ML20054L528

Final Particularization of Contentions 1,2 & 3.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20054L528
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	06/28/1982
From:	Jeffrey Reed REED, J.G.
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8207080211
Download: ML20054L528 (23)

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UNITED STATES OF AltRICA NUCLEAR REGULAWRY CO! MISSION l BEFmE THE A MiiIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

UNION ELECTRIC COWANY ) Docket No. STN 50-483 OL

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(Callaway Plant, Unit 1) )

FINAL PARTICUIARIZATIW OF REED'S CONTENTICNS 1. 2. AND 3 p

By Board Order, dated #9 June 1982, Mr. Reed was notified that final particularization of his contentions numbers 1 and 3 were to be filed by not later than 30 June 1982 In ccupliance with said order, the following is submitted.

REED'S CONTENTION NO.1

" Applicant han not made sufficient arrangements with local governments nor local agencies and organizations to meet the requirements of 10 CFR, Part 50, Section 50.47(b)."

DISCUSSIW The validity of such contention is based upon the following facts and ccmclusions:

1. Applicant nust submit radiological emergency response plans

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(RERPs) of State and local governmental entieties in the United States that are whol]hr or partiall,y within the plume exposure pathway EPZ with 1 i its application for an operating license. (See 10 CFR, Part 50, Section 50 33(g), at 45FR55402 and Part 50, Appendix E, at 45FR55402 and 46FR28838)

a. No Federal or State of Missouri statute exists to mandate State or local governmental preparation of RERPs or emergency response preparedness to meet NRC standards to support commercial nuclear power plant operation, nor does the Commission have such authority to require 8207080211 820628 PDR ADOCK 05000483 PDR c<w

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4 RERPs or the establishment of such response preparedness by States or local govemments.

b. The only regulatory authority in the area of radiological emergency response planning and preparedness rests with the Commission's ability to deny an operating license to an Applicant if such RERPs are not prepared and submitted as required above or said preparedness is not maintained to estehtished standards for the operational life of the plant.

c. Since no obligation exists in law for States and local governments to prepare plans and upgrade preparedness to meet Commission standards, it appears, in the alternative, that the Applicant, alone, is responsible to activaly seek and obtain voluntary emergency response support from State and local governments if it desires to obtain and retain an operating perisit (lisense)' from the Conaission,

d. Without support in law to provide the Applicant the assistance it requires to operate, the Applicant must make arrangements with the State and all local governments to obtain their voluntary support. With this obligation to obtain support rests the pecuniary responsibility to provide State and all local govemments equipment, funding, or anything else such State or local governments require for their services in support of the Applicant's commercial venture. (see 10.CFR, pg 50-SC-65, II. Funding)

e. Failure of the Applicast to obtain the active participation of State and local governments in the preparation of RERPs and the upgrade of radiological emergency response capability to Commission standards for the lifetime of the nuclear power plant has the potential to restrict such plant operation. The Comission has supported this viewpoint in 10 CFR, Part 50, Statements of Consideration, at 45FR55402, published 8/19/80:

"--the Commission has therefore concluded that adequate emergency preparednese is an essential acpect in the protection of the public health and safety. he Commincion recognizes there is a possibility that the operation of some reactors may be affected by this rule through inaction of state and local governments or an inability to comply with these rules. The Commission believes that the potential restricticn of plant operation by State and local officials is not significantly different in kind or effect from the means already available under existing law to prohibit reactor operation, such as zoning and land-use laws - - ." (see pg 50-SC-60, col 3) 2 RERPs are the basis for determination of the adequacy of all

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protective measures to protect the public health and safety in the event of a nuclear power plant accident. (see 10 CFR, Part 50, Section 50.47 (a), (1) and (2).)

3. Commission standards for RERPc are contained in 10 CFR, Part 50, Sectim 50.47(b),(1-16); Part 50, Appendix E; and further by specified criteria in NURID 0654 FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1. (see said documents)

4. 3e following delineation of inadequacies or lack of sufficient arrangements by Appliemt with local governments are listed under the respectivo sub-paragraph numbers of Section 50.47 (b) of the 10 CFR

a. See 50.47(b)(1). Primary responsibilities for emergency response by local organizations within the EPZ have not been assigned, nor have the emergency responsibilities of the various supporting organizations been specifically established and each principal response organization lacks staff to respond and augment an initial response on a continuous basis.

