ML20023C907
| ML20023C907 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, South Texas |
| Issue date: | 07/29/1980 |
| From: | Stello V NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20023A411 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-82-603 NUDOCS 8305180257 | |
| Download: ML20023C907 (16) | |
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1 STATEMENT OF VICTOR STELLO, JR., DIRECTOR OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
.w. g U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- C TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS l
x REP. BOB ECKHARDT, CHAIRMAN a5 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND
. _c FOREIGN COMMERCE i
JULY 29,1980 s
8305180257 830309
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Chronology of Events Leadino to Identification of Current Problems The Construction Permits for the South Texas Project were issued by the NRC on December 22, 1975.
As part of this initial licensing process the planned quality assurance program had been 'eviewed and was considered r
' acceptable to the NRC.
After construction was started and during the next several years, my 2
office carried out its normal construction inspection program utilizing inspectors from our Region IV office.
The inspection records for that time showed no extraordinary problems.
Then in early 1977 we received the first of a series of allegations A.
concerning harassment and intimidation of quality control inspectors at EN the site.
Each of these allegations was investigated bygy y;,.;, and most were not substantiated.
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Howev'er, due to the persistent nature of these allegations, in August 1978 the Director and staff of Region IV held an enforcement-oriented management meeting with the licensee.
The allegations received and l
investigated to date, as well as other concerns relative to implementation of the licensee's quality assurance program, were discussed.
t About a month later, on September 15, 1978, we stepped up our enforcement action by issuing an Immediate Action Letter to the licensee confirming the licensee stopping all work involving it. tallation of concrete l
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reinforcing steel due to deficiencies our inspectors had reported in the splicing of this steel.
We issued another Immediate Action Letter the following May due to improper storage of concrete reinforcing steel.
Then in June 1979 we issued the first of three Immediate Action Letters concerning voids in safety-related concrete structures after the licensee had stopped work in this area due to quality assurance problems.
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During this period, in the Spring of 1979, an allegation was received at the Houston, Tocas, Office of the FBI regarding possible conspiracy to H
defraud the United States Government through the NRC.
It was alleged that officials of Brown End Root, Inc., Houston Lighting and Power Company, and the NRC were involved in the conspiracy.
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The FEI performed an investigation of the allegation.
Subsequently, J. A.
ymy" Canales, United States Attorney, Southern District of Texas indicated in a letter to the NRC's General. Ccunsel dated December 4,1979 that prosecution was declined in this matter.
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s Meanwhile, because of our increasing concern with quality assurance problems at South Texas, we decided to conduct what is called our midterm quality assurance inspection earlier than usual.
This inspection was conducted in August 1979 by a group consisting of Region IV and Headquar-L ters personnel.
This inspection indicated quality assurance deficiencies
~in the areas examined - including examples of one subcontractor failing to follow quality assurance procedures and failing to conduct site audits as required.
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In September 1979, we assigned a Resident Inspector to provide a continuous NRC presence at the site.
On November 2, 1979 a new series of allegations was made to our Resident Inspector.
These allegations addressed threats, harassment and intimidation of quality control inspec-tors by construction personnel and lack of management support for quality assurance functions.
The following day, on November 3,1979, I directed that an in-depth i~g investigation be made into the continuing allegations of lack of QC
-c management support and harassment and intimidation of contractor quality control employees.
I also directed that a review of the current effective-ness.of the implementation of the quality assurance program be made.
This action was taken on the basis of the seriousness and the persistence k
of the allegations and was consistent with the views of the Director of the Division of Reactor Construction Inspection and the Director of Region IV.
When I directed that.a special investigation be performed, I designated
- q the Director of the Division of Reactor Construction Inspection in my
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office as the individual responsible for forming a multi-discipline
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investigation team.
The team consisted of six members selected from the various NRC regional offices and included the Resident Inspector at South Texas.
Utilizing inspectors from other regions provided not only a i
" fresh look" at the problems, but increased the technical expertise in the problem areas of concrete and structures.
Also I expected the special investigation team to obtain a broader, integrated view of the quality assurance program at the site than that previously obtained from
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individual inspections.
