ML20044E507
| ML20044E507 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 05/03/1993 |
| From: | Hopkins W, Lesser M, William Orders, John Zeiler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20044E484 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-413-93-09, 50-413-93-9, 50-414-93-09, 50-414-93-9, NUDOCS 9305250094 | |
| Download: ML20044E507 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000413/1993009
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 MARIET1 A STREET, N.W.
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ATt.ANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.:
50-413/93-09 and 50-414/93-09
Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, N.C.
28242
Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414
License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52
Facility Name:
Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted: March 14, 1993 - April 10, 1993
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Inspector:
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6AW. T. O ders Senior Re51 den Inspector
Date Signed
Inspector:[
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Inspector:
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fg4 J. Zeiler', Resident Injpector Q
Date Signed
Approved by:
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Mark S. Lesser, Chief
Date Signed
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Projects Section 3A
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, resident inspection was conducted in the areas of
review of plant operations, surveillance observations, maintenance
observations, licensee event reports; and follow-up of previously
identified items.
Results:
One violation was identified involving the failure of a qualified
technician to properly supervise a non-qualified individual during
motor maintenance on the 2A Safety Injection pump. The non-
qualified individual reassembled the inboard motor bearing to the
motor incorrectly, resulting in the motor failure when the pump
was operated (paragraph 5.c).
Two Non-Cited Violations were identified involving 1) the failure
to perform two Technical Specification surveillances of available
offsite power sources (paragraph 4.c), and 2) the failure to
perform Technical Specification surveillances of the Containment
Spray system and Phase B Isolation logic circuitry (paragraph 7).
9305250094 93o503
ADDCK 05000413
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One licensee weakness was identified in the maintenance area
involving a problem with pre-defined maintenance Work Order
documents not specifying the correct procedures to be used
(paragraph 5.c).
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REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
S. Bradshaw, Shift Operations Manager
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J. Forbes, Engineering Manager
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R. Futrell, Regulatory Compliance Manager
- T. Harrall, Safety Assurance Manager
- J. Lowery, Compliance Specialist
- W. McCollum, Station Manager
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W. Miller, Operations Superintendent
M. Tuckman, Catawba Site Vice-President
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Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
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NRC Resident Inspectors
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W. Orders
P. Hopkins
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- J. Zeiler
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- Attended exit interview.
Acronyms and abbreviations used throughout this report are listed in the
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last paragraph.
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2.
Plant Status
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Unit 1 Summary
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Unit 1 operated at or near full power for the entire report period.
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Unit 2 Summary
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Unit 2 began the report period in Mode 5 and day 44 of a planned 65 day
refueling outage. The unit achieved criticality on March 30 and ZPPT
was initiated. Following completion of ZPPT testing, reactor power was
escalated to Mode 1 on April 1, and the main generator was placed on
line that afternoon completing the outage four days early.
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Following the completion of power escalation testing, the unit achieved
100 percent power on the afternoon of April 5 and operated at or near
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full power for the remainder of the report period.
3.
Plant Operations Review (71707)
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a.
General Observations
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The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the report
period to verify conformance with regalatory requirements, TS and
administrative controls.
Control Room logs, the Technical
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Specification Action Item Log, and the R&R log were routinely
reviewed.
Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were
conducted in accordance with approved procedures. The complement
of licensed personnel on each shift inspected, met or exceeded the
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requirements of Technical Specifications.
Further, daily plant
status meetings were routinely attended.
Plant tours were performed on a routine basis. The areas toured
included but were not limited to the following:
Turbine Buildings
Auxiliary Building
Units I and 2 Diesel Generator Rooms
Units 1 and 2 Vital Switchgear Rooms
Units 1 and 2 Vital Battery Rooms
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Standby Shutdown Facility
During the plant tours, the inspectors verified by observation and
interviews that measures taken to assure the physical protection
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of the facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included
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the security organization; the establishment and maintenance of
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gates, doors, and isolation zones; and access control badging.
In addition, the areas toured were observed for fire prevention
and protection activities and radiological control practices. The
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inspectors also selectively reviewed current PIRs to determine if
the licensee was appropriately documenting problems and
implementing corrective actions.
b.
