ML19331C271
| ML19331C271 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River |
| Issue date: | 08/01/1980 |
| From: | Reid R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19331C272 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-46962, NUDOCS 8008140485 | |
| Download: ML19331C271 (52) | |
Text
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+pn nay[0, UNITED STATES
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j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION CITY OF ALACHUA CITY OF BUSHNELL CITY ')F GAINESVILLE CITS OF KISSIMMEE DTII 0F LEESBURG CITY OF NEW SMYRNA BEACH AND IT.LITIES COMMISSION, CITY OF NEW ">MYRNA BEACH l
CITY OF OCALA ORLANDO UTILITIES COMMISSION AND CITY OF ORLANDO SEBRING UTILITIES COMMISSION SEMINCLE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
CITY OF TALLAMASSEE DOCKET NO. 50-302 CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.32 License No. OPR-72 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Florida Power Corporation, et al (the licensees) dated March 21, 1980, as revised and suoplemented April 14 and 30, June 6 and 13, and July 22 and 31,1980, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
l 2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifica-l tions as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and para-l graph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. OPR-72 is hereby amended l
to read as fallows:
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8008140 9 5
~
-2 (2) Technical Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices l
A and 8, as revised through Amendment No. 32, are i
hereby incorporated in the license.
Florida Power Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0tHISSION ll f.
YbertW.Reid, Chief
.eV Operating Reactors Branch #4 Division of Licensing
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: August 1, 1980 l
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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENCMENT NO. 32 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72 DOCKET NO. 50-302 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.
Remove Pages Insert Pages III III 2-3 2-3 2-5 2-5 2-7 2-7 8 2-1 B 2-1 B 2-5 8 2-5 8 2-6 8 2-6 B 2-8 8 2-8 3/4 1-1 3/4 1-1 3/4 1-2a 3/4 1-2a 3/4 1-2b 3/4 1-7 3/4 1-7 3/4 1-8 3/4 1-8 3/4 1-10 3/4 1-10 3/4 1-10a 3/4 1-13 3/4 1-13 3/4 1-14 3/4 1-14 3/4 1-16 3/4 1-16 3/4 1-16a 3/4 1-17 3/4 1-17 3/4 1-27 3/4 1-27 3/4 1-28 3/4 1-28 3/4 1-29 3/4 1-29 3/4 1-30 3/4 1-30 3/4 1-38 3/4 1-38 3/4 1-39 3/4 1-39 3/4 2-2 3/4 2-2 3/4 2-3 3/4 2-3 3/4 2-11 3/4 2-11 3/4 2-13 3/4 2-13 3/4 4-1 3/4 4-1 3/4 10-4 3/4 10-4 8 3/4 1-1 B 3/4 1-1 B 3/4 1-2 B 3/4 1-2 B 3/4 1-3 B 3/4 1-3 CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 G
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j INDEX LIMITING CCNDITIONS FOR CPERATICN AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/A.0 APPLICABIllIY,...........................................
3/4 0-1 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL Shutdewn Ma rgi n - O pe ra ti n g......................... 3/4 1-1 Shutdown Ma rgi n.. S h utdown...........................
3/4 1-2a Boron Di1ution.......................................
3/4 1-3 Moderator Temperature Ccefficient.................... 3/4 1-4 Minimum Temcerature for Cri tical i ty..................
3/4 1-S 3/4.1.2 BORATICM SYSTEMS Flow Paths
.r Shutdcwn................................
3/4 1-6 Fl ew P a th s - Ope ra ti n g...............................
3/4 1-7 Makeup Pump - Shutdown...............................
3/41-9 Makeuo Pumps - Operating.............................
3/4 1-10 Decay Heat Removal Pump - Shutdown...................
3/4 1-11 B o ri c Aci d Pump - S h utdewn........................... 3/4 1-12 Bori c Aci d Pumps - Operating......................... 3/4 1-13 Borated Water Scurces - Shutdcwn..................... 3/4 1-14 Berated Water Scurces - Operating.................... 3/4 1-15 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTRCL ASSEMBLIES Groua Height - Safety and Regulating Rod Groups......
3/A 1-18 Group Height - Axial Pcwer Shaping Rod Group.........
3/4 1-20 Position Indicator Channel s.......................... 3/4 1-21 R o d D ro o T i me........................................ 3/4 1-23 Sa fety Rod Inse rtien Limi t........................... 3/4 1-24 Regul ating Rod Inse rtion Limi ts...................... 3/4 1-25 Red Program..........................................
3/4 1-33 Xenon Reactivity.....................................
3/4 1-36 Axial Pcwer Sha ping Red Insertion Limits.............
3/A 1-37 l
CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 III Amendment Nc. 76 3 2 m
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CRYSTAL RI'/ER - UNIT 3 2-3 Amendment No. 16, 19, 3 2 e
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SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS 2.2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM SETp0INTS 2.2.1 The Reactor Protection System instrJnentation setpoints shall be set consistant with the Trip Setpoint values shown in Table 2.2-1.
APPLICABILITY: As shown for each channel in Table 3.3-1.
ACTION:
With a Reactor Protection System instrumentation set oint less conserv-ative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 2.2-1, declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION statement recuirement of Specification 3.3.1.1 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip secpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
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CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 2-4
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REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRIMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS U
y FI)NC110NAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES h
1.
Manual Reactor Trip Not Applicable Not Appifcable Ul 2.
Nuclear Overpower
< 105.5% of RATED THERMAL POWER 1 105.5% of RATED THERMAL POWER Eith four pumps operating with four pumps operating c-5
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< 77.98% of RATED THERMAL POWER
< 77.98% of RATED THERMAL POWER Eith three pumps operating With three pumps operating 3.
RCS Outlet Temperature-High
< 619*F
< 619*F a
j 4.
Nuclear Overpower Trip Setpoint not to Allowable Values not to exceed j
Based on RCS Flow and exceed the limit line of the limit line of Figure 2.2-1.
j AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE (j)
Figure 2.2-1.
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RCS Pressure-Low
> 1800 psig
> 1800 psig 6.
RCS Pressure-High 1 2300 psig 1 2300 psig 7.
RCS Pressure-Variable LowIII
> (11.80 T F - 5209.2) psig
> (11.80 T F - 5209.2) psig out out j
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HEACTOR Pit 01FCT10N SYSTIN INSiktlHINTAil0N TPIP SETPOINIS n
FilNCTION llNIT TRIP SETPHINT AI LO6fARI E VAllif S H.
