ML19331A659
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| Site: | SHINE Medical Technologies, 99902034 |
| Issue date: | 11/14/2019 |
| From: | SHINE Medical Technologies |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
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Page 1 of 3 ENCLOSURE 2 SHINE MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC SHINE MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC OPERATING LICENSE APPLICATION SUPPLEMENT NO. 1 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT CHANGE
SUMMARY
PUBLIC VERSION Summary Description of Changes FSAR Impacts Identify Figure 1.3-1 as security-related information in accordance with Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2005-31.
Figure 1.3-1 Update the irradiation unit (IU) cell cover plug thickness to reflect the current design. The change in the cover plug thickness does not impact the structural, seismic, or radiological analyses as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
Section 4a2.5 Relabel "boron injection" line to "reagent addition" line in Figure 9b.7-4, and include description of reagent addition line to reflect the current design. Boron injection is not required and is not described in the FSAR.
Section 9b.7 Figure 9b.7-4 Remove process vessel vent system (PVVS) function of mitigating hydrogen concentration in the radioactive liquid waste immobilization (RLWI) system to reflect the current design. Conforming changes include the removal of the nitrogen purge system (N2PS) interface with the RLWI system, and the addition of PVVS isolation at the RLWI interface. RLWI hydrogen concentration levels remain below the lower flammability limit without mitigation.
Additionally, the RLWI interface with the facility nitrogen handling system (FNHS) was removed from Table 9b.7-1 to reflect the current design. The FNHS interface is not required and not described in the FSAR.
Table 3.1-1 Section 7.5 Table 7.5-2 Figure 7.5-1 Section 9b.6 Section 9b.7 Table 9b.7-1 Figure 9b.7-1
Page 2 of 3 Summary Description of Changes FSAR Impacts Update PVVS carbon guard bed and carbon delay bed configuration to reflect the current design. The primary configuration changes include updates to the carbon guard bed bypass, configuring carbon delay beds within groups, and updates to the carbon guard bed and carbon delay bed isolation functions. This system configuration change reduces engineered safety feature actuation system (ESFAS) interfaces with PVVS while maintaining process functions which support prevention or mitigation of potential accident scenarios, as described in Chapter 13.
Additionally, Figure 9b.6-1 was simplified to remove nonsafety-related instrumentation and controls, and to remove duplication of process flow provided in Figures 4b.4-2 and 4b.4-3.
Figure 6b.1-1 Section 6b.2 Section 7.5 Table 7.5-1 Table 7.5-2 Figure 7.5-1 Figure 7.5-3 (deleted)
Section 9a2.3 Section 9b.6 Table 9b.6-1 Figure 9b.6-1 Section 13b.1 Section 13b.2 Provide clarification for ESFAS single failure design criteria discussion. Clarification only.
Section 7.5 Consolidate ESFAS instrumentation supporting Vacuum Transfer System (VTS) Safety Actuation to the VTS vacuum header liquid detection instruments. Additionally, the VTS vacuum headers are divided based on the liquids being transferred. These changes reflect the current design. The changes reduce ESFAS interfaces with VTS while maintaining process functions which support prevention or mitigation of potential accident scenarios, as described in Chapter 13.
Section 6b.3 Section 7.5 Table 7.5-1 Figure 7.5-1 Figure 7.5-3 (previously Figure 7.5-4)
Section 9b.2 Figure 9b.2-1 Update carbon filters on the radiological ventilation zone 1 (RVZ1) supercell exhaust from nonsafety-related to safety-related to reflect the current design. The carbon filters are credited with a reduction in radioiodine from the supercell exhaust prior to RVZ1 isolation.
Section 6b.2 Section 9a2.1 Section 13b.1 Section 13b.2 Update the uranium receipt and storage system (URSS) process flow, system description, and criticality safety discussion to reflect a revised nuclear criticality safety evaluation (NCSE) for URSS and the current design. The revised Criticality Safety Basis in Subsection 6b.3.2.7 supports this change.
Section 4b.1 Section 4b.4 Table 4b.4-5 Table 4b.4-6 Section 6b.3 Figure 6b.3-6 Update the accident duration from 10 days to 30 days for several tritium release scenarios. The 30-day accident duration is more conservative as it provides additional margin to accident recovery.
The accident duration for the scenario associated with release of tritium from the TPS glovebox remains unchanged because it is expected that tritium recovery can be accomplished within 10 days for this scenario.
Section 13a2.2 Table 13a2.2-1 Update the glovebox stripper system (GBSS) isolation time from 10 seconds to 20 seconds to reflect the current design. The 20 second isolation time is more conservative.
Section 6a2.2 Section 13a2.2
Page 3 of 3 Summary Description of Changes FSAR Impacts Update accident analysis to credit RVZ1 holdup volume within ventilation exhaust of the primary closed loop cooling system (PCLS) expansion tank to reflect the current design. While the holdup volume had previously been credited in some scenarios, this change expands the applicability to additional scenarios and describes the system configuration which supports the holdup volume. The system configuration is described in the revisions to Chapter 5 and Chapter 9, and the applicability to the accident analysis is described in the revision to Chapter 13.
Section 5a2.2 Table 5a2.2-2 Figure 5a2.2-1 Section 5a2.7 Section 9a2.1 Figure 9a2.1-3 Section 13a2.2 Remove discussion of the facility compressed air system (FCAS) to reflect the current design. FCAS is not required. The previously described functions of the FCAS are replaced by facility nitrogen handling system (FNHS).
Figure 4a2.2-2 Table 4a2.8-2 Table 5a2.2-3 Remove ambiguous language associated with safety classifications of systems, structures, and components throughout the FSAR.
Clarification only.
Section 3.1 Table 3.1-3 Section 3.4 Section 4a2.7 Section 9a2.3 Update accident scenario involving a spill of target solution in the radioisotope production facility (RPF) pipe trench to reflect the current design. The scenario is updated to remove radioactive drains system (RDS) liquid detection as a credited control (including a conforming update of the radiation source term discussion). RDS liquid detection is not credited to support prevention or mitigation of this accident scenario, as described in Chapter 13.
Section 13b.2 Correct Figure 6b.3-4 to reflect the current design (i.e., target solution preparation system (TSPS) demister vented by RVZ1),
consistent with process flow diagram provided in Figure 4b.4-3.
Figure 6b.3-4 Correct the defense in depth measures described in Subsection 13a2.1.4, Scenario 5, to reflect the current design, consistent with the process flow diagram provided in Figure 9b.2-1.
Section 13a2.1 Update the isolation function description of the radioisotope process facility cooling system (RPCS) supplying the TSPS reflux condenser to reflect the current design. The update supports compliance with the ESFAS single failure criteria described in Subsection 7.5.2.4.
Section 4b.4 Table 5a2.3-3 Section 7.5 Table 7.5-2 Figure 7.5-1 Update the airborne release fraction (ARF) x leak path factor (LPF) tables and resulting dose consequence tables to reflect the current design. The updates to these tables are supported by the FSAR changes described throughout this change summary and by the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) Summary revision.
Table 6a2.1-2 Table 6b.1-2 Table 13a2.2-1 Table 13a2.2-2 Table 13a3-1 Table 13b.2-2 A markup of the FSAR changes is provided as Attachment 1.
187 pages follow ENCLOSURE 2 ATTACHMENT 1 SHINE MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC SHINE MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC OPERATING LICENSE APPLICATION SUPPLEMENT NO. 1 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT CHANGE
SUMMARY
PUBLIC VERSION FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT MARKUP
Security-Related Information - Withheld under 10 CFR 2.390(d)
Chapter 1 - The Facility General Description of the Facility SHINE Medical Technologies 1.3-6 Rev. 1 Figure 1.3 Production Facility Building General Arrangement
Chapter 3 - Design of Structures, Systems, and Components Design Criteria SHINE Medical Technologies 3.1-1 Rev. 1 CHAPTER 3 - DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS 3.1 DESIGN CRITERIA Structures, systems, and components (SSCs) present in the SHINE facility are identified in Tables 3.1-1 and 3.1-2, including the applicable FSAR section(s) which describe each SSC and the applicable SHINE design criteria. Design criteria derived from external codes, guides, and standards specific to the design, construction, or inspection of SSCs are included in the applicable FSAR section describing those SSCs. For each SSC, the FSAR section identifies location, function, modes of operation, and type of actuation for specific SSCs, as applicable.
Nuclear Safety Functional Classification and Relative Importance to Safety Safety-related SSCs at SHINE are those physical SSCs whose intended functions are to prevent accidents that could cause undue risk to health and safety of workers and the public; and to control or mitigate the consequences of such accidents.
Acceptable risk is achieved by ensuring that events are highly unlikely or by reducing consequences less than the SHINE safety criteria. The SHINE safety criteria are:
An acute worker dose of five rem or greater total effective dose equivalent (TEDE).
An acute dose of 500 millirem or greater TEDE to any individual located outside the owner controlled area.
An intake of 30 milligrams or greater of uranium in a soluble form by any individual located outside the owner controlled area.
An acute chemical exposure to an individual from licensed material or hazardous chemicals produced from licensed material that could lead to irreversible or other serious, long-lasting health effects to a worker or could cause mild transient health effects to any individual located outside the owner controlled area.
Criticality in the radioisotope production facility (RPF).
Loss of capability to reach safe shutdown conditions.
Some SSCs are nonsafety-related but perform functions that impact safety-related SSCs. These nonsafety-related SSCs have design basis requirements necessary to prevent unfavorable interactions with safety-related SSCs due to failure of the nonsafety-related SSCs.
Safety-related SSCs are identified in Table3.1-1 and nonsafety-related SSCs are identified in Table3.1-2.
SHINE Design Criteria The SHINE facility uses design criteria to ensure that the SSCs within the facility demonstrate adequate protection against the hazards present. The design criteria are selected to cover:
The complete range of irradiation facility and radioisotope production facility operating conditions.
The response of SSCs to anticipated transients and potential accidents.
Design features for safety-related SSCs including redundancy, environmental qualification, and seismic qualification.
Inspection, testing, and maintenance of safety-related SSCs.
Chapter 3 - Design of Structures, Systems, and Components Design Criteria SHINE Medical Technologies 3.1-3 Rev. 1 Table 3.1 Safety-Related Structures, Systems, and Components (Sheet 1 of 2)
Structure, System, or Component (SSC)
Acronym Section Applicable Design Criteria Engineered safety features actuation system ESFAS 7.1.3 7.5 13-19, 37-39 Facility structure FSTR 3.4.2 2, 6 Irradiation cell biological shield ICBS 4a2.1 4a2.5 29-36 Iodine and xenon purification and packaging IXP 4b.1.3 4b.3.1 9, 33, 36-37, 39 Light water pool system LWPS 4a2.1 4a2.4.2 25, 29-32, 36 Molybdenum extraction and purification system MEPS 4b.1.3 4b.3 27, 33, 36, 37, 39 Normal electrical power supply system NPSS 8a2.1 27, 28 Neutron flux detection system NFDS 4a2.1 7.1.7 7.8 13-19 Nitrogen purge system N2PS 6b.2.3 9b.6.2 39 Primary closed loop cooling system PCLS 4a2.1 5a2.2 9, 12, 21, 29, 33 Process vessel vent system PVVS 4b.1.3 9b.6.1 35, 39 Production facility biological shield PFBS 4b.2 29-32, 36 Radioactive drain system RDS 9b.7.6 36, 37 Radioactive liquid waste immobilization RLWI 9b.7.3 35-398 Radioactive liquid waste storage RLWS 4b.1.3 9b.7.4 35-36, 38-39 Radiological ventilation zones1, 2, and 3 RVZ1 RVZ2 RVZ3 9a2.1 29, 30, 32-36 Subcritical assembly system SCAS 4a2.1 4a2.2 9-11, 20, 22-25, 29-34, 36, 39
Chapter 3 - Design of Structures, Systems, and Components Design Criteria SHINE Medical Technologies 3.1-7 Rev. 1 Table 3.1 SHINE Design Criteria (Sheet 1 of 11)
Generally-Applicable Design Criteria Criterion 1 - Quality standards and records Safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety are designed, fabricated, erected, and tested to quality standards commensurate with the importance of the safety functions to be performed. Where generally recognized codes and standards are used, they are identified and evaluated to determine their applicability, adequacy, and sufficiency and are supplemented or modified as necessary to ensure a quality product in keeping with the required safety function.
A quality assurance program is established and implemented in order to provide adequate assurance that these SSCs satisfactorily perform their safety functions.
Appropriate records of the design, fabrication, erection and testing of safety-related SSCs important to safety are maintained by or under the control of SHINE throughout the life of the facility.
Criterion 2 - Natural phenomena hazards The facility structure supports and protects safety-related SSCs and is designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches as necessary to prevent the loss of capability of safety-related SSCs to perform their safety functions.
Safety-related SSCs are designed to withstand the effects of earthquakes without loss of capability to perform their safety functions.
Criterion 3 - Fire protection Safety-related SSCs are designed and located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions.
Noncombustible and heat resistant materials are used wherever practical throughout the facility, particularly in locations such as confinement boundaries and the control room.
Fire detection and suppression systems of appropriate capacity and capability are provided and designed to minimize the adverse effects of fires on safety-related SSCs. Firefighting systems are designed to ensure that their rupture or inadvertent operation does not significantly impair the safety capability of these SSCs.
Chapter 3 - Design of Structures, Systems, and Components Design Criteria SHINE Medical Technologies 3.1-13 Rev. 1 Criterion 24 - Inspection of primary system boundary The primary system boundary design includes provisions for in-service inspection to ensure structural and leak tight integrity, and an appropriate material surveillance program for the primary system boundary.
Criterion 25 - Residual heat removal The light water pool is provided to remove residual heat. The system safety function is to transfer fission product decay heat and other residual heat from the target solution vessel dump tank at a rate such that target solution design limits and the primary system boundary design limits are not exceeded.
Criterion 26 - Cooling water The radioisotope process facility cooling system and process chilled water system are provided to transfer heat from structures, systems, and componentssafety-related SSCs important to safety to the environment, which serves as the ultimate heat sink.
Table 3.1 SHINE Design Criteria (Sheet 7 of 11)
Chapter 3 - Design of Structures, Systems, and Components Design Criteria SHINE Medical Technologies 3.1-14 Rev. 1 Electric Power Systems Design Criteria Criterion 27 - Electric power systems An on-site electric power system and an off-site electric power system are provided to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safetysafety-related SSCs. The safety functions are to provide sufficient capacity and capability to assure that:
- 1) target solution design limits and primary system boundary design limits are not exceeded as a result of anticipated transients, and
- 2) confinement integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents.
The on-site uninterruptible electric power supply and distribution system has sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform its safety functions assuming a single failure.
Provisions are included to minimize the probability of losing electric power from the uninterruptible power supply as a result of or coincident with, the loss of power from the off-site electric power system.
Criterion 28 - Inspection and testing of electric power systems The safety-related electric power systems important to safety are designed to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing of important areas and features, such as wiring, insulation, connections, and switchboards, to assess the continuity of the systems and the condition of their components. The systems are designed with a capability to test periodically:
- 1) the operability and functional performance of the components of the systems, such as on-site power sources, relays, switches, and buses; and
- 2) the operability of the systems as a whole and, under conditions as close to design as practical, the full operation sequence that brings the systems into operation, including operation of applicable portions of the protection system, and the transfer of power among the on-site and off-site power supplies.
Table 3.1 SHINE Design Criteria (Sheet 8 of 11)
Chapter 3 - Design of Structures, Systems, and Components Design Criteria SHINE Medical Technologies 3.1-17 Rev. 1 Criterion 36 -Target solution storage and handling and radioactivity control The target solution storage and handling, radioactive waste, and other systems that contain radioactivity are designed to assure adequate safety under normal and postulated accident conditions. These systems are designed with:
- 1) capability to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing of safety-related components important to safety,
- 2) suitable shielding for radiation protection,
- 3) appropriate confinement and filtering systems, and
- 4) residual heat removal capability having reliability and testability that reflects the importance to safety of decay heat and other residual heat removal.
Criterion 37 - Criticality control in the radioisotope production facility Criticality in the radioisotope production facility is prevented by physical systems or processes and the use of administrative controls.
Use of geometrically safe configurations is preferred. Control of criticality adheres to the double contingency principle.
A criticality accident alarm system to detect and alert facility personnel of an inadvertent criticality is provided.
Criterion 38 - Monitoring radioactivity releases Means are provided for monitoring the primary confinement boundary, hot cell, and glovebox atmospheres to detect potential leakage of gaseous or other airborne radioactive material. Potential effluent discharge paths and the plant environs are monitored for radioactivity that may be released from normal operations, including anticipated transients, and from postulated accidents.
Criterion 39 - Hydrogen mitigation Systems to control the buildup of hydrogen that is released into the primary system boundary and tanks or other volumes that contain fission products and produce significant quantities of hydrogen are provided to ensure that the integrity of the system and confinement boundaries are maintained.
Table 3.1 SHINE Design Criteria (Sheet 11 of 11)
Chapter 3 - Design of Structures, Systems, and Components Seismic Damage SHINE Medical Technologies 3.4-10 Rev. 1 to accidental eccentricity. The torsional moment is taken equal to the story shear at the elevation and in the direction of interest times a moment arm equal to 5percent of the building dimension.
The torsional moment is distributed to the building shear walls based on the relative rigidity of the walls in plane. The loads are applied statically and account for variability in the load direction.
3.4.2.6.5 Structural Analysis Model A three-dimensional finite element model of the SHINE facility structure was created using the computer program SAP2000 (version 17.2) to represent the mass and stiffness of the major structural elements, equipment, and components of the FSTR. The model utilizes shell elements to represent slabs and walls, and frame elements to represent columns and beams. Elements are modeled at the geometric centerline of the structural member they represent with the following exceptions:
The below grade and mezzanine slabs are modeled at their actual top-of-slab elevation.
Minor adjustments are made to the dimensions and locations of wall openings to maximize mesh regularity in the model.
Roof truss locations are adjusted to align with the roof shell element mesh.
The adjustments described above are intended to maintain mesh regularity to the extent possible.
3.4.2.6.6 Structural Analysis Results Concrete walls and slabs in the SHINE facility are designed for axial, flexural, and shear loads per provisions of ACI 349-13 (ACI, 2014) considering all applicable design basis load combinations. Walls and slabs are modeled in SAP2000 using shell elements. To determine the longitudinal and transverse reinforcement required within a wall or slab, the design is performed on an element basis. Using resultant forces obtained from SAP2000 model data, the element is designed as a reinforced concrete section per ACI349-13 (ACI, 2014). The required area of steel is determined for combined axial and flexural loads, in-plane shear loads, and out-of-plane shear loads. Using these results, reinforcement size and spacing is specified.
3.4.3 SEISMIC CLASSIFICATION AND QUALIFICATION This subsection discusses the methods by which the SHINE facility SSCs are classified and qualified to ensure functional integrity.
3.4.3.1 Seismic Classification Facility SSCs, including their foundations and supports, that must perform safety function(s) after an SSE are designated as Seismic Category I. Safety-related SSCs are classified as Seismic Category I.
SSCs that are co-located with a Seismic Category I SSC and must maintain structural integrity in the event of an SSE to prevent unacceptable interactions with a Seismic Category I SSC, but are not required to remain functional, are designated as Seismic Category II.
The seismic classifications of SSCs important to safety are shown in Table 3.4-1.
Chapter 3 - Design of Structures, Systems, and Components Seismic Damage SHINE Medical Technologies 3.4-13 Rev. 1 performance of the active components during the tests. For acceptability, the components shall demonstrate their ability to perform their intended safety functions when subjected to all applicable loads.
3.4.3.2.3 Comparison with Existing Databases ISRS are used to develop RRS for comparison with existing response from a database. The candidate equipment must be similar to equipment in the existing seismic experience databases.
3.4.3.2.4 Combined Methods of Qualification Based on the available information, component complexity, and functional requirements, the above mentioned analytical and test methods may be combined in various sequence and content to achieve seismic qualification of the subject components.
3.4.4 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION Seismic instrumentation is not required under Section IV(a)(4) of Appendix S to 10 CFR 50 or Section VI(a)(3) of Appendix A to 10 CFR 100 because the SHINE facility is not a nuclear power plant. However, the facility has nonsafety-related seismic instrumentation to record accelerations experienced at the site during a seismic event.
The seismic instrumentation establishes the acceptability of continued operation of the plant following a seismic event. This system provides acceleration time histories or response spectra experienced at the facility to assist in verifying that safety-related SSCs important to safety at the SHINE facility can continue to perform their safety functions.
Seismic monitoring is performed by the process integrated control system (PICS), which is described in Section 7.3. Indication of a seismic event results in an alarm in the facility control room.
3.4.5 SEISMIC ENVELOPE DESIGN FOR EXTERNAL HAZARDS 3.4.5.1 AIRCRAFT IMPACT ANALYSIS The safety-related structures at the SHINE facility are evaluated for aircraft impact loading resulting from small aircraft which frequent the Southern Wisconsin Regional Airport (SWRA).
The analysis consists of a global impact response analysis and a local impact response analysis.
The global impact response analysis is performed using the energy balance method, consistent with U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Standard DOE-STD-3014-2006 (DOE, 2006). The permissible ductility limit for reinforced concrete elements is in accordance with Appendix F of ACI 349-13 (ACI, 2014). The permissible ductility limit for truss members is determined from Chapter NB of ANSI/AISCN690-12 (ANSI/AISC, 2012). The calculated values are then used to create the appropriate elastic or elastic-plastic load deflection curves. From these curves, the available energy absorption capacity of the structure at the critical impact locations is determined. The Challenger605 was selected as the critical aircraft for the global impact analysis based on a study of the airport operations data. The Challenger 605 is evaluated as a design basis aircraft impact. The probabilistic distributions of horizontal and vertical velocity of impact are determined from Attachment E of Lawrence Livermore National
Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Radioisotope Production Facility Description Acronyms and Abbreviations ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Acronym/Abbreviation Definition SHINE Medical Technologies 4-xii Rev. 1 FCAS facility compressed air system FCRS facility chemical reagent system FHA fire hazard analysis fl. oz.
fluid ounce FNHS facility nitrogen handling system fps feet per second ft.
feet g
gram g/cm3 grams per cubic centimeter g/L grams per liter g/s grams per second gal gallon gpm gallons per minute gU/L grams of uranium per liter
Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Radioisotope Production Facility Description Subcritical Assembly SHINE Medical Technologies 4a2.2-19 Rev. 0 Figure 4a2.2 Primary System Interfaces During Irradiation Unit Operation
Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Radioisotope Production Facility Description Subcritical Assembly SHINE Medical Technologies 4a2.2-19 Rev. 1 Figure 4a2.2
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Primary System Interfaces During Irradiation Unit Operation
Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Radioisotope Production Facility Description Irradiation Facility Biological Shield SHINE Medical Technologies 4a2.5-2 Rev. 1 The thickness of the walls of the IU cell shielding varies from approximately 4.0feet(ft.)
(1.2meters [m]) to 5.8ft. (1.8 m), the walls of the TOGS shielded cell shielding vary from approximately 4.0 ft. (1.2m) to 6.0 ft. (1.8 m), and the walls of the primary cooling room shielding vary from approximately 0.7 ft. (0.2 m) to 1 ft. (0.3 m). The IU cell cover plug thickness is approximately 5.04.3 ft. (1.53 m), the TOGS cover plug thickness is approximately 6.0ft. (1.8 m),
and the primary cooling room cover plug thickness is approximately 1.0 ft. (0.3m).
Concrete shielding is of standard density(nominally 140 pounds per cubic foot [lb/ft3])
(2.24grams per cubic centimeter [g/cm3]) concrete, and shield thicknesses result in general dose rates on the external surface of the shielding of less than 1.0 millirem per hour (mrem/hr).
Local hot spots (e.g., penetrations, interfaces) will be measured as part of the shielding test program and will be managed appropriately according to the Radiation Protection Program (see Section11.1). See Figure4a2.5-1 for a general depiction of the ICBS.
The primary cooling room shield doors are carbon steel and have an approximate thickness of 3inches(in.) (8centimeters [cm]).
4a2.5.2.3 Loss of Shield Integrity The biological shield walls and supporting structures are designed and constructed to remain intact during normal operations as well as during and following design basis accidents. A loss of shield integrity is not credible given the seismic design and robust nature of the IU and TOGS cells.
4a2.5.2.4 Unrestricted Environment Based on the design and construction of the biological shield walls, the neutron flux to soils surrounding the biological shield walls, in the unrestricted environment, is estimated to be less than 100 n/cm2-s. Thus, the neutron activation of groundwater and soils surrounding the biological shield is expected to be insignificant.
4a2.5.3 SHIELD MATERIALS The ICBS concrete shielding uses two distinct materials in different configurations to assemble the biological shield and meet the radiation exposure goals defined in Chapter11. The materials that make up the concrete shielding use an engineered concrete mix with carbon steel reinforcing bars. Standard concrete is used with no special additives for shielding purposes. In the shielding analyses, individual rebar is not modeled. Instead a homogenization of rebar and concrete is used when rebar is included in the modeling. Conservative assumptions are used to define the overall shielding properties of the concrete and rebar, and secondary radiation production is considered in the analysis.
4a2.5.3.1 Shielding Calculations Calculations are performed with the software package MCNP (Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code). MCNP is developed and validated by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and distributed by the Radiation Safety Information Computational Center (RSICC) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). MCNP uses a Monte Carlo based particle (neutrons and photons) transport method to generate a set of particle tracks through a model of the facility geometry (LANL, 2011). The Monte Carlo method generates a statistical set of results for individual
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Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Radioisotope Production Facility Description Thermal Hydraulic Design SHINE Medical Technologies 4a2.7-5 Rev. 1
[ ]PROP/ECI, the flow rate to CC3 is approximately [
]PROP/ECI.
The cooling water supply to the lower plenum of the SASS is at a pressure of up to approximately 20 pounds per square inch gage (psig) (138 kilopascal [kPa]) and a temperature of 59°F to 77°F (15°C to 25°C). The maximum PCLS cooling water temperature of 77°F (25°C) is used in the calculations presented in Subsection 4a2.7.5, below. This temperature limit is protected by the TSV reactivity protection system (TRPS) IU Cell Safety Actuation setpoints.
The TSV headspace pressure is maintained slightly below atmospheric pressure. The pressure over the target solution in the TSV is normally between -2 psig (-14 kPa) and 0 psig (0 kPa).
The cooling water pressure difference across the TSV within the SASS is less than approximately 7 psid (48 kPa), which accounts for entrance and exit pressure losses and frictional pressure losses in the cooling channels. See Table 5a2.2-1 for the PCLS parameters.
As the primary cooling water is maintained far from boiling even at atmospheric pressures, pressure profiles of the cooling water in the flow channels are not important to safetyfor the heat transfer characteristics of the system. Total cooling water flow rate and inlet temperature are principal variables of importance for heat transfer. These variables are monitored by the TRPS.
4a2.7.3.2 Chemical Effects Related to Heat Transfer The TSV is constructed of 347 stainless steel. The target solution is chemically compatible with this alloy of stainless steel. When 347 stainless steel is placed in a uranyl-sulfate solution at temperatures up to 212°F (100°C), the steel retains its metallic luster, and only after long periods of time does it develop a very thin tarnish film (Lane, 1958).
Plating out of chemicals on the TSV surfaces is not expected in the operating temperature range of the SHINE process. Plating out of chemicals onto surfaces can occur via two mechanisms: a layer of non-volatile material can be left on surfaces when water is removed by boiling or vaporizing, or a layer of material can form when soluble components are electro-chemically reduced to a non-soluble state. The TSV is maintained at a nominal 120°F (50°C) during irradiation, which is well below the boiling point of water, even at a pressure slightly below atmospheric. No plating out of chemicals is expected from boiling because no boiling will occur in the TSV. Evaporation of and collection of solid salts on the TSV walls at the liquid surface is postulated; however, this does not affect the heat transfer as this will be above the liquid surface.
Salts that are formed are expected to re-dissolve if they are rewetted due to differing solution heights between runs. There are multiple factors minimizing the opportunity for fission product ions to be reduced at the surface of the TSV. A stable, passive, non-porous oxide layer is quickly formed on the surface of the stainless steel. This will minimize plating out on the surface of the TSV. Therefore, plating out of chemicals on the TSV surfaces is not expected.
Potential precipitates are not expected to have significant effects on heat transfer in the TSV.
Small amounts of precipitates could form in the target solution, as discussed in Section 4a2.2.
However, the heat transfer surfaces are vertical, which reduces collection of settled precipitates.
Suspended precipitates will also be separated from the target solution through the normal filtration of the molybdenum-99 extraction column during normal isotope extraction processes.
Finally, precipitate masses are low, as indicated in Table 4a2.2-1, relative to masses that would be expected to affect heat transfer.
Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Radioisotope Production Facility Description Gas Management System SHINE Medical Technologies 4a2.8-11 Rev. 1 Facility compressed airnitrogen handling system (FCANHS)
The FCANHS supplies TOGS with compressed air or nitrogen to allow pressure regulation in TOGS.
