ML20042A221

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Sixteenth Set of Interrogatories
ML20042A221
Person / Time
Site: Clinch River
Issue date: 03/18/1982
From: Finamore B, Weiss E
HARMON & WEISS, National Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club
To:
JOINT APPLICANTS - CLINCH RIVER BREEDER REACTOR
Shared Package
ML20042A222 List:
References
NUDOCS 8203230218
Download: ML20042A221 (15)


Text

r

? f, ;

i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA !IllO E3 OI NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD-q\f ty

// 0' (n s Before Administrative Judges:

Marshall E. Miller, Chairman Q y,,/~n. !ky,0,p -

4 Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr. Oh

\Q,r,'l..mj$ -

Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr.

~

.pfn"o ~

s <>ida' 9' S

)

In the Matter of )

)

) Docket No. 50-537 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY )

PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION )

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY )

)

(Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant) )

)

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.

AND THE SIERRA CLUB SIXTEENTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO APPLICANTS Pursuant to 10 CFR S 2.740b, and in accordance with the Board's Prehearing Conference Order of February 11, 1982, Intervenors, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and the Sierra Club, request that the attached interrogatories be answered fully, in writing and under oath, by the indicated t>50 3

Department of Energy official, or, in cases where no official j

is indicated, by one or more officers or employees of

/ l Applicants who has personal knowledge or is the closest to having personal knowledge thereof. If the interrogatories are 8203230218 820318 PDR ADOCK 05000537 l Q PDR

,. . ~

2 answered by more than one person, whether or not he or she verified the answers, and whether or not he or she is an of ficer or employee of any of the Applicants, such person't

name and title should be set forth together with an identification of which interrogatories he or she is responsible for.

Unless otherwise indicated, each question is addressed to j all Applicants. In each question to all Applicants, each of the multiple Applicants is instructed to provide a separate ans we r . Iloweve r , when all Applicants are in agreement on a response, only one uniform answer need be given.

Each answer to an interrogatory shall be preceded by a copy of the particular question to which the answer is responding.

Each question is instructed to be answered in six parts, as f ollows.

Answer to Question  :

(a) Provide the direct answer to the question.

(b) Identify all documents and studies, and the particular parts thereof, relied upon by Applicants, now or in the past, which serve as the basis for the answer. In lieu thereof, at Applicants' option, a copy of such document and study may be attached to the answer.

(c) Identify principal documents and studies, and the 4

particular parts thereof, specifically examined but not cited in (b). In lieu thereof, at Applicants' 4 .* 4 h
  • 3 option, a copy of each such document and study may be attached to the ansker.

(d) Identify by name, title and affiliation the primary Applicant employee (s) or consultant (s) who provided the answer to the question.

(e) Explain w' ether Applicants are presently engaged in or intend to engage in any further, ongoing research program which may affect Applicants' answer. This answer need be provided only in cases where App 1icants intend to rely upon ongoing research not included in Section 1.5 of the PSAR at the LWA or construction permit hearing on the CRBR. Failure to provide such an answer means that Applicants do not intend to rely upon the existence of any such research at the LWA or construction permit hearing on the CRBR.

(f) Identify the expert (s) if any, which Applicants intend to have testify on the subject matter questioned, and state the qualifications of each such expert. This answer may be provided for each separate question or for a group of related questions. This answer need not be provided until Applicants have in fact identified the expert (s) in question or determined that no expert will testify, as long as such answer provides reasonable notice to Intervenors.

4 As used herein, " documents" include, but are not limited to, papers, photographs, criteria, standards of review, recordings, memoranda, books, records, writings, letters, telegrams, mailgrams, correspondence, notes and minutes of meetings or of conversations or of phone calls, interoffice, intra-agency or interagency memoranda or written communications of any nature, recordings of conversations either in writing or upon any mechanical or electronic or electrical recording devices, notes, exhibits, appraisals, work papers, reports, studies, opinions, surveys, evaluations, projections, hypotheses, formulas, designs, drawings, manuals, notebooks, worksheets, contracts, agreements, letter agreements, diaries, desk calendars, charts, schedules, appointment books, punchcards and computer printout sheets, computer data, telecopier transmissions, directives, proposals, and all drafts, revisions, and differing versions (whether f ormal or informal) of any of the foregoing, and also all copies of any of the foregoing which differ in any way (including handwritten notations or other written or printed matter of any nature) from the original.

