ML19331A669
| ML19331A669 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | SHINE Medical Technologies, 99902034 |
| Issue date: | 11/14/2019 |
| From: | SHINE Medical Technologies |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19331A832 | List: |
| References | |
| 2019-SMT-0119 | |
| Download: ML19331A669 (58) | |
Text
DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS tion Title Page DESIGN CRITERIA .............................................................................................. 3.1-1 METEOROLOGICAL DAMAGE ........................................................................... 3.2-1 3.2.1 WIND LOADING ................................................................................. 3.2-1 3.2.2 TORNADO LOADING ........................................................................ 3.2-1 3.2.3 SNOW, ICE, AND RAIN LOADING .................................................... 3.2-3 WATER DAMAGE ................................................................................................ 3.3-1 3.3.1 FLOOD PROTECTION ....................................................................... 3.3-1 3.3.2 STRUCTURAL DESIGN FOR FLOODING ........................................ 3.3-3 SEISMIC DAMAGE .............................................................................................. 3.4-1 3.4.1 SEISMIC INPUT ................................................................................. 3.4-2 3.4.2 SEISMIC ANALYSIS OF FACILITY STRUCTURES .......................... 3.4-3 3.4.3 SEISMIC CLASSIFICATION AND QUALIFICATION ....................... 3.4-10 3.4.4 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION ....................................................... 3.4-13 3.4.5 SEISMIC ENVELOPE DESIGN FOR EXTERNAL HAZARDS ......... 3.4-13 SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS ......................................................................... 3.5-1 REFERENCES ..................................................................................................... 3.6-1 NE Medical Technologies 3-i Rev. 0
1 Safety-Related Structures, Systems, and Components 2 Nonsafety-Related Structures, Systems, and Components 3 SHINE Design Criteria 1 Seismic Classification of Structures, Systems, and Components NE Medical Technologies 3-ii Rev. 0
1 View Looking Southwest of the Representative Concrete Sections 2 Cross Section of Structural Model 3 Selected Response Spectra, Exterior Locations (Looking Southeast) 4 Selected Response Spectra, Exterior Locations (Looking Northwest) 5 Selected Response Spectra Locations At Grade Slab 6 Selected Response Spectra Locations Below Grade Slab 7 Building Envelope Openings Evaluated as Missile Barriers NE Medical Technologies 3-iii Rev. 0
onym/Abbreviation Definition American Concrete Institute C American Institute of Steel Construction SI American National Standards Institute CE American Society of Civil Engineers ME American Society of Mechanical Engineers best estimate AS criticality accident alarm system MS continuous air monitoring system centimeter E U.S. Department of Energy east-west G emergency lighting system FAS engineered safety features actuation system S facility access control system HS facility chilled water system RS facility chemical reagent system NE Medical Technologies 3-iv Rev. 0
onym/Abbreviation Definition CS facility data and communications system WS facility demineralized water system S facility fire detection and suppression system LP facility grounding and lightning protection system WS facility heating water system HS facility nitrogen handling system WS facility potable water system S facility sanitary drains system R facility structure feet square feet cubic feet 4 facility ventilation zone 4 FD hot cell fire detection and suppression system AC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning hertz NE Medical Technologies 3-v Rev. 0
onym/Abbreviation Definition A International Atomic Energy Agency S irradiation cell biological shield E Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers irradiation facility inch S in-structure response spectra irradiation unit iodine and xenon purification and packaging m3 kilogram per cubic meter kilopascal kilometers per hour S quality control and analytical testing laboratories lower bound 2 pounds per square foot 3 pounds per cubic foot PS light water pool system NE Medical Technologies 3-vi Rev. 0
onym/Abbreviation Definition meter cubic meter meters per second PS molybdenum extraction and purification system S material handling system S molybdenum isotope product packaging system h miles per hour north-south S nitrogen gas purge system AS neutron driver assembly system DS neutron flux detection system PA National Fire Protection Association SS normal electrical power supply system C NDAS service cell HS process chilled water system LS primary closed loop cooling system NE Medical Technologies 3-vii Rev. 0
onym/Abbreviation Definition S production facility biological shield system A peak ground acceleration S process integrated control system F probable maximum flood P probable maximum precipitation pounds per square foot pounds per square inch VS process vessel vent system E qualification of active mechanical equipment MS radiation area monitoring system A radiologically controlled area S radioactive drain system WI radioactive liquid waste immobilization WS radioactive liquid waste storage CS radioisotope process facility cooling system F radioisotope production facility NE Medical Technologies 3-viii Rev. 0
onym/Abbreviation Definition S required response spectrum Z1 radiological ventilation system zone 1 Z2 radiological ventilation system zone 2 Z3 radiological ventilation system zone 3 AS subcritical assembly system S standby generator system MS stack release monitoring system P Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants SS square root of the sum of the squares WP solid radioactive waste packaging C structure, system, or component E safe shutdown earthquake soil-structure interaction RA Southern Wisconsin Regional Airport E total effective dose equivalent GS TSV off-gas system NE Medical Technologies 3-ix Rev. 0
onym/Abbreviation Definition tritium purification system PS TSV reactivity protection system S target solution preparation system S target solution staging system target solution vessel upper bound SS uninterruptible electrical power supply system SS uranium receipt and storage system vacuum transfer system zero period acceleration NE Medical Technologies 3-x Rev. 0
DESIGN CRITERIA ctures, systems, and components (SSCs) present in the SHINE facility are identified in les 3.1-1 and 3.1-2, including the applicable FSAR section(s) which describe each SSC and applicable SHINE design criteria. Design criteria derived from external codes, guides, and dards specific to the design, construction, or inspection of SSCs are included in the licable FSAR section describing those SSCs. For each SSC, the FSAR section identifies tion, function, modes of operation, and type of actuation for specific SSCs, as applicable.
lear Safety Classification ety-related SSCs at SHINE are those physical SSCs whose intended functions are to prevent idents that could cause undue risk to health and safety of workers and the public; and to trol or mitigate the consequences of such accidents.
eptable risk is achieved by ensuring that events are highly unlikely or by reducing sequences less than the SHINE safety criteria. The SHINE safety criteria are:
- An acute dose of 500 millirem or greater TEDE to any individual located outside the owner controlled area.
- An intake of 30 milligrams or greater of uranium in a soluble form by any individual located outside the owner controlled area.
- An acute chemical exposure to an individual from licensed material or hazardous chemicals produced from licensed material that could lead to irreversible or other serious, long-lasting health effects to a worker or could cause mild transient health effects to any individual located outside the owner controlled area.
- Criticality in the radioisotope production facility (RPF).
- Loss of capability to reach safe shutdown conditions.
me SSCs are nonsafety-related but perform functions that impact safety-related SSCs. These safety-related SSCs have design basis requirements necessary to prevent unfavorable ractions with safety-related SSCs due to failure of the nonsafety-related SSCs.
ety-related SSCs are identified in Table 3.1-1 and nonsafety-related SSCs are identified in le 3.1-2.
NE Design Criteria SHINE facility uses design criteria to ensure that the SSCs within the facility demonstrate quate protection against the hazards present. The design criteria are selected to cover:
- The complete range of irradiation facility and radioisotope production facility operating conditions.
- The response of SSCs to anticipated transients and potential accidents.
- Design features for safety-related SSCs including redundancy, environmental qualification, and seismic qualification.
- Inspection, testing, and maintenance of safety-related SSCs.
NE Medical Technologies 3.1-1 Rev. 1
- Quality standards.
- Analyses and design for meteorological, hydrological, and seismic effects.
- The bases for technical specifications necessary to ensure the availability and operability of required SSCs.
SHINE design criteria are described in Table 3.1-3.
terms used in Table 3.1-3 include primary system boundary, primary confinement boundary, process confinement boundary, which are defined in Sections 4a2.2, 6a2.2, and 6b.2, pectively.
