ML20056E527
| ML20056E527 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200001 |
| Issue date: | 08/05/1993 |
| From: | Poslusny C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9308240192 | |
| Download: ML20056E527 (154) | |
Text
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.,. s/t UNITED STATES l iff.j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
[d sy * /
f WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555-0001
- August 5, 1993 1
l Docket No.52-001 ,
APPLICANT: GE Nuclear Energy (GE)
PROJECT: Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (AbWR) ,
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING ON JULY 27, 1993 ,
l i
j A meeting was held in Rockville, Maryland, on July 27,-1993, between GE and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to discuss comments on GE's Tier 1 submittal for building designs and primary containment design.
Enclosure 1 is a list of those who attended the meeting. Enclosure 2 is a set ,
of GE responses provided for the building designs, and Enclosure 3 is a set of GE responses provided for the containment design. .
The following is a summary of the status of each staff comment based on the discussions held during the meeting.
t System Name Comment # Status Action Due Date I. Reactor 1.a. Res. GE Markup 'Provided Building 1.b. Res. GE Markup Provideu ;
1.c. Res. GE Markup 7/30 ,
(Modify DD and ITAAC for consistency.)
1.d. Res. GE Markup 7/30 l (Modify DD and ITAAC to indicate .3m for measurement tolerance.)
1.e Res. GE Markup Provided 1.f. Res. GE Markup Provided 1.g Res. GE Markup Provided' '
l.h. Unr. GE Harkup 7/30 (The staff requested that major codes and standards be in-cluded in the design description.) .
1.i. Res. GE Markup Provided 1.j. Res. hene None 1.k. Res. None None 1.1. Res. None None i 1.m. Res. None None l 1.n. Res. GF Markup- Provided )
2.a Mes. GE Markup Provided 2.b. Res. GE Markup 7/30 2.c. Res. GE Markup 7/30 2.d. Res. Amend 31 7/31 1 2.e. Res. GE Markup 7/30 )
[
jQ 2.f.
2.g.
Res.
Res.
None None Nor Note f~
(
9{ U lq 0
10%LuX @'
sM NRC FR.E CENTBt COPY
l l
l August 5, 1993 System Name Comment # Status Action Duc Date l 2.h. ' Res. GE Markup 7/3' 3.a. Res. GE Markup 7/30 l 3.b. Res. GE Markup Provided l 3.c. Res. None None 3.d. Res. None None l 3.e. Res. None None l 3.f. Res. GE Markup 7/30 l (Modify App 3H.4 to include a discussion of the subcomp-l artment analysis methodology.)
II. Turbine 1.a. Res. GE Markup 7/30 Building (Modify DD to indicate that collapse will not impair the j safety-related functions of any structures or any equipment l located adjacent to or wi+.hin the building.)
l 1.b. Res. GE Markup 7/30 l (Modify the DD to include statement that the design is such l that under SSE seismic loads that no damage to l safety-related functions will occur.)
1.c. Res. GE Markup 7/30 (Remove the IT/AC for this system because configuration check is not necessary.)
3.d. Unr. GE Markup 7/31 (Include in DD major codes and standards used in the de-sign.)
l 1.e. Res. None (Info included in circulating water system ITAAC.)
1.f. Res. GE Markup 7/10 1.g. Res. None None 2.a. Res. GE Markup 7/31 (Remove the ITfAC for this system because <.onfiguration check is not necessary. Significant information included in turbine, circulating water, and main steam ITAAC.)
2.b. Res. GE Markup 7/30 (Modify DC to state that the building is designed such that 1 under SSE seismic loads that no damage to safety-related i functions will occur.) l 2.c. Res. GE Markup 7/30 (Modify acceptance criterion to state that a structural !
analyses report exists which concludes that the building !
will not damage safety-related functions after being sub- {
jected to loads from an SSE.) i 2.d. Res. GE Markup 7/30 (Modify IT/AC to verify that a reconciliation analysis l exists.) i III. Radwaste 1.a. Res. GE Markup Provided Building 1.b. Res. None None 1.c. Unr. GE Markup 7/30 (Include in DD a listing of major codes and standards used in the design.) i l
i
! i
! i
( l l 1 August 5, 1993 l l
System Name Comment # Status Action Due Date l t 1.d. Res. GE Markup Provided i 1.e. Res. None None j 2.a. . Res. GE Markup 7/30J -
(Remove the ITAAC for this system because configuration !
check is not necessary.) .
r 2.b. Res. GE Markup Provided ;
l 2.c. Res. GE. Markup 7/30 .,
j (Revise design commitment to read that the building is de- l signed such that after being subjected to loads from an SSE that it' will not damage safety-related functions.) l 2.d. Res. GE Markup 7/30. j (Revise acceptance criteria to read that the building is ;
designed such that after being subjected to loads from an t
SSE that it will not damage safety-related functions.) -l 2.e. Res. GE SSAR Mkp Provided .;
i IV. Service 1.a. Res. -
None None !
l Building 2.a. Res. GE Markup 7/30 !
Remove the ITAAC for this system because configuration check l is not necessary.) l 2.b. Unr. GE Markup 7/30 I (Under discussion in San Jose.) l V. Control 1.a. Res. GE Markup 7/30 l Building (Mocify DD and ITAAC for consistency in measurement of l embedment.) i 1.b. Res. GE Markup Provided ;
1.c. Unr. GE Markup 7/30 t (Modify DD to include reference to major codes and standards i
- u. 'i in design.) . ;
1.d Res. GE Markup Provided :
1.e. Res. None None t 1.' Res. None None i 2 Res. GE Markup Provided !
L . h . GE Markup Provided .l 2.c. Res. GE Markup Provided j 3.a. Res. GE Markup Provided j 3.b. Res. GE Markup Provided '
3.c. Res. GE Markup Provided ;
3.d. Res. None None i 3.e. Res. None None ;
I VI. Primary Containment and Internal Structures :
- a. Design 1.a. Res. GE Markup 7/30 Description (Modify DD to define all loads for internal structures.) {
l.b. f.'r None None i 1.c. Res. GE Markup 7/30 l (Add equipment to seismic Category I listing.) )
1.d. Res. None None i
l
.~._.-_,.l
l August 5, 1993 l I
System Name Comment # Status Action Due Date 1.e. Res. GE Markup Provided I 1.f. Unr. GE Markup 7/30 1.g. Res. GE Markup. 7/30 ,
(Correct inconsistency.) i 1.h. Res. GE Markup 7/30 (Correct inconsistency.)
2.a. Res. GE Markup 7/30 ,
(Clarify DD figure defining areas of code compliance.) '
2.b. Res. GE Markup 7/30 ;
(Modify drawings for consistency.) ,
2.c. Res. GE Markup 7/30 l (Add location of structures in drawing.) i 2.d. Res. GE Markup Provided j
- b. ITAAC 3.a. Unr. GE Markup 7/30 f (Add as-built stress analysis report verification to ITAAC ~l and appropriate information to SSAR.). i 3.b. .Unr. GE Markup 7/30 l (Add analysis to verify response at critical locations.)
3.c. Unr. GE Markup 7/30 !
(Add verification that vessel meets design and construction j requirements of ASME Code.) !
(Original signed by)
Chester Poslusny, Project Manager :
Standardization Project Directorate !
Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors l
- and License Renewal Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation :
Enclosures:
As stated j cc w/ enclosures: !
See next page ]
l DISTRIBUTION w/ enclosures:
Docket File PDST R/F CPoslusny PDR PShea ~
DISTRIBUTION w/o enclosures: >
DCrutchfield TMurley/FMiraglia JNWilson T 6over RBorchardt WRussell, 12G18 SNinh DTang SKoenick JMoore, 15B18 ACRS (11) J0'Brien, RES BHardin,- RES LShao, RES GBagchi, 7H15- SAli, 7H15 Tcheng, 7H15 JHolmes, 8D1 WBurton,'8 CLi, 801 0FC: LA:PDST:ADAR PM:kDh:ADAR SC:PDSTdDAR f/ftS k,[bO: ;
NAME: PShea o tT5 CPoslusny:tz JNWilsoY T seyer k
DATE: 08/ /93 08/k/93 08/h/93 Ekh3 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY: ITAACSUM.CP
GE Nuclear Energy Docket No.52-001 cc: Mr. Patrick W. Marriott, Manager Mr. Joseph Quirk Licensing & Consulting Services GE Nuclear Energy l GE Nuclear Energy General Electric Company 175 Curtner Avenue 175 Curtner Avenue, Mail Code 782 San Jose, California 95125 San Jose, California 95125 Mr. Robert Mitchell General Electric Company 175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, California 95125 Mr. L. Gifford, Program Manager Regulatory Programs GE Nuclear Energy 12300 Twinbrook Parkway Suite 315 Rockville, Maryland 20852 Director, Criteria & Standards Division Office of Radiation Programs U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 401 M Street, S.W. -
Washington, D.C. 20460 Mr. Sterling Franks '
U.S. Department of Energy NE-42 Washington, D.C. 20585 Mr. Steve Goldberg Budget Examiner 725 17th Street, N.W.
Room 8002 Washington, D.C. 20503 Mr. Frank A. Ross U.S. Department of Energy, NE-42 Office of LWR Safety and Technology l 19901 Germantown Road Germantown, Maryland 20874 Mr. Raymond Ng 1776 Eye Street, N.W.
Suite 300 Washington, D.C. 20006 Marcus A. Rowden, Esq. !
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson '
1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Suite 800 l Washington, D.C. 20004 Jay M. Gutierrez, Esq.
Newman & Holtzinger, P.C. ,
1615 L Street, N.W.
Suite 1000 Washington, D.C. 20036 :
. - - - - - , -. .- - .- - . - . - . . . - _ ~ .-
i s
GE Nuclear Energy Docket No.52-001 l
l cc: Mr. Patrick W. Marriott, Manager Mr Joseph Quirk ';
Licensing & Consulting Services GE Nuclear Energy j GE Nuclear Energy General Electric Company ;
175 Curtner Avenue 175 Curtner Avenue, Mail Code 782 j San Jose, California 95125 San Jose, California ' 95125 ;
Mr. Robert Mitchell General Electric Company ,
175 Curtner Avenue l l San Jose, California 95125 l r
Mr. L. Gifford, Program Manager ;
Regulatory Programs i j
GE Nuclear Energy '
l 12300 Twinbrook Parkway Suite 315 i Rockville, Maryland 20852 j Director, Criteria & Standards Division [
Office of Radiation. Programs i l U.S. Environmental Protection Agency l l 401 M Street, S.W. ;
l Washington, D.C. 20460 ;
l Mr. Sterling Franks .
U.S. Department of Energy i NE-42 !
l Washington, D.C. 20585 Mr. Steve Goldberg Budget Examiner 725 17th Street, N.W. ;
Room 8002 1 Washington, D.C. 20503 j Mr. Frank A. Ross )
l U.S. Department of Energy, NE-42 Office of LWR Safety and Technology
- 19901 Germantown Road i
Germantown, Maryland 20874 Mr. Raymond Ng 1776 Eye Street, N.W.
Suite 300 Washington,.D.C. 20006 l
Marcus A. Rowden, Esq.
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Suite 800 Washington,- D.C. 20004 l- Jay M. Gutierrez, Esq.
- l. Newman & Holtzinger, P.C.
I 1615 L Street, N.W.
Suite 1000 Washington, D.C. 20036
- , ~. .. -- - - -. ._ . . .- - -._ ... . .
ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc. Docket No.52-002 cc: Mr. C. B. Brinkman, Acting Director Nuclear Systems Licensing ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.
1000 Prospect Hill Road Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 Mr. C. B. Brinkman, Manager l Washington Nuclear Operations- l ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc. l 12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330 Rockville. Maryland 20852 ,
Mr. Stan Ritterbusch i Nuclear Systems Licensing {
i ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc. l 1000 Prospect Hill Road ;
Post Office Box 500 i Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 l Mr. Sterling Franks i U.S. Department of Energy NE-42 i Washington, D.C. 20585 l Mr. Steve Goldberg l Budget Examiner j 725 17th Street, N.W. !
Washington, D.C. 20503 !
?
Mr. Raymond Ng !
1776 Eye Street, N.W. l Suite 300 i Washington, D.C. 20006 !
Joseph R. Egan, Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037-1128 l
Mr. Regis A. Matzie, Vice President l Nuclear Systems Development !
ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc..
l 1000 Prospect Hill Road j Post Office Box 500 !
Windsor, Connecticut- 06095-0500 l 1
l l
l 7
= r m*- y e- --r- r w+=,-n -
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l Docket No.52-003 Westinghouse Electric Corporation I t
cc: Mr. Nicholas J. Liparulo Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Analysis .
Nuclear and Advanced Technology Division !
Westinghouse Electric Corporation !
P.O. Box 355 !
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 l Mr. B. A. McIntyre Advanced Plant Safety & Licensing ,
Westinghouse Electric Corporation j Energy Systems Business Unit 1 Box 355 t Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 .j l
Mr. John C. Butler ;
i Advanced Plant Safety & Licensing ;
Westinghouse Electric Corporation Energy Systems Business Unit Box 355 i Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 l i
Mr. M. D. Beaumont j Nuclear and Advanced Technology Division j Westinghouse Electric Corporation l One Montrose Metro :
11921 Rockville Pike i Suite 350 !
9 Rockville, Maryland 20852 i Mr. Sterling Franks U.S. Department of Energy NE-42 Washington, D.C. 20585 Mr. S. M. Modro EG&G Idaho Inc.
Post Office Box 1625 Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 Mr. Steve Goldberg Budget Examiner 725 17th Street, N.W.
Room 8002 Washington, D.C. 20503 Mr.' Frank A. Ross U.S. Department of Energy, NE-42 Office of LWR Safety and Technology 19901 Germantown Road Germantown, Maryland 20874 l
i
MEETING ATTENDEES July 27.1993 ,
l NAME AFFILIATION j Chet Poslusny NRR/ADAR/PDST David Tang NRR/ADAR/PDST Syed Ali NRR/DE/ECGB Goutam Bagchi NRR/DE Tom Cheng NRR/DE Jeff Holmes NRR/SPLB Butch Burton i;RR/SPLB Chang Li NRR/SPLB Alan Beard GE, Rockville Gary Ehlert GE-NE b
Enclosure 1 i
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h ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING t
NRC COMMENT:
- 1. Design Description
- a. In the second paragraph, the Design Description should state that the R/B ,
slabs are supported by the R/B exterior walls (in addition to columns and beams).
GE RESPONSE:
Agree to change !
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
1.
i 2.
3.
Enclosure 2 ;
i
- - , _ . . . , . . .I
6 ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING
'i NRC COMMENT: ,
- 1. Design Description 4
- b. In the second paragraph, the Design Description should be corrected to ;
state that the horizontal loads are transferred through the RCCV and the R/B shear walls to the basemat and R/B foundation
. s GE RESPONSE:
Agree to change.
l l
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIEI.1:
1.
2.
1 3.
i
i ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING ,
NRC COMMENT:
- 1. Design Description i b. In the second paragraph, the Design Desc'ption should be corrected to state that the horizontal loads are transferred through the RCCV and the R/B shear walls to the basemat and R/B foundation l
i l
l l GE RESPONSE:
Agree to change.
Y
( PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIEI;1:
l 1.
l 2.
I 3.
l -
i ;
= = ~- , - - . - . _ _ _-
I i
l ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES i
. TO NRC COMMENTS ..
p SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING i
NRC COMMENT:
- 1. Design Description :
- c. As committed by GE in March 8-11,1993 meeting, the building l embedments should have been documented in the tier 1/ITAAC material. l
~
The comments on the revised design description are:
- ~ -
ph6
- The building embedment depth should be measured from the )
bottom of the basemat instead of from the top of the basemat to the 4
)
finished grade. J S
- The embedment depth of the R/B should be 25.7m i1m instead of /
25m im. The embedment depth of 25.7m is shown in SSAR ,g section 3.7.1.
