ML22034A614

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Shine Technologies, LLC, Application for Operating License Supplement 14, Revision to Final Safety Analysis Report
ML22034A614
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Site: SHINE Medical Technologies
Issue date: 01/26/2022
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ENCLOSURE 2 SHINE TECHNOLOGIES, LLC SHINE TECHNOLOGIES, LLC APPLICATION FOR AN OPERATING LICENSE SUPPLEMENT NO. 14 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT CHANGE

SUMMARY

PUBLIC VERSION Summary Description of Changes FSAR Impacts Administrative corrections, including correction of Section 3.1, Chapter 4, inconsistencies, cross references, document references, Table 4a2.8-1, Figure 4b.3-2, and typographical errors. Section 6b.2, Section 7.3, Section 9a2.1, Section 9b.8 Update to the seismic qualifications of radioisotope Section 13b.1, Section 13b.2 production facility (RPF) process piping based on safety-related classifications of structures, systems, and components (SSCs).

Design Feature (DF) 4.1.5 and Table 5.5.4 of the technical specifications have been revised to incorporate conforming changes.

Update to the site overview figure to reflect current site Figure 1.3-3 outbuilding and access road layout.

Update to the power/wide range detector type in the Table 4b.4-1, Section 7.8, neutron flux detection system (NFDS) from a fission Section 9a2.5 chamber to a boron-lined ionization chamber.

Update to relocate process vessel vent system (PVVS) Section 6b.2, Figure 6b.2-2, guard beds from the PVVS hot cell to a below-grade Section 9b.6 shielded vault.

Update to clarify tritium purification system (TPS) Section 6a2.2, Figure 6a2.2-2, glovebox penetrations and correct the TPS deuterium Figure 9a2.7-1 supply configuration.

Update to include firewall and door in the corridor outside Figure 1.3-1, Figure 9a2.1-1 the facility control room.

Update to the configuration of electrical power systems Section 8a2.1, Figure 8a2.1-1, and uninterruptible electrical power supply Section 8a2.2, Table 8a2.2-1, system (UPSS) loads. Table 8a2.2-2, Figure 8a2.2-1 Update to the temperature and flow control of the Section 4b.3, Section 7.3 molybdenum extraction and purification system (MEPS) hot water loop.

Page 1 of 4

Summary Description of Changes FSAR Impacts Update to the radioactive liquid waste immobilization Section 4b.2, Figure 4b.2-3, (RLWI) system configuration to incorporate design Section 7.3, Section 9b.7, progression, including the removal of RLWI dewatering Figure 9b.7-1 tanks and curing station and the incorporation of additional waste immobilization bays.

Update to correct figure error regarding power and Figure 4a2.6-4 temperature transients.

Update to clarify respiratory protection program Section 11.1, Section 11.3, conformance with regulatory guidance, including Section 11.4 administrative updates to align references.

Update to the 1/M curves and the subcritical multiplication Section 4a2.2, Figure 4a2.6-1 source strength to incorporate NFDS design progression.

Update to the configuration of the spillback line to the Figure 4b.3-1 MEPS eluate hold tank.

Update to clarify the facility demineralized water system Figure 9a2.1-5, Figure 9a2.1-11 (FDWS) interface with ventilation systems.

Update to the analytical limits for the radiological Table 7.4-1, Table 7.5-1, ventilation in-duct radiation monitors. Section 9a2.1 Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.1 of the technical specifications has been revised to incorporate conforming changes.

Update to replace the manual flow control valve on the Section 4a2.6 TSV fill inlet line with a flow control orifice.

Table 5.5.4 of the technical specifications has been revised to incorporate conforming changes.

Update to correct facility heating water system (FHWS) Section 9a2.1 flow control.

Update to replace MEPS conductivity instrumentation Section 4b.3, Section 7.3, with radiation monitors. Section 7.5, Table 7.5-1, Figure 7.5-1, Section 7.7, LCO 3.2.4 and LCO 3.7.1 of the technical specifications Table 7.7-1, Section 13b.1 have been revised to incorporate conforming changes.

Update to correct the instrument range of TPS Table 7.5-1 confinement tritium monitors.