Facility chemical reagent system (FCRS)
The FCRS supplies TOGS with oxygen gas to ensure hydrogen recombination capability.
Process vessel vent system (PVVS)
The PVVS accepts TOGS pressure relief gases. The PVVS also accepts sweep gas from TOGS during nitrogen purge system (N2PS) operation.
Table 4a2.8 TSV Off-Gas System Interfaces (Sheet 2 of 2)
System Interface Description
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Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Radioisotope Production Facility Description Facility and Process Description SHINE Medical Technologies 4b.1-4 Rev. 1 present a health (toxicity) risk through inhalation or other ingestion pathways. Exposure to uranium oxide and uranium metal areis controlled through storage in sealed containers, seismically -qualified storage racks and transfer carts, and confinement in the TSPS glovebox while being transferred from open containers. Airborne droplets that may emanate from the solution are controlled by sweep gas routed through a reflux condenser and exhausted to radiological ventilation zone 1 (RVZ1).
Other hazardous chemicals present in the TSPS room include sulfuric acid, hydrogen peroxide, and [ ]PROP/ECI. These reagents are used in the target solution preparation and are not produced from licensed materials.
A detailed description of the TSPS is provided in Section4b.4.
4b.1.3.2 Molybdenum Extraction and Purification System 4b.1.3.2.1 Process Functions Separate Mo from irradiated uranyl sulfate solution (target solution).
[
]PROP/ECI
[ ]PROP/ECI Concentrate the product solution volume such that it may be processed by the purification subsystem.
Reduce the acid and base vapor load of the gases going to the process vessel ventilation system.
Purify the molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) product to within the limits described in the customer supply agreements.
4b.1.3.2.2 Safety Functions Prevent inadvertent criticality through design of equipment in accordance with the criticality safety evaluation.
Ensure confinement boundaries are maintained during normal conditions and during and following design basis events to ensure dose consequences during accidents are within acceptance criteria.
Ensure the process system boundary integrity is maintained during normal conditions and during and following design basis events to prevent uncontrolled release of radioactivity.
4b.1.3.2.3 Process Description The MEPS extracts the Mo from the irradiated uranyl sulfate. The Mo is concentrated and purified to the final Mo product form and is sampled for product specification compliance prior to transfer to the MIPS.
MEPS operations are performed in two distinct phases:
1.
Mo extraction 2.
Mo purification
Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Radioisotope Production Facility Description Facility and Process Description SHINE Medical Technologies 4b.1-8 Rev. 1 4b.1.3.5 Uranium Receipt and Storage System 4b.1.3.5.1 Process Functions Provide receipt and repackaging of uranium (metal or oxide) received from a supplier Convert uranium metal to uranium oxide Provide storage for uranium oxide prior to use in the TSPS Provide storage for uranium metal Provide for sampling to measure uranium enrichment 4b.1.3.5.2 Safety Functions Prevent inadvertent criticality through design of equipment in accordance with the criticality safety evaluation.
Prevent exposure to uranium that would exceed allowable uptake limits through confinement of uranium during the uranium receipt, repackaging, conversion, and storage processes.
4b.1.3.5.3 Process Description The URSS processes include receipt, repackaging, storage, and conversion of uranium received from a supplier. Upon receipt of a uranium shipment, inner containers from the supplier shipping container are imported to the URSS glovebox and repackaged. If the material received is uranium metal, it is converted to uranium oxide using a furnace. If the material received is uranium oxide, further processing is not required. The uranium oxide is then weighed and repackaged into storage canisters. Once transfer to storage canisters is complete, the canisters are removed from the URSS glovebox and stored in the uranium oxide storage rack. Transfer of the storage canisters to the storage rack and to the TSPS is accomplished using the URSS transfer cart.
The SNM within the URSS system is LEU. This is present in the form of uranium oxide and uranium metal. The maximum inventory of LEU in the system is 770 kg. This is divided between the URSS glovebox, supplier shipping containers, furnace, SHINE storage containers, and the storage rack. A description of provisions for criticality control in the URSS is contained in Subsection6b.3.2.7.
The chemical hazards present from licensed materials in the URSS room include uranium oxide powder and uranium metal. The uranium can present a health (toxicity) risk through inhalation or other ingestion pathways. Exposure to uranium oxide and uranium metal areis controlled through storage in sealed containers, seismically -qualified storage racks and transfer carts, and confinement in the URSS glovebox while being transferred from open containers. A detailed description of the URSS is provided in Section4b.4.
4b.1.3.6 Process Vessel Vent System 4b.1.3.6.1 Process and Safety Functions Section 9b.6 describes the process and safety functions for the PVVS.
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Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Special Nuclear Material Radioisotope Production Facility Description Processing and Storage SHINE Medical Technologies 4b.4-5 Rev. 1 is stored in a favorable configuration for criticality safety within the shipping containers and is stored in those containers in accordance with packaging limitations for use. Operators verify supplied documentation and survey the shipping container and contents for damage.
URSS aAdministrative, criticality-safety controls limit the handling of uranium metal from the transportshipping container to the URSS glovebox, as described in Section6b.3.
Within the URSS glovebox, the uranium metal contents of the shipping container are sampled and verified for form and enrichment. Uranium metal is then repackaged into a uranium metal storage canister. The mass of uranium metal repackaged into a uranium metal storage canister is limited for criticality safety. The mass of SNM in the glovebox is limited for criticality safety. The uranium metal storage canister is then transferred to the uranium metal storage rack from the URSS glovebox using the transfer cart prior to further processing. Criticality safety controls in the URSS are further described in Subsection6b.3.2.7.
4b.4.2.1.3 Uranium Metal Storage Uranium metal storage canisters are stored in the uranium metal storage rack within the [
]SRI. The uranium metal storage rack holds uranium metal storage canisters in a favorable configuration for criticality safety. The uranium metal storage rack is designed as an array of storage cells. Each storage cell may hold one uranium metal storage canister and the cubic dimensions for each storage cell are maintained. Criticality safety controls in the URSS are further described in Subsection6b.3.2.7.
Uranium storage canisters are transferred individually from the uranium metal storage rack using the transfer cart to the URSS glovebox for conversion to uranium oxide. Detailed descriptions of the metal to oxide conversion can be found in Subsection4b.4.2.1.6.
4b.4.2.1.4 Uranium Oxide Receipt Shipments of uranium oxide are received in licensed shipping containers. Shipping containers are manually transferred to the [ ]SRI within the RCA. Uranium oxide is stored in a favorable configuration for criticality safety within the shipping containers and is stored in those containers in accordance with packaging limitations for use. Operators verify supplied documentation and survey the shipping container and contents for damage.
URSS administrative, criticality safety controls limit the handling of uranium oxide from the shipping container to the URSS glovebox, as described in Section6b.3.
Within the URSS glovebox, the uranium oxide contents are sampled and verified for form, enrichment, and moisture content. Uranium oxide is then repackaged into a uranium oxide storage canister. The mass of uranium oxide repackaged into a uranium oxide storage canister is limited for criticality safety. The mass of SNM in the glovebox is limited for criticality safety. The uranium oxide storage canister is then transferred to the uranium oxide storage rack from the URSS glovebox using the transfer cart prior to further processing. Criticality safety controls in the URSS are further described in Subsection6b.3.2.7.
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Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Special Nuclear Material Radioisotope Production Facility Description Processing and Storage SHINE Medical Technologies 4b.4-6 Rev. 1 4b.4.2.1.5 Uranium Oxide Storage Uranium oxide storage canisters are stored in the uranium oxide storage rack within the [
]SRI. The uranium oxide storage rack holds uranium oxide storage canisters in a favorable configuration for criticality safety. The uranium oxide storage rack is designed as an array of storage cells. Each storage cell may hold one uranium oxide storage canister and the cubic dimensions for each storage cell are maintained. Criticality safety controls in the URSS are further described in Subsection6b.3.2.7.
Uranium oxide storage canisters are transferred individually from the uranium oxide storage rack to the TSPS glovebox, located in the [ ]SRI, using the transfer cart for conversion to uranyl sulfate. A detailed description of the TSPS is provided in Subsection4b.4.2.2.
4b.4.2.1.6 Uranium Metal to Oxide Conversion Uranium metal is converted to uranium oxide thermally by an oxidation furnace within the URSS glovebox. Uranium metal storage canisters are transferred individually from the uranium metal storage rack to the URSS glovebox using the transfer cart. Uranium metal storage canisters are imported into the URSS glovebox, and contents are transferred to the furnace.
The oxidation process results in the uranium metal being converted into a powder. To prevent any entrainment of the uranium oxide powder into the ventilation systems, the URSS glovebox is kept at negative pressure by radiological ventilation zone 1 (RVZ1) and equipped with high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters to remove particles at both the ventilation supply and exhaust penetrations of the glovebox. The volume of each filter housing is limited as a criticality safety control.
Before the uranium oxide is removed from the furnace, the process is verified to have spent sufficient time at a minimum sustained temperature to ensure metal has been converted to oxide.
The uranium oxide is removed from the furnace and packed into a uranium oxide storage canister by the method described in Subsection4b.4.2.1.4.
Criticality safety controls in the URSS are further described in Subsection6b.3.2.7.
4b.4.2.2 Target Solution Preparation System The TSPS produces a LEU, uranyl sulfate solution, which once qualified for use, is referred to as target solution. Solid uranium oxide is dissolved in a sulfuric acid solution to convert the uranium to uranyl sulfate. Hydrogen peroxide may be used as a catalyst to aid the conversion. The solution is adjusted as needed for pH and the batch is verified to be within the specifications of the target solution qualification program. Target solution is released by operators to the RPF for use in the irradiation cycle. Solutions prepared by TSPS may be used either as a fresh target solution batch or as makeup solution for in-use target solution batches in the RPF.
4b.4.2.2.1 Safety Functions The safety functions of TSPS are provided in Section4b.1. The system interfaces for TSPS are provided in Table4b.4-6. The process flow diagram for TSPS are provided in Figure4b.4-3.
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Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Special Nuclear Material Radioisotope Production Facility Description Processing and Storage SHINE Medical Technologies 4b.4-7 Rev. 1 4b.4.2.2.2 Dissolution of Uranium Oxide Uranium oxide is converted to a uranyl sulfate solution within the uranyl sulfate dissolution tanks.
Uranium oxide, within a uranium oxide storage canister, is transferred from the uranium oxide storage rack to the [ ]SRI using the transfer cart. The uranium oxidestorage canister is imported and opened within the TSPS glovebox. Only one uranium oxide storage canister is imported to the TSPS glovebox at any time. The TSPS glovebox is kept at negative pressure by RVZ1 and equipped with HEPA filters on the supply and exhaust connections. The volume of the filters is limited as a criticality safety control.
Measurement, by mass, of uranium oxide powder is performed in the TSPS glovebox, and the material is transferred to one of the two uranyl sulfate dissolution tanks via a normally closed port in the TSPS glovebox. Two ports are provided, one dedicated to each uranyl sulfate dissolution tank. The ports preclude backflow of liquid from a uranyl sulfate dissolution tank. Unused uranium oxide remains in the uranium oxide storage canister and is returned to the uranium oxide storage rack.
The uranyl sulfate dissolution tanks are designed with favorable dimensions for criticality safety and are spaced from one another to minimize reactivity by interaction. Sulfuric acid used to convert the uranium oxide to uranyl sulfate is added to the tank. Hydrogen peroxide may also be added as a catalyst, and uranyl peroxide is formed as an intermediate. Heat is applied to the uranyl sulfate dissolution tank to aid the conversion to uranyl sulfate. Heat also decomposes excess hydrogen peroxide if it is used as a catalyst. Throughout the conversion process, the tank may be agitated. A reflux condenser on the exhaust ventilation of the uranyl sulfate dissolution tank is used to condense and return evaporated water. On a leak of the reflux condenser into the dissolution tank, a high level in the tank results in an engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) dissolution tank isolation, which closes the radioisotope process facility cooling system (RPCS) supply and return cooling water valves. Non-condensable gases are exhausted from the condenser to RVZ1 through a HEPA filter. The reflux condenser size is limited as a criticality safety control as described in Section6b.3, but operation of the reflux condenser is not required to maintain a safe configuration.
Once operators verify the dissolution process is complete by sampling, the uranyl sulfate is pumped to the target solution preparation tank through a set of filters to remove any potentially undissolved solids. The filters are limited in size as a criticality safety control.
4b.4.2.2.3 Preparation of Target Solution Both qualified target solution batches and uranyl sulfate makeup solutions are prepared for use in the target solution preparation tank. The target solution preparation tank has capacity for an entire batch of target solution and is a favorable geometry for criticality safety. Solutions are pumped into the target solution preparation tank from the uranyl sulfate dissolution tanks and blended to generate a target solution batch. If the solution is to be a qualified target solution batch, reagents, such as water, sulfuric acid, [ ]PROP/ECI are added to the tank to adjust solution properties within the constraints specified by the Target Solution Qualification Program, as described in Section4a2.2. Makeup solution is adjusted by operators as needed to ensure the batch already in a TSSS tank will meet the Target Solution Qualification Program requirements once the makeup solution is added.
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Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Special Nuclear Material Radioisotope Production Facility Description Processing and Storage SHINE Medical Technologies 4b.4-8 Rev. 1 Agitation of the target solution preparation tank is provided to ensure the solutions are well-mixed before samples are taken and before they are pumped to the TSSS. RVZ1 provides ventilation for the target solution preparation tank. HEPA filters at the target solution preparation tank minimize contamination of the ventilation system.
4b.4.2.3 Unirradiated SNM Related Equipment The following is a list of process equipment associated with processing unirradiated SNM.
System components meet the criticality safety controls determined in the nuclear criticality safety evaluations described in Section6b.3. Nominal sizes and specifications are provided below:
a.
URSS glovebox Quantity: 1 Design guidance: AGS-G001-2007 (AGS, 2007) b.
Uranium oxidation furnace Quantity: 1 Normal operating temperature: 482°F-1832°F (250°C-1000°C) c.
Uranium storage racks Capacity: 80 canisters d.
Uranium metal storage canister
==
Description:==
Storage of uranium metal Capacity: 25.8 lbs. (11.7 kg)Content administratively controlled to less than 14.7lbs.
(6.70kg) e.
Uranium oxide storage canister
==
Description:==
Storage of uranium oxide Capacity:Content administratively controlled to less than 8.8 lbs. (4.0 kg) f.
Transfer cart Capacity: 1 canister g.
TSPS glovebox Quantity: 1 Design guidance: AGS-G001-2007 (AGS, 2007) h.
Uranyl sulfate dissolution tank Quantity: 2 Size: 5.3 gal. (20 l)
Normal operating pressure: atmospheric (vented) i.
Target solution preparation tank Quantity: 1 Size: [
]PROP/ECI Normal operating pressure: atmospheric (vented) j.
Uranyl sulfate dissolution tank filter Quantity: 2
Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Special Nuclear Material Radioisotope Production Facility Description Processing and Storage SHINE Medical Technologies 4b.4-14 Rev. 1 Table 4b.4 URSS Interfaces
Interfacing System Interface Description Target solution preparation system (TSPS)
Uranium oxide storage canisters are transferred from the uranium oxide storage rack to the TSPS glovebox by the transfer cart.
Radiological ventilation zone 1 (RVZ1)
RVZ1 provides exhaust ventilation to the URSS glovebox.
Radiological ventilation zone 2 (RVZ2)
The URSS glovebox ventilation supply is taken from RVZ2.
Solid radioactive waste packaging (SRWP)
Spent SNM containers and URSS glovebox filters are processed by SRWP for disposal.
Normal electrical power supply system (NPSS)
The NPSS is distributed to provide power within the URSS glovebox, the oxidation furnace, and ancillary equipment.
Process integrated control system (PICS)
The URSS provide measurement signals to the PICS. The PICS allows operators to control processes in the URSS.
Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Special Nuclear Material Radioisotope Production Facility Description Processing and Storage SHINE Medical Technologies 4b.4-15 Rev. 1 Table 4b.4 TSPS Interfaces
Interfacing System Interface Description Uranium receipt and storage system (URSS)
Uranium oxide storage canisters are transferred from the uranium oxide storage rack to the TSPS glovebox by the transfer cart.
Target solution staging system (TSSS)
Uranyl sulfate solutions are pumped from the target solution preparation tank to the target solution hold tanks.
Facility chemical reagent system (FCRS)
The chemical reagent system supplies reagents to the uranyl sulfate dissolution tanks for the conversion of uranium oxide to uranyl sulfate solution as well as reagents for adjustment of solutions in the TSPS.
Solid radioactive waste packaging (SRWP)
Spent TSPS glovebox filters and spent liquid filters are processed by SRWP system.
Radioisotope process facility cooling system (RPCS)
The RPCS provides process cooling water to the reflux condensers on the uranyl sulfate dissolution tanks.
Radiological ventilation zone 1 (RVZ1)
RVZ1 provides exhaust ventilation to the TSPS glovebox, the uranyl sulfate dissolution tanks, and the target solution preparation tank.
Radiological ventilation zone 2 (RVZ2)
The ventilation supply for the TSPS glovebox, the uranyl sulfate dissolution tanks, and the target solution preparation tank is taken from RVZ2.
Normal electrical power supply system (NPSS)
The NPSS is distributed to provide power to the TSPS glovebox, to operate the pumps, heating elements, and ancillary equipment.
Engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS)
The ESFAS actuates isolation functions on detection of high dissolution tank level.
Process integrated control system (PICS)
The TSPS provides measurement signals to the PICS. PICS allows operators to control processes in TSPS.
Chapter 5 - Cooling Systems Acronyms and Abbreviations ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Acronym/Abbreviation Definition SHINE Medical Technologies 5-v Rev. 1 mho/cm micromho per centimeter ALARA as low as reasonably achievable Ar-41 argon-41 ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers Btu British thermal unit Btu/hr British thermal units per hour cm centimeter DBT dry bulb temperature FCAS facility compressed air system FCHS facility chilled water system FCRS facility chemical reagent system FDWS facility demineralized water system FNHS facility nitrogen handling system FPWS facility potable water system FSTR facility structure FVZ4 facility ventilation zone 4
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Chapter 5 - Cooling Systems Primary Closed Loop Cooling System SHINE Medical Technologies 5a2.2-1 Rev. 1 5a2.2 PRIMARY CLOSED LOOP COOLING SYSTEM 5a2.2.1 DESIGN BASES AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS The primary closed loop cooling system (PCLS) provides forced convection water cooling to the target solution vessel (TSV) and neutron multiplier during irradiation of the target solution and immediately prior to transferring target solution from the TSV to the TSV dump tank. The PCLS also provides indirect cooling of the light water pool via natural convection heat transfer to the PCLS components submerged in the pool, as described in Subsection 4a2.7.3. The PCLS rejects heat to the radioisotope process facility cooling system (RPCS). A total of eight independent instances of PCLS are installed in the SHINE facility, one for each irradiation unit (IU). There are no common pressure retaining components between the instances of PCLS. The major PCLS equipment is located in the primary cooling room and the IU cell.
Each instance of PCLS includes two pumps, a heat exchanger, and a cooling water clean-up side stream located in the primary cooling rooms adjacent to the east side of each IU cell. In the IU cell, the PCLS is connected to the subcritical assembly system (SCAS) and includes an air separator, an expansion tank, and a nitrogen-16 (N-16) delay tanks. Figure 5a2.2-1 provides a PCLS flow diagram.
The process functions of the PCLS cooling system are to:
remove heat from each TSV and neutron multiplier during full-power IU operation; cool the light water pool by natural convection heat transfer to PCLS components inside the light water pool; maintain water quality to reduce corrosion and scaling; limit concentrations of particulate and dissolved contaminants that could be made radioactive by neutron irradiation; reduce N-16 radiation exposure within the primary cooling room in support of as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) goals; and remove entrained gases from the cooling water.
PCLS removes heat from the TSV and neutron multiplier during startup and irradiation by circulating water in an upward direction [
]PROP/ECI along the exterior surfaces of the TSV and neutron multiplier walls. The subcritical assembly support structure (SASS) provides the shell side pressure boundary to direct the cooling water flow past the TSV and neutron multiplier. The PCLS is attached to the SASS upper and lower plenums.
PCLS is designed to remove a minimum of 580,000 British thermal units per hour (Btu/hr)
(170 kilowatts [kW]) of heat from each IU during full-power operation and during shutdown conditions when target solution is in the TSV.
PCLS is designed to maintain the pressure of the cooling water in the SASS higher than the internal pressure of the TSV. The TSV is designed and fabricated to prevent target solution from leaking into the PCLS. See Section 4a2.4 for additional information related to the TSV.
The PCLS cleanup side stream maintains system cooling water quality. The PCLS is designed to operate without corrosion inhibiting chemicals in the process fluid. The cleanup side stream can
Chapter 5 - Cooling Systems Primary Closed Loop Cooling System SHINE Medical Technologies 5a2.2-4 Rev. 1 Flow instrumentation is provided to monitor the flowrate of the PCLS cooling water. The PCLS is normally operated as a constant flowrate system during irradiation. However, the PCLS may operate with either one or both pumps operating.
If the PCLS temperature or flowrate is outside allowable limits, the TRPS initiates an IU Cell Safety Actuation, resulting in a transfer of the target solution to the TSV dump tank where it is cooled by natural convection to the light water pool.
Expansion tank level instrumentation provides indication of loss of cooling water, such as by evaporation or radiolysis. Addition of makeup cooling water is a manual operation. Expansion tank level instrumentation can also perform a leak detection function as described in Subsection5a2.2.6.
Conductivity instrumentation is provided to measure the conductivity of the PCLS water and monitor the performance of the PCLS cleanup side stream. Conductivity instrumentation can also perform a leak detection function as described in Subsection5a2.2.6.
The PCLS pressure, flow, temperature, and expansion tank level indications are available locally and in the control room. Sampling and analysis of cooling water from the PCLS is performed locally. System operational controls are in the control room.
5a2.2.4 RADIATION MONITORS AND SAMPLING The RVZ1e line ventilating the PCLS expansion tank headspace is equipped with radiation monitors as described in Subsection9a2.1.1. The RVZ1e radiation monitors are intended to detect leakage of target solution or fission product gases from the PSB or neutron multipliers. If radiation exceeding a predetermined setpoint is detected, the TRPS initiates an IU Cell Safety Actuation and the RVZ1e line is isolated.
Sampling and analysis of the water from the PCLS is performed to ensure that the water quality requirements are being maintained and contaminants are not present in the cooling water.
Maintaining water quality ensures functional and safe operation by reducing corrosion damage and scaling. See Table5a2.2-1 for water quality requirements. Sampling of cooling water for radiological contaminants is performed to detect possible leakage of target solution into the PSB.
5a2.2.5 PCLS INTERFACES The system interfaces of the PCLS are listed in Table5a2.2-3.
The PCLS cooling water is pumped through the PCLS heat exchanger, where the heat is transferred to the RPCS and subsequently transferred to the process chilled water system (PCHS), where it is dissipated to the environment.
The PCLS cooling water leaves the SCAS and enters the PCLS air separator, which allows entrained radiolytic gas to separate from the cooling water. Besides hydrogen and oxygen, the headspace contains air, water vapor, and small amounts of N-16 and argon-41 (Ar-41). An interface between the RVZ1e and the expansion tank allows radiolytic gases to be purged to RVZ1e, preventing the buildup of hydrogen gas. Ambient air from within the primary confinement boundary is drawn through a flame arrestor and filter for sweeping of the expansion tank headspace.
Chapter 5 - Cooling Systems Primary Closed Loop Cooling System SHINE Medical Technologies 5a2.2-7 Rev. 1 a) Commercially available equipment designed to standards satisfying system operation.
Table 5a2.2 PCLS Components
Component Functions Code/Standard PCLS heat exchanger Transfers heat from PCLS cooling loop to the RPCS ASME BPVC,Section VIII, Division 1 (ASME, 2010)
PCLS expansion tank Provides thermal expansion protection and pump head, and facilitates cooling loop level monitoring ASME BPVC Section VIII, Division 1 (ASME, 2010)
Piping components PCLS cooling loop piping ASME B31.3 (ASME, 2013)
Nitrogen-16 (N-16) delay tanks Allows for the decay of N-16 that is generated in the cooling water by neutron activation of oxygen and for the decay of the gaseous flow path from the PCLS air separator ASME B31.3 (ASME, 2013)
PCLS pumps Circulates PCLS cooling water through system components Note(a)
PCLS instrumentation Provides indication of PCLS operating parameters See Chapter7 for safety-related instrumentation See Note(a) for nonsafety-related instrumentation PCLS air separator Allows entrained radiolytic gas to leave the cooling water and enter into the expansion tank where it is vented to prevent the buildup of hydrogen in the system ASME BPVC Section VIII, Division 1 (ASME, 2010)
PCLS flame arrestor with filter Prevents the ignition of hydrogen in the PCLS expansion tank if RVZ1e flow through the expansion tank is lost Note(a)
PCLS deionizer bed Removes dissolved ions from the PCLS cooling water Note(a)
Chapter 5 - Cooling Systems Primary Closed Loop Cooling System SHINE Medical Technologies 5a2.2-8 Rev. 1 Table 5a2.2 PCLS System Interfaces
System Interface Description Radioisotope process cooling water system (RPCS)
The RPCS interfaces with each of the eight instances of PCLS inside the radiologically controlled area (RCA). Nonsafety-related manual isolation valves are located at the interface with PCLS.
Facility demineralized water system (FDWS)
The FDWS interfaces with each of the eight PCLS cooling loops inside the RCA. The FDWS interfaces with the PCLS downstream of a FDWS vacuum breaker. Nonsafety-related manual isolation valves are located at the interface with PCLS.
Subcritical assembly system (SCAS)
The SCAS interfaces with the PCLS in each of the eight light water pools located in the irradiation facility (IF).
Normal electrical power supply system (NPSS)
The NPSS provides power to PCLS process skid, including pumps and instrumentation, located inside the IF.
Uninterruptible electrical power supply system (UPSS)
The UPSS provides the PCLS safety-related instrumentation with electrical power during normal conditions and during and following design basis events.
TSV reactivity protection system (TRPS)
The PCLS provides instrumentation for the TRPS to monitor variables important to the safe operation of the PCLS. The TRPS provides controls to the PCLS components to perform safety actuations when monitored variables exceed predetermined limits.
Facility compressed airnitrogen handling system (FCANHS)
The FCANHS provides compressed nitrogen gas to the PCLS loop pneumatic control mechanisms located inside the IF.
Process integrated control system (PICS)
The PICS monitors and controls the PCLS process parameters, utilizing the instrumentation and controlled components within the IF.
Radiological ventilation zone 1 (RVZ1)
The RVZ1 provides an exhaust path from the headspace of each of the eight PCLS expansion tanks. The PCLS removes radiolytic gas from the cooling water and vents it to prevent combustible gas mixtures from forming.
Radiological ventilation zone 2 (RVZ2)
The RVZ2 provides an indirect source of makeup air into the PCLS expansion tanks via the supply air provided to the IF through the primary confinement.
Chapter 5 - Cooling Systems Primary Closed Loop Cooling System SHINE Medical Technologies 5a2.2-9 Rev. 0 Figure 5a2.2 Primary Closed Loop Cooling System Flow Diagram
Chapter 5 - Cooling Systems Primary Closed Loop Cooling System SHINE Medical Technologies 5a2.2-9 Rev. 1 Figure 5a2.2 Primary Closed Loop Cooling System Flow Diagram
Chapter 5 - Cooling Systems Radioisotope Process Facility Cooling System SHINE Medical Technologies 5a2.3-6 Rev. 1 Table 5a2.3 RPCS Interfaces (Sheet 1 of 2)
System Interface Description Primary closed loop cooling system (PCLS)
The RPCS interfaces with each of the eight PCLS cooling loops inside the RCA. Nonsafety-related manual isolation valves are located at the interface with PCLS.
TSV off-gas system (TOGS)
Interfaces at the TOGS cooling water supply and return connections inside the RCA to condense water vapor and remove heat from recombiner condensers and condenser-demisters. Nonsafety-related manual isolation valves are located at the interface with TOGS.
Molybdenum extraction and purification system (MEPS)
Interfaces at the evaporator supply and return connections inside the RCA to facilitate condensation of water vapor. Nonsafety-related manual isolation valves are located at the interface with MEPS.
Process vessel vent system (PVVS)
Interfaces at the supply and return connections of the PVVS cooler and condensers within the RPF section of the RCA to reduce the PVVS process temperature and relative humidity. Nonsafety-related manual isolation valves are located at the interface with PVVS.
Process chilled water system (PCHS)
Interfaces at the supply and return connections of the RPCS heat exchanger inside the RCA and transfers heat from the RPCS to the PCHS so it can be released to the environment exterior to the RCA boundary. Nonsafety-related manual isolation valves are located at the interface with PCHS.
