ND-19-1523, Unit 4 - Resubmittal of Notice of Uncompleted ITAAC 225-days Prior to Initial Fuel Load Item 2.5.02.06a.ii (Index Number 530)
ML19354A048 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Vogtle ![]() |
Issue date: | 12/19/2019 |
From: | Yox M Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
References | |
ND-19-1523 | |
Download: ML19354A048 (24) | |
Text
Michael J. Vox 7825 River Road
^Southern Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Director Vogtle 3 & 4 Waynesboro, GA 30830 DEC 1 9 2019 Docket Nos.: 52-025 52-026 ND-19-1523 10CFR 52.99(c)(3)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 3 and Unit 4 Resubmittal of Notice of Uncompleted ITAAC 225-davs Prior to Initial Fuel Load Item 2.5.02.06a.ii (Index Number 5301 Ladies and Gentlemen:
Pursuant to 10 CFR 52.99(c)(3), Southern Nuclear Operating Company hereby notifies the NRC that as of December 16, 2019, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant(VEGP) Unit 3 and Unit 4 Uncompleted Inspection, Test, Analysis, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) Item 2.5.02.06a.ii
[Index Number 530] has not been completed greater than 225-days prior to initial fuel load. The Enclosure describes the plan for completing ITAAC 2.5.02.06a.ii [Index Number 530]. Southern Nuclear Operating Company will at a later date provide additional notifications for ITAAC that have not been completed 225-days prior to initial fuel load.
Southern Nuclear Operating Company(SNC) previously submitted Notice of Uncompleted ITAAC 225-days Prior to Initial Fuel Load for Item 2.5.02.06a.ii [Index Number 530] ND-19-1323
[ML19304B856], dated October 31, 2019. This resubmittal supersedes letter number ND 1323 in its entirety.
This notification is informed by the guidance described in NEI-08-01, Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52, which was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.215. In accordance with NEI 08-01, this notification includes ITAAC for which required inspections, tests, or analyses have not been performed or have been only partially completed.
All ITAAC will be fully completed and all Section 52.99(c)(1) ITAAC Closure Notifications will be submitted to NRC to support the Commission finding that all acceptance criteria are met prior to plant operation, as required by 10 CFR 52.103(g).
This letter contains no new NRC regulatory commitments.
If there are any questions, please contact Tom Petrak at 706-848-1575.
Respectfully submitted.
Michael J. Vox L Regulatory Affairs Di/ector Vogtle 3&4
Enclosure:
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant(VEGP) Unit 3 and Unit 4 Completion Plan for Uncompleted ITAAC 2.5.02.06a.ii [Index Number 530]
MJY/JBN/sfr
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1523 Page 2 of 3 To:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company/ Georgia Power Company Mr. Peter P. Sena III (w/o enclosures)
Mr. D. L. McKinney (w/o enclosures)
Mr. M. D. Meier (w/o enclosures)
Mr. D. H. Jones(w/o enclosures)
Mr. G. Chick Mr. M. Page Mr. P. Martino Mr. M. J. Vox Mr. A. S. Parton Ms. K. A. Roberts Mr. T. G. Petrak Mr. C. T. Defnall Mr. C. E. Morrow Mr. J. L. Hughes Mr. S. Leighty Ms. A. C. Chamberlain Mr. J. C. Haswell Document Services RTYPE: VND.LI.L06 File AR.01.02.06 cc:
Nuclear Requlatorv Commission Mr. W.Jones (w/o enclosures)
Mr. F. D. Brown Mr. C. P. Patel Mr. G. J. Khouri Ms. S. E. Temple Mr. N. D. Karlovich Mr. A. Lerch Mr. C. J. Even Mr. B. J. Kemker Ms. N. C. Coovert Mr. C. Welch Mr. J. Gaslevic Mr. V. Hall Mr. G. Armstrong Ms. T. Lamb Mr. M. Webb Mr. T. Fredette Mr. C. Weber Mr. S. Smith Mr. C. Santos Oqlethorpe Power Corporation Mr. R. B. Brinkman Mr. E. Rasmussen
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1523 Page 3 of 3 Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia Mr. J. E. Fuller Mr. S. M. Jackson Dalton Utilities Mr. T. Bundros Westinahouse Electric Company. LLC Dr. L. Oriani (w/o enclosures)
Mr. D. C. Durham (w/o enclosures)
Mr. M. M. Corletti Ms. L. G. Iller Mr. Z. 8. Harper Mr. J. L. Coward Other Mr. J. E. Hesler, Bechtel Power Corporation Ms. L. Matis, Tetra Tech NUS, Inc.
Dr. W. R. Jacobs, Jr., Ph.D., GDS Associates, Inc.
Mr. 8. Roetger, Georgia Public Service Commission Ms. 8. W. Kernizan, Georgia Public Service Commission Mr. K. C. Greene, Troutman Sanders Mr. 8. Blanton, Balch BIngham
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1523 Enclosure Page 1 of 21 Southern Nuclear Operating Company ND-19-1523 Enclosure Vogtle Electric Generating Plant(VEGP) Unit 3 and Unit 4 Completion Plan for Uncompleted ITAAC 2.5.02.06a.ii [Index Number 530]
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1523 Enclosure Page 2 of 21 ITAAC Statement Design Commitment 6.a) The PMS initiates an automatic reactor trip, as identified in Table 2.5.2-2, when plant process signals reach specified limits.
6.b) The PMS initiates automatic actuation of engineered safety features, as identified in Table 2.5.2-3, when plant process signals reach specified limits.
6.c) The PMS provides manual initiation of reactor trip and selected engineered safety features as identified in Table 2.5.2-4.
8.a) The PMS provides for the minimum inventory of displays, visual alerts, and fixed position controls, as identified in Table 2.5.2-5. The plant parameters listed with a "Yes" in the "Display" column and visual alerts listed with a "Yes" in the "Alert" column can be retrieved in the MCR.
The fixed position controls listed with a "Yes" in the "Control" column are provided in the MCR.
8.c) Displays of the open/closed status of the reactor trip breakers can be retrieved in the MCR.
9.a) The PMS automatically removes blocks of reactor trip and engineered safety features actuation when the plant approaches conditions for which the associated function is designed to provide protection. These blocks are identified in Table 2.5.2-6.
9.b) The PMS two-out-of-four initiation logic reverts to a two-out-of-three coincidence logic if one of the four channels Is bypassed. All bypassed channels are alarmed in the MCR.