Update to incorporate the PVVS carbon monoxide (CO) Section 11.1, Figure 11.1-1, detection cabinet in the RPF. Figure 11.1-2 Update to remove redundant filter bank trains from Section 6a2.2, Section 9a2.1, radiological ventilation zone 1 exhaust (RVZ1e) and Figure 9a2.1-8 radiological ventilation zone 2 exhaust (RVZ2e) subsystems.

Update to ventilation system configurations associated Section 7.5, Table 7.5-2, with radiologically controlled area (RCA) ingress/egress Figure 7.5-1, Figure 9a2.1-4, and isolations between ventilation zones 2 and 3. Figure 9a2.1-6 LCO 3.8.9 of the technical specifications has been revised to incorporate conforming changes.

Page 2 of 4

Summary Description of Changes FSAR Impacts Update to the estimated waste streams to reflect design Section 11.2, Table 11.2-1, progression of related systems and components. Table 11.2-6 Update to ventilation system configurations to incorporate Section 9a2.1, Figure 9a2.1-3, design progression. Figure 9a2.1-9 Update to the airborne source estimates and estimated Table 11.1-5, Table 11.1-6 derived air concentrations to incorporate design progression (e.g., supercell and irradiation unit [IU] cell leakage, relocation of guard beds from PVVS hot cell, iodine and xenon purification and packaging [IXP] hot cell leakage, and incorporation of PVVS CO cabinet).

Update to clarify the IXP system interfaces. Table 4b.3-2 Update to remove description of drip pan leak detection in Section 6b.3, Section 9b.7 the RPF (leak detection is available via radioactive drains system [RDS]).

Update to describe the radiological dose consequence Section 13a2.2, Section 13b.2 assumption related to RCA isolation.

Update to include additional programmable logic Figure 7.3-1 controllers (PLCs) within process integrated control system (PICS).

A markup of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) changes is provided as Attachment 1.

Conforming technical specification markups associated with the above FSAR changes are provided as Attachment 2.

FSAR markups are incorporated into the FSAR revision provided in Enclosure 3 (non-public version) and Enclosure 4 (public version). FSAR markups which have been provided via References 1 through 10 (e.g., markups associated with SHINE responses to requests for additional information) have also been incorporated into Enclosures 3 and 4.

Technical specification markups are incorporated into the SHINE Technical Specifications revision provided in Enclosure 5 (non-public version) and Enclosure 6 (public version).

Technical specifications markups which have been provided via References 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 (e.g., markups associated with SHINE responses to requests for additional information) have also been incorporated into Enclosures 5 and 6.

References

1. SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC letter to the NRC, SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC Application for an Operating License Revision 1 of SHINE response to Request for Additional Information 3.4-6, dated April 16, 2021 (ML21106A136)
2. SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC letter to the NRC, SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC Application for an Operating License Response to Request for Additional Information, dated May 7, 2021 (ML21127A051)
3. SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC letter to the NRC, SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC Application for an Operating License Response to Request for Additional Information 4a-15, dated June 3, 2021 Page 3 of 4
4. SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC letter to the NRC, SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC Application for an Operating License Response to Request for Additional Information, dated July 2, 2021
5. SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC letter to the NRC, SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC Application for an Operating License Response to Request for Additional Information, dated July 27, 2021 (ML21208A135)
6. SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC letter to the NRC, SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC Application for an Operating License Response to Request for Additional Information, dated August 27, 2021 (ML21239A049)
7. SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC letter to the NRC, SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC Application for an Operating License Response to Request for Additional Information, dated August 31, 2021 (ML21243A267)
8. SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC letter to the NRC, SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC Application for an Operating License Supplement No. 8 and Response to Request for Additional Information, dated September 29, 2021 (ML21272A341)
9. SHINE Technologies, LLC letter to the NRC, SHINE Technologies, LLC Application for an Operating License Supplement No. 10 and Response to Request for Additional Information, dated October 15, 2021
10. SHINE Technologies, LLC letter to the NRC, SHINE Technologies, LLC Application for an Operating License Supplement No. 13 and Response to Request for Additional Information, dated November 22, 2021 Page 4 of 4