Reactor Containment Vessel g
pressure liigh 1 4 psig 1 4 psig 11 j
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UI irlp may be e,anually bypassed when itCS pressure 1 1720 psig by actuating Shutdwn Bypass provided that:
a.
The Nuclear.0verpower Trip Setroint is < 5% of RATED THERMAL. POWER h.
The Shutdwn Bypass 1105 Pressure - liigh7 rip Setpoint of 1 1720 psig is imposed, and l
c.
The Shutdwn Hypass is removed when RCS pressure > 1800 psig.
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2.1 SAFETY LIMITS BASES 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 REACTCR CCRE The restrictions of this safety limit prevent overheating of the fuel cladding and possible cladding perforation which would result in the release of fission products to the reactor coolant. Overr.ta*iog of the fuel cladding is prevented by restricting fuel aceration to win.in the nucleate boiling regime where the heat transfer ccefficient s large and the cladding surface temperature is slightly above the coolan t saturatien temoerature.
Operation above the upcer boundary of the nucleate boiline regime would result in excessive cladding temperatures because of the onset of departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) and tne resultant sharo reduction in heat transfer coefficient. CNB is not a directly measurable :arame:er during operation and therefore THERMAL POWER and Reactor Coolant Temoer-ature and Pressure have been related to CNB through the BAW-2 CNB correla-tien. The CNB correlation has been developed to predict the CNB flux and the location of CNB for axially uniform and non-uniform heat flux distributions. The local CNB heat flux ratio, CNBR, defined as the ratio of the heat flux that would cause DNS at a carticular core locatien to the local heat flux, is indicative of the margin to CNB.
The minimum value of the CNBR during steady state operation, normal operational transients, and anticicated transient 7 is limited to 1.30.
This value corresponds to a 95 :ercent probability at a 95 percent confidence level that CNB will not occur and is chosen as an appropriate margin to DNB for all ocerating conditions.
The curve presented in Figure 2.1-1 represents the conditions at which a minimum CNBR of 1.30 is predicted for the maximum possible thermal pcwer 112% when the reactor coolant flew is 139.7 x 106 lbs/hr, whien is 106.5% of the design flow rate for four operating reactor coolant oumes. This curve is tased on the following nuclear power ceaking factors with potential fuel densification effects:
F = 2.57; Ffg = 1.71; Ff=1.5Q The design limit pcwer peaking factors are the most restrictive calcu-lated at full power for the rance from all control rods fully withdrawn to minimum allewable control rod withdrawal, and form the core CNBR design basis.
CRYSTAL RI'/ER - UNIT 3 3 2-1 Arendment No. 76, ??,3 J o
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SAFETY 1.IMITS BASES.
The reactor trip envelope appears to approach the safety limit more closely than it actually does because the reactor tr'p pressures are measured at a location where the indicated pressure is about 30 psi less than core outlet pressure, providing a more conservative margin to the safety limit.
I The curves of Figure 2.1-2 are based on the more restrictive of two thermal limits and account for the effects of potential fuel densifica-i tiori and potential fuel rod bow:
1.
The 1.30 DNSR limit produced by a nuclear power peaking factor of F' = 2.57 or the combination of the radial peak, axial peak and position of the axial peak that yields no less than a 1.30 DNBR.
2.
The combination of radial and axial peak that causes central fuel melting at the hot spot. The limit is 19.7 kw/ft.
Power peaking is not a directly observable quantity and therefore
' d-its have been established on the basis of the reactor pcwer imbalance prcduced by the power peaking.
The specified flow rates for curves 1 and 2 of Figure 2.1-2 cor-respond to the expected minimum flow rates with four pumps and three pumps respectively.
The curve of Figure 2.1-1 is the most restrictive of all possible reacter coolant pump-maximum thennal power combinatiens shown in BASES Figure 2.1.
The curves of BASES Figure 2.1 represent the conditions at wnich a minimum DNBR of 1.30 is predicted at the maximum possible thernal power for the number of reactor coolant pumps in operation.
These curves include the potential effects of fuel rod bcw and fuel densi fica tion.
The DNBR as calculated by the BAW-2 DNB correlation continually increases from point of minimun DER, so that the exit DNBR is always higher. Extrapolation of the correlation beyond its published quality range of 22% is justified on the basis of experimental data.
CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 B 2-2 Amencment No 75, 17,2 S SEP G 1970
LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS BASES RCS Outlet Temoerature - Hich The RCS Outlet Temperature High trip < 619'F prevents the reactor outlet temcerature from exceeding the desiin limits and acts as a backuo trio for all power excursion transients.
Nuclear Overoower Based on RCS Flow and AXIAL DOWER IMBALANCE The power level trip setcoint produced by the reactor coolant system flow is based on a flux-to-flow ratio which has been established to accennodate flow decreasing transients frem high power.
The power level trip setooint oroduced by the power-to-flow ratio crovides both high cower level and low flow protection in the event the reactor power level increases or the reactor coolant flow rate decreases. The power level setooint produced by the power-to-flow ratio provides overpower CMS protection for all modes of pump operation.
For every flow rate there is a maximum permissible power level, and for every power level there is a minimum permissible low flow rate.
Tyoical power level and low flow rate combinations for the pump situations of Table 2.2-1 are as follows:
1.
Trip would occur when four reactor coolant pumps are operating if power is > 104.4% and reactor flow rate is 100%, or flow rate is < 95.78%and power level is 100%.
2.
Trip would occur when three reactor coolant oumos are coeratina if oower is > 77.98% and reactor flow rate is 74.7%, or flow ~
rate is <71.34% and power is 75%.
For safety calculations the maximum calibration and instrumentation errors for the power level were used.
CRYSTAL RIVER - UNITS 3 3 2-5 Amendment No. 16,77,32 O
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7 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINr.S BASES The AXIAL POWE9 I* BALANCE boundaries are established in order to orevent reactor therral limits frem being exceeded. These thermal limits are either power ceakina kw/ft limits or DNBR limits. The AXIAL DOWER I"*ALANCE reduces the power level trip produced by the flux-to-flow ratio such that the boundaries of Figure 2.2-1 are produced.
The flux-to-flow ratio reduces the power level trip and associated reactor power-reactor ocwer-imbalance boundaries by 1.044% for a 1%
flow reduction.
RCS Pressure - Lew, Hich and Variable Lew The High and Lew trips are provided to limit the pressure rance in which reactor o,peration is permitted.