NE Medical Technologies 3.1-2 Rev. 1
Table 3.1 Safety-Related Structures, Systems, and Components (Sheet 1 of 2)
Structure, System, or Component (SSC) Acronym Section Applicable Design Criteria gineered safety features 7.1.3 ESFAS 13-19, 37-39 uation system 7.5 cility structure FSTR 3.4.2 2, 6 4a2.1 diation cell biological shield ICBS 29-36 4a2.5 ine and xenon purification 4b.1.3 IXP 9, 33, 36-37, 39 d packaging 4b.3.1 4a2.1 ht water pool system LWPS 25, 29-32, 36 4a2.4.2 lybdenum extraction and 4b.1.3 MEPS 27, 33, 36, 37, 39 ification system 4b.3 rmal electrical power supply NPSS 8a2.1 27, 28 tem 4a2.1 utron flux detection system NFDS 7.1.7 13-19 7.8 6b.2.3 rogen purge system N2PS 39 9b.6.2 mary closed loop cooling 4a2.1 PCLS 9, 12, 21, 29, 33 tem 5a2.2 4b.1.3 cess vessel vent system PVVS 35, 39 9b.6.1 duction facility biological PFBS 4b.2 29-32, 36 eld dioactive drain system RDS 9b.7.6 36, 37 dioactive liquid waste RLWI 9b.7.3 35-38 mobilization dioactive liquid waste 4b.1.3 RLWS 35-36, 38-39 rage 9b.7.4 RVZ1 diological ventilation RVZ2 9a2.1 29, 30, 32-36 es 1, 2, and 3 RVZ3 4a2.1 bcritical assembly system SCAS 9-11, 20, 22-25, 29-34, 36, 39 4a2.2 NE Medical Technologies 3.1-3 Rev. 1
Structure, System, or Component (SSC) Acronym Section Applicable Design Criteria 4b.1.3 get solution preparation TSPS 4b.4.2 29-32, 36-37 tem 9b.2.3, 4b.1.3 get solution staging system TSSS 4b.4 36, 37, 39 9b.2.4 4a2.1 ium purification system TPS 12, 29-35, 38 9a2.7.1 4a2.1 V off-gas system TOGS 12, 20, 22-24, 29, 33-34, 37, 39 4a2.8 V reactivity protection 7.1.2 TRPS 13-19, 38-39 tem 7.4 interruptible electrical UPSS 8a2.2 29-30 wer supply system nium receipt and storage 4b.1.3 URSS 29-33, 36-37 tem 4b.4.2 4b.1.3 cuum transfer system VTS 36-37 9b.2.5 e 1: This table contains SSCs where at least one constituent component is classified as safety-related.
e 2: The generally-applicable design criteria 1-8 from Table 3.1-3 are not specifically listed even though they are generally applicable to most SSCs, with the exception of criterion 2 and criterion 6, which are specifically applied to the FSTR due to the unique relationship of these criteria to the facility structure.
e 3: Instrumentation, control and protection system-related design criteria 13-19 from Table 3.1-3 are only applied to the ESFAS, TRPS, and NFDS (i.e., the safety-related instrumentation and control systems). Other systems that include safety-related instrumentation that provides input to the safety-related instrumentation and control systems implement these criteria via flow down requirements from the safety-related instrumentation and control systems.
NE Medical Technologies 3.1-4 Rev. 1
Table 3.1 Nonsafety-Related Structures, Systems, and Components (Sheet 1 of 2)
Structure, System, or Component (SSC) Acronym Section Applicable Design Criteria ticality accident alarm 6b.3.2 CAAS 8, 37 tem 7.7.6 ntinuous air monitoring CAMS 7.7.4 13, 38 tem cility access control system FACS 12.8 -
cility chemical reagent FCRS 9b.7.10 7 tem cility chilled water supply FCHS 9a2.1.3 26 d distribution system cility data and FDCS 9a2.4 8 mmunications system cility demineralized water FDWS 5a2.6 33 tem cility fire detection and FFPS 9a2.3 -
pression system cility heating water system FHWS 9a2.1.4 -
cility nitrogen handling FNHS 9b.7.8 33 tem cility potable water system FPWS 9b.7.7 -
cility sanitary drains system FSDS 9b.7.9 -
cility ventilation zone 4 FVZ4 9a2.1 -
t cell fire detection and HCFD 9a2.3 -
pression system terial handling system MHS 9b.7.2 -
lybdenum isotope product MIPS 9b.7.1 -
kaging system AS service cell NSC 9a2.7.2 -
utron driver assembly 4a2.1 NDAS 33 tem 4a2.3 cess chilled water system PCHS 5a2.4 26 cess integrated control PICS 7.3 6, 13 tem ality control and analytical LABS 9b.2 -
ting laboratories 9b.5 NE Medical Technologies 3.1-5 Rev. 1
Structure, System, or Component (SSC) Acronym Section Applicable Design Criteria diation area monitoring RAMS 7.7.3 13, 38 tem dioisotope process facility RPCS 5a2.3 26 ling system id radioactive waste SRWP 9b.7.5 -
kaging ck release monitoring SRMS 7.7.5 13, 38 tem ndby generator system SGS 8a2.2 27-28 e 1: The generally-applicable design criteria 1-8 from Table 3.1-3 are not specifically listed unless they have a unique relationship with a particular SSC. See corresponding FSAR section(s) for detailed discussions of SSC design.
NE Medical Technologies 3.1-6 Rev. 1
Table 3.1 SHINE Design Criteria (Sheet 1 of 11) nerally-Applicable Design Criteria terion 1 - Quality standards and records ety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) are designed, fabricated, erected, and tested to quality standards mmensurate with the safety functions to be performed. Where generally recognized codes and standards are used, they are ntified and evaluated to determine their applicability, adequacy, and sufficiency and are supplemented or modified as necessary ensure a quality product in keeping with the required safety function.
uality assurance program is established and implemented in order to provide adequate assurance that these SSCs satisfactorily form their safety functions.
propriate records of the design, fabrication, erection and testing of safety-related SSCs are maintained by or under the control of INE throughout the life of the facility.
terion 2 - Natural phenomena hazards e facility structure supports and protects safety-related SSCs and is designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches as necessary to prevent the loss of capability of safety-related Cs to perform their safety functions.
ety-related SSCs are designed to withstand the effects of earthquakes without loss of capability to perform their safety functions.
terion 3 - Fire protection ety-related SSCs are designed and located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of s and explosions.
ncombustible and heat resistant materials are used wherever practical throughout the facility, particularly in locations such as finement boundaries and the control room.
e detection and suppression systems of appropriate capacity and capability are provided and designed to minimize the adverse ects of fires on safety-related SSCs. Firefighting systems are designed to ensure that their rupture or inadvertent operation does significantly impair the safety capability of these SSCs.
NE Medical Technologies 3.1-7 Rev. 1
terion 4 - Environmental and dynamic effects ety-related SSCs are designed to perform their functions with the environmental conditions associated with normal operation, intenance, testing, and postulated accidents. These SSCs are appropriately protected against dynamic effects and from external nts and conditions outside the facility.
terion 5 - Sharing of structures, systems, and components ety-related SSCs are not shared between irradiation units unless it can be shown that such sharing will not significantly impair ir ability to perform their safety functions.
terion 6 - Control room ontrol room is provided from which actions can be taken to operate the irradiation units safely under normal conditions and to form required operator actions under postulated accident conditions.
terion 7 - Chemical protection e design provides for adequate protection against chemical risks produced from licensed material, facility conditions that affect the ety of licensed material, and hazardous chemicals produced from licensed material.
terion 8 - Emergency capability e design provides emergency capability to maintain control of:
licensed material and hazardous chemicals produced from licensed material; evacuation of on-site personnel; and on-site emergency facilities and services that facilitate the use of available off-site services.
NE Medical Technologies 3.1-8 Rev. 1
bcritical Assembly Design Criteria terion 9 - Subcritical assembly design e subcritical assembly system, target solution vessel off-gas system, and primary closed loop cooling system are designed with propriate margins to assure that target solution design limits are not exceeded during conditions of normal operation, including the ects of anticipated transients.
terion 10 - Subcritical assembly inherent protection e subcritical assembly system is designed so that the net effect of the prompt inherent nuclear feedback characteristics tends to mpensate for a rapid increase in reactivity.
terion 11 - Suppression of subcritical assembly power oscillations e subcritical assembly system is designed to ensure that power oscillations that can result in conditions exceeding target solution ign limits can be reliably and readily detected and suppressed.
terion 12 - Reactivity limits e target solution vessel (TSV) off-gas system, primary closed loop cooling system, and the TSV fill subsystem are designed with propriate limits on the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase to ensure that the effects of postulated reactivity accidents neither (1) result in damage to the primary system boundary greater than limited local yielding nor (2) sufficiently disturb the V, its support structures or other TSV internals to impair significantly the capability to drain the TSV. These postulated reactivity idents include consideration of excess target solution addition, changes in primary cooling temperature, changes in primary tem pressure, and deflagration or detonation in the primary system boundary.
NE Medical Technologies 3.1-9 Rev. 1
trumentation, Control, and Protection Systems Design Criteria terion 13 - Instrumentation and controls trumentation is provided to monitor variables and systems over their anticipated ranges for normal operation, for anticipated nsients, and for postulated accidents as appropriate to ensure adequate safety, including those variables and systems that can ect the fission process, the integrity of the primary system boundary, the primary confinement and its associated systems, and the cess confinement boundary and its associated systems. Appropriate controls are provided to maintain these variables and tems within prescribed operating ranges.
terion 14 - Protection system functions e protection systems are designed to:
initiate, automatically, the operation of appropriate systems to ensure that specified acceptable target solution design limits are not exceeded as a result of anticipated transients; and sense accident conditions and to initiate the operation of safety-related systems and components.
terion 15 - Protection system reliability and testability e protection systems are designed for high functional reliability and inservice testability commensurate with the safety functions to performed. Redundancy and independence designed into the protection systems are sufficient to ensure that:
no single failure results in loss of the protection function, and removal from service of any component or channel does not result in loss of the required minimum redundancy unless the acceptable reliability of operation of the protection system can be otherwise demonstrated.
e protection systems are designed to permit periodic testing, including a capability to test channels independently to determine ures and losses of redundancy that may have occurred.