-4 II.
Results of Inspection by Special Investigation Team The special investigation team conducted its work between November 1979 and February 1980.
Their work resulted in substantiation of a large number.of the allegations.* Several instances were confirmed by formal statement that contractor quality control inspectors had been harassed.
Several instances of threats and tntimidation were also confirmed through statements.
Evidence that production pressures were brought to bear on Ig contractor quality control inspection was also obtained through statements.
'c Finally, evidence of nonsupport of contractor-quality assurance personnel by their supervision wa's also confirmed.
These findings are considered to be instances where the independence of the cuality assurance function was lost contrary to the requirements of the Commission's quality
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assurance requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
In addition, significant quality related deficiencies were found in the following work activities:
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1.
The quality of safety significant plant backfill in certain plant areas was deficient.
- It should be noted that the team took 57 statements under oath and that u
appror.imately 50 less formal interviews were conducted during the investigation.
Previous investigations had not utilized sworn statements.
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2.
In several it. stances welder qualification and weld quality were found to be marginal.
3.
The system for proper disposition and handling of quality nonconformance reports was found to be inadequate.
4.
The quality assurance audit system was found to be deficient.
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A number of other quality-related items were identified for followup m
and resolution; As a result of the special investigation there were few direct indidations of reduction in the safety capability of the facility to an unacceptable
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level.
No unacceptable systems, components or structures were found during-the investigation of the allegations.
However, the investigation did reveal the possibility of problems related to the compaction of engineered fill material' supporting safety-related buildings.
Major questions related to this aspect of plant construction were noted as 're-quiring resolution, leaving this one issue of adequate safety unanswered with regard to foundations.
Also during the investigation it.was found that improper welder qualifica-tion testing had been used.
Whether this has resulted in safety defects is a question that is to be addressed by the licensee in the actions which we have requested.
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3 III. Civil Penalty and Order of April 30, 1980 As a result of the findings from the special investigation, I issued.a Notice of Violation with civil monetary penaltier in'the cumulative amount of $100,000 on April' 30,1980.
In, addition, I issued an Order To Show Cause, effective in 90 days, why the safety related construction' activities at the South Texas Project should not be stopped and remain stopped until certain 'specified actions had been completed.
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,e The examples of harassment, production pressure, lack of management support, threats, and intimidation were used in finding the licensee in violation with Criterion I of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.
This criterion deals with the quality assurance organization and'the need for this
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A organization to have sufficient authority and organizational freedom to identify quality assurance problems.
The organization should also be free from cost and schedule pressures.
Twenty other noncompliances related to the quality assurance criteria of 5
Appendix B were also cited for civil penalty.
These included requirements '
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for 1) design' control, 2) instructions, procedures and drawings, 3) document control, 4) control of special processes, 5) inspection, 6) test l
control, 7) nonconforming materials, parts or componer.ts, 8) corrective j
action, 9) quality assurance records, and 10) audits.
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~ Another item of noncompliance, related to the use of improper techniques in welder qualification tests, was also cited in the civil penalty action.
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t 1 The. Order to Show Cause requires the licensee to address the problems and poor quality assurance situation that were found to exist, and to assure i
that completed work meets all necessary requirements.
In the Order, I specifically directed the licensee to complete eleven (11) actions to permit me to evaluate whether future activities at the South Texas Project will be conducted in accordance with Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 50.
Those actions are as follows:
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1.
Have a review conducted by an experienced, independent management
-c consultant, knowledgeable in QA/QC and nuclear construction, of the licensee's management of the quality assurance program to evaluate the current program and provide any recommendations for improvement.
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2.
Complete a review of existing information or obtain new data in
' order to address five specific safety issues related to Category I structural backfill.
3.
Conduct a review of completed on-site safety-related welding in the as civil-structural and piping work to determine its acceptability.
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4.
Rescind a Brown and Root brochure related to the QA Program and issue a new brochure.
A video tape used in training sessions was not to be used in the future and new training sessions are to be held.
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Define more clearly the procedures associated with the stop work authority in the quality group.