During a slow reactivity insertion startup accident from low pcwer or a slow reactivity insertion from hich power, the RCS Pressure-Hich setooint is reached before the Nuclear Overpewer Trio Setooint.
The trip setooint for RCS Pressure-High, 2300 osig, has been established to maintain the system pressure below the safety limit, 2750 psig, for any design transient. The RCS Pressure-High trip is backed up by the cressuri:er code safety valves for RCS over pressure protection, and is therefore set lower than the set pressure for these valves, 2500 psig. The RCS Pressure-High trip also backs us the Nuclear Overoower trip.
The RCS Pressure-Low,1800 psig, and RCS Pressure-Variable Lew.
maintain E. F-5204.2) osig, Trip Setpoints have been established tome DNB rat (11.80 T 0
accidents that result in a cressure reduction.
It also crevents reactor oceration at pressures below the valid range of DNB correlation limits, protecting against DNB.
Due to the calibration and instrumentation errors, the safety analysis used a RCS Pressure-Variable Lew Trio Setpoint of (11.80 T
F-5249.2) osia.
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CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 B 2-6 Amencrent No. 76, 79,32 l
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580 600 620 640 660 REACTOR OUTLET TEMP, F REACTOR COOLANT FLOW PUMPS OPERATING CURVE FLOW (% DESIGN)
POWER (RTP)
(TYPE OF LIMIT) 8 1
139.7 x 10 (106.5%)
117.3 %
4 PUMPS (DNBR) 8 2
104.4 x 10 (79.6%)
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3 PUMPS (DNBR) l PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS AT MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER FOR MINIMUM DNBR l
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covsT.M. 3IVE9 - UNIT 3 3 2-8 Amendment No. ??,3 2 l
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LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS BASES Reacter Containment Vessel Pressure - Hich The Reactor Contairment Yessel Pressure-High Trip Setpoint < 4 psig, provides positive assurance that a reactor trip will occur in the unlikely event of a steam line failure in the containment vessel or a loss-of-ccolant accident, even in the aosence of a RCS Pressure - Low trip.
l CRYSTAL R:VER - UNIT 3 3 2-7 Amendment No. 16,1 3 y
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e 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL SHUTDOWN MARGIN - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be > 1% ak/k.
APoLICABILITY:
'S 1, 2*, and 3.
ACTION:
With the SHUTDONN MARGIN < 1" ak/k, imediately initiate and continue boration at > 10 gpm of 11,600 com boric acid solutica or its ecuivalent, until the recuired SHUTD01-h MA:: GIN is restored.
SURVEILLANCE REOUIRE"ENTS 4.1.1.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be detennined to be > 1". ai/k:
a.
Within one hour after detection of an inoperable control rod (si and at least cnce per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter while the rod (s) is inocerable.
If the inocerable control rod is imovable or untrioceole, the above required SHUTC0k*4 MARGIN shall be increased by an amount at least equal to the withdrawn worth of the ininovable or untrippable control rod (s).
b.
When in MODES 1 or 2, at least once cer 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, by verifying that reculatina rod groups withdrawal is within the limits of Soecification 3.1.3.6.
N c.
When in WOCE 2 within a hours orier to achievino reactor criticality by verifying that the credicted critical control red position is within the limits of Soecification 3.1.3.6.
d.
Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THER"AL POWER after each fuel loading by consideration of the factors of e. below, with the regulating rod groues at the maximum insertion limit of Soecification 3.1.3.6.
ith K,ff > 1.0.
With X,ff < 1.0.
See Special Test Exceotion 3.10.4 CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 1-1 Amendment No. 20,32 I
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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (C>ntinued) e.
When in M000 3. at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by consideration of
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the following fact. irs:
1.
Reactor coola.it system boron concentration, 2.
Centrol rod p.isition, 3.
Reactor coolant system average temperature, r
4.
Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation, 5.
Xenon concent ation, and 6.
Samarium concintration.
4.1.1.1.1.2 The overall cora reactivity balance shall be compared to predicted values to demonstrite agreement within +1% ak/k at least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD). This comparison shall consider at least those factors stated in Specification 4.1.1.1.1.1.e above. The predicted reactivity values shall be adjusted (normalized) to correspond to the actual care conditions prio.a to exceeding a fuel burnup of 60 Effective Full Pcwer Days after each fuel loading.
P L
r I
l i
b l
CRYSTAL R'VLR - UNI! 3 3/4 1-2 g
Amendment No. 2 0 I
Jut. 3 1979 4
3/A.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTE,
3/a.1.1 40DATIon CONT 3fL SHUTCONN "aRGIN - SHUT 00WN LI"ITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN "ARGIN shall be 2 01 ak/k.
3 AccLICARILITY: MODES a and 5.
ACTION:
vggg a With the SHUT 00WN "ASTIN <3.0% ak/k, immediately initiate and continue beration at 2,10 ccm of 11,600 ccm beric acid solution er its ecuivalent until the recuired SH11TDOWN MARGIN is restored.
"00E 5 With the SHIITDOWN WAR".IN <3.0% ak/k, immediately initiate and continue baratien at > 10 com of 11,500 pcm boric acid solution or its ecuivalent until the recuired SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.
S!!RVEILLANCE RE0llIREuENTS 4.1.1.1.2.1 Tne SHUTDOWN "ARGIN shall be determined to be 3,3.05 ak/k:
a.
Within one hcur after detecticn of an inocerable control red (s) and at least once cer 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter while the rod (s) is incoerable.
If the inocerable control rod is immovable er untriccable, the abcve recuired SHUTT,04N "aRGIN shall be increased by an amount at least ecual to the withdrawn worth of che immovable or untriccable concrol red (s).
b.
At least once cer 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> by consideration of the followine factors:
i l
1.
Reactor coolant system boren concentration, 2.
Centrol rod cosition, I
3.
Reactor coolant system averace te,cersture, 2
Fuel burnuo based on cross thermal enercy ceneration, 5.
Xenon concentration, and 6.
Samarium concentratien CcYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 1-Za 4: enc =ent No. 23,3 2 e
i
OE.2CTIVITf CCVT CL SYSTE"5 FLC'4 327 C E:JTI';G LI"ITING C3'JITICN FC: CPE:JTIC'4 3.1.2.2 ' Each of the follcwing bcron infecti:n ficw :atns shall be CPE;> ELE:
a.
A flew ;ath frem the c:ncentrated beric acid storage system via a heric-acid pu=o and =akaus cr cecay hea: receval (CHR) su=c to the React:r C:clant System, and S.