(1). Local plans do not include letters of agreement with each local agency or organization indicating an acceptance of a response roll in the proposed RERP or SCP (Standard Operating Procedure). The assigrunent of a responsibility without its acceptance tv the agency or organization caicerned is not a valid assignment of such responsibility.

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1 (2). No acceptance of specific responsibilities, established in the proposed RERPs and SOPS, is indicated in said documents. l Assignment of a specific task to an individual must be accompanied by an acceptance of such responsibility by said individual or no assignment exists.

(3). Not all local organizations have staff to initiate and maintain a response on a continual basis. Personnel staffing is inadequate in many department /and agencies or organizations under nomal conditions.

b. See 50.47(b)(2). Interfaces among onsite response activities and all offsite support and response activities are not specified.

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(1). No interface exists between onsite and all local governments due to inadequate comnunications facilities and/or formal agreements.

c. See 50.47(b)(3). Arrangements for requesting and effectively using local assistance resources have not been made. l l

(1). All local assistance has not been identified, nor I have arrangements been made for their cooperation and participation in  !

l emergency response activities. Local response forces lack communications equipment, radio-protective eqtdpment, training, support equipment and funding to respond effectively.

(2). Formal interface with local governmental agents at l Applicant's ECF does not mitigate the need for dedicated consnunications l facilities for such agents use in contacting his local EOC. No such comnunications equipment has been identified or installed.

d. See 50.47(b)(4). A standard emergency classification system has been established, but no emergency action level scheme is included.

(1). Only emergency notification of personnel is included in the SOPS and the SOPS do not include specific actions to be taken.

(2). The proposed local plans do not include duties to be perforised by personnel when alerted (notified) or duty stations to Miich they report to perform said duties.

e. See 50.47(b)(5). Procedures have been established for notification, by the licensee, 'of State 'and local response organisations (local eheriffs' offices and the Missouri E.M.A. via the Missouri Highway Patrol), but no a

provision exists for notification of emergency personnel by all organizations who may respond or be needed to respond.

(1). County administrative judges may never be reached if they are away from their phones at home. The function of an administrative jadge is considered "part , time" and sane Courts sit one day a week.

(2). Sheriff's deputies, some fire personnel, police officers, and other emergency response' workers, to include sdiool bus drivers lack co:rrunications equipment if they are away from their home phones. Bus 4

drivers, especially, need communications equipment when they are enroute to and from schools with students. In such cases, without specific notice of required actions to be taken, children's health and safety is at risk.

f. See 50.47(b)(6). Provisions for prompt consr.unications between principal response organizations and emergency response personnel do not exist.

(1). Inadequate consunications facilities exist at all local governmental levela to comannicate effectively between all EOCs and i

emergency personnel in the field.

(a). Reliance on the Sheriff's radio net for the transmission of emergency traffic relating to a radiological emergency as well as the nomal law enforcement traffic it carries constitutes an overload to the system and interferes with the primary mission for sich the net was intended.

(2). No commnications networka or equipment for such nets exist for field use between operating units or for contact between field units and comand headquarters.

(a). Reliance on existing law enforcement or fire response nets is inadequate due to the short range of such existing equipment, dead spots in area coverage, and a potential for net overload as indicated above.

g. See 50.476)(7). Formal informational links do not exist between Applicant and all local governments impacted by the 10 mile EPZ. No letters of agreement have been signed by media personnel to perform public informational duties with.or without fees for auch services.

h. See 50.47(b)(8). Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support emergmcy response are not provided nor maintained at the local level of government.

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(1). Local governments do not have Emergency Operating Centers (EOCs), nor the equipment for the creation of such facility.

(2). Emergency response personnel do not have radiation protection equipment, conusunications equipment, nor is such available to them for use at the outset of a radiological accident at the power plant.

I 1. See 50.47(b)(9). Adequate methods, systems and equipment for t

assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are not in use or available at State or local government levels.

