ML19224D134
| ML19224D134 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 05/02/1979 |
| From: | Backus R O'NEIL, BACKUS & SPIELMAN |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19224D111 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7907100719 | |
| Download: ML19224D134 (14) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AT ERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0t@llSSION Public Service Company of
)
)
Doc ket.No s. : fid-443 (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2)
)
50-444 REQUEST FOR ACTION PURSUANT T0 10 CFR 2.206 Notice is hereby given that by petition dated May 2,1979, the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, requested that the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation issue an Oroer suspending ar revoking Construction Permit Nos. CPPR-135 and CPPR-136 issued for the Seabrook Station pending a determination that evacuation of persons within 30 miles of the site is feasible a,d the site is still acceptable after analysis of the consequences of a Class 9 accident.
This petition is being treated pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of the Comission's regulations and, accordingly, appropriate action will be taken on the petition within a reasonable time.
A copy of the petition is available for inspection in the Comission's Public Doctment Room,1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20555, and in the local public document room for the Seabrook Station at the Exeter Public Library, Front Street, Exeter, New Hampshire 03883.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0f41ISSION Harold P
nton, Di rector Office of ht.
Mr Reactor Regulation
' Cated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 2 4 ttday of May, 19 79.
369 057 7 9 o7/oo 7' ?
o
UNITED STATES OF A.'1 ERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO*1 TO:
DIRECTOR OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
.v.
p RE:
CONSTRI CTION PERMITS CPPR-135 CPPR-136
)
In the Matter of
)
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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF
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Docket Nos. 30 *,43
,1EU HAMP S HI Rn_, et al.
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3 0 s, s, s, s'
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
)
REQUEST FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY CONSTRUCTION PERMITS FOR THE PROPOSED NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AT SEA-BROOK SHOULD NOT BE SUSPENDED OR REVOKED This request for an Order to Show Cause is made on behalf of the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League, 5 Market Street, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, 03801 an Intervenor in the above captioned.
The relief requested is an Order to Sho.w Cause why the Seabrook construction permits should not be suspended or revoked because of:
1.
Failure of NRC to require development of an evacuation plan beyond the low population zone as part of the construction permit proceedings, and 2.
Failure of NRC to evaluate the consequences of a Class 9 accident, including the n e c e ssity for evacuation beyond the low population zone.
BACKGROUND OF THE EVACUATION ISSUE The Application for Seabrock constructicr permits was dccketed ir Cul; cf 1973.
During the pericC. cf license re'.ue',
the NRC
..e;ulatory Staff took the position, which it has T.ain:2ined throughout hO
- [
f 369 058
the proceeding in the above captioned, that demonstration of the ability to evacuate persons beyond the low population zone
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l' was within the jurisdiction of the Staff to require in a construction permit proceeding.
Over objection by the Applicants, the issue of evacuation feasibility beyond the LPZ was admitted as an issue in contention before the Aton.ic Safety and Licensing Board, and was t'.e subj ect of extensive evidentiary hearings in June of 1975.
However, in the Initial Decision, LBP 76-26, the Licensinc Board specifically declined to rule on the contet'.ed issue of the feasibility of evacuation beyond the LPZ, and particularly of Hampton Beach, for two reasons.
First, the Board held that the anticipated radiological doses likely to be received as the result of a design basis accident should be treated " realistically" rather than " conservatively."
When so treated, the Board found that the likely doses would be well below those doses for which protective action would be recommended under the protective action guides.
Thus the Board held:
"That evacuation of the area within about five miles of the Seabrook station would become advisible, or necessary, only in the event of an accident whose consecuences are substantially greater than and less probable than those reasonably to be expected from a design basis accident."
3 6')
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The Licensing Board further held, in a supporting opinion, that in any event the Jommission's regulations did not intend any requirement for a demonstration of protection of persons beyond the LPZ.
"... Appendix E should not be read as requiring consid-eration by a licensee of protective measures beyond the LPZ, but that so far as design basis events are concerned, the several safety features in a plant should be credited with reasonable protection of populations outside the LPZ."