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Develop and implement a more effective system to provide for the identification and correction of the root causes for the noncon-formances which occur.'
7.
Develop and implement a more effective system to provide for the control of field changes in order to assess the impact of design
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changes on the design with respect to safety.
8.
Develop and implement a more effective system of record controls.
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Develop and implement an improved audit system.-
10.
Verify and correct Final Safety Analysis Report statements related to soil foundations.
as For all of the above items the licensee was ordered to submit in writing,
' - -c under oath, 'information addressing actions taken.
11.
Participate with senior representatives of Brown and Root in a public meeting near the site, with the NRC.
In summary, I concluded that the quality assurance program at the South Texas Plant had significant deficiencies.
I also concluded that the
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quality assurance program had become impaired in the sense that several lines of defense in the quality assurance program had been seriously h
breached; viz.- quality control inspection in the civil engineering discipline through loss of independence, improper disposition of noncon-formance reports, and deficient auotts.
In addition significant questions were raised in the areas of plant backfill and welding and welder qualification.
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control inspectors must be placed with the licensee.
The inspection function in the civil engineering area must surely have been impaired through the relationship that the licensee allowed to exist between contractor quality assurance personnel and construction workers.
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experience there is much "give and take" among quality control people and construction workers, but the South Texas situation appears to have exceeded the norm.
In further consideration of the findings of this investigation and the l.
results of previous inspection, we believe that the licensee (Houston Lighting and Power) and its principal contractor (Brown and Root) have not been in sufficient control of the South Texas Project.
The matter of independence of contractor quality assurance inspectors and the other matters related to quality assurance program implementation are clearly l
matters controllable by management.
I want to emphasize that we do not' wish to place blame on the inspectors or on the workers.
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Because of the significance of the findings of this investigation in terms of implementation of the quality assurance program at South Texas, we initiated higher threshold enforcement action.
A civil penalty was considered to be the appropriate sanction in this case because the most critical work has been stopped and will remain stopped until we are satisfied that proper corrective action has been taken.
The Show Cause Order should provide the means to achieve corrective
-.e'. g actions and to assure'that the licensee proceeds with improved methods of s
project control.
IV.
Licensee Responses / Actions to the Notice of Violation The Notice of Violation issued on April 30, 1980 prescribed that the licensee had twenty-five (25) days to respond.
The licensee responded in a letter dated May 23, 1980 with payment of the $100,000 civil penalty and an admission that "the items of noncompliance, as we understand them are essentially substantiated."
In addition to a denial or admission'for J
' an item of noncompliance a licensee in responding to this type of Notice of Violation is required to provide (1) the reason for each item of I
noncompliance; (2) the' corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved; (3) corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further items of noncompliance; and (4) the date when full compliance i.
will be achieved.
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The licensee satisfactorily addressed all of the twenty-two (22) items.
A co=plete response in some instances was deferred, to become part of the licensee's response to the Order to Show Cause, due today July 29, 1980.
This was considered to be satisfactory based on the licensee's commitment in the May 23, 1980 letter to devoting great attention to attacking the root causes of the' items of noncompliance. We interpret this to m'ean a systematic approach which would: 1) determine t'he cause of each problem and 2) establish corrective actions to remedy unacceptable results and eliminate the discovered cause.
This represents a change to the apparent past approach of numerous minor or " band aid fixes which most instances would remedy an apparent result, but not the root cause of the problem.
My letter of June 11, 1980 acknowledged the licensee's submittal of
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May 23, 1980 and the meeting that was held in my office on May 30, 1980 with the licensee to clarify certain aspects of that response.
In my letter I expressed certain concerns about their activities and stated the following:
1 "We note that the proposed corrective and preventive
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actions predominantly involve additional or revised procedures and instructions.
Although our inspectors identified a few cases of inadequate procedures, the principal finding was the fai.are on the part of both 3
Houston Lighting & Power and Brown & Root personnel to effectively implement the in place QA/QC programmatic requirements.
In our follow-up inspections we will be
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r concentrating not only upon the adequacy of procedures and instructions but also upon the effectiveness of their impiementation."
.V.