Target solution preparation system (TSPS)
Interfaces at the supply and return connections of the TSPS reflux condensers inside the RCA to mitigate liquid loss during dissolution.
Nonsafety-related manualSupply and return isolation valves are located at the interface with TSPS.
Radiological ventilation Zone 1 recirculating cooling subsystem (RVZ1r)
Interfaces at the supply and return connections of the IU supplemental cooling system fan coil, exterior to the primary confinement boundary, inside the RCA. Nonsafety-related manual isolation valves are located at the interface with RVZ1r.
Radiological ventilation Zone 2 recirculating cooling subsystem (RVZ2r)
Interfaces at the supply and return connections of the recirculating unit fan coils inside the RCA. Nonsafety-related manual isolation valves are located at the interface with RVZ2r.
Facility demineralized water system (FDWS)
Interfaces upstream of the RPCS pumps inside the RCA to supply makeup water to the RPCS.
Neutron driver assembly system (NDAS)
Interfaces with each of the nine NDAS cooling cabinets within the RCA to remove heat from the independent NDAS cooling loops.
Chapter 5 - Cooling Systems Nitrogen-16 Control SHINE Medical Technologies 5a2.7-1 Rev. 1 5a2.7 NITROGEN-16 CONTROL Nitrogen-16 (N-16) is generated in the PCLS and light water pool by the neutron activation of oxygen. The N-16 control is provided by the primary closed loop cooling system (PCLS) delay tanks. As shown in Figure 5a2.2-1, onea liquid delay tank is located downstream of the air separator, in the PCLS cooling loop flow path, and the other is a gaseous delay tank located downstream of the PCLS expansion tank, inside the primary confinement boundary.
The N-16 delay tanks provides additional holdup time to allow for sufficient decay of N-16 prior to exiting the shielding to meet with as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) goals and the radiation protection program. In addition, to allowing a portion of the N-16 to decay, a reduction in shielding wall thickness is realized as well as a reduction in the PCLS equipment radiation tolerance requirements.
The PCLS uses an air separator to remove entrained gases from the cooling water flow path.
The PCLS air separators are vented to the headspace of the corresponding IU cell expansion tank inside the primary confinement boundary. The headspace of the PCLS expansion tank accepts separated gases, including N-16, and directs those gases to the gaseous delay tank, via vent lines through the primary confinement boundary, and into the radiological ventilation zone 1 exhaust (RVZ1e). Redundant safety-related isolation valves are provided on the flow path between the gaseous N-16 delay tank and the RVZ1e interface with the PCLS.The gas volumes of the expansion tank headspace and vent lines are sufficient to allow adequate decay of N-16 prior to the gases leaving the IU cell shielding.
Subsection11.1.1 provides a discussion of airborne and liquid radiation sources at the SHINE facility, including N-16.
Chapter 6 - Engineered Safety Features Summary Description SHINE Medical Technologies 6a2.1-4 Rev. 1 Table 6a2.1 Comparison of Unmitigated and Mitigated Radiological Doses for Select Irradiation Facility DBAs Representative DBA Unmitigated Public Dose (rem)
Mitigated Public Dose (rem)
Public TEDE Worker TEDE Worker Limiting Organ Public TEDE Worker TEDE Worker Limiting Organ Mishandling or Malfunction of Target Solution (Primary Confinement Boundary - IU Cell) 5.0E+00 4.1E+02 2.4E+03 6.5E-02 1.5E+00 3.0E+00 Mishandling or Malfunction of Equipment (Primary Confinement Boundary - TOGS Cell) 4.9E+00 4.0E+02 2.3E+03 2.3E-01 4.8E+00 2.8E+01 Facility-Specific Events (Tritium Confinement Boundary) 2.1E+00 2.5E+02 2.4E+02 3.34E-01 4.67.1E-02 4.46.9E-02
Chapter 6 - Engineered Safety Features Detailed Descriptions SHINE Medical Technologies 6a2.2-3 Rev. 1 Tritium in the IF is confined using active and passive features of the TPS. The TPS glovebox is a credited passive confinement barrier that encloses the isotope separation subsystem process equipment. The TPS glovebox is maintained at negative pressure relative to the TPS room and has a nitrogen atmosphere. The TPS glovebox provides confinement in the event of a breach in the TPS process equipment that results in a release of tritium from the isotope separation process equipment.
The ATIS header jacket and ATIS gloveboxes are a credited passive confinement barrier that encloses the ATIS header tritium lines and ATIS subsystem process equipment. The ATIS gloveboxes are maintained at negative pressure relative to the IF and have a nitrogen atmosphere. The ATIS header jacket and ATIS gloveboxes provide confinement in the event of a breach in the ATIS process equipment or ATIS header tritium lines that results in a release of tritium from the ATIS process equipment or ATIS header tritium lines.
The TPS glovebox is equipped with the glovebox stripper system (GBSS) which strips tritium from the nitrogen atmosphere during normal operation and from the process lines during maintenance. The GBSS process equipment exhausts to RVZ1e and is located in an air hood adjacent to the glovebox. The GBSS process equipment is part of the credited passive confinement boundary. The TPS process equipment other than the GBSS is not credited with confinement functions under accident conditions.
The TPS glovebox includes isolation valves on the nitrogen supply for the nitrogen atmosphere.
The TPS process equipment within the TPS glovebox has isolation valves on the process connections to the tritium supply header, the deuterium supply header, and the mixed gas return header. The TPS process equipment within the TPS glovebox also has isolation valves on the process evacuation lines that connect to the GBSS and the instrument nitrogen supply line. The GBSS process equipment has isolation valves on the connection to the ATIS glovebox exhaust and the exhaust to RVZ1e. These valves close automatically upon loss of power or receipt of a confinement isolation signal generated by the ESFAS.
When the isolation valves for a process line or glovebox close, the spread of radioactive material is limited to the glovebox plus the small amount between the glovebox and its isolation valves.
The liquid nitrogen supply and exhaust lines for the TPS equipment are credited to remain intact during a DBA and serve as a passive section of the tritium confinement boundary. Process piping outside the glovebox other than the GBSS piping to the isolation valves are not credited to remain intact during accident conditions to achieve confinement of tritium.
Upon detection of high TPS exhaust to facility stack tritium concentration or high TPS glovebox tritium concentration, the ESFAS automatically initiates a TPS isolation. The active components required to function to maintain the confinement barrier are transitioned to their deenergized (safe) state by the ESFAS. This includes process isolation valves, the GBSS RVZ1e isolation valves, and the RVZ2 dampers that isolate the TPS room from the IF general area. A description of the ESFAS and a complete listing of the active components that transition state with a TPS isolation are provided in Section 7.5.
In the event of a break in the process piping within the TPS glovebox, the release of tritium from the glovebox is uncontrolled for up to ten20 seconds until the isolation valves close. Long-term leakage and permeation of the confinement barrier result in migration of tritium out of the confinement and into the TPS room, IF, and environment. The facility accident analysis considers the effect of this air exchange in its evaluation of radiological consequences. The
Chapter 6 - Engineered Safety Features Summary Description SHINE Medical Technologies 6b.1-4 Rev. 1 Table 6b.1 Comparison of Unmitigated and Mitigated Radiological Doses for Select Radioisotope Production Facility DBAs Representative DBA Unmitigated Public Dose (rem)
Mitigated Public Dose (rem)
Public TEDE Worker TEDE Worker Limiting Organ Public TEDE Worker TEDE Worker Limiting Organ Critical Equipment Malfunction (Process Confinement Boundary - Supercell) 7.9E-01 5.2E+01 4.6E+02 1.16.8E-023 6.53.2E-01 5.52.9E+00 Critical Equipment Malfunction (Process Confinement Boundary - Below Grade) 7.6E-01 5.1E+01 4.4E+02 5.4E-03 4.0E-01 3.9E+00
Chapter 6 - Engineered Safety Features Summary Description SHINE Medical Technologies 6b.1-5 Rev. 0 Figure 6b.1 Radioisotope Production Facility Engineered Safety Features Block Diagram ESFAS Confinement Isolation Signal Supercell Ventilation Isolation (Supply and Exhaust)
Supercell - RPF General Area N2PS Valves Facility-Wide RVZ1 Isolation Dampers (RCA Boundary)
Facility Mezzanine Hot cell Isolation Valves Supercell - RPF General Area Supercell Confinement Supercell - RPF General Area VTS Safety Actuation Supercell - RPF General Area N2PS Piping Facility-wide PVVS Carbon Beds and Piping Supercell and Delay Bed Vaults Delay Bed Isolation Valves Delay Bed Vault PVVS Safety Exhaust Valves Facility Mezzanine Active I & C Systems Active Components Passive Com ponents PVVS Process Isolation Guard Bed Isolation Valves Supercell Production Facility Biological Shield Components RPF Process Confinement Boundary Combustible Gas M anagement
Chapter 6 - Engineered Safety Features Summary Description SHINE Medical Technologies 6b.1-5 Rev. 1 Figure 6b.1 Radioisotope Production Facility Engineered Safety Features Block Diagram ESFAS Confinement Isolation Signal Supercell Ventilation Isolation (Supply and Exhaust)
Supercell - RPF General Area N2PS Valves Facility-Wide RVZ1 Isolation Dampers (RCA Boundary)
Facility Mezzanine Hot cell Isolation Valves Supercell - RPF General Area Supercell Confinement Supercell - RPF General Area VTS Safety Actuation Supercell - RPF General Area N2PS Piping Facility-wide PVVS Carbon Beds and Piping Supercell and Delay Bed Vaults Delay Bed Isolation Valves Delay Bed Vault PVVS Safety Exhaust Valves Facility Mezzanine Active I & C Systems Active Components Passive Components PVVS Process Isolation Production Facility Biological Shield Components RPF Process Confinement Boundary Combustible Gas Management
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Chapter 6 - Engineered Safety Features Detailed Descriptions SHINE Medical Technologies 6b.2-1 Rev. 1 6b.2 DETAILED DESCRIPTIONS This section provides the details of the design, initiation, and operation of engineered safety features (ESFs) that are provided to mitigate the design basis accidents (DBAs) in the radioisotope production facility (RPF). The RPF DBAs, the ESFs required to mitigate the DBAs, and the location of the bases for these determinations are listed in Table6b.1-1.
6b.2.1 CONFINEMENT The confinement systems are designed to limit the release of radioactive material to uncontrolled areas during and after DBAs to mitigate the consequences to workers, the public, and the environment. The principal objective of the confinement systems is to protect on-site personnel, the public, and the environment. The second objective is to minimize the reliance on administrative or active engineering controls to provide a confinement system that is as simple and fail-safe as reasonably possible. Figure6b.1-1 provides an overview of the structures, systems, and components that provide RPF confinement safety functions.
A listing of the automatic isolation valves included in the confinement boundaries is in Section7.5.
6b.2.1.1 Supercell Confinement The supercell is a set of hot cells in which isotope extraction, purification, and packaging is performed, and gaseous waste is handled. The supercell provides shielding and confinement to protect the workers, members of the public, and the environment by confining the airborne radioactive materials during normal operation and in the event of a release. The supercell includes features to allow the import of target solution, consumables, and process equipment; transfer between adjacent cells; and export of final products, waste, spent process equipment, and samples for analysis in the laboratory. The export features of the supercell are integrated into the confinement boundary to allow export operations while maintaining confinement. The supercell is described in detail in Section4b.2.
Figure6b.2-1 provides a block diagram of the supercell confinement boundary. [
]PROP/ECI The hot cells are fitted with stainless steel boxes for confinement of materials and process equipment. The radiological ventilation zone 1 (RVZ1) draws air through each individual confinement box, drawing air from the general RPF area, to maintain negative pressure inside the confinement, minimizing release of radiological material to the facility. Filters and carbon adsorbers on the ventilation inlets and outlets control release of radioactive material to workers and the public. These are not credited in the accident analysis. RVZ1 is described in Section9a2.1.
The supercell ventilation exhaust ductwork is fitted with radiation monitoring instrumentation to detect off-normal releases to the confinement boxes. Upon indication of a release exceeding setpoints, isolation dampers or valves on both the inlet and outlet ducts isolate the hot cells from the ventilation system. Additionally, the actuation signal closes isolation valves on the molybdenum extraction and purification system (MEPS) heating loops and conducts a vacuum transfer system (VTS) safety actuation. The active components required to function to maintain
Chapter 6 - Engineered Safety Features Detailed Descriptions SHINE Medical Technologies 6b.2-3 Rev. 1 under accident conditions. If sufficient radioactive material reaches the radiation monitors in the RVZ1 exhaust duct, ESFAS will isolate the RVZ building supply and exhaust. The evaluated accident sequence for which the process confinement boundary is necessary is listed in Table6b.1-1 and discussed further in Section13b.2.
The requirements needed for process confinement boundary system operability, periodic surveillance, setpoints, and other specific requirements needed to ensure the functionality of the process confinement boundary are located in technical specifications.
6b.2.2 PROCESS VESSEL VENT ISOLATION The process vessel vent system (PVVS) captures or provides holdup for radioactive particulates, iodine, and noble gases generated within the RPF and primary system boundary. The system draws air from the process vessels through a series of processing components which remove the radioactive components by condensation, acid adsorption, mechanical filtration with high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters, and adsorption in carbon beds. Two sets of carbon beds are used; the guard beds located in the supercell, and the delay beds located in the carbon delay bed vault.
Fires may occur in the carbon guard and delay beds which result in the release of radioactive material into the downstream PVVS system, which leads to the facility ventilation system and the environment. The PVVS guard and delay beds are equipped with isolation valves at the inlet and the outlet that isolate the affected guard bed or group of delay beds from the system and extinguish the fire. The isolation valves also serve to prevent the release of radioactive material to the environment. The guard and delay beds are equipped with sensors to detect fires which provide indication to ESFAS. The isolation valves close within 30 seconds of the receipt of the actuation signal. The redundancy in the beds and the ability to isolate individual beds allows the PVVS to continue to operate following an isolation.
The evaluated accident sequence for which the PVVS isolation is necessary is listed in Table6b.1-1 and discussed further in Section13b.2.
The requirements to be specified in the technical specifications for system operability, periodic surveillance, setpoints, and other specific requirements needed to ensure the functionality of the PVVS isolations are located in Section7.5 and Section 9.6, which describes the ESFAS and the PVVS, respectively.
6b.2.3 COMBUSTIBLE GAS MANAGEMENT Hydrogen gas is produced by radiolysis in the target solution during and after irradiation. During normal operation, the PVVS removes radiolytic hydrogen and radioactive gases generated within the RPF and primary system boundary. The PVVS is described in detail in Section9b.6. If PVVS becomes unavailable, the buildup of hydrogen gas is limited using the combustible gas management system, which uses the nitrogen purge system (N2PS), process system piping, and the PVVS to establish an inert gas flow through the process vessels.
The principle objective of the combustible gas management system is to prevent the conditions required for a hydrogen deflagration in the gas spaces in the RPF process tanks.
Nuclear Criticality Safety in the Chapter 6 - Engineered Safety Features Radioisotope Production Facility SHINE Medical Technologies 6b.3-16 Rev. 1 The lift tanks are capable of drawing solution from the TSSS, RLWS, subcritical assembly system (SCAS), and the RDS for various purposes and supply solution to the TSSS, RLWS, RLWI, SCAS, and MEPS. The tanks are supplied with vacuum through associated vacuum pumps and valves which regulate and maintain vacuum pressure throughout the system.
Vacuum is broken in the lift tanks by venting the tank through a three-way valve which isolates the vacuum header and allows inflow from radiological ventilation zone 2 (RVZ2). Breaking vacuum in a lift tank allows gravity drain of its contents to the desired destination in one of the connected systems. Note that two-way transfers are not possible for the MEPS, RLWI, and RDS.
VTS can only supply to MEPS and RLWI, and it can only remove target solution from the RDS.
Criticality Safety Basis The NCSE for the VTS shows that the entire process will remain subcritical under normal and credible abnormal conditions.
The VTS components which contain target solution are designed with favorable geometry for the most reactive concentration. The components individually have geometry within the evaluated single parameter limits for target solution. In cases where favorable geometry components are in proximity to each other, the interaction between the components is evaluated and controlled.
The VTS components are designed to prevent leaks of solution. Vaults or hot cells containing the VTS tanks or associated piping are equipped with drip trays and adequately sized drains that drain to RDS. The vacuum buffer tank is equipped with a demister that separates potentially entrained liquid in the vapor, which prevents transfer of target solution to downstream components.
The inadvertent transfer of solution to a non-fissile system requires application of the DCP to prevent criticality accidents. The VTS piping design and features prevents transfer of target solution to non-favorable geometry components within the VTS. The vacuum lift tanksheaders are equipped with level controlsliquid detection that stops transfers upon detection of high levelliquid. Additionally, a ball-check valve is located between the vacuum lift tanks and the vacuum headerbuffer tank (VTS knockout pot) to prevent high level transfer of solution to the vacuum buffer tank.
6b.3.2.6 Process Vessel Vent System The PVVS is an off-gas management system for the process equipment which contains radioactive liquids with the potential for excessive hydrogen production in the IXP system, MEPS, RLWI, RLWS, TSSS, and VTS. The PVVS also periodically accepts gas from the target solution vessel (TSV) off-gas system (TOGS). The PVVS supplies ventilation flow and receives radioactive gas from the tanks and other equipment in these systems and processes it through a series of filters, delay beds, and blowers before it is released from the facility stack. The system does not normally contain significant fissile material.
Criticality Safety Basis The NCSE for the PVVS shows that the entire process will remain subcritical under normal and credible abnormal conditions. There are no identified criticality safety controls for the PVVS.
Inadvertent transfer of target solution into the PVVS is prevented in upstream systems.
Nuclear Criticality Safety in the Chapter 6 - Engineered Safety Features Radioisotope Production Facility SHINE Medical Technologies 6b.3-17 Rev. 1 6b.3.2.7 Uranium Receipt and Storage System The URSS receives and stores enriched uranium oxide and metal and converts uranium metal into oxide for use in the TSPS. A process overview is provided in Figure 6b.3-6.
Activities for the receipt and measurements of uranium and the conversion from metal to oxide occur inside the URSS glovebox. Upon receipt, the convenience cans are removed from the shipping container and imported into the glovebox for measurement and repackaging into metal or oxide storage cans, as appropriate. Once the metal or oxide cans are appropriately loaded, they are moved to the appropriate storage rack via a transfer cart. For conversion activities, a metal can is moved from the storage rack via the transfer cart to the glovebox where it is converted using specified time and temperature constraints to the appropriate uranium oxide.
The oxide is then measured, and an oxide can is loaded with the product which is then transferred to the oxide storage rack via the transfer cart. Oxide may also be transferred to the TSPS via the transfer cart for processing into solution.
Criticality Safety Basis The NCSE for the URSS shows that the entire process will remain subcritical under normal and credible abnormal conditions.
Receipt and handling of shipping containers which contain uranium is in accordance with the approved safety analysis for packaging associated with each container. Areas in which intact shipping containers are stored are controlled by limiting the aggregate criticality safety index for the storage area. Administrative controls are used to ensure the criticality safety index limits are not exceeded.
Under normal process conditions, the mass of uranium metal and oxide areis limited to quantities below evaluated safe subcritical limits for moderated material. Moderators in the room and the glovebox are controlled to establish double contingency protection for the system. For a criticality to occur under normal conditions, a non-credible quantity of metal or oxide would need to be introduced into the system or mass limits would need to be exceeded concurrent with the introduction of a significant quantity of moderator. Moderator exclusions featurescontrols and the glovebox itself prevent the introductionuncontrolled intrusion of moderators into the URSS room and glovebox. The furnace and cooling lines are seismically qualified with isolation valves upstream and downstream of the furnaceareas containing exposed fissile material.
Introduction of high-enrichment uranium requires application of the DCP to prevent criticality accidents. SUpon receipt of uranium, examination of the supplier certification is verified to ensureused to confirm the condition of received material prior to import of material to the glovebox. Confirmation of material form and enrichment is within limits. Additionally, batchby sample analysis verifies the uranium enrichment is withinare used to ensure that appropriate limits are applied.
Accumulation of excess mass requires application of the DCP to prevent criticality accidents. The number of canisters within the glovebox is limited undermass of uranium in-and out-of-storage is administratively controlled. Additionally,Material contained within sealed shipping containers, the glovebox, and the storage racks is considered to be in-storage and is subject to specific limits for each of these areas. Material out-of-storage is administratively limited to a value significantly below the single-parameter subcritical limit. Controls on the use and transport of moderator
Nuclear Criticality Safety in the Chapter 6 - Engineered Safety Features Radioisotope Production Facility SHINE Medical Technologies 6b.3-18 Rev. 1 exclusion featuress within the room are used to prevent the introduction of external moderatorsinteraction of material out-of-storage with moderating materials. HEPA filters, which are favorable geometry within single parameter limits, prevent the accumulation of oxide outside of the glovebox or in downstream ventilation.
Upon receipt of uranium, supplier certification is verified to be within moisture limits. Additionally, a sample analysis of received oxide verifies the moisture of the fissile material is within moisture limits. Holdup of fissile material in the process is controlled in the glovebox and furnace by tracking mass and periodic cleanout of the glovebox and furnace based on the throughput of uranium. Cleanout of fissile material holdup is independently verified prior to restarting operations. During maintenance activities, fissile material is removed prior to maintenance and moderators are removed prior to restarting operations and. Confirmation of fissile material and moderator removal is performed under supervisory oversight.
Incomplete oxidation of metal requires application of the DCP to prevent criticality accidents. The furnace oxidation steps are administratively controlled to ensure adequate oxidation.
Additionally, sample analysis following oxidation verifies oxide powder content and moisture content of the oxide. Operators visually confirm that only uranium oxide is added to an oxide canister.
Excess mass added to an oxide or metal canister requires application of the DCP to prevent criticality accidents. Supplier certification is verified that the mass of metal in a canister is within limits. Additionally, operators weigh the mass of metal added to a metal canister. Uranium oxide, either from a received canister or from the furnace, is metered onto a weigh tray to ensure the mass is within limits. Additionally, the uranium oxide transferred from the weigh tray to an oxide canister is weighed to verify the mass in the oxide canister is within limits.
The URSS oxide storage rack and metal storage rack are favorable geometry and maintain the appropriate storage cell size. The maximum number of storage cells is significantly below the allowable number of storage cells based on the mass per storage canister. Transfers from the URSS glovebox to themass in each storage racks is performed one canister at a time using a transfer cart that is administratively controlled. Movement of fissile material out-of-storage is maintainsed at an appropriate separation distance to other fissile material in storage to prevent unfavorable interaction.
6b.3.2.8 Radioactive Drain System The RDS collects overflows and leakage of target solution from systems in the RPF and directs it to two favorable-geometry tanks in below grade vaults. A process overview is provided in Figure 6b.3-7.
The system is comprised of drip pans, piping, and collection tanks. The collection tanks are normally maintained empty and are equipped with instrumentation to alert personnel of an abnormal condition. The system operates by gravity drain, where overflows and leakage flow through installed piping directly to the RDS hold tanks. The hold tank contents can be mixed, sampled, and withdrawn through the VTS to the TSSS or RLWS as appropriate.
Criticality Safety Basis
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Nuclear Criticality Safety in the Chapter 6 - Engineered Safety Features Radioisotope Production Facility SHINE Medical Technologies 6b.3-26 Rev. 0 Figure 6b.3 Target Solution Preparation System Overview
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Nuclear Criticality Safety in the Chapter 6 - Engineered Safety Features Radioisotope Production Facility SHINE Medical Technologies 6b.3-26 Rev. 1 Figure 6b.3 Target Solution Preparation System Overview
Nuclear Criticality Safety in the Chapter 6 - Engineered Safety Features Radioisotope Production Facility SHINE Medical Technologies 6b.3-28 Rev. 0 Figure 6b.3 Uranium Receipt and Storage System Overview ES-3100 Shipping Container Convenience Cans Weigh (Metal)
Furnace Tray Furnace Weigh (Oxide)
Tare (Tray)
Weigh (Oxide)
Load Storage Can Tare (Can)
Weigh (Loaded Can)
Export to Storage Rack Import to Glove Box Pass to Oxide Glove Box Import to Glove Box Tare (Funnel)
Oxide Metal Metal Side Oxide Side Uranium Handling Glovebox Tare (Funnel)
Load Storage Can Tare (Can)
Weigh (Loaded Can)
Export to Storage Rack Tare (Tray)
Nuclear Criticality Safety in the Chapter 6 - Engineered Safety Features Radioisotope Production Facility SHINE Medical Technologies 6b.3-28 Rev. 1 Figure 6b.3 Uranium Receipt and Storage System Overview Repackage to Oxide Storage Canister Oxide Metal Uranium Handling Glovebox Receive Shipping Package Remove Canisters Import Oxide Canister Import Metal Canister Repackage to Metal Storage Canister Repackage to Metal Storage Canister Export Oxide Storage Canister Export Metal Storage Canister Storage in Racks Storage in Racks Thermal Oxidation
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems List of Figures LIST OF FIGURES Number Title SHINE Medical Technologies 7-v Rev. 1 7.1-1 Instrumentation and Control System Architecture 7.1-2 Target Solution Vessel Reactivity Protection System Architecture 7.1-3 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Architecture 7.2-1 HIPS Platform Timing 7.2-2 TRPS and ESFAS Programmable Logic Lifecycle Process 7.3-1 Process Integrated Control System Interfaces 7.4-1 TRPS Logic Diagrams 7.4-2 TRPS Mode State Diagram 7.5-1 ESFAS Logic Diagrams 7.5-2 Extraction Hot Cell 7.5-3 Carbon Guard Bed Physical Configuration 7.5-43 Vacuum Transfer System 7.5-54 Radiologically Controlled Area Isolation 7.6-1 Facility Control Room Layout 7.6-2 Status Indication Panels 7.6-3 Maintenance Workstation 7.7-1 Effluent Monitor Locations
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Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-1 Rev. 1 7.5 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM 7.5.1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) is a three-division safety-related instrumentation and control (I&C) system that performs various control and actuation functions credited by the SHINE safety analysis as required to prevent the occurrence or mitigate the consequences of design basis events within the SHINE facility. The ESFAS provides sense, command, and execute functions necessary to maintain the facility confinement strategy and provides process actuation functions required to shutdown processes and maintain processes in a safe condition. The ESFAS also provides nonsafety-related system status and measured process variable values to the facility process integrated control system (PICS) for viewing, recording, and trending.
The ESFAS monitors variables important to the safety functions for confinement of radiation and tritium within the irradiation facility (IF) and the radioisotope production facility (RPF) and for criticality safety to perform the following functions:
Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA) Isolation Supercell Isolation Carbon Guard Bed Isolation Guard Bed Misalignment Actuation Carbon Delay Bed Isolation Vacuum Transfer System (VTS) Safety Actuation Tritium Purification System (TPS) Isolation Irradiation Unit (IU) Cell Nitrogen Purge RPF Nitrogen Purge Molybdenum Extraction and Purification System (MEPS) [
]PROP/ECI Isolation Extraction Column Alignment Actuation Iodine and Xenon Purification and Packaging (IXP) Alignment Actuation Dissolution Tank Isolation The ESFAS monitors the IF and the RPF continually throughout the operation of processes within the main production facility, via the use of radiation monitoring and other instrumentation.
Interlocks and bypass logic necessary for operation are implemented within the ESFAS. If at any point a monitored variable exceeds its predetermined limits, the ESFAS automatically initiates the associated safety function. ESFAS logic diagrams are provided in Figure7.5-1 and the general architecture of the ESFAS is provided in Figure7.1-3.
7.5.2 DESIGN CRITERIA The SHINE design criteria are described in Section3.1. Table3.1-1 shows the SHINE design criteria applicable to the ESFAS.
7.5.2.1 Access Control ESFAS Criterion 1 - The ESFAS shall require a key or combination authentication input at the control console to prevent unauthorized use of the ESFAS.
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-3 Rev. 1 7.5.2.3 General Instrumentation and Control Requirements ESFAS Criterion 14 - The ESFAS safety functions shall perform and remain functional during normal operation and during and following a design basis event.
ESFAS Criterion 15 - Manual controls of ESFAS actuation components shall be implemented downstream of the digital I&C portions of the safety system.
7.5.2.4 Single Failure ESFAS Criterion 16 - The ESFAS shall be designed to perform its protective functions after experiencing a single random active failure in nonsafety control systems or in the ESFAS, and such failure shall not prevent the ESFAS and credited redundant passive control components from performing itsthe intended functions or prevent safe shutdown of an IU cell.
ESFAS Criterion 17 - The ESFAS shall be designed such that no single failure can cause the failure of more than one redundant component.
ESFAS Criterion 18 - The ESFAS shall be designed so that no single failure within the instrumentation or power sources concurrent with failures as a result of a design basis event should prevent operators from being presented the information necessary to determine the safety status of the facility following the design basis event.