9.c) The PMS does not allow simultaneous bypass of two redundant channels.
I nspections/Tests/Analvses An operational test of the as-built PMS will be performed using real or simulated test signals.
An operational test of the as-built PMS will be performed using real or simulated test signals.
An operational test of the as-built PMS will be performed using the PMS manual actuation controls.
i) An inspection will be performed for retrievability of plant parameters in the MCR.
iii) An operational test of the as-built system will be performed using each MCR fixed position control.
Inspection will be performed for retrievability of displays of the open/closed status of the reactor trip breakers in the MCR.
An operational test of the as-built PMS will be performed using real or simulated test signals.
An operational test of the as-built PMS will be performed.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1523 Enclosure Page 3 of 21 An operational test of the as-built RMS will be performed. With one channel in bypass, an attempt will be made to place a redundant channel in bypass.
Acceptance Criteria ii) RMS output signals to the reactor trip switchgear are generated after the test signal reaches the specified limit. This needs to be verified for each automatic reactor trip function.
Appropriate RMS output signals are generated after the test signal reaches the specified limit.
These output signals remain following removal of the test signal. Tests from the actuation signal to the actuated device(s) are performed as part of the system-related inspection, test, analysis, and acceptance criteria.
ii) RMS output signals are generated for reactor trip and selected engineered safety features as identified in Table 2.5.2-4 after the manual initiation controls are actuated.
i) The plant parameters listed in Table 2.5.2-5 with a "Yes" in the "Display" column, can be retrieved in the MCR.
iii) For each test of an as-built fixed position control listed in Table 2.5.2-5 with a "Yes" in the "Control" column, an actuation signal Is generated. Tests from the actuation signal to the actuated device(s) are performed as part of the system-related inspection, test, analysis and acceptance criteria.
Displays of the open/closed status of the reactor trip breakers can be retrieved in the MCR.
The RMS blocks are automatically removed when the test signal reaches the specified limit.
The RMS two-out-of-four initiation logic reverts to a two-out-of-three coincidence logic if one of the four channels is bypassed. All bypassed channels are alarmed in the MCR.
The redundant channel cannot be placed in bypass.
ITAAC Completion Description Multiple ITAAC are performed to verify that:
- The Rrotection and Safety Monitoring System (RMS)initiates an automatic reactor trip, as identified in Table 2.5.2-2, when plant process signals reach specified limits.
- The RMS provides manual initiation of reactor trip and selected engineered safety features as identified in Table 2.5.2-4.
- The RMS provides for the minimum inventory of displays, visual alerts, and fixed position controls as identified in Table 2.5.2-5, with the plant parameters listed with a "Yes" in the "Display" colurhn and visual alerts listed with a "Yes" in the "Alert" column retrievable in the MCR (Main Control Room), and the fixed position controls listed with a "Yes" in the "Control" column provided in the MCR.
The subject ITAAC requires:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1523 Enclosure Page 4 of 21
- An operational test of the as-bullt RMS be performed using real or simulated test signals to verify RMS output signals to the reactor trip switchgear are generated after the test signal reaches the specified limit for each automatic reactor trip function.
- An operational test of the as-built RMS be performed using the RMS manual actuation controls to verify RMS output signals are generated for reactor trip and selected engineered safety features as identified in Table 2.5.2-4 after the manual initiation controls are actuated.
- An inspection be performed to verify the plant parameters listed in Table 2.5.2-5 with a "Yes" in the "Display" column, can be retrieved in the MGR.
- An operational test of the as-bullt system be performed using each MGR fixed position control to verify for each test of an as-built fixed position control listed in Table 2.5.2-5 with a "Yes" in the "Control" column, an actuation signal is generated.
This ITAAG also performs:
- An operational test of the as-built RMS using real or simulated test signals to verify appropriate RMS output signals are generated after the test signal reaches the specified limit and remain following removal of the test signal to demonstrate the RMS initiates automatic actuation of engineered safety features, as identified in Table 2.5.2-3, when plant process signals reach specified limits.
- An inspection for retrievability of displays of the open/closed status of the reactor trip breakers in the MGR to demonstrate displays of the open/closed status of the reactor trip breakers can be retrieved in the MGR.
- An operational test of the as-bullt RMS using real or simulated test signals to demonstrate the RMS automatically removes blocks of reactor trip and engineered safety features actuation identified in Table 2.5.2-6 when the plant approaches conditions for which the associated function is designed to provide protection.
- An operational test of the as-built RMS to demonstrate the RMS two-out-of-four initiation logic reverts to a two-out-of-three coincidence logic if one of the four channels is bypassed and bypassed channels are alarmed in the MGR.
- An operational test of the as-built RMS in which with one channel in bypass, an attempt will be made to place a redundant channel in bypass to demonstrate the RMS does not allow simultaneous bypass of two redundant channels.
ID RMS output signals to the reactor trip switchgear are generated after the test signal reaches the specified limit. This needs to be verified for each automatic reactor trip function.
An operational test of the as-built RMS is performed using simulated test signals. The operational test verifies that RMS output signals to the reactor trip switchgear are generated after the test signal reaches the specified limit for each automatic reactor trip function identified in GOL Appendix G Table 2.5.2-2 (Attachment A).
This ITAAG is completed as a combination of:
- Factory Acceptance Test- Functional testing of each RMS automatic reactor trip from the test signal input to the RMS output signals to the reactor trip switchgear
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1523 Enclosure Page 5 of 21
- Site software installation and regression test- Hardware and software integration verification and testing of changes The Factory Acceptance Testing (FAT)follows the guidance of NEI 08-01 Section 9.4 (Reference 50)for the as-built tests to be performed at other than the final installed location.
The FAT was performed in accordance with RMS Software Program Manual WCAP-16096 (Reference 1), PMS Test Plan APP-PMS-T5-001 (Reference 2), and applicable Codes and Standards described in Vogtle 3 and 4 UFSAR Chapter 7(Reference 48).
The FAT included testing of PMS inputs and outputs, logic, and functionality. During the test, the process parameters were simulated and adjusted to create applicable reactor trip conditions.