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In short, the Licensing Board's decision held that a demonstration of the feasibility of protective action, primarily meaning evacuation, was only required for the LPZ, a circle it held was properly drawn at a radial distance of 1.5 miles from the reactors, and which did not include within its orbit Hampton Beach or the other barrier beaches.
As a result, the Licensing Board did not resolve the conflicting testimony about the feasibility of evacuating persons more than 1.5 miles from the reactors, such as persons on Hampton and the other beaches.
Appeals from the Licensing Ecard decision were taken to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board by the Intervenor New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution, the Attorney General of New Hampshira, and by the NRC staff itself.
The Appeal Board disposed of the evacuation issue in ALAB-390, April 3,
1977, in a man.er contrary to the Staff's position.
The Appeal Ecard a
eld:
"That, ender the Ccamission's regulanicas in their present forn, consideration is not to be given in a licensing proceeding 20 the feasibility of devising ar emergency plan for the protection (in the event of an accident) of persons located outside the lou popula-tion cone."
369 060
t j
Because of the ruling that the regulations did not i
permit consideration of persons outside the LP2 in the
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event of an accident, the Appeal Board did not need to, and did not, consider the propriety of treating the radio-i logical consequences of a design basis accident on "realis-tic" rather than " conservative" assumptions, as had been done by the Licensing Board.
In a concurring opinion,
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Appeal Beard member Farrar stated:
"I balieve there is much to be said for the view, pressed upon us here, that consideration need be given to the feasibility of protecting people located outside (as well as inside) a reactor's low population zone from radiological hazards in j
the event of a serious accident."
l I
Mr. Farrar went on to point out that the Advisory I
i Committee on Reactor Safety had stated, in a Decenber 10, 1974 letter reviewing the Seabrook Application:
1 i
"Because of the proximity of the Seabro~ok i
station to the beaches on the coast and because of the nature of the road network serving the beaches, the Applicant ha s g iven
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early attention to the problem of. evacuation.
The Committee believes, however, that further attention needs to be given to evacuation of residents and transients in the vacinity even
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t hou gh chey maybe outside the LPZ."
(Emphasis supplied by Mr. Farrar.)
In a subsequent Appeal Board decision, reviewing other aspects of the Initial Decision in the Seabrock proceeding,
'. L L.E - 4 2 2, the Appeal Ecard further held that the LPC for Seabrcok shculd te reduced frcr 1.5 cc 1.25 T.iles, based a p c.-
369 061
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the Appeal Board's finding that the Licensing Board had l
erred in treating Portsmouth, New Hampshire, approximately 11 miles from the reactor, as the population center distance.
Contrary to the Applicant's and Staff's position, the Appeal Eoard held that the appropriate population center distance was Hampton Bea h, since:
"There is no doubt that, at peak periods there, in excess of 25,000 people will be found in a densely populated area--indeed, no one disputes the claim that this area will be at times the most densely populated area in the State."
The effect of thic holding, however, was merely to reduce i
the area in which the Applicants were held to have a duty to CZZZ)
.,-x demonstrate an ability to protect persons in the event of an eif-sa y4 (n. m.J.
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accident, since the Appeal Board adhered to its ruling in t ~.c Q
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ALAB-390 that NRC regulations did not permit consideration of Tr a
evacuation of persons outside the low population zone.
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[ipgp m
On September 21, 1978, the NRC's Office of Standards (j]e;;
Development notified NRC licensees that the Commission was, Of Lwm in effect, reversing the holding of ALAB-390 by means of a m
fQe.
%a _.
proposed rule.
(SLc D
"The proposed changes to the Commission's Part 50,
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%4 Appendix E, would recuire an applicant to consider emergency planning beycna the low population zone...."
The proposed rule, designated to provide " interim guidance,"
2nd gublished ir the Federal Register on August 23, 1973 pr:11 des:
"The e:: tent to ;hich emergency plar.i.g, which ma; incl;de evacuaticn measures, would extend to areas beyond the LP:
.culd be based on the design features cf the facility, and the physicial and population characteristics of the land surrounding the plant site as well as the acceptable protective action criteria developed b3 federal, otate nd 1;;al au=n=rities."