\

S INTERROGATORIES I. Contention 5

1. In light of the analysis in the NASAP report, for each principal chemical and physical form in which plutonium-containing material is f ound in the CRBR fuel cycle:
a. identify the chemical and physical form of such material;
b. identify where such material is found in the CRBR fuel cycle (e.g. , fuel f abrication plant, reprocessing plant);
c. identify whether such material is directly weapons-usable, i.e., does not require further chemical processing;
d. identify what quantities of such material are considered to be of " safeguards significance,"d/

(i.e., give the approximate mass needed for a clandestine fission explosive (CFE));

e. indicate Applicants' estimate of the time needed to convert such material into a form suitable for a CFE; 1/ Intervenors use the term " safeguards significance" to define a significant quantity of material in relation to the amount of nuclear material needed for a nuclear explosive.

(Cf. NASAP Report, DOE /NE-0001/2, pp. 3-3 8 and 4-4. ) The use i ot this definition is meant to avoid the need for Applicants to release details concern ~ing weapons design.

l

6

f. to the extent not provided in updating answers to Intervenors' Eighth Set of Interrogatories,Section VII, define the response time Applicants deem to be adequate for detecting the diversion of an amount of such material considered to be of safeguards significancer and
g. identify the degree of Applicaats' assurance (e.g., 99 percent confidence level) that detection will occur within the period specified in subpart (e) above.
2. In determining what constitutes an adequate safeguards system, do Applicants conservatively or otherwise assume that a crude CFE could be designed and constructed by a small group of people (perhaps one) ,

none of whom have ever had access to the classified literature, without necessarily using a great deal of technological equipment or conducting any experiments? (See OTA Report, Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards, pp. 140-141.)

3. In light of recent analyses and recommendations by the General Accounting Office, see GAO, Assessment of various Aspects of this Nation's Nuclear Safeguards Program (EMD-80-4 8) (1980) , describe what steps have been taken to coordinate nuclear threat definition policy and levels of protection provided to similar

7 nuclear mateials by DOD, DOE, and NRC. To the extent i

differences among the three agencies still exist with respect to the application of physical security and material control and accounting to f acilities that possess or handle strategic quantities of special nuclear material, specify what such differences are, with specific reference to:

a. the internal threat to such f acilities assumed by each agency including but not limited to assumptions regarding:
1. the number of people; ii. the degree of collusion; iii. the degree of armament; iv. the degree of training;
v. the degree of planning; and
b. the external threat to such f acilities assumed by each agency including assumptions regarding the factors listed in subpart (a) (i) through (a) (v) above.
4. For each DOE GOCO f acility that is of a type likely to be utilized in the CRBR fuel cycle, identify fully each safeguards inspection of such f acility conducted from April 23, 1977 to date by DOE, DOE Contractors and the General Accounting Office which has identified failure (s) to meet the requirements of:

e

8

a. federal law (s);
b. agency regulations;
c. other agency guidance; or
d. prudent safety practice.
5. Identify all reports in Applicants' possession or known to Applicants, not otherwise identified in Applicants' update to Question 7 of Intervenors' First Set of Interrogatories to Applicants, issued since April 23, 1977 that assess the adequacy of physical security and material control and accounting at:
a. DOE facilities;
b. DOD facilities.

II. Contention 8

1. John W. Gofman argues [in Radiation and Human Health, Sierra Club Book 1981, pp 760-853] that the BEIR I, III and UNSCEAR (1977) estimates of genetic risk from radiation exposure do not adequately account for many irregularly inherited diseases and consequently they underestimate the genetic effect of radiation exposure with respect to irregularly inherited diseases by a factor between 6 and 100. (See Gofman, supra, page 791. ) If Applicants disagree with Gofman's ,

analysis in this regard or if Applicants disagree with Gofman's estimate of the total of all genetic and

9 chromosomal diseases or defects (at page 849) please explain precisely the nature of your disagreement.

2. Identify the latest EPA position with respect to proposed occupational exposure limits.
3. Identify the latest Applicant position with regard to proposed occupational exposure limits.

III. Contentions 9, 10 (a) and 17 Intervenors request that the interrogatories in this section be answered by the Department of Energy (DOE) Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs Mr. Herman Roser or the DOE Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Materials Mr. F. Charles Gilber t , and any other officers or employees of Applicants who have personal knowledge thereof or are the closest to having personal knowledge thereof. If the Interrogatories are answered, not only by Mr. Roser or Mr. Gilbert but also by other persons, whether or not he or she has verified the ans wer s , and whether or not he or she is an official or employee of Applicants, such person's name and title should be set fortn together with an identification of which Interrogatories he or she is responsible for answering.