NE Medical Technologies 3.1-10 Rev. 1
terion 16 - Protection system independence e protection systems are designed to ensure that the effects of natural phenomena, and of normal operating, maintenance, ting, and postulated accident conditions on redundant channels do not result in loss of the protection function or are demonstrated be acceptable on some other defined basis. Design techniques, such as functional diversity or diversity in component design and nciples of operation, are used to the extent practical to prevent loss of the protection function.
terion 17 - Protection system failure modes e protection systems are designed to fail into a safe state if conditions such as disconnection of the system, loss of energy (e.g.,
ctric power, instrument air), or postulated adverse environments are experienced.
terion 18 - Separation of protection and control systems e protection system is separated from control systems to the extent that failure of any single control system component or nnel, or failure or removal from service of any single protection system component or channel that is common to the control and tection systems leaves intact a system satisfying all reliability, redundancy, and independence requirements of the protection tem. Interconnection of the protection and control systems is limited to assure that safety is not significantly impaired.
terion 19 - Protection against anticipated transients e protection systems are designed to ensure an extremely high probability of accomplishing their safety functions in the event of icipated transients.
NE Medical Technologies 3.1-11 Rev. 1
mary System Boundary Design Criteria terion 20 - Primary system boundary e primary system boundary is designed, fabricated, erected, and tested to have an extremely low probability of abnormal leakage, apidly propagating failure, and of gross rupture.
terion 21 - Primary closed loop cooling system design e primary closed loop cooling system is designed with sufficient margin to ensure that the design conditions of the primary system undary are not exceeded during any condition of normal operation, including anticipated transients.
terion 22 - Quality of primary system boundary mponents that are part of the primary system boundary are designed, fabricated, erected, and tested to the highest quality level ctical. Means are provided for detecting and, to the extent practical, identifying the location of the source of primary system undary leakage.
terion 23 - Fracture prevention of primary system boundary e primary system boundary is designed with sufficient margin to ensure that when stressed under operating, maintenance, testing, d postulated accident conditions:
the boundary behaves in a nonbrittle manner, and the probability of rapidly propagating fracture is minimized.
e primary system boundary design reflects consideration of service temperatures and other conditions of the boundary material der operating, maintenance, testing, and postulated accident conditions and the uncertainties in determining:
material properties, the effects of irradiation on material properties, and steady state and transient stresses.
NE Medical Technologies 3.1-12 Rev. 1
terion 24 - Inspection of primary system boundary e primary system boundary design includes provisions for in-service inspection to ensure structural and leak tight integrity, and an propriate material surveillance program for the primary system boundary.
terion 25 - Residual heat removal e light water pool is provided to remove residual heat. The system safety function is to transfer fission product decay heat and er residual heat from the target solution vessel dump tank at a rate such that target solution design limits and the primary system undary design limits are not exceeded.
terion 26 - Cooling water e radioisotope process facility cooling system and process chilled water system are provided to transfer heat from safety-related Cs to the environment, which serves as the ultimate heat sink.
NE Medical Technologies 3.1-13 Rev. 1
ctric Power Systems Design Criteria terion 27 - Electric power systems on-site electric power system and an off-site electric power system are provided to permit functioning of safety-related SSCs. The ety functions are to provide sufficient capacity and capability to assure that:
target solution design limits and primary system boundary design limits are not exceeded as a result of anticipated transients, and confinement integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of postulated accidents.
e on-site uninterruptible electric power supply and distribution system has sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to form its safety functions assuming a single failure.
visions are included to minimize the probability of losing electric power from the uninterruptible power supply as a result of or ncident with, the loss of power from the off-site electric power system.
terion 28 - Inspection and testing of electric power systems e safety-related electric power systems are designed to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing of important areas and tures, such as wiring, insulation, connections, and switchboards, to assess the continuity of the systems and the condition of their mponents. The systems are designed with a capability to test periodically:
the operability and functional performance of the components of the systems, such as on-site power sources, relays, switches, and buses; and the operability of the systems as a whole and, under conditions as close to design as practical, the full operation sequence that brings the systems into operation, including operation of applicable portions of the protection system, and the transfer of power among the on-site and off-site power supplies.
NE Medical Technologies 3.1-14 Rev. 1
nfinement and Control of Radioactivity Design Criteria terion 29 - Confinement design nfinement boundaries are provided to establish a low-leakage barrier against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the ironment and to assure that confinement design leakage rates are not exceeded for as long as postulated accident conditions uire. Four classes of confinement boundaries are established:
the primary confinement boundary, the process confinement boundary, hot cells and gloveboxes, and radiologically-controlled area ventilation isolations terion 30 - Confinement design basis ch confinement boundary is designed to withstand the conditions generated during postulated accidents.
terion 31 - Fracture prevention of confinement boundary ch confinement boundary design reflects consideration of service temperatures and other conditions of the confinement boundary terial during operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accident conditions to prevent fracture of the confinement boundary.
terion 32 - Provisions for confinement testing and inspection ch confinement boundary is designed to permit:
appropriate periodic inspection of important areas, such as penetrations; an appropriate surveillance program; and periodic testing of confinement leakage rates.
NE Medical Technologies 3.1-15 Rev. 1
terion 33 - Piping systems penetrating confinement ing systems penetrating confinement boundaries that have the potential for excessive leakage are provided with isolation abilities appropriate to the potential for excessive leakage.
ing systems that pass between confinement boundaries are equipped with either:
a locked closed manual isolation valve, or an automatic isolation valve that takes the position that provides greater safety upon loss of actuating power.
nual isolation valves are maintained locked-shut for any conditions requiring confinement boundary integrity.
terion 34 - Confinement isolation es from outside confinement that penetrate the primary confinement boundary and are connected directly to the primary system undary are provided with redundant isolation capabilities.
ntilation, monitoring, and other systems that penetrate the primary, process, glovebox or hot cell confinement boundaries, are nected directly to the confinement atmosphere and are not normally locked closed, have redundant isolation capabilities or are erwise directed to structures, systems, and components capable of handling any leakage.
lation valves outside confinement boundaries are located as close to the confinement as practical and upon loss of actuating wer, automatic isolation valves are designed to take the position that provides greater safety. Manual isolation valves are intained locked-shut for any conditions requiring confinement boundary integrity.
electrical connections from equipment external to the confinement boundaries are sealed to minimize air leakage.
terion 35 - Control of releases of radioactive materials to the environment e facility is designed to include means to suitably control the release of radioactive materials in gaseous and liquid effluents and to ndle radioactive solid wastes produced during normal operation, including anticipated transients. Sufficient holdup capacity is vided for retention of radioactive gases.
NE Medical Technologies 3.1-16 Rev. 1
terion 36 -Target solution storage and handling and radioactivity control e target solution storage and handling, radioactive waste, and other systems that contain radioactivity are designed to assure equate safety under normal and postulated accident conditions. These systems are designed with:
capability to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing of safety-related components, suitable shielding for radiation protection, appropriate confinement and filtering systems, and residual heat removal capability having reliability and testability that reflects the importance of decay heat and other residual heat removal.
terion 37 - Criticality control in the radioisotope production facility ticality in the radioisotope production facility is prevented by physical systems or processes and the use of administrative controls.
e of geometrically safe configurations is preferred. Control of criticality adheres to the double contingency principle.
riticality accident alarm system to detect and alert facility personnel of an inadvertent criticality is provided.
terion 38 - Monitoring radioactivity releases ans are provided for monitoring the primary confinement boundary, hot cell, and glovebox atmospheres to detect potential kage of gaseous or other airborne radioactive material. Potential effluent discharge paths and the plant environs are monitored for ioactivity that may be released from normal operations, including anticipated transients, and from postulated accidents.
terion 39 - Hydrogen mitigation stems to control the buildup of hydrogen that is released into the primary system boundary and tanks or other volumes that tain fission products and produce significant quantities of hydrogen are provided to ensure that the integrity of the system and finement boundaries are maintained.
NE Medical Technologies 3.1-17 Rev. 1
1 WIND LOADING subsection discusses the criteria used to design the SHINE facility for protection from wind ing conditions.
1.1 Applicable Design Parameters SHINE facility structure is designed to withstand wind pressures based on a basic wind city of 90 miles per hour (mph) (145 kilometers per hour [kph]) adjusted for a mean urrence interval of 100 years, per Figure 6-1 and Table C6-7 of American Society of Civil ineers/Structural Engineering Institute (ASCE), Standard 7-05, Minimum Design Loads for dings and Other Structures (ASCE, 2006).
1.2 Determination of Applied Forces design wind velocity is converted to velocity pressure in accordance with Equation 6-15 of CE 7-05 (ASCE, 2006):
qz = 0.00256KzKztKdV2I (pounds per square foot [lb/ft2]) (Equation 3.2-1) ere:
Kz = velocity pressure exposure coefficient evaluated at height (z) in Table 6-3 of ASCE 7-05 Kzt = topographic factor as defined in Section 6.5.7 of ASCE 7-05 Kd = wind directionality factor in Table 6-4 of ASCE 7-05 V = basic wind speed (3-second gust) obtained from Figure 6-1 of ASCE 7-05 for Wisconsin I = importance factor = 1.15 design wind pressures and forces for the building at various heights above ground are ained in accordance with Section 6.5.12.2.1 of ASCE 7-05 (ASCE, 2006) by multiplying the city pressure by the appropriate pressure coefficients, gust factors, accounting for sloped aces (i.e., the roof of the building). The building is categorized as an enclosed building ording to Section 6.2 of ASCE 7-05 (ASCE, 2006) and, as a result, both external and internal ssures are applied to the structure. A positive and negative internal pressure is applied to the rnal surfaces of the exterior walls as well as the roof.