PMS signals at reactor trip computer point PMSY-RXTR (Y = A, B, C, or D in accordance with its PMS division) were monitored and it was confirmed that each automatic reactor trip function works as designed from the simulated input to reactor trip computer point PMSY-RXTR. This testing was performed in accordance with FAT Test Procedures APP-PMS-T1P-007(Reference
- 3) and APP-PMS-T1P-035 (Reference 4). The results of this testing are documented in FAT test reports SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-007(References 5 through 7)and SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-035 (References 8 through 10). During testing in FAT Test Procedure APP-PMS-T1P-012 (Reference 11), a Steam Generator-2 Level Low-2 is initiated, signals at the computer point PMSY-RXTR are verified, the shunt trip outputs from PMS are verified to turn on, and the under voltage outputs from PMS are verified to turn off. The results of this testing are documented in the FAT test reports SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-012(References 12 through 14).
Additional hardware and software installation and associated inspections and testing are performed on-site to verify that the cabinets are intact and functional in accordance with Units 3 and 4 for applicable Field Change Notifications(FCNs) API000 Vogtle Unit 3 PMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release 8.7.0.1 and API000 Vogtle Unit 4 PMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release 8.7.0.1, and B-GEN-ITPCI-001 (References 15,16, and 49).
References 15,16, and 49 include steps that confirm and document successful software load and further confirm the physical properties of the as-built PMS. A regression analysis (i.e.,
change evaluation) is performed for hardware changes(References 17 and 18) and software changes (Reference 19)to determine if additional testing is needed for the as-built system.
The completed Unit 3 and Unit 4 FAT test reports (References 5 through 10 and 12 through 14),
FCNs (References 15 and 16), B-GEN-ITPCI-001 (Reference 49), and regression test results (References 17 through 19) confirm that appropriate PMS output signals are generated after the test signal reaches the specified limit. These output signals remain following removal of the test signal. Tests from the actuation signal to the actuated device(s) are performed as part of the system-related inspection, test, analysis, and acceptance criteria.
References 5 through 10 and 12 through 19 are available for NRC inspection as part of the Unit 3 and 4 ITAAC 2.5.02.06a.ii Completion Packages (References 46 and 47).
Aporopriate PMS output sianals are Generated after the test sional reaches the specified limit.
These output signals remain following removal of the test signal. Tests from the actuation signal to the actuated device(s) are performed as part of the svstem-related inspection, test, analvsis.
and acceptance criteria.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1523 Enclosure Page 6 of 21 An operational test of tfie as-built RMS is performed using simulated test signals. The operational test verifies that appropriate RMS output signals are generated after the test signal reaches the specified limit and that these output signals remain following removal of the test signal.
This ITAAC is completed as a combination of:
- Factory Acceptance Test- Functional testing of RMS automatic engineered safety features from the test signal input to the actuation signal output
- Site software installation and regression test- Hardware and software integration verification and testing of changes The Factory Acceptance Testing (FAT)follows the guidance of NEI 08-01 Section 9.4 (Reference 50)for the as-built tests to be performed at other than the final installed location.
The FAT was performed in accordance with RMS Software Program Manual WCAR-16096 (Reference 1), RMS Test Plan ARR-RMS-T5-001 (Reference 2), and applicable Codes and Standards described in Vogtle 3 and 4 UFSAR Chapter 7(Reference 48).
The FAT includes testing of RMS inputs and outputs, logic, and functionality. During this test, the initial conditions for the test scenarios were established and confirmed that the setpoints and logics which generated output signals for all the engineered safety features(ESF) identified in COL Table 2.5.2-3(Attachment B) work as designed. Testing initially inputs a test signal that verifies the bistable and coincidence logic of the RMS. The output from the RMS is then sent to modules that operate the devices in the field with the output signals of these modules documented. Additionally, output signals which are designed to remain following removal of the test signal were verified. This testing was performed in accordance with FAT Test Procedures ARR-RMS-T1R-007(Reference 3), ARR-RMS-T1R-008 (Reference 20), ARR-RMS-T1R-009 (Reference 21), ARR-RMS-T1R-012(Reference 11), and ARR-RMS-T1R-035(Reference 4).
The results of the tests are documented in FAT Test Reports SV0/SV3/SV4-RMS-T2R-007 (References 5 through 7), SV0/SV3/SV4-RMS-T2R-008 (References 22 through 24),
ARR/SV3/SV4-RMS-T2R-009(References 25 through 27), and SV0/SV3/SV4-RMS-T2R-012 (References 12 through 14), and SV0/SV3/SV4-RMS-T2R-035 (References 8 through 10).
The output signals for the Turbine Trip ESF function are designed to not remain following removal of the test signal and is not included in the testing above. In the event of a Turbine Trip, manual operator action is performed to latch the Turbine.
Additional hardware and software installation and associated inspections and testing are performed on-site to verify that the cabinets are intact and functional in accordance with Units 3 and 4 for applicable Field Change Notifications(FCNs) API000 Vogtle Unit 3 RMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release 8.7.0.1 and API000 Vogtle Unit 4 RMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release 8.7.0.1, and B-GEN-ITRCI-001 (References 15,16, and 49).
References 15, 16, and 49 include steps that confirm and document successful software load and further confirm the physical properties of the as-built RMS. A regression analysis (i.e.,
change evaluation) is performed for hardware changes (References 17 and 18) and software changes (Reference 19)to determine if additional testing is needed for the as-built system.
The completed Unit 3 and Unit 4 FAT test reports (References 5 through 10, 12 through 14, and 22 through 27), FCNs (References 15 and 16), B-GEN-ITRCI-001 (Reference 49), and regression test results (References 17 through 19) confirm that appropriate RMS output signals
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1523 Enclosure Page 7 of 21 are generated after the test signal reaches the specified limit. These output signals remain following removal of the test signal. Tests from the actuation signal to the actuated device(s) are performed as part of the system-related inspection, test, analysis, and acceptance criteria.
References 5 through 10, 12 through 19, and 22 through 27 are available for NRG inspection as part of the Unit 3 and 4 ITAAC 2.5.02.06a.ii Completion Packages(References 46 and 47).
ii) PMS output signals are generated for reactor trip and selected engineered safetv features as identified in Table 2.5.2-4 after the manual initiation controls are actuated.
An operational test of the as-built PMS is performed using PMS manual actuation controls. The operational test verifies that PMS output signals are generated for reactor trip and selected engineered safety features as identified in Table 2.5.2-4 after the manual initiation controls are actuated.