A Mcw =ath frem the berated water s:Orage tank via rakeuc or CHR :u:.c to *.he React:r Ceciant Systes.
APPLICABILITf: "CCES 1, 2, 3 and 4 AC ICN:
%CES 1, 2 and 3 a.
'Witn the ficw =ath fr:ra the c:ncentrated 5cric acid st:rsge system ine:erable, restre the inceerable flew :ath :: e.pg:;3LE status witnin 72 hcurs or be in a: least FOT STA.NCSY and berated to a SHUTCC'4N."AR3IN ecuivalent t: l' *.k/k at ZWF widin the nex-5 hcurs; rest:re the Scw :a2 :: C:E J3LE status within 2e nex: 7 days er be in CCLD SWTDC'nN witnin de next 30 hcurs.
5.
- 4ith the fi:w cath frea One herated water s. rage tank inc:erable, restere the ficw :ath : 0:EFJ3LE status vi-hin One beur er be in at leas: MO~ STA.*C6Y within ite next 5 neurs anc in CCLD SMITDC'N within the f:llcwing 30 hcurs.
w-:.
w.
a.
With the ficw ath frem the c:ncentrated beric acid st race system inccerable, restart the inceerable ficw :ath. GFE:JELE status within 72 hcurs or be herated to a 5WTDChN w.!RGIN ecuivalen:
3.Ct ak/k a: 2CC*F within the next 5 hcurs; rest:re One Scw :4:h to CPERA:.LE stats within the next 7 days er be in CCLJ SWTCC=1 within tne next 30 hcurs.
"R5T:L RI'/EE 8 NIT 3 3/.I-7 Iren: en: "O. 3 2 e
ue,-
-w n-
-w-.
c.EACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ACTION: (Continued) b.
With the flew path frem the borated water stora&e tank inoper-able, restore the flew path to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWM within the follcwino 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SUCVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS~
4.1.1.2 Each of the above required ficw paths shall be demcnstrated OPERA 3LE:
a.
At least once per 7 days by verifying that the oice temperature of the heat traced portion of the ficw path from the concentrated -
boric acid storage system is > 105"F.
b.
At least once per 31 days by verifyino that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the ficw path that is not locked, i
sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
l 4
k CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/d 1-8 Amendment No. J 2 m
y
,,-,y y
-s, a
,e-
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS MAKEUP PUMP - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.3 At least one makeup pump in the boron injection flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus.
APPLICABILITY: MODE 5*.
ACTION:
With no makeup pump OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes until at least one makeup pump is restored to OPERABLE status.
(
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ,4.1.2.3 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.
RCS Pressure 3,150 psig.
CRYSIAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 1-9
'1 j
- - - - - - - - - ' - ~ -
2 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS max!dP DUtioS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPEDATION 3.1. 2. 4.1 At least two makeup pumps shall be OPERABLE.
APDLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3 ACTION:
With cnly cna makeuo pump OPERAELE, restore at least two makeup pumes to CFERABLE status within 72 hcurs or be in at least HOT STANCBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to 15 ak/k at 200*F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore at least two makeuc pumos to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in CCLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hcurs.
SURVEILLANCE REOUIDEMENTS 4.1. 2. 4.1 No addif ional Surveillance Requirements other than those recuired by Specification 4 J.S.
l l
l l
l CRv5Tal RIVER - L' NIT 3 3/2 1-10 Amendment No. 3 2 l
0.EACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS
":XEUP PUMPS - OPEDATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.4.2 At least one makeup pumo shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODE 4*
ACTION:
With no makeup pumo OPERABLE, restore at least one makeuo pumo to OPERABLE status within one hour or be borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN ecuivalent to 3.0% ak/k at 200*F and be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE RECUIREMENTS 4.1. 2. 4. 2 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.
- Witn RCS pressure 3,150 psig.
C7YST;L RI'/ER - UNIT 3 3/2 1-10a amencment No. 3 2 m
s
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORIC ACID PUMPS - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR ODERATION 3.1. 2. 7 At least one boric acid pump in the boron injection flow cath required by Specification 3.1.2.2a shall be OPERABLE and capable of beino powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus if the ficw cath through the boric acid pumo in Soecification 3.1.2.2a is OPERABLE.
APDLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
MODES 1, 2 and 3 With no boric acid pumo OPERABLE, restore at least one boric acid cumo to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to 1% ak/k at 200*F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore at least one boric acid pumo to GPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
MODE 4 With no boric acid pump OPERABLE, restore at least one boric acid cumo to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN eouivalent to 3.0% ak/k at 200*F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore at least one boric acid pump to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTOOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS l
4.1.2.7 No additional Surveillance Recuirements other than those recuired by Soecification 4.0.5.
l CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 1-13 Amendment No.3 2 l
- -.. -,.. ~.. _ -,,....,,,, _, _ _, _ _,.. _, _,,..,. _ _, _,.
REACTIVITY CONTROL SY31 EMS BORATED WATLR SOURCES - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDIT!0N FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.8 As a minimum, one cf the following borated water sources shall be 0PERABLE:
A concentrated boric acid storage system and associated heat a.
tracing with:
1.
A minimum contained borated seter volume of 6615 gations, l
2.
Between 11,600 and 14,000 t.pm of boron, and 3.
A minimum solution temperature of 105'F.
b.
The bcrated water storage tank (SWST) with:
1.
A minimum cortained borated water volume of 13,500. gallons, 2.
A mir,imum boron contentration of 2270 ppm, and 3.
A minimum solution temperature of 40*F.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 5.
ACTION:
With no borated water sources OPERtBLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATION or positive reactivity changes until at least one borated water source is restored to 3PERABLE status.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIRLMENTS 4.1.2.8 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
I a.
At least once per 7 days by:
j 1.
Verifying the boron concentration of the wate, i
2.
Verifying the contained borated water volume of the tank, and CRYSTAL RIVLR - UNIT 3 3/4 1-14 Amendment No. M 3 2
. -.-~
..====~~~
po..,,
y y
_-,y g.-.v.
7
4 i
)
]
REACTIVITY CCNTROL SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE' REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 3.
Verifying the concentrated boric acid storage system solution temperature when it is the source of berated water.
b.
