ML20056D097
| ML20056D097 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200001 |
| Issue date: | 07/15/1993 |
| From: | Poslusny C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9308030360 | |
| Download: ML20056D097 (14) | |
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j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Y ~'f WASWNGToN. D.C. 20555 0001
\l p8 July 15,1993 .l I
Docket No.52-001 ,
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APPLICANT: GE Nuclear Energy (GE)
PROJECT: Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR)
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING ON THE ABWR INSTRUMENTATION TECHNICAL SPECIFI-CATIONS (TS)
On June 21 through 24, 1993,'the NRC's TS Branch and Instrumentation and e Controls Branch, met with GE to write Proof and Review Instrumentation Systems .:
TS-for the GE ABWR. The meeting attendees are listed in Enclosure 1. ~l The meeting with GE was held at the Lawrence Livermere National Laboratory I (LLNL) in Livermore, California and a summary of the results of the meeting is !
provided in Enclosure 2. Enclosure 3 is the draft' emergency core cooling . .
j' system (ECCS) Actuation Instrumentation limiting condition for operation (LCO) and Bases GE supplied to the working group at the_beginning of the meeting. ;
With submittal of this LCO, GE's commitment to propose instrumentation ~ TS-consistent wits their design, for staff review, is complete. The working i group completed definitions' for ABWR TS. instrument channels and for TS ,
surveillance requirements. The group also completed the proof and review .
markup of LCO 3.3.1.1, " Safety System Logic and Control-(SSLC) Sensor Instru- 1 mentation." In addition, a schedule and agenda were outlined for the July ;
meeting- to assure the proof and review TS will be completed by the August '
target date.
GE committed to incorporate all changes and revise the SSLC Sensor Instrumen-tation LCO and Bases at the July iteeting. The TS for this LCO establish the benchmark for drafting the' remaining TS.
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NRC RE CENTER COPY ps; b m ,
July 15,1993 l The next meeting is schedule for July 19 through 23, 1993, at the GE offices i in San Jose, California.
l OnginalS%n64ppF Chester Poslusny, Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors '
and License Renewal l Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ,
Enclosures:
As stated ,
cc w/ enclosures:
See next page -
DISTRIBUTION w/ enclosure:
Docket File PDR PDST R/F PShea CPoslusny JNWilson w/o enclosure:
TMurley/FMiraglia, 12G18 DCrutchfield RBorchardt WRussell, 12G18 SNinh DTang SKoenick t' JMoore, 15B18. ACRS (11) J0'Brien, RES BHardin, RES LShao, RES CSchulten, 11E22 JStewart, 8H3' !
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0FC: LA:PDST:ADAR PM:PbSk:ADAR (A)SC:PD[T:ADAR NAME: PShea 'Eb)5 CPoslusny:sg RBorchardt !
DATE: I 07/l/9f 07/\b/93 07/6/93 OfflCAL RECORD COPY:
DOCUMENT NAME:MTGSUM.CP i
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GE Nuclear Energy Docket No.52-001 l '
cc: Mr. Patrick W. Marriott, Manager Mr. Joseph Quirk Licensing & Consulting Services GE Nuclear Energy GE Nuclear Energy General Electric Company 175 Curtner Avenue 175 Curtner Avenue, Mail Code 782 San Jose, California 95125 San Jose, California 95125 Mr. Robert Mitchell General Electric Company 175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, California 95125 Mr. L. Gifford, Program Manager Regulatory Programs .
GE Nuclear Energy 12300 Twinbrook Parkway .
Suite 315 Rockville, Maryland 20852 Director, Criteria & Standards Division Office of Radiation Programs U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 401 M Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20460 Mr. Sterling Franks '
U.S. Department of Energy NE-42 '
Washington, D.C. 20585 Mr. Steve Goldberg Budget Examiner 725 17th Street, N.W.
Room 8002 Washington, D.C. 20503 Mr. Frank A. Ross i U.S. Department of Energy, NE-42 Office of LWR Safety and Technology 19901 Germantown Road Germantown, Maryland 20874 Mr. Raymond Ng 1776 Eye Street, N.W.
Suite 300 Washington, D.C. 20006 Marcus A. Rowden, Esq.
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Suite 800 Washington, D.C. 20004 Jay M. Gutierrez, Esq.
Newman & Holtzinger, P.C.