Refueling Outage
The licensee completed the Unit 2, E0C-5 Refueling Outage on April
1, four days ahead of schedule.
The MSR tube bundles were replaced this outage, in preparation for
steam generator replacement. The tubes in the old MSRs had a
constituent of copper which has been shown to cor. tribute to SG
tube degradation. This job was critical path for the outage.
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was scheduled to be accomplished in 40 days but was actually
completed 3 days ahead of schedule. This large modification was
well planned and executed.
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Fourteen RN valves in the shared return header were replaced
during this outage. Complicated, innovative methods of isolating
for this work were necessary which necessitated placing Unit 1 in
a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> action statement. The modification was successfully
completed in this time frame, and is considered to have been well
planned and executed. For more details pertaining to the RN work,
refer to NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-413,414/93-07.
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Additional shutdown risk precautions were implemented during this
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outage which were targeted at minimizing the risk to the plant
during periods of high vulnerability.
For example, the licensee
did not drain the reactor coolant system to mid-loop until the
core was unloaded. The licensee also installed temporary diesel
generators to use as a source of temporary power, along with one
of the permanent D/Gs, to maintain both residual heat removal
trains available when the reactor coolant system was drained to
mid-loop after refueling. These initiatives are notable, and
indicative of safety consciousness.
Overall, this was one of Catawba's better refueling outages,
having been accomplished ahead of schedule, and under the estimate
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for radiation exposure and with minimal rework.
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c.
Control Room Drawing Review
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The inspectors reviewed approximately 200 control room drawings to
verify that they were legible, accurate and to assure that there
was no inordinate backlog of drawing corrections to be made.
Virtually all of the drawings were legible, accurate and current.
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One drawing was illegible, but was immediately replaced.
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If a modification affects VTO drawings, the control room drawing
and aperture card are required to be updated within seven days.
Non-VTO drawing must be updated within 30 days. The inspectors
verified there was no significant backlog of drawing updates for
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either VTO or non-VTO drawings.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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4.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
a.
General
During the inspection period, the inspectors verified that plant
operations were in compliance with various TS requirements.
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Typical of these requirements were confirmation of compliance with
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the TS for reactivity control systems, reactor coolant systems,
safety injection systems, emeraency safeguards systems, emergency
power systems, containment, and other important plant support
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systems. The inspectors verified that:
surveillance testing was
performed in accordance with approved written procedures, test
instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation
were met, appropriate removal and restoration of the affected
equipment was accomplished, test results met acceptance criteria
and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing
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the test, and any deficiencies identified during the testing were
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properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management
personnel.
b.
Surveillance Activities Reviewed
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The inspectors witnessed or reviewed the following surveillarm:
PT/0/A/4150/19A
Reactivity Balance Calculation
PT/1/A/4200/06A
Boron Injection Lineup
PT/1/A/4200/06B
ECCS Valve Lineup
PT/1/A/4200/62
NW Surge Chamber IB RN Flow Verification
PT/1/A/4250/06
Unit 1 CA Pump Head and Valve Verification
PT/1/A/4350/02A
Diesel Generator IA Operability Test
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PT/1/A/4450/03B
Anr.ulus Ventilation System Train IB
Operability Test
PT/1/A/4450/13B
Auxiliary feedwater Pump Room C02
Weekly Test
PT/2/A/4000/02C
Mode 3 Periodic Surveillance Item
PT/2/A/4150/01A
NC System Mini Hydro Test
PT/2/A/4150/01B
NC Manual Leakage Calculation
PT/2/A/4150/01D
NC System Leakage Calculation
PT/2/A/4150/02
Visual Inspection Verification of
Radiation
System Outside Containment
PT/2/A/4200/06
Unit 2 CA Pump Head and Valve Verification
PT/2/A/42.50/02B
Weekly Main Turbine Movement Test
PT/2/A/4250/03E
CA System Discharge Control Valve
Throttling Procedure Verification
PT/2/A/4550/04
D/G Fuel Oil Tank Oil / Water Inspection
(Tank 2B1)
PT/2/A/4600/01
RCCA Movement Test
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PT/2/A/4600/02
Periodic Surveillance Test
PT/2/A/4600/02A
Mode 1 Periodic Surveillance
PT/2/A/4600/09
Loss of Operator Aid Computer Check
PT/2/A/4600/19B
Premode 2 Periodic Surveillance Items
PT/2/8/4250/02A
Main Turbine Weekly Trip Test
No discrcpancies were identified.