At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the BWST temperature when it is the source of borated water and the outside cir temperature is < 40*F.
s CRYSTAL R VER - UNIT 3 3/4 1-15 l
1
=
REACTIVITY CONTROL 3YSTEMS BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR ODERATION 3.1.2.9 Each of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:
The concentrated boric acid storage system and associated heat a.
tracing with:
1.
A minimum contained barated water volume of 6615 gallons, 2.
Between 11,600 and 14,000 ppm of baron, and 3.
A minimum solution temperature of 105*F.
b.
The borated water storage tank (BW!f) with:
1.
A contained borated water volume of between 415,200 and 449,000 gallons, 2.
Between 2270 and 24E0 ppm of baron, and 3.
A minimum solution temperature of 40*F.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
MODES 1, 2, and 3:
With the concentrated boric acid storage system inoperable, a.
restore the storage system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY and berated to a SHUTCOWN MARGIN equivalent to 1% ak/k at 200*F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore the concentrated boric acid storage system to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTCOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
b.
With the borated water storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTCCHN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
MODE 4:
With the concentrated beric acid storage system incoerable, a.
restore the storage system to GCERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/2 1-16 Amendment No. 3, 76, 23,3 ?
1 i
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ACTION:
(Continued) borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN eauivalent to 3.Cf. ak/k at 200*F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore the concentrated boric acid storage system to OPERABLE status within tne next 7 days or be in cold shutdewn within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
b.
With barated water storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN -
within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.1.2.9 Each barated water source shall be demonstrated ODERABLE:
a.
At least once cer 7 days by:
1.
Verifying the boren concentration in each water source, 2.
Verifying the contained borated water volume of each water source, and 3.
Verifying the concentrated boric acid storage system solution temperature.
b.
At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the BHST temperature when outside air temperature is < 40*F.
CRYSTAL RI'!ER - UNIT 3 3/2 1-17 amenc=ent No. 3 2 4
e
~
REACTIVITY CCNTRCL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.3 MCVAELE CCNTROL ASSEMSLIES GRCUP HEIGHT - SAFETY AND REGULATING RCD GRCUPS LIMITING CCNDITIC*4 PCR C:ERATIONS 3.1.3.1 A1; : ntrol (safety and regulating) r:ds snall be CPERA3LI and Ocsi icrac within - 5.5L (indicate: ;csitten) of ineir ge:u; average neign:.
APPLICA3ILITY: MCCE3 l' and 2*.
ACTICN:
a.
Witn One er more ::nte:1 reds inoperable due :: eing inecvatie as a result of excessive fri::icn or mechanical interference er kncwn to :e untrippable, detamine tna: the ShUTCCWN MARGIN recuirement :f Specificati:n 3.1.1.1 is satisfied 'within ene neur and te in at least HOT STANSBY within 5 neurs.
O.
Witn =cre inan One centr:1 red inc: era le or misaligned from its group average heign: by =cre : nan - 5.5~ (indicated pest:icn), te in at leas: HOT STASCSY witnin 5 hcurs.
c.
Witn :ne c:ntrol red inc erable cue t: causes etner : nan accressed in ACT:CN a, a:cve, or misalignec from its grou:
average heign: ty =cre than - 5.5% (indicated ;csiti:n), PCWER CPERATICet =ay c:ntinue previ?ed na witnin One hcur ei:ner:
1.
The ::ntrol r:c is rest:rcu to CPERASLE status wi:hin
- ne a:cve alismer.: recuireents, Or 4.
The ::ntrol red is ceclared inocera le and the SHUT CWN MARGIN requiremen: Of S:ecificati:n 3.1.1.1 is satisfied.
PC%ER CPERATICN may then c:ntinue Or: viced that:
a)
An analysis of the :ctential ejected rod wer n is perfa ced wi nin 72 neurs and ne red cr n is ceter-minec :: :e < 1.C% ak a: :er cwer and < C.55 ak at RATE] LERMAL PCWER for :ne renaincer of the fuel cycle, and
- )
The SHUT;ChN MARG!N recuirsten: Of S:ecificati n 3.1.1.1 is de:ar=ined a: least once :er 12 hcurs, and
- 5ee Special Tes: Exce:: tens 3.10.1 and 3.10.2.
CRYSTAL RIVER - LN!T 3 3/4 1-13 wn,,
e
e
]
POWER LEVEL CUTOFF (52% RATED THERMAL POWER)
E0b.i $ ~Ad.
~$;5=
h - 'I -(1'77,102): Y ~.f N 102i i- - :1--4_ INifiE' if i
..g.
.. l.: - h.',90) _. ~... -...
(2ilo I
-- \\ : c.-.30 _
SC
- =_= -:
5 UNACCEPTA8 LEE in..... d-\\(250,80) g OPERATION _~ (161,801j ~' \\
80 -
- /
k
.J g
70 -
1 a0 I
c
/
t 50 (106.hi d66.50)
E 40 -~
d
- -- --- ACCEPTABLE 3
30 OPERATION o
A 20 10 -
~
g (0.0),
j i
~
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 0 255075 100 0
25 50 75 100 I t 8
I I
I f f I I GROUP 5 GROUP 7 l
l 0
25 50 75 100 I
f I
f I
GROUP 8 FIGURE 3.11 i
REGULATING RCD GROUP INSERTION UMITS FOR 4 PUMP OPERATION FROM 0 EFPO TO 250 ::: 10 EFPD l
CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 1-27 Amendment.Mo. I, 2, If, M, 32 e
-v
-n-
,---a-
.-n.,
110 (261.102)
(300.102)
$g, 90 (2S1.90);_qN POWER LEVEL CUTOFF g
w (S2% RATED THERMAL POWER) g 80:
(250.80li
~
c.
E_EEUNACCEPTA8LE f
J
= OPERATION e
y 70 s$
i:
80 7
O E--
50
-(175.50) g 2;
/
m i
i W
'~
M
[-[.
ACCEPTA8LE 20 2h.'_ j[ -
OPERATION
.-_f._^~;:_'.~.._~
10 2.M_ J _
0<id(0.01L_.- - - ~
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 ROD INDEX % WITHDRAWN 0 25 50 75 100 0
25 50 75 100 I I I I I
I e f I I
GROUP 5 GROUP 7 0
25 50 75 100 I
I I I
I 4
GROUP 6 FIGURE 3.1-2 REGULATING ROD GROUP INSERTION LIMITS FOR 4 PUMP OPERATION AFTER 250 10 EFPD
~
CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 1-28 Amendment "o. 76, 17,3 2 e
e
110-I UNACCEPTABLE OPERATION i
90 m
(16i,76.515(250.76.5)E o
r a.
y N
i 3
t E
E
^.