To the extent not covered in the update to Questions 15 - 19 in Intevenors' First Set of Interrogatories to Applicants and Parts II and III of the Eighth Set:

O 10

1. Identify by grade and form (whether separated or contained in scrap) all U.S. stocks of f uel-grade and reactor-grade plutonium available as of September 30, 1981.
2. For each fiscal year from FY 1982 through FY 1995, provide a table showing DOE's best estimates of the supply, demand, and remaining U.S. inventory of separated fuel- and reactor-grade plutonium.
a. The estimates of U.S. f uel- and reactor-grade plutonium supply should indicate what portion of the stocks in question are expected to be provided from the following sources, and should indicate the bases for such expectations:
1) scrap (including scrap from retired nuclear R&D f acilities);
11) the processing of N-reactor spent fuel in the Purex plant; iii) ,

the processing of non-production reactor Zuels in government-owned reprocessing plants at Savannah River, Idaho or Hanford; iv) the purchasing or otherwise obtaining of plutonium from foreign sources; v) the reprocessing of commercial spent fuel in the Barnwell, S.C. reprocessing plant; vi) other sources (specify).

, a - . - - - , - _ - - - . - - ,

O 11

b. The estimate of U.S. demand for separated fuel-l and reactor-grade plutonium should specify how much plutonium is expected to be allocated to the following programs or facilities, and should indicate the bases for such expectations:

i) the FFTF (fuel requirements) ;

ii) the CRBR (fuel requirements);

iii) the Large Development Plant (fuel requirements);

iv) the laser isotope plutonium separation plant; v) the blending with high purity plutonium for U.S. weapons program needs; vi) other (specify).

3. With regard to the estimated supply of plutonium through the processing of non-production reactor fuels in government-owned reprocessing plants at Savannah River, Idaho, or Hanford, identify the estimated source of such fuels (e.g. FFTF, other research reactors) and indicate the quantity of such fuel that would be processed utilizing the proposed shear / leach head-end facility being designed for one of the government-owned reprocessing plants.
4. With respect to the proposed shear / leach head-end facility being designed or under consideration for one

12 of the government-owned reprocessing plants to enable it to process non-production reactor fuel:

I

a. what is the proposed capacity for such facility in terms of fuel input and plutonium output?
b. what is the justification for the proposed size and capacity of such facility?
5. With respect to the Barnwell, S.C. reprocessing plant, should it be completed and put into operation to reprocess commercial spent fuel:
a. what is the maximum plutonium recovery rate f or which the Barnwell plant is designed?
b. what is the most likely plutonium recovery rate the Barnwell plant would achieve?
6. With respect to the proposed laser isotope plutonium separation plant:
a. What is the proposed capacity for such facility in terms of plutonium input and output?
b. What is the justification for the proposed size and capacity of such facility?
7. Please describe any inquiries made since April 23, .

1977 by the U.S. to any foreign government, including but not limited to the United Kingdom, regarding the i purchase or otherwise obtaining of plutonium from foreign government (s) . For each such inquiry, please indicate:

l

O 13

a. the date of the inquiry;
b. the party to whom the inquiry was made;
c. the amount of plutonium sought;
d. the proposed use for such plutonium;
e. the date and nature of the response; and
f. whether and when such plutonium was or will be provided.
8. Identify the proposed source of plutonium or other fuel for the CRBR for each individual year of its operation until the estimated date of decommissioning (i.e., the source of the first CRBR core and every estimated reload) .
a. For each such year, identify who is responsible for providing the necessary fuel.
9. With respect to the use of highly enriched uranium rather than plutonium as fuel for the CRBR:
a. Do Applicants contemplate that highly enriched uranium might ever be used to fuel the CRBR?
b. Do Applicants believe they can demonstrate the technical performance, reliability, maintainability, licensability, safety, environmental acceptability and economical feasibility of LMFBRs through a uranium-fueled CRBR?

14

c. What would be the breeding ratio of the CRBR, for all or part of its operating history, if it were operated on highly enriched uranium rather than plutonium?
10. Does the existing stockpile of plutonium in, or allocated for use in, the U.S. breeder program represent a contingency source of plutonium for the U.S. weapons program?
11. If the answer to question 10 above is yes indicate the circumstances in which the DOE utilitizes such materials for weapons, including the nature of the breakout, or other scenarios, where use of this source of plutonium would likely occur.

~4 s 4

d 15 i Respectfully submitted,

%i fErr k4 ed Ellfn R. Weiss ( /

HARMON & WEISS 1725 Eye Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 833-9070

$ w A// 6 i ,w Barcara A. Finamore S. Jacob Scherr Natural Resources Defense l Council, Inc.

1725 Eye Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C 20006 (202) 223-8210 Attorneys for Intervenors Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

and the Sierra Club Dated: March 18, 1982 Washington, D.C.

-