(1). No ability exists to detect or measure alpha emissions or presence of radio-iodines at State or local levels of government.

(2). No protective equipment is available to fire-fighters, law enforcement officers or other emergency workers who may man road-blocks or monitor evacuees leaving a contaminated or suspected contaminated

area.

(3). No pro-sited decontamination centers are identified or established for evacuees or emergency workers who may become contaminated as a result of a radiological accident at the plant.

(4). No facilities exist in the State of Missouri (except at the plant site) for evaluation of personnel exposures to radiation or their biological uptake of radio-nuclides.

e (5). Proposed use of Applicant's onsite facilities for evaluation of evacues and emergency workers radiological exposure and/or biological uptake of radio-nuclides is impractical in an evacuation situation wherein personnel are being directed away from the plant for safety reasons, also, Applicant has not authorised the on-site facilities for. such use by either State or local governments. (see State RERP, pg Fl.1)

j. See 50.47(b)(lo). A range of protective actions have not been developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers or the public which protect against radiation (direct or ingested), nor are such in place. Protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have not been developed.

(1). Evacuation is established in the State RERP as preferable to use of pottassium iodido (KI) as protection against inhalation / ingestion of radio-iodines; however, evacuation is considered secondary to in-place shelter as a protective measure. (see }O. RERP, pg B5 and B11)

(2). State of Missouri recommends use of folded man's handkerchist over the nose for respiratory protection (see M0. RERP, pg C21). This is not in accordance with provisions' of 10 CFR, part 20 or NRC Regulatory Guide 8.15 for respiratory protection devices.

l (3). Use of KI for omergency workers and tho general population

residing within the plume exposure pathway EPZ to protect the thyroid from the destructive effects of radio-iodines has been deemed by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to be both safe and effective. The Commission has no objection to such use and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) has issued KI for general use at Soddy / Daisy, Tenneesee. 1his

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I constitutes Federal guidance in this matter, also see EPA-520A-75-ool.

(4). No pre-located decontamination facilities are established 4

or identified for evacuees and/or emergency workers. Portable units are I not immediately available for use by contaminated individuals.

j k. See 50.47(b)(11). Means for controlling radiological exposures j of emergency workere at the local level of govemment have not been established.

(1). No protective equipment is available for each emergency worker, nor is there an adequate detection and measurement capability at State or local levels of government for alpha emissions or radio-iodines.

(see State RERP, pg DS, D51, A2B.2)

1. See 50.47(b)(12). Arrangements have not been made for medical services for contaminated, injured individuals (emergency workers and l

l residents living within the plume exposure pathway EPZ).

( (1). No agreements exist with local ambulance districts to transport such victime (patients).

(2). No agreements with ambulance districts outside the local area to provide transport for radiologically contaminated, injured individuals are in existance.

(3). No capability exists in the State of Missouri (outside Applicant's facility onsite) to fully measure radiological exposure or biological uptake of radio-nuclides. (see HD. RERP, pg F1.1)

(4). No agreement exists with Applicant to use its ensite

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_9-facility for biological evaluations of radiological exposure or uptake and such use would be impractical during an accident requiring facility evacuation.

rn. See 50.47(b)(13). No general plans for recovery or reentry are developed at the local level of government.

(1). A simple statement of reentry controls and authorization does not constitute a plan. No implementing instructims (detailed, step by stop procedures) exist for recovery / reentry or general area decontamination in State or local plans.

n. See 50.47(b)(lk). No local authority or organization has agreed to participate in either drills or exercises.

o. See 50.47(b)(15). No program for radiological . training exists outside of general guidance in the State of Missouri and Applicant's RERPs, nor have local emergency workers been trained in response procedures.

p. See 50.47(b)(16). Local planners do not exist at tal local governmental levels, nor are responsiblities for local emergency plan development, review and distribution established. No planners are trained I 1 I

at the local level of government, nor is a training program for auch planners l

in existance.