2 TORNADO LOADING subsection discusses the criteria used to design the SHINE facility to withstand the effects design-basis tornado phenomenon.
NE Medical Technologies 3.2-1 Rev. 0
design-basis tornado characteristics are described in Regulatory Guide 1.76, Design Basis nado for Nuclear Power Plants (USNRC, 2007a):
- a. Design-basis tornado characteristics are listed in Table 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.76 for Region I.
- b. The design-basis tornado missile spectrum and maximum horizontal missile speeds are given in Table 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.76.
2.2 Determination of Applied Forces maximum tornado wind speed is converted to velocity pressure in accordance with ation 6-15 of ASCE 7-05 (ASCE, 2006):
qz = 0.00256KzKztKdV2I (lb/ft2) (Equation 3.2-2) ere:
Kz = velocity pressure exposure coefficient equal to 0.87 Kzt = topographic factor equal to 1.0 Kd = wind directionality factor equal to 1.0 V = maximum tornado wind speed equal to 230 mph (370 kph) for Region I I = importance factor equal to 1.15 tornado differential pressure is defined in Regulatory Guide 1.76, Table 1 as 1.2 pounds per are inch (psi) (8.3 kilopascals [kPa]) for Region I (USNRC, 2007a). The tornado differential ssure is applied as an outward pressure to the exterior walls of the building, as well as the
, because the structure is categorized as an enclosed building in accordance with Section 6.2 SCE 7-05 (ASCE, 2006).
procedure used for transforming the tornado-generated missile impact into an effective or ivalent static load on the structure is consistent with NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for Review of Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants (SRP) Section 3.5.2, Subsection II NRC, 2007b).
loading combinations of the individual tornado loading components and the load factors are ccordance with SRP Section 3.3.2 (USNRC, 2007c).
2.3 Effect of Failure of Structures, Systems, or Components Not Designed for Tornado Loads Cs whose failure during a tornado event could affect the safety-related portions of the facility either designed to resist the tornado loading or the effect on the safety-related structures the failure of these SSCs or portions thereof are shown to be bounded by the tornado sile or aircraft impact evaluations.
NE Medical Technologies 3.2-2 Rev. 0
idents caused by a tornado event are protected by the design of the enclosed structure. The ctural analysis does not credit venting of the Seismic Category I boundary during a tornado nt. The differential pressure on all surfaces as an enclosed structure results in higher ssures, and the differential pressure would be reduced by the effects of venting. Therefore, e are no consequences to venting the building during a tornado event.
3 SNOW, ICE, AND RAIN LOADING subsection discusses the criteria used to design the SHINE facility to withstand conditions to snow, ice, and rain loading. Rain loading is not considered in the structural design of the ding as the sloped roofs do not result in rain accumulation. As a result of the lack of rain umulation, load due to ice is anticipated to be minimal and is enveloped by the design snow 3.1 Applicable Design Parameters w load design parameters pertinent to the SHINE facility are provided in Chapter 7 of CE 7-05 (ASCE, 2006).
3.2 Determination of Applied Forces sloped roof snow load is calculated in accordance with Sections 7.3 and 7.4 of ASCE 7-05 CE, 2006). The combined equation utilized to calculate the sloped roof load is:
ps = 0.7CsCeCtIpg (Equation 3.2-3) ere:
Cs = roof slope factor as determined by Sections 7.4.1 through 7.4.4 of ASCE 7-05 Ce = exposure factor as determined by Table 7-2 of ASCE 7-05 Ct = thermal factor as determined by Table 7-3 of ASCE 7-05 I = importance factor as determined by Table 7-4 of ASCE 7-05 pg = ground snow load as set forth in Figure 7-1 of ASCE 7-05 alanced roof snow loads are computed in accordance with Section 7.6 of ASCE 7-05 (ASCE, 6). The design snow drift surcharge loads are computed in accordance with Section 7.7.1 of CE 7-05 (ASCE, 2006).
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design basis precipitation, flood levels, and ground water levels for the SHINE facility are as ws:
- Design basis flood level: 50 feet (ft.) (15.2 meters [m]) below grade.
- Design basis precipitation level: at grade.
- Maximum ground water level: 50 ft. (15.2 m) below grade.
Subsection 2.4.2.3, a local probable maximum precipitation (PMP) event creates a water l about level with grade. The first floor of the building is at least 4 inches (in.)
2 centimeters [cm]) above grade; therefore, water will not infiltrate the door openings in the e of a local PMP event.
Subsection 2.4.3, a local probable maximum flood (PMF) event creates a water level roximately 50 ft. (15.2 m) below grade. The water elevation for the PMF is derived from MA flood profiles. The lowest point of the facility is 26 ft. (7.9 m) below grade; therefore, ding does not cause any structural loading in the case of a local PMF event.
impact of internal flooding is determined by the maximum flow rate and the volume of water ilable to feed the flood. No active response is assumed to terminate the flow and the entire me of available water is assumed to spill into the SHINE facility. For water sources outside building (fire water), automatic or operator actions are required to terminate the flow.
ms and ramps are used within the facility to:
- Capture and contain water collected in the RCA resulting from postulated water system ruptures or fire system discharges above grade.
- Prevent water intrusion into the uranium receipt and storage system (URSS) and target solution preparation system (TSPS) rooms.
- Prevent a release of water from the RCA due to the postulated failure of the radioisotope process chilled water system (RPCS) room, the process chilled water system (PCHS), or the facility demineralized water system (FDWS).
- Prevent bulk release of water into the radioactive drain system (RDS) sump tanks thereby overfilling the sump collection piping.
ety-related equipment vulnerable to water damage is protected by locating it in flood-ective compartments and/or installing it above flood elevation.
1 FLOOD PROTECTION subsection discusses the flood protection measures that are applicable to safety-related Cs for both external flooding and postulated flooding from failures of facility components taining liquid.
lyses of the worst flooding due to pipe and tank failures and their consequences are ormed in this subsection.
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tulated flooding from component failures in the building compartments is prevented from ersely affecting plant safety or posing any hazard to the public. Exterior or access openings penetrations into the SHINE facility are above the maximum postulated flooding level and do not require protection against flooding.
1.1.1 Flood Protection from External Sources ety-related components located below the design (PMP) flood level are protected using the dened protection approach described below. The safety-related systems and components are d-protected because they are enclosed in a reinforced concrete safety-related structure, ch has the following features:
- a. Exterior walls below flood level are not less than 2 ft. (0.61 m) thick.
- b. Water stops are provided in construction joints below flood level.
- c. Waterproofing is applied to external surfaces exposed to flood level.
- d. Roofs are designed to prevent pooling of large amounts of water.
erproofing of foundations and walls of Seismic Category I structures below grade is omplished principally by the use of water stops at construction joints.
ddition to water stops, waterproofing of the SHINE facility is provided up to 4 in. (10.2 cm) ve the plant ground level to protect the external surfaces from exposure to water.
re is no fire protection piping in the RCA general area.
1.1.2 Flood Protection from Internal Sources total discharge from the fire protection discharge consists of the combined volume from any ighting hoses. In accordance with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 801, tion 5.10 (NFPA, 2008), the credible volume of discharge is sized for a manual fire-fighting rate of 500 gallons per minute (1893 liters per minute) for a duration of 30 minutes (min.).
refore, the total discharge volume is 15,000 gallons (56,782 liters). The resulting flooded er depth in the RCA from fire protection discharge is less than 2 in. This bounds the total er available in the PCHS and RPCS cooling systems that could cause internal flooding.
floors of the URSS/TSPS rooms are elevated to prevent water intrusion in the event of an rnal flood. Water sensitive safety-related equipment is raised from the floor 8 in. (20.3 cm) in RCA to provide defense in depth. Therefore, the depth of water due to fire protection harge is less than the elevation that water sensitive safety-related equipment is raised from floor.
side of the RCA there is limited water discharge from fire protection systems. The safety-ted function(s) of systems that are subject to the effects of a discharge of the fire suppression tem are appropriately protected by redundancy and separation. The uninterruptible electrical er supply system (UPSS) has two trains to provide redundancy. These trains are isolated each other to prevent one train from being damaged by discharge of the fire protection tem in the vicinity of the other train. Any water sensitive safety-related equipment is installed a imum of 8 in. (20.3 cm) above the floor slab at grade.
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lified. There is no high-energy piping within these areas. Any pipe or tank rupture in the oisotope production facility (RPF) vaults is routed to the radioactive drain system (RDS). The S is sized for the maximum postulated pipe or tank failure as described in Subsection 9b.7.6.
design of the shield plugs over the pipe trenches and vaults prevents bulk leakage of liquid the vaults from postulated flooding events within the remainder of the RCA.
light water pool in the irradiation unit cell (IU) is filled to an elevation approximately equal to top of the surrounding area floor slab. Given the robust design of the light water pool proximately 4 ft. thick reinforced concrete) and the stainless steel liner, loss of a significant ount of pool water is not credible.