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c.
Missed Power Availability Technical Specification Surveillances
During this report period, the inspectors reviewed the
circumstances surrounding two separate occasions during the
previous report period, in which the licensee failed to perform a
TS required surveillance to verify the operability of the offsite
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power sources. TS 3.8.1.1 requires that when one or more offsite
power sources or D/Gs become inoperable, appropriate action shall
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be taken to demonstrate the operability of the two offsite power
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sources by performing the surveillance af TS 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1
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hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter. Operability of the
offsite power sources is determined by verifying proper breaker
alignments and checking indications of power availability.
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The first missed surveillance occurred on February 25, 1993, after
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Unit 1 entered TS 3.0.3 at 5:45 p.m. due to both trains of the RN
system being inoperable. Since RN is the assured cooling source
for the D/Gs, both Unit 1 D/Gs were also declared inoperable.
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Operations personnel thought that it was not necessary to perform
the power availability surveillance since TS 3.0.3 had been
entered.
Following shift turnover at 6:30 p.m., the oncoming
shift personnel questioned the need to perform the surveillance
and correctly determined that the surveillance was required,
regardless of the fact that TS 3.0.3 had been entered. At 8:35
p.m. the surveillance, confirming that both offsite power sources
had been operable since the entry into TS 3.0.3 was completed.
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Since the surveillance was not performed within the required 1
hour from the time that D/Gs were declared inoperable, this
constituted a missed TS surveillance.
The licensee's corrective action included providing guidance to
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operations personnel on each shift addressing the surveillance
requirements of TS 4.8.1.1.1.a when TS 3.0.3 is entered. A TS
interpretation document is also to be written to clarify these
requirements, and additional training will be performed when the
interpretation is completed. The inspectors concluded that
adequate corrective action was being taken by the licensee.
Therefore, this violation will not be cited because the licensee's
efforts in identifying and correcting the violation meet the
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criteria specified in Section VII.B. of the Enforcement Policy.
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This issue is documented as NCV 413/93-09-01:
Failure to Perform
TS Surveillances of Offsite Power Sources.
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The second missed power availability surveillance occurred on
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March 5, 1993. At 10:01 p.m. that day, the Unit 1 Train A D/G was
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declared inoperable when Train A of the RN system was rendered
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inoperable while conducting an ISI hydro test.
In order to
maintain the Unit 1 Train A D/G available during this testing (but
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not Operable), a contingency plan was implemented f r providing
cooling water to the D/G if a start signal was received. The
contingency plan allowed the D/G to remain in service during the
hydro.
Since the D/G remained in service, it was not necessary
for operations personnel to perform procedure OP/1/A/6350/02 for
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removing the D/G from service.
Steps directing the performance of
TS surveillance 4.8.1.1.1.a are embodied in this procedure. Thus,
since OP/1/A/6350/02 was not performed, operations personnel
failed to recognize the need to perform the surveillance. The
missed surveillance was identified by personnel on the next shift.
At 9:20 a.m. on March 6, the surveillance was completed confirming
that both offsite power sources were operable,
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Since this event, the procedures for removing both the RN system
and D/Gs from service have been revised to ensure that appropriate
actions are taken when a D/G is rendered inoperable.
In addition,
details of the incident were discussed with all operations shifts.
The inspectors determined that adequate corrective action was
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being taken by the licensee. Therefore, this violation will not
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be cited due to the' licensee's efforts in identifying and
correcting the violation met the criteria specified in Section
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VII.B. of the Enforcement Policy. This issue is identified as
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another example of NCV 413/93-09-01:
Failure to Perform TS
Surveillances of Offsite Power Sources.
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One NCV was identified.
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5.
