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m U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION REGION I DIVISION OF COMPLIANCE Report of Inspection CO Report No. 47/68-3 Licensee:
U.
S.. ARM'l MATERIALS AND MECHANICS RESEARCH CENTER License No. R-65 Category E Dates of Inspection:
October 28 and 29, 1968 Dates of Previous Inspection:
April 24 and 25, 1968 Inspected by:
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G. L. Madsen, Reactor Inspector date'
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Reviewed by :
& 28 N.
C'. Moseley, Senifr Reactor Inspector D' ate Proprietary Information:
None SCOPE An announced routine visit was made to the U. S. Army Materials and Mechanics Research Center (AMMRC), 2 Mwt research reactor, at Watertown, Massachusetts.
The inspector was accompanied by MI. F.
S. Cantrell, Reactor Inspector.
SUMMARY
Sa fety Items - None Noncomoliance Items - None Unusual Occurrences - None Status of Previously Recorted Problems - None 8204210261 011005 PDR FOIA KABAT-Z81-311 PDR
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Other Significant Items - The AMMRC minimum operator coverage criteria fulfills the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54-(m).
(Section B)
Twenty reactor scrams were encountered in the past seven. months.
(Section C)
The fire protection coverage was reviewed and found to be adequate.
(Sect' ion D) operation with two primary loops has been initiated.
(Section E.2) a o douw o r th. ma.a s u re m e n t s-have not been made since the initial startup of the reactor.
(Section F.3)
Manacement Interview - The inspector held an exit interview with Mr. O'Connor at the conclusion of the visit.
Items discussed included:
1.
Reactor Scrams The reasons for the reactor scrams during the last seven months were reviewed.
Mr. O'Connor indicated the scram frequency did not appear excessive in that the majority of the scrams were associated with two problems, the cause of which were somewhat difficult to detect.
In addition, he stated that each condition did not represent unsafe situations.
2.
Primarv Svstem Reactor operation with two primary loops in service was discussed.
Mr. O'Connor indicated an intent to continue checking cut this mcde of operation in conjunction with the future intent of alsing reactor pcwer to 5 Mwt.
3.
Control Rod Worths The inspector indicated that the available control rod worth information appears to be short of optimum.
Mr. O'Connor indicated an inherent problem in calibration
n of rods with a beryllium reflector in that the in-hour equation does not accurately apply.
He indicat4d that the rods would be calibrated with the new core loading in mid-November, 1968, and that an effort is being made to come up with a gcod rod calibracion technique for this facility with the beryllium reflector.
Mr. O'Cennor agreed to discuss dae rod calibration data with the inspector en completien of the measurements.
4.
Centainment Pressure Relief Device The existence of a water leg centainment pressure relief device was discussed.
The inspector indicated that DRL is presently evaluating the acceptability of this device and the results would be discussed during a subsequent vis it.
5.
Fuel Stortge Monitorinc The inspector indicated that the existing monitoring program, for the annular pool, does not meet the written requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 regarding storage of fuel elements; however, no immediate actions would be. required of AMMRC since there is some question of.the applicability of this regulation to reactor pools.
Mr. O'Connor stated that he intended to await further information en this subject prior to initiation of any changes.
6.
Containment Isolation valves The existence of one inlet and exhaust containment valve was discussed.
Mr. O'Connor stated that work is in progress on answering a DRL question relative to meeting the single failure criterien for containment isolation.
DETAILS A.
Persons Centacted Mr. Jack O'C nnor, Chief, Nuclear Research Laboratory Mr. Paul O'Connor, Assistant to Chief, Nuclear Research Lab.
Mr. Charles Dady, Health Physicist
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B.
Administration and Organization 1.
Personnel Colonel James C.
Bennett has replaced General Gerace as Director of AMMRC.
Colonel Bennett's experience is strongly directed towards administration.
The reactor operational staff has been stable.
The present staff includes four senior operators and two reactor operators that have active licenses for the AMMRC facility.
One additional operater is presently in training andris scheduled to take a reactor operator licensing test in the 'near future.
The inspector asked what AMMRC considered to be the minimum operator coverage.
Mr. J. O'Connor stated that a minimum of two licensed reactor operators are present during reactor operation, one of which must be a senior reactor operator.
This mode of reactor coverage fulfills the requirement of 10 CFR 50.54 (m).
2.
Reactor Safeguards Committee The reactor safeguards committee conducted five meetings during the last six months.
Items discussed included:
a.
Review and approval of several updated operating procedures.
b.
Review of proposed material irradiations, c.
Semi-annual review of reactor operations.
C.
Coerations The reactor is operated on an eight-hour day, five days per week basis.- Evaluation of the effects of the recently approved
- two heat exchanger mcde of operation is in progress.
A review of records indicated to the inspector that the reactor had been operated within the 2 Mwt limit.
Observations by the inspector of a reactor startup on October 29, 1968, indicated adequate opera-tional control.
- License Change No.
2.