ENCLOSURE 2 ATTACHMENT 1 SHINE TECHNOLOGIES, LLC SHINE TECHNOLOGIES, LLC APPLICATION FOR AN OPERATING LICENSE SUPPLEMENT NO. 14 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT CHANGE

SUMMARY

PUBLIC VERSION FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT MARKUP

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Chapter 1 - The Facility General Description of the Facility Figure 1.3 Main Production Facility Building General Arrangement SHINE Medical Technologies 1.3-6 Rev. 5

Chapter 1 - The Facility General Description of the Facility Figure 1.3 Site Overview HWY 51 GATE SECURITY FENCE N

MAIN PRODUCTION BULK NITROGEN FACILITY N2PS STRUCTURE PARKING AREA GENERATOR PADS SITE BOUNDRY RESOURCE BUILDING MATERIAL STAGING BUILDING GATE CONCRETE PAD FOR AIR-COOLED CHILLERS STORAGE BUILDING SHINE Medical Technologies 1.3-8 Rev. 5

Chapter 3 - Design of Structures, Systems, and Components Design Criteria CHAPTER 3 - DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS 3.1 DESIGN CRITERIA Structures, systems, and components (SSCs) present in the SHINE facility are identified in Tables 3.1-1 and 3.1-2, including the applicable FSAR section(s) which describe each SSC and the applicable SHINE design criteria. Design criteria derived from external codes, guides, and standards specific to the design, construction, or inspection of SSCs are included in the applicable FSAR section describing those SSCs. For each SSC, the FSAR section identifies location, function, modes of operation, and type of actuation for specific SSCs, as applicable.

Nuclear Safety Classification Safety-related SSCs at SHINE are those physical SSCs whose intended functions are to prevent accidents that could cause undue risk to health and safety of workers and the public; and to control or mitigate the consequences of such accidents.

Acceptable risk is achieved by ensuring that events are highly unlikely or by reducing consequences less than the SHINE safety criteria. The SHINE safety criteria are:

  • An acute worker dose of five rem or greater total effective dose equivalent (TEDE).
  • An acute dose of 1 rem or greater TEDE to any individual located outside the owner controlled area.
  • An intake of 30 milligrams or greater of uranium in a soluble form by any individual located outside the owner controlled area.
  • An acute chemical exposure to an individual from licensed material or hazardous chemicals produced from licensed material that could lead to irreversible or other serious, long-lasting health effects to a worker or could cause mild transient health effects to any individual located outside the owner controlled area.
  • Criticality in the radioisotope production facility (RPF)where fissionable material is used, handled, or stored (with the exception of the target solution vessel).

Some SSCs are nonsafety-related but perform functions that impact safety-related SSCs. These nonsafety-related SSCs have design basis requirements necessary to prevent unfavorable interactions with safety-related SSCs due to failure of the nonsafety-related SSCs.

Safety-related SSCs are identified in Table 3.1-1 and nonsafety-related SSCs are identified in Table 3.1-2.

SHINE Design Criteria The SHINE facility uses design criteria to ensure that the SSCs within the facility demonstrate adequate protection against the hazards present. The design criteria are selected to cover:

  • The complete range of irradiation facility and radioisotope production facility operating conditions.
  • The response of SSCs to anticipated transients and potential accidents.
  • Design features for safety-related SSCs including redundancy, environmental qualification, and seismic qualification.

SHINE Medical Technologies 3.1-1 Rev. 5

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Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Radioisotope Production Facility Description Subcritical Assembly 4a2.2.4.3 Source Strength The source is required to provide greater than 6.5.0E+05 neutrons per second (n/s).

4a2.2.4.4 Interaction with the System The placement of the source is inside of a stainless steel capsule that is located below the tritium target chamber. This capsule is accessible when the target chamber is removed and the source is able to be inserted and removed using long-handled tools.

4a2.2.4.5 Physical Environment The nominal temperature of the cooling water surrounding the source is approximately 68°F (20°C). The neutron source will be exposed to external neutron radiation up to [

]PROP/ECI and external gamma radiation up to [

]PROP/ECI.

4a2.2.4.6 Verification of Integrity and Performance Leak and contamination tests of the subcritical multiplication source are performed prior to use in the SHINE facility. Neutron strength measurements are made to ensure the stated activity prior to operation using the source.