1.2 Permanent Dewatering System re is no permanent dewatering system provided for the flood design.
2 STRUCTURAL DESIGN FOR FLOODING ce the design PMP elevation is at the finished plant grade and the PMF elevation is roximately 50 ft. (15.2 m) below grade, there is no dynamic force due to precipitation or ding.
load from build-up of water due to discharge of fire water in the RCA is supported by slabs grade, with the exception of the mezzanine floor. Openings that are provided in the zzanine ensure that the mezzanine slab is not significantly loaded. The mezzanine floor slab esigned to a live load of 250 pounds per square foot (1221 kilograms per square meter).
refore, the mezzanine floor slab is capable of withstanding temporary water collection that y occur while water is draining from the mezzanine floor.
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smic analysis criteria for the SHINE facility conform to IAEA-TECDOC-1347, Consideration of ernal Events in the Design of Nuclear Facilities other than Nuclear Power Plants, with phasis on Earthquakes (IAEA, 2003), which provides generic requirements and guidance for seismic design of nuclear facilities other than nuclear power plants. Additional criteria vided in the Regulatory Guides and NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of ety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants (SRP), provide more detailed guidance in the seismic lysis of the main production facility structure (FSTR).
dimensions of the FSTR at grade level are approximately 212 feet (ft.) (64.6 meters [m]) in north-south (N/S) direction and 158 ft. (48.2 m) in the east-west (E/W) direction. The main duction facility is a single-story building with a mezzanine, with a roof height of approximately
- t. (17.7 m). The FSTR also includes an exhaust stack with a height of approximately 67 ft.
4 m). The SHINE facility main floor has below grade reinforced concrete vaults for housing ipment. The roof of the facility is supported by a steel truss system.
FSTR building is a box-type shear wall system of reinforced concrete. The major structural ments include the foundation mat, mezzanine floor, roof slab supported by roof trusses, and ar walls. The exterior building walls of the majority of the FSTR are thick cast-in-place crete, and are designed to protect the people, materials, and equipment inside the facility natural and manmade accidents.
FSTR includes the irradiation facility (IF), the radioisotope production facility (RPF), the
-radiologically controlled seismic area, and a nonsafety-related area. The IF contains the diation units (IUs) and tritium purification system (TPS), and the RPF contains the supercell below-grade tanks. The non-radiologically controlled seismic area contains the control room, ery rooms, uninterruptible electrical power supply rooms, and other miscellaneous support ms. The RPF, IF, and non-radiologically controlled seismic area are within the seismic ndary and are classified as Seismic Category I. These areas contain the safety-related ctures, systems, and components (SSCs). To the south of the seismic boundary are the ping and receiving areas, as well as other areas that contain nonsafety-related support tems and equipment. This part of the structure is not Seismic Category I. The areas outside seismic boundary do not contain safety-related SSCs.
FSTR is modeled to the analyses described in this chapter. The concrete walls, slabs, and emat are modeled using thick shell elements. The steel structural members are modeled g three-dimensional beam elements. Seismic mass is considered in the model in accordance SRP Section 3.7.2 (USNRC, 2013a). Figure 3.4-1 and Figure 3.4-2 provide three-ensional views of the structural model.
tain material in this section provides information that is used in the technical specifications, uding conditions for operation and design features. In addition, significant material is also licable to, and may be referenced by, the bases that are described in the technical cifications.
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1.1 Design Response Spectra safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) ground motion is defined with a maximum ground eleration of 0.2 g and design response spectra in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.60, ision 2, Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants (USNRC, 4a).
sistent with SRP Section 3.7.2 (USNRC, 2013a), the location of the ground motion should be he ground surface. The competent material (material with a minimum shear wave velocity of 00 feet per second [ft./sec] [305 meters per second {m/s}]) is 7.5 ft. (2.3 m) below the ground ace for the site. Hence, the SSE response spectra are defined as an outcrop at a depth of ft. (2.3 m) below grade.
1.2 Design Time Histories soil-structure interaction (SSI) analysis and for generating in-structure response spectra, ign acceleration time histories are required. Synthetic acceleration time histories are erated to envelop the design response spectra. Mutually orthogonal synthetic acceleration histories are generated for each horizontal direction and one for the vertical direction. Each hese time histories meets the design response spectra enveloping requirements consistent Approach 2, Option 1 of SRP Section 3.7.1 (USNRC, 2014b). The specifics of each of these histories are:
- Each synthetic time history has been generated starting with seed recorded earthquake time histories.
- The strong motion durations (Arias intensity to rise from 5 percent to 75 percent) of synthetic time histories are greater than a minimum of 6 seconds.
- The time history has a sufficiently small increment and sufficiently long duration. Records shall have a Nyquist frequency of at least 50 hertz (Hz) and a total duration of at least 20 seconds. The time step increment will be 0.005 seconds, which meets the Nyquist requirement for frequencies up to 100 Hz.
- Spectral acceleration at 5 percent damping is computed at a minimum of 100 points per frequency decade, uniformly spaced over the log frequency scale from 0.1 Hz to 50 Hz or the Nyquist frequency.
- Comparison of the response spectrum obtained from the synthetic time history with the target response spectrum shall be made at each frequency computed in the frequency range of interest.
- The computed 5 percent damped response spectrum of the acceleration time history shall not fall more than 10 percent below the target response spectrum at any one frequency and shall have no more than 9 adjacent frequency points falling below the target response spectrum.
- The computed 5 percent damped response spectrum of the artificial time history shall not exceed the target spectrum at any frequency by more than 30 percent in the frequency range of interest.
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ctural damping values for various structural elements used in the seismic analyses are vided in Section 1.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.61, Revision 1, Damping Values for Seismic ign of Nuclear Power Plants (USNRC, 2007d). In the modal analysis, for structures posed of different materials (having different damping values) the composite modal damping alculated using either the stiffness-weighted method or mass-weighted method, based on P Section 3.7.2 (USNRC, 2013a). This applies to either the response spectrum method or the history method.
2 SEISMIC ANALYSIS OF FACILITY STRUCTURES 2.1 Seismic Analysis Methods general equation of motion (as seen below) is used regardless of the method selected for seismic analysis.
[M ]{x} + [C ]{x} + [K ]{x} = [M ]{ug } (Equation 3.4-1) ere:
[M] = mass matrix
[C] = damping matrix
[K] = stiffness matrix
= column vector of relative accelerations
= column vector of relative velocities
= column vector of relative displacements
= ground acceleration lytical models are represented by finite element models. Consistent with SRP Section 3.7.2 NRC, 2013a), SRP Acceptance Criterion 3.C, finite element models are acceptable if the wing guidelines are met:
- The type of finite element used for modeling a structural system should depend on structural details, the purpose of analysis, and the theoretical formulation upon which the element is based. The mathematical discretization of the structure should consider the effect of element size, shape, and aspect ratio on solution accuracy.
- In developing a finite element model for dynamic response, it is necessary to consider that local regions of the structure, such as individual floor slabs or walls, may have fundamental vibration modes that can be excited by the dynamic seismic loading. These local vibration modes are represented in the dynamic response model, in order to ensure that the in-structure response spectra include the additional amplification.
finite element model consists of plate/shell, solid, beam, or a combination of finite elements.
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SSI model provides structural responses for design basis level seismic loading of the SHINE lity, including transfer functions, maximum seismic acceleration (zero period acceleration A]), and in-structure response spectra (ISRS) (horizontal and vertical directions) for various ping values. The SSI model is developed using the computer program Structural Analysis tware System Interface (SASSI2010), version 1.0.
or structural elements of the SHINE facility, including walls, slabs, beams and columns, are deled with appropriate mass and stiffness properties. Major openings within walls and slabs included in the SSI model. The model uses thick shell elements to represent concrete slabs walls, and beam elements to represent steel members, mostly comprising the truss ponents in the facility. Elements are modeled at the geometric centerline of the structural mber they represent with the following exceptions:
- The below grade and mezzanine slabs are modeled at their actual top-of-slab elevation.
- Minor adjustments are made to the dimensions and locations of wall openings to maximize mesh regularity in the model.
- Roof truss locations are adjusted to align with the roof shell element mesh.
ddition to self-weight of the structure, floor loads and equipment loads are converted to mass included in the model. A portion of the loads are considered mass sources in the following nner according to SRP Section 3.7.2 (USNRC, 2013a):
- Dead Load 100 percent
- Live Load25 percent
- Snow Load.75 percent ddition to the loads that are converted to mass, the hydrodynamic mass of the water in the IU s is included.
