ML20011A460
| ML20011A460 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 09/23/1981 |
| From: | Beeman G Battelle Memorial Institute, PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATION, NRC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20011A456 | List:
|
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8110130435 | |
| Download: ML20011A460 (3) | |
Text
.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
}
UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY Docket Nos. STN 50-483 CL (Callaway Plant, Unit.1)
^
AFFIDAVIT OF GORDON BEEMAN I, Gordon Beeman, being duty sworn: do depose and state:
I have been a research engineer for Battelle Memoriel Institute at the Pacific fiorthwest Laboratory (PNL) since 1975.
I received a Bachelor of Science degree in hiysical Metallurgy in 1972 and a Master of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering in 1975 both from Washington State University.
I have been a consultant to the Mechanical Engineering Branch of NRC since August of 1979.
Since that time I have assisted in safety reviews of seven different nuclear plants currently under construction.
In ad-dition I have directed the independent confirmatory stress analyses per-formed at PNL for the NRC to verify American Society of Mechanical l
Engineers (ASME) Code compliance for various safety related piping systems in ten different nuclear plants currently under construct' ion.
My involvement in the matter raiseo in Contention II-A(1) came about as the result of an independent confirmatory piping stress analysis to ascertain complia.;ce with the ASME Code.
By coincidence the safety related system chosen for analysis at the Callaway plant Unit 1 was the loop lbk0koa 0 00 0
No.1 emergency core cooling system attached to the redttor coolant loop inside containment. This includes the accumulator discharge line and part of tne residual heat removal system. The r'esults nf this analysis are documented in a report submitted to the HRC entitled "SNUPPS (Callaway and Wolf Creek) Loop No.1 Emergency Core Cooling System Piping Analysis,"
dated May 1981.
That portion of the line questioned in Contention II-A(I) is cor-rectly designated as ASME Code Class 2.
It runs from the accumulator tank outlet nozzle to the check valve at the Class 1 to Class 2 bound-a ry. This portion of piping has a design pressure of 700 psi and a design temperature of 150*F. The results of the aforementioned confirma-tory piping stress analysis show a 7,000 psi stress at the location of the alleged d(fective weld for sustained loads as calculated per the equation in ASME Code NC-3652.1.
The ASME Code allowable stress for the piping material at 150*F is 18,300 psi.
The following statements are made to address the specific allegations in Contention II-A(1):
1.
In terms of the Charge that the pipe was "substantially out-of-l round" the measurements (taken by the Applicant with the NRC Senior Resident Inspector present) have been reviewed.
The ASME Code contains no provisions for cut-of-roundness of Chss 2 and Class 3 piping.
However, the Material Specification for ASME SA-358 piping allows an outside diameter variation of 1%. The pipe in question is 10 inch schedule 140.
It has a nominal outtf de diameter of 10.75 inches.
The measured outside diameter variation of the pipe is 0.092 inches. This is less than the 1% variation allowed by Material Specification ASME SA-358.
The ASME Code provides additional
rulcs for out-of-roundness of Class 1 piping.
If the out-of-roundness is greater than 0.0h (where t is the nominal wall thickness) the stress index K1 used in NB-3653.2 must be adjusted accordingly. The piping system in question is not part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and is correctly designated as ASME Code Clau 2.
However, if the piping were evaluated using ASME Code Class 1 rules the effect of the out-of-roundness would be negligiblu.
2.
Concerning the allegation that the pipe was " machined below the minimum wall," I have independently performed calculations to determine minimum wall thickness using ASME Section III, Article NC-3640 and find the minimum wall thickness of 0.814 inches to be acceptable.
3.
In terms of the allegation that the pipe had " rejectable weld defects on the inside of a longitudinal seam weld," radiography is an acceptable method of nondestructive examination used throughout the industry.
It will reveal any significant weld defects with a reasonable degree of certainty.
'ordon Beeman Subscribed and sworn to before me l
this cUrdday of September,1981.
l M Th. %
l Notary Public
()
My Commission expires: M /, / 9 f s-0 0
i l
_