GE RESPONSE:
The measurement was taken from top of mat to allow for sloping sites or uneven sites as discussed in the March meeting. At that time it was agreed to the top of mat measurement. The embedment depth of 20.5m was selected as being within the tolerances of not changing the safety conclusions, even though the seismic results may change. Any change from the design will be picked up by l the design report. tier 1 embedmont depth will be changed to 20.5m from 25m. -!
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
- 1. Change embedment depth from 25m to 20.5m in design description.
- 2. Make matching ITAAC change 3.
ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS .
i SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING NRC COMMENT:
- 1. Design Description
- d. The use ofi1m for tolerances of building embedment appears to be too $M .
large. Discuss the appropriateness of a smaller tolerance (This comment gu U I applies to all building system ITAAC). a
. gyl%
a
/ h GE RESPONSE:
5*[ i ,
The use of 1m for tolerances was to allow for embedment errors. Any deviation, even smaller ones would have to be reconciled in the design report. If !
this is not acceptabi,e reccommend elimination of this ITAAC.
No changes to tier 1. g PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1: h^-
- 1. /
- 2. I h$ / darf k 3.
- _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ..._._-.._.,.i
ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS ,
SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING NRC COMMENT:
- 1. Design Description
- e. The exterior wall thickness of 0.6m or greater is the requirement for water seapage only. Clarification is needed.
I GE RESPONSE:
GE will clarify design description.
~
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
1
- 1. GE will add the statement that 0.6m for seepage only.
2.
l 3.
t ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES l TO NRC COMMENTS ;
SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING t
NRC COMMENT: i
- 1. Design Description ]
- f. from reading the table of contents, it appears that the Tier 1/ITAAC material for the stack is combined with the R/B information. However, the stack design is not mentioned in this section and needs to be addressed ,
as a part of Tier 1 material if it is Seismic Category 1. If the stack is not seismic category 1, then the table of contents should b~e revised to show stack entry (2.16.1) as being underlined (Title only - no entry for design certification). !
l GE RESPONSE: l Table of contents will be changed. The stack is non-seismic category 1.
l l
PROPOSED CHANGES TO BER 1:
- 1. Change stack entry to show now design entry.
2.
l l
3.
i 1
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ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES l TO NRC COMMENTS l SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING l
l NRC COMMENT:
- 1. Design Description
- g. Classification of the stack needs to be verified because it is not consistent with the SSAR (It is classified as seismic category I in SSAR Table 3.2-1 l and non-seismic elsewhere). . ,
GE RESPONSE:
SSAR Table 3.2-1 has been changed showing the stack as non-seismic category I.
t l
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
1.
2.
3.
1 i
1 l,
4 ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS 3 i
- 4 a
4 l SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING s
NRC COMMENT.
- 1. Design Description l
- h. The design description should include the major codes and standards used in the design of the R/B (without specifiying the edition). s o c. ,
~
CN / l
- GE RESPONSE
Only ASME is placed into Tier 1. Any code or standard referenced by Tier i places the code or standard into the federal register. ASME selected as being :
okay since 10CFR already elevated ASME to federal register. No additional codes or standards can be elevated to tier 1 per GE/NRC agreement.
I i
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
- 1. ,
4 2.
3.
l i
- - ~ . .
ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS ..
3 SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING NRC COMMENT:
- 1. Design Description
- i. Discuss the flood protection features for the below grade tunnel which connects the reactor, turbine, and radwaste buildings.
0\
GE RESPONSE:
Even though this is covered under extemal flood protection features. A statement will be placed into the design description of the reactor building that the radwaste tunnel penetration will be water tight at the reactor building end in order to clarify this item.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
- 1. A tunnel connects tne rad.vaste, turbine, and reactor buildings for the liquid radwaste system piping. The penetrations from the tunnel to the reactor building will be water tight.
2.
3.
L
- - ~
. - . _ -. ===.:-..___.. .. ..
I i i I
ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES I . TO NRC COMMENTS ,
SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING l
NRC COMMENT:
- 1. Design Description
- j. Clarify whether the doors which serve as fire and flood barriers will be alarmed. This is a concern from the shutdown risk perspective.
v3 W i kt t 3 !
cQ GE RESPONSE: o g- ;
E Y
'M i The only Tier 1 entry are for safety-related doors protecting safety-related p4V !
equipment from floods; therefore, only ECCS room watertight doors are considered Tier 1 material.
i PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
- 1. :
i l
1 <
' i 3.
l 1
9 t
t i
. _ . . _ . , _ , _ . _ , . . . _ , __.t
1 ;
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! ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS !
I i !
- SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING I
I a i
- I 3 NRC COMMENT
, )
4
! 1. Design Description Clarify that there are no penetrations through barriers (walls, floors, j k.
j ceilings, doors) which separate divisions. i i
i l i
GE RESPONSE: hk There are many systems that penetrate divisional barriers. It is the intent of the !
j j
ITAAC to verify that all such penetrations have appropriate 3 hr fire ratings. No !
- changes to Tier 1 material needed. l i
i PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1: !
- 1. !
k
- ) I
- 2. !
3.
1 2
i l
l l
_ _ _ . _ . . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . - . _ . _ _ . . _ . . _ _ ._ . _ . . _ _ _ . ~ . _ . . . - . . - . . _ . . . . _ . . _ _
J L
i' ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS I SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING i
NRC COMMENT: I
. 1. Design Desription I. State that HVAC ducts and drains serving SGTS, remote shutdown areas, and areas housing Division IV instruments are physically separated by division.
-\ ~
p/
i GE RESPONSE:
Each area called out above is served by one of the 3 power divisions for either smoke, cooling, or power. All divisional barriers between those listed are called out already and shown on the drawings. This is sufficient as it is consistent with all other safety-related equipment. No changes to Tier 1 required.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO BER 1:
- 1. l 2.
3.
_. _ _ - ~ _ . _ . . __ . .__ _ . _ _ _ _
. ~ . - = _ ,_.- .- _-,
4 4
i.
TO NRC COMMENTS , !
SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.'15.10 REACTOR BUILDING 1
NRC COMMENT:
- 1. Design Description Discuss features to protect flooding between buildings above grade. f m.
J A
GE RESPONSE: QV No discussion in SSAR on this subject Therefore no discussion in Tier 1 can be 'V made. For information purposes, there are no major sources of water outside the mainsteam tunnel above grade. No special features are considered by the RB system. See drains for any special features for mainsteam tunnel floor ,
drains. ,
PROPOSED CHAhGES TO TIER 1:
i 1.
i L
3.
1 I
l l
l l
- =mz=. . =- .
~ ~
r k
4 ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING r
q-i i
NRC COMMENT:
- 1. Design Description
- n. In the second bullet of the last paragraph, delete " fire" from the internal events.
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k~
7A 1
GE RESPONSE:
Will delete " fire" from the second bullet of the last paragraph ;
l j
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
- 1. Delete fire from the second butlet of the last paragraph.
2.
l 3.
! t i
i
, ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES l
. TO NRC COMMENTS i
i SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING ,
l :
f l NRC COMMENT.
- 2. Figures 2.15.10a through 2.15.10o j
- a. Other discrepancies between Tier 1/ITAAC material and the SSAR figures i
l are noted as follows: :
- reactor building partition or cubicle wa!!s arrangement -
- Example: Fig. 2.15.10c vs Figs.1.2-4 and 3.B-2 of SSAR. -
i
- R/B major structural elements arrangement of emergency electric rooms - Exampe: Fig 2.15.10a (elevation view - Section A-A) of l i
' ITAAC vs girders / beams shown in Fig.1.2-2a of SSAR.
i GE RESPONSE: ,
, figure 1.2-4. The marked up copy we recieved from NRC is not the current SSAR figure. It was changed at least twice since that one was
- published. )
- 2. Girders, Beams, and columns were removed from ITAAC drawings. Not !
- considered part of configuration check. Reconciliation report will document str'uctural checks, and their impact to the SSAR and FSER.
The drawings are for equipment configuration check, divisional
- separation, fire protection and flood protection only.
- 3. Tier 1 and SSAR figures are being brought upto date with the current design. I expect minor changes to the SSAR. The ITAAC figures will match. 4 PROPOSED CHANGES TO BER 1:
1.
2.
t 3.
i I
l I
l
...--:,,,- y -.,,., r,.wm.,.. . _ , - . . - . , w .-.mm,., ,,, ,.,m.-y, ,..p...,, ,w- y-m,, - 9ww.7.,,-
l ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES l TO NRC COMMENTS 1
i l SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING t
NRC COMMENT:
- 2. Figures 2.15.10a through 2.15.10o
., b. Elevation views, Section A-A (Fig. 2.15.10a) and Section view B-B (Fig 2.15.10b) cannot be identified from the floor plans (Figs. 2.15.10c through 2.15.100).
GE RESPONSE:
The section location was adjusted on Tier 1 drawings in order to bring certain ,
details forward. Plan view drawings will be updated to show section locations.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
- 1. Update plan view drawings to show section lines.
t 1
2.
3.
~
Am e ...--w -. . y . . . ,
-a l l
l ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS . j SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING
! NRC COMMENT:
- 2. Figures 2.15.10a through 2.15.10o !
- c. The removable block walls cannot be identified from figs. 2.15.10v, 2.15.10d,2.15.10j and 2.15.10k. ,
l- * '
l
. 1 GE RESPONSE:
The block walls are being removed from the Tier i drawings. The differentiation l l between block walls and reinforced concrete walls is not neccessary for Tier 1.
i l
I PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
- 1. Update drawings 2.15.10d,2.15.10j,2.15.10k and 2.15.10o 2.
4 3.
l
ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING NRC COMMENT:
- 2. Figures 2.15.10a through 2.15.10o
- d. Detailed comparisons of the figures of Tier 1/ITAAC material and the figures in the SSAR cannot be performed, because a complete set of updated drawings is not available in the current SSAR.
GE RESPONSE:
SSAR Drawings will be completed by July 31 amendment. ITAAC figures are being updated. The need for an accurate match between ITAAC and SSAR are inconsistent with goals of meeting safety / design commitments. Piping, tray and duct layout during detail design will adjust these partition wall locations and shape. The partition walls are for separation purposes not for structural design confirmation. Example, is RHR Divsion A separated by a wall from RHR division ,
B.
l I
4 l PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
1.
2.
3.
i 4 i 1
i ;
i l 1
l ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES !
TO NRC COMMENTS i
6 i
SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING j
j NRC COMMENT:
i
- 2. Figures 2.15.10a through 2.15.10o
! e. An EV shaft from El. 2950mm to El. 39700mm is shown in SSAR Fig.1.2-1 2a (Amend 21). However, the shaft is not st.: rein in Fig. 2.15.10b of Tier 1 '
Material. Clarification is needed. ,
GE RESPONSE:
Section views selected for Tier 1 are not the same as shown in SSAR. Drawings will be updated showing section locations.
PROFOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
- 1. Update plan views showing s etion lines.
1
- 2. l 3.
I
~ ' ~ .- ,. . . . - . . , , . , _ _ _ ,
~
. e n. =... -
== -
ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES l TO NRC COMMENTS ,
SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING Jl 4
4 NRC COMMENT-
- 2. Figures 2.15.10a through 2.15.10o
- f. Floors and ceilings which serve as fire and flood barriers are not identified.
- .[
_ ff &
f GE RESPONSE:
As discussed in the March meeting, overlaying a hatch pattern on these areas would clutter up the drawings further. It can be inferred by the physically ,
overlaying the drawings which will show where 2 divisions overlap. No tier 1
- change neccessary.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
1.
l t
2.
3.
I
.- n - -- - . -. - . . _ .
i ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS ,
SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING NRC COMMENT:
- 2. Figures 2.15.10a through 2.15.100 l
- g. Some doors which should be watertight are not identified as such. Also some doors appear to swing the wrong way.
r p-L GE RESPONSE: -
All watertight doors necessary to protect safety-related equipment from a DBA '
are shown. Other watertight doors are used for investment protection only and are not shown. Door swing on nonwatertight doors is for information only (see drawing legend)
I 1
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
- 1. ,
t 2.
3.
l
^
.. :- = = _ . - == -- ~ - ---.
. TO NRC COMMENTS l l
SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING 1 I
1 NRC COMMENT. ;
- 2. Figures 2.15.10a through 2.15.10o
- h. Several fire barriers are missing (primarily between a division and the ,
mainsteam tunnel). .
~
(g,f V l
/ i GE RESPONSE:
Barriers will be added along mainsteam tunnel walls. All other barriers will be reviewed for completeness. l t
PROPOSED CHANGES TO DER 1:
- 1. Add fire barriers on mainsteam tunnel walls.
i l 2- l 3.
- .. . :e: _. ~ .- z .-- - _
.. m -
l -
- I i
l.
j .
TO NRC COMMENTS 4
2 SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: REACTOR BUILDING i
i !
l i j NRC COMMENT:
.i 3. ITAAC l
l a. Design commitment #2 and Acceptance criteria #2 should read 'The J bottom of the R/B basemat is located 25.7m 11m below the finished grade." -
4 r
GE RESPONSE:
The design commitment and acceptance criteria will be changed to read 20.5m instead of 25m. It will still read from top of basemat as discussed in the design ,
description open issue.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
1.
l 2.
t 3.
J i
i 5
, , --,,p- s-...r., , , , , .,
.--n .
- - - - - - - - ..-s .,--n,- ,-<en, --n.r .e -. - , > w , . . , ,
TO NRC COMMENTS :
SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING ;
I l
NRC COMMENT:
- 3. ITAAC i b. Design commitment #8a should read " External walls . . . equal to or '
l greater than 0.6m against water seepage."
l GE RESPONSE:
Will change ITAAC #8a accordingly l
PPOPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
! 1. Change ITAAC #8a to read "Extemal walls . . . equal to or greater than l 0.6m against water seepage.
I 2.
4 3.
l r
f
, , - . . _ . - - . ~ -. . - - - . - . . . - . . . . . . , , -
., ~-. . - . .
- - = ==:-. ..- - - - - . .
ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING NRC COMMENT:
- 3. ITAAC '
- c. ITAAC #9 referes to a structural analysis report for the as-built verrification of the building. However, the SSAR needs to discuss the '
scope and contents of the structural analysis report (Punchlist item 9). ;
~ .
GE RESPONSE: '
As-built structural analysis report scope and contents has been added to the SSAR. No changes to ITAAC required. t PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
1.
- 2. l
/
3.
i r
l t
- i. ,, , , ,
- . . = w+=-. = . . _. : ._ .'. - - - - -
i i
TO NRC COMMENTS. .
-)
SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING i NRC COMMENT:
- 3. ITAAC
- d. Verify alarm on doors serving as divisiv..al boundaries. ,-
0 I
GE RESPONSE: - i Alarms on ECCS compartment doors are Tier 1 only. Additional alarms as i discussed in March meeting are not considered Tier 1 material. No changes required.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1: ,
- 1. .
i l
i 2.
l l
- 3. /
l l
ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING NRC COMMENT:
- 3. ITAAC
- e. Verify divisional separation of ducts and drains for areas housing SGTS, z t. #
RSP, and Division IV instruments. )'1 GE RESPONSE:
For SGTS, RSP and Division IV instrument rooms are divisional areas. There divisional boundaries are shown on the figures. For specifics on drains see the drain ITAAC (2.9.2). No changes to RB ITAAC needed.
i PROPOSED CHANGES TO BER 1: ,
- 1. ,
2.