SSI analyses are performed separately on an equivalent linear-elastic basis for mean (best mate [BE]), upper bound (UB), and lower bound (LB) soil properties to represent potential ations in in-situ and backfill soil conditions around the building in accordance with SRP tion 3.7.2 (USNRC, 2013a). SSI analysis requires detailed input of the soil layers supporting structure. Strain dependent soil properties were determined from geotechnical investigations free field site response analysis. The free-field site response analysis is performed for the BE, and UB soil properties. In accordance with SRP Section 3.7.2, the UB and LB values of soil shear modulus, G, are obtained in terms of their BE through the equations shown below.
ations 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 are used to calculate the low strain properties for the LB and UB. The l soil properties are calculated from the SHAKE2000 program, version 3.5.
(Equation 3.4-2)
(Equation 3.4-3)
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2.3 Combination of Earthquake Components rder to account for the responses of the structures subjected to the three directional (two zontal and the vertical) excitations, the maximum co-directional responses are combined g either the square root of the sum of the squares (SRSS) method or the 100-40-40 rule as cribed in Section 2.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.92, Revision 3, Combining Modal Responses and tial Components in Seismic Response Analysis (USNRC, 2012).
2.4 Seismic Analysis Results seismic loads are applied to the structural analysis model as described in Subsection 3.4.2.6 utilized to develop in-structure response spectra of the facility for use in sizing equipment components. Response spectra accelerations are output from SASSI at the 75 standard uencies between 0.2 Hz and 34 Hz as suggested by Regulatory Guide 1.122, Revision 1, elopment of Floor Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Floor-Supported ipment or Components (USNRC, 1978). In addition, response spectra accelerations are cified to be output at frequencies of 37 Hz, 40 Hz, 43 Hz, 46 Hz and 50Hz.
2.5 Assessment of Structural Seismic Stability stability of the SHINE facility is evaluated for sliding and overturning considering the wing load combinations and factors of safety in accordance with Section 7.2 of American iety of Civil Engineers (ASCE)/Structural Engineering Institute (SEI) Standard 43-05, Seismic ign Criteria for Structures, Systems, and Components in Nuclear Facilities (ASCE/SEI, 2005)
SRP Section 3.8.5 (USNRC, 2013b):
Minimum Factor of Safety Load Combination Sliding Overturning 1.1 1.1 (Equation 3.4-4) 1.1 1.1 (Equation 3.4-5) 1.5 1.5 (Equation 3.4-6) ere:
D = Dead Load H = Lateral Earth Pressures E = Earthquake Load Wt = Tornado Load W = Wind Load NE Medical Technologies 3.4-5 Rev. 1
ction is considered using the 100-40-40 percent combination rule as specified in section 3.4.2.3 above.
lateral driving forces applicable to the seismic stability evaluation of the SHINE facility ude active lateral soil force, static surcharge lateral soil force, dynamic surcharge lateral soil, amic lateral soil force, and seismic lateral inertial force. The resistance for sliding is due to the ic friction at the soil-basemat interface for sliding evaluation and passive lateral soil stance. The self-weight of the structure is considered in the resistance to overturning effects.
2.6 Structural Analysis of Facility 2.6.1 Description of the Structures SHINE facility is a box-type shear wall system of reinforced concrete with reinforced crete floor slabs. The major structural elements in the SHINE facility include the shear walls, floor and roof slabs, and the foundation mat.
2.6.2 Applicable Codes and Standards
- ACI 349-13, Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety-Related Concrete Structures and Commentary (ACI, 2014)
- ANSI/AISC N690-12, Specification for Safety-Related Steel Structures for Nuclear Facilities (ANSI/AISC, 2012) 2.6.3 Site Design Parameters following subsections provide the site-specific parameters for the design of the facility.
2.6.3.1 Soil Parameters soil parameters for the facility are provided below.
- Net allowable static bearing pressure at 3 ft. below grade: 2380 pounds per square foot (psf) (114 kilopascal [kPa]).
- Net allowable static bearing pressure at 17 ft. below grade: 1230 psf (58.9 kPa).
- Minimum average shear wave velocity: 459 ft./sec (140 m/s).
- Minimum unit weight: 117 pounds per cubic foot (lb/ft3) (1874 kilograms per cubic meters
[kg/m3]).
2.6.3.2 Maximum Ground Water Level
- 50 ft. (15.2 m) below grade level.
2.6.3.3 Maximum Flood Level
- Section 2.4 describes the probable maximum precipitation (PMP).
- Section 2.4 describes the probable maximum flood (PMF).
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- Snow load: 30 psf (1.44 kPa) (50-year recurrence interval).
- A factor of 1.22 is used to account for the 100-year recurrence interval required.
2.6.3.5 Design Temperatures
- The winter dry-bulb temperature (-7°F [-22°C]).
- The summer dry bulb temperature (88°F [31°C]).
2.6.3.6 Seismology
- SSE response spectra: per Regulatory Guide 1.60 (USNRC, 2014a).
- SSE time history: envelope SSE response spectra in accordance with SRP Section 3.7.1 (USNRC, 2014b).
2.6.3.7 Extreme Wind
- Basic wind speed for Wisconsin: 90 miles per hour (mph) (145 kilometers per hour [kph])
(50-year recurrence interval).
- A factor of 1.07 is used to account for the 100-year recurrence interval required.
- Exposure Category C.
2.6.3.8 Tornado
- Maximum tornado wind speed (Region 1): 230 mph (370 kph).
- Radius of maximum rotational speed: 150 ft. (45.7 m).
- Tornado differential pressure: 1.2 pounds per square inch (psi) (8.3 kPa).
- Missile Spectrum: see Table 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.76 (USNRC, 2007a).
2.6.3.9 Rainfall
- The SHINE facility's sloped roof and building configuration preclude accumulation of rainwater; therefore, rain loads are not considered in this evaluation.
2.6.4 Design Loads and Loading Combinations 2.6.4.1 Dead Load d loads consist of the weight of all materials of construction incorporated into the building, as as the following:
- Concrete cover blocks for below grade tanks and trenches.
- Fixed equipment (includes tanks and hot cells).
- Partition walls.
- Precast tank vaults in the RPF.
- Weight of commodities attached to structural elements.
- Crane dead loads as described in Subsection 3.4.2.6.4.6.
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building is evaluated for live loads consistent with the use of and occupancy of the facility.
includes minimum live loads driven by occupancy and non-permanent loads caused by ipment or required during plant operations.
following categories encompass the live loads for the SHINE facility:
- A distributed live load of 125 psf (5.99 kPa) is used for areas designated as light manufacturing.
- A distributed live load of 250 psf (12.0 kPa) is used for areas designated as heavy manufacturing.
itionally, the following categories are considered as live loads in the areas where they occur:
- Concrete cover block laydown load.
- Supercell drum export system and shield gate live load.
- Forklift live load associated with the movement of a shipping container throughout the radiologically controlled area (RCA).
- Roof live load.
- Equipment live loading.
2.6.4.3 Snow Load snow load is based on a ground snow load of 30 psf (1.44 kPa) with an importance factor of and a mean recurrence interval of 100 years.
2.6.4.4 Wind Load wind load is based on a basic wind speed of 90 mph (145 kph) with an importance factor of 5 and a mean recurrence interval of 100 years.
2.6.4.5 Earthquake Load amic analysis is conducted with a portion of the loads considered as mass sources in the wing manner according to SRP Section 3.7.2 (USNRC, 2013a):
- Dead Load 100 percent
- Live Load25 percent
- Snow Load.75 percent
- Parked Crane Load.100 percent
- Hydrodynamic Load100 percent thquake load is applied in a SAP2000 model (version 17.2) on an equivalent static basis. The ivalent static model represents the soil as dynamic springs, developed in accordance with CE 4-98 (ASCE, 2000). Maximum seismic acceleration at each node of the structure is ermined by SSI analysis using SASSI2010, as discussed in Subsection 3.4.2.2. Figures 3.4-3 ugh 3.4-6 show selected response spectra locations throughout the FSTR.
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e of the SAP2000 analysis are multiplied by the peak accelerations determined from the SSI lysis to determine an equivalent static earthquake load at each node. The direction of load lication is iterated to obtain nine seismic force terms.
2.6.4.6 Crane Load building is evaluated for loads associated with two overhead bridge cranes, one servicing IU cell area and one servicing the RPF area. Crane loading is evaluated in accordance with erican Society for Mechanical Engineers (ASME) NOG-1, Rules for Construction of Overhead Gantry Cranes (ASME, 2004).
2.6.4.7 Soil Pressure
-grade walls of the SHINE facility are designed to resist static lateral earth pressure loads, paction loads, static earth pressure, dynamic surcharge loads, and elastic dynamic soil ssure loads. Static earth pressure consists of at-rest, active, and passive soil pressure loads, ch are applied as required to ensure the stability of the building.
2.6.4.8 Fluid Load hydrostatic loading is calculated based on the actual dimensions of the IU cells and applied e model as lateral hydrostatic pressure on the walls and vertical hydrostatic pressure on the om slabs.