5. Applicant has emeshed itself in the local planning process by hiring the NUS Corporation of Rockville, Maryland to prepare local RERPs and S&s; additionally, Applicant employees have become actively involved in planning negotiations (which have proven unsuccessful to date). Such acts by Applicant negate any claim by Applicant that it han no active roll or responsibilities in resolving the inadequacies / deficiencies indicated abOV8

SUMMARY

Applicant must submit radiological emergency response plans of State and local governmental entietics in the United States that are wholly or partially within the plume exposure pathway EPZ with its application for an operating license.

No force exists wit $1n law to compel States or local governments to prepare RERPs that confom to Commissica standards or upgrade existing emergency response capabilities and maintain such to support an applicant's commercial venture.

Applicant must obtain the voluntary support of State and local governments if it is to obtain an operating licznse from the Commission. No alternative exists for Applicant except to bargain with such governmental entieties for such support as is needed or defer from seeking an operating license. A bargain consists of giving sorr.ething in order to receive something (in law,

" quid pro quo"). Nowhere is " quid pro nihil" (this for nothing) been the basis for a fair and equitable agreement; such an agreement is termed as unfair and hence illegal (a fool's contract).

Based upon the inadequacies listed, above, and the absence of a fomally accepted local governr.cntal RERP for each local governmental entiety located wholly or partially within the plume exposure pathway EPZ, Mr. Reed's Contention Number 1, must be validated by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.

End Contention No.1

REED'S CONTENTION NO. 2

" Funding of local government to meet radiological safety response capability has not been adequately addressed by NRC, FEMA, or other Federal Agency. Failure to resolve the problem of funding for emerreacy planning and response capability at the local level of government will result in a placing of responsibility for supporting commercial nuclear power plants upon governnental jurisdictions which do not have the financial ability to meet established NRC criteria for the protection of public health and safety. This is a contradiction of Connicsion policy and intent (PS-31, 44 FR 6H23, 10/23/79). To defer action on this matter until after the Callaway Plant is in operation can adversly affect the health and safety of the public as regards any radiological incident due to the operation of this facility."

DISCUSSICH The Commission has acknowledged an immediate need at all levels of government, beginning at the lowest and going to the highest, for access to immediate additional funds to upgrade response capabilities. This is clearly delleniated in 10 CFR, part 50, Statements of Consideration, pg 50 ,3C-62, Issue L: Funding, at 45 FR 55402; and NUREG 0553, Beyond- Defense-In-Depth, a final Corsdssion Staff Report on coat and funding of State and local governcent radiological emergency response plans and preparedness in support of commercial nuclear power stations, it was found that in the issue of funding, there were basically three central issues: (Ch 7, pg II-100)

"'Ihe assurance of adequate funds to the local Civil Defense / Emergency Services in the jurisdiction that is hosting the nuclear power station and receiving taxes, or the equivalent, from the operating utility.

The assurance of adequate funds to local Civil Defense / Emergency Services in jurisdictions neighboring the host jurisdiction that are not receiving taxes, or the equivalent, fmn the operating utility.

i The assurance of continuity over time of adequate funds to the local Civil Defense / Emergency Services of all impacted jurisdictions."

It was concluded that NRC should draft and propose legislation that would create a fund for State and local governments. Such recomendation has not been taken seriously, nor has such legis1ntion been drafted or proposed for passage by the Federal Governrent.

l In a letter to Honorable Paul McCloskey, U.S. House of Representatives, dated 26 June 1979, Mr. Joseph M. Hendrie, then Chairman of the NRC, said, "I also want to note the very important question of providing financini assintance for some States and local governments to put in place effective emergency planning measures. - - - The quer. tion of funding for emergency planning, at leant at the local level, would seem to be an appropriate matter to include in our rule-making proceeding.- ."

Such letter was incorporated into Union Calendar No. 234, 96th Congress, 1st Session - Houss' Report No. 96-L13, NRC Oversight - 4th Report.

Without an adequate source of funding at the local level of government to implement the protective actions indicated in RERPs, such plans are reduced to administrative assignments of responsibilities that cannot be ful filled. While minor drills and incomplete exercises may be conducted on a place-meal basis to show some degree of response proficiency, no real evaluation of response effectiveness will be made until an accident occurs and the paper-work plan is tested under real conditions. It is then, that the inability to implement the required orotective reepense actions will be scon; unfortunately, it will be too late to effectively correct the situation so that the public health and safety is assured.