~
O y
gn y
!(100.43)
(300.48)!
ai ACCEPTABLE OPERATION y
A.
E 10 0$0.0)
O 50 100 150 200 250 300 I
ROD INDEX. % WITHDRAWN 0255075 100 0
25 50 3 100 I
I f
I I
I f
f f
f GROUP 5 GROUP 7 0
25 50 75 100 i
f f
f i
GROUP $
FIGURE 3.1-3 REGULATING ROD GROUP INSERTION UMITS FOR 3 PUMP OPERATION FROM 0 EFPD TO 250 :: 10 EFPD CRYS ~AL QI'lER - UNIT 3 3/1 1-19 Amend ent Nc. 75, 77,3 2 an e
v u--
---.,e
~
110 l#
UNACCEPTABLE OPERATION 90 I
g i
I E
m 0
i
.a l
G50.M.51N (300.75.51 4
70 lE h
60
_. ~f O
~- -
4 50 3'(175W)
[
n
.--..7_,.
43
~
. -. - - +
i 3
m
-i
- i2 O
/
ACCEPTAB LE==
n.
OPERATION U
'j 10
,f'
-p-a st0.0:
0 50 10 150 200 250 300 ROD INDEX, % WITHDRAWN 0255075 100 0
25 50 75 100 t i I I I
i e I e i GROUP 5 GROUP 7 l
l 0
25 50 75 100 t
I I I I
GROUPS l
l FIGURE 3.1-4 REGULATING ROD GROUP INSERTION UMITS FOR 3 PUMP OPERATION AFTER 250 10 EFPD l
RYSTAL RI'iER - UNIT 3 3/4 1-30 Amendment No. If, 73,3 2 1
l
o RCACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS AXIAL POWER SHAPING R00 INSERTION LIMITS LIMIT";.sG CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.9 The axial power shaoing rod group shall be limited in physical insertion as shown on Figures 3.1-9 and 3.1-10.
APPLICABILITY: MODES I and 2*.
ACTION:
With the axial power shaping rod group outside the above insertion limits, either:
a.
Restore the axial power shaping rod group to within the limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, or b.
Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the rod group po-sition using the above figure within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, or c.
Be in at least HOT STANCBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l
t 4.1.3.9 The position of the axial power shaping rod group shall be determined to be within the insertion limits at least once every 12 l
hours.
I l
o I
- wt:n x,ff >,1.0.
s CRYS?t' RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 1-37 Amenement No. If, : 3 JUL 3 1979,
110r
- 10.1021:
- 36,102) 100 UNACCEPTABLE
'10,901-
'36,90)
OPERATION SO e
f w
3 80 f40,80.-
. :44,80:
'i O
I a,
i 70 2
m Ar i.:EPTABLE OPERATION g
o j
50 i
(100,50)$
u.
O
--u.---
E E
30 Oc.
20 10 i
f l
0 1
l
[
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 ROD POSmON, % WITHDRAWN F;GURE 3.1-9 AXIAL POWER SHAPING ROD GROUP INSERTION LIMITS FROM 0 EFPD TO 250 t 10 EFPD l
CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/a 1-38 Amendment No. 76, J3,3 3 e
t
, ~, -,
--n a
110 c.__.,- +--
= : : :...
3 10.102)
- (37,102E
- 7. -: -
_ UN ACCEPTABLE =
l
..~ ~ "
-2 OPERATION
=
- (37,90)?
..d 5(10,90)
U 90
.... s.
=.s _
' v.(50.80L
- g",80) E __.. _
g w
d(0 3
80 o
- ="..__.
a.
i
- ps ---
a<
70 -
~...
'x_
- b. = ; + - -
3, x
. L =., a_ 2 w
x 60 -
--y
.. x --
C
' $"2 ACCEPTABLE-3
~-
N
-!rY3-- OPERATION :
- (100,50l=
4 50
. __ y -
2
-E Liji W
O
..:.. n--
40 1 ~_ ;. _... _._._._ _
g
-=
3 30 C._.._
O
- -= - - - -
=_. - --_
c.
20
~.._ _-
= n=L : ' -
10 1_...
= :_ __ms 0
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 0 I~
- ' - - - - ' ~
ROD POSITION, % WITHDRAWN 1
i f
FIGURE 3.1-10 AXIAL POWER SHAPING RCD GROUP 10 EFPD INSERTION LIMITS AFTER 250_ _ _
Amendment No. 7?,
3/4 1-39 32 CRYSTAL RI'/E9 - UNIT 3
.e
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3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.2.1 AXIAL PCWER IMBALANCE shall be maintained within the limits shown on Figures 3.2-1 and 3.2-2.
APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 above 40% of RATED THERMAL PCWER.*
ACTION:
With AXIAL PCWER IMBALANCE exceeding the limits specified above, either:
Restore the AXIAL PCWER IMBALANCE to within its limits within a.
15 minutes, or b.
Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.2.1 The AXIAL PCWER IMBALANCE shall be determined to be within Ifmits in each core quadrant at least once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> when above 40% of RATED THERMAL PCWER except when an AXI AL PCWER IMBALANCE monitor is inoperable,-then calculate the AXIAL PCWER IMBALANCE in each core quadrant with an inoperable monitor at least once per hour.
- See Special Test Exception 3.10.1.
CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/421 S
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AX!AL POWER IMBALANCE ENVELOPE FOR l
OPERATION FROM 0 EFPD TO 250 2 0 EFPD 1
1 CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/.1 2-2 hendment No. I, 2, J5, 19, 32 4
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5 FIGURE 3.2-2 AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE ENVELOPE FOR OPERATION AFTER 250 :: 10 EFPD 3YSTAL RI'ER - U!iIT 3 3/.1 2-3 Acen&en No. If, 79,3 2 e
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PCWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS NUCLEAR HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR - Fg LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.2.2 F shall be limited by the following relationships:
g F
3.08 g1 P
i THERMAL POWER 1
where P = RATF0 THERMAL POWER and P 10.
l APoLICABILITY: MODE 1.
AC* ION:
1 j
With F exceeding its limit:
g a.
Reduce THERMAL POWER at least 15 for each 1 F exceeds the n
limit within 15 minutes and similarly reduce tMe Nuclear Overpower Trip Setpoint and Nuclear Overpower based on RCS Flow and AXIAL POWER IMBALANCE Trip Setpoint within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, b.