2.6.4.9 Tornado Load tornado load is based on a tornado wind speed of 230 mph (370 kph) and a tornado missile ctrum as described in Table 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.76 (USNRC, 2007a). The tornado load, is further defined by the following combinations:
Wt = Wp (Equation 3.4-7)
Wt = Ww + 0.5Wp (Equation 3.4-8)
Wt = Ww + 0.5Wp + Wm (Equation 3.4-9) ere:
Wp = load from tornado atmospheric pressure change Ww = load from tornado wind Wm = load from tornado missile impact 2.6.4.10 Accidental Eccentricity equired by Section 3.1.1(e) of ASCE 4-98, Seismic Analysis of Safety-Related Nuclear ctures and Commentary (ASCE, 2000), the structure is evaluated for a torsional moment due NE Medical Technologies 3.4-9 Rev. 1
torsional moment is distributed to the building shear walls based on the relative rigidity of the s in plane. The loads are applied statically and account for variability in the load direction.
2.6.5 Structural Analysis Model ree-dimensional finite element model of the SHINE facility structure was created using the puter program SAP2000 (version 17.2) to represent the mass and stiffness of the major ctural elements, equipment, and components of the FSTR. The model utilizes shell elements epresent slabs and walls, and frame elements to represent columns and beams. Elements modeled at the geometric centerline of the structural member they represent with the wing exceptions:
- The below grade and mezzanine slabs are modeled at their actual top-of-slab elevation.
- Minor adjustments are made to the dimensions and locations of wall openings to maximize mesh regularity in the model.
- Roof truss locations are adjusted to align with the roof shell element mesh.
adjustments described above are intended to maintain mesh regularity to the extent sible.
2.6.6 Structural Analysis Results crete walls and slabs in the SHINE facility are designed for axial, flexural, and shear loads provisions of ACI 349-13 (ACI, 2014) considering all applicable design basis load binations. Walls and slabs are modeled in SAP2000 using shell elements. To determine the itudinal and transverse reinforcement required within a wall or slab, the design is performed an element basis. Using resultant forces obtained from SAP2000 model data, the element is igned as a reinforced concrete section per ACI 349-13 (ACI, 2014). The required area of steel etermined for combined axial and flexural loads, in-plane shear loads, and out-of-plane shear
- s. Using these results, reinforcement size and spacing is specified.
3 SEISMIC CLASSIFICATION AND QUALIFICATION subsection discusses the methods by which the SHINE facility SSCs are classified and lified to ensure functional integrity.
3.1 Seismic Classification ility SSCs, including their foundations and supports, that must perform safety function(s) after SSE are designated as Seismic Category I. Safety-related SSCs are classified as Seismic egory I.
Cs that are co-located with a Seismic Category I SSC and must maintain structural integrity in event of an SSE to prevent unacceptable interactions with a Seismic Category I SSC, but are required to remain functional, are designated as Seismic Category II.
seismic classifications of SSCs are shown in Table 3.4-1.
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eneral, one of the following four methods of seismically qualifying the SSCs is chosen based n the characteristics and complexities of the subsystem:
- Dynamic analysis.
- Testing.
- Comparison with existing databases.
- A combination of analysis and testing.
methods to be used for qualification are stated below. These methods will depend on the of equipment and supporting structure. The following defines some of the possible cases associated analytical methods which may be used in each case.
S for the FSTR are used to determine the appropriate seismic design of equipment, piping, components in the safety-related envelope. For the evaluation of cable and conduit raceway tems, quantitative evaluation criteria are applied only to the most seismically vulnerable ions of these systems.
3.2.1 Qualification by Analytical Methods lytical calculations may be used as a qualification method when maintaining the structural grity is an assurance for the safety function. This method can be used for equipment and ng systems when expected response to the earthquake excitations can be characterized as ar or simple non-linear behavior (e.g., piping, skids, and large equipment).
S from Subsection 3.4.2.2 are used in the response spectrum analysis of piping and ipment. These response spectra are used to determine the seismic requirements at the ponent mounting locations for qualification purposes and for piping subsystem dynamic lysis.
tic Analysis equipment, as well as its support, can be considered rigid, and may be analyzed by static lysis, if it can be shown that its fundamental natural frequency does not fall in the frequency ge below the high frequency asymptote (ZPA) of the required response spectrum (RRS).
rigid equipment supported by a rigid structure, the equipment motion shall be the same as floor motion without amplification. The horizontal and vertical dynamic accelerations shall be n as the ZPA from the applicable response spectrum. These acceleration values are used to orm a static analysis. In this case, the dynamic forces are determined by multiplying the ss of the subassembly or parts of the equipment by the ZPA of the RRS. These forces should applied through the center of gravity of the subassembly or the part of the equipment.
stresses resulting from each force (in each of the three directions) should be combined by an ropriate combination method to yield the dynamic stresses. The dynamic deflections lections due to dynamic loads) may be calculated in the same manner. These dynamic sses and deflections are combined with stresses and deflections from other loads per the combinations defined in the applicable design codes.
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mplified dynamic analysis may be performed in cases where the equipment and support tems natural frequency falls in the frequency range below the high frequency asymptote A) of the applicable RRS. This is similar to the static analysis described above but requires g different values for the accelerations. The accelerations to be used are obtained from the ropriate ISRS curves at each natural frequency in the frequency range of interest. If the uency information is not available, the simplified dynamic analysis (sometimes referred to as equivalent static analysis) is performed using 1.5 times the maximum peak of the applicable r response spectra. Once the dynamic forces are determined using the 1.5 times the peak eleration values from the RRS, stresses and deformations may be computed following the e procedures used for static analysis.
ailed Dynamic Analysis en acceptable justification for static or simplified dynamic analysis cannot be provided, a ailed dynamic analysis is performed. A mathematical model may be constructed to represent dynamic behavior of the equipment. A finite element model may be constructed and analyzed g the response spectrum modal analysis or time-history analysis. The maximum inertia es, at each mass point, from each mode, are applied at that point to calculate the modal ctions (forces and moments) and modal deformations (translations and rotations). The ous modal contributions are combined by an appropriate combination method. Closely ced modes are combined by using an approach from Regulatory Guide 1.92 (USNRC, 2012).
stresses and deflections resulting from each of the three directions are combined to obtain dynamic stresses and deflections. These dynamic stresses and deflections are combined stresses and deflections from other loads per the load combinations defined in the licable design codes.
3.2.2 Qualification by Tests smic qualification by testing is the preferred method of qualification for complex equipment suitable for analysis, and for equipment required to perform an active function (e.g., valves instrumentation). Qualification by testing may be performed using applicable procedures cified by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and/or ASME qualification of ve mechanical equipment (QME) standards.
vibration inputs for the seismic tests are the response spectra or Required Input Motion ical for line-mounted equipment) at the mounting location of the equipment. ISRS are used to elop Test Response Spectra for testing.
test samples shall be mounted to simulate the recommended service mounting. If this not be done, the effect of the actual supporting structure shall be considered in determination he input motion. The project specification will state the expected (or calculated) piping nozzle ction loads on the equipment which shall be used in the qualification. Any other loads that y act on the component (mechanical, electrical, or instrument) during the postulated dynamic nt must be simulated during the test, unless the supporting test (or calculations) shows that are insignificant.
he completion of the tests, inspection shall be made by the test conductor to assure that no ctural damage has occurred. Sufficient monitoring devices shall be used to evaluate the NE Medical Technologies 3.4-12 Rev. 1
licable loads.
3.2.3 Comparison with Existing Databases S are used to develop RRS for comparison with existing response from a database. The didate equipment must be similar to equipment in the existing seismic experience databases.
3.2.4 Combined Methods of Qualification ed on the available information, component complexity, and functional requirements, the ve mentioned analytical and test methods may be combined in various sequence and content chieve seismic qualification of the subject components.
4 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION smic instrumentation is not required under Section IV(a)(4) of Appendix S to 10 CFR 50 or tion VI(a)(3) of Appendix A to 10 CFR 100 because the SHINE facility is not a nuclear power
- t. However, the facility has nonsafety-related seismic instrumentation to record accelerations erienced at the site during a seismic event.
seismic instrumentation establishes the acceptability of continued operation of the plant wing a seismic event. This system provides acceleration time histories or response spectra erienced at the facility to assist in verifying that safety-related SSCs at the SHINE facility can tinue to perform their safety functions.
smic monitoring is performed by the process integrated control system (PICS), which is cribed in Section 7.3. Indication of a seismic event results in an alarm in the facility control m.