Meetinos with Licensee In preparing to respond to the specific items of the Order previously discussed, the licensee requested meetings in order to clarify certain g
aspects of the Order.
During the month of June several meetings were
-c held between Region IV and the licensee.
Then on June 30, 1980, a meeting was held in my office at the request of -
the licensee.
The purpose of the meeting was to provide me with an overview of the actions taken to date by the licensee.
Brief summar.ies of the studies made for the licensee were presented as well as some organization charts reflecting changes being made within the licensee's organization as well as that of Brown and Root.
One of the statements arising from the discussion is worth mentioning here.
In explaining
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their past problems, the licensee indicated that its QA function had been l
reduced to a QC group looking at the control of specific items and l
responding to those specifics rather than performing as a total overview l
group, analyzing and assessing the total picture.
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The most recent meeting, held on July 3,1980, in Region IV, involved discussion of basically the same items discussed in my office on June 30, 1980.
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As I.noted previously the response to the Order is due today, July 29, 1980.
Even if it has been received in our offices, I obviously cannot address.its adequacy at'this time.
I believe, however, that my actions in this enforcement case are achieving results and I have seen some serious reassessment on the part of the licensee and Brown and Root.
It remains for the NRC to review the documents to ascertain whether such problems are likely to arise again, but more importantly, to continue.its inspection effort to assess the actual effects in the field as imple-g 9
mentation occurs.
My office will be reviewing the licensee's submittal in the immediate future to evaluate the response.
The results of that evaluation and any related follow-up will, of course, be a matter of public record.
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VI.
Other Items - Current Status i
l As a result of the Show Cause Order which I issued on April 30, 1980 1
several groups and individuals have requested a hearing on the Order. '
1 The most substantive is a filing, dated May 28, 1980, from Mr. Lanny Sinkin, Co-coordinator for the Citizens Concerned About Nuclear Power, Inc. and the Citizens for Equitable Utilities.
On June 24, 1980 the staff made a filing before the Commission recommending that the request for hearing not be granted because 1) the Show Cause Order did not i
adversely affect Mr. Sinkin's interests and, 2) an operating license hearing was to be held in the near future.
I am unaware of any new developments on this matter.
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The public meeting required by the Order is to be held on August 19, 1980 I
at the Municipal Service Center located at 2105 M Street (7th and M) in Bay City, Texas.
That meeting will be: conducted in two sessions.
The first session will convene'at approximately 2:00 p.m. and terminate at 5:30 p.m.-
At this session the staff will meet with the licensee with the public present to iiiscuss outstanding issues and to obtain further informa-tion to evaluate the licensee's response to the Show Cause' Order.
The second session will be open for public participation on the issues of the 5
April 30, 1980 Notice of Violation and Order to Show Cause.
This evening session will convene at 7:00 p.m. and is intended to be an open session on nuclear power in general in order for the NRC to respond to questions f
from members of the public..The evening session will continue as long as necessary to accommodate constructive communications.
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VII.. Analysis of Problem and Generic Implications In retrospect I wish we could have recognized the problems sooner.
However, the information we currently have indicates the facility has'
.e been constructed in such a manner that major corrective construction work is not likely to be required.
This, of course, must be confirmed.
The stoppage of work in many safety-related areas that has been in effect
.and remains in effect has permitted an examination by the licensee of that construction already completed.
It has also allowed time to reassess the past with regard to the quality of the work and to plan for future improvements in areas noted to be weak based on the past experience.
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Our experience at South Texas has increased our awareness to the possibility of similar problems in quality assurance at~other construction sites.
If similar circumstances arise again at another site, we should be able to react more quickly in order to obtain corrective action.
VIII.' Projection of the Future Construction of the South Texas Project In my opinion, there is no reason to expect that the South Texas Project
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Certainly.
when problems arise of the magnitude of major quality assurance program deficiencies there will be time delays in order to reassess and correct problems.
There will no doubt be problems during future construction at South Texas and there may be new safety issues that arise that will have.
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to be addressed, but it is my opinion that'the plant can be constructed i
L to meet our requirements and that it can be operated without undue risk to the public.
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