4a2.2.4.7 Technical Specifications There are no technical specifications applicable to the subcritical multiplication source.

4a2.2.5 SUBCRITICAL ASSEMBLY SUPPORT STRUCTURE The TSV maintains the location and shape of the target solution during irradiation. The SASS positions the TSV relative to the neutron driver, neutron multiplier, subcritical multiplication source, and neutron flux detectors as shown in Figure 4a2.1-2. The SASS contains the TSV and supports TSV dump lines, TSV overflow lines, TOGS components, and associated instrumentation.

The SASS channels cooling water around the TSV and neutron multiplier. The PCLS is attached to the SASS upper and lower plenums. The PCLS forces cooling water to pass [

]PROP/ECI along the TSV inner and outer shells, and around the neutron multiplier to remove heat from the TSV and neutron multiplier during operation.

The SASS and PSB components are designed to withstand the design basis loads, including thermal, seismic, and hydrodynamic loads imposed by the light water pool during a seismic event. Hydrodynamic loads to safety-related equipment submerged within the light water pools were applied considering hydrodynamic added mass and drag forces from sloshing pool water.

These hydrodynamic loads were calculated using the maximum vertical displacement of sloshing pool water determined using the methods in Section 9 of ACI 350.3-06, Seismic Design of Liquid-Containing Concrete Structures and Commentary (ACI, 2006). In addition, the SASS and supported PSB components are designed to withstand normal operating loads imposed by the SHINE Medical Technologies 4a2.2-10 Rev. 4

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Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Radioisotope Production Facility Description Nuclear Design at the end of TSV fill. This is set by the nominal core configuration, which is the most reactive core.

The analytical limit includes consideration for transient neutronics behavior, detector uncertainties, maximum solution fill rate, and delay for opening of the dump valves.

The limiting core configuration is that configuration that yields the highest power densities. The limiting core configuration is at a batch size in the TSV of [ ]PROP/ECI, corresponding to a fill height of [ ]PROP/ECI from the bottom of the TSV. The calculated uranium concentration at this fill height is [ ]PROP/ECI. See Subsection 4a2.6.3.5 for more discussion on the limiting core configuration.

4a2.6.1.8 Calculated Reactivities for TSV Configurations Calculated keff values for TSV configurations are provided in Table 4a2.6-6, including the limiting core configuration, which yields the highest possible power density. As shown in the table, keff for the subcritical assembly remains below 1.0 during operation.

The highest reactivity anticipated is at cold startup conditions, immediately following the filling of the TSV (Mode 1). The keff for this configuration is approximately [ ]PROP/ECI.

During irradiation (Mode 2, Operation), keff decreases due to the large temperature and void coefficients and is approximately [ ]PROP/ECI at nominal operating conditions.

Accordingly, the anticipated range for keff in the subcritical assembly for TSV configurations is approximately [ ]PROP/ECI.

4a2.6.1.9 Means to Prevent Addition of Positive Reactivity Reactivity control in the TSV includes the following mechanisms:

  • Passive control: TSV dump tank and hold tank are placed physically below the TSV, requiring motive force to move the solution from these tanks into the TSV.
  • Passive control: During the fill process, the available pressure head, TSV fill line size, and manual flow control valve that is set and locked in positionorifice inherently limit the flow rate of solution from the target solution fill lift tank into the TSV.
  • Passive control: Strong neutronics feedback reduces reactivity during operation due to highly negative temperature and void coefficients.
  • Active engineered control: Remaining solution in the TSV fill lift tank from Mode 1 (Startup) is drained to the TSV hold tank when not in Mode 1 (Startup).
  • Active engineered control: Two TSV fill isolation valves in series are closed and interlocked when system is not in Mode 1 (Startup).
  • Active engineered control: Neutron flux detectors and the TRPS initiate dump of TSV and closure of fill valves (for Mode 1) if neutron flux exceeds predetermined flux level setpoint in both Mode 1 (Startup) and Mode 2 (Irradiation).
  • Active engineered control: TSV is dumped if PCLS temperature exceeds acceptable limits.
  • Active engineered control: The neutron driver is allowed a recovery window to return to full power operation, after which time the HVPS breakers are opened [

]PROP/ECI to initiate a ramp up, similar to that used at the start of irradiation.