1615 L Street, N.W.
Suite 1000 Washington, D.C. 20036
ATTENDEES JUNE 21 THROUGH 24, 1993 NAME AFFILLIATION Carl S. Schulten NRC/0TSB Barry H. Simon GE-NE Calvin K. Tang GE-NE Dave Wilson EPRI-NMPC Gary L. Johnson LLNL Bob Wyman LLNL Jim Palomar LLNL Jim Stewart NRC/I&C l
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l Enclosure 1
Interdepartmental letterhead l
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Mail Smon L.G32 ;
t En 3-7025 l June 24,1993
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To: CS&R Files
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From: Jim Palomar
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Subject:
Personnel notes from the June 21,1993 through June 24,1993 meeting on ABWR Technical .
Specifications.
t L. J .. Sarry S; mon, General Electric !
Calvin Tang, General Electric l Dave Wdson, EPRI l
Carl Schulten, US NRC i Jim Stewart, US NRC I Gary Johnson, LLNL Jim Palomar, LLNL l i
Bob Wyman, LLNL (On June 21 only)
The people listed above attended a public meeting requested by Jim Stewart to discuss the GE ABWR Technical !
Specifications. The four day meeting was held at LLNL's Livermore, California facility. Two working i documents were supplied to all attendees before the meeting, Barry Simon provided one of the documents -- .
which contained channel definitions. The other document was submitted by Jim Palomar and defined channels !
Es well as surveillance tests. In the two days the group agreed on channel definitions and some surveillance i 12sts definitions. The group carefully deliberated all surveillance tests presented at the meeting. The tests '
were either defined, outlined, or deemed not necessary. At the end of the second day, all attendees expressed ,
there satisfaction with the results.
jl Attached is a marked-up copy showing changes agreed to during this meeting. I Below are key statements, action items and definitions agreed to by the attendees.
Statement: The group reviewed and marked up the SSLC instrumentation technical specification.
Barry Simon will include these mark-ups in the next version of the technical specifications.
Action item: General Electric will hold the master copy, incorporate all changes, and resubmit the technical specifications with revisions.
Action item: Credit for longer duration's between functional testing is given because of the microprocessor self-diagnostics. This needs to be explained in the bases. Barry Simon to add into the bases, Action item: Jim Stewart asked all attendees to consider the following question and present ideas at the June 21 meeting. What technical specifications requirements are needed on control room displays?
Action item: Jim Stewart will provide a list of shutdown technical specifications that need to be addressed in section 3.3 of the technical specifications.
Action item: Carl Schulten will verify, with Pete Hearn, applicability requirements for RWCU. The group questioned whether Function 29 should be excluded in modes 4 and 5.
Action item: Carl Schulten promised to send a copy of all Standard Technical Specifications to LLNL (Jim Palomar or Gary Johnson).
1 Enclosure 2
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Action hem: General Electric will change the technical specifications where necessary to assure that
. all functions, systems, components, etc. in the ABWR are referred to by the same name in the technical specifications as the SAR.
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Action item: General Electric will add a table and explain the table in the bases. The table wil! !
delineate which parameters affect which function. l l
Action item: Jim Stewart will verify that surveillance definition A. (below) is acceptable to NRC l neutron monitor experts.
'J Act'on item: Cal Tang will verify that surveillance definition A. (below) is acceptable to GE neutron monitor experts. ]
Action item: Jim Palomar will write the definition and bases for the Comprehensive Functional Test. '!
The bases willinclude a description of types of test to be included and provide the reason .;
for each test. In addition, how to select a group of tests will be discussed. [
Action item: Jim Stewart will put Jim Palomar on the controlled distribution list for the ABWR SAR i updates. '}
Action item: '
A meeting is scheduled from July 19,1993 at Sam through July 22,1993 at Spm at GE, San Jose unless notified otherwise.
Action item: A tentative meeting is scheduled from August 16,1993 Sam through August 19,1993 }
Spm in Germantown. l i
Action item: Barry Simon will let Jim Palomar know what size disk (20 Mb,40 Mb, BOMB) their Bernoulli drive will read. Jim Palomar will bring a Bernoulli disk down to GE, San Jose j to obtain a electronic copy of the latest version of the ABWR SAR. .
i Action item: Jim Palomar will do a sensibility review of all bases and point out any gross errors in ;
the LCOs by the July 19 meeting. ;
Action item: Carl Schulten will review and mark up the following sections by the July 19 meeting:
i 3.3.4.1 ATWS-EOC RPT l 3.3.4.2 FW/MTT I 3.3.6.1 PAMI 3.3.6.2 RSS Action item: Cal Tang and Barry Simon to complete the following task and send revision to Jim
- Stewart by July 12:
Rewrite the SSLC action bases.