Proper planning for any operation consists of determining what is to be the intent of the mission or task, deciding how to best accomplish the task, evaluating the manpower and equipment needed, figuring out the time needed to accomplish the mission, making arrangements for logistical support over that time frame, assuring adequate coranunications exist at all echelons, and insuring that sufficient funding is available to obtain and retain all of the men and material needed for training and to accomplish the mission.

A deficiency in any of these areas reduces the effectiveness of the entire operation; funding is the basis for all hspects of the mission, for without

money, planners cannot be hired, equipment cannot be purchased, emergency workers cannot be hired / paid, instructors cannot be hired, workers cannot be trained, retrained or proficiencies maintained over time.

To apnrove radiological evergency response plant which do not have the support of " full funding" is, therefore, an acceptance of sub-standard plans and is in contradictiori to the mission of the Commission to protect e

the public health and safety.

SUMMARY

The Corranission has duly recognized the need for additional funding for local governcents to prepare REP.Ps and to upgrade emergency response capabilities. 'lhe Staff and a past Chairman of the Corraission has noted the need for the NRC to take action to correct this situation. Failure to resolve this matter in a timely manner places a burden on local governments to realistically meet the standards set by the Commission in plans and preparedness. In accepting responsibilities which they cannot fulfill, i local governments place the health and safety of their citizens in jeopardy.

l l This violates the mis, ion of the Commission and stated Commission policy as regards this matter.

Er.d Contention 2 REED'S CONTENTION NO. 3 "There has not been an adequate definition of the allocation of responsibilities for offsite emergency planning between state and local organizations, as provided in NUREG-0654."

DISCUSSION NC.C fM4 PE!'A-Rr.P-1, Rev.1, Nove-ber 3 9% (identifled an NUEEG-OUh, her enfter) clearly states that guidance contnined therein is final

ruidrince (9co NUP1G-0654; I; B. Backcround; pernrrnph 2; lir.c 1).

l FEf'i and fi?.C regard all of the pinnnirg standurds identi fied and contained in NUEG-0654 as ea :entitti rar nn adeqarite rn jiological emergency plan (coe !! LEG-06S4; I; C. . cope, parn,;rm. P, li at sentence) .

Tne concept of EPZs necesucrily imolies natually supportive err.ergency l planning and preparegness arrange:..ents by :>everG 1evels of government:

Federal, State and local governa.cnts, incit. ding counties, townships and even villages (see IWU 06%; I; 6. Contiruous-Jurisdicticm Governmental therrency Planning; sentir.ce 1).

'Aile it is not possible to totally specify er.ch class or type of orgr.nization that any be involved in the total emergency planning and preparedness schere, ncr is it possible to define the particular roles, function and renponsibilit.. ins of " principal orruiz .tions" nnd "sub-orgnnizations"; Whero the "fuidance" in ?i' Rim 0/>54 indientes a function thrt must by, refor:ned, eargency plancers at all Invels, rnuat decide and agrec among themnelven, .hich erganizatio_n _is .to. nerform such function.

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l a r:dnimum, one lead agency at the St, ate level and one lead local governmer.t agency having 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> r.anning is . required (see NUEG-0654; Appendix 5; Private C actor (organizationa); entire pr:ragraph followir.r, this definition).

"Pl" inning Star.dard" is defined as the standtrd thEt must g .rct for oncite end offsite i.eergency pln:,n and prep . redness (see NUEG 0654; Appendix 5; iefinition on nage 3-4). Such "p1tnninE standards" are contained in I;UftEG-C654; II. Plannirm .;tnndards and tvaluntior " rit eri a. ~he evaluaticn criteria used to asrure comeliance of cuch p1;c: ina; str..ndard is included l in t r e section refercriced above, as are indications of the applicability I

placed beneath of such standards and evaluation crit eria. The letter "X" the column identified as " Applicability and Cross Refermee to Plans",

under sub-columns titled " Licensee", " State", and " Local" indicates whether or not the planning standard applies to all governmental entities and the licensee or to only selected entities or the licensee. Example:

- Planning standard II, B. Onsite Emergency Organization (NUREG 0654, pages 34 through 39) aoplies to Licensee exclusively. Such intent is clearly shown by the placing of the letters "X" under the sub-colum l

" Licensee" and the omission of such marks under the other 2 sub-colunris.