Maintenance Observations (62703)
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a.
General
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Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components
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were observed / reviewed to ensure that they were conducted in
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accordance with the applicable requirements. The inspectors
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verified licensee conformance to the requirements in the following
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areas of inspection:
activities were accomplished using approved
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procedures, and functional testing and/or calibrations were
performed prior to returning components or systems to service;
quality control records were maintained; activities performed were
accomplished by qualified personnel; and materials used were
properly certified. Work requests were reviewed to determine the
status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority was
assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect
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system performance.
b.
Maintenance Activities Reviewed
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The inspectors witnessed or reviewed the following maintenance
activities:
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Install Air Conditioning in D/G Room 2B
(observed hanger installation work)
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Rework / repair Valve 2NRE22
Repair Leak on Valve 2 nil 65
Repair Leak on Valve 2 nil 67
Repair / replace Relay in 2AT62 for VA Buss
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Investigate and Repair Invertor Low
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Voltage on 2EIB
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Inspect Repair VC/YC Chiller
.D/G 1A Oil Condition Inspection Verification
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No discrepancies were identified.
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c.
Inadequate Maintenance on 2A Safety Injection Pump Motor
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On March 23, 1993, with Unit 2-in Mode 5, the 2A NI pump was being
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run in order to fill the Cold Leg Accumulators. The pump was
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being used for this activity even though it was still considered
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inoperable and was awaiting post-maintenance testing as a result
of performing motor bearing maintenance on March 6.
After the
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pump was operated for a short period, a fire detection alarm
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annunciated in the control room indicating a problem in the 2A NI
pump room. An operator was sent to investigate and discovered
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smoke coming from the NI pump motor. The pump was secured and it
was subsequently discovered that the inboard bearing of the motor
had failed due to a lack of adequate lubrication. Since there was
extensive damage to the motor, a decision was made to replace the
motor prior to entering Mode 4.
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When the inboard motor bearing was disassembled, it was discovered
that the cause of the lubrication problem was the incorrect
assembly of the bearing's oil sling ring which provides bearing
lubrication. On March 6, in connection with routine preventative
maintenance, the inboard motor bearing had been disassembled,
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inspected, and then reassembled. During this reassembly, the
technician incorrectly reassembled the oil sling ring such that
lubricating oil was not delivered to the bearing when the pump was
operated.
Following this discovery, licensee management directed
a three-man team to investigate the motor failure. The findings
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from this investigation will be documented in PIR 2-093-213.
The inspectors reviewed the WO package for the March 6 preventive
maintenance, the maintenance procedures governing the work, and
discussed the work with the maintenance supervisor responsible for
the work.
In addition, the preliminary findings from the
licensee's investigation were reviewed to determine if the
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inspector's concerns had been evaluated. A number of problems
were identified pertaining to this maintenance activity.
Several
of the more significant items are discussed below:
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1.
The technician who performed the inboard bearing reassembly
was not qualified via the licensee's ETQS to perform the
task.
The individual was on loan from another department
and was assisting the IAE group during the outage. The
individual was working with a qualified technician who
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failed to properly direct / supervise the non-qualified
individual's activity as required. The inspectors
considered this to be the major deficiency resulting in the
incorrect assembly of the motor bearing.
2.
The procedure used to perform the motor maintenance,
MP/0/A/2002/01, Motor Inspection and Maintenance, lacked
detailed instructions to ensure that the motor bearing was
reassembled properly. Step 11.5 of the procedure stated
that the motor (including the bearings) be reassembled in
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the reverse order of disassembly.
In addition, the
manufacturer's drawings of the motor were not adequately
detailed, nor were there drawings of the bearings for the
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technicians to refer to during reassembly.
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3.
Procedure MP/0/A/2002/001 was revised on December 30, 1992
for motors of this type.
The new procedure, IP/0/A/4974/13,
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Horizontal Split-Sleeve Bearing Motor Inspection and
Maintenance, should have been used for this task. The WO
document incorrectly designated MP/0/A/2002/01 to be used as
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opposed to IP/0/A/4974/13. The inspectors determined that
this was not an isolated case.
