told that NUMARC intends to carry out an independent review of the ABWR ITAAC. GE already has comments from utilities on the Stage 3 ITAAC. These will be incorporated into the continuing iterations between the staff and GE.

, =We are concerned with the structural adequacy of walls and associated penetrations within buildings housing critical systems outside of primary containment during possible fires, floods, or pipe breaks. It was not clear from the material presented to us how structural requirements for these will be verified through the

i The Honorable Ivar! Selin 3 August 12, 1992 ITAAC process. ~h expect to pursue this matter at a future meeting.

A PRA has been performed for the ABWR design and certain conclusions about the safety of the design can be drawn from this.

In performing the PRA, many assumptions were necessary about the performance reliability of components and systems. There appears to be no means by which Tier 1 requirements (e.g., ITAAC) will ensure that components and systems in the plant can be expected to have reliabilities which are consistent with those assumed in the PRA. The SSAR provides some information on this, but does not close the loop. We were told that appropriate reliability values for components and systems will be ensured through a reliability assurance program developed by a COL applicant. We believe this matter deserves more study.

In our report to you of September 10, 1991 on ITAAC, we expressed a preference for Option 3 in SECY-91-210 which would allow for completing the ITAAC af ter issuance of the FDA for ABWR. The staf f position is that completion of the ITAAC before the FDA is essential. Given our evaluation of the current status of ABWR documentation, we agree.

We trust the above discussion and comments have been helpful. We expect to complete our review in the near future.

Sincerely, I

i David A. Ward Chairman

References:

1. SECY-91-210, dated July 16, 1991, from James M. Taylor, Executive Director for Operations, for the Commissioners,

Subject:

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) Requirements for Design Review and Issuar.ce of a Final Design Approval (FDA).

2. Staf f Requirements Memorandum dated April 1, 1992, from Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary, for David A. Ward, ACRS,

Subject:

Periodic Meeting with the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards on March 5, 1992.

3. Excerpts of Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria from CE Nuclear Energy Report: " Tier' 1 Design Certification Material for the GE ABWR," dated June 1992, as follcws?

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e The lionorable Ivan Selin 4 August 12, 1992 e Standby Liquid control System (2.2.4) e Residual Heat Removal System (2.4.1) 9 Reactor Building Cooling Water System (2.13.3) e Emergency Diesel Generator System (Standby he Power Supply -

0 12.13) e Control Building (2.15.12)

4. Report dated September 10, 1991, f rom David A. Ward, Chairman, ACRS, to Ivan Selin, Chairman, NRC,

Subject:

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) for Design

ertifications.

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