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. The proposed Safety Analysis Report and Technical Specification for 5 Mwt operation is still under consideraticn by DRL.
AMMRC has been requested
- to submit additional information.
Mr. O'Connor stated that the information would be submitted in the near future.
A review of records indicated that 20 reactor scrams were encountered during the past seven months of operations.
The causes of the scrams were as folicws:
Causes Number l
Lcw Magnet Current - Rod No. 3 12 Lcw Magnet Current - Red No. 1 1
startup Channel - Cable 5
Startup Channel Chamber Pcsition 1
Operator Error
_1._
20 A review of reasons provided for scrams revealed that these events did not represent unsafe conditions.
D.
Facility Precedures 1.
Fire Protection A review of fire protection procedures revealed the folicwing:
a.
Numercus fire extinguishers are available throughout the facility.
A spot check, by the inspector, indi-cated that these extinguishers receive periodic servicing.
b.
The licensee has a written fire plan.
The plan specifies respcnsibilities and appropriate actions.
c.
AMMRC has assigned post and building fire marshals.
- Letter to Army Material and Meenanics Research Center from D.J. Skovholt, Division of Reactor Licensing, daued Octcher 9, 1968.
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The local Watertcwn Fire Department furnishes fire coverage.
e.
If fire were to cccur in the reactor censole,.the reactor would scram by tripping of one of the~various scram devices.
The reactor does not require re-circulation ficw during shutdown, hence the facility could be evacuated in case of fire without significantl.
affecting nuclear safety.
The inspector feels that adequate equipment and instructions are available at the facility.
2.
Oeerstina Precedures An inspection by the military inspection team in June 1968, revealed apparent operation precedure deficiencies.
A review of the subj ect procedures, by the inspector, revealec that these deficiencies had been adequately resolved by updating and correcting the precedures or review by the AMMRC reactor safeguard cc=mittee indicated that no change was required.
E.
Primarv Svstem 1.
Reactor Pool The leak rate through the recently installed stainless steel 2iner continues to be about 2 gallens per day.
2.
Primary Coolant Svstem The facility was being operated with two parallel heat exchangers in service as authorized by change No. 1 of the reactor license.
Primary ficw was 1550 gallons per minute.
Upon inquiry, Mr. O'Connor stated that no unusual conditions had been encountered with the two primary loop operation; hcwever, the radiation dcae level had approxi-mately doubled in the vicinity of the heat exchangers with the decrease in primary water holdup time.
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7-F.
Reactivity Centrol and Core Physics 1.
Control Reds The control rods were visually inspected by the licensee in October 1968.
No flaw s or adverse' conditions were detected.
Twelve reactor scrams have cccurred during the last 6 months, as a result of insufficient red magnet holding strength during withdrawal of red No. 3.
The rod drive shifts were straightened in September 1968, in an endeavor to eliminate possible mechanical friction areas.
No scrams from this condition were enccuntered daring the subsequent 1-1/2 months.
2.
Start-un Channel Instrumentation Five reactor scrams were encountered as a result of false indications frem the start-up channel.
The cause of the condition was determined to be asscciated with a faulty cable plug between the chamber and amplifier.
No scrams were encountered during the subsequent two months.
3.
Reactivity Control, The inspector inquired as to the availability of rod worth curves for the present loading configuration.
Mr. O'Connor stated that the only rod calibration curves avairable are those which were taken during the initial checkout of the reactor.
Since that date, the original boron carbide rods have been replaced with baron stainless steel rods.*
Mr. O'Connor indicated that the replacement red worths were established by comparison with the originally calibrated -
rods.
The inspector questioned the validity of the re-activity numbers and their accuracy when used to determine excess reactivity and shutdown margins.
Mr. O'Connor stated that the facility has interlocks and procedures which require rods to be at a shim range at criticality and that the minimum amount that the reactor would be subcritical when
- Amendment No. 4, License No. R-65.
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. shutdown, with all safety rods inserted, would be greater than the reactivity worth of the maximum worth rod.
Zir. O'Connor also indicated that incremental red worths have compared favorably with the calculated xenon centribu-tions during operation.
Upon further questioning, Mr.
O'Connor agreed that the xenon centribution versus red worths applied only to a portion of the reds and that the incremental red compcsition, frcm the rods inserted posicion to the shim range interlock position, are assumed to be equivalent to the remainder of the rod.
He also indicated that the reactivity worths of the stainless reds,. were equivalent to the original reds at the shim range position.
In addition, Mr. O'Connor stated that reloading of the core was scheduled to begin in mid-Ncvember 1968, at which time the rods would be calibrated.
K.
Containment 1.
Pressure Relief Device The acceptability of the previcusly reported
- water leg containment pressure relief device was reviewed.
The inspector inquired as to the desireability of having an automatic refill device available.
Mr. O'Connor : stated that the pressure relief device would not be affected by the maximum reactor accident because the relief pressure point is greater than the attained containment pressure.
The real purpose of the relief device was to prevent over-l pressurization of the containment in the event of an in-advertent release of compressed air.