SHINE Medical Technologies 4a2.6-15 Rev. 4

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Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Radioisotope Production Facility Description Nuclear Design Figure 4a2.6 1/M Curves SHINE Medical Technologies 4a2.6-52 Rev. 4

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Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Radioisotope Production Facility Description Nuclear Design Figure 4a2.6 Power and Temperature Transients Due to Changes in TOGS Pressure Partially Collapsing Void in Target Solution SHINE Medical Technologies 4a2.6-55 Rev. 4

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Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Radioisotope Production Facility Description Gas Management System Table 4a2.8 TSV Off-Gas System Major Components (Sheet 3 of 3)

Principal Major Design Component Description Dimensions Code/Standard Recombiner The recombiner condenser is a shell and [ ]PROP/ECI ASME BPVC condenser tube heat exchanger. The recombiner diameter shell Section VIII condenser cools the TOGS sweep gas (ASME, 2010) leaving the recombiner and condenses the water vapor generated by the recombination process in order to reduce the temperature of the sweep gas entering the TSV and TSV dump tank to below the pool water temperature. The TSV off-gas recombiner condenser is geometrically favorable.

Recombiner The recombiner demister removes [ ]PROP/ECI ASME BPVC demister entrained droplets from the TOGS sweep diameter shell Section VIII gas leaving the recombiner condenser and (ASME, 2010) returns the liquid to the TSV. This process is necessary to prevent accumulation of water in the TSV dump tank, which would increase uranium concentration in the target solution in the TSV during irradiation and thereby increase reactivity in the subcritical assembly. Only the TOGS train BA is equipped with a recombiner demister because it is the only one that connects to the TSV dump tank. The TSV off-gas recombiner demister is geometrically favorable.

Vacuum tank The vacuum tank is a vacuum reservoir [ ]PROP/ECI ASME BPVC that receives gas from the TOGS sweep diameter shell Section VIII gas loop to regulate pressure within the (ASME, 2010) primary system boundary. The vacuum tank is re-evacuated as needed by the vacuum transfer system (VTS) to maintain pressure regulation capability. The vacuum tank is shared with both TOGS trains per irradiation unit. The TSV off-gas vacuum tank is geometrically favorable.

Primary The TOGS piping forming a portion of the Up to NPS ASME B31.3 system primary system boundary is stainless steel [ ]PROP/ECI (ASME, 2013) boundary pipe that interconnects the TOGS major piping components. The TOGS primary system boundary piping is geometrically favorable.

SHINE Medical Technologies 4a2.8-9 Rev. 5

Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Radioisotope Production Facility Radioisotope Production Facility Description Biological Shield 4b.2.2.2 Geometry and Configuration The general shape of the PFBS shielding elements is that of rectangular slabs comprising the walls and cover plugs.

The shield walls of the supercell shield are lead and vary in thickness from approximately 0.75 ft.

(0.2 m) to 1.0 ft. (0.3 m). The walls of the RLWI shielded enclosure are concrete and vary in thickness from approximately 1.50 ft. (0.53 m) to 2.50 ft. (0.86 m). Below-grade PFBS enclosures include process tank vaults, pipe trenches, valve pits, waste drum storage bore holes, and the carbon delay bed vault. The concrete process tank and pipe trench cover plugs vary in thickness from approximately 4.5 ft. (1.4 m) to 5.5 ft. (1.7 m), the concrete carbon delay bed vault cover plug thickness is approximately 5.5 ft. (1.7 m), and the lead waste drum storage cover plug thickness is approximately 0.83 ft. (0.25 m). Alternative shielding materials and configurations that provide equivalent or increased shielding effectiveness may be used.

Biological shielding materials are described in Section 4b.2.3 and shield thicknesses support ALARA goals and compliance with 10 CFR 20 dose limits as described in Section 11.1. Local hot spots (e.g., penetrations, interfaces) will be measured as part of the shielding test program and will be managed appropriately according to the Radiation Protection Program (RPP), as described in Section 11.1.