7.5.2.5 Independence ESFAS Criterion 19 - Interconnections among ESFAS safety divisions shall not adversely affect the functions of the ESFAS.
ESFAS Criterion 20 - A logical or software malfunction of any interfacing nonsafety systems shall not affect the functions of the ESFAS.
ESFAS Criterion 21 - The ESFAS shall be designed with physical, electrical, and communications independence of the ESFAS both between the ESFAS channels and between the ESFAS and nonsafety-related systems to ensure that the safety functions required during and following any design basis event can be accomplished.
ESFAS Criterion 22 - Physical separation and electrical isolation shall be used to maintain the independence of ESFAS circuits and equipment among redundant safety divisions or with nonsafety systems so that the safety functions required during and following any design basis event can be accomplished.
ESFAS Criterion 23 - The ESFAS shall be designed such that no communication - within a single safety channel, between safety channels, and between safety and nonsafety systems -
adversely affects the performance of required safety functions.
ESFAS Criterion 24 - ESFAS data communications protocols shall meet the performance requirements of all supported systems.
ESFAS Criterion 25 - The timing of ESFAS data communications shall be deterministic.
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-11 Rev. 1 7.5.3.1.14 Carbon Guard Bed 1 Isolation Carbon Guard Bed 1 Isolation initiates the following safety functions:
Energize PVVS carbon guard bed 1 inlet isolation valve Energize PVVS carbon guard bed 1 outlet isolation valve Energize PVVS carbon guard bed bypass valve Deenergize PVVS carbon guard bed 2 inlet isolation valve Deenergize PVVS carbon guard bed 2 outlet isolation valve The ESFAS initiates a Carbon Guard Bed 1 Isolation based on the following variable:
High carbon guard bed 1 temperature A representation of the Carbon Guard Bed 1 Isolation is provided in Figure7.5-3.
7.5.3.1.15 Carbon Guard Bed 2 Isolation Carbon Guard Bed 2 Isolation initiates the following safety functions:
Energize PVVS carbon guard bed 2 inlet isolation valve Energize PVVS carbon guard bed 2 outlet isolation valve Energize PVVS carbon guard bed bypass valve Deenergize PVVS carbon guard bed 1 inlet isolation valve Deenergize PVVS carbon guard bed 1 outlet isolation valve The ESFAS initiates a Carbon Guard Bed 2 Isolation based on the following variable:
High carbon guard bed 2 temperature A representation of the Carbon Guard Bed 2 Isolation is provided in Figure7.5-3.
7.5.3.1.16 Guard Bed Misalignment Actuation Guard Bed Misalignment Actuation initiates the following safety functions:
Energize PVVS carbon guard bed bypass valve Deenergize PVVS carbon guard bed 1 inlet isolation valve Deenergize PVVS carbon guard bed 1 outlet isolation valve Deenergize PVVS carbon guard bed 2 inlet isolation valves Deenergize PVVS carbon guard bed 2 outlet isolation valve The ESFAS initiates a Guard Bed Misalignment Actuation if an isolation valve is fully closed in both carbon guard beds:
PVVS carbon guard bed 1 inlet isolation valve OR PVVS carbon guard bed 1 outlet isolation valve fully closed, AND
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-12 Rev. 1 PVVS carbon guard bed 2 inlet isolation valve OR PVVS carbon guard bed 2 outlet isolation valve fully closed.
A representation of the Guard Bed Misalignment Actuation is provided in Figure7.5-3.
7.5.3.1.17 Carbon Delay Bed Group 1 Isolation Carbon Delay Bed Group 1 Isolation initiates the following safety functions:
Energize PVVS carbon delay bed group 1 three-way valves Energize PVVS carbon delay bed 1 inlet isolation valve Energize PVVS carbon delay bed group 1 outlet isolation valves The ESFAS initiates a Carbon Delay Bed Group 1 Isolation based on the following variables:
High carbon delay bed group 1 exhaust carbon monoxide 7.5.3.1.18 Carbon Delay Bed Group 2 Isolation Carbon Delay Bed Group 2 Isolation initiates the following safety functions:
Energize PVVS carbon delay bed group 2 three-way valves Energize PVVS carbon delay bed 2 inlet isolation valve Energize PVVS carbon delay bed group 2 outlet isolation valves The ESFAS initiates a Carbon Delay Bed Group 2 Isolation based on the following variables:
High carbon delay bed group 2 exhaust carbon monoxide 7.5.3.1.19 Carbon Delay Bed Group 3 Isolation Carbon Delay Bed Group 3 Isolation initiates the following safety functions:
Energize PVVS carbon delay bed group 3 three-way valves Energize PVVS carbon delay bed 3 inlet isolation valve Energize PVVS carbon delay bed group 3 outlet isolation valves The ESFAS initiates a Carbon Delay Bed Group 3 Isolation based on the following variables:
High carbon delay bed group 3 exhaust carbon monoxide 7.5.3.1.20 Carbon Delay Bed 4 Isolation Carbon Delay Bed 4 Isolation initiates the following safety functions:
Energize PVVS carbon delay bed 4 three-way valve Energize PVVS carbon delay bed 4 inlet isolation valve Energize PVVS carbon delay bed 4 outlet isolation valves
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-13 Rev. 1 The ESFAS initiates a Carbon Delay Bed 4 Isolation based on the following variables:
High carbon delay bed 4 exhaust carbon monoxide 7.5.3.1.21 Carbon Delay Bed 5 Isolation Carbon Delay Bed 5 Isolation initiates the following safety functions:
Energize PVVS carbon delay bed 5 three-way valve Energize PVVS carbon delay bed 5 inlet isolation valve Energize PVVS carbon delay bed 5 outlet isolation valves The ESFAS initiates a Carbon Delay Bed 5 Isolation based on the following variables:
High carbon delay bed 5 exhaust carbon monoxide 7.5.3.1.22 Carbon Delay Bed 6 Isolation Carbon Delay Bed 6 Isolation initiates the following safety functions:
Energize PVVS carbon delay bed 6 three-way valve Energize PVVS carbon delay bed 6 inlet isolation valve Energize PVVS carbon delay bed 6 outlet isolation valves The ESFAS initiates a Carbon Delay Bed 6 Isolation based on the following variables:
High carbon delay bed 6 exhaust carbon monoxide 7.5.3.1.23 Carbon Delay Bed 7 Isolation Carbon Delay Bed 7 Isolation initiates the following safety functions:
Energize PVVS carbon delay bed 7 three-way valve Energize PVVS carbon delay bed 7 inlet isolation valve Energize PVVS carbon delay bed 7 outlet isolation valves The ESFAS initiates a Carbon Delay Bed 7 Isolation based on the following variables:
High carbon delay bed 7 exhaust carbon monoxide 7.5.3.1.24 Carbon Delay Bed 8 Isolation Carbon Delay Bed 8 Isolation initiates the following safety functions:
Energize PVVS carbon delay bed 8 three-way valve Energize PVVS carbon delay bed 8 inlet isolation valve Energize PVVS carbon delay bed 8 outlet isolation valves
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-14 Rev. 1 The ESFAS initiates a Carbon Delay Bed 8 Isolation based on the following variables:
High carbon delay bed 8 exhaust carbon monoxide 7.5.3.1.25 VTS Safety Actuation VTS Safety Actuation Isolation initiates the following safety functions:
Deenergize VTS vacuum transfer pump 1 breakers Deenergize VTS vacuum transfer pump 2 breakers Deenergize VTS vacuum transfer pump 3 breakers Deenergize VTS vacuum break valves MEPS A extraction column wash supply valve MEPS A extraction column eluent valve MEPS A [
]PROP/ECI wash supply valve MEPS A [
]PROP/ECI eluent valve MEPS B extraction column wash supply valve MEPS B extraction column eluent valve MEPS B [
]PROP/ECI wash supply valve MEPS B [
]PROP/ECI eluent valve MEPS C extraction column wash supply valve MEPS C extraction column eluent valve MEPS C [
]PROP/ECI wash supply valve MEPS C [
]PROP/ECI eluent valve IXP recovery column wash supply valve IXP recovery column eluent valve IXP [
]PROP/ECI wash supply valve IXP [
]PROP/ECI eluent valve IXP FNHS supply valve IXP liquid nitrogen supply valve The ESFAS initiates a VTS Safety Actuation based on the following variables or safety actuations:
VTS vacuum header liquid detection switch signal VTS extraction lower lift tank A liquid detection switch signal VTS extraction lower lift tank B liquid detection switch signal VTS extraction lower lift tank C liquid detection switch signal VTS extraction lower lift tank D liquid detection switch signal VTS extraction upper lift tank A1 liquid detection switch signal VTS extraction upper lift tank A2 liquid detection switch signal VTS extraction upper lift tank B1 liquid detection switch signal VTS extraction upper lift tank B2 liquid detection switch signal VTS extraction upper lift tank C1 liquid detection switch signal VTS extraction upper lift tank C2 liquid detection switch signal TSV fill lift tank 1 liquid detection switch signal TSV fill lift tank 2 liquid detection switch signal TSV fill lift tank 3 liquid detection switch signal TSV fill lift tank 4 liquid detection switch signal TSV fill lift tank 5 liquid detection switch signal Proprietary Information - Withheld from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390(a)(4)
Export Controlled Information - Withheld from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390(a)(3)
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-15 Rev. 1 TSV fill lift tank 6 liquid detection switch signal TSV fill lift tank 7 liquid detection switch signal TSV fill lift tank 8 liquid detection switch signal Target solution storage lift tank liquid detection switch signal Uranium liquid waste lift tank liquid detection switch signal RDS lift tank liquid detection switch signal RDS liquid detection switch signal Supercell Area 1 Isolation Supercell Area 2 Isolation Supercell Area 6 Isolation Supercell Area 7 Isolation RCA Isolation Facility master operating permissive A representation of the VTS Safety Actuation is provided in Figure7.5-3.
7.5.3.1.26 TPS Isolation TPS Isolation initiates the following safety functions:
Deenergize accelerator tritium interface system (ATIS) header glovebox stripper system (GBSS) isolation valves Deenergize ATIS header GBSS bypass isolation valves Deenergize GBSS RVZ isolation valves Deenergize ATIS header return line isolation valves Deenergize TPS process evacuation header isolation valves Deenergize ATIS header deuterium supply isolation valves Deenergize storage and separation system GBSS raffinate isolation valves Deenergize ATIS header tritium supply isolation valves Deenergize ATIS glovebox exhaust header isolation valves Deenergize TPS process evacuation GBSS isolation valves Deenergize TPS glovebox nitrogen supply valves Deenergize RVZ TPS ventilation dampers The ESFAS initiates a TPS Isolation based on the following variables or safety actuation:
High TPS exhaust to facility stack tritium concentration High TPS glovebox tritium concentration RCA Isolation Facility master operating permissive 7.5.3.1.27 IU Cell Nitrogen Purge IU Cell Nitrogen Purge transitions the nitrogen purge system (N2PS) IU cell header valves to their deenergized state.
The ESFAS also provides the target solution vessel (TSV) reactivity protection system (TRPS) for each IU cell with an actuation signal to initiate an IU Cell Nitrogen purge within the TRPS.
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-16 Rev. 1 The ESFAS initiates an IU Cell Nitrogen Purge based on the following variables:
UPSS loss of external power TRPS IU cell 1 nitrogen purge signal TRPS IU cell 2 nitrogen purge signal TRPS IU cell 3 nitrogen purge signal TRPS IU cell 4 nitrogen purge signal TRPS IU cell 5 nitrogen purge signal TRPS IU cell 6 nitrogen purge signal TRPS IU cell 7 nitrogen purge signal TRPS IU cell 8 nitrogen purge signal 7.5.3.1.28 RPF Nitrogen Purge RPF Nitrogen Purge initiates the following safety functions:
Deenergize PVVS blower bypass valves Deenergize radioactive liquid waste immobilization (RLWI) PVVS isolation valve Deenergize PVVS carbon guard bed bypass valves Deenergize N2PS RPF header valves Deenergize N2PS RVZ2 north header valves Deenergize N2PS RVZ2 south header valves The ESFAS initiates an RPF Nitrogen Purge based on the following variable:
Low PVVS flow 7.5.3.1.29 RCA Isolation RCA Isolation initiates the following safety functions:
Deenergize RVZ1 exhaust isolation dampers Deenergize RVZ2 exhaust isolation dampers Deenergize RVZ2 supply train 1 isolation dampers Deenergize RVZ2 supply train 2 isolation dampers Deenergize RVZ3 supply isolation dampers shipping/receiving IF Deenergize RVZ3 supply isolation dampers shipping/receiving RPF Deenergize RVZ3 supply isolation dampers main RCA ingress/egress Deenergize RVZ3 supply isolation dampers RPF emergency exit Deenergize RVZ3 supply isolation dampers IF emergency exit Deenergize RVZ3 exhaust isolation dampers IF emergency exit Deenergize RVZ1 exhaust train 1 blower breakers Deenergize RVZ1 exhaust train 2 blower breakers Deenergize RVZ2 exhaust train 1 blower breakers Deenergize RVZ2 exhaust train 2 blower breakers Deenergize RVZ2 supply train 1 blower breakers Deenergize RVZ2 supply train 2 blower breakers Supercell Area 1 Isolation Supercell Area 2 Isolation Supercell Area 3 Isolation
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-17 Rev. 1 Supercell Area 4 Isolation Supercell Area 5 Isolation Supercell Area 6 Isolation Supercell Area 7 Isolation Supercell Area 8 Isolation Supercell Area 9 Isolation Supercell Area 10 Isolation VTS Safety Actuation TPS Isolation The ESFAS initiates an RCA Isolation based on the following variables:
High RVZ1 RCA exhaust radiation High RVZ2 RCA exhaust radiation A representation of the RCA Isolation is provided in Figure7.5-4.
7.5.3.1.30 Extraction Column A Alignment Actuation Extraction Column A Alignment Actuation initiates the following safety functions:
Deenergize MEPS area A upper three-way valve Deenergize MEPS area A lower three-way valve Deenergize MEPS A extraction column eluent valve The ESFAS initiates the Extraction Column A Alignment Actuation based on both of the following inputs being active:
MEPS area A upper three-way valve supplying position indication MEPS area A lower three-way valve supplying position indication 7.5.3.1.31 Extraction Column B Alignment Actuation Extraction Column B Alignment Actuation initiates the following safety functions:
Deenergize MEPS area B upper three-way valve Deenergize MEPS area B lower three-way valve Deenergize MEPS B extraction column eluent valve The ESFAS initiates the Extraction Column B Alignment Actuation based on both of the following inputs being active:
MEPS area B upper three-way valve supplying position indication MEPS area B lower three-way valve supplying position indication 7.5.3.1.32 Extraction Column C Alignment Actuation Extraction Column C Alignment Actuation initiates the following safety functions:
Deenergize MEPS area C upper three-way valve
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-18 Rev. 1 Deenergize MEPS area C lower three-way valve Deenergize MEPS C extraction column eluent valve The ESFAS initiates the Extraction Column C Alignment Actuation based on both of the following inputs being active:
MEPS area C upper three-way valve supplying position indication MEPS area C lower three-way valve supplying position indication 7.5.3.1.33 IXP Alignment Actuation Iodine and Xenon Purification and Packaging (IXP) Alignment Actuation initiates the following safety functions:
Deenergize IXP upper three-way valve Deenergize IXP lower three-way valve Deenergize IXP recovery column eluent valve The ESFAS initiates the IXP Alignment Actuation based on both of the following inputs being active:
IXP upper three-way valve supplying position indication IXP lower three-way valve supplying position indication 7.5.3.1.34 Dissolution Tank Isolation Dissolution Tank Isolation initiates the following safety functions:
Deenergize target solution preparation system (TSPS) radioisotope process facility cooling system (RPCS) supply cooling valves Deenergize TSPS RPCS return cooling valve Deenergize RVZ2 TSPS supply damper Deenergize RVZ1 TSPS exhaust damper The ESFAS initiates the Dissolution Tank Isolation based on the following input being active:
High TSPS dissolution tank 1 level switch signal High TSPS dissolution tank 2 level switch signal 7.5.3.2 ESFAS Monitored Variables Table7.5-1 identifies the specific variables that provide input to the ESFAS and includes the instrument range for covering normal and accident conditions, the accuracy for each variable, the analytical limit, and the response time of the sensor element.
7.5.3.3 Operating Conditions The ESFAS control and logic functions operate inside of the facility control room where the environment is mild and not exposed to the irradiation process. However, the cables for the ESFAS are routed through the radiologically controlled area to the process areas. The routed
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-19 Rev. 1 The environmental conditions for ESFAS components are outlined in Table 7.2-1 through Table 7.2-3. The facility heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems are relied upon to maintain the temperature and humidity parameters in these areas. The facility HVAC systems are described in Section 9a2.1.
7.5.4 DESIGN ATTRIBUTES 7.5.4.1 Access Control A detailed description of access control is provided in Subsection 7.2.5.
7.5.4.2 Software Requirements Development A detailed description of the development of software requirements is provided in Subsection 7.2.6.
7.5.4.3 General Instrumentation and Control Requirements The ESFAS is powered from the uninterruptible electrical power supply system (UPSS), which provides a reliable source of power to maintain the ESFAS functional during normal operation and during and following a design basis event. The UPSS is designed to provide power to the ESFAS controls for six hours after a loss of off-site power. The UPSS is described in Section 8a2.2.
The actuation and priority logic (APL) portions within an equipment interface module (EIM) support the implementation of different actuation methods. The APL is implemented using discrete components and is not vulnerable to a software common cause failure (CCF). Having the capability for hardwired signals into each EIM supports the capability for additional and diverse actuation means from automated actuation. As an example, a division of APL circuits may receive inputs automatically from the programmable logic portion of the ESFAS, inputs from manual controls in the facility control room, and input signals from a nonsafety control system.
Both the manual controls and nonsafety control system inputs come individually into the APL and are downstream of the programmable logic portion of the ESFAS architecture as shown in Figure 7.1-3.
7.5.4.4 Single Failure The ESFAS consists of three divisions of input processing and trip determination and two divisions of actuation logic (see Figure 7.1-2) arranged so that no single failure can prevent a safety actuation when requiredwithin the ESFAS results in the loss of the protective function.
The only nonsafety inputs into the ESFAS are those from the PICS for controls. The nonsafety control signals from the PICS are implemented through a hardwired parallel interface that requires the PICS to send a binary address associated to the output state of the EIM along with a mirrored complement address. The mirrored complement address prevents any single incorrectly presented bit from addressing the wrong EIM output state. To prevent the PICS from inadvertently presenting a valid address, the ESFAS contains a safety-related enable nonsafety switch that controls when the hardwired parallel interface within the APL is active, thus controlling when the PICS inputs are allowed to pass through the input circuitry and for use in the priority logic within the APL. When the enable nonsafety switch is not active, the nonsafety-related
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-20 Rev. 1 The only nonsafety inputs into the ESFAS are those from the PICS for controls. The nonsafety control signals from the PICS are implemented through a hardwired parallel interface that requires the PICS to send a binary address associated to the output state of the EIM along with a mirrored complement address. The mirrored complement address prevents any single incorrectly presented bit from addressing the wrong EIM output state. To prevent the PICS from inadvertently presenting a valid address, the ESFAS contains a safety-related enable nonsafety switch that controls when the hardwired parallel interface within the APL is active, thus controlling when the PICS inputs are allowed to pass through the input circuitry and for use in the priority logic within the APL. When the enable nonsafety switch is not active, the nonsafety-related control signal is ignored. If the enable nonsafety is active, and no automatic or manual actuation command is present, the nonsafety-related control signal can control the ESFAS output. The hardwired module provides isolation for the nonsafety-related signal path.
7.5.4.5 Independence A description of the application of independence to the ESFAS is provided in Subsection7.2.2.
7.5.4.6 Prioritization of Functions Each division of the ESFAS includes the analog logic circuitry necessary to prioritize the ESFAS inputs. Automatic Safety Actuation or Manual Actuation are highest priority and PICS nonsafety control inputs are lower in priority.
7.5.4.7 Fail-Safe The fail-safe positions of components upon loss of power to ESFAS are provided in Table7.5-2.
7.5.4.8 Setpoints Setpoints in the ESFAS are based on a documented methodology that identifies each of the assumptions and accounts for the uncertainties in each instrument channel. The setpoint methodology is described in Subsection7.2.3.
7.5.4.9 Operational Bypass, Permissives and Interlocks Maintenance bypasses are described in Subsection7.1.4.
If either Carbon Guard Bed 1 Isolation or Carbon Guard Bed 2 Isolation is active, then the Guard Bed Misalignment Actuation is bypassed.
The ESFAS starts a 180 second timer on loss of external power to the UPSS. If the indication of loss of external power to the UPSS clears prior to the 180 second timer expiring, the timer resets.
If the timer expires, the ESFAS initiates an IU Cell Nitrogen Purge on loss of external power to the UPSS.
Nonsafety inputs into the ESFAS are transferred from PICS through the hardwired module. The PICS inputs are bypassed with the enable nonsafety switch permitting the inputs to control ESFAS outputs when administrative procedures permit the operator to use the switch to enable the PICS functionality with the ESFAS.
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-21 Rev. 1 The manual actuation inputs from the operators in the facility control room are connected directly to the discrete APL. The manual actuation input into the priority logic does not have the ability to be bypassed and will always have equal priority to the automated actuation signals over any other signals that are present.
7.5.4.10 Completion of Protective Actions The ESFAS is designed so that once initiated, protective actions will continue to completion. Only deliberate operator action can be taken to reset the ESFAS following a protective action.
Figure7.5-1, Sheets 2619 through 231, shows how the ESFAS latches in a protective action and maintains the state of a protective action until operator input is initiated to reset the output of the ESFAS to normal operating conditions.
The output of the ESFAS is designed so that actuation through automatic or manual means of a safety function can only change when a new position is requested. If there is no signal present from the automatic safety actuation or manual actuation, then the output of the EIM remains in its current state. A safety-related enable nonsafety switch allows an operator, after the switch has been brought to enable, to control the output state of the ESFAS with a hardwired binary control signal from the nonsafety-related controls. The enable nonsafety switch is classified as part of the safety system and is used to prevent spurious nonsafety-related control signals from adversely affecting safety-related components. If the enable nonsafety switch is active, and no automatic safety actuation or manual actuation signals are present, the operator is capable of energizing or deenergizing any EIM outputs using the nonsafety-related hardwired control signals. If the enable nonsafety switch is not active, the nonsafety-related hardwired control signals are ignored.
7.5.4.11 Equipment Qualification ESFAS rack mounted equipment is installed in a mild operating environment and is designed to meet the environmental conditions described in Subsection7.4.3.4. Rack mounted ESFAS equipment is tested to appropriate standards to show that the effects of EMI/RFI and power surges are adequately addressed. Appropriate grounding of the ESFAS is performed in accordance with Section5.2.1 of Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Standard 1050-2004, IEEE Guide for Instrumentation and Control Equipment Grounding in Generating Stations (IEEE, 2004b).
7.5.4.12 Surveillance The TRPS supports calibration and testing to ensure operability as described in Subsection7.2.4.
7.5.4.13 Classification and Identification Each division of the ESFAS is uniquely labeled and identified in accordance with SHINE identification and classification procedures.
7.5.4.14 Human Factors The ESFAS provides manual actuation capabilities for each of the safety functions identified in Subsection7.5.3. To support the use of manual actuations, the ESFAS includes isolated outputs
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-23 Rev. 1 7.5.5.2 High RVZ1 Supercell Radiation (PVVS Cell)
The high RVZ1 supercell radiation signal protects against hot cell equipment leakage or an accident that could potentially result in excess radiation doses to the workers or to the public. The RVZ1 supercell radiation is measured by an analog interface on three different channels, one for each division of ESFAS. When two-out-of-three or more high RVZ1 supercell radiation channels are active, then a Supercell Isolation for that area and VTS Safety Actuation are initiated.
7.5.5.3 High RVZ1 Supercell Radiation (MEPS Extraction Cells)
The high RVZ1 supercell radiation signal protects against hot cell equipment leakage or an accident that could potentially result in excess radiation doses to the workers or to the public. The RVZ1 supercell radiation is measured by an analog interface on two different channels, one for each Division A and Division B of ESFAS. When one-out-of-two or more high RVZ1 supercell radiation channels are active, then a Supercell Isolation for that area, MEPS [
]PROP/ECI Isolation and VTS Safety Actuation are initiated.
7.5.5.4 High RVZ1 Supercell Radiation (IXP Extraction Cell)
The high RVZ1 supercell radiation signal protects against hot cell equipment leakage or an accident that could potentially result in excess radiation doses to the workers or to the public. The RVZ1 supercell radiation is measured by an analog interface on two different channels, one for each Division A and Division B of ESFAS. When one-out-of-two or more high RVZ1 supercell radiation channels are active, then a Supercell Isolation for that area and VTS Safety Actuation are initiated.
7.5.5.5 High RVZ1 Supercell Radiation (Purification and Packaging Cells)
The high RVZ1 supercell radiation signal protects against hot cell equipment leakage or an accident that could potentially result in excess radiation doses to the workers or to the public. The RVZ1 supercell radiation is measured by an analog interface on two different channels, one for each Division A and Division B of ESFAS. When one-out-of-two or more high RVZ1 supercell radiation channels are active, then a Supercell Isolation for that area is initiated.
7.5.5.6 High MEPS [
]PROP/ECI Conductivity The high MEPS [
]PROP/ECI conductivity signal protects against leakage of high radiation solutions into the [
]PROP/ECI, which is partially located outside the supercell shielding and could potentially result in an excess dose to the workers. The MEPS
[
]PROP/ECI conductivity is measured by an analog interface on two different channels, one for each Division A and DivisionB of ESFAS. When one-out-of-two or more high MEPS
[ ]PROP/ECI conductivity channels are active, then a MEPS [ ]PROP/ECI Isolationis initiated.
7.5.5.7 High PVVS Carbon Guard Bed Temperature The high PVVS carbon guard bed temperature signal protects against a fire in the PVVS carbon guard bed impacting the efficiency of the PVVS carbon delay beds. The PVVS carbon guard bed temperature is measured with a temperature interface on two different channels, one for each Division A and Division B of ESFAS. When one-out-of-two or more high PVVS carbon guard bed Proprietary Information - Withheld from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390(a)(4)
Export Controlled Information - Withheld from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390(a)(3)
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-24 Rev. 1 temperature channels are active, then a Carbon Guard Bed Isolation for the affected bed is initiated.
7.5.5.8 PVVS Carbon Guard Bed Isolation Valves Misaligned PVVS carbon guard bed isolation valves misaligned protects against inadvertent closure of all PVVS or N2PS flow paths through the carbon guard beds. PVVS carbon guard bed isolation valve indication is measured through a discrete input channel through the respective ESFAS division the valve is assigned to. When one-out-of-two or more valves show as fully closed in both trains of the carbon guard beds, then a Guard Bed Misalignment Actuation is initiated.
7.5.5.9 High PVVS Carbon Delay Bed Exhaust Carbon Monoxide The high PVVS carbon delay bed exhaust carbon monoxide signal protects against a fire in the PVVS delay bed. The PVVS carbon delay bed exhaust carbon monoxide is measured with an analog interface on two different channels, one for each Division A and Division B of ESFAS.
When one-out-of-two or more high PVVS carbon delay bed exhaust carbon monoxide channels are active, then a Carbon Delay Bed Isolation for the affected bed group is initiated.
7.5.5.10 VTS Lift Tank Liquid Detection Switch The VTS lift tank liquid detection switch signals protect against an overflow of the vacuum lift tanks. The VTS lift tank liquid detection switch signals are measured with a discrete input interface with a single detection signal for each lift tank associated to ESFAS Division A and a redundant detection signals common to all lift tanks at the VTS vacuum header associated to ESFAS DivisionB. If one-out-of-two or more (Division A and Division B) VTS lift tank liquid detection switch signals are active, then a VTS Safety Actuation is initiated.
7.5.5.11 RDS Liquid Detection Switch The RDS liquid detection switch signal detects leakage or overflow from other tanks and piping.
The RDS liquid detection switch signal is measured with a discrete signal input on two different channels, one for each Division A and Division B of ESFAS. When one-out-of-two or more RDS liquid detection switch signal channels are active, then a VTS Safety Actuation is initiated.
7.5.5.12 High TPS Exhaust to Facility Stack Tritium The high TPS exhaust to facility stack tritium signal protects against a release of tritium from the exhaust of the TPS glovebox stripper system into the facility ventilation systems. The TPS exhaust to facility stack tritium is measured with an analog interface on three different channels, one for each division of ESFAS. When one-out-of-two or more high TPS exhaust to facility stack tritium channels are active, then a TPS Isolation is initiated.
7.5.5.13 High TPS Glovebox Tritium The high TPS glovebox tritium signal protects against a release of tritium from TPS equipment into the TPS glovebox. The TPS glovebox tritium is measured with an analog interface on three different channels, one for each division of ESFAS. When one-out-of-two or more high TPS glovebox tritium channels are active, then a TPS Isolation is initiated.
