05000219/LER-1981-007, Forwards LER 81-007/03L-0

Forwards LER 81-007/03L-0

ML20008E883
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	03/03/1981
From:	Finfrock I JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20008E884	List: 05000219/LER-1981-007, Forwards LER 81-007/03L-0 05000219/LER-1981-007-03, /03L-0:on 810202,water-tight Door to Containment Spray Sys I Compartment Not Closed & Verification of Closed Door Not Performed.Caused by Personnel Error & Lack of Controls to Ensure Doors Are Closed After Passage
References
NUDOCS 8103100442
Download: ML20008E883 (3)

LER-1981-007, Forwards LER 81-007/03L-0

Event date:
Report date:
2191981007R00 - NRC Website

text

.

G OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION N

%. Ame,7,f,y,p (609) 693-1951 P.O. BOX 388

• FORKED RIVER

• NEW JERSEY

• C8731 p gplC; m s,w-burch 3,1981 to 0)\\

REG [lf[

s Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director g7 MAR 0.N ISBN

- ]'

~

Office of Inspection and Enforcanent j

Region.I United States Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission V

U 631 Park Avenue Kina of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Cu

Dear Mr. Grier:

SLBTEcr: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Licensee Event Peport Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-07/3L This letter forwards three copies of a Licens Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-07/3L in ccupliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b(3) of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

/

AMdW van R. Finfrock, J.

ice President - J &L Director - Oyster Creek IRF:dh Enclosures cc: Director (40 copies)

Office of Inspection and Enforcenent United States Nuclear Regulatory Ctmnission Washington, D.C.

20555 Director (3)

Office of Managment Infonnation and Program Control Lhited States Nuclear Regalatory Ccmnission Washington, D. C. 20555 NBC Resident Inspector (1)

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, N. J.

8108100 N'd.

b

OYSTER CREEK hU1 EAR GE2ERATING STATICN Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Licensee Event Peport Reportable Occtuma.e No. 50-219/81-07/3L Report Date March 3, 1981 Occurrence Date February 2, 1981 Identification of Occurrence Violation of Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.4.E when the Northeast Containment Spray Ptmp amtpartrent door was disecnered open on a routine tour of the Reactor 9141 ding, and paragrapt 4.4.C.3 when required sunnillance, to verify the empLet doors are closed after each entry, was not perfc.unui.

This event constitutes a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Smcifications, paragra;h 6.9.2.b(3).

Conditions Prior to occurrence The plant was operating at steady state power. Major plant parameters at the time of ocetum were:

Power:

Core 1833 M9t Electrical 626 Mie 4

Flow:

Recirculation 15.3 x 10 gpn Feedwater 6.67 x 106 lb/hr Description of Occurrence Ch February 2,1980 at approximately 7:00 PM, an operator perfor: ting a routine tour of the Beactor Building discovered the door frcm the torus area to the Contairnent Spray Systen I Ptmp Rxa (northeast corner rocm on elevation -19'-6")

was.open. 'Ihe operator 4-aa4ately closed and dogged the door and reported the dia'nvery to tha Group Shift Supervisor. The cbor had apparently been left open by contractor >wmel using the door for access to the torus area. The doors to the other otmpartments were checked and found to be closed.

Apparent cause of Occurrence The cause of the occurrence is attributed to personnel error in that contractor persc we.1 failed to close the watertight door after rissing through. Although signs are posted on each door indicating that they nust be closed and dogged at all times except for passage, there are no positive controls to ensure that this is done.

Reportable Occurrence Page 2 Peport No. 50-219/81-07/3L Analysis of Occurrence 2e Contalment Spray Systs is provided to renove heat energy frm the contain-ment in the event of a loss of coolant accident. me flow frm one pump in either loop is more than sufficient to provide the required heat re: oval capability.

he mntaiment spray pmps (and core sprav pmps) are located in capartments at the lowest level of the reactor building. hee capartments were provided with water-tight doors as part of a systen to isolate the corner roams fran the renainder of the reactor building at that level. The Technical Specifications require that the empartsnent doors be closed at all times except during passage in order to consider the core spray and containment spray systers operable.

We Facility Description and Safety Analysi~ Report (FDSAR) has analyzed the cases where water frm the torus is depositti in either of the corner reans or_

in the center compartnent around the torus. However, the release of water frm the torus with a water-tight door open has not been analyzed to determine its affect on the operation of other safety systens utilizing the torus as a water source. Although this specific case has not been analyzed, it is expected that the torus water would es*ahlinh a level resulting in a Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) about eight (8) feet above the NPSH requiranent for the Core Spray pmps at rated flow (nost limiting case). Berefore, the significance of this event is limited to a loss of redundancy in the Containment Spray Systan.

Corrective Action

te water-tight door was closed and dogged immediately upon discovery. He other water-tight doors were checked and found to be properly closed. The Plant Operations Manager suspended the work in the torus area and reviewed the incident with the personnel involved. He explained the possible consequences of leaving the doors open and informed than of the Technical Specifications requirenent that the doors be closed at all times except for passage. Work was then allom d to resume in the area.

In order to prevent a recurrence of this in the future, a positive means of ensuring the doors are closed after passage will be installed. Mditionally, a more detailed analysis will be performed to detennine the effects on the operation of other safety systans, using the torus as a water source, in the event that a corner romt water-tight door is left open and water is released from the torus.

Positive administrative controls will be inplanented by the contractor to assure closure of the water-tight doors after passage.

Failure Data Not applicable.