Demonstrate through in-core mapping that F is within its limit within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after exceeding the limit 9r reduce THERMAL POWER to less than St of RATED THERMAL POWER within tne next 2 hcurs.
~
c.
Identify and correct the cause of the out of limit condition price to increasing THERMAL POWER above the reduced limit re-quired by a or b, above; subsequent POWER OPERATION may proceed provided that F is demonstrated through in-core map-n ping to be within its IV.it at a nominal 50% of RATED THERMAL PCWER prior to exceeding this THERMAL POWER, at a nominal 75%
of RATED THERMAL POWER prior to exceeding this THERMAL POWER and within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after attaining 95% or greater PATED THERMAL POWER.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.2.2.1 F shall be detennined to be within its limit by using the incere n
detectors to cbtain a power distributien map:
l CRYSTAL RIVER. UNIT 3 3/4 2-4 Anencment No. ~5 g
w TABLE 3.2-2 CUADRANT POWER TILT LIMITS STEADY STATE TRANSIENT MAXIMUM LIMIT LIMIT LIMIT OUADRANT POWER TILT as Measured by:
Synnetrical Incore Detector System
- 3. 31 8.81 20.0 Power Range Channels 1.96 6.96 20.0 Minimum Incore Detector System 1.90 4.40 20.0 CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 2-11 Amendment 'ic. 75, D,
30 em
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POWER DISTRIBUTICN LIMITS ONB PARAMETERS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.2.5 The following DNS related parameters shall be maintained within the limits shown on Table 3.2-1:
a.
Reactor Coolant Hot leg Temperature b.
Reactor Coolant Pressure c.
Reactor Coolant Flow Rate APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.
ACTION:
With any of the above parameters exceeding its limit, restore the param-eter to within its limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.2.5.1 Each of the parameters of Table 3.2-1 shall be "arified to be within their limits at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
4.2.5.2 The Reactor Coolant System total flow rate shall be determined to be within its limit by measurement at least onca per 18 months.
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CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 2-12 l
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TABLE 3.2-1 c,
DNB MARGIN W
"I LIMITS
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Four Reactor Three Reactor o
- 2 Coolant Pumps Coolant Pumps
'o" Parameter Operating Opera tinq b
Reactor Coolant Hot Leg
}
Teraperature. T F
< 604.6
<604.6(j)
(
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III Reactor Coolant Pressure, psig
> 206).6
> 2057.2 6
6 Reactor Coolant flow Rate, lb/hr
> 139.7 x 10
> 104.4 x 10 t'u
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{
Applicable to the loop with 2 Roactor Coolant Pumps Operating.
(2) Limit not applicable during e:ther a TilERt1AL POWER ramp increase in excess of 5% of RATED TilERMAL POWER per minute or a TilERMAL POWER step increase j
of greater than 10% of RATED TilERMAL POWER.
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3/4.4 REACT 0D COOLANT SYSTEM REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.1 Both reactor coolant loops and both reactor coolant cumps in each loop shall be in operation.
APPLICABILITY: As noted below, but excluding MODE 6.*
ACTION:
MODES 1 and 2:
a.
With one reactor coolant pump not in operation, STARTUD and POWER OPERATION may be initiated and may proceed provided THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than 77.98% of RATED THERMAL POWER and within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> the setpoints for the follow-ing trips have been reduced to the values specified in Soecification 2.2.1 for operation with three reactor coolant pumps operating:
1.
Nuclear Overpower MODES 3, 4 and 5:
a.
Operation may proceed provided at least one reactor coolant loco is in ooeration with an associated reactor coolant pumo or decay heat removal pump.
b.
The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not aoplicaole.
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.4.1 The Reactor Protective Instrumentation channels specified in the soplicable ACTION stateeent above shall be verified to have had their trip setpoints changed to the values specified in Specification 2.2.1 for the applicable number of reactor coolant pumps operating either:
a.
Within a hours after switching to a different cump combination if the switch is made while operating, or b.
Prior to reactor criticality if the switch is made while shutdcwn.
See Sr ecial Test Exception 3.10.3.
- RYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 A-1 Amendment No. 77,32 4
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e CRYSTEl. RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 44 Amendment No.17 JAll 4 1921 W
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SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTION NO FLCW TEST LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.3 The limitations of Soecification 3.4.1 may be suspended during the performance of startup and PHYSICS TESTS provided:
a.
The THERMAL POWER does not exceed 5" of RATED THERMAL POWER, and b.
The reactor trip set:oints on the CPERABLE Nuclear Overpcwer channels are set < 25; of RATED THERMAL POWER.
APPLICABILITY: During startup and PHYSICS 'ESTS.
ACTION:
With the THERMAL PCWER greater than 5^. of RATED '.~ DERMAL POWER, imediately open the control rod drive trip breakers.
t SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.10.3.1 The THERMAL POWER shall ce determined to be < 5% ;r RATED THERMAL POWER at least once per hour during startup ani "dYSICS TFSTS.
4.10.3.2 Each Nuclear Overpower Channel shall be se dected to a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> prior to initiating startup or PHYSICS TESTS.
CRYSTAL RIVEg. UNIT 3 3/4 10-3
SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTICN SHUTDONN MARGIN, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.4 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1.1 may be suspended for measurement of control rod worth and shutdown margin provided:
a.
Reactivity equivalent to at least the highest estimated control rod worth is available for trip insertion from OPERABLE control rod (s), and b.
All axial power shaoinc rods are withdrawn to at least 35%
(indicated position) and CPERABLE.
ApeLICABILITY: MODE 2.
ACTION:
a.
With any safety or regulating control rod not fully inserted and with less than the above reactivity equivalent available for trip insertion or the axial power shaping rods not within their withdrawal limits, inrnediately initiate and continue boration at > 10 gpm of 11,600 ppm boric acid solution or its equivalent, lintil the SHUTCOWN MARGIN ' required by Specification 3.1.1.1.1 is restored.
b.
With all safety or regulating control rods fully inserted and the reactor subcritical by less than the above reactivity equivalent, i,inediately initiate and continue baration at > 10 gpm of IT,600 ppm boric acic solutton or ttr equivalent, until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1.1 is restoied..
SURVEILLANCE RECUIREMENTS l
4.10.4.1 The position of each safety, regulating, and axial ocwer shaoing rod either partially or fully withdrawn shall be detennined at least once
- er 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
4.10.4.2 Each safety or regulating control rod not fully inserted shall be l
demonstrated capable of full insertion when tripped from at least the 50f,
(
withdrawn positio within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to reducing the SHUTDOWN WARGIN to less than the limets of Specification 3.1.1.1.1.