Proprietary Information - Withheld from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390(a)(4)
Export Controlled Information - Withheld from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390(a)(3)
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-27 Rev. 1 MEPS [
]PROP/ECI conductivity extraction area A 8.8 micromho/cm 1/2 0.1 to 50 micromho/cm 3 percent 5 seconds MEPS [
]PROP/ECI conductivity extraction area B 8.8 micromho/cm 1/2 0.1 to 50 micromho/cm 3 percent 5 seconds MEPS [
]PROP/ECI conductivity extraction area C 8.8 micromho/cm 1/2 0.1 to 50 micromho/cm 3 percent 5 seconds Carbon guard bed 1 temperature 150°C 1/2 0 to 350°C 2 percent 10 seconds Carbon guard bed 2 temperature 150°C 1/2 0 to 350°C 2 percent 10 seconds PVVS carbon guard bed 1 inlet isolation valve fully closed Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 1 second PVVS carbon guard bed 1 outlet isolation valve fully closed Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 1 second PVVS carbon guard bed 2 inlet isolation valve fully closed Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 1 second PVVS carbon guard bed 2 outlet isolation valve fully closed Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 1 second Carbon delay bed group 1 exhaust carbon monoxide 20 ppm 1/2 0 to 30 ppm 10 percent 15 seconds Carbon delay bed group 2 exhaust carbon monoxide 20 ppm 1/2 0 to 30 ppm 10 percent 15 seconds Carbon delay bed group 3 exhaust carbon monoxide 20 ppm 1/2 0 to 30 ppm 10 percent 15 seconds Table 7.5 ESFAS Monitored Variables (Sheet 2 of 7)
Variable Analytical Limit Logic Range Accuracy Response Time
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-28 Rev. 1 Carbon delay bed 4 exhaust carbon monoxide 20 ppm 1/2 0 to 30 ppm 10 percent 15 seconds Carbon delay bed 5 exhaust carbon monoxide 20 ppm 1/2 0 to 30 ppm 10 percent 15 seconds Carbon delay bed 6 exhaust carbon monoxide 20 ppm 1/2 0 to 30 ppm 10 percent 15 seconds Carbon delay bed 7 exhaust carbon monoxide 20 ppm 1/2 0 to 30 ppm 10 percent 15 seconds Carbon delay bed 8 exhaust carbon monoxide 20 ppm 1/2 0 to 30 ppm 10 percent 15 seconds VTS vacuum header liquid detection switch signal(a)
Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 5.5 seconds VTS extraction lower lift tank A liquiddetection switch signal(a)
Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 5.5 seconds VTS extraction lower lift tank B liquiddetection switch signal(a)
Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 5.5 seconds VTS extraction lower lift tank C liquiddetection switch signal(a)
Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 5.5 seconds VTS extraction lower lift tank D liquiddetection switch signal(a)
Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 5.5 seconds VTS extraction upper lift tank A1 liquid detection switch signal(a)
Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 5.5 seconds VTS extraction upper lift tank A2 liquid detection switch signal(a)
Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 5.5 seconds Table 7.5 ESFAS Monitored Variables (Sheet 3 of 7)
Variable Analytical Limit Logic Range Accuracy Response Time
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-29 Rev. 1 VTS extraction upper lift tank B1 liquid detection switch signal(a)
Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 5.5 seconds VTS extraction upper lift tank B2 liquid detection switch signal(a)
Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 5.5 seconds VTS extraction upper lift tank C1 liquid detection switch signal(a)
Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 5.5 seconds VTS extraction upper lift tank C2 liquid detection switch signal(a)
Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 5.5 seconds Target solution storage lift tank liquiddetection switch signal(a)
Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 5.5 seconds Uranium liquid waste lift tank liquiddetection switch signal(a)
Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 5.5 seconds RDS lift tank liquid detection switchsignal(a)
Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 5.5 seconds TSV fill lift tank 1 liquid detection switch signal(a)
Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 5.5 seconds TSV fill lift tank 2 liquid detection switch signal(a)
Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 5.5 seconds TSV fill lift tank 3 liquid detection switch signal(a)
Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 5.5 seconds TSV fill lift tank 4 liquid detection switch signal(a)
Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 5.5 seconds Table 7.5 ESFAS Monitored Variables (Sheet 4 of 7)
Variable Analytical Limit Logic Range Accuracy Response Time
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-30 Rev. 1 TSV fill lift tank 5 liquid detection switch signal(a)
Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 5.5 seconds TSV fill lift tank 6 liquid detection switch signal(a)
Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 5.5 seconds TSV fill lift tank 7 liquid detection switch signal(a)
Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 5.5 seconds TSV fill lift tank 8 liquid detection switch signal(a)
Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 5.5 seconds RDS liquid detection switch signal Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 5.5 seconds TPS exhaust to facility stack tritium 80 µCi/m3 2/3 1 to 100 µCi/m3 10 percent 5 seconds TPS glovebox tritium 150 Ci/m3 2/3 0.001 to 50,000 Ci/m3 10 percent 5 seconds PVVS flow 5.0 scfm 2/3 1-20 scfm 3 percent 0.5 seconds TSPS dissolution tank 1 level switch signal Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 1 second TSPS dissolution tank 2 level switch signal Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 1 second TRPS IU cell 1 nitrogen purge signal Active 1/1 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 500 ms TRPS IU cell 2 nitrogen purge signal Active 1/1 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 500 ms Table 7.5 ESFAS Monitored Variables (Sheet 5 of 7)
Variable Analytical Limit Logic Range Accuracy Response Time
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-31 Rev. 1 TRPS IU cell 3 nitrogen purge signal Active 1/1 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 500 ms TRPS IU cell 4 nitrogen purge signal Active 1/1 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 500 ms TRPS IU cell 5 nitrogen purge signal Active 1/1 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 500 ms TRPS IU cell 6 nitrogen purge signal Active 1/1 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 500 ms TRPS IU cell 7 nitrogen purge signal Active 1/1 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 500 ms TRPS IU cell 8 nitrogen purge signal Active 1/1 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 500 ms MEPS area A lower three-way valve supplying position indication(b)
Active 1/2 & 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 1 second MEPS area A upper three-way valve supplying position indication(ba)
Active 1/2 & 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 1 second MEPS area B lower three-way valve supplying position indication(ba)
Active 1/2 & 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 1 second MEPS area B upper three-way valve supplying position indication(ba)
Active 1/2 & 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 1 second Table 7.5 ESFAS Monitored Variables (Sheet 6 of 7)
Variable Analytical Limit Logic Range Accuracy Response Time
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-32 Rev. 1 MEPS area C lower three-way valve supplying position indication(ba)
Active 1/2 & 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 1 second MEPS area C upper three-way valve supplying position indication(ba)
Active 1/2 & 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 1 second IXP lower three-way valve supplying position indication(ba)
Active 1/2 & 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 1 second IXP upper three-way valve supplying position indication(ba)
Active 1/2 & 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 1 second UPSS loss of external power Active 1/2 Active/Inactive Discrete input signal 1 second (a)
Each lift tank is provided one division of liquid detection at the tank; the redundant division of liquid detection is located in the VTS header and serves all lift tanks.
(b)
A safety actuation is initiated when both the lower and upper three-way valve supplying position indications show one-out-of-two of the redundant indications are active.
Table 7.5 ESFAS Monitored Variables (Sheet 7 of 7)
Variable Analytical Limit Logic Range Accuracy Response Time
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Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-33 Rev. 1 Table 7.5 Fail Safe Component Positions on ESFAS Loss of Power (Sheet 1 of 3)
FAIL-SAFE POSITION: CLOSED RVZ1 exhaust isolation dampers RVZ2 supercell area 9 (packaging area 2) inlet isolation dampers RVZ2 exhaust isolation dampers RVZ1 supercell area 9 (packaging area 2) outlet isolation dampers RVZ2 supply train 1 isolation dampers RVZ2 supercell area 10 (IXP area) inlet isolation dampers RVZ2 supply train 2 isolation dampers RVZ1 supercell area 10 (IXP area) outlet isolation dampers RVZ3 supply isolation dampers shipping/receiving IF RVZ TPS ventilation dampers RVZ3 supply isolation dampers shipping/receiving RPF PVVS carbon guard bed bypass valveRLWI PVVS isolation valve RVZ3 supply isolation dampers main RCA ingress/egress MEPS [ ]PROP/ECI A inlet isolation valve RVZ3 supply isolation dampers RPF emergency exit MEPS [ ]PROP/ECI B inlet isolation valve RVZ3 supply isolation dampers IF emergency exit MEPS [ ]PROP/ECI C inlet isolation valve RVZ3 exhaust isolation dampers IF emergency exit MEPS [ ]PROP/ECI A discharge isolation valve RVZ2 TSPS supply damper MEPS [ ]PROP/ECI B discharge isolation valve RVZ1 TSPS exhaust damper MEPS [ ]PROP/ECI C discharge isolation valve RVZ2 supercell area 1 (PVVS area) inlet isolation dampers MEPS A extraction column wash supply valve RVZ1 supercell area 1 (PVVS area) outlet isolation dampers MEPS A extraction column eluent valve RVZ2 supercell area 2 (extraction area A) inlet isolation dampers MEPS A [
]PROP/ECI wash supply valve RVZ1 supercell area 2 (extraction area A) outlet isolation dampers MEPS A [
]PROP/ECI eluent valve RVZ2 supercell area 3 (purification area A) inlet isolation dampers MEPS B extraction column wash supply valve RVZ1 supercell area 3 (purification area A) outlet isolation dampers MEPS B extraction column eluent valve RVZ2 supercell area 4 (packaging area 1) inlet isolation dampers MEPS B [
]PROP/ECI wash supply valve RVZ1 supercell area 4 (packaging area 1) outlet isolation dampers MEPS B [
]PROP/ECI eluent valve RVZ2 supercell area 5 (purification area B) inlet isolation dampers MEPS C extraction column wash supply valve RVZ1 supercell area 5 (purification area B) outlet isolation dampers MEPS C extraction column eluent valve RVZ2 supercell area 6 (extraction area B) inlet isolation dampers MEPS C [
]PROP/ECI wash supply valve RVZ1 supercell area 6 (extraction area B) outlet isolation dampers MEPS C [
]PROP/ECI eluent valve RVZ2 supercell area 7 (extraction area C) inlet isolation dampers IXP recovery column wash supply valve RVZ1 supercell area 7 (extraction area C) outlet isolation dampers IXP recovery column eluent valve RVZ2 supercell area 8 (purification area C) inlet isolation dampers IXP [
]PROP/ECI wash supply valve RVZ1 supercell area 8 (purification area C) outlet isolation dampers IXP [
]PROP/ECI eluent valve
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-34 Rev. 1 IXP FNHS supply valve Storage and separation system GBSS raffinate isolation valves IXP liquid nitrogen supply valve ATIS header tritium supply isolation valves ATIS header GBSS isolation valves ATIS glovebox exhaust header isolation valves ATIS header GBSS bypass isolation valves TPS process evacuation GBSS isolation valves GBSS RVZ isolation valves TPS glovebox nitrogen supply valves ATIS header return line isolation valves N2PS RVZ2 north header valves TPS process evacuation header isolation valves N2PS RVZ2 south header valves ATIS header deuterium supply isolation valves TSPS RPCS supply cooling valves TSPS RPCS return cooling valve FAIL-SAFE POSITION: OPEN RVZ1 exhaust train 1 blower breakers PVVS carbon delay bed 4 inlet isolation valve RVZ1 exhaust train 2 blower breakers PVVS carbon delay bed 5 inlet isolation valve RVZ2 exhaust train 1 blower breakers PVVS carbon delay bed 6 inlet isolation valve RVZ2 exhaust train 2 blower breakers PVVS carbon delay bed 7 inlet isolation valve RVZ2 supply train 1 blower breakers PVVS carbon delay bed 8 inlet isolation valve RVZ2 supply train 2 blower breakers PVVS carbon delay bed group 1 outlet isolation valves VTS vacuum transfer pump 1 breakers PVVS carbon delay bed group 2 outlet isolation valves VTS vacuum transfer pump 2 breakers PVVS carbon delay bed group 3 outlet isolation valves VTS vacuum transfer pump 3 breakers PVVS carbon delay bed 4 outlet isolation valves VTS vacuum break valves PVVS carbon delay bed 5 outlet isolation valves PVVS blower bypass valves PVVS carbon delay bed 6 outlet isolation valves PVVS carbon guard bed bypass valves PVVS carbon delay bed 7 outlet isolation valves PVVS carbon guard bed 1 inlet isolation valve PVVS carbon delay bed 8 outlet isolation valves PVVS carbon guard bed 1 outlet isolation valve MEPS A extraction feed pump breakers PVVS carbon guard bed 2 inlet isolation valve MEPS B extraction feed pump breakers PVVS carbon guard bed 2 outlet isolation valve MEPS C extraction feed pump breakers PVVS carbon delay bed 1 inlet isolation valve N2PS IU cell header valves PVVS carbon delay bed 2 inlet isolation valve N2PS RPF header valves PVVS carbon delay bed 3 inlet isolation valve Table 7.5 Fail Safe Component Positions on ESFAS Loss of Power (Sheet 2 of 3)
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-35 Rev. 1 FAIL-SAFE POSITION: SUPPLYING PVVS carbon delay bed group 1 three-way valves PVVS carbon delay bed 5 three-way valve PVVS carbon delay bed group 2 three-way valves PVVS carbon delay bed 6 three-way valve PVVS carbon delay bed group 3 three-way valves PVVS carbon delay bed 7 three-way valve PVVS carbon delay bed 4 three-way valve PVVS carbon delay bed 8 three-way valve FAIL-SAFE POSITION: DISCHARGING MEPS area A lower three-way valve MEPS area C lower three-way isolation valve MEPS area A upper three-way valve MEPS area C upper three-way isolation valve MEPS area B lower three-way valve IXP upper three-way valve MEPS area B upper three-way valve IXP lower three-way valve Table 7.5 Fail Safe Component Positions on ESFAS Loss of Power (Sheet 3 of 3)
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-36 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 1 of 32)
Trip Determination
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-37 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 2 of 32)
Trip Determination
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-38 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 3 of 32)
Trip Determination
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Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-39 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 4 of 32)
Trip Determination
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-40 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 5 of 32)
Trip Determination
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-41 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 6 of 32)
Trip Determination
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-42 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 7 of 32)
Trip Determination
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-43 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 8 of 32)
Trip Determination
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Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-44 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 9 of 32)
Trip Determination
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-45 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 10 of 32)
Trip Determination
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Safety Functions
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Safety Functions
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Safety Functions
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Chapter 7 - Instrumentation & Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-49 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 14 of 32)
Safety Functions
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation & Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-50 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 15 of 32)
Safety Functions
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation & Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-51 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 16 of 32)
Safety Functions
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation & Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-52 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 17 of 32)
Safety Functions
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Safety Functions
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Safety Functions
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Chapter 7 - Instrumentation & Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-55 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 20 of 32)
Safety Functions
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation & Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-56 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 21 of 32)
Safety Functions
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation & Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-57 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 22 of 32)
Safety Functions
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation & Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-58 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 23 of 32)
Safety Functions
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation & Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-59 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 24 of 32)
Safety Functions
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation & Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-60 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 25 of 32)
Nonsafety Interface Decode
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Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation & Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-61 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 26 of 32)
Priority Logic
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation & Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-62 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 27 of 32)
Priority Logic
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation & Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-63 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 28 of 32)
Priority Logic
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation & Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-64 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 29 of 32)
Priority Logic
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation & Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-65 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 30 of 32)
Priority Logic
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation & Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-66 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 31 of 32)
Priority Logic
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation & Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-67 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 32 of 32)
Legend
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Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-29 Rev. 1 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 1 of 24)
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-30 Rev. 1 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 2 of 24)
Trip Determination
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-31 Rev. 1 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 3 of 24)
Trip Determination
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-32 Rev. 1 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 4 of 24)
Trip Determination
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Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-33 Rev. 1 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 5 of 24)
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-34 Rev. 1 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 6 of 24)
Trip Determination
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-35 Rev. 1 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 7 of 24)
Trip Determination
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Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-39 Rev. 1 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 11 of 24)
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-40 Rev. 1 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 12 of 24)
Safety Functions
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Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-43 Rev. 1 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 15 of 24)
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-44 Rev. 1 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 16 of 24)
Safety Functions
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-45 Rev. 1 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 17 of 24)
Safety Functions
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-46 Rev. 1 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 18 of 24)
Nonsafety Decode
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Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-47 Rev. 1 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 19 of 24)
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-48 Rev. 1 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 20 of 24)
Priority Logic
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-49 Rev. 1 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 21 of 24)
Priority Logic
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-50 Rev. 1 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 22 of 24)
Priority Logic
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-51 Rev. 1 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 23 of 24)
Priority Logic
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-52 Rev. 1 Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 24 of 24)
Legend
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-70 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 Carbon Guard Bed Physical Configuration (Sheet 1 of 2)
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-71 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 Carbon Guard Bed Physical Configuration (Sheet 2 of 2)
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-72 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 Vacuum Transfer System (Sheet 1 of 2)
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Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-73 Rev. 0 Figure 7.5 Vacuum Transfer System (Sheet 2 of 2)
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-72 Rev. 1 Figure 7.5 Vacuum Transfer System (Sheet 1 of 2)
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Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-73 Rev. 1 Figure 7.5 Vacuum Transfer System (Sheet 2 of 2)
Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-74 Rev. 1 Figure 7.5 Radiologically Controlled Area Isolation (Sheet 1 of 2)
Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-75 Rev. 1 Figure 7.5 Radiologically Controlled Area Isolation (Sheet 2 of 2)
Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 9a2.1-2 Rev. 1 Details of the inspection and testing requirements of safety-related RV systems are provided in Subsection 9a2.1.1.5.
9a2.1.1.2
System Description
Radiological Ventilation Zone 1 RVZ1 is divided into two subsystems: RVZ1r and RVZ1e. A flow diagram of RVZ1r is provided in Figure 9a2.1-2. A flow diagram of RVZ1e is provided in Figure 9a2.1-3.
RVZ1r provides cooling for systems within the irradiation unit (IU) cell and the target solution vessel (TSV) off-gas system (TOGS) cell. RVZ1r recirculates, filters, and cools air within the irradiation unit (IU) cell and the TOGS cell. The system includes two fan coil units and associated ductwork and dampers per each set of lU/TOGS cells. Each set of RVZ1r units is located within the confinement boundary for the lU/TOGS cells that it serves. RVZ1r provides sampling, ventilation, and cleanup connections for the primary confinement.
RVZ1e exhausts air from the areas with a high potential for contamination in the facility. The air is filtered and directed out of the SHINE facility through the exhaust stack. The subsystem includes fans, filters, ductwork, dampers, and high efficiency filter banks. It also includes the necessary transfer ductwork to allow makeup from the RCA general area into the exhausted areas.
RVZ1e is designed to maintain ventilation zone 1 areas at a lower pressure than ventilation zone 2 areas. The design inhibits backflow with the use of backflow dampers at the discharge of the RVZ1e and RVZ2e exhaust fans in order to minimize the spread of contamination. RVZ1e ductwork provides sampling locations for radiation detectors, fire detection equipment, stack release monitoring, and an exhaust stack connection point for RVZ2e and the process vessel vent system (PVVS).
The RVZ1 serves the following areas:
IU cells TOGS cells Glovebox stripper system (GBSS) process equipment Primary closed loop cooling system (PCLS) expansion tank Uranium receipt and storage system (URSS) glovebox Radioactive liquid waste immobilization (RLWI) shielded enclosure Supercell Target solution preparation system (TSPS) glovebox Target solution dissolution tanks Target solution preparation tank HVAC enclosures Radiological Ventilation Zone 2 RVZ2 includes three subsystems: RVZ2e, RVZ2s, and RVZ2r. A flow diagram of RVZ2e is provided in Figure 9a2.1-4. A flow diagram of RVZ2s air handling units (AHUs) is provided in Figure 9a2.1-5. A flow diagram of RVZ2s distribution and RVZ2r is provided in Figure 9a2.1-6.
Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 9a2.1-4 Rev. 1 Preparation room Tool crib Vestibule Primary cooling rooms IF general area Neutron driver assembly system (NDAS) service cell TPS room Supercell Radiological Ventilation Zone 3 Under normal operating conditions, RVZ3 transfers air from ventilation zone 4 to ventilation zone 3 then from ventilation zone 3 to ventilation zone 2 via engineered pathways. RVZ3 receives air from RVZ2s in the IF exit labyrinth. A flow diagram of RVZ3 is provided in Figure 9a2.1-7. Under accident conditions, bubble tight dampers close, isolating ventilation zone 2. The design of RVZ3 inhibits backflow within ductwork that could spread contamination.
9a2.1.1.3 System Operation RVZ1e areas draw ambient supply air from adjacent ventilation zone 2 spaces, except for the supercell. During normal operation, areas ventilated by RVZ1e are maintained at negative pressure with respect to their surrounding ventilation zone 2 spaces. The supercell is supplied air directly from RVZ2r. The air supplied to the supercell is exhausted by RVZ1e.
RVZ1e contains redundant fans that are capable of continuous operation. During normal operation, one fan is operating while the other fan is on standby. If the operating fan fails, the standby fan will start automatically.
The exhaust from RVZ1e areas collects in the RVZ1e system duct header and then is drawn through the final filter banks on the mezzanine. These filter banks contain high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters and carbon adsorbers upstream of the building isolation dampers.
These filters and adsorbers are equipped with differential pressure monitoring equipment and are periodically monitored by operations personnel. The building isolation dampers are safety-related automatic isolation dampers controlled by ESFAS. These dampers are located at the RCA boundary, upstream of the exhaust fans and exhaust stack.
Negative pressure is maintained in the ductwork to control contamination and maintain pressure gradients. System operation between RVZ1e, RVZ2e, and RVZ2s is coordinated such that the overall airflow and pressure gradients are maintained. The pressure gradients create flow patterns that direct air towards areas of increasing contamination potential. This is maintained by the variable frequency drives (VFDs) on the exhaust fans. Minimum airflow will be maintained during normal system operation.
During upset conditions, affected sections of the RVZ1e, RVZ2s, and RVZ2e ventilation systems are isolated as required for the specific event or indication. Bubble tight dampers close, based on detection of increased radiation. The RVZ1e supply flow path to the supercell includes nonsafety-related HEPA and carbon filters. The RVZ1e exhaust flow path from the supercell includes nonsafety-related HEPA filters and safety-related carbon filters. The remaining RVZ1e flow paths that exhaust confinements for fission products contain non-creditedsafety-related
Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 9a2.1-5 Rev. 1 HEPA filters and credited,carbon filters. The RVZ1e safety-related, redundant bubble-tight dampers are situated as near to the confinement boundary as practical.
The IU cell exhaust flow path of RVZ1e provides ventilation of the IU cell and TOGS cell via the PCLS expansion tank headspace. This path is equipped with radiation monitoring instrumentation and redundant isolation valves. Between the RVZ1e IU cell radiation instrumentation and RVZ1e IU cell ventilation valves is an isolation lag tank. If radiation measurements exceed predetermined limits, the TSV reactivity protection system (TRPS) initiates an IU Cell Safety Actuation, which closes the RVZ1e IU cell ventilation valves. The isolation lag tank provides an exhaust gas delay time greater than the closing time of the valves.
Upon loss of power, loss of signal, or ESFAS initiation of confinement, dampers seal the affected confinement areas within 30 seconds.
The RVZ1r fan coil units (FCUs) are capable of continuous operations. The RVZ1r recirculates, and cools air within the IU cell and TOGS cell. The IU cell and TOGS cell are established as low leakage boundaries.
RVZ2e fans are capable of continuous operation. RVZ2e exhausts the various normally occupiable rooms within the RCA as well as fume hoods, filters the air via HEPA filter banks and discharges to the facility stack. Exhaust headers are maintained at a negative pressure by the VFD. Negative pressure is maintained in the ductwork to control contamination and maintain pressure gradients. The exhaust from RVZ2 areas collects in the RVZ2 system duct header and then is drawn through final HEPA filters and carbon adsorbers prior to discharge to the exhaust stack.
During normal operation, ventilation zone 2 areas are maintained at negative pressure with respect to RVZ3 airlocks. The speed of the RVZ2e exhaust fans is controlled to maintain a negative pressure setpoint in the RVZ2e exhaust header. Minimum airflow will be maintained during normal system operation.
RVZ2s AHUs are capable of continuous operation. Ventilation zone 2 and portions of ventilation zone 3 areas are directly supplied air via the RVZ2s AHUs. The AHUs supply conditioned, 100 percent outside air. Each AHU contains filters, pre-heat and cooling coils, and supply fans.
The supply system includes redundant AHUs. If a single AHU fails, the standby AHU will start automatically. The AHUs normally supply a constant volume of conditioned air to RVZ2 and RVZ3 areas.
The RVZ2s supply duct contains safety-related automatic isolation dampers controlled by ESFAS. These dampers are located at the RCA boundary.
RVZ2r AHUs are capable of continuous operation. The RVZ2r AHUs further condition the air in the RCA general area to comfort levels.
The RVZ1e and RVZ2e subsystems combine downstream of each subsystems respective filter banks, RCA isolation bubble-tight dampers, and exhaust fans, as shown in Figure 9a2.1-8. The PVVS delay bed discharge is also combined with the RVZ1e and RVZ2e flow downstream of the exhaust fans and upstream of the stack release monitor. The discharge of the stack is approximately 10 feet above the roofline of the facility and will maintain a minimum discharge velocity of 3,000 fpm.
Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 9a2.1-15 Rev. 0 Figure 9a2.1 Radiological Ventilation Zone 1 Exhaust Subsystem (RVZ1e) Flow Diagram
Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 9a2.1-15 Rev. 1 Figure 9a2.1 Radiological Ventilation Zone 1 Exhaust Subsystem (RVZ1e) Flow Diagram
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Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Fire Protection Systems and Programs SHINE Medical Technologies 9a2.3-1 Rev. 1 9a2.3 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS AND PROGRAMS 9a2.3.1 FIRE PROTECTION PLAN AND PROGRAM The Fire Protection Plan describes the overall facility Fire Protection Program (FPP). The FPP describes the fire protection organization and responsibilities, design and programmatic approach, and means to limit the probability and consequences of fire at the SHINE facility. The Fire Protection Plan establishes the requirements to be satisfied by the facility fire protection program. This plan establishes a program that represents an integrated effort involving components, procedures, analyses, and personnel used in defining and carrying out activities of fire protection. It includes system and facility design, fire prevention, fire detection, annunciation, confinement, suppression, administrative controls, inspection and maintenance, training, quality assurance, and testing. The established fire protection program elements, systems, structures, and components are subject to the SHINE Quality Assurance Program, as described in the Quality Assurance Program Description. The elements of the FPP work together to satisfy the requirements of applicable regulatory requirements presented in 10 CFR 50.48(a). The FPP is comprised of the following lower tier documents which are developed and maintained as part of the overall FPP.
Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA);
Safe Shutdown Analysis; Pre-Fire Plans; and Administrative controls (e.g., implementing procedures, drawings, calculations, analyses, specifications).
Development of the FPP is informed by the guidance provided in National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 801, Standard for Fire Protection for Facilities Handling Radioactive Materials (NFPA, 2014). The structure and content of the FPP are based on the precepts of 10 CFR 50.48(a) and NFPA 801. The FPP ensures, through the application of the defense-in-depth concept, that a fire will not prevent the performance of necessary safety-related functions and that radioactive releases to the environment, in the event of fire, will be minimized.
9a2.3.2 DESIGN BASES The concept of defense-in-depth is fundamental to the FPP. Fire protection defense-in-depth for the SHINE facility is defined as follows:
Prevent fires from starting, including limiting combustible materials; Detect, control, and extinguish those fires that do occur to limit consequences; and Provide protection for safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety so that a continuing fire will not prevent the safe shutdown of the irradiation units or cause an uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the environment.
The FPP is developed and implemented to accomplish these criteria.
Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Fire Protection Systems and Programs SHINE Medical Technologies 9a2.3-4 Rev. 1 and impurities allowing for reuse of the solution in the irradiation process. These processes present a possibility of radiological release from processes, with fire presenting an energetic source that can drive release. Radiological release due to fire is typically associated with combustion of radiologically contaminated ordinary combustible materials or fire damage to confinement systems that could allow release of collocated radiological materials.
Uranium oxide and uranium metal are received and stored in the uranium receipt and storage system (URSS) room. Storage of the uranium metal and uranium oxide is in metal storage canisters. Canisters are stored on metal storage racks to ensure a safe configuration of the stored materials. Uranium metal is received in sufficiently massive configurations that it is not pyrophoric.
The TSPS and URSS rooms are protected with automatic fire detection and provided with appropriate portable fire extinguishers for incipient stage fire suppression. Combustible loading in these rooms is maintained low to prevent fire. Fire response using water-based extinguishants is prohibited; elevated floors of the URSS and TSPS fire area are provided to prevent flooding of these rooms.