3.
l
~ . - . .-
i b
ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS :
I SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.10 REACTOR BUILDING NRC COMMENT:
e
- 3. ITAAC
- f. Add an ITAAC entry, which will require the performance of a subcompartment analysis using mass and energy releases based on as- ;
built plant data.
7 GE RESPONSE:
As discussed in March, this structural reconciliation ITAAC covers seismic, l hydrodynamic loads and subcompartment loads on the structure. Any changes [ .
in the above results that effect equipment EQ would be updated. No separate ,
ITAAC is needed. (5'pU ' i
}Ql5"
,0e .
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1: /
e l
,+4 / /
1.
u -
3 _7 3.
eal @ U* l
'Gc hwa ,. dp,,4 h l! 6G&
m _ a g / %-
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\ l h,
. 44
?v=;O)w C W ? ,
a pa a;
j ABWR c: sign 0: cum:nt 2.15.10 Reactor Building i
Design Description The Reactor Building (R/ B) is a structure which houses and provides protection
- and support for, the reactor primarv systems. the primay containment and much of the plant ufety-related equipment. Figures 2.15.10a through 2.15.10o show the basic configuration and scope of the R/B*.
The R/B is constructed of reinforced concrete and structural steel with a steel frame and reinforced concrete roof. The R/B encloses the primary containment. The R/B slabs and fuel pool girders are integrated with the reinforced ohco.ncJre, e containment vessel (RCCV). The R/B slabs are supported by columnsgnd beams to carry vertical loads to ge basemat and transfer horizontalloads to either the RCCV or the R/B;..EEU' The R/B, together with the RCCV and the reactor pedestal, are supported by a common basemat.
- Inside the RCCV, the basemat is considered part of the Primary Containment System (PCS); outside the RCCV, the basemat is part of the R/B. The top of the R/B basemat is locatedh ilm below the finished grade elevation.
20.s The R/B is divided into three separate divisional areas for mechanical and electrical equipment and four divisional areas for instrumentation racks. Inter- ;
f divisional boundaries have the following features:
(1) Inter divisional walls, Doors, doors and penetrations which have three-hour fire rating.
(2) Watertight doors to prevent Gooding in one division from propagating
- to other divisions.
(3) Divisional walls in the basement are 0.6 meters thick or greaterb W-a 65*b # * * '" 5 o n Em ecy.nu3 Sde%5W*" M'"S Watertight doors ben;:: Ed dht!= have open/close sensors with status indication in the main control room.
4 The R/B flooding that results from component failures in any of the R/B divisions does not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor. The basement Door is the collection location point for all floods. The building configuration at this elevation is such that even for a flooding event involving release of the suppression pool water into the R/B, no more than one division of saferv-related equipment is affected. Except for the basement area, all safety-related electiical.
instrumentation and control equipment is located at least 20 cm above the Door surface.
- The overall building dimensions provided in Figures 2.15.10a through 2.15.10o are provided for information only and are not intended to be part of the certined ABh%
information. 1
.j. 2.15.10 g3 i
- n -. - . . - _ - . - -. ...
ABWR oasign 0: cum:nt
- The Re B is protected again>t external Good. The following design features are piovided
- -c W External walls below Good lesel are equal to or greater than 0.6 meters
'.j ,ig .
thick, + p re v ent ge#u n d wa!rer stepa gt..
c c j# C (2) Penetradons in the external walls below flood level are provided with
- j
-+ sj g-
- Good protection features.
j t t, The R/B is protected against the pressurization effects associated with ,
-t j f. f postulated rupture of pipes containing high<nergy fluid that occur in j p& 3 subcompanments of the R/B.
~it # .I The R/B is classified as Seismic Category I. It is designed to accommodate the v,p,
-f a dynamic and static loading conditions associated with the 5arious loads and load combinations which fonn the structural design basis. The loads are those i[5-] tEj f
associated wi'h: '
1 b51
- Natural phenomena including wind, Goods, tcenados, canhquakes, i @C 54- J C *, rain and snow.
0D = 'l~
7 . -r$
- Internal events including floods, pipe breaks and missiles.
T ,I*
O t c v
.j , 'p .,
- Nonnal plant operation including live loads, dead loads, temperature qcNy effects and building vibration loads.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria f
Table 2.15.10 provides a definidon of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with associated acceptance criteria, which will be undenaken for the R/B.
1 i
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l 2.15.10 i a,93 2-
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od oe bu r loc g if 5 Rw eo lai n di o1 o r s epn v et s sf a o t t wl glono i
s n 1 ns a eno . h nir r a nei nsu sg nqdlauibt e o2 hl t e on sd5 lo e t t p: c D c s b . at 1 r gio nn r i t ,
f i o g. t na r olaer r e vlise is cer o pmon isvt i n hh2g o insae detsh mf pi c m o Bi in e eol t
ao r agu Vva ExraP iai Bis cB/
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g Table 2.15.10 Reactor Building (Continued) l e i Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analysee Acceptance Criterie
- 9. The R/B is able to withstand the structural 9. A structural analysis will be performed 9. A structural analysis report exists which design basis loads as defined in Section which reconciles the as built date with concludes that the as-built IVE is able to 2.15.10. structural design basis as defined in withstand the structural design basis loads Section 2.15.10. as defined in Section 2.15.10.
N 8
8 I
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O N
5 5
4 46
.- . - _ - . _ 2 _ _ . _ . - - . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ - _ _ - . . _ . - _ _ - _ - - - . _ . _ . - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - --- -- - -- - - - _ . _ _ _ -- w.-- - --- __- - - - - _ _ -
.. ~. - :. . . _: _. _..
ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS
.h I
SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.11 TURBINE BUILDING l NRC COMMENT:
- 1. Design Description '
T. l
- a. The 3rd Paragraph: The phrase "not collapse under" should be replaced l by " withstand."
\\b? f' ,
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- V j'(
et? l r1l?yN 1,
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GE RESPONSE: gp The word ' Withstand" gives the expectation of no damage expected after an a SSE, which is not true. The turbine building is designed to UBC code zone 3, 7 thereby not colapse due to an SSE or tornado winds. Large deformations are allowed and expected.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO BER 1:
- 1. ,
2.
3.
~ ~ ^ ~
- -. : .. ._ _~ _ ..
\
l 4
I i
- ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS
~
/
/ '
SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.11 TURBINE BUILDING / -
i
,/ ,
lV .\
NRC COMMENT: / *'
{+
- 1. Design Description
- b. The design basis loads such as earthquake should be defined in the design description if they are different from those for the R/B and C/B.
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50 $
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GE RESPONSE: t -
The only licensing base commitment elevated to tier 1 is the colapse under SSE.
In march GEINRC decided that the structural design of the TB does not need to be tier 1. No change to Tier i required. ,
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
1.
2.
3.
4 l
. - - ~. .- ._
i ~~ j l
l i
ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS ,
SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.11 TURBINE BUILDING NRC COMMENT: 'N 1.
c.
Design Description A general description of the turbine building construction should be adde
(' \ '
L 0 '
to the design description. Without such a description, the intent of the basic fi uratidh eck (ITAAC #1)is vague. See comment 2a be go g
^
43
}py GE RESPONSE:
Nothing can be put into Tier 1 that is not in the SSAR. Since the only Q) :
commitment in the SSAR is for UBC zone 3 without a discussion as to material U or construction methods. This information can not be discussed in Tier 1. No ;
change in Tier 1 material required. The configuration check verifies the l' statements in the design description. An example is that the TB contains a turbine, a condenser and so on. t PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
e 1.
2.
3.
,c...- = _- _.
f ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS e SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.11 TURBINE BUILDING NRC COMMENT: ,
- 1. Design Description 7-
- d. The Design Description should include the Qajor codes and standards used in the design of the turbine building without $pecifiying the edition.
GE RESPONSE:
Only ASME is placed into Tier 1. Any code or standard referenced by Tier 1 places the code or standard into the federal register. ASME selected as being okay since 10CFR already elevated ASME to federal register. No additional codes or standards can be elevated to tier 1.
t PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
5.
/ .
2.
3.
l l
1
P I
TO NRC COMMENTS
)
l SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.11 TURBINE BUILDING A
NRC COMMENT:
- 1. Design Description 4
- e. Discuss function and location of condenser pit water level detectors (detects should be located above maximum anticipated water level. l i
GE RESPONSE:
Condenser pit water level sensors are part of the circulating water system t- ,J i (2.10.23). No changes required for the'MB ITAAC. g ; ;
A i s
p jY\p x' S :.^l ;
g& (
r
{-
y pJ' PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
3
/ ,g,S I,;h J
. V'
- 1. i
.i .
3 d 2.
3.
\
_ _ . - _- . _ _ _ _ . _ . - . . . -- +%., ,. __, , .,,,,2.y .,. 9 .,.-.._.,.,ag-gy,y --..e,.
.___a _._._ = . ~ _ . _ _ _;____,_ _ _____ _____ _
l l
- TO NRC COMMENTS SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.11 TURBINE BUILDING l NRC COMMENT: :
Design Description 1.
Discuss below grade tunnel (see reactor building comments above) l
- f. !
1
~
fl !
h GE RESPONSE:
The same discussion as in RB will be added to the TB design description. l e
i PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
l
- 1. A tunnel connects the radwaste, turbine, and reactor buildings for the liquid radwaste system piping. The penetrations from the tunnel to the turbine building will be water tight.
2.
3.
i i I
l J t I
,J 1
! ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES '
2 l
TO NRC COMMENTS .,.
4
- .. [
SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.11 TURBINE BUILDING l
( :
NRC COMMENT: f l 1. Design Description (dj' # {
} g. Discuss features to protect flooding between buildings above grade.
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GE RESPONSE: l 4
No protection features above grade outside the mainsteam tunnel provided
- except for floor drains. For floor drains see the drain system ITAAC (2.9.12). No changes to this ITAAC are needed. The only features of the mainsteam tunnel l is it opens into the TB condenser pit. This is rather obvious as the mainsteam tunnel follows the mainsteam lines. No change in Tier 1 is necessarry. -!
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i PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIEili:
1.
2.
a i 3.
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ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS !
SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.11 TURBINE BUILDING !
h j NRC COMMENT:
- 2. ITAAC r
- a. From reading the design description in Section 2.15.11, it is difficult to imagine what will be performed in the configuration chaeck of the TIB. A better description or drawing of the turbine building is needed for -
~-
conducting a configuration inspections.
3 i
b GE RESPONSE:
As was agreed in March meeting, no figures will be provided. The objective of the configuration check is to verify all committments in the design description are met. A figure is not necessarry to verify this. No changes to Tier 1 needed.
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TO NRC COMMENTS SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.11 TURBINE BUILDING i
NRC COMMENT: ,
- 2. ITAAC '
j b. The Design Commitment in ITAAC #2 should read "the T/B is designed to withstand the SSE loads."
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GE RESPONSE:
. The word " Withstand" gives the expectation of no damage expected fier an SSE, which is not true. The turbine building is designed by the UBC code, and to not colapse due to an SSE or tomado. Large deformations are allowed and expected. No changes to Tier 1 required.
1 l
I l
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
1.
2.
3.
ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS i SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.11 TURBINE BUILDING NRC COMMENT:
- 2. ITAAC
- c. Acceptance Criterion for ITAAC #2 should read "A structural analysis report exists which concluoes that the T/B will withstand the SSE loads."
' ~
GE RESPONSE:
The word ' Withstand" gives the expectation of no damage expected fier an SSE.
which is not true. The turbine building is designed by to UBC code zone 3, and therefore not colapse in an SSE or tomado wind. Large deformations are allowed and expect'ed. No changes to Tier i required.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER;1:
1.
2.
3.
ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.11 TURBINE BUILDING NRC COMMENT:
- 2. ITAAC
- d. The SSAR should discuss the scope of the structural analysis report for .
the turbine building if the as-built reconciliation for the turbine building is l to address a scope different than that for seismic category 1 buildings.
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GE RESPONSE:
The scope of the analysis report for SSE colapse has been added to the SSAR. !
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1 ABWR ossign Document 2.15.11 Turbine Building Design Description .
The Turbine Building (T/B) consists of a non-safetv-related turbine and electrical building that is located adjacent to the safety-related Seismic Categog I Control Building. The T/B houses the main turbine generator and other 1 I power conversion cycle equipment and auxiliaries. With the exception of instrumentation associated with monitoring of condenser pressure, turbine first- l d s# l hy2 stage pressure, turbine controlvalve oil pressure and stop valve position, there is no safety-related equipment in the T/B. The electrical building houses various l j g]3 Mj plant suppon systems and equipment such as non<ihisional switchgear and
-+ ep chillers.
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Flood conditions in the T/B are prevented from propagating into the Control
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( i5 Building (C/B) via the Service Building. This is achieved by locating the access 6
-5,y
- 'N P from the T/B to the S/B at or above grade level and providing a flood control ~
i
<c doorwa} at the access location. - :
v -
w at l 44)-i h .j The T/B is not classified as a Seismic Category I stmeture. However, the building is designed to not collapse under seismic loads corresponding to the safe j shutdown canhquake (SSE) ground acceleration.
g56
- s 7 . E __c 5 ,V , inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria l " ]D#~ -!'T Table 2.15.11 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses.
} p y#*
,C t , together with associated acceptance criteria which will be undenaken for the j
/ h i Turbine Building.
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l 2.15.11
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I Table 2.15.11 Turbine Building
$ Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections of the as-built structure will be 1. The es built T/B ::onforms with the basic The basic configuration of the T/B is 1.
- 1. configuration described in Section 2.15.11.
conducted.
described in Section 2.15.11.
- 2. A seismic analysis of the T/B will be 2. A structural analysis report exists which
- 2. The T/B does not collapse unde
- seismic concludes building collapse does not
' performed !
fonds. occur.
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- - ------- a ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS j z-SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME
- 2.15.13 RADWASTE BUILDING NRC COMMENT:
- 1. Design Description
- a. The basemat of the RW/B should also be classified as seismic Category 1.
Therefore, the three words "and the basemat" should be added to the first sentence of 3rd and 4th paragraphs after the word " grade".
GE RESPONSE:
C GE will the change ITAAC accordingly.
i l
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1: l 1
- 1. The three words "and the 'oasemat" will be added to the first sentence of 3rd and 4th paragraphs after the word " grade".
2.
3.
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. . . . ~ . . . -- . . _
1 I
TO NRC COMMENTS 3 SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.13 RADWASTE BUILDING I
i NRC COMMENT:
- 1. Design Description
- b. Load (1): Will the extemal walls below grade be designed for wind and tornados loads? Clarification is needed.
GE RESPONSE:
The radwaste building has monolithic exterior walls. Any shear force or moment applied cbove grade walls will be felt on the below grade walls by vertical forces.
These loads need to be accounted for in their design. No changes needed.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
1.
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2.
3.
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j ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES I
TO NRC COMMENTS q i f 4
SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.13 RADWASTE BUILDING l 1 :
l
] NRC COMMENT: ,
- 1. Design Description l l c. The design description should include the major codes and standards used in the design of the radwaste building without specifiying the edition.
i GE RESPONSE:
Only ASME is placed into Tier 1. Any code or standard referenced by Tier 1 places the code or standard into the federal register. ASME selected as being !
okay since 10CFR already elevated ASME to federal register. No additional codes or standards can be elevated to tier 1. ,
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
4 1.
2.
3.
ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS j SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.13 RADWASTE BUILDING l ,
l l i
l NRC COMMENT:
- 1. Design Description
- d. Discuss below grade tunnel (see reactor building comments above). i
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i GE RESPONSE: '
A discussion will be added to the design description similar to RB.
l l
PROPOSED CHANGES TO BER 1:
- 1. A tunnel connects the radwaste, turbine, and reactor buildings for the l liquid radwaste system piping. The penetrations from the tunnel to the turbine building will be water tight.