- Planning standard II, G. Public Education and Information (NUREG 0654, pages 49 through 51) applies to " Licensee", " State", and Local" in that the letters "X" appear under each title below the column marked Applicability and Cross Reference to Plans. The exception to all of this evaluation criteria being so applicable, is the elimination of the letters "X" under the cub-columns " State" and " Local" under evaluaticri criteria 3.b. This criteria states that "Each licensee shall provide space - ."

which clearly excludes placing any requirement on State or local governments.

- Planning standard II, J. Protective Response (NURID 0654, page 64, item 11)

Item 11 states, "Each Stato shall - .", and the letter "X" is placed only under the sub-column marked " State"; clearly providing guidance that this item applies exclusively to the State and Stato, alone.

The placement of these letters "X" under the sub-columns identified above, clearly fulfills the requirement of " guidance" as indicated in NUREG 0654, Appendix 5. Since such " guidance" mandates one lead agency at the State level and one lead local governnent agency having 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> manning (as a ndnimum) be available to perform a required function, the absence of such

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a capability at either State or local level of government will validate Mr. Reed's Contention No. 3. Because of a lack of adequate definition of responsibilities by planners, the following inadequacies ir. State and local planning exists and can only be corrected by application of the full guidance and intent of the Conalssion as clearly indicated in the above cited docurr.entation:

, PLANNING INADffQUxCIES Re following items are referenced to the planning standards and criteria listed in NUREG 0654 FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1:

1. Not all local or private sector response agencies have been identified as required in criteria A,1.a. Failure to include fire protection distr.i ets in all counties, abulance compardes, <

etc. will be verified by absence of such in plans and tcctimony of individuals in such Ar.encies.

2. Concepts of operations and relations to tr.e total effort is not specified as required in A,1.b. for each organiaction or sub-organisation. The failure of hospitals, ambulance districts, fire departments, bus companies, trucking conpanies and law enforcerc.ent arsncies to indicate how they will function will be verified by the abenee of such speci fication in plans and by individual teclimony as requi red.

3 No identifiestion of the individual in charco nse becn included for e ich orgv.! zati on as required in A ,3.e.

4. Not all authorities for inclusion of incorporated c.ities, toens, or villages in county reponse activities nr" contained in local PJT.Ps as requ: red in A,2.b. Absence of such yreen.ents/contr; cts and official testimeny will verify this item.

3. Not c11 State / local governrer.ta] vgenciets and other curport organizations have <ritten tcrovnnts ir, dical ter acceptence of emer6ency measures to be providei, mutually accenteble criteria or arrangements for exchrnge of inforrr.ntion t.3 required in A,2.&3.

6. Not all princip'd cry,enizationn Sr:ve. .:4 hour o;, erat.ienal capability for protracted periods au requirei by , ,4. Volunteer organizations cannot provjde Jr.divid'tals on any but ahort term operations.

7. IORPs fail to ident.ify facilities, organizations and individuals who con be relied uoon for emergency assistence as required by C,4. Absence of letters of agreement with facilities, organizations and individuals (bue, drivers, truck drivers, monitor personnel, etc.)

and testimony of auch individuals chall support this item if needed.

8. No procedures are in place to provide for emergency actions as required in D,4. No M.RP/30P cutlines snecific actions to be taken if emerger.cy actions are recommended by the Applicant.

9. No organization (including sub-organizations) has a procedure for alerting /nctifying/ mobilization at the local levels of government as required by E,2. Week-ends, non-duty hours, etc. are not l

provided for in local PlRPs.

10. No written messages contain instructions with regard to srecific actions to be taken by occupants of affected areas as regards effective respiratory protection and thyroid protection as required s

in E,7. for short tena or protracted shelter or evacuation. Absence of such information in R:RPs ar.d bops will verify this item.