Figure 4b.2-1 shows a section view through a representative auxiliary valve pit, pipe trench, and tank vault, providing a general depiction of the below-grade RPF biological shielding.

4b.2.2.2.1 Functional Design of Biological Shield Process piping generally transitions between the RPF and IF biological shields (i.e., PFBS and irradiation cell biological shield [ICBS]) directly through below-grade piping penetrations.

Auxiliary piping and unirradiated target solution piping enter the PFBS shielding through one of two auxiliary valve pits using fixed supplemental shielding and non-linear paths, as shown in Figure 4b.2-1. Shielding for the waste drum bore holes, shown in Figure 4b.2-2, utilizes a shielding gate, which interfaces with the drum transfer cart to limit streaming paths.

Compensating shielding is used as needed to ensure sufficient shielding for the different gate positions. Process tank vault, pipe trench, and carbon delay bed cover plugs are not removed during routine operation, but can be removed for equipment replacement, maintenance, or inspection. Smaller access plugs are available within larger plugs for inspection purposes.

The RLWI shielded enclosure has functional design requirements for waste and equipment import and export. The liquid process wastes enter the RLWI shielded enclosure through the process piping trench, they are solidified in the cells, and the solidified waste drums exit through the RLWI drum access doors. New drums enter the RLWI shielded enclosure through the same drum access doors, and personnel can enter and leave the shielding via the personnel access door. Contaminated process equipment is removed via the drum access door or shield plugs.

Figure 4b.2-3 shows a general depiction of the entry and exit facilities for the RLWI shielded enclosure.

The supercell has multiple functional design requirements for interfacing with the shielded area.

Solid wastes exit through drum export features on the supercell. The supercell includes features to allow the import of consumables and process equipment and transfer between adjacent cells.

The supercell has export features for product shipping containers. Penetrations through the hot SHINE Medical Technologies 4b.2-2 Rev. 3

Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Radioisotope Production Facility Radioisotope Production Facility Description Biological Shield Figure 4b.2 RLWI Shielding Entry and Exit Facilities - General Arrangement (Not to Scale)

PERSONNEL ACCESS DOOR DRUM ACCESS DOORS SHINE Medical Technologies 4b.2-10 Rev. 3

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Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Radioisotope Production Facility Description Radioisotope Extraction System

]PROP/ECI The cryotrap is reheated to desorb the xenon and allow it to be packaged.

9. Xenon is transferred to a xenon product gas bottle meeting customer requirements and shipping requirements. The resulting product is xenon-133 gas, with a volume of [

]PROP/ECI.

10. The iodine product bottle is transferred to the MIPS system to prepare for shipment.
11. The xenon product bottle is transferred to the MIPS system to prepare for shipment.
12. If replacement is required for product purity or product yield purposes, the iodine recovery, [ ]PROP/ECI disconnected and removed from service. The columns are placed on a decay storage rack prior to being transferred into the waste export drum. The SRWP system is described in Subsection 9b.7.5. New columns are then installed to replace the spent columns.

The radioactive inventory in the IXP process is evaluated for release in the safety analysis. The ESFAS system detects unacceptable releases from the hot cell, if they were to occur, and provides confinement functions to maintain doses within acceptable levels. Section 7.5 provides a detailed description of ESFAS.

4b.3.1.4.4 Process Equipment The following is process equipment associated with the Mo-99 extraction system.

Components within the extraction cell are typically replaceable with the manipulators. Materials of construction for the below listed components are principally stainless steel. Materials of construction for extraction components are chemically compatible with the process fluids (including target solution for relevant components) to ensure corrosion resistance, designed to prevent galvanic coupling concerns, and perform acceptably under the radiation environment.

Alloys that meet these criteria include type 316/316L stainless steel, type 347 stainless steel, type 304/304L stainless steel, and Alloy 20.

Nonsafety-related monitoring and control of MEPS is provided by the process integrated control system (PICS), which is described in Section 7.3. PICS monitors valve position, process temperature, pressure, and pump operation in MEPS. PICS also provides interlocks to minimize process errors.