4 2.
3.
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., L ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES ,
l .
TO NRC COMMENTS -
l 1 - ,
i SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.13 RADWASTE BUILDING l 1 i j i i
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t '
e NRC COMMENT '
4 1. Design Description
- e. Discuss features to protect flooding between buildings above grade.
l 1)IL 4- !
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GE RESPONSE:
) The radwaste building is separated from other building in the main power ;
complex. No connections exist above grade to other buildings; therefore no i
- discussion is required for the radwaste building.
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i PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
- 1. /
2.
3.
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ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS l g:
A SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.13 RADWASTE BUILDING (
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NRC COMMENT: l
- 2. ITAAC g
- a. Design commitment for ITAAC #1: From reading the design description in ob section 2.15.13, ti is difficult to imagine what will be verified in the ( ,
configuration check for the RadWaste building. A description of the i building arrangement or drawing of the radwaste building needs to be provided. -
l l
GE RESPONSE: ,
Per GE/NRC discussion in march, it was agreed that no drawings would be provided for thr radwaste, turbine, or service building ITAAC's. The l configuration check is to verify that the radwaste building contains the liquid and '
solid radwaste systems as discussed in the design description. It is not to verify )
the structural adequacy of the design. That is performed by the structural I reconciliation report (ITAAC #2). No Tier 1 changes are required.
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i i I i ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES 4 TO NRC COMMENTS : 4 1 SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.13 RADWASTE BUILDING i i l 4 i NRC COMMENT: r ) 2. ITAAC i
- b. Since the basemat is also seismic category 1 item, add the words "and l
{ j the basemat" after the word " grade" in the design commitment for ITAAC l 2. . GE RESPONSE: - GE agrees to the change } y , i 4 1 ! l PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1: !
- 1. The three words "and the basemat" will be added to the first sentence of i 3rd and 4th paragraphs after the word " grade" l l
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- 2. ;
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ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES -5 TO NRC COMMENTS s i SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.13 RADWASTE BUILDING l NRC COMMENT: ) '
- 2. ITAAC
- c. In the design commitment for ITAAC #3: Replace the phrase "are desiged j
- to not collapse under" by the phrase "will withstand the". - i I
i GE RESPONSE: l The word ' Withstand" gives the expectation of no damage expected after an ! i SSE, which is not true. The turbine building is designed to UBC code zone 3, i thereby not colapse due to an SSE or tomado winds. Large deformations are allowed and expected. i
/
PROPOSED CHANGES TO BER 1: 1.
- 2. -
3.
l i i I ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES ! TO NRC COMMENTS 4 SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.13 RADWASTE BUILDING f NRC COMMENT: ,
- 2. ITAAC l
- d. In the acceptance criteria for ITAAC #3
- Replace the phrase " collapse does not occur under" by the phrase "will withstand the."
The last word " accelerator" should be "accleration". GE RESPONSE: The word ' Withstand" gives the expectation of no damage expected after an ) I SSE, which is not true. The turbine building is designed to UBC code zone 3, thereby not colapse due to an SSE or tornado winds. Large deformations are allowed and expected. The word " accelerator" will be replaced by " acceleration"
/
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
- 1. The word " accelerator" will be replaced by " acceleration."
2. 3.
ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES l TO NRC COMMENTS ; l SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.13 RADWASTE BUILDING 4 i 1 - NRC COMMENT: , 2. ITAAC ,
- e. The SSAR should discuss the scope of the structural analysis report for the radwaste building. [
i
,- r GE RESPONSE: ,/ ,
The scope of the structural analysis report has been added to the SSAR. No V)j/L changes to Tier i required. , t i PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1: i
- 1. /
- 2. l 3.
t
1 i l . l ABWR 0: sign 0: cum:nt i l 2.15.13 Radwaste Building \ i Design Description The Radwaste Building (RW/B) is a structure which houses the solid and liquid I r'adwaste treatment systems. The RW/B is classified as non-safety-related. l Flood conditions in the RW/B are prevented from propagating into the Reactor Building and Turbine Building by providing the penetrations in extemal walls l below flood level with flood protection features. l
- sad %s bastmd i The external walls of the RW/B below gradegre classified as Seismic Categog I. !
The exterior walls above grade, the floor slabs, the interior columns, and the l l roof are classified as non-seismic. s., d 4t bustmd l The external walls of the RW/B below grade gaccommodate the dynamic and ] static loading conditions associated with the various loads and load
~
combinations which form the stmetural design basis.The loads are those l l associated with: l (1) Natural phenomena including wind, floods, tornados, earthquakes, rain, and snow. 3 (2) Internal mocki=bding r.d floods. (3) Normal plant operations including live loads, dead loads, and temperature effects. The exterior walls above grade, the floor slabs, the interior columns, and the roof does not collapse under seismic loads corresponding to the safe shutdowTi earthquake (SSE) ground acceleration. Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.15.13 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses together with associated acceptance criteria which will be undertaken for the Radwaste Building. I
-1 2.15.13 5/20/93
I Table 2.15.13 Redweste Building ta
" inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptonce Criteria l
Design Commitment
- 1. The basic configuration of the RW/B is 1. Inspections of the as-built structure will be 1. The as-built RW/B conforms with the basic conducted. configuration in Section 2.15.13.
described in Section 2.15.13.
- 2. A structural analysis will be performed 2. A structural analysis report exists which
- 2. The externalwalls of the RW/B below grade are able to withstand the design which reconciles the as-built data with the concludes that the as built RW/B is able to structural design basis as defined in withstand the structural design basis loads basis loadings as defined in Section Section 2.15.13. as defined in Section 2.15.13. }
2.15.13.
- 3. The exterior walls above grade, the floor
- 3. A seismic analysis will be performed. 3. A structural analysis report esists which slabs, the interior columns, and the roof concludes building collapse does not occur under seismic loads corresponding to the are designed to not collapse under seismic loads corresponding to the SSE r;round SSE ground accelerators.
accelerations. h b n I 1: 4 , , e'
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i e r 1 4 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ ._ .______.m___.m_____________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ __ _ _ _ . _ . - . _ _ _ . - . ..,_c -- _. . . . - , __,_.m .
- c .. .
1 I I l ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES
. TO NRC COMMENTS y SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.14 SERVICE BUILDING l
l l NRC COMMENT:
- 1. Design Description l a. Discuss features to protect flooding between buildings above grade (e.g.
l from turbine building)
- YU l
GE RESPONSE: ; The ITAAC's for the service building is limited to those items that are required for l emergency planning, since the structure is not safety-related. In addition, since no features in the s.ervice building were given credit in the design basis flooding analysis. No discussion cant be added. No Tier 1 change required.
/
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
- 1. j
! 2. 3.
. I l
. l ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES
. TO NRC COMMENTS ;i SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.14 SERVICE BUILDING NRC COMMENT:
- 2. ITAAC
- a. It is unclear what will be inspected in the basic configuration check in ITAAC #1. The design description should describe the building arrangement or provide a description of the building attriburtes that need to be inspected.
3/& 4'
~
cf GE RESPONSE: b l All of the attributes that require checking have been provided in the design 4pf]/ ' description. They are the TSC is in the service building and the lunch room which serves as the OSC is in the service building. No other important to safety features exist inside the building. No changes to Tier 1 are required. 3
,) '
)'- ,
3 ,
- 1 PROPOSED CHANGES TO BER 1:
4 1. 2.
- 3. )
1 ! i r i i l l l l ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES l TO NRC COMMENTS y b SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.15.14 SERVICE BUILDING NRC COMMENT: !
- 2. ITAAC :
- b. The ABWR service building houses the support facilities related to emergency planning. Our review indicates that the proposed ITAAC are not adequate to ensure the EP-related support facilities would operate in ,
- accordance with the design certification. GE should provide ITAAC for en . ;
on-site Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center ; (OSC), and support facilites. ;
- uuq 3 _
GE RESPONSE: Of the EP-related fe,atures provided in the service building and based upon only ' ) bringing a subset of the features forward to Tier 1, the TSC and the OSC were brought forward. No additional features compare as in importanca to these two. i in additiori, a large percentage of the EP-related items for the ABWR are outside certification or outside the scope of thew building ITAAC (Communication 2.12.16)
/
l PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1: 1. t l 2.
- 3. !
I l-l
ABWR D: sign D: cum:nt 2.15.14 Service Building Design Description The Senice Building (S/B) is a structure which houses the Technical Support V Center, Emergency Operations Center, and the counting room.The S/B is classified as non-safety-related. It is located adjac e Control Building. 8 f*d accided. s*P1-'"J The S/B is not classified as a Seismic Category I structure. Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criterin Table 2.15.14 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses together with associated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the Turbine Building. l l
~TS C 0 20 C Ui i r7 ghgg Ts c3 s
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i l o l l 1 f I l 2.15.14 5/20/93 )
l Table 2.15.14 Service Building ia
" Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria ,
inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Cetterie Design Commitment The basic configuration of the S/B is 1. Inspections of the as-built structure will be 1. The as-built S/B conforrns with the basic 1. conducted. configuration described in Section 2.15.14. described in Section 2.15.14. l N
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b$- $ Qd ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS Structural Systems Task Groun r SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: B. SYSTEM SPECIFIC COMMENTS 2.15.12 Control Buildina NRC COMMENT:
- 1. Desian Descriotion
- a. Second Paragraph:
f- The third sentence should read Qlumns and walls carry vertical loads to the basemat."
)/- As previously discussed for the R/B (Comment 1.c), the ' ,
building embedment depth should be measured from the b, f ' e t ; bottom of the basemat to the finished grade rather than from ~f,v the top of the basemat.
. ... (Flc~ i J//- The measurement from,the bottom of the basemat should be ,
23.2m i 1m instead of 20.5mi 1m. GE RESPONSE: ("/ ; i- Agree to change 11- GE does not ceccur. The measurement was taken from the top l of the mat to allow for sloping sites or uneven sites as discussed in the March meeting. At th&t time it was agreed to the top of , mat measurement. The embedment depth of 20.5 selected as
/ being within the tolerances of not changing the safety conclusions, even though the seismic results may change. Any change from the PROPOSED C GES TO TIER 1: (continged on next page) 1--Pr ided changes are shown on the attached marked-up Design Description.
- 1. ii-None iii-None 1 !
l 3. 92
'~ , ,
1 l l l l GE 1J.SPONSE (ii) CONTINUED: , i design will be picked up by the design report addressed in ITAAC Table entry nu~.ber 13. iii - The 20.5 + im refers to the top of the basemat and will be retained per the above discussion. die 4
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ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS Structural Systems Task Group i
.t SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME:
B. SYSTEM-SPECIFIC COMMENTS , 2.15.12 Control Buildina NRC COMMENT:
- 1. Desion Descriotion
- b. The exterior wall thickness of 0.6m or greater is the requirement for water seepage only. Clarification is needed. 1
- \
GE RESPONSE: 2 will clarify design description. The sentence will read:
" External valls below flood level are equal to or greater than o.6m thick to prevent ground water seepage."
l PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1: j, GE will add the statement that 0.6m thick to prevent ground water seepage as shown on the attached marked up design description text.
- 2. .
l l l 3. l l. 93 ;
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- ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS Structural Systems Task Groun ;
SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: B. SYSTEM-SPECIFIC COMMENTS 2.15.12 Control Buildina NRC COMMENT: 1
- 1. Desian Descriotion ,
- c. The Design Description should include the major codes and standards used in the design of the control building without specifying i the edition.
l GE RESPONSE: 2 and NRC have previously agreed that only ASME is to be referenced j Tier 1. Any code or standard referenced by Tier 1 places the entire g ; code or standard into the federal register ar a codified part of the / { design certification rule. This.is unneessarily . restrictive and non- , compliance with any of the code previous (even'trival iters)-becomes , i Tier 1 non-compliance. Treatment of ASME in Tier 1 is considered l acceptable because entire 10CFR already elevates ASME to federal register. No a~dditional codes or standards should be elevated to Tier 1 per the easiest 2/NRC agreement. l 1 PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1: 1
- 1. i 2.
3. 94 l
l l ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS - l Structural Systems Task Groun 5 1 SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: B. SYSTEM-SPECIFIC COMMENTS 2.15.12 Control Buikfino NRC COMMENT:
- 1. Desion Descriotion
- d. Discuss function and location of water level sensors (in separate
- divisional areas and above maximum anticipated floor level .
(5 meters)]. , j'r GE RESPONSE: (,' l( The function and location of water level sensors and in the event that the raximum flood level of 5 meters occurs are discussed in the SSAR, Section 3.4.1.1.2.2. E believes the amount Tier 1 treatrent of C/B water level sensors is appropriate. The C/B design description states that sensors are provided in each division and will lead to indication of the RSW in the event of a flood involving RSW table entries can verify that the sensors have been provided. ; These sensors are not located above the maximum flood height of 5 meters. As discussed in SSAR Section 3.4.1.1.2.2 (Amend. 29), the maximum flood , height including 2 km of RSW piping is 5 meters. The sensors are located / at 1.5 m ro acation of this flood beyond the C/B division in which it (cont. ) PROPOSED C GES TO TIER 1: 1.
/
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3. 95 l I
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- ._ . ..-- _ _ _ _.m . . . . ._, . - _ . . . . _ _ _
r l I f C RESPONSE CONTINUED: l
! occurs is precluded by the water tight doors identified in the C/B design !
description and verified by ITAAC Table entry 4. j ; However, C agrees that the sensor elevation could be added to Tier 1. f The C/B design description will be changed to include the followings j j i "These sensors are located no higher than 1500mm above the C/B basement f j floor and these words will also be included as part of ITAAC table entry , l 1 number 8. ) l verification that the maximum flood height is in the C/B basement is equal to or less than 5m cannot be addressed by a design certification ITAAC f because it is dependent upon the. volume of water in the RSW System. This { system is larkly not within the certified design (it is a site-specific design feature). Section 2.11.9 ider.tifies an interface requirement (
~ that the water volume in the RSW System be conpatable with a C/B basement :
maximum flood height of 5 meters or less. Consequently, C believes that l
' the ITAAC to verify this flood height must be provided by the COL i applicant as part of his site-specific SSAR and Tier submittals for the l RSW System.
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ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS Structural Systems Task Groun , SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: B. SYSTEM-SPECIFIC COMMENTS l f 2.15.12 Control Buildino
/ 1I L i NRC COMMENT: f
- 1. D
_ esion Descriotion
- e. Discuss alarm for doors which serve as water and 3re boundary -
(needed for shutdown risk). l GE RESPONSE: 2 does not concur. During earlier 2/NRC discussion of the alarm scope, I and content of Tier 1 entries for buildings, it was decided that these ' alarms do not rerit Tier 1 treatment. (Status indication for the water 1 tight doors is addressed). i i l
\
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
/
- 1. NM
- 3. l I
96 l
- ~ ,v ,-- -, , e , , , , - -, ,.,, ,-
- ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES i TO NRC COMMENTS I Structural Systems Task Group i i f 1
SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: B. SYSTEM-SPECIFIC COMMENTS i d 2.15.12 Control Buikfino NRC COMMENT: Ni# (
- 1. Desian Descriotion
- f. Discuss features to protect flooding between buikiings above grade. ~ >
l GE RESPONSE: No discussion in SSAR on this subject. 'Iherefore, no discussion in Tier 1 can be rade. For inforration purposes, there are no rajor sources of water i outside the rainsteam tunnel above grade. Currently, no special features l are provided in the C/B system to address the issue of flooding between
- buildings. t i
I l 1 PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
- 1. rete /
- 2. k 3.