H. No commur.ications facilities exLst for sustained cortmunications between local EOCs and emergency response field teams, or between l

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r. embers of such field teams at separate sites, to include support I

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services that may be required as specified in F,1.d.

12 No provisions are included in local RERPs for alerting / activating emergency personnel in eact} response organization as required in F,1.e.

13 No coordinated corrunications for fixed and mobile medical support exists in all local governments as required in F,2.

14. No EOF exists at all local governments as required in H,3

15. No local radiological monitor equipment capable of detecting er measuring iodines or alpha particles exists in the vicinity of the nuclear facility as called for in H,7.

16. No reserve equipment is provided as required in H,10.

17. No protective, communications, radiological monitoring equipment and emergency supplies is appendixed to local RERPs as required in H,11.

18. No central point for receipt and analysis of all field monitor data and sample media exists at local government levels as required in H,12.

19. No local resources or capability for local field monitoring within the PEP exists as specified in 1,7.

20. No State or local capability exists to provide methods, equipment, and expertise to make rapid assessinents of radiological hazards, including activation, notification means, field team composition, transport, cormunication, ironitor equipment and estimated deployment times as required in I,6.

21. The State of luscouri has no capability to measure radioiodine l levels as low as 10-7 uCi/cc under field conditions as required in I,9. See State RERP, page 42B.2 (time lost implementing IRAP

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violates item I,8. standard for " rapid ascesement".

2?. No separate procedures are published (none referenced in State RERP) by the State of Missouri to meet the requirements of I,10 23 No provisions are included in State or local RERPs to comply with the criteria requirerents of J,2.

24. No licensee action is noted in State or local RERPs to indicate how or where an individual arriving on site during an emergency will receive protective clothing, respiratory / thyroid protection as required by J ,6.a.b.c.

25. No formal means (mechanisms) are indicated for prompt, direct recommendation of protective actions to all local governments as required in J,7. No command communication net' exists in RihPs.

26. No capability exists at any local level of governnent to implement protective measures regarding human and animal foods as required in'J,9. No succific actions are defined in the State RERP.

27. State and local RERPs do not indicate creselected radiation samule or monitor points, relocation centers or shelter areas as required in J ,10.a.

28. Local RERPs do not include orotection for persons of impaired mobility as requi red in J,10.d.

29. No provisions exist in RERPs to imp]ement J,e. & f. (KI for emergency workers and civil populace) as required. See MO. RERP, pg Bll.

30. No local RERPS contain methods for identification of potential impediments or contain ect.tengency measures as required in J,k.

31. No time estimates are centained in State / local RERPs, per J,1.&c.

32. State RERP does not set out rethods of protection of public from ingestion of rad-contaminated foods, or criteria for deciding

whether dairy aninals shall be put on stored feed, detection of contamination, estinating dose consequences of uncontrolled ingestion or imposing protective measures, etc. per J,ll.

33. No r.eans of registration / monitoring of r encuees at all host areas at local governmental levels for the f; - G 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period, per J,12. is included in State or local RERPs. Additionally, ne means of eqptrol of traffic from evacuation areas to host areas is identified in said MJiPs.

34. No capability exists at State or local government to meet the requirements of K,3.a.b., nor is such included in said RERPs.

35 No local organization has established a decision chain for authorizing radiological exposures in excess of EPA PAGs per K,4.

36. No State or local action levels have been estimated for the determination of a need for decontamination as required in K,5.a.

nor do provisions to comply with K,5.b. exist in plans.

37. No arrangements for local and backup hospital and medical service with a capability to evaluate and measure radiological exposure and biological uptake or that persons providing such services are prepared to handle contaminated persons as required in L,1.

38 Not all local governments or State has arranged for transport of victims of radiological accidents to medical sunport facilities as required in L,4.

39 No State or local REhPs indicate plans and procedures for reentry and recovery exist (except for cimple statements that such is under the control of the Presiding Judge) or are the peans indicated by which the allowing of relaxation of protective measures is permitted ha snecified in M,1.