This ITAAC is completed as a combination of:
- Factory Acceptance Test- Testing of PMS logic and functions using simulated manual initiation control inputs and verifying generation of the outputs for reactor trip and ESP functions
- Site software installation and regression test- Hardware and software integration verification and testing of changes
- Component Test- Testing of the as-built manual initiation controls and verifying the inputs to PMS for ESP functions
- Preoperational Test- Testing of the as-built manual initiation controls and verifying the inputs to PMS for reactor trip functions The Factory Acceptance Testing (PAT)follows the guidance of NEI 08-01 Section 9.4 (Reference 50)for the as-built tests to be performed at other than the final installed location.
The PAT was performed in accordance with PMS Software Program Manual WCAP-16096 (Reference 1), PMS Test Plan APP-PMS-T5-001 (Reference 2), and applicable Codes and Standards described in Vogtle 3 and 4 UPSAR Chapter 7(Reference 48).
The PAT included testing of PMS inputs and outputs, logic, and functionality. During this test, the manual initiation control inputs to the PMS were simulated and it was confirmed that the output signals were actuated for reactor trip and selected engineered safety features manual actuations as identified in COL Appendix C Table 2.5.2-4 (Attachment C). This testing was performed in accordance with the PMS PAT procedures APP-PMS-T1P-007(Reference 3)and APP-PMS-T1P-008 (Reference 20). The results of the tests are documented in the PAT test reports SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-007(References 5 through 7)and SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-008 (References 22 through 24).
Additional hardware and software installation and associated inspections and testing are performed on-site to verify that the cabinets are intact and functional in accordance with Units 3 and 4 for applicable Field Change Notifications(PCNs) API000 Vogtle Unit 3 PMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release 8.7.0.1 and AP1000 Vogtle Unit 4 PMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release 8.7.0.1, and B-GEN-ITPCI-001 (References 15,16, and 49).
References 15,16, and 49 include steps that confirm and document successful software load and further confirm the physical properties of the as-built PMS. A regression analysis (i.e..
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1523 Enclosure Page 8 of 21 change evaluation) is performed for hardware changes(References 17 and 18) and software changes (Reference 19)to determine if additional testing is needed for the as-built system.
Testing of selected ESF manual initiation controls identified in Attachment C is performed in accordance with component test packages SNCXXXXXX (Unit 3) and SNCYYYYYY (Unit 4)
(References 28 and 29). These component test packages utilize B-GEN-ITPCI-006 (Reference
- 30) to test ESF manual initiation controls. Selected ESF manual initiation controls are actuated and confirmed at the PMS input, by visually inspecting the digital input LED. The completed Unit 3 and Unit 4 component test packages confirm that select ESF manual controls actuations are received at PMS.
Testing of reactor trip manual controls is performed in accordance with pre-operational tests 3/4-PMS-ITPP-504(References 31 and 32) to test reactor trip manual initiation controls.
Reactor trip manual initiation controls PMS-HS025 and PMS-HS026 are actuated in the Main Control Room (MGR)and Manual Reactor Trip Logic Trip is verified on each divisional safety display. The completed Unit 3 and Unit 4 test procedures confirm that each RTCB trip status is changed after actuation of manual controls.
The completed Unit 3 and Unit 4 FAT test reports (References 5 through 7 and 22 through 24),
FGNs(References 15 and 16), B-GEN-ITPGI-001 (Reference 49), regression test results (References 17 through 19), completed component test packages (References 28 and 29), and completed preoperational test results (References 31 and 32), confirm that the PMS output signals are generated for reactor trip and selected engineered safety features as identified in Table 2.5.2-4 after the manual initiation controls are actuated.
References 5 through 7,15 through 19, 22 through 24, and 28 through 32 are available for NRG inspection as part of the Unit 3 and Unit 4ITAAG 2.5.02.06a.ii Gompletion Packages (References 46 and 47).
i) The plant parameters listed in Table 2.5.2-5 with a "Yes" in the "Disolav" column, can be retrieved in the MGR.
An inspection is performed to verify the retrievability of the VEGP Unit 3 and Unit 4 plant parameters in the MGR. The inspection for retrievability confirms that the plant parameters listed in GOL Appendix G Table 2.5.2-5 (Attachment D) with a "Yes" in the "Display" column can be retrieved in the MGR.
The inspection is performed in accordance with Work Orders SNG921600(Unit 3) and SNGZZZZZZ (Unit 4)(References 33 and 34) and visually confirms that when each of the plant parameters identified in Attachment D with a "Yes" in the "Display" column is recalled using the MGR PMS Visual Display Units(VDUs), the expected display appears on the PMS VDU.
The inspection results are included in References 33 and 34 and confirm that the plant parameters listed in Table 2.5.2-5 with a "Yes" in the "Display" column can be retrieved in the MGR.
References 33 and 34 are available for NRG inspection as part of the Unit 3 and Unit 4 ITAAG 2.5.02.06a.ii Gompletion Packages (References 46 and 47).
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1523 Enclosure Page 9 of 21 ill) For each test of an as-built fixed position control listed in Table 2.5.2-5 with a "Yes" in the "Control" column, an actuation signal is generated. Tests from the actuation sianal to the actuated device(s) are performed as part of the system-related inspection, test, analysis and acceptance criteria.
An operational test of the as-built PMS is performed using each MCR fixed position control to verify that for each test of an as-built fixed position control listed in COL Appendix C Table 2.5.2-5 with a "Yes" in the "Control" column (Attachment D), an actuation signal is generated.
This ITAAC is completed as a combination of:
- Factory Acceptance Test- Testing of PMS logic and functions using simulated fixed position control inputs and verifying generation of the actuation signal output
- Site software installation and regression test- Hardware and software integration verification and testing of changes
- Component Test- Testing of the as-built fixed position controls and verifying the inputs to PMS for ESF functions
- Preoperational Test- Testing of the as-built fixed position controls and verifying the inputs to PMS for reactor trip functions The Factory Acceptance Testing (FAT)follows the guidance of NEI 08-01 Section 9.4 (Reference 50)for the as-built tests to be performed at other than the final installed location.
The FAT was performed in accordance with PMS Software Program Manual WCAP-16096 (Reference 1), PMS Test Plan APP-PMS-T5-001 (Reference 2), and applicable Codes and Standards described in Vogtle 3 and 4 UFSAR Chapter 7(Reference 48).