97
\
l
6 ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS - l Structural Systems Task Group r t SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: B. SYSTEM-SPECIFIC COMMENTS 2.15.12 Control Buildina NRC COMMENT:
- 2. Ficures 2.1512a throuch 2.15.120 Elevation view, Section A-A (Figure 2.15.12a) cannot be identified [
- a. :
- from the floor plans (Figures 2.15.12b through 2.15.12g). .
I GE RESPONSE: Plan view drawings will be up-dated to show section locations. [dd#
/ ;
i , t i l PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
- 1. Update plan view drawings to show section locations.
- 2. 1 l
3. 98
1 [ ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS Structural Systems Task Groun 4 d . SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: B. SYSTEM-SPECIFIC COMMENTS , 4 2.15.12 Control Buildina NRC COMMENT:
- 2. Feures 2.15.12a throuch 2.15.120
- b. The building orientation is not shown in the floor plans
- (Figures 2.15.12b through 2.15.12g). ,
p GE RESPONSE: Plan view drawings will be updated to show the building orientation.
}}J 3
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1: I
- 1. ppdate plan view drawings to show the building orientation.
- 2. E1 3.
l l 99
- aeC m
ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS Structural Systems Task Groun SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: B. SYSTEM-SPECIFIC COMMENTS 2.15.12 Control Buikiino NRC COMMENT:
- 2. Fioures 2.15.12a throuch 2.15.12a An elevation view (cross section) through the short dimension of the c.
building should be provided to show the relationship with the other . buildings, especially the gaps between this hvilding and the R/B and T/B to prevent pressurization. GE RESPONSE: zL<
+
An elevation view (section B-B) through the short dimension of the building will be provided. This additional C/B figures will address the issue of additional gaps between buildings.
/ l PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1: j
- 1. Pr p'de an elevation view (section B-B) through the short di m Qon of the building. The note addresses gaps.
2.
- 3. !
100 I
]
ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS Structural Systems Task Groun . SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: B. SYSTEM-SPECIFIC COMMENTS 2.15.12 Control Building NRC COMMENT: l
- 3. ITAAC
_ a. Design Commitment and Acceptance Criteria for ITAAC #1: , Figures 2.15.12a through 2.15.12g were not provided. 7jt
/
GE RESPONSE: Figures 2.15.12a through 2.15.12h have been provided. Due to SSAR change, the submittal e2 those figures were held up. l PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1: 4
- 1. m 2.
( 3. 101
ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS Structural Systems Task Groun SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: B. SYSTEM-SPECIFIC COMMENTS 2.15.12 control Buildino NRC COMMENT:
- 3. ITAAC
- b. Design Commitment and Acceptance Criterion for ITAAC #2 should read, "The bottom of the C/B basemat is located 23.2m i 1m below.
the finished grade." _ l GE RESPONSE: E does not concur. The measurement was taken from top of mat to allow for sloping sites or uneven sites as discussed in the March meeting. At that time it was agreed to the top of mat measurement. The embedment depth , of 20.,$m was selected 'as being within the tolerances of not changing the safety conclusions, even though the seismic results may change. Any g chan from the design will be picked up by the design report. 3 l PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
- 1. pon k
- 2. i i
3. I f 102
i ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS Structural Systems Task Group > SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: B. SYSTEM-SPECIFIC COMMENTS 2.15.12 Control Buikiina NRC COMMENT: i
- 3. ITAAC
- c. Add "against water seepage" to the end ot Design Commitment for
- ITAAC #10a. . ;g,p
- f GE RESPONSE:
ITAAC #10a will be changed to read:
" External walls below flood level are equal to or greater than 0.6m - to prevent ground water seepage."
PROPOSED CHANGES TO T1ER 1:
- 1. ITAAC #10a will be changed to read: " External walls below flood level are equal to or greater than O.6m to prevent ground water see .
- 2. i l
I 3. 103
i ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS Structural Systems Task Groun , i SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: B. SYSTEM. SPECIFIC COMMENTS 7 2.15.12 Control Buikiina i NRC COMMENT:
- 3. ITAAC (J' W Provide an ITAAC to verify the sensor location. j ;
- d. -
GE RESPONSE: Please see Item # 1.d Response for Explaination. ~ PROPOSED CHANGES TO T1ER 1: i 1 none. /
- 2. (
3. 104 so w= --- - m ---e r-- -w-- m_--
l l ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS i Structural Systems Task Groun ] l i SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME-B. SYSTEM-SPECIFIC COMMENTS 2.15.12 Control Buildino i NRC COMMENT:
- 3. ITAAC g ,til
- e. Provide an ITAAC to verify the door alarm function. .
GE RESPONSE: , Please see DD Item # 1.e. PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1: f None. f
- 2. (s !
3. 105
j - b ABWR Design oscum:nt i } 2.15.12 Control Building I Design Description ' i ( , l The Control Building (C/B) is a structure which houses and provides protection and support for plant control and electrical equipment, batteries, portions of the Reactor Building Cooling Water (RCW) System, and C/B heating, ventilating ! and air conditioning equipment. The C/B is located between the Reactor and Turbine Buildings. Figures 2.15.12a through 2.12.12gThow the basic [ configuration and scope of the C/B.* f The C/B is constructed of reinforced concrete and structural steel. The C/B is a shear-wall structure which accommodates seismic loads with its perimeter wally- l r and steam-tunnel walls, together with their supporting floors. Columns camf verticalloads to the basemat. The top of the C/B basemat is located 20.5m im below the finished grade elention. The C/B, except for the main control area envelope, is dhided into three i separate divisional areas for mechanical and electrical equipment and four divisional areas for instrumentation and control equipment (including batteries). Interdhisional boundaries have the following features: (1) Interdivisional walls, floors, doors and penetrations which have three-hour fire rating. (2) Watertight doon to prevent flooding in one division from propagating i to other dhisions. t 1 (3) DiGsional walls in the basement are 0.6m thick or greater. The main control area envelope is separated from the rest of the C/B by walls, 3 floors, doors and penetrations which have three-hour fire rating. Watertight doors between flood dhisions have open/close senson with status indication in the main control room. The C/B floodmg that results from component failures in any of the C/B divisions does not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor.The basement floor is the collection point for floods. Except for the basement and main control area envelope, safety related electrical equipment and instrumentation and control equipment is located at least 20 centimeten above the Door surface. Level sensors are located in the basement area of each of the three mechanical dhisions.These sensors send signals to the corresponding divisions of the ugh ) ar ovided
- The overall building dimensions provided in Figur for information only and are not intended to be part of the cerified ABWR information.
2.15.12
-1 5/1&S3 .
* ' " + ' " - ._y , ,_
- i
^
ABWR 0: sign oscuant 1 Reactor Senice Water (RSW) System indicating flooding in that division of the ' C/B. ?>}P.r2 J@30r.C 0,rt /0C0049' /Jo 4sy6At' WAo /800 /7/2 OAcv2 :r%g CM &JVodflooC The basement area level sensors are powered from their respective divisional Cl us 1 E power supply. Independence is provided between the Class 1E divisions for these sensors and also between the Class IE divisions and non Class IE ' equipment. To protect the C/B against an external flood.The following design features are prosided: (1) External walls below flood level are equal to or greater than 0.6m thick ' do Art M y M W W W W Y . j i (2) Penetrations in the external walls below flood level are provided with flood protection features. j
'~ Within the C/B, the steam tunnel has no penetrations from the steam tunnel . '
into other areas of the C/B.The concrete thickness of the steam tunnelwails, floor and ceiling within the C/B are equal to or greater than 1.6m. The C/B is classified as Seismic Category I. It is designed to accommodate the I dynamic and static loading conditions associated with the various loads and load combinations which form the structural design basis. The loads are those associated with: l (1) Natural phenomena, including wind, floods, tornadoes, earthquakes, rain and snow. (2) Internal events, including fires, floods, pipe breaks and missiles. (3) Normal plant operation, including live loads, dead loads and temperature effects. The steam tunnelis prote cted against pressurization effects that occur in the steam tunnel as a result of postulated rupture of pipes containing high energy fluid. Inspections, Teets, Analyses and Acceptance Criterls Table 2.15.12 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with associated acceptance criteria, which will be undenaken for the Control Building. 1 I 2.15.12
-2 5/18/93 i
=_. _ - _ . - . . ._. . -._
I Table 2.15.12 Control Building [b inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment ' g n:h, Tests, Ano6yses l Inspections of the as-built structure will be 1. The as built C/B conforms with the basic
- 1. The basic configuration of the C/B is shown 1.
conducted, configuration shown on Figures 2.15.12a on Figures 2.15.12e through 2.15.1 6, theough 2.15.128/. /
- 2. The top of the C/B basemat is located
- 2. Inspections of the as built structure will be
- 2. The top of the C/B basemat is located 20.5mi1m below the finished grade 20.5mi1m below the finished grado conducted.
elevation. elevation.
- 3. The as-installed walls, floors, doors and
- 3. Inter-divisional wells, floors, doore and 3. Inspections of the as-installed inter.
penetrations that form the inter-divisional penetrations in the C/B have a three-hout divisional boundaries will be conducted. boundaries have a three-hour fire rating. fire reting.
- 4. The as-built C/B has walls and watertight
- 4. Inspections of the as-built walls, and doors
- 4. The C/B has divisional areas with nets and doors as shown on Figures 2.15.12e
_1%F,t doors as shown on Figures will be conducted. theough 2.15.12eN/. 2.15.12e through 2.15.12$. Inspections of the as-built structure will be 5. The as-built C/B has a main controf area
- 5. The main control aren envelope is 5. envelope separated from the rest of the C/B conducted, ia r
separated from the rest of the C/B by walls, by walls, floors, doors and penettstions floors, doors and penetrations which have which have a three-hour fire rating. a three-hour fire rating.
- 6. Displays exist or can be retrieved in the
' 6. Main control room displays provided for 6. Inspections will be performed on the main control room displays for the C/B. main control room as defined in Section the C/B are as defined in Section 2.15.12. 2.15.12.
- 7. Except for the basemat and main control
- 7. Except for the basemat and main control 7. Inspections will be conducted of the ' as- area envelope, safety related electrical area envelope, safety-related electrical built equipment.
equipment and instrumentation, and equipment and instrumentation, mod conte 01 equipment is located at least 20 cm control equipment is located at least 20 cm. above the floor surf ace. above the floor surface.
- 8. Inspections of the as-built equipment will 8. Level sensora are located in the basement
- 8. Level eensors are located in the basement area of each of the three mechanical be conducted.
76Mf M1f0/$ CV"6 area of each of the three mechanical divisions. divisions. %WP JMO/:f CVT /O YO' NO b'fEf b*0 DOW s
/D C W eW /)O hiphgr that) '
Goo % c\6 care 16e c/4
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~
r
t Table 2.15.12 Control Building (Continued) 3 5
= Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria inspectlens, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Sa, Tests will be conducted on the as-built 9a. The test signal exists only in the Class 1E
- 9. For the basement area level sensors, division under test.
sensors by providing a test signal in only independence is provided between the one Class 1E division at a time, Class 1E divisions for these sensors and also between the Class 1E divisions and 9b. Inspections of the as-installed Class IE Sb. Physical separation exists between Class non-Class 1E equipment. 1E divisions. Physical separation exists divisions will be conducted. between these Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E equipment.
- 10. The C/B is protected against extemal floods
- 10. The C/B is protected against externel floods 10. Inspections of the as-built structure will be by having:
conducted. by having: a) External walls below flood level that h are equal to or greater than 0.6m. a) Extemel wolle below flood are equel to or grooter then O.64.y d'O A/#fMpN Mr89$00[. b) Providing penettations in the external b) Providing penetrations in the extemet walls below flood level with flood wells below flood levelwith flood protection features. l protection features,
- 11. Within the C/B, the steam tunnel has no
- 11. Inspections of the as-built structure will be b 11. Within the C/B, the steem tunnel has no penetrations from the steam tunnelinto penetrations from the steam tunnelinto conducted.
other areas of the C/B. other stees of the C/B.
- 12. Inspections of the as-built structure will be 12. The concrete thickness of the steam tunnel
- 12. The concrete thickness of the steem tunnel walls, floor and ceiling within the C/B are walls, floor and ceiling within the C/B are conducted.
i equal to or greater than 1.6m. equel to or greater then 1.6m.
- 13. A structural analysis report exists which
- 13. A structural analysis will be perfqrmed
- 13. The C/B is able to withstand the structural which reconciles the as-built data with concludes that the as-built C/B is able to design basis loads as defined in Section withstand the structural design basis loads i structural design basis as defined in 2.15.12. as defined in Section 2.15.12.
Section 2.15.12. i .; % l 4 4 b h a N i 5
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1 ! ABWR Dasion orcum:nt f 2.14 Containment and Environmental Control Systems - 2.14.1 Primary Containment System ; Design Description f '
- 't.
The Primary Containment System (PCS) encompasses: - (1) A reinforced concrete containment stmcture with an intemal steel liner. The stmeture includes various penetrations, equipment hatches and personnel access locks. Stmctures inside the primary containment which partition the b b ) (2) containment $nto dqwell and wetwell regions, provide equipment 1 support, radiation protection, and components for operation of the ; l /# ABWR pressure suppression containment. l > r - l
. M Figure 2.14.1 shows the basic configuration and scope. _ i
/ MW$ '
A The steellined reinforced concrete containment stmcture- AM = a b reinforced concrete basemat provides the primary containmeptpressurqbaniergj,, and is M ASME Code Section III, Division 2fYhe Reaciiir Pressure ~F7d,'H Vessel (RPV) suppon pedestal and a diaphragm floor partition the containmen volume into dnwell and wetwell regions. The RPV suppon pedestal is asteel 1 44 5 L h. structure &ith concretq6ii mueriaidhe diaphragm floor is a reinforced concrete structure. Other major internal structures within the containment are 4 l the reactor shield wall, lower drywell personnel and equipment access tunnelsM sM/' and the drywell equipment and piping suppon structhre. These internal *"", i l structures are steel fabrications. Penetrations through the containment pressure boundary include; the drywell head closure, equipment hatches to both upper and lower drywell regions, personnel locks into upper and lower drywells, a combined personnel access and equipment hatch into the wetwell and piping and electrical penetrations. Thesej gy gIE, Code gg pressure boundary appunenances are steel uim o Jw= ' == Section III, Division 1, Class MC. %M The containment design pressure is 3.16 kg/cm2 8.The design temperatures for i the drywell and the enc!! : 171 *C and 104 *C respectively.The maximum { calculated pressures and temperatures for the design basis accident are less than these design conditions.The primary containment pressure boundary including penetrations and isolation valves, has a leak rate equal to or less than 0.5% per day of the containment gas mass at the maximum calculated containment pressure for the desi basis accident. fd af-.< > p ~ d) :&, ca C,,yA..Ia..uu.+ s*Vf u ~ d** e&u.pu"A
- 'd' N' A}' ""
_ un u - i om u.> . _,_ ,_,,
ABWR D: sign occum:nt i The reinforced concrete diaphra oor separating the upper drywell and the wetwell gas spaces, has a steel lin plate on the underside. The design
- differential pressure of the diaphragm floor between dowell and werwell isi.76 k kg/cm 2in the downward direction.
The RPV pedestal forms the lower drywell region and consists 8 drical 5 y} composite steel structure. It is anchoredG the basemat and supports the RPV g
-g-p,, through a support ring girder. The pedestal also supports the reactor shield wall.