369 062
The Not:ce to Licensees also stated that, "I
"Where a construction permit has been issued, the emergency plans will be reviewed at the operating license stage."
In summary, it is clear that at the present time:
1.
No determination of the feasibility of protecting persons beyond the Seabrook LPZ, 1.25 miles from the reactors, by evacuation or otherwise has been made.
2.
,The reason for not requiring such a demonstration, the lack of regulatory authority to do so, has been expressly repudiated by the Cc= mission in promulgating the proposed rule.
3.
The alternate basis for not requiring proof of the feasibility of evacuation beyond the LPZ, the use of " realistic" rather than " conservative" radiological dose assumptions, has never been reviewed or approved by the Appeal Board or the Commission, or even endor. sed by the Staf f.
4.
The issue of evacuation must be dealt with, in any event, during the operating license stage for the proposed Seabrook plant.1
~The Seabrook construction permits, it should be noted, are still not final.
Th,ey are under challenge before the First Circ. lit Court of ILWs as to the Ccmission's discharge of its duties as to alternative sites, and under challenge in the same Ccurt with recard to the Cormission's treatrent of the nuclear waste issue, raa pendmg before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals cn reand.
In additicn, a seisnic issue at the S# nock site awaits pcssible Ccrmission review umr ccroleticn of Appeal Ecard member Farrar's full dissent en this subject.
(See AIA -422 and de Ccar.issicn's Crde cf Septeder 15, 1977.)
369 063 O
- BACEGROUND OF THE CLASS 9 ACCIDENT ISSUE
,Y.
In its Safety Evaluation Reporc and Final Environmental S ta temen t',
consistent with established practice, the NRC Regulatory Staff declined to consider the consequences of the so-called Class 9 accident. (FES 7-3)
A Class 9 accident is, by definition, an accident that involves the failure of engineered safety features, and includes such scenarios as a core meltdown with consequent breach cf containment.
The Staff, in order to avoid the evaluation of the consequences of a Class 9 accident in the performance of its NEPA review, appears to have relied upon NASH 1400, the reactor safety study, more commonly known as the Rasmussen Report.
(FES Chapter 7)
The Licensing Board, in adopting the Staff's view that no consideration need be given to the Class 9 accident, relied upon the proposed annex to Appendix D to 10 C.F.R'.
Part 50.
The proposed anne:s admitted that "the consequences (of a Class 9 accident] could be severe."
However, the annex also stated that "the probability of their occurrance is so small that the environmental risk is extremely lcw."
However, in the Initial Decision, the Licensing Board, although adopting the Suff's position that no consideration of a Class 9 accident was required, added:
"'fith regard c accidents larger than those acnciferef in 335e:3 e..,..=-e m-e 2 m.,., -
-u,-
c..,-ration ir the event cf a Ilass 9 accifent cu d he desirable, and indeed ir some cases necessary."
(Cicing 'dASE 1400)
Since the Initial Decision, however, the basis fcr refusing CC Consider the Consequences cf a Class 9 accident, th20 is 369 064
_a_
the assumption of extremely low probability of this occurrence,
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has been severly undermined by action of both the Cc= mission and of the Regulatory Staff.
First, in Regulatory Guide 4.7, the Staff had long ago recognized that some guidance for implementing the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 100 was appropriate.
Regulatory Guida 4.7 pro'.' ide s tha t :
" Areas of low population density are preferred for nuclear power station sites."
The Regulatory Guide goes on to provide as follows:
"If the population density, including weighted transient population, projcation at the time of initial operation of a nuclear powar station exceeds 500 persons p r square mile averaged out over any radial distance out to 30 miles (cumulative population at a distance divided by the area at that distance), cr the projected population density over the lifetime of the facility exceeds 1,000 persons per square mile averaged out over any radial distance out to 30 miles, special attention should be given to the consideration of alternative sites with lower population densities."