The FAT included testing of PMS inputs and outputs, logic, and functionality. During this test, the fixed position control inputs to the PMS were simulated and it was confirmed that the actuation signals were generated for reactor trip and selected engineered safety features manual actuations as identified in Attachment D. This testing was performed in accordance with the PMS FAT procedures APP-PMS-T1P-007(Reference 3)and APP-PMS-T1P-008 (Reference 20). The results of the tests are documented in the FAT test reports SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-007(References 5 through 7) and SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-008 (References 22 through 24).
Additional hardware and software installation and associated inspections and testing are performed on-site to verify that the cabinets are intact and functional in accordance with Units 3 and 4 for applicable Field Change Notifications(FGNs) API000 Vogtle Unit 3 PMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release 8.7.0.1 and API000 Vogtle Unit 4 PMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release 8.7.0.1, and B-GEN-ITPCI-001 (References 15,16, and 49).
References 15,16, and 49 include steps that confirm and document successful software load and further confirm the physical properties of the as-built PMS. A regression analysis (i.e.,
change evaluation) is performed for hardware changes(References 17 and 18) and software changes(Reference 19) to determine if additional testing is needed for the as-built system.
Testing of selected ESF fixed position controls identified in Attachment D is performed in accordance with component test packages SNCXXXXXX (Unit 3)and SNCYYYYYY (Unit 4)
(References 28 and 29). These component test packages utilize B-GEN-ITPCI-006 (Reference 30)to test ESF fixed position controls. Selected ESF fixed position controls identified in
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1523 Enclosure Page 10 of 21 Attachment D are actuated and confirmed at the RMS input, by visually inspecting the digital input LED.
Testing of the Manual ADS and IRWST Injection Unblock is performed in accordance with Unit 3 and Unit 4 component test packages SNCAAAAAA and SNCBBBBBB (References 35 and 36). These component test packages utilize B-GEN-ITPCI-039(Reference 43) to direct the performance of test procedures 3/4-PMS-OTS-17-012(References 44 and 45). The Manual ADS and IRWST Injection Unblock fixed position control switch is taken to unblock in the MGR and the block is verified to be removed at the Component Interface Modules (CIM).
Testing of reactor trip fixed position controls is performed in accordance with pre-operational tests 3/4-PMS-ITPP-504 (References 31 and 32) to test reactor trip fixed position controls.
Reactor trip fixed position controls are actuated in the Main Control Room (MCR)and Manual Reactor Trip Logic Trip is verified on each divisional safety display. The completed Unit 3 and Unit 4 test procedures confirm that each RTCB trip status is changed after actuation of the manual reactor trip fixed position controls.
The completed Unit 3 and Unit 4 FAT test reports (References 5 through 7 and 22 through 24),
FCNs (References 15 and 16), B-GEN-ITPCI-001 (Reference 49), regression test results (References 17 through 19), completed component test packages(References 35 and 36), and completed preoperational test results (References 31 and 32) confirm that for each test of an as-built fixed position control listed in Attachment D with a "Yes" in the "Control" column, an actuation signal is generated. Tests from the actuation signal to the actuated device(s) are performed as part of the system-related inspection, test, analysis and acceptance criteria.
References 5 through 7, 15 through 19, 22 through 24, 31, 32, 35, and 36 are available for NRC inspection as part of the Unit 3 and Unit 4 ITAAC 2.5.02.06a.ii Completion Packages (References 46 and 47).
Displavs of the open/closed status of the reactor trip breakers can be retrieved in the MCR.
An inspection is performed to verify the displays of the open/closed status of the reactor trip breakers can be retrieved in the MCR.
The inspection is performed in accordance with 3/4-PMS-ITPP-504(References 31 and 32) and visually confirms that when each of the displays of the open/closed status of the reactor trip breakers are summoned using the MCR PMS Visual Display Units (VDUs), the expected display appears on the PMS VDU.
The inspection results are included in References 31 and 32 and confirm that displays of the open/closed status of the reactor trip breakers can be retrieved in the MCR.
References 31 and 32 are available for NRC Inspection as part of the Unit 3 and Unit 4 ITAAC 2.5.02.06a.ii Completion Packages (References 46 and 47).
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1523 Enclosure Page 11 of 21 The RMS blocks are automatically removed when the test signal reaches the specified limit.
An operational test of the as-built RMS is performed using simulated test signals to verify that RMS blocks are automatically removed when the test signal reaches the specified limit.
This ITAAC is completed as a combination of:
- Factory Acceptance Test- Functional testing of RMS ability to automatically remove blocks
- Site software installation and regression test- Hardware and software integration verification and testing of changes The Factory Acceptance Testing (FAT)follows the guidance of NEI 08-01 Section 9.4 (Reference 50)for the as-built tests to be performed at other than the final installed location.
The FAT was performed in accordance with RMS Software Program Manual WCAR-16096 (Reference 1), RMS Test Plan ARR-RMS-T5-001 (Reference 2), and applicable Codes and Standards described in Vogtle 3 and 4 UFSAR Chapter 7(Reference 48).
The FAT included testing of RMS inputs and outputs, logic, and functionality. During this test, the initial conditions for the test scenarios were established and confirmed that RMS blocks are automatically removed as appropriate for the reactor trip and engineered safety feature actuation blocks identified in COL Appendix C Table 2.5.2-6 (Attachment E). During the test, the process parameters were simulated and adjusted to create applicable unblock conditions, RMS unblock signals were monitored, and it was confirmed that the automatic unblock functions work as designed. This testing was performed in accordance with FAT Test Procedures ARR-RMS-T1R-008 and ARR-RMS-T1R-035(Reference 20 and 4). The results of the testing are documented in the FAT test reports SV0/SV3/SV4-RMS-T2R-008(References 22 through 24) and SV0/SV3/SV4-RMS-T2R-035 (References 8 through 10).
Additional hardware and software installation and associated inspections and testing are performed on-site to verify that the cabinets are intact and functional in accordance with Units 3 and 4 for applicable Field Change Notifications(FONs) API000 Vogtle Unit 3 RMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release 8.7.0.1 and API000 Vogtle Unit 4 RMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release 8.7.0.1, and B-GEN-ITRCI-001 (References 15,16, and 49).
References 15, 16, and 49 include steps that confirm and document successful software load and further confirm the physical properties of the as-built RMS. A regression analysis (i.e.,
change evaluation) is performed for hardware changes (References 17 and 18) and software changes (Reference 19)to determine if additional testing is needed for the as-built system.