Mr. O'Connor also indicated thz the AMMRC reactor is not presently required to have a relief device.
The inspector indicated that the i
water leg pressure relief device is presently being evaluated by DRL in conjunction with the AMMRC proposed safety analysis.**
- CO Report No. 47/68-2, Section K.
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- Safety Analysis Report for AMMRC Reactor dated July 5, 1968.
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Containment Isolation The containment inlet and exhaust isclation valve systems were reviewed.
The inspector noted that only ene: valve damper exists at the inlet and exhaust line.
The dampers can be manually operated or automatically operated as a result of high containment radicactivity levels.
Mr.
O'Connor informed the inspector that work is in progress towards answering a DRL questien*
relative to the meeting of the single failure criterien for containment isolation.
A review of records indicated no valve malfunctions during functional checking since 1966.
The inspector indicated that the subject of single isolation dampers would be discussed with DRL and the results will be included in the DRL evaluation of AMMRC proposed Safety Analysis.
N.
Emercencv Power Mr. O'Connor indicated to the inspector that the emergency pcwer generator is no-load tested on a weekly basis by the post engineers.
The post engineer indicated that no malfunctions of the generator had been encountered to date and that test records were available l
for review, P.
Radiation Protection 1.
Personnel Excesures A review of personnel film badge records for the period January through September 1968, revealed a maximum exposure of 500 mrem which is below the 10 CFR 20 limits.
2.
Bear Tubes A review of survey records indicated to the inspector, that adequate shielding was made available folicwing the
- Letter to Army Materials and Mechanic Research Center from l
D.J. Skovholt, Division of Reactor Licensing, dated October 9, 1968.
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. reactor modification cutage.
Future activities of one beam tube facility will necessitate a need for.a "High Radiation" zone control area.
The inspector noted that photo-electric cells were being installed at the entry to the beam port area.
Upen inquiry, Mr. O' Conner stated that the photo cell wculd be wired to produce a signal at the location and in the centrol rocm and wculd be in service prior to initiation of beam port activities which might cause the existence of a "High Radiation" zone.
The inspector noted that plastic tubes had been connected to the vent tubes for the active beam ports.
Upon inquiry Mr. O'Connor stated that the centainment Ar-41 activity ha increased as a result of the recent beam tube modification.
and necessitate corrective action.
He stated that the temporary plastic vent lines were installed and are connected to the stack exhaust duct.
This arrangement appears to have corrected the containment activity problem Mr. O'Connor indicated that permanent vent lines are scheduled to be installed.
3.
Hes: Exchancer Area The inspector found the heat exchanger area to be designate as a high radiation area.
Control devices were in service that fulfill the requirements of 10 CFR 20, paragraph 20.2C for high radiation areas.
4.
Fuel Storace Monitorine The applicability of 10 CFR 70, paragraph 70.24, to the storage of fuel elements in the reactor annular pool, was discussed with Mr. O'Connor.
The inspector informed Mr. O'Connor that DRL is presently reviewing
- this subj ect as it applies to storage of fuel at all reactor facilities.
A review of the available monitoring devices revealed the.
following:
The pool top radiation monitor is the only area a.
i monitor that is relevant to this subject.
It is located at the surface of the water, above the
- Memorandum fr0m J. P. O'Reilly, CO:HQ to R. T. Carlsen, CO:I, dated August 6, 1968.
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reactor core.
The storage annulus is shield'ed from this monitor by about 16 inches of concrete.
b.
The normal alarm set point for the pool top monitor is 100 mr/hr.
Readings during reactor operation at 2 Mwt are 8 to 10 mr/h-i c.
The pool top monitors are operated continuously, even during shutdown.
The alarm point could be lowered, if required, by procedural control.
The inspector indicated that the existing monitoring program for the annual pool, does not appear to meet the written requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 regarding storage of fuel elements; however, no immediate actions would be required due to the pending resolution of this subj ect by DRL.
s Q.
Radioactive Waste Svstems 1.
Liquid Ef fluent A review of records for the period January through September, 1968, indicated that 32,000 gallons of liquid i
waste had been discharged to sanitary sewer.
The concentration of activity was below 'the limits of 10 CFR 20.
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Gaseous Effluent l
l A review of gaseous release records for the period January through September, 1968, indicated a maximum average monthly activity release of 4 x 10-11 uci/ml of particulate material and 1.65 x 10-6 uCi/ml of gaseous activity.
Application of the authorized dilution factor of 10-10 seconds per cubic centimeter revealed the gaseous releases ~
to be within the limits of 10 CFR 20.
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Reliability Information 1.
The control rods were visually inspected.
No flaws were detected.
(Section F.1.)
2.
A review of maintenance records revealed that varicus periodic checks had been completed.
The ccmpleted checksr included:
(a) red inspection, (b) pool temperature calibration, (c) twenty second period calibration, (d) operational check of containment dampers, and (e) checking of high radiation alarms which are located in the guard house.
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