Move manual functions to the appropriate LCOs.
General clean up of SSLC bases to conform to work of June 21 through June 24 j meeting.
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The following definitions were modified and agreed to at the meeting.
All words that are defined below are typed in upper case when used. i CHANNEL L6FINITIONS: .
A) SENSORCHANNEL
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A SENSOR CHANNEL is defined as a set of interconnected hardware and software components that i process an identifiable sensor signal within a division. This includes the sensor, data acquisition, (
signal conditioning, data transmission, software, alarms, disp!ays, and all transmission lines in the !
division and between divisions associated with the sensor signal up to an input of a 2-out-of-4 voter !
or an input of a bistable function within the TLU or SLU. ,
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B) LOGCCHANNEL A LOGIC CHANNELis defined as a set of interconnected hardware and software components that process the inputs to produce an identifiable trip signal or ESF actuation signal within a division. For the RPS, this includes the trip signars associated TLU 2-out-of-4 voters, TLU bistable functions, operator controls, interlocks, data transmission, software, alarms, displays, division-of-sensors bypass, transmission lines out to the OLU inputs, and transmission lines out to other division TLU inputs. Each ESF function will have two ESF LOGIC CHANNELS to include one of the ESF actuation signars associated SLU 2-out-of-4 voters, SLU bistable functions, operator controls, fnterlocks, data transmission, software, alarms, displays, division-of-sensors bypass, EMS, and transmission ,
lines out to the input of the 2-out-of-2 voters.
C) OUTPUTCHANNEL A. , , v . , w . v. .n,mEL is defined as a set of interconnected components that process the inputs to ,
produce an identifiable signal that deenergize scram solenoids, deenergize MSIV isolation solenoids, or energize ESF device actuator within a division. For the RPS, this includes the signars associated OLU, transmission lines, manual divisional trip and reset switches, trip logic output bypass switch, and scram pilot valve solenoid load drivers. Form MSIVs, this includes the signars associated OLU, transmission lines, manual divisional isolation and reset switches, trip logic output bypass switch, and MStV isolation pilot valve solenoid load drivers. For the ESF, this includes the signars associated 2-out-of-2 voter ESF Output Channel Bypass switch, transmission lines out to the ESF device actuator.
SURVIEllANCE DEFINITIONS:
A Modify SR 3.3.1.1.8 to be:
...........................-NOTE------.-----..---------------
- 2. Required to be met with a d2 decade overlap prior to entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1.
SR 3.3.1.1.8 Verify the SRNM and APRM channels overlap. !
B. COMPREHENSIVE FUNCTO4ALTEST A COMPREHENSIVE FUNCTIONAL TEST is testing of a division while simulating the other three divisions and all channe!s in that division using a selected range of sensor inputs. This test verifies OPERABILITY of all SENSOR CHANNELS, LOGIC CHANNELS, and OUTPUT CHANNELS. This test includes running all microprocessor self-diagnostics and exercising the system by inputting simulated sensor inputs to the RMUs, DTMs, and TLU's to verify RPS load driver actuation, MSIV load driver actuation, and ESF initiation signal to the two-out-of two voting logic occurs for a selected set of trip ;
conditions. The simulated trip conditions must verify division performance of each SSLC function, including bypasses, under simulated accident conditions. The simulated trip conditions should be selected so that a given combination of inputs is not repeated over the life of the plant. For each selected set of trip combinations the SSLC response time must be recorded and compared to previous tests to confirm operation has not degraded system response time.
The tester which performs the COMPREHENSIVE FUNCTIONAL TEST does not have the capability to monitor the ESF OUTPUT CHANNEL Thus, an OUTPUT CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on the ESF OUTPUT CHANNEL may be completed independent'y of the COMPREHENSIVE FUNCTIONALTEST.
To be performed once every refueling interval.
C OUTPUT CHANNEL FUNCTO4ALTEST An OUTPUT CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is the injection of simulated or actual signa!s into the OUTPUT CHANNEL to verify OPERABILITY.