In December 1973, in NUREG-0501, entitled "NRC Staf5 Testimony Related to Alternative Sites'to Seabrook I and II,"
the Staff for the first time presented evidence of population densities at Saabrook averaged out over a radial distance of 30 miles.
This study showed that the " trip levels" of Regulatory Guide 4.' were exceeded both in 1980 three years prior to the start of plant cperation, and in 2020, near the end cf plant
- peration, at mos: radial n._1 ma r:.er s.
The S aff's testimen; further showed that ncne cf the alternative cites being canvassed ir detail by the Staff had population densi les as high as those 369 065
- at the proposed Seabrook site.
Finally, prior to the release of SUREG-0501, but unknown 9
t o c o u n s e-1 for the person making this request, the Staff had changed the position it had taken before the Licensing Board where it had contended that the consequences of a Class 9 accident need not be considered.
In Staff action document SECY 137, March 7, 1978, the Staff pointed out that in certain cases, such es the proposed Clinch River Breeder Reactor and the floating nuclear power plant, it had analyzed the consequences of a Class 9 accident.
In SECY-78-137, the Staff presented ^the following recommendation for Commission action:
"Pending completion of the Commission's review of its reactor siting policy, that the Staff perform quantitative assessments of the relative differences in Class 9 accident consequences and risks in the review of alternative sites where the proposed site exceeds the general population guidelines of Regulatory Guide 4.7."
Thus, the Staff's position in the FES appears to have been substantially modified, as became clear during the reopened hearings on alternative sites held before the Appeal Board in J.anuary of 1979.
At this point, it appears that the Staff would now require some evaluation of the consequences of a Class 9 accident when a proposed site, as in ae case of Seabrook, exceeds the " trip levels" of Regulatory Guide 4.7.
Seccnd, the Commissicr has itself taken action which under-T.inss the prio: 5:aff decisicr to
.c ecalcate the consequenccc cf a Class 9 acc. dent.
As previously pointed out, the Staff apparently, and the L":ensing Soard explicicly, elled upon he ccnclusion that
'ASE l-
- , the R2smussen Es crt, to su-ti9:5 '-t 066
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the consequences of a Class 9 accident need not be considered f
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u.
because the probability of its occurrence was "so small that e
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(its] environmental risk is extremely low."
On January 19, 1979, the Commission expressly repudiated the executive summary of WASH 1400, the Rasmussen Report, and further stated that:
" Absolute values of the risk presented by WASH 1400 l
should not be used uncritically either in the regula-tory process or for public policy purposes...."
The Commission added:
"In particular, in light of the Review Group's conclusions on accident probabilities, the i
Commission does not regard as reliable the neactor Safety Studies numerical estimate of the overall risk of reactor accident."
Thus, the staff decision not to require,ccasideration of Class 9 accident consequences, insofar as it depended on t; ASH 1400's conclusions, is at this point without proper scientific or analytical foundation.
As a result, both the environnental and safety analyses of the proposed Seabrook site are inccmplete at this time.
i:
In summary, it is clear that at the present time:
No evaluation of the consequences of a Class 9 at Seabrook have been performed, even as to alternative sites.
2.
The evaluation of a Class 9 accident consequence sculd require, among other things, ccasideraticr Of evacuaticr of persens beyond the icw populaticr
- cne, as the Licensing Board us held.
- c finding that e'cacu :icn
_s
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2;ble ceycnd the low population zone has ever 'een made by any c
J.ribunal in the Seabrcok proceeding. (See I"" C Iecisi n) 4.
"te basis for not considering the Class 9 accident, 7_ he allegedl; e:::remely Ic cha'
'_y of it:
occurrence, has been undercut by the Commission's repudiation of the assessment risk values in t.he T"
Rasmussen Report.
5.
The Staff has recognized the desirability of at least some analysis of the consequences of a Class 9 accident when population densities within 30 radial miles of the reactor exceed certain " trip levels,'" which levels are in f act exceeded at Seabrook.