It was concluded that there
were numerous other examples in which pre-defined WO
documents specified the use of procedures that had been
deleted and did not specify using a new procedure that had
replaced them. This was identified as a licensee weakness
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in the maintenance area.
4.
Alarms for high bearing temperature were not received in the
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Control Room when the bearing failed. Temperature readings
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from the inboard thermocouple were much lower than expected
temperatures based on the magnitude of bearing damage
observed. The thermocouple was tested following the event
and found to be working properly. This indicated, along
with other problems identified with the spring mechanism of
the thermocouple, that it may not have been making adequate
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contact with the bearing. The inspectors confirmed that one
of the licensee's correction action items was to check the
proper operation of thermocouples of other safety-related
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motors.
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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's ETQS requirements governing
the responsibility of qualified technicians when working with non-
qualified individuals on safety-related tasks. Standard No.
902.0, Employee Qualifications Component, Section 5.1.7, requires
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that when an individual is required to perform a task which he/she
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is not qualified to, then that individual will be
directed / supervised by a qualified individual to ensure that the
task is performed correctly. Contrary to this requirement, a non-
qualified individual was allowed to reassemble the inboard motor
bearing on the 2A Safety Injection pump without adequate
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supervision by a qualified individual. This resulted in the
incorrect reassembly of the bearing by the non-qualified
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individual and the subsequent damage to the motor when the pump
was operated. This issue is documented as Violation 414/93-09-02:
Failure to follow ETQS Requirements during Safety Injection Motor
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Maintenance.
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One violation was identified.
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Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700)
The below listed LERs were reviewed to determine if the information
provided met NRC requirements. The determination included: adequacy of
description; verification of compliance with Technical Specifications
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and regulatory requirements; corrective action taken; existence of
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potential generic problems; reporting requirements satisfied; and the
relative safety significance of each event.
a.
(Closed) LER 413/91-05:
TS 3.0.3 Entry as a Result of Both
Trains of Control Room Ventilation System Being Inoperable due to
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a Possible Design / Installation Deficiency and Inappropriate
Action.
Both trains of the VC/YC system became inoperable on February 12,
1991. The Tra3n "A" YC chiller tripped on low refrigerant
temperature due to a refrigerant leak at the chiller compressor
power terminal box. The Train "B" chiller was placed in service
but the YC chiller tripped on low refrigerant temperature when the
associated condenser water automatic control valve inadvertently
failed open. This placed the plant outside the provisions of TS 3.7.6 and in TS 3.0.3 for approximately I hour and 50 minutes. TS 3.0.3 was exited once the Train "B" condenser water automatic
control valve was restored and the YC chiller was successfully
restarted.
The refrigerant leak on the Train "A" YC chiller was repaired, the
low refrigerant tempereture cutout switch was calibrated and the
YC system was returned to service.
To prevent recurrence, the licensee has completed the following
actions:
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VC/YC system low refrigerant temperature cutout switches
have been included in the stations preventative maintenance
program.
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Maintenance Engineering Services has issued MES Guideline 21
wM ch ider.tifies the independent verification process for
the remov71 and r
toretion of equipment from service. This
includes - Tectrical circuits.
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Bahnson's procedures AFP-CNS-5.019, NH95 and NH96 Hydromotor
Actuators, AFP-CNS-5.020, NH91 ITT Hydromotor Actuators, and
AFP-CNS-5.025, NH92 ITT Hydromotor Actuators, have been
enhanced to ensure that electrical isolation are tagged in
accordance with Station Directive 3.0.12, Electrical Circuit
Isolation Tagging.
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MES evaluated the compressor power terminal box assembly and
found that the terminal box assembly had been modified to
reduce the potential of refrigerant leaks.
b.
(Closed) LER 413/91-18: Unit 1 Essential Bus Blackout due to
Inappropriate Action.
On Sept mber 6, 1991, Unit I was operating in Mode 1.