D. Perform RPS Response Time Test i
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l The definition and bases for this test shall be copied from the BWR 6 Standard Technical ]
, Specifications. ;
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To be performed once every refueling interval. :
E. Perform ECCS Response Time Tost I 1
l The definition and bases for this test shall be copied from the BWR 6 Standard Technica!
l Specifications. ,
i To be performed once every refueling interval. .
F. Perform isolation Response Time Test ,
The definition and bases for this test shall be copied from the BWR 6 Standard Technical Specifications.
To be performed once every refueling interval.
i J. V. Palomar Electronics Engineering 1
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ECCS Actu; tion ,
3.3.1.4 i
3.3 INSTRUMENTATION l
3.3.1.4 ECCS Actuation l LCO 3.3.1.4 The ECCS Actuation Functions in Table 3.3.1.4-1 shall be OPERABLE.
I APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1.4-1.
AC,'l lONb NOTE Separate Condition entry is allowed for each output function.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One of a redundant pair A.1 Place the output channelin [4] hours of output channels for a bypass.
single ECCS feature inoperable. ANQ A.2 Restore the inoperable [ prior to next output I
channel. channel functional test] i B. Both of a redundant pair B.1 Place remaining inoperable [4] hours ;
of output channels for a channel in bypass, single ECCS feature inoperable. AND B.2 Restore at least one channel [24] hours l
to OPERABLE status, 1 AND l
B.3 Restore both output [ prior to next output channels to OPERABLE channel functional status. testl 1
C. Required Action and C. Declare the supported immediately associated Completion feature inoperable.
Time of Condition A or B not met.
ABWR STS 3.3-26.1 06/19/93 Enclosure 3
.' ECCS Ac'uation t
3.3.1.4 t-SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOTE When a channelis placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Survei!!ances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
[921 days SR 3.3.1.4.1 Perform OUTPUT CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
REFUELING SR 3.3.1.4.2 Perform COMPREHENSIVE FUNCTIONAL TEST. INTERVAL Table 3.3.1.4-1 (Page 1 of 1)
Isolation Actuation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER ,
SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE -l FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS REQUIREMENTS
- 1. Low Pressure Core Flooder. 1,2,3 2 per LPFL SR 3.3.1.4.1 subsystem SR 3.3.1.4.2
- 2. High Pressure Core Flooders. 1,2,3 2 per HPCF SR 3.3.1.4.1 subsystem SR 3.3.1.4.2 i
- 3. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling. 1,2(a) 3(a)
, 2 SR 3.3.1.'4.1 SR 3.3.1.4.2
- 4. Automatic Depressurization 1, 2(b) 3(b)
. 2 per AOS SR 3.3.1.4.1 System subsystem SR . 3.3.1.4.2 (a) With reactor pressure greater than 15G P ig (b) With reactor pressure greater than EO Peig ABWR STS 3.3202[ 06/19/93 e
- ECCS Actuation B 3.3.1.4 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.1.4 Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) Actuation BASES BACKGROUND The ECCS system automatically initiates appropriate systems to provide adequate core cooling following Loss of Coolant Accidents. The Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) encompasses the High Pressure Core Flooder (HPCF) system, Automatic Depressurization System (ADS),
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system, and the Low Pressure Flooder (LPFL) mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system. The purpose of the ECCS is to initiate appropriate responses from the systems to ensure that fuelis adequately cooled in the event of a design basis accident or transient. The equipment involved with each of these systems is described in the Bases for LCO 3.5.1, *ECCS - Operating."
The ECCS uses sensors, data transmission, signal processing, relays, and switches that are necessary to cause initiation of the various features needed to mitigate the consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). close off flow paths that could result in unacceptable fission product release. Functional diversity is provided by monitoring a wide range of independent parameters. The input data to the ECCS features :
originates in devices that monitor local parameters (e.g. high !
temperatures, high flows) as well as primary system and containment j system parameters that are indicative of a leak. The ECCS controllogic hardware and software for developing initiation signals are contained within the four independent, divisional panels of Safety System logic and Control (SSLC) as described in LCO 3.3.1.1.
A desc,ription of the operation of the ECCS initiation channels is given in LCO 3.3.1.1. Each of a redundant pair of ESF SLUs sends initiation data to a pair of output channels via the EMS. Both output channels must receive initiation data before system actuation will occur. One of a redundant pair of output channels may be bypassed either manually or automatically be the SSLC self test. When an output channelis bypassed the actuation logic becomes one-of-one.