The pedestal consists of two concentric steel cylindersjoined together radially by l l vertical steel diaphragms and filled with concrete. The pressure suppression ;
}N d e.
venting paths are an integral part of the pedestal structure. This includes: a) the ducts which interconnect the lower and upper drywell regions, b) the vertical l (j,p, downcomers from the interconnecting ducts to the horizontal vents, and c) the - p horizontal vents that direct steam into the suppression pool. ; Vacuum relief between the drywell volumes and the wetwell gas space is provided l k-by vacuum breaker valves on piping sleeves penetrating the pedestal wall. Eight' j l 4(WXf-normally closed swing check valves with nominal diameter of 500 mm are . kg4 provided. The water volume in the suppression pool including the vents is equal to or l greater than 3,580 m3 . The horizontal center line of the SRVDL quencher arms l are located at or below the elevation of the center row of horizontal vents in the : I s suppression pool. ; Water return paths connect the region within the pedestal to the vertical downcomers and horizontal vent paths. At least one meter of corium protection l fill concrete is provided on the lower dowell floor. Thermally activated flooding valves are also located in this region. ., The following PCS components are classified as Seismic Category I; the W5@ reinforced concrete containment structure, the dowell head,(equipment * " > hatches to both upper and lower dowell regions, personnel locks into upper and q lower dowells, the combined personnel access and equipment hatch into the j 1 werwell, the basemat, the reactor pedestal,pd containment isolation valves together with their penetrations. sL'arl inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.14.1 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with the associated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the Primary Containment System. 6/18/93 -2 2.101
ABWR ossign occum:nt
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t Figure 2.14.1 Primary Containment System 6/18/93 -3 2.14.1
( I 3 Table 2.14.1 Primary Containment Cystem 5 Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment R; : f .- :, Tests. .";_L _ Acceptance Crtteria
- 1. The basic configuration of the PCS is as 1. Inspections of the as-built system will be 1. The as-built PCS conforms with the basic shown on Figure 2.14.1. conducted. configuration shown on Figure 2.14.1.
- 2. The ASME Code pressure boundary 2. A structural integrity test (SIT) will be 2. The results of the SIT of the pressure components of the PCS retain their conducted on the pressure boundary boundary components conform with the integrity under internal pressures that will components of the PCS per ASME Code requirements of the ASME Code, be experienced during service. requirements.
- 3. The maximum calculated pressures and 3. Analyses of the design basis accident will 3. The maximum calculated pressures and temperatures for the design basis accident be performed using as-built PCS date. temperatures are less than design are less than design conditions. conditions
- 4. The primary ccetainment pressure 4. An integrated leak rate test of the as-built 4. The primary containment pressure boundary including penetrations and primary containment will be conducted, boundary including penetrations and isolation valves has a leak rate equal to or isolation valves has a leak rate equal to or less than 0.5% per day of the containment less than 0.5% per day of the containment gas mass at the maximum calculated gas mass at the maximum calculated containment pressure for the design basis containment pressure for the design basis accident. accident.
- 5. The design differential pressure of the 5. An SIT will be conducted of the as-built 5. An SIT report exists concluding that the as-diaphragm floor between the drywell and diaphragm floor with the drywell pressure built diaphragm floor is able to withstand wetwellis 1.76 kg/cm2 in the downward greater than wetwell pressures by 1.15 the design differential pressure.
direction. , times the design differential pressure l 6. The water volume in the suppression pool 6. Analyses of the as-built PCS will tg 6. The water volume in the suppression pool 3 including the vents is equal to or greater performed. including the vents is equal to or greater than 3580 m3. than 3500 m3. i I 7. The horizontal center line of the SRVDt. 7. Inspections of the as-built SRVDL 7. The horizontal center line of the SHVDt. ! quencher arms are located at or below the quenchers will be conducted. quencher arms are located at or below the ! elevation of the center row of horizontal elevation of the center row of horizontal ! vents in the suppression pool. vents in the suppression pool.
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,o ABWR Design Document 4 4 1 2.15.10 Reactor Building '
- Design Description l Re Reactor Building (R/B) is a structure which houses and provides protection :
i and support for[the reactor primary systems, the primary containment and l much of the plant safety-related equipment. Figures 2.15.10a through 2.15.10o j show the basic configuration and scope of the R/B*. a ne R/B is constructed of reinforced concrete and structural steel with a steel frame and reinforced concrete roof. The R/B encigrim pt 3 j l containment. The R/B slabs and fuel pool girders are wi r g.,r the :g K Y l' b' # reinforced concrete containment vessel (RCCV) The R/B slabs columns-- - 2 6---To carry vertical loads to the basemat and transfer pported sbg' l I orizontal loads assidser the RCCVYthe R/B, shear wallsifK/ a, Ma chitn the RUCV and the reactor DedestaL are suDDorted by a Common basemat i Inside the RCCV, the basemat is considered part of the Primary Containtnent l System (PCS); outside the RCCV, the basemat is part of the R/B. The ofthe ! R/B basemat is located Om ilm below the finished gradG- ~- A 4,A, l ss,7m l The R/B is divided into three separate divisional areas for mechanical and elecuical equipment and four divisional areas for instrumentation racks. Inter- i divisional boundaries have the following features: (1) Inter divisional walls, floors, doors and penetrations which have three- I hour fire ratmg. (2) Watertight doors to prevent flooding in one division from propagating l to other divisions. - tI (3) Divisional walls in the basement are 0.6 meters thick or greater [ h4 g . Watertight doors between flood divisions have open/close sensors with status indication in the main control room. He R/B flooding that results from component failures in any of the R/B divisions does not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor. The basement floor is the collection Wpoint for all floods. The building configuration at this elevation is such that even for a floodmg event invohing release of the suppression pool water into the R/B, no more than one division of safety-related equipment is affected. Except for the basement area, all safety-related electrical, instrumentation and control equipment is located at least 20 cm above the floor surface.
- The overaD building dunensions provided in Figures 2.15.10m through 2.15.10o are provided for irdormation only and are not intended to be pan of the cenified ABWR infonnation.
Ws/93 -1 2.15.10
i i ABWR Design Document
- ' The R/B is protected against external Good. The following design features are ;
provided: (1) External walls below Good level are equal to or greater than 0.6 meters i thicksf LarM-l l (2) Penetrations in the extemal walls below flood level are prmided with j flood protection features. The R/B is protected against the pressurization effects associated with postulated mpture of pipes containing high-energy Guid that occur in subcomparunents of the R/B. , The R/B is classiSed as Seismic Category I. It is designed to accommodate the l l dynamic and static loading conditions associated with the various loads and load ; i combinations which form the structural design basis. The loads air those - l associated with: - j
- 0A'e% MO)A Natural phenomena including wind, floods, tomadofharthquakes, rain and snow. i
;PL3 [
- Internaleventsincludin < es, floods, pipe breaks and missiles.
Normal plant operation including live loads, dead loads, temperature effects and building vibration loads. ! Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria 1 1 ! Table 2.15.10 provides a dermition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, . l together with associated acceptance criteria, which will be undenaken for the R/B. l l I l l
#8/93 2.15.10
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- 1. DIMENSIONS ARE IN mm UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED.
Figure 2.15.10b Reector Building Arrangement--Section S B 4%53 4 2.15.10
ABWR oesign Document 1 e
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- 1. DIMENSIONS ARE IN mm UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED.
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Figure 2.15.101 Reactor Building Arrangement Floor 3F-Elevation 23500 mm
-14 2.15.10 4/Rf93
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p NJw S,',,ee .L 4,lMf.;ef A % d ~~A d> A*.; f,.4 ~y*L set b~ " 7 Table 2.15.10 Reactor Building g Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspectlene, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criterie
- 1. The boele configuration of the IVB le shown 1. Inspections of the ee-built structure will be 1. The es-built R/B conforms with the be-ic on Figures 2.15.10e through 2.15.10o. conducted. configuration shown in Figuree 2.15.10e through 2.15.10o.
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- 2. Thetopot the R/B beoemet le located 2. # Inspections of the as-built structure will be 2. ThetDPof the R/B beoemet le located
$5milm below the finlohed grade, conducted. as.7h,25mi1m below the finlohed grade .
.m1=uvu.r uneysuon.1
- 3. Inter-divletonal wolle, floore, doore end 3. Inspections of the as-Instelled inter- 3. The as-Instelled wolle, floore doors and penetratione in the R/B have a three-hour divlelonel bounderles will be conducted. penetratione that form the Inter-divletonal fire reting. bounderles have a three-hour fire retir.g.
- 4. The R/B hoe divisionel erees with welle. 4. Inspectione of the as-built wolle, wetettight 4. The so-built R/B hoe wolle, watertight doore watertight doors and elite es shown on doore end sills will be conducted and ellis as shown on Figures 2.15.10e Figures 2.15.10e through 2.15.10o.
theough 2.15.10o.
^
, 5. Mein control room displays provided for 5. Inspections will med on the mein 5. Displays exlet or een be retrieved in the
, iji the R/B are os defined in Section 2.15.10. control room displays for the R/B. moln control room es defined in Section 2.15.10.
- 6. A flooding event involving releeos of 6. Inspections will be conducted of the 6. Penetrations (except for watertight doore) suppreselon pool water does not effect divlelonel bounderles shown on Figure in the divisional wolle are et least 2.5 m more then one division of eefety-related 2.15.10c. above the floor level of -8200mm.
equipment. '
- 7. Except for the beoemet eres, enfety-related 7. Inspections will be conducted of tid es- 7. Except for the beoemet eren, safety.related electrical, instrumentation, and control built equipment. electrical, Instrumentation, and control
- equipment le located at leest 2C cm. above equipment is located at least 20 cm above the floor surface. the floor surface. m
- 8. The R/B le protected egelnet externel floods. 8. Inspections of the as-built structure will be 8.
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. el External wolle below flood level th , ! g Externel wolle equel to or below greater thenflood level are 0.6 meters are equelgor greater then 0.6mbnd b) Provieng penetratione in the external W
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NI thick.
. / b) Penetrations in the external walle wolle below flood level with flood -
- below flood level are provided with protection features.
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/ / flood protection features.
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f s Table 2.15.10 Reactor Building (Continued) Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criterie Nien cenwnstm.nt sn.,e.,fone, Te, ". .. , = Ace.ptence crit.de
- 9. The R/8 le oble to withstand the structural 9. A structural analysis will be performed 9. A structural analysis report exists which design basis loeds as defined in Section which reconciles the as-built data with concludes that the as built R/B is abie to 2.15.10. structural design basis as defined in withstand the structural design basis loeds Section 2.15.10. as defined in Section 2.15.10.
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l l ABUR DESIGN CERTIFICATION: DISPOSITION CF FUNCN LIST ITEMS l FROM THE JANUARY AND MARCH 1993 CE/NRC TIER 1/ITAAC REVIEWS l l l SYSTEM: 2.15.10 Reactor Building PUNCH LIST ITEM: 5. Load drop considerations addressed by Cranes and Hoists ITAAC (2.15.3). i CE DISPOSITION: Load drop considerations will be addressed in the Cranes and Holsts Tier 1 entry 2.15.3. The + approach will be procedural in that acceptable load paths will be defined and load movements constrained within gfrs) acceptable paths. , du t r e,.a . j s , 4 SECT 10Nste 57 E ___m-m .m- . - - - - - - - n w rv , . .-r - - m-- . s , - ,. - __ - ..._ . . - - ,- + - _ - ,-. --.._,------_ . ___ , _.- r,, . . . . - -
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i t ABWR Design Document ! i ! i . 1 !
! 2.15.11 Turbine Building ;
J q ^ Design Description l a . lt The Turbine Building (T/B) consists of a nondety-related turbine and l ] ! electrical building that is located adjacent to the safety-related Seismic Category I Control Building. The T/B houses the main turbine generator and other l 4 power conversion cycle equipment and auuliaries. With the exception of , i instrumentation associated with monitoring of condenser pressure, turbine rust- ' stage pressure, turbine control valve oil pressure and stop valve position, there is no safety-related equipment in the T/B. The electrical building houses various plant support systems and equipment such as non<lhisional switchgear and j ! chillers. i i ' j Flood condiuons m the T/B are prevented from propagating into the Control Building (C/B) via the Senice Building. This is achieved by locating the access, ; from the T/B to the S/B at or above grade level and providing a flood control l doorway at the access location. l
-to w IN&
a Seismic Category I structure. However, the building M'irhe T/ Bis not classifie
,' is designedM.. : 1; -= der keismic loads corresponding to the safe '
shutdown earthquake (SSE) ground acceleration. i' Inspections Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria . Table 2.15.11 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with associated acceptance criteria which will be undertaken for the Turbine Building. i NB,93 -1 2.15.11
r' i .
- Tacle 2.15.11 Turbine Building d
Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspectione, Tests, Anolysee Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The basic configuration of the T/B is 1. Inspections of the as-built structure will be 1. The as-built T/B conforms with the basic described in Section 2.15.11. conducted. configuration described in Section 2.15.11.
&.kl N /c4 J d Ss G 2. A structural analysis report exists which
- 2. The T/B du uCI g&&_inder solamic 2. A seismic analysis of the T/B will be performed concludesidb ="== -^cc --
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i 1 l ABWR oesign Docunant l 2.15.12 Control Building Design Description The Control Building (C/B) is a stnicture which houses and provides protection and support for plant control and electrical equipment, batteries, portions of the Reactor Building Cooling Water (RCW) System, and C/B heating, ventilating and air conditioning equipment. The C/B is located between the Reactor and Turbine Buildings. Figures 2.15.12a through 2.12.12g show the basic configuration and scope of the C/B.* The C/B is constructed of reinforced concrete and structural steel. The C/B is a shear-wall structure whigogmodates seismic loads with its perimeter wallg and steam-tunnel walls, we.ML their supporting floors. Columns (carry ' ! vertical loads to the basemat. The@ of the C/B basemat is located IIDmilm below the finished grade elevation.4 T2 ] Srti y - The C/B, except for the main control area cEveione, is divided into three separate divisional areas for mechanical and 'el'e c'tri' cal equipment and four j divisional areas for instnimentation and control equipment (including l batteries). Interdivisional boundaries have the following features: I I (1) Interdivisional walls, floors, doors and penetrations which have three- ]
~ hour fire rating.
(2) Watertight doors to prevent flooding in one division from propagating to other divisions.
'(3) Divisional walls in the basement are 0.6m thick or greater A=/7 -
The main control area envelope is separated from the rest of the C/B by walls, floors, doors and penetrations which have three-hour fire rating. Watertight doors between flood divisions have open/close sensors with status indication in the main control room. The C/B flooding that results from component failures in any of the C/B divisions does not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor. The basement floor is , the collection point for floods. Except for the basement and main control area i l envelope, safety-related electrical equipment and instrumentation and control equipment is located at least 20 centimeters above the floor surface. Level . sensors are located in the basement area of each of the three mechanical ! divisions. These sensors send signals to the corresponding divisions of the
- The overall building dimensions provided in Figures (later) through (later) are provided for inforrnation only and are not intended to be part of the certified ABWR information.