5 SEISMIC ENVELOPE DESIGN FOR EXTERNAL HAZARDS 5.1 AIRCRAFT IMPACT ANALYSIS safety-related structures at the SHINE facility are evaluated for aircraft impact loading ulting from small aircraft which frequent the Southern Wisconsin Regional Airport (SWRA).
analysis consists of a global impact response analysis and a local impact response analysis.
global impact response analysis is performed using the energy balance method, consistent U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Standard DOE-STD-3014-2006 (DOE, 2006). The missible ductility limit for reinforced concrete elements is in accordance with Appendix F of 349-13 (ACI, 2014). The permissible ductility limit for truss members is determined from pter NB of ANSI/AISC N690-12 (ANSI/AISC, 2012). The calculated values are then used to ate the appropriate elastic or elastic-plastic load deflection curves. From these curves, the ilable energy absorption capacity of the structure at the critical impact locations is ermined. The Challenger 605 was selected as the critical aircraft for the global impact lysis based on a study of the airport operations data. The Challenger 605 is evaluated as a ign basis aircraft impact. The probabilistic distributions of horizontal and vertical velocity of act are determined from Attachment E of Lawrence Livermore National NE Medical Technologies 3.4-13 Rev. 1
h wall that protects safety-related equipment was evaluated for impacts at the center of the panel and at critical locations near the edge of the wall panel. Each roof that protects safety-ted equipment was evaluated for impacts near the end of the roof truss, at the center of the truss, at the center of the roof panel between trusses.
local response evaluation was conducted using empirical equations in accordance with E-STD-3014-2006 (DOE, 2006). The structure was shown to resist scabbing and perforation.
unching shear failure was not postulated based on Appendix F of ACI 349-13 (ACI, 2014).
bbing and perforation thickness requirement was calculated using DOE-STD-3014-2006 E, 2006).
ause engine diameter and engine weight are both critical for the local evaluation, the local act evaluation was performed for the Hawker 400 as well as the Challenger 605 aircraft. The llenger 605 and Hawker 400 are evaluated as design basis aircraft impacts.
evaluate the capability of the structure to withstand impact from an aircraft, each wall that is ject to potential impact from an aircraft missile is evaluated. Figure 3.4-7 shows the openings e building which are evaluated as missile barriers.
design basis aircraft impacts have been evaluated against the acceptance criteria of 349-13 (ACI, 2014) for concrete and ANSI/AISC N690-12 (ANSI/AISC, 2012) for steel and it been demonstrated that all components of the FSTR structure that are relied upon to provide act protection have adequate energy absorption capacity to perform their design basis tion.
5.2 EXPLOSION HAZARDS ause the SHINE facility is not licensed as an operating nuclear reactor, explosions postulated result of the design basis threat as defined in Regulatory Guide 5.69, Guidance for the lication of Radiological Sabotage Design-Basis Threat in the Design, Development and lementation of a Physical Security Program that Meets 10 CFR 73.55 Requirements NRC, 2007e), are not considered. However, accidental explosions due to transportation or age of hazardous materials outside the facility and accidental explosions due to chemical ctions inside the facility are assessed in the integrated safety analysis.
maximum overpressure at any safety-related area of the facility from any credible external rce is discussed in Subsection 2.2.3). The seismic area is protected by outer walls and roofs sisting of reinforced concrete robust enough to withstand credible external explosions as ned in Regulatory Guide 1.91, Revision 2, Evaluations of Explosions Postulated to Occur at rby Facilities and on Transportation Routes Near Nuclear Power Plants (USNRC, 2013c).
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Table 3.4 Seismic Classification of Structures, Systems, and Components Seismic System, Structure, and Component Acronym Category gineered safety features actuation system ESFAS I ility fire detection and suppression system FFPS II ility structure FSTR I ine and xenon purification and packaging IXP I diation cell biological shield ICBS I ht water pool system LWPS I terial handling system MHS II lybdenum extraction and purification system MEPS I utron driver assembly system NDAS II utron flux detection system NFDS I ogen purge system N2PS I rmal electrical power supply system NPSS I mary closed loop cooling system PCLS I cess vessel vent system PVVS I duction facility biological shield PFBS I dioactive drain system RDS I dioactive liquid waste immobilization RLWI I dioactive liquid waste storage RLWS I diological ventilation zone 1 RVZ1 I diological ventilation zone 2 RVZ2 I diological ventilation zone 3 RVZ3 I bcritical assembly system SCAS I get solution preparation system TSPS I get solution staging system TSSS I ium purification system TPS I get solution vessel (TSV) off-gas system TOGS I V reactivity protection system TRPS I nterruptible electrical power supply system UPSS I nium receipt and storage system URSS I cuum transfer system VTS I e: The seismic category listed is the highest for the system. Portions of the system may have wer seismic categorization.
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Full structure (looking southeast)
Full structure from below El. 0 ft. (looking southeast)
NE Medical Technologies 3.4-16 Rev. 1
NE Medical Technologies 3.4-17 Rev. 1 NE Medical Technologies 3.4-18 Rev. 1 NE Medical Technologies 3.4-19 Rev. 1 NE Medical Technologies 3.4-20 Rev. 1 NE Medical Technologies 3.4-21 Rev. 1 NE Medical Technologies 3.4-22 Rev. 1 SHINE facility structure, system, and component (SSC) designs are based on the SHINE ign criteria described in Section 3.1.
design of the SHINE facility and systems is based on defense-in-depth practices. Defense-epth practices means a design philosophy, applied from the outset and through completion of design, that is based on providing successive levels of protection such that health and safety not wholly dependent upon any single element of the design, construction, maintenance, or ration of the facility. The net effect of incorporating defense-in-depth practices is a servatively designed facility and systems that exhibit greater tolerance to failures and rnal challenges.
SHINE facility and system design incorporates a preference for engineered controls over inistrative controls, independence to avoid common mode failures, and incorporates other ures that enhance safety by reducing challenges to safety-related components and systems.
sical separation and electrical isolation are used to maintain the independence of safety-ted control circuits and equipment among redundant safety divisions or with nonsafety tems so that the safety functions required during and following design basis events can be omplished.
undancy is also incorporated into system designs. Two divisions of safety-related protection tems and two divisions of safety-related emergency power are provided for active engineered trols that depend on control and/or continued power to perform their safety functions. Active ineered safety-related SSCs requiring control or power may be reduced to a single division n redundancy of the function is provided by other means (e.g., when a check valve is used in bination with an automatically actuated isolation valve).
design bases for the SSCs of the SHINE facility are described in detail throughout the FSAR.
FSAR sections where SSCs are described also provide information that is used in the nical specifications. This includes limiting conditions for operation, setpoints, design ures, and means for accomplishing surveillances. In addition, these FSAR sections also sent information that is applicable to, and may be referenced by, the technical specification es.
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, 2014. Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety-Related Concrete Structures and mmentary, ACI 349-13, American Concrete Institute, 2014.
SI/AISC, 2012. Specification for Safety-Related Steel Structures for Nuclear Facilities, SI/AISC-N690, American National Standards Institute/American Institute of Steel struction, 2012.
CE, 2000. Seismic Analysis of Safety-Related Nuclear Structures and Commentary, CE 4-98, American Society of Civil Engineers, 2000.
CE, 2006. Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, ASCE 7-05, American iety of Civil Engineers, 2006.
CE/SEI, 2005. Seismic Design Criteria for Structures, Systems, and Components in Nuclear ilities, ASCE 43-05, American Society of Civil Engineers, 2005.
ME, 2004. Rules for Construction of Overhead and Gantry Cranes, ASME NOG-1, American iety of Mechanical Engineers, 2004.
E, 2006. Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into Hazardous Facilities, DOE-STD-3014-2006,
. Department of Energy, 2006.
A, 2003. Consideration of External Events in the Design of Nuclear Facilities other than lear Power Plants, with Emphasis on Earthquakes, IAEA-TECDOC-1347, International mic Energy Agency, 2003.
PA, 2008. Standard for Fire Protection for Facilities Handling Radioactive Materials, PA 801-2008, National Fire Protection Association, 2008.
RL, 1997. Hossain, Q.A., R.P. Kennedy, R.C. Murray, K. Mutreja, and B.P. Tripathi, ctures, Systems, and Components Evaluation Technical Support Documents, DOE ndard, Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into Hazardous Facilities, UCRL-ID-123577, rence Livermore National Laboratory, 1997.
NRC, 1978. Development of Floor Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Floor-ported Equipment or Components, Regulatory Guide 1.122, Revision 1, U.S. Nuclear ulatory Commission, 1978.
NRC, 2007a. Design Basis Tornado and Tornado Missiles for Nuclear Power Plants, ulatory Guide 1.76, Revision 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2007.
NRC, 2007b. Structures, Systems, and Components to be Protected from Externally-erated Missiles, NUREG-0800, Subsection 3.5.2, Revision 3, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory mmission, 2007.
NRC, 2007c. Tornado Loads, NUREG-0800, Subsection 3.3.2, Revision 3, U.S. Nuclear ulatory Commission, 2007.
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NRC, 2007e. Guidance for the Application of Radiological Sabotage Design-Basis Threat in Design, Development and Implementation of a Physical Security Program that Meets CFR 73.55 Requirements, Regulatory Guide 5.69, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 7.
NRC, 2012. Combining Modal Responses and Spatial Components in Seismic Response lysis, Regulatory Guide 1.92, Revision 3, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2012.
NRC, 2013a. Seismic System Analysis, NUREG-0800, Subsection 3.7.2, Revision 4,
. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2013.
NRC, 2013b. Foundations, NUREG-0800, Subsection 3.8.5, Revision 4, U.S. Nuclear ulatory Commission, 2013.
NRC, 2013c. Evaluations of Explosions Postulated to Occur at Nearby Facilities and on nsportation Routes Near Nuclear Power Plants, Regulatory Guide 1.91, Revision 2,
. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2013.
NRC, 2014a. Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, ulatory Guide 1.60, Revision 2, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2014.
NRC, 2014b. Seismic Design Parameters, NUREG-0800, Subsection 3.7.1, Revision 4,
. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2014.
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