Safety-related monitoring and control of MEPS is provided by ESFAS. ESFAS monitors positions of valves performing a safety-related function in MEPS, conductivityradiation in the MEPS hot water return, radiation in the hot cell ventilation ducts, and level detection in the radioactive drain system (RDS). In the event ESFAS detects an abnormal condition in any of these parameters, ESFAS actuates to isolate the MEPS hot cell and place MEPS equipment in a safe condition.

Details on each ESFAS operation and actuation are described in Section 7.5.

MEPS isolation valves and conductivity instrumentationradiation monitors are the only components within the MEPS that are required to function during an accident to ensure doses to the public and workers meet acceptance criteria. A conductivity of greater than 500 micromho/cm in the MEPS heating loop would indicate a leak in the system and potential for dose to the workers. Components are designed to meet criticality safety controls. The ESFAS monitors the position of the extraction column upper and lower three-way valves as a criticality safety control, as referenced in Section 4b.1 and discussed in Section 6b.3.

SHINE Medical Technologies 4b.3-4 Rev. 4

Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Radioisotope Production Facility Description Radioisotope Extraction System Table 4b.3-5 provides the chemical inventories associated with the IXP. In addition to the reagents used, the IXP receives target solution. Section 4b.4 provides a description of the target solution preparation process. Off-gases evolved during IXP processing are generally swept to PVVS. Should off-gases be released during processing, they are released within the supercell, are isolated from workers by the supercell confinement, and are processed by the RVZ1 system, as described in Section 9a2.1.

4b.3.3 CRITICALITY CONTROL FEATURES The MEPS and IXP prevent inadvertent criticality through criticality control features, described in detail in Section 6b.3.

4b.3.4 SHIELDING AND RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION The MEPS and IXP processes described above are performed in the production facility biological shield (PFBS) hot cells, which supports compliance with the as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) objectives and dose limits required by 10 CFR 20. Refer to Section 11.1 for the facility radiation protection description, and Section 4b.2 for description of the PFBS.

The processes are remotely controlled, and performed with remote manipulators, with minimal automated sequences. Radiation monitors and alarms are used to monitor release of radiological materials, monitor high background gamma dose levels, and to detect criticality events were such an event to occur.

Piping that contains potentially radioactive material is routed through shielded pipe trenches to limit the worker exposure to radiation. Tanks within the MEPS are inside shielded hot cells, so additional tank shielding is not required.

4b.3.5 MEPS HOT WATER LOOP SUBSYSTEM The MEPS hot water loop subsystem is a closed-loop hot water system for process heating within the extraction hot cells. The temperature of the water loop is less than 212°F (100°C), to provide assurance that solutions warmed by the hot water loop do not boil.

The MEPS hot water loop subsystem supports the process of separating Mo from target solution.

The MEPS hot water loop subsystem is also used as needed to preheat the reagents for Mo extraction and concentration before they are pumped into the hot cell. The subsystem provides branch connections at the hot cells for the FCRS equipment designed to preheat reagents before they are introduced into the hot cell processes.

Deionized water is circulated through the hot water loop to provide heating service to the MEPS preheater and the FCRS components at the supercell. Water is pumped through and heated by an electric circulation heater. A temperature instrument at the heater outlet feeds back to the heater controller to ensure temperature of the water supply is consistent. The header is routed from the heater outlet to the supercell. Branches from the header are taken at each hot cell where hot water is needed.

After the supply branches are taken from the header, the header turns back to the hot water loop skid. A flow control valvebackpressure regulator is installed on a by-pass to the hot water return header. The flow control valve ensures flow to each hot cell is constant by SHINE Medical Technologies 4b.3-8 Rev. 4

Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Radioisotope Production Facility Description Radioisotope Extraction System maintainingbackpressure regulator regulates the pressure in the supply header. The header returns to the skid and enters the air separator to remove any entrained gases. An expansion tank downstream of the separator provides constant pressure to the suction side of the pump. A pressure relief valve is provided at the outlet of the pump. The discharge of the relief valve is routed to a container that sits below the skid. The facility deionized water system provides make up water as needed.

The PICS accepts outputs from the MEPS hot water loop subsystem instruments. PICS is further discussed in Section 7.3.