Diesel
Generatcr IB was being shutdown by a non-licensed operator
following a post maintenance operability test run. The operator
began unloading the diesel per procedure and inadvertently opened
Feeder Breaker IETB-3 ins'aad of IETB-18. This caused the
generator to immediately upply the load to IETB. The operator
attempted to secure the diesel. This caused the sequencer
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circuit, sensing a loss of voltage on the bus, to initiate the
blackout sequence and to restart the diesel. The operator was
unable to stop the diesel using the normal means but was able to
stop the diesel using the emergency stop solenoid. After this
event, the diesel generator was successfully retested.
The licensee evaluated this event and initiated the following
corrective actions to prevent recurrence:
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An " Operator Update" was issued to the operators which
emphasized the importance of self-verification.
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The event was incorporated into the operations training
packages.
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Procedures PT/l(2)/A/4350/02A(B), Diesel Generator
Operability Test, and OP/l(2)/A/6350/2, Diesel Generator
Operation, were revised so that the procedure steps match
actual equipment / panel nomenclature.
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An evaluation was made on the feasibility of assigning
higher priority to the resolution of essential breaker
indication problems.
No changes were deemed necessary.
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A review was made for the identification of the
administrative procedures which employ the use of tags to
identify equipment deficiencies.
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The operators training program has been revised to provide
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specific demonstration and practice in recognizing diesel
generator automatic starts, runaway diesels, and other
failures. Diesel generator restart criteria has also been
included.
c.
(Closed) LER 413/91-26: SSPS TS Violation Due to a Possible
Inappropriate Action.
During the performance of a surveillance test of the SSPS system
on October 17, 1991, a jumper was discovered across two terminals
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inside the Unit 1 SSPS cabinet. This jumper would have prevented
the Train "B" Reactor Trip Breakers from opening during certain
events. The jumper was removed and the Unit I and 2 SSPS cabinets
were inspected to verify that no additional unknown jumpers were
installed.
To prevent recurrence Procedures IP/1(2)/A/3200/03A, Reactor
Protection / Engineered Safeguards Features Response Time Testing,
were revised to clearly specify the installation and removal of
the jumpers required for the tests.
During January - February,
1992, a detailed electrical cabinet inspection was performed by
the Safety Review Group.
Several discrepancies were identified;
however, out of approximately 1100 cabinets inspected, only four
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undocumented jumpers were found. These four jumpers were
installed inside non-safety related cabinets. The licensee
concluded that the current controls for the use of jumpers were
adequate.
d.
(Closed) LER 414/91-13: TS violation Due to Inappropriate Action
Rendering One Train of the BDMS.
With Unit 2 in Mode 6 during a refueling outage, sporadic and
. spurious alarms were received in the control room on November 2,
1991. Subsequent investigation found Valve 2NV252A, Chemical
Volume and Control NV-Pump Suction from Refueling Water Storage
Tank, was red tagged closed and power to the valve was de-
energized.
This valve is required to open on a high flux signal
from the BDMS. Two trains of BDMS are required when the plant is
in Modes 5 and 6.
With Valve 2NV252A closed and power de-
energized, Train "A" of the BDMS was inoperable per TS.
Operability of Train "A" was restored after the breaker which
supplies power to the valve was closed.
This event was evaluated by the licensee but no required revisions
to procedures or other documents were identified.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (92701 and 92702)
a.
(Closed) URI 50-413, 414/93-07-04: Review of SSPS and ESFAS
Testing Inaccuracies.
During the previous inspection, two problems involving the SSPS
and ESFAS testing circuitry were reviewed.
One of these problems involved the licensee's failure to properly
test the continuity of the containment spray channel between the
process instrumentation and the ESF actuation and logic circuitry.
A special test circuit had been provided by the vendor to conduct
this continuity check, however, the licensee failed to recognize
the significance of this circuit, and as a result, failed to ever
perform this testing.
Following identification of the problem,
the licensee initiated the continuity testing for both Units and
did not find an operability problem with the Containment Spray
circuitry. Based on these results, the licensee determined that a
past operability problem did not exist. However, this was
considered a missed surveillance and thus a violation of TS 4.3.2.1.
This violation will not be subject to enforcement action
because the licensee's efforts in identifying and correcting the
violation meet the criteria specified in Section VII.B. of the
Enforcement Policy. Thit issue is documented as NCV 413,414/93-
09-03:
Inadequate Surveillance Testing of ESFAS Circuitry.