APPLICABLE Operation of the FCCS is explicitly assumed in the analysis of references SAFETY ANALYSIS of 1, 2, and 3. Tl e ECCS is initiated to preserve the integrity of the fuel LCO, and cladding by limit' ig the post LOCA peak cladding temperature to less APPLICABILITY than the 10CFF 40.46 limits. The ECCS output channels are required to be OPERABLE 'i the MODES or other specified conditions that may require ECCS titiation to mitigate the consequences of a design basis l accident or transient. The applicability basis for the ECCS systems are (continued)
m ECCS Actuotion B 3.3.1.4 BASES APPLICABLE given in LCO 3.5.1 and 3.5.2. To ensure reliable ECCS initiation, a '
SAFETY ANALYSIS, combination of features are required.
LCO, and APPLICABILITY The ECCS output channels satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy continued Statement. .
The OPERABILITY of the ECCS actuation is dependent on the OPERABILITY of the individual Functions specified in LCO 3.3.1.1. The OPERABILITY of the output channel devices shown in table 3.3.1.4-1 are covered by this LCO.
ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent trains, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional f ailure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition.
However, the Required Actions for inoperable ECCS output channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for multiple inoperable divisions. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable ECCS output channel.
A.1 This condition assures that appropriate actions are taken when one of a redundant pair of ECCS output channels is inoperable. Placing the ,
inoperable channelin bypass causes the logic to change from 2 out of 2 to 1 out of 1 so initiation capability is maintained. However, the ECCS feature is more vulnerable to spurious actuation.
The Completion Time for A.1 provides a reasonable amount of time to perform diagnostics and effect repairs while avoiding the risks associated with plant shutdown. Plant operation in this condition for the specified time does not contribute significantly to plant risk.
Since plant protection is maintained and the potential for a spurious trip is ,
low because of the high reliability of the logic, operation in this condition l for an extended period is acceptable. A maximum completion time corresponding to the next channel functional test is acceptable since the >
channel functional test interval criteria is a suitable criteria for operation in this condition.
(continued)
I ABWR STS B 3.3-82.2 06/19/93 i
ECCS Actu;ti:n ;
B 3.3.1.4 )
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ACTION B.1. B.2. and 8.3 '
continued This Condition is provided to assure that appropriate action is taken when multiple inoperable channels cause automatic ECCS feature actuation to l become unavailable. However, automstic initiation for redundant features remain available.
The Completion Time for B.1 is intended to provide a reasonable amount of time to effect sufficient repairs to restore automatic actuation to at least 1/1 logic while limiting the amount of time the plant is operating in a degraded condition. [24] hours provides adequate time to effect repairs and avoid the risks associated with plant shutdown while continued plant operation in this condition for the specified time does not contribute significantly to plant risk.
Action B.1 reaores adequate plant protection and places the feature in a <
condition identical to condition A. Therefore the completion times for B.2 l and B.3 are the same as for A.1 and A.2. 3
.Cd if the specified action for Conditions A or B are not implemented within ,
the specified completion times, the plant must be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO does not apply. Declaring the associated feature inoperable will cause entry into the appropriate condition of LCO 3.5.1 or 3.5.2. These LCOs will provide appropriate actions for the inoperable ECCS feature.
SURVEILLANCE The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that, when a division REQUIREMENTS is placed in an inoperable status solelp for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, provided the associated Function maintains trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> allowance, the division must be retumed to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. ) assumption that 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is the average time required to perform surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that isolations occur when necessary.
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ABWR STS B 3.3-82.3 06/19/93 l
ECCS Actu:tian B 3.3.1.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.4.1 REQUIREMENTS continued An OUTPUT CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on actuation channel to provide confidence that an ECCS actuation will occur when required.
Since the isolation actuation uses devices that have a high reliability, an output channel functional test every 192) days provides confidence that an ECCS actuation will occur when needed.
SR 3.3.1.4.2 The COMPREHENSIVE FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the ECCS output channels and output logic. This test must be performed in conjunction with the COMPREHENSIVE FUNCTIONAL TEST performed under LCO 3.3.1.1.
The refueling interval frequency is based on the need to perform this l Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage to prevent potential unplanned transients if the Surveillance was performed !
with the reactor at power. The high reliability of the devices used in the ;
iso;ation actuation devices coupled with the output channel functional j tests provide confidence that the refueling interval frequency is adequate. i REFERENCES 1. ABWR SSAR, Section 15.21 !
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