4.10.4.3 The axial power shaoing rods shall be demonstrated CPERABLE by moving each axial power shaping rod > 6.5% (indicated position) within a hours prior to reducing tr-SHUT 00WN MARGIN to less than the limits of Scecification 3.1.1.1.1.
t CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 10-4 Amendment No.3 2 l
l i
l
3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS
- 2SES 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL 3/4.1.1.1 SHUTDOWN KtRGIN A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that 1) the reactor can be made subcritical frem all operating conditions, 2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and 3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently subcritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.
During Modes 1 and 2 the SHUTDOWN MARGIN is known to be within limits if all control rods are OPERABLE and withdrawn to or beyond the insertion limits.
SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughcut core life as a functicn of fuel depletion, RCS baron concentration ano RCS Tavo.
The most restrictive condition for Modes 1, 2, ano 3 occurs at EOL, with Tavg at no load operating temcerature, and is associated with a postulated steam line break accident and resulting uncontrolled RCS cooldown.
In the analysis of this accident a minimum SHUTDONN MARGIN of 0.60% ak/k is initially required to control the reactivity transient. Accordingly, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required is based upon this limiting condition and is c:nsistent with FSAR safety analysis assumptions.
The most restrictive condition for MODES a and 5 occurs at BOL, and is associated with deboration due to inadvertent injection of sodium hydroxide. The higher requirement for these modes insures the accident will not result in criticality.
3/4.1.1.2 BORON DILUTION A minimum flow rate of at least 2700 GPM provides adequate mixing, orevents stratification and ensures that reactivity changes will be gradual through the Reactor Coolant System in tne core during baron cencentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant Systen.. A flow rate of at least 2700 GPM will circulate an equivalent Reactor Ccolant Systen voldme of 12,000 cubic feet in accroximately 30 minutes. The reactivity change rate associated with boron concentration reduction will be within the cacability for operator recognition and control.
3/4.1.1.3 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT The limitations on acderator temoerature coefficient (MTC) are orovided to ensure that the assumotions used in the accident and transient analyses remain valid through each fuel cycle. The surveillance require-ment for measurement of the MTC each fuel cycle are adecuate to confirm the 'iTC value since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup.
he confirmation that the measured MTC value is within its limit orovides assurance that the coefficient will be maintained within acceptable values
- 9rougnout each fuel cycle.
00?STAL RIVER - L' NIT 3 33/41-1 Amendment No. 3 2
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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.1.4 MINI"UM TEupERATURE FOR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 525*F. This limitation is recuired to ensure 1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, 2) the protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range, 3) the pressurizer is capable of F
beino in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and 4) the reactor pressure vessel is above its minimum RT temperature.
NDT 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS The baron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility oceration. The comconents required to cerform this function include 1) borated' water sources, 2) makeup or DHR -
pumos, 3) separate flow paths, 4) boric acid pumps, 5) associated heat tracino systems, and. 6) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE emergency busses.
With the RCS averace temoerature above 200*F, a minimum of two separate ud redundant baron injection systems are provided to ensure sincie functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the systems inocerable. Allowable out-of-service periods ensure that minor comoonent repair or corrective action may be completed without undue risk to overall facility safety from injection system failures during the repair period.
The boration capability of either system is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from all operating conditions of 3.05.ik/k after xenon decay and cooldown to 200*F. The maximum boration capability requirement occurs at EOL from full cower equilibrium xenon conditions and requires either 6615 callons of 11,600 ppm boric acid solution frem the baric acid storage tanks or 45,421 gallons of 2270 opm barated water from the borated water storage tank.
The requirements for a minimum contained volume of 415,200 gallons of barated water in the borated water storace tank ensures the capability for boratino the RCS to the desired level. The specified quantity of borated water is consistent with the ECCS requirements of Specification 3.5.4.
Therefore, the larger volume of borated water is specified.
With the RCS temperature belcw 200*F, one injection system is acceotable without sincie failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions orchibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change in the event the sincie injection system becomes inocerable.
CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 8 3/4 1-2 Amendment ^!o.16, 20, 32 4
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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMd BASES 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)
The boron capability in Modes 4 and 5 is based on a potential moderator dilution accident and is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 3.0% ak/k after xenon decay and a cooldown from 200*F to 140*F.
This condition requires either 300 gallons of 11,600 ppm boron from the boric acid storage system or 1608 gallons of 2270 ppm boron from the borated water storage tank.
To envelop future cycle 34ST contained borated water volume requirements, a minimum volume of 13,500 gallons is specified.
The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available because of discharge line location and other physical charac-teristics. The limits on contained water volume, and boren concentration ensure a pH value of between 7.2 and 11.0 of the solution sprayed within containment after a design basis accident. The pH band minimi:es the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion cracking on mechanical systems and comconents.
The OPERABILITY of one baron injection system during REFUELING encures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.
3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The scecifications of this section (1) ensure that acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) ensure that the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) limit the potential effects of a rod ejection accident. OPERASILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control red alignment and insertion limits.
The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that l
the original criteria are met. For examole, misalignment of a safety or regulating red recuires a restriction in THERMAL POWER. The reactivity worth of a misaligned rod is limited for the remainder of the fuel cycle to prevent exceeding the assumotions used in the safety analysis.
The position of a rod declared inoperable due to misalignment should not be included in computing the average group position for determining the OPERAEILITY of rods with lesser misalignments.
CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 5 3/1 1-3 Amendment ?!c. j56', 3 2 4
I
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS i
3ASES 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTRCL ASSEMBLIES (Continued) j The maximum rod drop time permitted is consistent with the assumed rod drop time used in the safety analyses. Measurement with T
>525*Fandwithreactorcoolantpumpsoperatingensuresthat$5$
measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a reactor trip at operating conditions.
Control rod positions and OPERABILITY of the rod position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable. These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCO's are satisfied.
The limitation on THERMAL POWER based on xenon reactivity is necessary to ensure that power peaking limits are not exceeded even with specified rod insertion limits satisfied.
The limitation on Axial Power Shaping Rod insertion is necessary to ensure that power peaking limits are not exceeded.
~
CRYSTAL RI"ER - UNIT 3 8 3/4 1 4 Amendment No.
SEp i 1i75 i
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