40. The State RERP does not ine:ude the means of informing the members of response organizations that recovery is to be initiated or at what radiation levels recovery response is i

possible/ practical as required $n M,3.  ;

41. Neither State or local RrAPs provide methods of estimating total population exposures to radiation /nuclides as required in M,4.

42. No agreemen)s by local response organj zations to participate in exercises or drills is included in local RERPs as provided for in N,; N,1.b.; N,2.a.c.d.

43 No local RERP has a description of how exercises / drills will be carried out as required in N,3

44. No local RERP identifies an official observer by name or title as specified in N,4.

45 No local means for evaluation of observer / participant comments exist in RERPs as required in N,5

46. No radiological emergency response is proposed for local personnel in all political entities as specified in 0,; 0,1.a.b.; 0,4 & 5.

Current plans call for no radiation monitor equipment in local hands.

47. No local RERP provides for compliance with planning criteria au required in P. ; P.l. ,6. ,7. , & 1p.

48 No capability for local remote interrogation of meterological data and effluent transport and diffusion estinates exist at county EOCs or at the State EOC as outlined on page 2-4, Appendix 2.

49. No system to provide an alerting cignal under the provisions of Anpendix 3, B & C is physice.lly in place.

50. No one lead local government agency having 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> manning has been approve 1 by each local government for each funct. ion required

o to be performed as is establiched as a mininum in Appendix 5, lines 18 through 22, pago 5-2.

End Planning Inadequacie,s because local planning has been taken over by the Applicant, local jurisdictions are being led by Appliennt to accept responsibilities and no actual upgrade of, capabilities is being considered. State planners are of no assistance to local governments because of their unwavering support for the Applicant's solution for each viewed inadequacy identified by local governmental leaders. This pressure tactic almost completely eliminates an ability to insist on realistic standards of emergency response, equipment viewed as necessary, functions to be pcrformed at local levels of

~

government in initial accident stagen, etc. by officialn who have no expertise in either plans or operations or knowledge of radiological hazards. Because l of this situation, the inadequacies listed above, and the standards and I

criteria requirements established by the NRC, as identified above, Mr. Reed feels that the Board must validate his Contention No. 3 "e pectfully submitted, Dated this 28th day John G. Reed of June 1982, at Citizen of the United Statos Kingdom City, Missouri of America RFD #1 Kingdom City, 65262 tel: (314) 642-2769

O UMITr.D STATr517 AVfAICA NUCL%R RFEULAICRY cot?!!3EION TF.FOllE, THr: ATCX!C SAFiTY A.ND LICIISING NIARD in the YaLLor er )

)

UNION ELECTRIC COM'ANY ) Loc' vet No. S'IN .WM3

)

(Calbway Plant, Unit 1) )

CrTiTIFICAT1; 0F SFJtVTCE I hereby certify that the document, attachr.d hereto was served this g? $ day of ,19P2 by deposit in the U.S. mall, first class postar,e prepaid upon the following:

James P. Gleason, Esquire Mr. Glenn C. Bright Chairrnan, Atomic Safety and Atomic Safety and Licensing Donni Licensing Board Panel Panel 513 Gihnoure Drive U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Silver Spring, Marylsnd 20901 Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Jerry R. Kline Docketing and Service Section Atomic Safety and Licensing Office of the Secretary Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Roy P. Lessy, Jr., Esquire Kenneth M. Chackes, Esquire Office of the Executive Legal Director Chackes and Hoare U.S. Nuclear Reguletory Corraission -

314 N. Broadway Washington, D.C. 20555 St. Louis, MO. 63102 A. Scott Cauger, Esquire

. Thomas A. Baxter, Esquire Assister.t General Countcl Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge MO. Public Service Comission 1800 M. Street, N.W. P.O. Box 360 Washington, D.C. 20036 Jeffereon City, MG. 65102 Ato.7 tic Safety and Licensing Robert Wright, Ju<!ge Eastern Dict.

Appeal Eoard Callway County Court U.S . Nuclear ilegulatory Co-r . s ion Ccunty Court. house Washington, D.C. 20555 Fulten, Missouri 65251 J r-hn G . het Citi'"?. < t' t t . e '. h ' *. % S t.atsm of Arnerica