The completed Unit 3 and Unit 4 FAT test reports (References 8 through 10 and 22 through 24),
FONs (References 15 and 16), B-GEN-ITRCI-001 (Reference 49), and regression test results (References 17 through 19) confirm that the RMS blocks are automatically removed when the test signal reaches the specified limit.
References 8 through 10,15 through 19, and 22 through 24 are available for NRC inspection as part of the Unit 3 and 4 ITAAC 2.5.02.06a.ii Completion Packages(References 46 and 47).
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1523 Enclosure Page 12 of 21 The RMS two-out-of-four initiation logic reverts to a two-out-of-three coincidence logic If one of the four channels is bypassed. All bypassed channels are alarmed in the MGR.
An operational test of the as-built RMS is performed to verify that RMS two-out-of-four initiation logic reverts to a two-out-of-three coincidence logic if one of the four channels is bypassed and that ail bypassed channels are alarmed in the MGR.
This ITAAG is completed as a combination of:
- Factory Acceptance Test- Functional testing of RMS to ensure two-out-of-four initiation logic reverts to a two-out-of-three coincidence logic if one of the four channels is bypassed and that all bypassed channels are alarmed in the MGR
- Site software installation and regression test- Hardware and software integration verification and testing of changes
- Rre-operational Test- Functional testing of RMS to ensure that an alarm is received in the MGR when a channel is bypassed The Factory Acceptance Testing (FAT)follows the guidance of NEI 08-01 Section 9.4 (Reference 50)for the as-built tests to be performed at other than the final installed location.
The FAT was performed in accordance with RMS Software Program Manual WGAR-16096 (Reference 1), RMS Test Plan ARR-RMS-T5-001 (Reference 2), and applicable Godes and Standards described in Vogtle 3 and 4 UFSAR Ghapter 7(Reference 48).
The FAT included testing of RMS inputs and outputs, logic, and functionality. During this test, the initial conditions for the test scenarios were established and confirmed that RMS two-out-of-four initiation logic reverts to a two-out-of-three coincidence logic if one of the four channels is bypassed. During the test, one of the four RMS channels was taken to bypass, RMS logic was monitored, and it was conifirmed that the change in logic works as designed. This testing was performed in accordance with FAT Test Procedures ARR-RMS-T1R-026 (Reference 37). The results of the testing are documented in the FAT test reports SV0/SV3/SV4-RMS-T2R-026 (References 38 through 40).
Additional hardware and software installation and associated inspections and testing are performed on-site to verify that the cabinets are intact and functional in accordance with Units 3 and 4 for applicable Field Ghange Notifications(FGNs) API000 Vogtle Unit 3 RMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release 8.7.0.1 and AR1000 Vogtle Unit 4 RMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release 8.7.0.1, and B-GEN-ITRGI-001 (References 15,16, and 49).
References 15,16, and 49 include steps that confirm and document successful software load and further confirm the physical properties of the as-built RMS. A regression analysis (i.e.,
change evaluation) is performed for hardware changes(References 17 and 18) and software changes (Reference 19)to determine if additional testing is needed for the as-built system.
Testing of bypass alarms in the MGR is performed in accordance with pre-operational tests 3/4-RMS-ITRR-521 (References 41 and 42). Each RMS division is individually placed in partial bypass at the Maintenance and Test Panel (MTR)and the bypassed channel alarms are verified in the MGR. The completed Unit 3 and Unit 4 test procedures confirm that each RTGB trip status is changed after actuation of the manual reactor trip fixed position controls.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1523 Enclosure Page 13 of 21 The completed Unit 3 and Unit 4 FAT test reports (References 38 through 40), PONs (References 15 and 16), B-GEN-ITPCI-001 (Reference 49), regression test results (References 17 through 19), and completed preoperational test results (References 41 and 42), confirm that the PMS two-out-of-four initiation logic reverts to a two-out-of-three coincidence logic if one of the four channels is bypassed and that all bypassed channels are alarmed in the MGR.
References 38 through 40, 15 through 19, 41, and 42 are available for NRG inspection as part of the Unit 3 and 4 ITAAG 2.5.02.06a.ii Completion Packages (References 46 and 47).
The redundant channel cannot be placed in bvoass.
An operational test of the as-built PMS is performed by attempting to place a redundant channel in bypass with one channel in bypass to verify the redundant channel cannot be placed in bypass.
This ITAAG is completed as a combination of:
- Factory Acceptance Test- Functional testing of PMS to ensure redundant channels cannot be placed in bypass with one channel in bypass
- Site software installation and regression test- Hardware and software integration verification and testing of post system delivery changes The Factory Acceptance Testing (FAT)follows the guidance of NEI 08-01 Section 9.4 (Reference 50)for the as-built tests to be performed at other than the final installed location.
The FAT was performed in accordance with PMS Software Program Manual WGAP-16096 (Reference 1), PMS Test Plan APP-PMS-T5-001 (Reference 2), and applicable Godes and Standards described in Vogtle 3 and 4 UFSAR Ghapter 7(Reference 48).
The FAT included testing of PMS inputs and outputs, logic, and functionality. During this test, the initial conditions for the test scenarios were established and confirmed that with one channel of PMS in bypass, the redundant channel cannot be placed in bypass. During the test, one of the four PMS channels was taken to bypass, an attempt to place a redundant channel in bypass was made, and it was confirmed that the redundant channel cannot be placed in bypass. This testing was performed in accordance with FAT Test Procedure APP-PMS-T1P-026 (Reference 37). The results of the testing are documented in the FAT test reports SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-026 (References 38 through 40).
Additional hardware and software installation and associated inspections and testing are performed on-site to verify that the cabinets are intact and functional in accordance with Units 3 and 4 for applicable Field Ghange Notifications(FGNs) API000 Vogtle Unit 3 PMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release 8.7.0.1 and API000 Vogtle Unit 4 PMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release 8.7.0.1, and B-GEN-ITPGI-001 (References 15, 16, and 49).
References 15, 16, and 49 include steps that confirm and document successful software load and further confirm the physical properties of the as-built PMS. A regression analysis (i.e.,
change evaluation) is performed for hardware changes (References 17 and 18) and software changes(Reference 19)to determine if additional testing is needed for the as-built system.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1523 Enclosure Page 14 of 21 The completed Unit 3 and Unit 4 FAT test reports (References 38 through 40), FCNs (References 15 and 16), B-GEN-ITPCI-001 (Reference 49), and regression test results (References 17 through 19) confirm that with one PMS channel In bypass, the redundant channel cannot be placed In bypass.