Irradiation is performed in the irradiation facility (IF). Chemical processing, to extract medical isotopes from the target solution, is performed in the RPF. The irradiation and chemical processing of radiological materials is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
Once target solution is introduced to the irradiation process, it is contained in pipes and tanks.
These pipes and tanks are located in the IU cells, hot cells, tank vaults, and pipe trenches throughout the IF and RPF. The IU cells, hot cells, tank vaults, and pipe trench structures are constructed of massive steel and concrete barriers to provide radiation shielding. The monolithic construction of these structures provides significant fire separation from the general areas of the IF and RPF. This construction provides protection to the pipes and tanks containing radiological materials. Combustible loading in the spaces within the IU cells, hot cells, tank vaults, and pipe trenches is maintained very low. Combustible materials in these spaces are limited to cable and equipment. Combustible loading in the IF and RPF general areas is maintained low to present a minimal potential for fire. The IF and RPF general areas are equipped with automatic fire detection and provided with portable fire extinguishers to provide incipient fire suppression capability.
Filters contained in the facility ventilation systems that may contain fission products are replaced on a regular basis. Filters are contained in non-combustible ductwork. Areas of the radiologically controlled area (RCA) containing filters are protected with automatic fire detection and portable fire extinguishers. Combustible loading is maintained low in these areas.
The carbon guard beds located in the process vessel vent system (PVVS) are equipped with temperature detection. The guard beds are isolated upon indication of an unacceptable increase in temperature. The carbon delay beds are monitored with in-bed temperature detection and carbon monoxide detectors at eachthe outlet of each carbon delay bed group. The carbon delay beds are equipped with a nitrogen purge line that ismay be used to extinguish hot spots if detected.
Three facility systems are provided to mitigate hydrogen generation due to radiolysis. These systems are the TSV off-gas system (TOGS), PVVS, and nitrogen purge system (N2PS).
Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Handling and Storage of Target Solution SHINE Medical Technologies 9b.2-3 Rev. 1 and the lift tank is vented to atmosphere. Once pressure is equalized, the solution may be drained, pumped from the lift tank, or transferred to a second stage of lift tanks for additional elevation gain. Liquid transfers using vacuum lift tanks in the RPF are identified in Table9b.2-1.
The second method facilitates solution transfers without using a vacuum lift tank. Vacuum from the knockout pot is applied directly to the selected destination tank, and valves in the pathway between the source tank and destination tank are aligned to allow flow. This method is typical for transfers in the RLWS system, the RLWI system, and between laboratory scale processes that are part of the isotope separation process. Direct liquid transfers between tanks facilitated by VTS are identified in Table9b.2-2.
Two separate vacuum headers are provided based on the liquid being transferred. Tanks designed to contain target solution are provided with vacuum from a separate header than tanks with concentration controls or other tanks or services that are not intended to contain fissile material. The headers are air gapped at the knockout pot as shown in Figure 9b.2-1.
The VTS provides an interface for sampling of solution in the target solution hold tanks, target solution storage tanks, RLWS system tanks, and the radioactive drain system (RDS).
The VTS is the only system used to transport SNM between the RPF and IF. A description of the process used to fill the TSV is provided in Subsection 4a2.6.1. The VTS is one of the systems used to transport solutions of SNM or byproduct material in the RPF. The other systems used to transport solutions containing SNM or byproduct material in the RPF are TSPS, MEPS, IXP, and the RLWI system, which use pumps to provide the motive force to transport the solutions.
Table 9b.2-3 identifies the systems which interface with the VTS.
Figure 9b.2-1 provides a process flow diagram of the VTS.
9b.2.5.3 Instrumentation and Controls Temperature of solution in the source tank is monitored prior to a transfer to ensure that the transfer does not induce the solution to flash in the pipe. Level of each vacuum lift tank is also monitored to allow the process integrated control system (PICS) to control each transfer.
Automatic flow shut-off valves and liquid detection instruments are provided in the VTS to prevent solution from entering the knockout pot. On detection of liquid by these instruments, ESFAS actuates valves that act as vacuum breakers on the knockout pot and trips the breakers on the vacuum pumps, terminating solution transfers. The knockout pot drains to favorable geometry tanks in the RLWS system in the event of high-level alarm. ESFAS also trips the vacuum breaking valves and pump on detection of high radiation in radiological ventilation zone 1 (RVZ1) or on level detection in the RDS. A detailed description of the ESFAS is provided in Section 7.5.
9b.2.5.4 Safety Analysis The VTS is a safety-related system. The VTS structural framework and pipe supports are designed to withstand design basis seismic events. The VTS is classified as Seismic Category I.
Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Handling and Storage of Target Solution SHINE Medical Technologies 9b.2-15 Rev. 0 Figure 9b.2 Vacuum Transfer System Process Flow Diagram (Sheet 6 of 6)
Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Handling and Storage of Target Solution SHINE Medical Technologies 9b.2-15 Rev. 1 Figure 9b.2 Vacuum Transfer System Process Flow Diagram (Sheet 6 of 6)
Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Cover Gas Control in the Radioisotope Production Facility SHINE Medical Technologies 9b.6-2 Rev. 1 the tank headspace, to the PVVS conditioning and filtration equipment. Gases pass through condensers, cooled with process chilled water, to remove excess heat and reduce absolute humidity of the off-gas.
Condensate is collected in the PVVS condensate tank within the PVVS hot cell, located within the supercell. Condensate may be returned to the target solution staging system (TSSS) tanks as makeup water or to the radioactive liquid waste storage (RLWS) system for waste processing. An in-line heater, the PVVS reheater, downstream of the condenser heats the off-gas back to ambient temperature to reduce the relative humidity. The off-gas then flows through acid adsorber beds, HEPA filters, and the guard beds to neutralize entrained acid droplets or gases, filter particulates, and capture iodine. The gas flows from the hot cell to a below-grade, shielded vault, passing through a series of delay beds packed with carbon to delay the release of fission product noble gases such as xenon and krypton. The eight delay beds are organized into three groups as shown in Figure 9b.6-1. Group 1 includes Delay Beds 1 and 2. Group 2 includes Delay Beds 3, 4, and 5. Group 3 includes Delay Beds 6, 7, and 8. A final set of HEPA filters removes any entrained carbon fines upstream of the blowers, and the treated gases are discharged to the facility stack.
In the event PVVS loses the capability to provide flow, the nitrogen purge system (N2PS) actuates nitrogen flow to the RPF tanks to mitigate hydrogen generation. Upon actuation of the N2PS, the isolation valves at the PVVS intake interface with ventilation zone 2 actuate closed, and the PVVS isolation valve at the radioactive liquid waste immobilization (RLWI) interface actuates closed, to prevent nitrogen backflow. During the nitrogen purge, the PVVS equipment and piping continues to provide the flow path for the off-gas through the RPF. Safety-related bypasses are provided around filtration equipment in the hot cell that could contribute to a blocked pathway and an alternate, safety-related exhaust point to the roof is actuated open.
The branch to the alternate release point is upstream of the PVVS blowers.
Fire protection is provided for the guard beds and delay beds. Temperature instrumentation and carbon monoxide detection are used to monitor for oxidation. The beds may be isolated or purged with nitrogen to smother the reaction. Additionally, operators can attempt to increase the system flow rate to increase convective cooling. The engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) automatically isolates an affected delay bed groups on high temperature in the carbon guard beds or high carbon monoxide concentration in the carbon delay bedseffluent gas.
Principal components of the PVVS are identified in Table 9b.6-2.
A process flow diagram of the PVVS is provided in Figure 9b.6-1.
9b.6.1.3 Operational Analysis and Safety Function The PVVS provides confinement of fission products to prevent release of radioactive material.
The PVVS maintains hydrogen concentrations below the lower flammability limit (LFL) to preclude a hydrogen deflagration or detonation, as discussed in Subsection 9b.6.1.3.1. The PVVS passively reduces the concentration of radionuclides in the gaseous effluent to the facility stack, including during postulated transients, as discussed in Subsection 9b.6.1.3.2.
Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Cover Gas Control in the Radioisotope Production Facility SHINE Medical Technologies 9b.6-5 Rev. 1 9b.6.2.2
System Description
N2PS provides back-up sweep gas flow in the form of stored pressurized nitrogen gas.
Downstream pressure is controlled with self-regulating pressure reducing valves with overpressure protection by pressure relief valves. On actuation of the N2PS, nitrogen flows through the irradiation facility (IF) and RPF equipment to ensure the hydrogen concentration is below the LFL. The nitrogen purge flows through the normal PVVS path and filtration equipment, including the delay beds. After exiting the delay beds in PVVS, the nitrogen purge is diverted to a safety-related alternate vent path in case of a downstream blockage. Valves configured to fail open allow the diversion to the alternate vent path. After actuation of the N2PS, the pressurized storage tubes can be refilled by truck deliveries.
A process flow diagram of the N2PS is provided in Figure 9b.6-2.
Purge of an IU Upon loss of normal power as determined by the engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) and after a delay or upon loss of normal sweep gas flow in the IU as determined by the TSV reactivity protection system (TRPS), solenoid valves on the nitrogen discharge manifold actuate open, releasing nitrogen into the IU cell supply header. Upon loss of sweep gas flow in any IU cell, nitrogen solenoid isolation valves for the given cell actuate open releasing nitrogen purge gas into the TSV dump tank, and valves in the TOGS actuate open to allow the nitrogen purge gas to flow to the PVVS. The nitrogen purge gas flows through the TSV dump tank, TSV, and TOGS equipment before discharging into PVVS. A flow switch provides indication that nitrogen is flowing to the IU cell. A detailed discussion of the IU Cell Nitrogen Purge is provided in Section 7.4.
Purge of RPF Equipment Upon loss of normal power or loss of normal sweep gas flow through PVVS, as determined by the ESFAS, solenoid valves on the ventilation zone 2 air supply to PVVS fail closed and isolate the sweep gas air flow to the RPF tanks. At the same time, solenoid valves on the nitrogen discharge manifold actuate open, releasing nitrogen into the RPF distribution piping. The nitrogen flows through the RPF equipment in parallel before discharging into PVVS. A flow switch provides indication that nitrogen is flowing to the RPF distribution piping.
Processes that arereceive ventilated byion air from the PVVS during normal conditions are also ventilated by N2PS during deviations from normal operation. In the RPF, the N2PS ventilates tanks in the TSSS, RLWS system, radioactive liquid waste immobilization (RLWI) system, radioactive drain system (RDS), molybdenum extraction and purification system (MEPS),
iodine and xenon purification and packaging (IXP) system, and VTS. A detailed discussion of the RPF Nitrogen Purge is provided in Section 7.5.
9b.6.2.3 Operational Analysis and Safety Function In the event of a loss of normal power, loss of sweep gas flow through PVVS, or loss of sweep gas flow through any TOGS, the N2PS controls the buildup of hydrogen which is released into the primary system boundary and tanks or other volumes which contain fission products to ensure that the system and confinement boundaries are maintained.
Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Cover Gas Control in the Radioisotope Production Facility SHINE Medical Technologies 9b.6-8 Rev. 1 Table 9b.6 Process Vessel Vent System Interfaces (Sheet 1 of 2)
Interfacing System Interface Description Engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS)
The ESFAS monitors the operation of the process vessel vent system (PVVS) and. ESFAS actuates the nitrogen purge system (N2PS) on failure ofand opens the PVVS blowersfiltration bypass on low ventilation flow through PVVS, and isolates the delay beds on high carbon monoxide concentration.
Iodine and xenon purification and packaging (IXP) system The PVVS ventilates tanks in the IXP.
Molybdenum extraction and purification system (MEPS)
The PVVS ventilates the molybdenum eluate hold tank and MEPS condensate tank.
Nitrogen purge system (N2PS)
The N2PS provides sweep gas flow through the PVVS piping and filtration equipment on loss of normal power or normal flow in PVVS.
Normal electrical power supply system (NPSS)
The NPSS is distributed to the PVVS blowers, the PVVS reheater, and ancillary equipment.
Process integrated control system (PICS)
The PICS controls the PVVS and monitors PVVS instrument signals.
Production facility biological shield (PFBS)
The PFBS provides shielding to workers from the PVVS. PVVS equipment is located in a hot cell and in a below-grade vault.
Radioactive drain system (RDS)
The PVVS ventilates the RDS tanks.
Radioactive liquid waste storage (RLWS) system The PVVS ventilates the RLWS tanks. The PVVS drains condensate water to the RLWS for disposal.
Radioactive liquid waste immobilization (RLWI) system The PVVS ventilates the immobilization feed tank.
Radioisotope process facility cooling system (RPCS)
The RPCS provides cooling capacity to the PVVS for the off-gas condensers.
Radiological ventilation zone 1 (RVZ1)
The PVVS blowers discharge into a header shared by RVZ1 to the facility stack. Some PVVS components are located in a hot cell, which is ventilated by RVZ1.
Radiological ventilation zone 2 (RVZ2)
The PVVS intake removes air from RVZ2 for use as sweep gas across the RPF tanks.
Stack release monitoring system (SRMS)
The SRMS monitors the discharge from the PVVS delay beds to the stack.
Standby generator system (SGS)
The SGS provides nonsafety-related backup power to PVVS components.
Target solution staging system (TSSS)
The PVVS ventilates the TSSS tanks to mitigate hydrogen generation.
The PVVS may also transfer condensate water to the TSSS for reuse in the irradiation cycle.
Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Cover Gas Control in the Radioisotope Production Facility SHINE Medical Technologies 9b.6-12 Rev. 0 Figure 9b.6 PVVS Process Flow Diagram
Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Cover Gas Control in the Radioisotope Production Facility SHINE Medical Technologies 9b.6-12 Rev. 1 Figure 9b.6 PVVS Process Flow Diagram
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Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Other Auxiliary Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 9b.7-6 Rev. 1 Reduce radiation exposure during operation in accordance with applicable guideline exposures set forth in 10 CFR 20.
The RLWI system piping is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME B31.3, Process Piping (ASME, 2013). Nonsafety-related components within the RLWI system are designed to standards satisfying system operation.
9b.7.3.2
System Description
The RLWI system solidifies blended liquid waste to a form suitable for shipping and disposal. The RLWI system removes selected isotopes, as needed, from the blended liquid waste and then immobilizes the wastes for ultimate disposal. The headspace cover gas in the immobilization feed tank is swept by the PVVS or nitrogen from the nitrogen purge system (N2PS) to maintain radiolytically generated hydrogen gas below the lower flammability limit.
The blended liquid waste sources and radionuclide and uranium concentrations are described in Subsection 9b.7.4.
The immobilization feed tank is filled from the liquid waste blending tanks on a batch basis by vacuum suction applied to the immobilization feed tank from the vacuum transfer system (VTS).
Positive displacement pumps transfer the contents of the immobilization feed tank [
]PROP/ECI, and meter the tank contents to a disposable waste drum.
The waste drums are prefilled with measured amounts of dry, powdered solidification agent in accordance with the process control program (PCP). The prefilled drum is transferred into an enclosure for contamination control. The radiological ventilation zone 1 exhaust subsystem (RVZ1e) equipment processes air from the enclosure through a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) and carbon filter before discharging to the facility stack. Transfer of the prefilled waste drum inside the enclosure is by remote handling equipment and positioners.
The liquid waste drum is filled with blended liquid waste and mixed. Subsequent to fill and mixing, the fill and vent ports are disengaged. The drum is then remotely transferred to a curing station where the mixed contents of the waste drum hardens prior to removal from the enclosure. The cured drum is remotely transferred into a shielded cask and transported to the material staging building for further radiological decay, as needed, prior to shipment to a licensed disposal facility.
Remote sampling for waste characterization is performed in the RLWS prior to solidification activities. Radiation measurements are performed on the solidified waste drum prior to shipment in the material staging building to verify it meets shipping dose rate requirements.
Table 9b.7-1 identifies the systems which interface with the RLWI system. Figure 9b.7-1 provides a process flow diagram of the RLWI system.
9b.7.3.3 Operational Analysis and Safety Function Liquid waste solidification is performed in accordance with a PCP. The RLWI system is sized to process approximately double the routine liquid waste generation rate from the RPF.
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Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Other Auxiliary Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 9b.7-8 Rev. 1 9b.7.4.2
System Description
The RLWS system collects, stores, blends, conditions, and meters liquid wastes for processing by the RLWI for solidification. Included in the blended liquid wastes is PVVS condensate which can also be recycled through the target solution staging system (TSSS) to minimize waste generation. The RLWS system can also transfer liquid via a normally removed pipe spool to a target solution storage tank for sampling and verification against target solution parameters. The headspace in each RLWS system tank is swept with air by the PVVS or by the nitrogen purge system (N2PS) to remove the potential accumulation of radiolytically generated hydrogen gas.
Laboratory waste is preconditioned and manually processed separately from the RLWS system.
Liquid waste collected, blended, and stored by the RLWS system includes:
Uranium liquid waste, with uranium concentrations potentially exceeding 25 gU/l. This waste is located in the uranium liquid waste tanks.
Radioactive liquid waste, with negligible uranium concentration with respect to criticality safety (<1gU/l). This waste is stored in the liquid waste collection tanks.
Blended liquid waste, with low uranium concentrations (< 25 gU/l). Blended waste may originate from uranium liquid waste, radioactive liquid waste, or any combination of the two.
Uranium liquid waste tanks are geometrically favorable annular tanks similar in design to those used in TSSS. These tanks include two redundant overflow lines which drain to the radioactive drain system (RDS) in the event of an overfill. The uranium liquid waste tanks are connected in series to ensure high concentration uranium-bearing waste (greater than 25 gU/l) is not inadvertently transferred to the non-geometrically favorable liquid waste blending tanks.
The uranium liquid waste tanks are configured to operate in series, with the first tank receiving wastes from the following sources:
Mo-99 extraction column washes Iodine-131(I-131) recovery column washes Spent target solution Solution in radioactive drain sump tanks Solution in VTS knockout pot Decontamination liquid waste PVVS condensate tank Solution from the second uranium liquid waste tank via gravity drain from the uranium liquid waste lift tank The remaining liquid wastes are collected in four liquid waste collection tanks designed and sized to maximize storage capacity. The liquid waste collection tanks are configured to receive wastes from the following sources:
[
]PROP/ECI effluent and washes MEPS condensate and purification waste
[
]PROP/ECI washes
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Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Other Auxiliary Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 9b.7-9 Rev. 1 Process liquid wastes determined by sampling to be less than 25 gU/l are consolidated into the eight liquid waste blending tanks. The liquid waste blending tanks are configured to receive wastes from the following sources:
Second uranium liquid waste tank PVVS condensate tank Liquid waste collection tanks Uranium liquid waste is combined with the radioactive liquid waste and/or PVVS condensate in the liquid waste blending tanks for homogeneous radionuclide and uranium concentrations in the RLWI system feed.
The tanks are sized to maximize decay time thereby minimizing dose rates from the immobilized waste product. Each uranium liquid waste tank has a minimum nominal capacity of
[ ]PROP/ECI, and each of the liquid waste collection tanks and liquid waste blending tanks has a minimum nominal capacity of 600 gallons.
The RLWS system piping is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME B31.3, Process Piping (ASME, 2013).
Table 11.2-6 provides the chemical composition and radiological properties of liquid waste streams.
Table 9b.7-2 identifies the systems which interface with the RLWS system. Figure 9b.7-2, Figure 9b.7-3, and Figure 9b.7-4 provide process flow diagrams of the RLWS system.
9b.7.4.3 Operational Analysis and Safety Function Solenoid valves isolating radioactive liquid flow paths fail to the normally isolated positions.
Solenoid valves isolating the sweep gas flow path fail to the normally aligned flow from air to the PVVS vent header. Operators align the RLWS tank inlets and outlets based on procedures using information from the position indicators and instrumentation.
The RLWS system tanks, valves, and piping are located in shielded tank vaults, valve pits, and pipe trenches within the RPF. Section 11.1 provides a description of the radiation protection program, and Section 4b.2 provides a detailed description of the PFBS.
Sampling of RLWS system tank contents for pH verifies that waste solution acidity is maintained or is adjusted as necessary. Solution composition can be adjusted via the reagent addition line.
Sampling of waste tanks is performed by vacuum lift to a hot cell, where samples are remotely obtained.
Following a period of decay to reduce dose rates, waste is transferred from the liquid waste blending tanks to the RLWI system immobilization feed tank. Subsection 9b.7.3 provides a detailed discussion of the RLWI system.
RLWS system piping connected to, installed over, or installed adjacent to safety-related equipment is designed to meet seismic requirements because its failure could damage safety-related equipment such that the equipment would be prevented from performing its safety function.
Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Other Auxiliary Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 9b.7-20 Rev. 1 Table 9b.7 Radioactive Liquid Waste Immobilization System Interfaces (Sheet 1 of 2)
Interfacing System Interface Description Nitrogen purge system (N2PS)
N2PS supplies sweep gas to RLWI tank headspace cover gas upon a loss of power or loss of normal sweep gas flow to remove potential accumulation of radiolytically generated hydrogen gas.
Process vessel vent system (PVVS)
The PVVS supplies sweep gas to the immobilization feed tank headspace to remove potential accumulation of radiolytically generated hydrogen gas.
The immobilization feed tank cover gas and waste drum vent both discharge via a common header to the PVVS vent header.
Radioactive liquid waste storage (RLWS) system Immobilization feed tank receives radioactive liquid waste from the RLWS system.
Vacuum transfer system (VTS)
Suction from VTS provides the motive force for waste liquid transfer from the blending tanks to the immobilization feed tank.
Radiological ventilation zone 1 (RVZ1)
The RLWI shielded enclosure is ventilated by RVZ1.
Ventilation of the solidification skid enclosure and glovebox removes residual decay heat in the immobilization feed tank and the heat of hydration from the solidification process in the glovebox.
Radiological ventilation zone 2 (RVZ2)
The RVZ2 is the source of air supply to the shielded enclosure through RVZ2 filtration equipment.
The RVZ2 is the source of air for the vacuum break between the VTS suction header and the drum fill head vacuum test tank.
Facility nitrogen handling system (FNHS)
The FNHS provides instrument-grade pressurized nitrogen to immobilization feed tank level instrumentation.
Process integrated control system (PICS)
The components of the RLWI system are controlled and monitored by the PICS.
Normal electrical power supply system (NPSS)
The components of the RLWI system are powered by the NPSS.
Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Other Auxiliary Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 9b.7-30 Rev. 0 Figure 9b.7 RLWI System Process Flow Diagram
Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Other Auxiliary Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 9b.7-29 Rev. 1 Figure 9b.7 RLWI System Process Flow Diagram
Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Other Auxiliary Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 9b.7-33 Rev. 0 Figure 9b.7 RLWS Liquid Waste Blending Tanks Process Flow Diagram
Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Other Auxiliary Systems SHINE Medical Technologies 9b.7-32 Rev. 1 Figure 9b.7 RLWS Liquid Waste Blending Tanks Process Flow Diagram
Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Accident-Initiating Events and Scenarios SHINE Medical Technologies 13a2.1-20 Rev. 1 material by the cooling water, minimizes the potential for criticality in the PCLS and dose to workers or the public.
Because of the system characteristics and preventative controls in place, further analysis is not required.
Scenario 5 - Failure in the TOGS Causes High Pressure in the TSV during Fill Mode A failure by the TOGS to control pressure, and a resulting pressure increase during TSV filling operations, may result in a backflow of target solution. Target solution may flow through the fill line into the TSV fill lift tank, into the VTS header, and into the VTS buffer tank. This failure potentially results in radiological exposures to workers or a criticality accident in non-favorable-geometry components in the VTS.
The protection in place for this scenario is the configuration of the TSV fill line to prevent significant volume of target solution from backflowing from the TSV into the VTS lift tank. The TSV fill line connects to the TSV with an air gap. The connection is located at the approximate elevation of the TSV overflow lines. The fill line is sloped to allow it to drain after fill operations have occurred. Therefore, no significant volume of target solution will backflow from the TSV to the VTS lift tank in the event of pressurization of the TSV.
Defense-in-depth measures are also present to mitigate this scenario, which include:
the VTS vacuum valve to lift tank closes from high liquid level in the lift tank, and a drain valve for the buffer tank opens and drains to the RDS sumpRLWS if a high level in the liftbuffer tanks is detected.
Because of the system characteristics and preventative controls in place, further analysis is not required.
Scenario 6 - Target Solution Leakage within a Valve Pit A pipe or valve failure in the valve pit may be caused by overpressurization due to thermal expansion of target solution in an isolated section of piping. This pipe or valve failure results in leakage of target solution from the system into the valve pit, which subsequently could result in:
(1) increased worker or public dose, or (2) a criticality accident in the valve pit. The protections in place to mitigate the consequences of target solution leakage within a valve pit are: (1) drip pans and drains to the radioactive drain system (RDS), which prevent accumulation of solution within the valve pit and prevent criticality, and (2) valve pit shielding and confinement for fission products that could result from leakage, reducing potential dose to workers and the public.
Because this piping is potentially located in either the IF or the RPF, this event and associated dose consequences is further analyzed in Chapter13b.
13a2.1.4.3 Accident Consequences The release of target solution from the PSB to the light water pool or connected process systems results in potential radiological exposure to workers and the public. The accident consequences associated with the mishandling or malfunction of target solution are evaluated further in Subsection13a2.2.4.
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Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Accident Analysis and Determination of Consequences SHINE Medical Technologies 13a2.2-5 Rev. 1 The public dose was generally calculated over a 30-day interval at the site boundary. SThe scenarios resulting in the release of tritium from the TPS glovebox uses a 10-day release interval because it is expected that tritium recovery can be accomplished within this time frame. The /Q values are calculated at the nearest point along the site boundary and at the nearest resident location. The maximum calculated value over all directions of the 50th percentile /Q was used for both receptor locations. A ground release was used as the release point.
The environmental and meteorological conditions used to develop the atmospheric dispersion factors are discussed in Section2.3.
Conservatism Additional areas of conservatism included in the determination of radiological consequences include:
Conservative TSV power history and operational cycle:The TSV power history was derived from nearly continuous TSV operation over a [ ]PROP/ECI period at a power level that exceeds the design power level by ten percent. No credit was taken for medical isotope extraction activities that normally occur during the operation of the SHINE facility.
Conservative statistical bounding of nuclide inventory: Due to inherent uncertainties in MCNP5, multiple unique sets of results were run through ORIGEN-S to determine the nuclide inventories. The nuclide inventories were analyzed such that a 95 percent confident 95th percentile upper bound was determined for each nuclide. These uncertainties on individual nuclides, 0 to 35 percent, were added to the safety basis inventory to account for the uncertainties inherent to the methods used.
Conservative estimation of nuclide decay (linear interpolation in lieu of exponential decay):Analyses which account for the decay of nuclides between time steps use linear interpolation in lieu of exponential decay, which increases the available radionuclide inventory at the intervening points.
Condensation was conservatively neglected in the LPF model.
Uncertainties Uncertainty in the radionuclide inventory was evaluated using statistical modeling to account for uncertainties associated with the use of Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code (MCNP)
(LANL,2011) in the SHINE Best Estimate Neutronics Model (BENM). The modeling produced a nuclide-dependent multiplication factor ranging from approximately0to 35 percent increase in the nuclide inventory per nuclide. For the radionuclides which were increased, the average increase was approximately 2.5 percent, and the total estimated increase in inventory was approximately 1percent. The unweighted uncertainty associated with the multiplication factors was approximately 12 percent. Given that the majority of radionuclides either did not receive an increase or received an increase less than 10 percent and that the multiplication factor only increased the inventory this uncertainty is considered to be negligible.
Based on the results of the validation activities for the LPF model, described below, there is no additional uncertainty associated with the LPF model used in the analysis.
The DCFs used in the analysis are well-recognized and are used without consideration of uncertainty in the values.
Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Accident Analysis and Determination of Consequences SHINE Medical Technologies 13a2.2-12 Rev. 1 13a2.2.3.6 Radiological Consequences Because the postulated reduction in cooling events do not exceed any design limits or cause damage to the PSB, there are no radiological consequences to workers or the public from a reduction in cooling event.
13a2.2.4 MISHANDLING OR MALFUNCTION OF TARGET SOLUTION The bounding scenario analyzed as a design basis accident(DBA) for mishandling or malfunction of target solution is a loss of the PSB integrity which results in a release of target solution into the IU cell. This scenario is described in Subsection13a2.1.4.2 as Scenario1b.
13a2.2.4.1 Initial Conditions The TSV is operating at 110percent of its design power limit at the time of the initiating event.
Additional initial accident conditions are described in Subsection13a2.1.4.1.
13a2.2.4.2 Initiating Event The accident sequence is initiated by a catastrophic loss of PSB integrity. Potential causes of the initiating event are discussed in Subsection13a2.1.4.1.
13a2.2.4.3 Sequence of Events It is assumed that the primary confinement boundary is intact and performs a mitigation function with respect to radionuclide transport from the IU cell to the IF. The primary confinement boundary components are designed to maintain their integrity under postulated accident conditions and are maintained in accordance with the facility configuration management and maintenance requirements.