LEGAL AUTHORITY Thig request is made pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2.206.
In addition, it is made in reliance upon the duty of the Commission's Staff to take appropriate action in the light of evolving safety standards and newly. developed information as set forth in such cases as Ft. Pierce Utilities Authority of the City of Ft. Pierce v.
United States of America and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, No. 77-1925 and 77-2101, decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, March 23, 19' DISCUSSION There is no doubt that Seabrook is today being constructed without any evaluation of a Class 9 accident and, in particular, without any determination that evacuation at this site of persons beyond the low population cne is practicable.
The issue raised by this recuest for an Crder to Show Cause is whether this determination of practicality can be deferred, as intended ~1 the September 21, 1975 " Notice to Licensees," tc the aparatic., l ic e.: s e stage.
- is the por".ticn of fcur requester _ hat deferral cf thl:
issue to the cperating license stage for Seabrcck is singularly inapprcpriate, and not ccasistent
..ri t h the staff's primary 369 068
obligation to protect the public's health and safety.
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This position is supported by the following reasons.
First, all parties to this proceeding have recognized that, in certain cases, evacuation beyond the LPZ is appropriate as a siting question.
The NRC Staf f took this position consistently during the licensing process.
Furthermore, counsel for the Applicant, Mr. Thomas G.
Dignan, himself stated to the Licensing Board on hune 18, 1975:
"The issue in a construction permit hearing is feasibility, and what we are now getting is detailed questions on an evacuation plan, which I think has been uniformly testified doesn.'t exist yet.
The burden is upon us to show feasibility."
(Tr. 3471)
Second, the only bases for not requiring a demonstration of evacuation feacibility beyond the LpZ as part of a siting decision have been expressly repudiated by subsequent eventc.
These events are the reversal of ALAB 390's holding that the regulations did not provide for this authority by the promulgation of the proposed rule amending Appendix E, and the highly question-able use of " realistic" rather than " conservative" assumptions as to radiological doses from a design basis accident.
Third, the consideration of evacuation, like any other issue, will be tainted by the spector of a completed plant, and billions of dellars i., vested, if the inquir'; into feasibility is to attait the cperating license stage.
The issue will ceccme 369 069 9
. at that stage not feasibility, but rather one of making
./ y the best of a potentially bad, or impossible, s tuation.
Fourth, the Seabrook site is now known to exceed staff population guidelines, as set forth in Regulatory Guide 4.7, so the issue of evacuation is particularly appropriate for consideration as a siting issue in this proceeding.
Fifth, the Seabrook site is a particularly difficult one in regard to evacuation because of the barrier beaches, which are at times extremely heavily populated.
These beaches are connected to major evacuatian routes by only three highways, with very limited capacity, and two of which would lead evacuees generally back toward the reactors.
Sixth, although EPA Protective Action Guidelines suggest evacuation would only be considered at dose levels of 1 to 5 rems whole body or 5 to 25 rems thyroid, it is a fact that during the Three Mile Islaid event a partial evacuation was ordered by the Governor of Pennsylvania, at the suggestion of the Chairman of the NRC, when, according to published reports, do'ses only in millerems were detccted in the environment.
Nonetheless, it was based upon the values of the EPA ?AG's, plus the use of " realistic" rather than " conservative" dose assumptions that enabled the Licensing Board to rule that, e er if regula:icns permitted it, no acnsider2:icr of efacuaticr 2;fCnd the LPC was ne2eSsar; for a design Ja s ' s a C c _d e n t.
369 070
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CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, and in particular in light t
}
of the difficult physicial character of the proposed site, I
together with its high population densities, the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulations should immediately issue a show cause crder pending a soundly based determination L
l that:
(1)
Evacuation of persons within the 30 mile area surrounding the proposed reactor is feasible, and (2)
Analysis of the consequences of a Class 9 accident finds the site still to be acceptable.
Re spec tf,ully submitted, SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE By Their Attorneys, O'NEILL BACKUS SPIELMAN s
BY:
Robert A.
Backus May 2, 1979 369 071 O
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