References 38 through 40 and 15 through 19 are available for NRG Inspection as part of the Unit 3 and 4 ITAAC 2.5.02.06a.ll Completion Packages (References 46 and 47).
List of ITAAC Findings In accordance with plant procedures for ITAAC completion. Southern Nuclear Operating Company(SNC) performed a review of all findings pertaining to the subject ITAAC and associated corrective actions. This review found there are no relevant ITAAC findings associated with this ITAAC.
References(avaiiable for NRG inspection)
- 1. WCAP-16096 "Software Program Manual for Common Q Systems" Revision 4A
- 2. APP-PMS-T5-001, Rev. 5,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Test Plan"
- 3. APP-PMS-T1P-007,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System - Reactor Thp Channel Integration Test Procedure"
- 4. APP-PMS-T1P-035,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Display Calibration Data Test Procedure"
- 5. SV3-PMS-T2R-007,"Vogtle Unit 3 API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Display Calibration Data Test Report"
- 6. SV4-PMS-T2R-007,"Vogtle Unit 4 API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Display Calibration Data Test Report"
- 7. SV0-PMS-T2R-007,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Display Calibration Data Test Report"
- 8. SV3-PMS-T2R-035,"Vogtle Unit 3 API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System -
Reactor Trip Channel Integration Test Report"
- 9. SV4-PMS-T2R-035,"Vogtle Unit 4 API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System -
Reactor Trip Channel Integration Test Report"
- 10. SV0-PMS-T2R-035,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System - Reactor Trip Channel Integration Test Report"
- 11. APP-PMS-T1P-012,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System - System Integration Test for Time Response Test Procedure"
- 12. SV3-PMS-T2R-012,"Vogtle Unit 3 API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System -
System Integration Test for Time Response Test Report"
- 13. SV4-PMS-T2R-012,"Vogtle Unit 4 API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System -
System Integration Test for Time Response Test Report"
- 14. SV0-PMS-T2R-012,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System - System Integration Test for Time Response Test Report"
- 15. SV3-GW-GCW-300, Field Change Notice "API000 Vogtle Unit 3 PMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release 8.7.0.1"
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1523 Enclosure Page 15 of 21
- 16. SV4-GW-GCW-XXX, Field Change Notice "API000 Vogtle Unit 4 PMS initial Software installation - Software Release 8.7.0.1"
- 17. GiC-AP1000-HEDS-19-001, Rev. 0"Regression Testing Analysis for Vogtle Unit 3 Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) Baseline 8.2 to 8.4 Hardware Modifications Performed at Site"
- 18. GIC-AP1000-HEDS-YY-XXX, Rev. X "Regression Testing Analysis for Vogtle Unit 4 Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) Baseline X.X to X.X Hardware Modifications Performed at Site"(YY-XXX is the Year-Letter #)
- 19. SV0-PMS-T2R-050,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Channel Integration Test Integrated System Validation Test Report"
- 20. APP-PMS-T1P-008,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System - System-Level Engineered Safety Features Channel Integration Test Procedure"
- 21. APP-PMS-T1P-009,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System - Integrated Logic Processor Component Logic Channel Integration Test Procedure"
- 22. SV3-PMS-T2R-008,"Vogtle Unit 3 API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System -
System-Level Engineered Safety Features Channel Integration Test Report"
- 23. SV4-PMS-T2R-008,"Vogtle Unit 4 API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System -
System-Level Engineered Safety Features Channel Integration Test Report"
- 24. SVO- PMS-T2R-008,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System - System-Level Engineered Safety Features Channel Integration Test Report"
- 25. SV3-PMS-T2R-009,"Vogtle Unit 3 API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System -
Integrated Logic Processor Component Logic Channel Integration Test Report"
- 26. SV4-PMS-T2R-009,"Vogtle Unit 4 API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System -
Integrated Logic Processor Component Logic Channel Integration Test Report"
- 27. APP-PMS-T2R-009,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System - Integrated Logic Processor Component Logic Channel Integration Test Report"
- 28. SNCXXXXXX
- 29. SNCYYYYYY
- 30. B-GEN-ITPCI-006,"Main Control Room & Remote Shutdown Room"
- 31. 3-PMS-ITPP-504,"PMS REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS"
- 32. 4-PMS-ITPP-504,"PMS REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS"
- 33. SNC921600,"Perform ITAAC 2.5.02.06a.ii, Item 8.a.i"
- 34. SNCZZZZZZ
- 35. SNCAAAAAA
- 36. SNCBBBBBB
- 37. APP-PMS-T1P-026,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Display Partial Actuate / Partial Bypass Test Procedure"
- 38. SV0-PMS-T2R-026,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Display Partial Actuate / Partial Bypass Test Report"
- 39. SV3-PMS-T2R-026,"Vogtle Unit 3AP1000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Display Partial Actuate / Partial Bypass Test Report"
- 40. SV4-PMS-T2R-026,"Vogtle Unit 4 API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Display Partial Actuate / Partial Bypass Test Report"
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1523 Enclosure Page 16 of 21 41.3-PMS-ITPP-521,"Protection and Safety Monitoring System Logic Test Preoperational Test Procedure" 42.4-PMS-ITPP-521,"Protection and Safety Monitoring System Logic Test Preoperational Test Procedure"
- 43. B-GEN-ITPCI-039,"PMS CIM Component Test Procedure" 44.3-PMS-OTS-17-012,"ADS & IRWST Injection Block and Squib Valve Testing" 45.4-PMS-0TS-17-012,"ADS & IRWST Injection Block and Squib Valve Testing" 46.2.5.02.06a.ii -U3-CP-Rev 0"U3 ITAAC 2.5.02.06a.ii Completion Package" 47.2.5.02.06a.ii -U4-CP-Rev 0"U4 ITAAC 2.5.02.06a.ii Completion Package"
- 48. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant(VEGP) Units 3 and 4 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report(UFSAR)