1.
A failure of the PSB leads to mixing of irradiated target solution with the IU cell light water pool.
2.
Radioactive material enters the gas space above the light water pool and is confined by the primary confinement boundary, which is described in Section6a2.2.
3.
Some radioactive material is transported into the IF through minor leakage paths around penetrations in the confinement boundary, and through the PCLS expansion tank to RVZ1e.
4.
Detection of airborne radiation in RVZ1e actuates the primary confinement boundary isolation valves and an IU trip within 20 seconds of detection. A sufficient time delay is provided by the holdup volume in RVZ1e to prevent radioactive gases from exiting through RVZ1e prior to isolation.
5.
The radioactive material is then dispersed throughout the IF and exits the facility to the environment through building penetrations.
6.
Detection of airborne radiation in RVZ1e actuates the primary confinement boundary isolation valves and an IU trip within 20 seconds of detection. A sufficient time delay is provided by design to prevent significant radioactive gases from exiting through this path prior to isolation.
7.
Detection of high radiation in the RCA actuates ventilation dampers between the RCA and the environment and minimizes the transport of radioactive material to the environment.
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Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Accident Analysis and Determination of Consequences SHINE Medical Technologies 13a2.2-13 Rev. 1 8.
Personal dosimeters, local radiation alarms, and alarms in the facility control room notify facility personnel of radiation leakage.
9.
Facility personnel evacuate the immediate area upon actuation of the radiation alarms.
No operator actions are taken or required to reach a stabilized condition or to mitigate dose consequences.
Following the failure of the PSB, it is assumed that the MAR is instantly well-mixed with the light water pool. Gases immediately evolve out of the pool and into the IU cell gas space. For the purposes of the accident analysis, it is assumed that the N2PS is operating and causes pressurization of the IU cell. Radiation transport is driven by pressure-driven flow between the IU cell and the IF. Reduction in the MAR occurs during the release due to adsorption of iodine onto the IU cell walls and other surfaces until equilibrium conditions are established. The majority of the MAR is transported to the IF through leakage through the primary confinement boundary.
Transport to the environment occurs through leakage around penetrations in the RCA boundary.
Safety Controls The safety controls credited for mitigation of the dose consequences for this accident are:
Primary confinement boundary Ventilation radiation monitors Ventilation isolation mechanisms Holdup volume in the RVZ1e 13a2.2.4.4 Damage to Equipment Chemical and radiological contamination may occur to systems within the IU cell. The contamination does not affect the safety function of the affected systems.
Following isolation of the primary confinement boundary, leakage between the IU cell and the IF is driven primarily by pressure-driven flow caused by N2PS. The IU cell sealing is a significant contributor to the function of the primary confinement boundary and will maintain its function under accident conditions.
The light water pool is required to act as a passive heat sink to remove decay heat from the irradiated target solution. The light water pool is constructed with a stainless steel liner surrounded by concrete and maintains the light water pool water inventory and will not be affected by the release of target solution.
13a2.2.4.5 Radiation Source Terms The initial MAR for this scenario is the TSV target solution inventory at the end of approximately
[ ]PROP/ECI of continuous 30-day irradiation cycles with a [ ]PROP/ECI downtime between cycles. The power level used for the analysis is 137.5 kW, which is 110percent of design operating power. The entire radionuclide inventory in the TSV is instantaneously released to the light water pool and dispersed uniformly throughout the pool.
Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Accident Analysis and Determination of Consequences SHINE Medical Technologies 13a2.2-16 Rev. 1 13a2.2.6.2 Initiating Event A seismic event is the initiating event for a tritium release into multiple IU cells. All NDAS accelerators experience vacuum boundary component failures and cause a pressurized release of tritium and SF6 gas into the eight IU cells simultaneously as a result of the seismic event.
The initial accident conditions for each IU cell are the same to those accident conditions involving the NDAS of a single IU cell, as described in Subsection13a2.1.12.1.
13a2.2.6.3 Sequence of Events The accident sequence proceeds as follows:
1.
The initiating event is a seismic event that causes the simultaneous vacuum boundary component failure in all eight NDAS units, instantaneously releasing tritium and SF6 gas into the IU cells.
2.
The IU cells become slightly pressurized due to the mass of released SF6 gas.
3.
Some tritium is transported into the IF through penetrations in the confinement boundary and through the PCLS expansion tanks to RVZ1e.
4.
Detection of high accelerator TPS interface system (ATIS) mixed gas return line pressure actuates the primary confinement boundary isolation valves and irradiation unit trips within 20 seconds of detection. A sufficient time delay is provided by the holdup volume in RVZ1e to prevent radioactive gases from exiting through RVZ1e prior to isolation.
5.
Tritium migrates to the IF through the IU cell plugs and is released to the environment.
6.
Detection of high accelerator TPS interface system (ATIS) mixed gas return line pressure actuates the primary confinement boundary isolation valves and irradiation unit trips within 20 seconds of detection. Tritium is assumed to exit by this path until isolation has occurred.
7.
Detection of high radiation in the RCA actuates ventilation dampers between the RCA and the environment and minimizes the transport of radioactive material to the environment.
8.
Personal dosimeters, local radiation alarms, and alarms in the facility control room notify facility personnel of radiation leakage.
9.
Facility personnel evacuate the immediate area within 10 minutes upon actuation of the radiation alarms.
For the first 20seconds, the mixed gas flow to RVZ1e equalizes the excess pressure and results in a direct release to the IF. After the primary confinement boundary is isolated, rRadiation transport is driven primarily by barometric breathing between the IU cell and the IF.
The safety-related SSCs in the IU cell do not fail during a seismic event, but the NDAS and its internal components are not safety-related and cannot be relied upon to remain intact following a design basis earthquake.
No operator actions are taken or required to reach a stabilized condition or to mitigate dose consequences.
Safety Controls The safety controls credited for mitigation of the dose consequences for this accident are:
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Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Accident Analysis and Determination of Consequences SHINE Medical Technologies 13a2.2-17 Rev. 1 Primary confinement boundary IU Cell Safety Actuation on high ATIS mixed gas return line pressure Ventilation isolation mechanisms Holdup volume in the RVZ1e It is assumed that the primary confinement is intact and performs a mitigation function with respect to radionuclide transport from the IU cells to the IF. The primary confinement boundary components are designed to maintain their integrity under postulated accident conditions and are maintained in accordance with the facility configuration management and maintenance systems.
13a2.2.6.4 Damage to Equipment Failure of the NDAS vacuum boundary does not cause subsequent damage to equipment. While the NDAS vacuum boundary integrity is not seismically qualified to maintain integrity, the NDAS is designed to maintain structural integrity during and following a design basis earthquake.
After the initial IU cell pressurization has reached equilibrium, leakage between the IU cells and the IF is driven primarily by barometric breathing. The leakage between the cells and the IF is not impacted by the accident sequence.
13a2.2.6.5 Radiation Source Terms The initial MAR for this scenario is a total of [
]PROP/ECI of tritium from all of the neutron driver assemblies.
The accident source term development is discussed in Section13a2.2. The LPF model values used in the source term development for the public and worker doses are provided in Table13a2.2-1 and Table13a2.2-2, respectively.
13a2.2.6.6 Radiological Consequences The radiological consequences of this accident scenario are determined as described in Section13a2.2. The results of the determination are provided in Table13a3-1 and meet the accident dose criteria.
13a2.2.7 MISHANDLING OR MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT The bounding scenario analyzed for mishandling or malfunction of equipment events is a loss of the PSB integrity which results in a release of off-gas into the TOGS cell. This scenario is described in Subsection13a2.1.7.2 as Scenario1.
13a2.2.7.1 Initial Conditions Initial accident conditions are described in Subsection13a2.1.7.1.
13a2.2.7.2 Initiating Event The accident sequence is initiated by a failure of the PSB in the TOGS within the TOGS cell. The cause of the initiating event is discussed in Subsection13a2.1.7.
Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Accident Analysis and Determination of Consequences SHINE Medical Technologies 13a2.2-18 Rev. 1 13a2.2.7.3 Sequence of Events The accident sequence proceeds as follows:
1.
A failure of the PSB in the TOGS causes a release of noble gases and iodine into the TOGS cell.
2.
The radioactive material is confined by the primary confinement boundary, which is described in Section6a2.2.
3.
Some radioactive material is transported into the IF through penetrations in the confinement boundary.
4.
The radioactive material is then dispersed throughout the IF and exits to the environment through building penetrations.
5.
Detection of high radiation in the RVZ1e ventilation from the IU cell actuates ventilation dampers and minimizes the transport of radioactive material to the environment. The assumed response time for RVZ1e ventilation is 20 seconds from detection of high airborne radiation. A sufficient time delay is provided by designthe holdup volume in RVZ1e to prevent significant radioactive gases from exiting through this pathRVZ1e prior to isolation.
6.
The TRPS initiates an IU Cell Safety Actuation signal which terminates irradiation operations and isolates the primary confinement boundary. The TRPS signal may be initiated by a TOGS failure or a RVZ1e high radiation signal. The N2PS actuates.
7.
The main facility ventilation system (i.e., RVZ2) is isolated by the ESFAS within 30seconds of detectable accident conditions. Leakage to the environment continues through unfiltered leakage pathways.
8.
Personal dosimeters, local radiation alarms, and alarms in the facility control room notify facility personnel of radiation leakage.
9.
Facility personnel evacuate the immediate area within 10 minutes upon actuation of the radiation area monitor alarms.
A portion of the gaseous iodine is adsorbed onto the cell walls, while the majority of the available MAR is transported to the IF through pressure-driven flow caused by the N2PS and leakage through the primary confinement boundary. Transport to the environment occurs through penetrations in the RCA boundary.
Safety Controls The safety controls credited for mitigation of the dose consequences for this accident are:
Primary confinement boundary Ventilation radiation monitors Ventilation isolation mechanisms Holdup volume in the RVZ1e It is assumed that the primary confinement boundary is intact and performs a mitigation function with respect to radionuclide transport from the TOGS cell to the IF. The primary confinement boundary components are designed to maintain their integrity under postulated accident conditions and are maintained in accordance with the facility configuration management and maintenance systems.
Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Accident Analysis and Determination of Consequences SHINE Medical Technologies 13a2.2-27 Rev. 1 13a2.2.12.1.3 Sequence of Events It is assumed that the primary confinement is intact and performs a mitigation function with respect to radionuclide transport from the IU cell to the IF. The primary confinement is designed to maintain its integrity under postulated accident conditions and is maintained in accordance with the facility configuration management and maintenance programs.
1.
The initiating event is a vacuum boundary component failure in the NDAS, which instantaneously releases tritium and SF6 gas into the IU cell.
2.
The IU cell becomes slightly pressurized due to the mass of released SF6 gas.
3.
Tritium is transported into the IF through penetrations in the confinement boundary and through the PCLS expansion tank to RVZ1e.
4.
Detection of high ATIS mixed gas return line pressure actuates the primary confinement boundary isolation valves and an irradiation unit trip within 20 seconds of detection. A sufficient time delay is provided by the holdup volume in RVZ1e to prevent radioactive gases from exiting through RVZ1e prior to isolation.
5.
Tritium migrates to the IF through penetrations in the primary confinement boundary and is released to the environment.
6.
Detection of high ATIS mixed gas return line pressure actuates the primary confinement boundary isolation valves and an irradiation unit trip within 20 seconds of detection.
Tritium is assumed to exit by this path until isolation has occurred.
7.
Detection of high radiation in the RCA actuates ventilation dampers between the RCA and the environment and minimizes the transport of radioactive material to the environment.
8.
Personal dosimeters, local radiation alarms, and alarms in the facility control room notify facility personnel of radiation leakage.
9.
Facility personnel evacuate the immediate area within 10 minutes upon actuation of the radiation area monitor alarms.
For the first 20seconds, a direct release to the environment is modeled. After the primary confinement boundary is isolated, rRadiation transport is primarily driven by barometric breathing between the IU cell and the IF. The accident duration used in this analysis is 10 days, after which it is assumed that recovery actions will have occurred to stop further release and dispersion of radioactive material.
Safety Controls The safety controls credited for mitigation of the dose consequences for this accident are:
Primary confinement boundary (IU cell plugs and seals)
IU Cell Safety Actuation on high ATIS mixed gas return line pressure IU cell ventilation isolations Holdup volume in the RVZ1e 13a2.2.12.1.4 Damage to Equipment Failure of the NDAS vacuum boundary does not cause subsequent damage to equipment.
Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Accident Analysis and Determination of Consequences SHINE Medical Technologies 13a2.2-28 Rev. 1 After the initial IU cell pressurization has reached equilibrium, leakage between the IU cells and the IF is driven primarily by barometric breathing. The leakage paths between the cells and the IF are not impacted by the accident sequence.
13a2.2.12.1.5 Radiation Source Terms The initial MAR for this scenario is [ ]PROP/ECI of tritium from the neutron driver assembly in the IU cell.
The accident source term development is discussed in Section 13a2.2. The LPF model values used in the source term development for the public and worker doses are provided in Table 13a2.2-1 and Table 13a2.2-2, respectively.
13a2.2.12.1.6 Radiological Consequences The radiological consequences of this accident scenario are determined as described in Section 13a2.2. The accident duration used in this analysis is 10 days, after which it is assumed that recovery actions will have occurred to stop further release and dispersion of radioactive material.
The radiological consequences of this accident scenario are provided in Table 13a3-1 and meet the accident dose criteria.
13a2.2.12.2 Tritium Release into the Tritium Purification System Glove Box A release of the tritium inventory from the TPS is analyzed as a DBA. This accident is described in Subsection 13a2.1.12.3 as TPS Scenario 1. This analysis establishes bounding radiological conditions for a release of tritium due to a TPS process deflagration, release of tritium to the facility stack, and release of tritium from the tritium storage bed.
13a2.2.12.2.1 Initial Conditions Initial conditions for facility-specific events are described in Subsection 13a2.1.12.1.
13a2.2.12.2.2 Initiating Event An event causes a break in the tritium piping and vessels such that the uncontrolled release of the entire tritium in-process inventory occurs within the tritium confinement boundary. The tritium confinement boundary is described in detail in Section 6a2.2. Potential causes of the initiating event are discussed in Subsection 13a2.1.12.3.
13a2.2.12.2.3 Sequence of Events It is assumed that the tritium confinement boundary is intact and performs a mitigation function with respect to radionuclide transport from the TPS to the IF. The tritium confinement boundary components are designed to maintain their integrity under postulated accident conditions and are maintained in accordance with the facility configuration management and maintenance programs.
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Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Accident Analysis and Determination of Consequences SHINE Medical Technologies 13a2.2-29 Rev. 1 1.
The initiating event is a break in the tritium piping and vessels which instantaneously releases the entire tritium inventory of the TPS system into the TPS glovebox.
2.
For the first 120 seconds, tritium escapes from the glovebox to the IF at 10 percent of the maximum GBSS flow rate.
3.
The glovebox ventilation shuts down after 120 seconds due to the glovebox tritium monitors.
4.
During the 30 seconds after the initiating event, the TPS room vents to the IF at an elevated rate due to the facility RVZ2 ventilation system.
5.
The RVZ2 ventilation damper from the TPS room isolates after 30 seconds due to the glovebox tritium monitors.
6.
The radioactive material is then dispersed throughout the IF and exits the facility to the environment through building penetrations.
7.
Personal dosimeters, local radiation alarms, and alarms in the facility control room notify facility personnel of radiation leakage.
8.
Facility personnel evacuate the immediate area within 10 minutes upon actuation of the radiation area monitor alarms.
Throughout the accident sequence, the leakage rate between the TPS glovebox and the TPS room is constant. After the TPS room ventilation is isolated, radiation transport is driven by air exchange between the TPS glovebox and the IF. Transport to the environment occurs through RCA boundary leak paths. The accident duration used in this analysis is 10 days, after which it is assumed that recovery actions will have occurred to stop further release and dispersion of radioactive material.
Safety Controls The safety controls credited for mitigation of this accident are:
TPS room ventilation isolations GBSS ventilation isolations TPS glovebox tritium radiation monitors Tritium confinement boundary, as described in Section6a2.2 In addition, TPS glovebox deflagration is prevented by:
TPS glovebox gas space inerted with nitrogen TSP glovebox minimum volume prevents deflagration conditions 13a2.2.12.2.4 Damage to Equipment Failure of the TPS piping and vessels does not cause subsequent damage to other equipment.
13a2.2.12.2.5 Radiation Source Terms The initial MAR for this scenario is 236,000 curies of tritium from the TPS equipment in the TPS glovebox.
The accident source term development is discussed in Section13a2.2. The LPF model values used in the source term development for the public and worker doses are provided in Table13a2.2-1 and Table13a2.2-2, respectively.
Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Accident Analysis and Determination of Consequences SHINE Medical Technologies 13a2.2-32 Rev. 1 Table 13a2.2 Summary of Radiation Transport Terms (Public)
Accident Category ARF x LPF Nobles (30-day)
Iodine (30-day)
Non-volatiles (30-day)
Tritium (10-day)
Tritium (30-day)
Maximum Hypothetical Accident (Subsection 13a2.2.1) 9.98E-01 9.98E-01 0
N/A N/A Mishandling or Malfunction of Target Solution (Subsection 13a2.2.4) 9.98E-01 1.22E-01 9.058.39E-07 N/A N/A External Events (Subsection 13a2.2.6)
N/A N/A N/A 1.75E-01N/A 3.66E-01 Mishandling or Malfunction of Equipment (Subsection 13a2.2.7) 9.98E-01 5.72E-01 0
N/A N/A Facility-Specific Events (Subsection 13a2.2.12)
Tritium Release into an IU Cell N/A N/A N/A 1.75E-01N/A 3.66E-01 Tritium Release into the Tritium Purification System Glovebox N/A N/A N/A 1.537E-01 N/A Tritium Release into the Irradiation Facility (Header Release)
N/A N/A N/A 9.30E-01N/A 1.00E+00
Table 13a2.2 Summary of Radiation Transport Terms (Worker)
Accident Category ARF x LPF (10-minute)
Nobles Iodine Non-volatiles Tritium Maximum Hypothetical Accident (Subsection 13a2.2.1) 1.19E-02 1.19E-02 0
N/A Mishandling or Malfunction of Target Solution (Subsection 13a2.2.4) 8.24E-03 4.03E-05 9.69E-11 N/A External Events (Subsection 13a2.2.6)
N/A N/A N/A 91.47E-021 Mishandling or Malfunction of Equipment (Subsection 13a2.2.7) 1.19E-02 1.17E-02 0
N/A Facility-Specific Events (Subsection 13a2.2.12)
Tritium Release into an IU Cell N/A N/A N/A 91.47E-021 Tritium Release into the Tritium Purification System Glovebox N/A N/A N/A 1.852.89E-04 Tritium Release into the Irradiation Facility (Header Release)
N/A N/A N/A 1.00E+00 Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Accident Analysis and Determination of Consequences SHINE Medical Technologies 13a2.2-33 Rev. 1
Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Summary and Conclusions SHINE Medical Technologies 13a3-2 Rev. 1 Table 13a3 Irradiation Facility Accident Dose Consequences Accident Category (Bounding Scenario)
Public Dose TEDE (mrem)
Worker Dose TEDE (mrem)
Maximum Hypothetical Accident (Subsection 13a2.2.1)
TOGS failure with complete PVVS blockage 3676 4800 Insertion of Excess Reactivity (Subsection 13a2.2.2)
No consequences Reduction in Cooling (Subsection 13a2.2.3)
No consequences Mishandling or Malfunction of Target Solution (Subsection 13a2.2.4)
Primary system boundary leak into an IU cell 65 1480 Loss of Off-Site Power (LOOP) (Subsection 13a2.2.5)
No consequences External Events (Subsection 13a2.2.6) 59106 411930 Mishandling or Malfunction of Equipment (Subsection 13a2.2.7) 234 4760 Large Undamped Power Oscillations (Subsection 13a2.2.8)
No consequences Detonation and Deflagration affecting the Primary System Boundary (Subsection 13a2.2.9)
No consequences Unintended Exothermic Chemical Reactions other than Detonation (Subsection 13a2.2.10)
No consequences System Interaction Events (Subsection 13a2.2.11)
No consequences Facility-Specific Events (Subsection 13a2.2.12)
Tritium Release into an IU Cell 713 513616 Tritium Release into the Tritium Purification System Glove Box 32635 4671 Tritium Release into the Irradiation Facility (Header Release) 257 3140
Radioisotope Production Facility Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Accident Analysis Methodology SHINE Medical Technologies 13b.1-4 Rev. 1 consequences above the appropriate evaluation guidelines for worker or public exposure were then subject to control selection. Appropriate preventative or mitigative controls were identified to reduce the overall risk of the evaluated scenarios to within acceptable limits. For accident sequences that are not prevented and have mitigative controls applied, the radiological or chemical consequences were quantitatively evaluated to demonstrate the effectiveness of the selected controls. The radiological consequences of accidents that were selected for additional evaluation are further evaluated in Section13b.2. The accident analysis for chemical exposures is provided in Section13b.3.
13b.1.2.1 Maximum Hypothetical Accident in the RPF The MHA in the RPF is a fire in a carbon guard bed with degraded performance of the downstream carbon delay beds.
The initiating event for this accident is ignition of transient combustibles or exothermic chemical reaction in the bed resulting the formation of a hot spot and eventually a fire. Redundant tTemperature sensorsindication normally detect the fires an increase in temperature and initiate an isolation of the affected carbon guard bed is isolated. The carbon guard bed releases its inventory to the downstream carbon delay beds which are normally credited with adsorbing 99 percent of the released iodine. For the MHA, the carbon delay beds are assumed to be operating at a reduced efficiency of 95 percent. TheAnalysis demonstrates that the carbon guard bed is assumed to be isolated on high exit gas temperature after 100 percent of the material-at-risk is released from the guard bed to prevent damage offire will not propagate to the carbon delay beds. This scenario is described further in Subsection13b.2.1.
13b.1.2.2 External Events The external initiating events for the RPF that were evaluated include seismic events, tornados or high winds, small aircraft impacts, flooding, fires, and chemical releases. The SHINE main production facility is designed to withstand credible external events, as described in Subsection13a2.1.6. External events were considered as potential IEs for a number of accident scenarios that fall within the other accident categories. The design basis seismic event results in potential chemical consequences, as described below and in Section13b.3.
A design basis flooding event could result in potential flooding of internal vaults, trenches, and pits, as well as the URSS and TSPS rooms. Flooding of the areas that contain fissile material reduces the margin to criticality and challenges the double-contingency principle. Water intrusion into these areas is minimized by sealed covers for the below-grade locations and by elevated room floors for the URSS and TSPS rooms. The local maximum probable precipitation event resulting in a 100-year flood will not exceed the first-floor entrance elevations, providing additional margin.
External event scenarios are further described in Subsection13b.2.3.
13b.1.2.3 RPF Critical Equipment Malfunction Critical equipment malfunctions in the RPF were evaluated as part of the accident analysis.
Multiple scenarios were identified as having potential radiological consequences and were selected for additional evaluation. The identified scenarios are described below. For each scenario, the controls that act to reduce the likelihood or consequences of the accident are listed.
Radioisotope Production Facility Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Accident Analysis Methodology SHINE Medical Technologies 13b.1-5 Rev. 1 For scenarios that require mitigative controls, the radiological consequence assessments for limiting exposures are presented in Subsection13b.2.4.
Scenario 1 - Spill of Target Solution in the Supercell (MEPS Column Misalignment)
A spill of target solution in the supercell has the potential to release radioactive gases, aerosol, and particulates into the hot cell and ventilation system. Potential consequences of spilled target solution in the supercell include radiological dose. To mitigate the impact of spilled target solution, the following controls are applied: the supercell is designed as a confinement boundary, hot cell exhaust ventilation (radiological ventilation zone 1 [RVZ1]) is equipped with radiation monitors that provide a signal to the engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) to isolate the affected cell and limit the amount of target solution introduced into the cell, hot cell outlet (RVZ1) ducts are equipped with carbon filters, hot cell inlet (radiological ventilation zone 2
[RVZ2]) and outlet (RVZ1) ventilation ducts are equipped with ESFAS-controlled redundant isolation dampers, and ESFAS-controlled MEPS extraction pump breakers, VTS vacuum transfer pump breakers, and VTS vacuum break valves are provided to limit the amount of target solution introduced into the affected hot cell. This scenario is further described in Subsection13b.2.4.1.
Scenario 2 - Spill of Target Solution in the Supercell (MEPS Overpressurization)
A spill of target solution in the supercell caused by MEPS overpressurization has the potential to release radioactive gases, aerosol, and particulates into the hot cell and ventilation system.
Potential consequences of spilled target solution in the supercell include radiological dose. To prevent deflagrations, which may cause overpressure events, the nitrogen purge system (N2PS) automatically actuates on a failure of PVVS and is relied on to dilute hydrogen concentrations in tanks and vessels in the RPF. Additionally, target solution extraction pumps are provided pressure relief mechanisms. To mitigate the impact of spilled target solution, the following controls are applied: the supercell is designed as a confinement boundary, hot cell exhaust ventilation (RVZ1) is equipped with radiation monitors that provide a signal to ESFAS to isolate the affected cell and limit the amount of target solution introduced into the cell, hot cell outlet (RVZ1) ducts are equipped with carbon filters, hot cell inlet (RVZ2) and outlet (RVZ1) ventilation ducts are equipped with ESFAS-controlled redundant isolation dampers, and ESFAS-controlled.
MEPS extraction pump breakers, VTS vacuum transfer pump breakers, and VTS vacuum break valves are provided to limit the amount of target solution introduced into the affected hot cell. This scenario is further described in Subsection13b.2.4.1.
Scenario 3 - Spill of Molybdenum Eluate Solution in the Supercell (Overfill or Drop of Rotovap Flask)
A spill of the molybdenum solution in the MEPS purification cell may result in the release of radioactive gases, aerosol, and particulates into the hot cell and ventilation system. Potential consequences of spilled eluate solution in a hot cell include radiological dose. To mitigate the impact of spilled eluate solution, the following controls are applied: the supercell is designed as a confinement boundary, hot cell exhaust ventilation (RVZ1) is equipped with radiation monitors that provide a signal to ESFAS to isolate the affected cell, hot cell outlet (RVZ1) ducts are equipped with carbon filters, and hot cell inlet (RVZ2) and outlet (RVZ1) ventilation ducts are equipped with ESFAS-controlled redundant isolation dampers. The resulting sequence of events for this scenario is analogous to the MEPS eluate spill described in Subsection13b.2.4.2.
Radioisotope Production Facility Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Accident Analysis Methodology SHINE Medical Technologies 13b.1-6 Rev. 1 Scenario 4 - Spill of Target Solution in the Supercell (IXP Column Misalignment)
A spill of target solution in the IXP extraction cell caused by IXP column misalignment has the potential to release radioactive gases, aerosol, and particulates into the hot cell and ventilation system. Potential consequences of spilled target solution in supercell include radiological dose.
To mitigate the impact of spilled target solution, the following controls are applied: the supercell is designed as a confinement boundary, hot cell exhaust ventilation (RVZ1) is equipped with radiation monitors that provide a signal to ESFAS to isolate the affected cell and limit the amount of target solution introduced into the cell, hot cell outlet (RVZ1) ducts are equipped with carbon filters, hot cell inlet (RVZ2) and outlet (RVZ1) ventilation ducts are equipped with ESFAS-controlled redundant isolation dampers, and ESFAS-controlled IXP extraction pump breakers, VTS vacuum transfer pump breakers, and VTS vacuum break valves are provided to limit the amount of target solution introduced into the affected hot cell. This scenario is further described in Subsection13b.2.4.1.
Scenario 5 - Spill of Target Solution in the Supercell (IXP Overpressurization)
A spill of target solution in the IXP extraction cell caused by IXP column overpressurization has the potential to release radioactive gases, aerosol, and particulates into the hot cell and ventilation system. Potential consequences of spilled target solution in the supercell include radiological dose. To prevent hydrogen deflagrations, which may cause overpressure events, the N2PS automatically actuations on a failure of PVVS and is relied on to dilute hydrogen concentrations in tanks and vessels in the RPF. Additionally, target solution extraction pumps are provided pressure relief mechanisms. To mitigate the impact of spilled target solution, the following controls are applied: the supercell is designed as a confinement boundary, hot cell exhaust ventilation (RVZ1) is equipped with radiation monitors that provide a signal to ESFAS to isolate the affected cell and limit the amount of target solution introduced into the cell, hot cell outlet (RVZ1) ducts are equipped with carbon filters, hot cell inlet (RVZ2) and outlet (RVZ1) ventilation ducts are equipped with ESFAS-controlled redundant isolation dampers, and ESFAS-controlled IXP extraction pump breakers, VTS vacuum transfer pump breakers, and VTS vacuum break valves are provided to limit the amount of target solution introduced into the affected hot cell. This scenario is further described in Subsection13b.2.4.1.