5/18/93 1- 2.15.12 l h
ABWR Design Docum:nt - Reactor Senice Water (RSW) System indicating flooding in that division of the C/B. l The basement area level sensors are powered from their respective divisional Class 1 E power supply. Independence is provided between the Class 1E dhisions for these sensors and also between the Class IE divisions and non Class IE equipment. i To protect the C/B against an external flood.The following design features are prosided: (1) External walls below flood level are equal to or greater than 0.6m thickp g , (2) Penetmtions in the external walls below flood level are provided with ! flood protection features. Within the C/B, the steam tunnel has no penetrations from the steam tunnel into other areas of the C/B. The concrete thickness of the steam tunnel walls, floor and ceiling within the C/B are equal to or greater than 1.6m. The C/B is classified as Seismic Category I. It is designed to accommodate the dynamic and static loading conditions associated with the various loads and load ; combinations which form the structural design basis. The loads are those ! 4 associated with: i (,nhdiny miss!!eJ} (1) Natumi phenomena, including wind, floods, tornadoey earthquakes, rain and snow. l . 1 l (2) Internal events, including fires, floods, pipe breaks and missiles. . (3) Normal plant operation, including live loads, dead loads and j temperature effects. 7
,& kL- We a Z W&ra A WI U Yo>b a The steam tunnel is prot ctedVgainst pressurization effects that occur in the steam tunnel as a result of postulated mpture of pipes containing high energy fluid.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.15.12 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with associated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the Control Building. l 5/18/93 -2 2.15.12 l l _ -- _
$ T;.bla 2.15.12 C:ntr:I Building Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The basic configuration of the C/B is shown 1. Inspections of the as built structure will be 1. The as-built C/B conforms with the basic on fjg u rnajL15.12a_th r o ugW5J2g._, cor'1 ducted. configuration shown onfigurgs_M2a_.
w .4 f .L . Mu 20 -
- 2. The t'ch the C/B basemat is located 2. Inspections of the as-built structure will be 2. ThelMof the C/B basemat is located M.2. c2cmi1m below the finished grade, conducted. 23.a. titsmi1m below the finished grade.
. Tleveisav-
- 3. Inter-divisional walls, floors, doors and 3. Inspections of the as-installed inter- 3. The as-installed walls, floors, doors and penetrations in the C/B have a three-hour divisional boundaries will be conducted. penetrations that form the inter-divisional fire rating. boundaries have a three-hour fire rating.
- 4. The C/B has divisional areas with walls and 4 Inspections of the as-built walls, and doors 4. The as-built C/B has walls and watertight watertight doors as shown on.Etgures. will be conducted. doors as shown on.Eiguras1_1512a g2m thmunhM5.12g h6
- 5. The main control area envelope is 5. Inspections of the as-built structure will be 5. The as-built C/B has a main control area y separated from the rest of the C/B by walls, conducted. envelope separated from the rest of the C/B floors, doors and penetrations which have by walls, floors, doors and penetrations ,
~
a three-hour fire rating. which have a three-hour fire rating.
- 6. Main control room displays provided for 6. Inspections will be performed on the main 6. Displays exist or can be retrieved in the the C/B are as defined in Section 2.15.12. ct,ntrol room displays for the C/B. main control room as defined in Section j m ihE b e @ %
- 7. f,reegt c fgtthtttLasntuaCladgl t htcontroL 7. Inspections will be conducted of the as-
- 7. Jrgepj.for the basemat and main control arg(erivelong, safety-related electrical built equipment. , area envelope, safety-related electrical equipment and instrumentation, and equipment end instrumentation, and (
control equipment is located at least 20 cm. control equipment is located at least 20 cm above the floor surface. above the floor surface.
- 8. Level sensors are located in the basement 8. Inspections of the as-built equipment will 8. Level sensors are located in the basement area of each of the three mechanical be conducted. area of each of the three mechanical divisions. divisions.
e h
( t 3 Tchb 2.15.12 Cantrzl Cullding (Ccntinued) 5 w Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criterie
- 9. For the basement area level sensors, 9a. Tests will be conducted on the as-built 9a. The test signal exists only in the Class 1E
, independence is provided between the sensors by providing a test eignal in only division under test. Class 1E divisions for these sensore and one Class 1E division at a time.
- also between the Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E equipment. 9b. Inspections of the as-installed Class 1E 9b. Physical separation exists between Class divisions will be conducted. 1E divisions. Physical separation exists
, between these Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E equipment.
- 10. The C/B is protected against external floods, 10. Inspections of the as-built structure will be 10. The C/B is protected against extemal floods
- etVMaving
onducted. by having: a) External walls below flood level that a) Extemal walls below flood level that are equal to or greater than 0.Sm. .LA qp . . are equal to or greater than 0.6m.
- b) Providing penetrations in the exte nel b) Providing penetrations in the extemal walls below flood level with flood walls below flood level with flood
- (protectionleatutes. protection features.
b 11. Within the C/B, the steam tunnel has no 11. Inspections of the as-built structure will be 11. Within the C/B, the steam tunnel has no i penetrations from the steam tunnel into conducted. penetrations from the steam tunnel into other areas of the C/B. other areas of the C/B. s i
- 12. The concrete thickness of the steam tunnel 12. Inspections of the as-built structure will be 12. The concrete thickness of the steam tunnel
! walls, floor and ceiling within the C/B are conducted. walls, floor and ceiling within the C/B are . equal to or greater than 1.6m. equal to or greater than 1.6m.
- 13. The C/B is able to withstand the structural 13. A structural analysis will be performed 13. A structural analysis report exists which
- design basis loads as defined in Section which reconciles the as-built data With concludes that the as-built C/B is able to l
- 2.15.12. structural design basis as defined in withstand the structural design basis loads ( ,
Section 2.15.12. as defined in Section 2.15.12.
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i ABWR 0: sign Docum:nt 2.15.13 Radwaste Building Design Description W" --->The Radwaste Building (RW/B) is a structure which houses the solid and radwaste treatment s); stems. The RW/B is classified as non-safety-related. Flood conditions in the RW/B are prevented from propagating into the Reactor Building and Turbine Building by providing the penetrations in external walls below flood level with flood protection features. ( MM The extemal walls of the RW/B below grade'are classified as Seismic Category I. The exterior walls above grade, the floor slabs, the interior columns, and the roof are classified as non-seismic. L nL& Wh The external walls of the RW/B below gradd accommodate the dynamic and _ static loading conditions associated with the various loads and load . combinations which form the structural design basis. The loads are those associated with: Y (1) Natural phenomena including in , floods,(tornadoslearthquakes, rain, and snow. (2) Intemal events including fires, and floods. (3) Normal plant operations including live loads, dead loads, and temperature effects. The exterior walls above grade, the floor slabs, the interior columns, and the roof goes n6i collaust undecseismic loads corresponding to the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) grobnd acceleration. ) lu HI v Mrw l Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.15.13 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses < together with associated acceptance criteria which will be undertaken for the Radwaste Building. 5/20/93 2.15.13 l
i
@ Tcbla 2.15.13 R:dw;sta Cullding
, ia l Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria d 1. The basic configuration of the RW/B is 1. Inspections of the as-built structure will be 1. The as-built RW/B conforms with the basic described in Section 2.15.13. conducted. configuration in Section 2.15.13.
- 2. A structural analysis will be performed 2. A structural analysis report exists which hd 4.A@ gradehre The externalable to withstandwalls basis loadings at defined in Section the design of the RW/B below which reconciles the as-built data with the structural design basis as defined in concludes that the as-built RW/B is able to withstand the structural design basis loads 2.15.13. Section 2.15.13. as defined in Section 2.15.13.
- 3. The exterior walls above grade, the floor ' 3. A seismic analysis will be performed. 3. A structur I analysis report exists which slabs, the interior columns. and the roof conclud uilding " ; - .' -- - r='r ru
-g .. .-. : .. . w; - --::__. - ,d-- seismic enfier seismic loads corresponding to the loads corresponding to the SSE ground SSE ground accelerators .
accelerations . am.K/
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ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES j TO NRC COMMENTS SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.'A.1 Primary Containment System s NRC COMMENT: Desion Description (DD) la. Following the same approach used in the R/B design description, the design basis loads, such as , earthquake load, normal operation load, and the loads due to internal events should be defined. GE RESPONSE: - Since the Primary Containment is designed to ASME Code Section III,-Divition 2 Subsection CC, the applicable loads, load combinations and load factors are specified within code subsection CC-3000. . Restatement of these requirements in TIER 1 is ; unnecessary. PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1: , No changes to TIER 1 proposed.
. Enclosure 3
l ; ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES l TO NRC COMMENTS ; SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.14.1 Primary Containment System i 11~ i NRC COMMENT: ; Desian Descriotion (DD) ; i
- lb. The RPV stabilizer truss should also be one of the
- major internal structures and should be shown in !
Fig. 2.14.1. ; j GE RESPONSE: i The RPV stabilizer is described in IT'AAC 2.1.1 Reactor Pressure Vessel System. It is treated as an
- RPV attachment as is the RPV support skirt or the j CRD stabilizers. Some confusion may exist with a i stabilizer between Reactor shield and the !
- f containment boundary. This Reactor Shield stabilizer has been previously described in Chapter 3.8 of the SSAR. However, this is an unnecessary
, st.ucture and the description will be eliminated in l Ah'ndment 30 to the SSAR. i PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1: I No changes to TIER 1 proposed.
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1 - ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES , TO NRC COMMENTS SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.14.1 Primary Containment System r' NRC COMMENT: l Desian Description (DD) , Ic. The RPV stabilizer truss, reactor shield wall, and drywell equipment piping support structure (DEPSS) should be added to the last paragraph of this j section for PCS components to be classified as seismic Category I. GE RESPONSE: l l The RPV stabilizer is described in ITAAC 2.1.1 ' i Reactor Pressure Vessel System and will be treated l there. The reactor shield wall and Drywell l Equipment and Piping Support Structure (DEPSS) will i H be added to the listing of seismic Category I . structures. PROPOSED CRANGES TO TIER 1:
- 1. Revise last paragraph of Design Description to read:
"The following PCS components are classified as.
Seismic Category I; the reinforced concrete , containment structure, the drywell head, equipment hatches to both upper and lower drywell regions, personnel locks into upper and lower drywells, the combined personnel access and equipment hatch into the wetwell,/the basemat, the reactor pedestal, the reactor shield wall, the drywell equipment and piping support structure, and containment isolation valves together with their penetrations."
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ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.14.1 Primary Containment System l NRC COMMENT: Y 1 I Desian Description (DD) l l l Id. The terminology " primary containment" should be- l consistent with the term " reinforced concrete i containment vessel (RCCV)" defined in Section 2.15.10. ; GE RESPONSE: , The terminology used in ITAAC 2.14.1 and ITAAC 2.15.10 are consistent. The RCCV is a portion of the Primary Containment System as defined in [ paragraph one of ITAAC 2.14.1 design description. l' At most the ITAAC 2.15.10 could have a sentence ; inserted into the second paragraph of the Design l Description as follows: "The primary containment l l includes a reinforced concrete containment vessel ! (RCCV)." l l ! PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1 i l No changes are proposed to this ITAAC. ! f l L i t t l l l
e *.m I i ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES l i j TO NRC COMMENTS l 1 SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.14.1 Primary Containment System ;
<r '
NRC COMMENT: : i Desian Description (DD) I le. In the Design Description, the description of the ) basic function of the primary containment should be l moved to the first paragraph. l i
.- GE RESPONSE: l
. l The basic function of the primary containment has :
3 not been included in the Design Description since it l
- is spelled out in 10CFR50 Appendix A GDC 16.
However, a statement can be added to the ITAAC to identify this basic function. ; PROPOSED CRANGES TO TIER la f
- 1. Revise first paragraph of ITAAC to read:
l "The Primary Containment System (PCS) encompasses l (1) A reinforced concrete containment structure with an internal steel liner. The structure includes various penetrations, equipment hatches and l personnel access locks. This structure provides an : essentially leak tight barrier against the ! uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the f environment as long as postulated accident !
~
conditions require. l
. . _ _ _ _ ._ ._.. . . _ __ ~ . _ _ _ - . . . . _ . _ . . . . . _ . . _ _ -_
- --=
l 2 t i ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES i TO NRC COMMENTS ' i f SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.14.1 Primary Containment System i n. NRC COMMENT: 3: l Desian Description (DD) If.The Design Description should include the major l codes and standards used in the design of the l
~
containment (without specifying the edition). i
-The Design Description should state that the primary -
concrete containment pressure barrier is designed and constructed-in accordance with the requirements ; of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section l III, Division 2. - l
-The Design Description should state that the l pressure boundary appurtenances are designed and l - constructed in accordance with the requirements of l the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section l III, Division 1, Subsection NE and are classified as l ASME Code Class MC components. l GE RESPONSE:
Paragraphs three and four of the Design Description do identify the above ASME code sections. The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code is referred to as l the "ASME Code" to be consistent with all other sections of the ITAAC document. PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1: No changes to the ITAAC are proposed. 1
- - - _,. . , _ _ - _ . _ _ _ , - _ . _ _ _ . . _ ~ , . - . . . - . _ . . . . ~ . - _ - - - . - _ _ _
k ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES l TO NRC COMMENTS SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.14.1 Primary Containment System NRC COMMENT: E ' i
\
l Desian Description (DD) Ig. The primary containment leak rate is specified as 0.5% per day in ITAAC but 0.4% per day in SSAR Amendment 29, Section 6.2.1.1.2 (page 6.2-2) and 0.5% per day in Table 6.2-2. The earlier revision of SSAR had 0.5% per day in Section 6.2.1.1.2
~
Correct this inconsistency in Section 6.2.1.1.2 of the current SSAR revision. - GE RESPONSE: The value of 0.4% per day is incorrect in the SSAR and will be revised to be consistent with Table 6.2-2. PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER la 1 1 No changes to the ITAAC are proposed. I i 1 - - - - - e m- w e- -- -w-+, r ~. w
e
. u ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES.
i TO NRC COMMENTS ' SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.14.1 Primary Containment System NRC COMMENT: Desian Description (DD) 1h. The size of vacuum relief between the drywell volumes and wetwell gas space is 500mm. This number is described in this ITAAC item and roadmap. Table 4, but the number in Section 6.2.1.1.4.1 of the SSAR is l 50.8 cm i.e. 508 mm. Revise the number 500 mm to j 508 mm to be consistent with SSAR. .. ) l GE RESPONSE: ' l The ITAAC will be revised to eliminate the nominal vacuum breaker diameter and express only the minimum l total area of all vacuum. breakers combined. l Specifying the individual vacuum breaker diameter is to much detail for Tier I ITAAC. , i PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1: Revise third paragraph, page 2 of Design Descript-ion to read:
" Vacuum relief between the drywell volumes and the wetwell gas space is provided by vacuum breaker valves on piping sleeves penetration-the pedestal !
wall. Eight normally closed swing check valves with l a total -flow area of at least 1.53 m2 are provided. " l 1 i
, , - . , - . . , . . - - - , - . , , - , , , . - . , . - ~ . , . . , . n, , , , , . . , - - . . . ~ , , _ ,
ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESP.ONSES , TO NRC COMMENTS SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.14.1 Primary Containment System ! e i NRC COMMENT: .hI ! Ficure 2.14.1 ! la. As discussed in the R/B design description (Section 2.15.10), the R/B slabs are structurally connected l' with the primary containment shell. Therefore, the , lines between the R/B slabs and PC shell should be removed. , GE RESPONSES l It is true that the R/B floor slabs.are connected to : the primary containment structural shell. However, J the floor slabs are designed to a different code i than the RCCV. The RCCV is an ASME Code, Section : III, Division 2 vessel and the floor slab reactions are treated as loads on the RCCV. Thus Figure , 2.14.1 should retain the lines between the RCCV and 7 R/B slabs to indicate the limit of the containment structure. PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1: No changes to TIER 1 proposed. i I
ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES l l TO NRC COMMENTS l SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.14.1 Primary Containment System A. NRC COMMENT: "ff Ficure 2.14.1 l lb. The RPV support mechanism shown in Fig. 2.14.1 is different from the shown in SSAR Fig. 1.2-2. t Clarification is needed. GE RESPONSE: Figure 2.14.1 has attempted to include more detail
.- of the structural steel in the RPV support which is not shown in SSAR Figure 1.2-2. This.is probably to l
much detail for the Tier 1 ITAAC. ; PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1:
- 1. Delete steel detail from ITAAC Figure 2.14.1.