- 49. B-GEN-ITPCI-001,"PMS CABINETS"
- 50. NEI 08-01,"Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52"
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1523 Enclosure Page 17 of 21 Attachment A Excerpt from COL Appendix 0 Table 2.5.2-2*
Source Range High Neutron Flux Reactor Trip Intermediate Range High Neutron Flux Reactor Trip Power Range High Neutron Flux (Low Setpoint) Trip Power Range High Neutron Flux (High Setpoint) Trip Power Range High Positive Flux Rate Trip Reactor Coolant Pump High-2 Bearing Water Temperature Trip Overtemperature Delta-T Trip Overpower Delta-T Trip Pressurizer Low-2 Pressure Trip Pressurizer High-2 Pressure Trip Pressurizer High-3 Water Level Trip Low-2 Reactor Coolant Flow Trip Low-2 Reactor Coolant Pump Speed Trip Low-2 Steam Generator Narrow Range Water Level Trip High-3 Steam Generator Water Level Trip Automatic or Manual Safeguards Actuation Trip Automatic or Manual Depressurization System Actuation Trip Automatic or Manual Core Makeup Tank(CMT)Injection Trip Passive Residual Heat Removal(PRHR) Actuation Reactor Trip
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1523 Enclosure Page 18 of 21 Attachment B Excerpt from COL Appendix C Table 2.5.2-3*
RMS Automatically Actuated Engineered Safety Features*
Safeguards Actuation Containment Isolation Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Actuation Main Feedwater Isolation Reactor Coolant Pump Trip CMT Injection Turbine Trip (Isolated signal to non-safety equipment)
Steam Line Isolation Steam Generator Relief Isolation Steam Generator Slowdown Isolation Passive Containment Cooling Actuation Startup Feedwater Isolation Passive Residual Heat Removal(PRHR) Heat Exchanger Alignment Block of Boron Dilution Chemical and Volume Control System (CVS) Makeup Line Isolation Steam Dump Block (Isolated signal to non-safety equipment)
Main Control Room Isolation, Air Supply Initiation, and Electrical Load De-energization Auxiliary Spray and Purification Line and Zinc/Hydrogen Addition Isolation Containment Air Filtration System Isolation Normal Residual Heat Removal Isolation Refueling Cavity and Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (SFS) Isolation In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank(IRWST) Injection IRWST Containment Recirculation CVS Letdown Isolation Pressurizer Heater Block (Isolated signal to nonsafety equipment)
Containment Vacuum Relief Component Cooling System Containment Isolation Valve Closure
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1523 Enclosure Page 19 of 21 Attachment 0 Excerpt from COL Appendix 0 Table 2.5.2-4*
RMS Manually Actuated Functions*
Reactor Trip Safeguards Actuation Containment Isolation Depressurization System Stages 1, 2, and 3 Actuation Depressurization System Stage 4 Actuation Feedwater Isolation Core Makeup Tank Injection Actuation Steam Line Isolation Passive Containment Cooling Actuation Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Alignment IRWST Injection Containment Recirculation Actuation Main Control Room Isolation, Air Supply Initiation, and Electrical Load De-energization Steam Generator Relief Isolation Chemical and Volume Control System Isolation Normal Residual Heat Removal System Isolation Containment Vacuum Relief
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1523 Enclosure Page 20 of 21 Attachment D Excerpt from COL Appendix 0 Table 2.5.2-5*
DescrlDtion* Control* Displav*
Neutron Flux -
Yes Startup Rate -
Yes Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure -
Yes Wide-ranqe Hot Lea Temperature -
Yes Wide-range Cold Lea Temperature _
Yes RCS Cooldown Rate Compared to the Limit Based on RCS Pressure -
Yes Wide-range Cold Leg Temperature Compared to the Limit Based on RCS Pressure -
Yes Containment Water Level -
Yes Containment Pressure -
Yes Pressurizer Water Level -
Yes Pressurizer Water Level Trend -
Yes Pressurizer Reference Leg Temperature -
Yes Reactor Vessel-Hot Leg Water Level -
Yes Pressurizer Pressure -
Yes Core Exit Temperature -
Yes RCS Subcooling -
Yes RCS Cold Overpressure Limit -
Yes IRWST Water Level -
Yes PRHR Flow -
Yes PRHR HX Outlet Temperature -
Yes PRHR HX Inlet Isolation and Control Valve Status Yes Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS)Storage Tank Water Level -
Yes PCS Cooling Flow -
Yes IRWST to Normal Residual Heat Removal System (RNS)Suction Valve Status -
Yes Remotely Operated Containment Isolation Valve Status -
Yes Containment Area High-range Radiation Level -
Yes Containment Pressure (Extended Range) -
Yes CMT Level -
Yes Manual Reactor Trip (also initiates turbine trip) Yes -
Manual Safeguards Actuation Yes -
Manual CMT Actuation Yes -
Manual MCR Emergency Habitabilitv System Actuation Yes -
Manual ADS Stages 1. 2, and 3 Actuation Yes -
Manual ADS Stage 4 Actuation Yes -
Manual PRHR Actuation Yes -
Manual Containment Cooling Actuation Yes -
Manual IRWST Injection Actuation Yes -
Manual Containment Recirculation Actuation Yes -
Manual Containment Isolation Yes -
Manual Main Steam Line Isolation Yes -
Manual Feedwater Isolation Yes -
Manual Containment Vacuum Relief Yes Manual ADS and IRWST Injection Unblock Yes -
Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1523 Enclosure Page 21 of 21 Attachment E Excerpt from COL Appendix 0 Table 2.5.2-6*
RMS Blocks*
Source Range High Neutron Flux Reactor Trip Intermediate Range High Neutron Flux Reactor Trip Power Range High Neutron Flux (Low Setpoint) Trip Pressurizer Low-2 Pressure Trip Pressurizer High-3 Water Level Trip Low-2 Reactor Coolant Flow Trip Low-2 Reactor Coolant Pump Speed Trip High-3 Steam Generator Water Level Trip Low-2 Steam Generator Narrow Range Water Level Trip ADS and IRWST Injection Actuation Automatic Safeguards Containment Isolation Main Feedwater Isolation Reactor Coolant Pump Trip Core Makeup Tank Injection Steam Line Isolation Startup Feedwater Isolation Block of Boron Dilution Chemical and Volume Control System Isolation Chemical and Volume Control System Letdown Isolation Refueling Cavity and Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (SFS) Isolation Steam Dump Block Auxiliary Spray and Letdown Purification Line Isolation Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Alignment Normal Residual Heat Removal System Isolation