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12
As discussed in the previous inspection, a problem was identified
while the licensee was attempting to perform the continuity checks
for the first time on Unit 1.
Two of the four containment spray
channels tested did not exhibit the expected response.
Following
a visual inspection of the test circuitry boards, it was-
discovered that the circuit cards were not wired:according to the
vendor schematics. When the licensee. discussed this problem wi.th
the vendor (Westinghouse), it was learned that an upgrade had.been
made to these circuit cards in 1979, however, due to a problem at
the vendor site, the cards were shipped to Catawba prior to the
modifications being incorporated.
The licensee replaced these cards, retested the circuitry, and
verified that all other spare cards in the warehouse were
correctly wired. No discrepant spare cards were identified.
The second problem reviewed in the previous report irvolved a mis-
wiring error in the SSPS Train "A" Phase B Containtrent Isolation
test circuitry. Because of this wiring discrepancy, when the
monthly SSPS Actuation Logic Surveillance was conducted, the Phase
B Containment Isolation Logic was not tested.
Instead,
Containment Spray Actuation logic was tested twice.~ The wiring
errors were corrected and the circuitry was tested with
satisfactory results.
Based on these results and the fact that
the Phase B isolation circuitry is verified to function every 18
months during ESF Response Time testing, the licensee determined
that past operability was not a concern.
During this inspection, the licensee completed a review of work
performed in the SSPS cabinets and determined that there have been-
no station modifications to these circuits which would have
involved the associated wiring discrepancies. The licensee
discussed with the vendor, the possibility of a manufacturer's
field change that would have. corrected the wiring errors, but,
none have been identified.
Based on this, it appears that a
manufacturer's fabrication deficiency resulted in this mis-wiring
error.
TS 4.3.2 requires that each train of the Phase B Isolation
Automatic Actuation Logic and actuation relays be tested at least
every 62 days on a staggered test basis. The mis-wired. circuitry
~
resulted in the missing of these surveillances since. initial
start-up. However, this violation will not be subject to
enforcement action because the licensee's efforts in correcting.
the violation meet the criteria specified in Section VII.B. of the
Enforcement Policy. This issue is documented as another example
of NCV 413, 414/93-09-03:
Inadequate Surveillance Testing of
ESFAS Circuitry.
One NCV was identified.
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8.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 14, 1993,
with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector described
the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings
listed below. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
'
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials
provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
Item Number
Description and Reference
j
NCV 413/93-09-01
Failure to Perform TS Surveillances of Offsite
Power Sources (paragraph 4.c).
VIO 414/93-09-02
Failure to Follow ETQS Requirements during
Safety Injection Motor Maintenance (paragraph
5.c).
NCY 413, 414/93-09-03
Inadequate Surveillance Testing of ESFAS
,
Circuitry (paragraph 7).
,
9.
Acronyms and Abbreviations
BDMS -
Boron Dilution Mitigation System
CA
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D/G
-
Diesel Generator
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ECCS -
EOC-5 -
End-of-Cycle 5
ESFAS -
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System
ETQS -
Employee Training Qualification System
IAE
-
Instrumentation and Electrical
IP
-
Instrumentation Procedure
-
Inservice Inspection
4
LER
-
Licensee Event Report
MES
-
Maintenance Engineering Services
-
NC
-
-
Non-Cited Violation
NI
-
Safety Injection
,
NV
-
Chemical Volume and Control System
NW
-
Containment Valve Injection Water System
t
OP
-
Operating Procedure
-
Problem Investigation Report
-
Periodic Procedure
RCCA -
Rod Cluster Control Assembly
RN
-
Nuclear Service Water System
R&R
-
Removal and Restoration
-
SSPS -
Solid State Protection System
TS
-
Technical Specifications
TSM
-
Temporary Station Modification
.
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Unresolved Item
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Auxiliary Building Ventilation System
VC/YC -
Control Room Ventilation and Chill Water System
V10
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Vital To Operation
-
Work Order
ZPPT -
Zero Power Physics Testing
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