~ - - . - . . . . -
ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES i TO NRC COMMENTS SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.14.1 Primary Containment System
. ss.
NRC COMMENT: ~ ~3; Ficure 2.14.1 Ic. The location of other seismic Category I structures such as the DEPSS and RPV stabilizer truss should be shown in this figure. i GE RESPONSE: . ! i As discussed earlier the RPV stabilizer is included ,- with the Reactor Pressure Vessel System ITAAC 2.1.1 and should not be repeated here. The DEPSS can be shown on Figure 2.14.1. PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER la
- 1. Add DEPSS to Figure 2.14.1 in the upper drywell. l l
l I
l j ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES ! TO NRC COMMENTS f SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.14.1 Primary Containment System l NRC COMMENT: .
.t. ! Ficure 2.14.1 i
- Ed. Remove "360*" from the shield wall description.
4 GE RESPONSE: a i PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1: 1.
~ - Remove the "360** description from the shield wall of Figure 2.14.1. .- ,
l; ' i ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES ! ! TO NRC COMMENTS ! SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.14.1 Primary Containment System l f&. -~ i NRC COMMENT: -g l ITAAC
- Ia. A structural analysis is needed to reconcile the as-built data with the structural design basis loads I defined in Section 2.14.1 similar to ITAAC 69 provided for the reactor building. j i I GE RESPONSE: j Since the containment will be subjected to a l Structural Integrity Test and the measured deflect- !
ions compared to the intended structural design ; deflections, as built design calculations are not ! i, needed to confirm design cdequacy. The only reason l for reactor building and control bn'11 ding as-built :
; calculations is that these buildings cannot pract- ; ically be directly hydro-tested as is the contain- ,
- _ ment. The SIT places the containment more in the
; category of the RPV confirmation. i i
PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER la l No changes to TIER 1 proposed. ) I l l 4 l
ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.14.1 Primary Containment System
.w 1
NRC COMMENT: ITAAC lb. The Design Description should include a discussion ' of the critical parameters that were used to establish the SRV/LOCA suppression pool hydrodynamic loadings. ITAAC should be developed to verify that the SRV/LOCA response spectra in the SSAR are appropriate. As a minimum, the Design Description should address the quencher type and azimuthal location, the SRV line parameters used to establish the SRV responses spectra, and the containment parameters assumed in the LOCA analyses. GE RESPONSE: The quenchers used in the ABWR are the standard GE "X" type and this can be called out in the design description. The SRu J oad d?finitions have baan_ > selected to bound the e:cpected loads that result from variation in discharge line parameters. Variation in discharge line parameters would lead to the same or reduced SRV discharge loads on the suppression pool e.nd thus Tier 1 checks are not necessary. To insure that the suppression. pool is effectively used as a heat sink, the ITAAC does check that the quenchers are located at or below the center line of mid-level vents in the horizontal vent system. The azimuthal location of the quencher is not very critical from a load definition point of view and because of the large number of quenchers in
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ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES
- TO NRC COMMENTS i ;
l &
- the pool they are inherently uniformly spaced. Thus l this does not seem to be an important enough item to warrant a Tier 1 ITAAC.
i For LOCA hydrodynamic loads, the most important parameters are the horizontal vent diameter, number ! of vents and the distance to the containment wall. PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1 l
- 1. Add a statement to Design Description to identify the SRV quenchers as "X" type.
- 2. Add a statement to the Design Description to identify vent diameter, number of vents and distance l to pool wall as follows: The horizontal vents consist of 30, 700 mm diameter pipes uniformly spaced around the perimeter of the pedestal in ten ;
stacks of three each. The distrance from the } pedestal containing these horizontal vents to the outer suppression pool vall is 7.5 m.* i l j
ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES : TO NRC COMMENTS i ) SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.14.1 Primary Containment System i i j NRC COMMENT: TN i ^ . ITAAC Ic. ITAAC #3 should be expanded to verify that the primary containment vessel meets the design and i construction requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III (Divisions 1 and
! 2). An inspection should be performed to verify the ! existence of ASME Code-required design and construction records.
GE RESPONSE: ITAAC 43 is intended to confirm that the basic pressure and temperature conditions on the as-built ' structure following a postulated accident are within ' the design conditions applied during the containment
- load definition phase of design. The structural integrity test in ITAAC #2 confirms that the as-built structure is consistent with the ASME i
- design. Thus inspection of design and construction records are redundant and should not be included in Tier 1 ITAAC. I PROPOSED CRANGES TO TIER 1
No changes proposed for ITAAC. 1
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- i j ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES l TO NRC COMMENTS l
2 SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.14.1 Primary Containment System l
- NRC COMMENT
- V . !
9n l Desion Description (DD) ! ! 1 ITAAC states that the horizontal center line of the SRVDL quencher arms are located at or below the .i elevation of the center row of horizontal vent in i the suppression pool. There is no reference for this statement in the SSAR. I GE RESPONSE: The positions of the quenchers are not called out in l the text of the SSAR. However, the quencher posit-ions are shown in the arrangement drawings of the SSAR. Specifically, SSAR Figure 1.2-131 shows the ; i "X" quenchers with radial and azimuthal positions in the suppression pool. SSAR Figure 1.2-3c shows the ; quencher elevation inline with the center row of i
- horizontal vents.
1 PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1: No changes to TIER 1 proposed. i
=-
ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS , 4 i SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.14.1 Primary Containment System - NRC COMMENT: k
-V 1
ITAAC Ficure 2.14.1 2 ITAAC Fig. 2.14.1 shows a continuous steel liner in the wetwell. The liner in the wetwell should be stainless steel. A statement should also be added ! to the ITAAC Design Description to states all l normally wetted surfaces of the liner in the suppression pool are stainless steel. , GE RESPONSE: ) i It is true that the wetted surfaces'of the suppres-sion pool are intended to be stainless steel to ! control corrosion and water quality. However, we . would like to keep the option open to consider l' stainless clad carbon steel liner materials typical of those used in fuel storage pools. In any case the differentiation between stainless and carbon [ steels does not seem important enough from a safety - . point of view to be identified as part of the Tier 1 ! ITAAC. PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1: No changes to TIER 1 proposed. l l
]
. _n _r n cr - - -- - - - - - - - -
i j ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES
- TO NRC COMMENTS
) SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.14.1 Primary Containment System NRC COMMENT: : Desion Description (DD) 3 The Design Description and ITAAC state that the MSIV leakage is not included in the primary containment allowable leakage of 0.5%. In most BWR plants, the MSIV leakage test result can be exclude from the Type C tests total (not for PWRs) but an exemption from Appendix J is required. If GE can justify an exemption from Appendix J, then the MSIVs leakage can be treated separately and the MSIVs can be deleted from Table 6.2-7.
- GE RESPONSES -
The analytic predictions of radiological consequen-ces from containment leakage in the SSAR have been based on the assumption of 0.5% per day containment leakage plus a separated MSIV leakage. The next revision of the SSAR will clarify that MSIV leakage is to be excluded from the 0.5% per day. The clarif ication and NRC acceptance of this definition in the SSAR should lead to the generic exemption to Appendix J. It is only necessary to clarify the exclusion of MSIV leakage in the Tier 1 ITAAC. PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1: No changes to TIER 1 proposed. l
l ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES ! TO NRC COMMENTS l l SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.14.1 Primary Containment System i NRC COMMENT: hI
- q ,
Desian Description (DD) ; 4 The primary containment leak rate is specified as O.5% per day in ITAAC but 0.4% per day in SSAR i Amendment 29, Section 6.2.1.1.2 (page 6.2-2) and l 0.5% per day in Table 6.2-2. The earlier revision ! of SSAR had 0.5% per day in Section 6.2.1.1.2. ( - Correct this inconsistency in Section 6.2.1.1.2 of l the current SSAR revision. j GE RESPONSE: _ i The SSAR will be corrected to reflect the correct . value of 0.5% per day containment leakage in the next Amendment. l l ' PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER la i No changes to TIER 1 proposed. i i l 1 l l I l I 1
..= _ _ . . . . _. ,
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ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES ! TO NRC COMMENTS I 1 SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.14,1 Primary Containment System _i : NRC COMMENT: _ .k.- l
- 3.g l Desian Description (DD)
5 The size of vacuum relief between the drywell volumes and wetwell gas space is 500 mm. This i number is described in this ITAAC item and road map
- Table 4, but the number in Section 6.2.1.1.4.1 of ;
the SSAR is 50.8 cm i.e. 508 mm. Revise the number i 500 mm to 508 mm to be consistent,with SSAR. ! l
.- GE RESPONSE: ;
The size of the vacuum breaker is a' nominal 20 ; inches in English units. The comparable number for i
- metric is a nominal 500 mm diameter. The SSAR is '
being corrected to express this nominal size. The ITAAC has been changed to express only the minimum total area of eight vacuum breakers in parallel. l PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1: i' The ITAAC wording will be revised to read, "Eight normally closed swing check valves with a total flow , area of at least 1.53 m2 are provided." ; i 1 i P
_ _.==.:.-- - l ABWR TIER 1 - GE RESPONSES ! l TO NRC COMMENTS ; I SYSTEM NUMBER AND NAME: 2.14.1 Primary Containment System s?, NRC COMMENT: -G# ; en* ! Desion Description fDD) 1 2.14.1, Primary Containment - Provide'a test of the drywell leak tightness and include the drywell leakage value of 0.05 square meters of effective leakage pathway as an acceptance criteria for the test. This value is relied upon in the DBA dose assessment on the SSAR and SER. . GE RESPONSE: f The drywell leak tightness is confirmed by ITAAC 64 . which requires that Appendix J type leakage measure-ments have been made. The appropriate measure and the basis for the SSAR dose assessments is leakage ! equal to or less than 0.5% per day. PROPOSED CHANGES TO TIER 1: No changes to TIER 1 proposed.
2.14.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT SYSTEM July 15, 1993 DESIGN DESCRIPTION He Primary Cc ntainment System (PCS) encompasses: [
.t (1) A reinforcec oncrete containment structure with an internal steelliner.I De structure includes various penetrations, equipment batches and personnel access locks.1 This structure provides an essentially leak tight barrier againrt the uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the environment as long as postulated accident conditions require.
(2) Structures inside the primary containment which partition the containment into drywell and wetwell regions, provide equipment support, radiation protection components for operation of the ABWR pressure suppression co Figure 2.14.1 shows the basic configuration and scope.4 The steellined reinforced concrete containment structure attached to a reinforced concrete basemat provides the primary containment pressure barrier and is c.lasdned n AShE code Section III, Division 2.5 The reactor pressure vessel (RPV) support pedestal and a diaphragm floor partition the containment volume into drywell and wetwell regions.6 ne 7 RPV support pedestalis asteel a reinforced cor. crete structure.gtructure withwithin Other major internal structures concrete.fiD material. the containment are De diap the reactor shield wad, lower drywell personnel and equipment access tunnels and the drywell equigOment and piping support structure.9 Dese internal structures are stee fabrications. Penetrations through the containment pressure boundary include; the drywell head closure, i equipment batches to both upper and lower drywell regions, personnellocks into upper and i lower drywells, a combined personnel access and equipment batch into the werwell and ! piping and electrical penetrations.ll Hese pressure boundary appurtenances are steel l structures rhmficias ASSE code Section III, Division 1, Class MC.12 De containment design pressure is 3.16 Kg/cm2g ,13 De design temperatures for the drywell and the wetwell are 171 CC and 104 OC respectively.14 He maximum calculated pressures and temperatures for the design basis accident are less than these design conditions.15 He primary containment pressure boundary including penetrations and isolation valves, has a leak rate equal to or less than 0.5 % per day of the containmentgas mass at the maximum calculated containment pressure for the design basis accident.1 l 2.14.1 file:ITACC/Rev.4
- .- = :...
2.14.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT SYSTEM July 15, 1993 DESIGN DESCRIPTION (continued) De reinforced concrete diaphragm Door separating the upper drywell and the wetwell gas spaces, has a steelliner plate on the underside.17 De desig differentialpressure of the diaphragm Door between drywell and wetwell is 1.76 Kg/cm in the downward direction.18 De RPV pedestal forms the lower drywell region and consists of a cylindrical composite steel structure. It is anchored to the basemat and supports the RPV through a support ring l girder. He pedestal also supports the reactor shield wall. He pedestal consists of two ! concentric steel cylinders joined together radially by vertical steel diaphragms and filled with ! concrete. He pressure suppression venting paths are an integral part of the pedestal structure. His includes: a) the ducts which interconnect the lower and upper drywell regions, b) the vertical downcomers from the interconnecting ducts to the horizontalvents, and c) the horizontal vents that direct steam into the suppression pool.19 The horizontal ventr consist of 30, 700 mm diameterpipes umformly spaced around the perimeter of the pedestal j in ten stacks of three each. The distrancefrom thepedestalcontaining these horizontalwna to l I the outersuppression pool wallis 7.5 m. Vacuum relief between the drywellvolumes and the wetwell ggspace is provided by vacuum breaker vah es on piping sleeves penetrating the pedestal wall. Eight normally closed j 2 swing check valves with a totalflow area of at least 1.53 m ::=in:0 d!=cte r cf f T mm are l provided.21 i ne water volume in the suppression poolincluding the vents is equal to or greater than 3,580 cubic metevs.21 The SRVdischarge lines terminate in GEstandard 'X" type quenchers. He horizontal center line of the SRVDL quencher arms are located at g below the i elevation of the center layer of horizontalvents in the suppression pool. Water return paths connect the region within the pedestal to the vertical downcomers and horizontal vent paths.24 At least one meter of corium protection fill concrete is prcuided on ; the lowq drywell Door.25 Hermally activated Gooding vah es are also located in this region.- He following PCS components are classified as Seismic Category I; the reinforced concrete containment structure, the drywell head, equipment batches to both upper and lower drywell j regions, personnellocks into upper and lower drywells, the combined personnel access and equipment hatch into the wetwell, the basemat, the reactor pedestal, the reactorshield wall the drywellequipment arg~ ipingsupportstructure, and containment isolation valves together with their penetrations. I l l l file:ITACC/Rev.4 2.14.1
i j 2.14.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT SYSTEM July 15, 1993 Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria - ( Table 2.14.1 provides the definition of the inspection tests and /or analyses, bgether with the , associated acceptance criteria which will be undertaken for the Primary Containment System. : t t I l n filerITACC/Rev.4 2.14.1 1
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TEN THERW ALLY l [EtNFORCED CowCRETE
/ s EE Rk ACIIVAIED ILOODE' YALVE5 THIRTY E[M04: 20NTAL g h WETWELL C04 gTR$ CORiuW PROTECT CM FLL b I8 aySS4 TOTAL 4 to0TE 1 #
33r NOTE 2 h BASEMAT AREAS: te0TES: A. UPPER DRYWELL 1. CORIUW PROTECTION FLL DEPTM S 31 m B. WETWELL CAS SPACE 2. RPV PEDESTAL h THE LOWER DRYWELL RECION MAS a team C. SUPPRESSION POOL C0hCRETE TMuktl$ (ERCEPT ADJECENT 10 WERTsCAL DOWN C0tERSI D. LCWER DRYWELL 3. PER$0NNEL AND E0uetsENT ACCESS PolNTS ARE AT VARICUS CRCUWFERENTIAL LOCATs0M5
- 4. REACTOR DutLDeeC FLOORS.1007 PART or PCs; skcWW MERE FOR RLFEREleCE OILY FIGURE 2.14.1 PRlWARY CONTAINWENT SYSTEW
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