Scenario 6 - Spill of Target Solution in the Supercell (Liquid Nitrogen Leak in IXP Hot Cell)
A liquid nitrogen leak in the IXP hot cell may damage components in the supercell and result in a spill of target solution in the hot cell, with the potential to release radioactive gases, aerosol, and particulates into the supercell and ventilation system. Potential consequences of spilled target solution in the supercell include radiological dose. To mitigate the impact of spilled target solution, the following controls are applied: the supercell is designed as a confinement boundary, hot cell exhaust ventilation (RVZ1) is equipped with radiation monitors that provide a signal to ESFAS to isolate the affected cell and limit the amount of target solution introduced into the cell, hot cell inlet (RVZ2) and outlet (RVZ1) ventilation ducts are equipped with ESFAS-controlled redundant isolation dampers, hot cell outlet (RVZ1) ducts are equipped with carbon filters, and ESFAS-controlled IXP extraction pump breakers, VTS vacuum transfer pump breakers, and VTS vacuum break valves are provided to limit the amount of target solution introduced into the affected hot cell. This scenario is further described in Subsection13b.2.4.1.
Radioisotope Production Facility Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Accident Analysis Methodology SHINE Medical Technologies 13b.1-7 Rev. 1 Scenario 7 - Spill of Iodine Solution in the Supercell (Overfill or Drop of Iodine Solution Bottle)
A spill of iodine eluate solution in the IXP cell results in the release of radioactive gases, aerosols, and particulates into the hot cell and ventilation system. Potential consequences of iodine solution spilling inside the IXP cell include radiological dose. To mitigate the impact of spilled iodine solution, the following controls are applied: the supercell is designed as a confinement boundary, hot cell exhaust ventilation (RVZ1) is equipped with radiation monitors that provide a signal to ESFAS to isolate the affected cell, hot cell outlet (RVZ1) ducts are equipped with carbon filters, and hot cell inlet (RVZ2) and outlet (RVZ1) ventilation ducts are equipped with ESFAS-controlled redundant isolation dampers. The resulting sequence of events for this scenario is analogous to the MEPS eluate spill described in Subsection13b.2.4.2.
Scenario 8 - Spill of Target Solution in the Pipe Trench from a Single Pipe A spill of target solution in the pipe trench results in the release of radioactive gases, aerosols, and particulates into the pipe trench. Potential consequences of spilled target solution inside the pipe trench include radiological dose. To mitigate the impact of spilled target solution, the following controls are applied: the pipe trench is designed as a confinement boundary, RDS drains prevent the accumulation of target solution in the pipe trench, the RDS sump tank liquid detection sensor detects fluid in-leakage and provides a signal to ESFAS to stop any in-process transfers of solution within the facility via opening ESFAS-controlled VTS vacuum transfer pump breakers and VTS vacuum break valves, and the RVZ1 and RVZ2 building exhausts are equipped with radiation monitors that provide a signal to ESFAS to isolate the building ventilation supply and exhaust dampers on high radiation. This scenario is further described in Subsection13b.2.4.3.
Scenario 9 - Spill of Target Solution in the Pipe Trench from Multiple Pipes A spill of target solution in the pipe trench results in the release of radioactive gases, aerosols, and particulates into the hot cell and ventilation system. Potential consequences of spilled target solution in the pipe trench include radiological dose. To prevent the failure of multiple target solution-carrying pipes, the pipes are seismically qualified. This scenario is further described in Subsection13b.2.4.3.
Scenario 10 - Spill of Target Solution in a Tank Vault (Hold Tank Leak or Rupture)
A spill of target solution in a tank vault results in a release of radioactive gases, aerosols, and particulates into the tank vault. Potential consequences of target solution spilling in the tank vault include radiological dose. To mitigate the impact of spilled target solution, the following controls are applied: the tank vault is designed as a confinement boundary, RDS drains prevent the accumulation of target solution in the tank vault, the RDS sump tank liquid detection sensor detects fluid in-leakage and provides a signal to ESFAS to stop any in-process transfers of solution within the facility via opening ESFAS-controlled VTS vacuum transfer pump breakers and VTS vacuum break valves, and the RVZ1 and RVZ2 building exhausts are equipped with radiation monitors that provide a signal to ESFAS to isolate the building ventilation supply and exhaust dampers on high radiation. This scenario is further described in Subsection13b.2.4.4.
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Radioisotope Production Facility Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Accident Analysis Methodology SHINE Medical Technologies 13b.1-8 Rev. 1 Scenario 11 - Spill of Target Solution in a Tank Vault (Hold Tank Deflagration)
A spill of target solution in a tank vault caused by a hold tank deflagration results a release of radioactive gases, aerosols, and particulates into the tank vault. Potential consequences of target solution spilling in the tank vault include radiological dose. To prevent a deflagration in the hold tank, the N2PS automatically actuates on a failure of PVVS and is relied upon to dilute hydrogen concentrations. To mitigate the impact of spilled target solution, the following controls are applied: the tank vault is designed as a confinement boundary, RDS drains prevent the accumulation of target solution in the tank vault, the RDS sump tank liquid detection sensor detects fluid in-leakage and provides a signal to ESFAS to stop any in-process transfers of solution within the facility via opening ESFAS-controlled VTS vacuum transfer pump breakers and VTS vacuum break valves, and the RVZ1 and RVZ2 building exhausts are equipped with radiation monitors that provide a signal to ESFAS to isolate the building ventilation supply and exhaust dampers on high radiation. This scenario is further described in Subsection13b.2.4.4.
Scenario 12 - Spill of Target Solution in a Tank Vault (Seismic Event)
A spill of target solution in a tank vault caused by a seismic event results in a release of radioactive gases, aerosols, and particulates into the tank vault. Potential consequences of target solution spilling in the tank vault include radiological dose. To prevent seismically caused damage, the process tanks and piping are designed to withstand earthquakes. To mitigate the impact of spilled target solution, the following controls are applied: the tank vault is designed as a confinement boundary, RDS drains prevent the accumulation of target solution in the tank vault, the RDS sump tank liquid detection sensor detects fluid in-leakage and provides a signal to ESFAS to stop any in-process transfers of solution within the facility via opening ESFAS-controlled VTS vacuum transfer pump breakers and VTS vacuum break valves, and the RVZ1 and RVZ2 building exhausts are equipped with radiation monitors that provide a signal to ESFAS to isolate the building ventilation supply and exhaust dampers on high radiation. This scenario is further described in Subsection13b.2.4.4.
Scenario 13 - Spill of Molybdenum Eluate in the Supercell (Deflagration)
Loss of sweep gas flow from PVVS through the eluate tank in the supercell may result in a buildup of hydrogen in the eluate tank and a subsequent deflagration. A spill of molybdenum eluate caused by a deflagration in the eluate tank results in the release radioactive gases, aerosols, and particulates into the hot cell. Potential consequences of spilled eluate solution in a hot cell include radiological dose. To prevent deflagrations in tanks and vessels in the RPF, the N2PS automatically actuates upon a loss of PVVS and is relied upon to dilute hydrogen concentrations. To mitigate the impact of spilled eluate solution, the following controls are applied: the supercell is designed as a confinement boundary, hot cell exhaust ventilation (RVZ1) is equipped with radiation monitors that provide a signal to ESFAS to isolate the affected cell, hot cell outlet (RVZ1) ducts are equipped with carbon filters, and hot cell inlet (RVZ2) and outlet (RVZ1) ventilation ducts are equipped with ESFAS-controlled redundant isolation dampers. This scenario is further described in Subsection13b.2.4.2.
Scenario 14 - Target Solution Leaking out of the Supercell (MEPS [
]PROP/ECI Leak)
A leak in the MEPS extraction column [
]PROP/ECI allows target solution to enter the
[
]PROP/ECI. Potential consequences of target solution leaking into the [
Radioisotope Production Facility Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Accident Analysis Methodology SHINE Medical Technologies 13b.1-10 Rev. 1 sequence is prevented. The RLWI enclosure damage scenario is further described in Subsection13b.2.4.5.
Scenario 19 - Heavy Load Drop onto a Tank Vault or Pipe Trench Cover Block A crane failure or operator error resulting in a heavy load drop on a tank vault or pipe trench cover block causes a damage to the cover block and internal equipment. Potential consequences of a heavy load drop include radiological dose. To prevent damage to a cover block, the cover blocks have been designed to withstand a heavy load drop. This scenario was evaluated qualitatively and is not described in Section13b.2 because the accident sequence is prevented.
13b.1.2.4 RPF Inadvertent Nuclear Criticality Nuclear criticality safety (NCS) in the RPF is accomplished through the use of criticality safety controls to prevent criticality during normal and abnormal conditions. Each process that involves the use, handling, or storage of SNM is evaluated by the SHINE nuclear criticality safety staff under the requirements of the NCS program. The results of the criticality safety evaluations are incorporated into the ISA. Radiological consequences of criticality accidents are not included in the accident analysis because preventative controls are used to ensure criticality events are highly unlikely. Further discussion of the criticality safety bases for RPF processes is included in Section6b.3.
13b.1.2.5 RPF Fire The RPF was evaluated for internal fire risks based on the fire hazards analysis (FHA). The FHA documents the facility fire areas and each area was individually evaluated for fire risks. Internal facility fires are generally evaluated as an initiating event for the release of radioactive material and are included in the scenarios evaluated in Section13a2.1 and this section. Two unique scenarios are described below and evaluated in detail in Section13b.2.
The main production facility maintains a facility fire protection plan to reduce the risks of fires, as described in Section9a2.3.
Scenario 1 - PVVS Carbon Delay Bed Fire An upset or malfunction in the PVVS (high moisture or high temperature) results in ignition of the carbon media in a delay bed. A fire in the carbon delay bed results in a release of the captured radioactive material into the PVVS downstream of the delay bed and to the environment via the facility exhaust stack. A release to the environment results in radiological exposure to the public.
Release of radioactive material in excess of acceptable levels is prevented by the carbon delay bed carbon monoxide (CO) detectors, which provide a signal to ESFAS to close the PVVS carbon delay bed isolation valves for the affected carbon delay bed group and bypass the affected group in the event of high CO concentration indicative of a fire in thea bed. Releases to the RPF are further mitigated by the process confinement boundary (carbon delay bed vaults).
This scenario is further described in Subsection13b.2.6.1.
Radioisotope Production Facility Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Accident Analysis Methodology SHINE Medical Technologies 13b.1-11 Rev. 1 Scenario 2 - PVVS Carbon Guard Bed Fire An upset or malfunction in the PVVS (high moisture or high temperature) results in ignition of the carbon media in a guard bed. A fire in the guard bed results in a release of the captured radioactive material into the PVVS downstream of the guard bed, into the delay beds, and to the environment via the facility exhaust stack. A release to the environment results in radiological exposure to the public. Release of radioactive material in excess of acceptable levels is prevented by the carbon guard bed temperature sensors, which provide a signal to ESFAS to close the PVVS carbon guard bed isolation valves for the affected carbon guard bed in the event of high temperature indicative of a fire in the bed. Additionally, the downstream carbon delay beds, which reduce or delay radioisotope release. Releases to the RPF are further mitigated by the supercell confinement boundary. This scenario is further described in Subsection13b.2.6.2.
13b.1.2.6 RPF Chemical Accidents Potential chemical exposures in the RPF were evaluated to identify chemical hazards and necessary controls. The bounding inventories of chemicals used in the main production facility were identified and evaluated for exposure to workers and the public. Only exposure to uranium oxide presents a risk that exceeds the applicable evaluation criteria. This scenario is discussed further in Section13b.3.
Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Analyses of Accidents with Radiological Consequences SHINE Medical Technologies 13b.2-1 Rev. 1 13b.2 ANALYSES OF ACCIDENTS WITH RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES Several design basis accidents described in Section13b.1 result in a release of radioactive materials into or outside the controlled areas of the facility.
The analyses in this section evaluate the applicable radiological consequences of these accidents to demonstrate than an individual located in the unrestricted area following the onset of a postulated accidental release of licensed material would not receive a radiation dose in excess of 500 mrem total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) for the duration of the accident.
Radiological consequences to workers are also evaluated and are shown to not exceed 5 rem TEDE during the accident.
13b.2.1 MAXIMUM HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT IN THE RPF The maximum hypothetical accident (MHA) in the radioisotope production facility (RPF) is a fire in a carbon guard bed with degraded carbon delay bed efficiency. It is postulated that 100percent of the radionuclide inventory is released from the guard bed and flows downstream into the carbon delay beds and is then released to the facility stack. The performance of the carbon delay beds is assumed to be degraded to 95 percent. The automatically mitigated release from a credible carbon guard bed fire is discussed in Subsection13b.2.6.2.
Initial Conditions The process vessel vent system (PVVS) is operating normally, with nominal flow through one carbon guard bed.
The affected carbon guard bed contains radioactive iodine from RPF process streams. The material-at-risk (MAR) in this scenario is a combination of gases from eight irradiation units (IU),
with various modifiers applied to account for decay and operational sequencing.
Initiating Event An upset or malfunction in the PVVS results in high moisture or high temperature flow through the carbon guard bed. The high moisture or high temperature results in ignition of the carbon guard bed absorber media. Potential initiating events for this scenario are discussed further in Subsection13b.1.2.1.
Sequence of Events 1.
Ignition of one of the carbon guard beds occurs, resulting in an exothermic release of 100percent of the stored radioactive material to the gas piping downstream of the guard bed.
2.
The downstream carbon delay beds adsorb 95 percent of the radioactive material.
3.
The radioactive material exiting the carbon delay beds is released to the environment through the PVVS and facility stack.
4.
Automatic isolation of the guard bed occurs before the gas temperature exiting the bed reaches 180°C to protect the downstream carbon delay beds from damage. The maximum gas temperature entering the carbon delay beds is 130°C, which is insufficient to propagate the fire condition to the carbon delay bed. Temperature instrumentation in
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Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Analyses of Accidents with Radiological Consequences SHINE Medical Technologies 13b.2-2 Rev. 1 the carbon guard bed detects increased temperature and the carbon guard beds are isolated. However, the isolation of the carbon guard bed is not credited for limiting the release of radioactive materials from the carbon guard bed in this scenario.
Damage to Equipment The occurrence of fire damages the affected carbon guard bed and eliminates its ability to function. No other damage to the PVVS system or its components occurs.
Transport of Radioactive Material The methods used to calculate radioactive material transport are described in Section13a2.2.
The leak path factor (LPF) model terms used in this accident are provided in Table13b.2-1. For this accident, the release of material from the guard bed is assumed to be instantaneous and is transported to the environment at an increased rate.
Radiation Source Terms The initial MAR for this scenario is a portion of the iodine gas inventory evolved from target solution during normal operations. Development of the accident source term for this scenario is discussed further in Section13a2.2.
The iodine gas inventory is produced by fission and decay of fission products and continuously evolved from the target solution and through the target solution vessel (TSV) off-gas system (TOGS) during operations. Partitioning fractions for iodine gas are used to describe the quantities of iodine in solution that move to the RPF. Removal of iodine by the TOGS zeolite beds are credited for all gases that are transported to the RPF. The MAR uses selected time intervals for the most recent purges (i.e., [
]PROP/ECI) to account for the operational sequencing of the combined eight IUs. The MAR assumes the combined iodine gas inventory produced by eight IUs over approximately [ ]PROP/ECI of irradiation with the most recent purges of [
]PROP/ECI. The iodine accumulates in the carbon guard bed and decays.
Radiological Consequences The radioactive material is contained in the PVVS system and does not result in worker exposure. The radiological consequences of this accident scenario are determined as described in Section13a2.2. The results of the determination are provided in Table13b.2-2.
13b.2.2 LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER Loss of off-site power (LOOP) was evaluated in the accident analysis as an initiating event for a number of critical equipment malfunction scenarios. A facility-wide LOOP results in automatic actuation of multiple facility engineered safety features, which act to ensure the risk associated with radiological or chemical releases is reduced to within acceptable limits. The facility-wide LOOP does not result in system or component failures within the RPF that result in unacceptable radiological or chemical consequences. The facility-wide LOOP is further discussed in Subsection13a2.1.5 and Subsection13a2.2.5.
Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Analyses of Accidents with Radiological Consequences SHINE Medical Technologies 13b.2-4 Rev. 1 Initiating Event An event causes a break in the MEPS piping between the extraction pump discharge and the extraction column. The break downstream of the pump discharge causes spray and aerosolization of the target solution without any extraction of isotopes by the extraction column.
Potential initiating events for this scenario and analogous scenarios for the iodine and xenon purification (IXP) system cell are discussed further in Subsection13b.1.2.3; Scenarios 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6.
Sequence of Events 1.
A break in the MEPS piping between the extraction pump discharge and the extraction column occurs.
2.
Aerosolized target solution sprays from the break into the hot cell, releasing radioactive material into the hot cell and causing the cell to become pressurized to the nominal pressure of the cell drain loop seal.
3.
Radiation detectors in the hot cell exhaust ventilation detect high airborne radiation and cause the engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) to shut down the vacuum transfer system (VTS), shut down the extraction pump, and isolate the hot cell ventilation.
4.
Leakage of radioactive material from the hot cell to the RPF and the environment through the ventilation dampers occurs, resulting in radiological consequences to workers and the public.
The maximum volume of spilled target solution in this accident scenario is limited by the volume of the vacuum lift tanks and installed piping of the MEPS. The ESFAS shutdown of the VTS prevents additional target solution from entering the hot cell after high radiation has been detected. The analyzed volume of target solution for this scenario is 30 liters, which is conservatively based on the volume of two vacuum lift tanks plus additional pipe volume.
The controls credited for mitigation of the dose consequences for this accident are:
Supercell confinement boundary Hot cell radiological ventilation zone 1 (RVZ1) radiation monitors Hot cell RVZ1 outlet carbon filters (radioiodine)
Inlet (radiological ventilation zone 2 [RVZ2]) and outlet (RVZ1) ventilation isolation dampers MEPS or IXP extraction pump breakers VTS vacuum transfer pump breakers VTS vacuum break valves ESFAS Supercell Isolation function ESFAS VTS Safety Actuation function Damage to Equipment The leak of target solution in the supercell does not cause subsequent damage to equipment.
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Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Analyses of Accidents with Radiological Consequences SHINE Medical Technologies 13b.2-5 Rev. 1 Transport of Radioactive Material The methods used to calculate radioactive material transport are described in Section13a2.2.
The LPF model terms used in this accident are provided in Table13b.2-1.
Radiation Source Terms The initial MAR for this scenario is 30 liters of target solution from the IU at [ ]PROP/ECI post-shutdown. The action of the TOGS during this [
]PROP/ECI period removes more than 67percent of the iodine present in the solution at shutdown. It is conservatively assumed that 35percent of the post-shutdown iodine inventory is released to the supercell during the accident. Additionally, partitioning fractions are applied to the noble gases present in target solution. Development of the accident source term for this scenario is discussed further in Section13a2.2.
Radiological Consequences The radiological consequences of this accident scenario are determined as described in Section13a2.2. The results of the determination are shown in Table13b.2-2.
13b.2.4.2 Spill of Eluate Solution in the Supercell Initial Conditions At the time of the initiating event, eluate solution in the MEPS eluate tank is spilled onto the floor of the hot cell, releasing radioactive material into the hot cell atmosphere.
Initiating Event An event causes the failure of the MEPS eluate tank, which results in a spill of eluate solution.
Potential initiating events for this scenario and analogous scenarios for the purification and IXP cells are discussed further in Subsection13b.1.2.3; Scenarios 3, 7, and 13.
Sequence of Events 1.
A break in the MEPS eluate tank occurs.
2.
Eluate solution spills from the tank into the hot cell, releasing radioactive material into the hot cell and causing the cell to become pressurized to the nominal pressure of the cell drain loop seal.
3.
Radiation detectors in the hot cell exhaust ventilation detect high airborne radiation and cause ESFAS to isolate hot cell ventilation.
4.
Leakage of radioactive material from the hot cell to the RPF and the environment through the ventilation dampers occurs, resulting in radiological consequences to workers and the public.
The controls credited for mitigation of the dose consequences for this accident are:
Supercell confinement boundary Hot cell RVZ1 radiation monitors Hot cell RVZ1 outlet carbon filters (radioiodine)
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Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Analyses of Accidents with Radiological Consequences SHINE Medical Technologies 13b.2-7 Rev. 1 4.
A portion of the released material leaks through the process confinement boundary (trench cover) into the RPF and the environment, resulting in radiological consequences to workers and the public.
5.
Liquid detection in the RDS sump tank sends a signal to ESFAS, which opens the VTS vacuum pump breakers and the VTS vacuum break valves to stop transfers of solution in the RPF. It is assumed that up to 70 liters of target solution are released in the course of the accident.
The controls credited for mitigation of the dose consequences for this accident are:
Process confinement boundary (trench or pit cover and cover seal)
RDS drains to the RDS sump tank RDS sump tank liquid detection sensors VTS vacuum transfer pump breakers VTS vacuum break valves ESFAS VTS Safety Actuation function Additional controls described in Subsection13b.1.2.3 are provided but not credited in the dose analysis.
Damage to Equipment The leak of target solution into the pipe trench does not cause further damage to equipment.
Transport of Radioactive Material The methods used to calculate radioactive material transport are described in Section13a2.2.
The LPF model terms used in this accident are provided in Table13b.2-1.
Radiation Source Terms The initial MAR for this scenario is 70 litersa batch of target solution from the IU at [
]PROP/ECI post-shutdown. The action of the TOGS during this [
]PROP/ECI period removes more than 67percent of the iodine present in the solution at shutdown. It is conservatively assumed that 35percent of the post-shutdown iodine inventory is released to the pipe trench during the accident. The volume used in this analysis is based on the available volume of the VTS lift tanks and associated piping. It is assumed that this is maximum volume that can be released from the system before the ESFAS actuation shuts down the VTS. Additionally, partitioning fractions are applied to the noble gases present in target solution. Development of the accident source term for this scenario is discussed further in Section13a2.2.
Radiological Consequences The radiological consequences of this accident scenario are determined as described in Section13a2.2. The results of the determination are provided in Table13b.2-2.
Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Analyses of Accidents with Radiological Consequences SHINE Medical Technologies 13b.2-11 Rev. 1 The affected carbon delay bed contains noble gases from RPF process streams. The MAR in this scenario is a combination of gases from eight IUs with various modifiers applied to account for decay and processing capacity of target solution batches in the supercell.
Initiating Event An upset or malfunction in the PVVS results in high moisture or high temperature flow through the carbon delay bed. The high moisture or high temperature results in ignition of the carbon delay bed absorber media. Potential initiating events are discussed further in Subsection13b.1.2.5, Scenario 1.
Sequence of Events 1.
Ignition of the carbon delay bed occurs, resulting in an exothermic release of stored radioactive material to the PVVS downstream of the delay bed.
2.
Radioactive material is released to the environment through the PVVS and facility stack.
3.
Incipient fire conditions are detected by the in-line carbon monoxide detectors, which send an actuation signal to the ESFAS.
4.
ESFAS isolates the affected carbon delay bed group using installed actuation valves.
Valve closure is assumed to occur within 30 seconds of detection for bounding consequence determination.
5.
Following valve closure, the gross release of radioactive material is stopped and the fire is extinguished. Leakage through the valve occurs at a diminished rate.
The components credited for mitigation of the dose consequences for this accident are:
PVVS carbon delay bed carbon monoxide detectors PVVS carbon delay bed isolation valves ESFAS carbon delay bed isolation function Damage to Equipment The occurrence of fire damages the affected carbon delay bed and eliminates its ability to function. No other damage to the PVVS system or its components occurs.
Transport of Radioactive Material The methods used to calculate radioactive material transport are described in Section13a2.2.
The LPF model terms used in this accident are provided in Table13b.2-1. For this accident, the release of material for the first 30 seconds is assumed to be instantaneous and is transported to the environment at an increased rate. Following isolation valve actuation, the transport occurs at a reduced rate.
Radiation Source Terms The initial MAR for this scenario is a portion of the noble gas inventory evolved from target solution during normal operations. Development of the accident source term for this scenario is discussed further in Section13a2.2.
Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Analyses of Accidents with Radiological Consequences SHINE Medical Technologies 13b.2-12 Rev. 1 The noble gas inventory is produced by decay of fission products and continuously evolved from the target solution and through the TOGS during operations. The MAR uses selected time intervals for the most recent purges (i.e., [ ]PROP/ECI) to account for the processing capacity of target solution batches in the supercell for the combined eight IU. The gases accumulate in the carbon delay bed and decay. The MAR assumes the combined noble gas inventory produced by eight IUs over approximately [
]PROP/ECI of irradiation with the most recent purges of [
]PROP/ECI. Partitioning fractions for noble gases are used to describe the quantities of noble gases in solution that move to the RPF to account for removal during movement of solution.
Radiological Consequences The radioactive material is contained in the PVVS system and does not result in worker exposure. The radiological consequences of this accident scenario are determined as described in Section 13a2.2. The results of the determination are provided in Table 13b.2-2.
13b.2.6.2 PVVS Carbon Guard Bed Fire Initial Conditions The PVVS is operating normally, with nominal flow through a carbon guard bed.
The affected carbon guard bed contains iodine from RPF process streams. The MAR in this scenario is a combination of iodine from eight IUs with various modifiers applied to account for decay and processing capacity of target solution batches in the supercell.
Initiating Event An upset or malfunction in the PVVS results in high moisture or high temperature flow through the carbon guard bed. The high moisture or high temperature results in ignition of the carbon guard bed adsorber material. Potential initiating events are discussed further in Section 13b.1.2.5, Scenario 2.
Sequence of Events 1.
Ignition of the carbon guard bed occurs, resulting in an exothermic release of stored radioactive material to the PVVS downstream of the guard bed.
2.
Radioactive material is captured by the downstream carbon delay bed and filtered. One percent of the released radioactive material is released through PVVS and the facility stack to the environment.
3.
Incipient fire conditions are detected by redundant temperature indication in the guard bed, which send an actuation signal to the ESFAS.
4.
ESFAS isolates the carbon guard bed using installed isolation valves. Valve closure is accomplished within 30 seconds of detection of elevated temperature above the actuation setpoint.
5.
Following valve closure, the gross release of radioactive material is stopped and the fire is extinguished. Leakage through the valve occurs at a diminished rate.
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Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Analyses of Accidents with Radiological Consequences SHINE Medical Technologies 13b.2-13 Rev. 1 The components credited for mitigation of the dose consequences for this accident areis:
PVVS carbon guard bed temperature indicators PVVS carbon guard bed isolation valves ESFAS Carbon Guard Bed Isolation function PVVS delay bed filtration Supercell confinement boundary Damage to Equipment The occurrence of fire damages the affected carbon guard bed and eliminates its ability to function. No other damage to the PVVS system or its components occurs.
Transport of Radioactive Material The methods used to calculate radioactive material transport are described in Section13a2.2.
The LPF model terms used in this accident are provided in Table13b.2-1. For this accident, the release of material for the first 30 secondsguard bed inventory is assumed to be at an elevated rate due to continued PVVS flow. Following isolation damper actuation, theinstantly transport occurs at aed to the delay bed. The delay bed is credited to reduced rate the release of material by 99percent with no credit taken for carbon guard bed isolation functions.
Radiation Source Terms The initial MAR for this scenario is a portion of the iodine gas inventory evolved from target solution during normal operations. Development of the accident source term for this scenario is discussed further in Section13a2.2.
The iodine gas inventory is produced by fission and decay of fission products and continuously evolved from the target solution and through the TOGS during operations. Partitioning fractions for iodine gas are used to describe the quantities of iodine in solution that move to the RPF.
Removal of iodine by the TOGS zeolite beds are credited for all gases that are transported to the RPF. The MAR uses selected time intervals for the most recent purges (i.e., [
]PROP/ECI) to account for the operational sequencing of the combined eight IUs.
The MAR assumes the combined iodine gas inventory produced by eight IUs over approximately
[ ]PROP/ECI of irradiation with the most recent purges of [
]PROP/ECI. The iodine accumulates in the carbon guard bed and decays.
Radiological Consequences The radioactive material is contained in the PVVS system and does not result in worker exposure.
The radiological consequences of this accident scenario are determined as described in Section13a2.2. The results of the determination are provided in Table13b.2-2.
Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Analyses of Accidents with Radiological Consequences SHINE Medical Technologies 13b.2-15 Rev. 1 Table 13b.2 Radioisotope Production Facility Accident Dose Consequences Accident Scenario Public Dose TEDE (mrem)
Worker Dose TEDE (mrem)
Maximum Hypothetical Accident 4023 No consequences Spill of Target Solution in the Supercell 117 64317 Spill of Eluate Solution in the Supercell 7814 47501 Spill of Target Solution in the RPF Pipe Trench 4
170 Spill of Target Solution from a Tank 5
398 Spill of Waste Solution in RLWI 103 657861 PVVS Carbon Delay Bed Fire 39 No consequences PVVS Carbon Guard Bed Fire 81 No consequences