Conductivity sensorsRadiation monitors are provided in the MEPS hot water loop to detect ingress of radioactive material if it were to occur. If conductivityradiation exceeds predetermined limits, ESFAS initiates a MEPS heating loop isolation, closing the hot water loop inlet and outlet isolation valves and tripping the extraction feed pump breakers. MEPS also closes the hot water loop inlet and outlet isolation valves on level detected in RDS and as part of a supercell isolation.

Section 7.5 provides a detailed description of ESFAS.

4b.3.6 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Certain material in this section provides information that is used in the technical specifications.

This includes limiting conditions for operation, setpoints, design features, and means for accomplishing surveillances. In addition, significant material is also applicable to, and may be used for, the bases that are described in the technical specifications.

SHINE Medical Technologies 4b.3-9 Rev. 4

Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Radioisotope Production Facility Description Radioisotope Extraction System Table 4b.3 IXP Interfaces Interfacing System Interface Description Engineered safety features ESFAS actuates isolation functions of the IXP to prevent actuation system (ESFAS) unacceptable radiological releases.

Molybdenum extraction and The MEPS supplies acidic solutions for the IXP to purification system (MEPS) separate from iodine product.

Molybdenum isotope product The iodine-131 and xenon-133 production containers are packaging system (MIPS) transferred to the packaging hot cell for labeling and placement in shipping containers by MIPS.

Solid radioactive waste packaging Solid wastes of IXP are placed into waste containers and (SRWP) exported from the hot cell to SRWP.

Target solution staging system Target solution batches may be discharged to TSSS (TSSS) following the separation of iodine.

Radioactive liquid waste storage Liquid wastes resulting from the processing of the iodine (RLWS) batches are discharged to the RLWS tanks.

Facility nitrogen handling system The FNHS supplies nitrogen to purge the IXP product (FNHS) bottle headspace and to cool the cryotrap.

Process vessel ventilation system Tanks in the IXP are ventilated by the PVVS to mitigate (PVVS) radiological hydrogen generation. The cryotrap discharges gaseous radiological wastes to the PVVS.

Process integrated control system PICS allows operators to monitor IXP parameters and (PICS) control process functions.

Facility chemical reagent system The FCRS provides chemical reagents to IXP as needed.

(FCRS)

Production facility biological shield The IXP components with radiological inventories are (PFBS) within a hot cell to minimize worker doses.

Vacuum Transfer System (VTS) The VTS provides vacuum service to IXP for liquid transfer between components within the IXP.

Nitrogen Purge System (N2PS) The N2PS supplies nitrogen to the tanks in the IXP that are ventilated by the PVVS from zone 2 air.

Radiological Ventilation Zone 1 The IXP cryotrap has an exhaust connection to RVZ1.

(RVZ1)

SHINE Medical Technologies 4b.3-11 Rev. 4

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Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Radioisotope Production Facility Description Radioisotope Extraction System Figure 4b.3 MEPS Process Flow Diagram (Sheet 1 of 2)

SHINE Medical Technologies 4b.3-15 Rev. 4

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Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Radioisotope Production Facility Description Radioisotope Extraction System Figure 4b.3 IXP Process Flow Diagram SHINE Medical Technologies 4b.3-17 Rev. 3

Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Special Nuclear Material Radioisotope Production Facility Description Processing and Storage Table 4b.4 Special Nuclear Material Maximum Inventory in the Main Production Facility (Approximate)

Chemical Form(a) Physical Form Inventory(b)

Uranium metal Solid 1030 lb. (470 kg)

Uranium oxide Powder 310 lb. (140 kg)

Uranyl sulfate Aqueous 4770 lb. (2170 kg)

Uranyl sulfate Solidified 16 lb. (8 kg)

Plutonium Aqueous, solidified 4.08 lb. (1.85 kg)

Highly enriched uranium in Solid 0.55 lb. (0.25 kg) fission chambers a) Uranium is low enriched uranium (LEU), unless otherwise noted.

b) Inventory mass does not include the water mass for aqueous solutions.

SHINE Medical Technologies 4b.4-10 Rev. 4

Chapter 6 - Engineered Safety Features Detailed Descriptions The primary confinement boundary has a normally-closed atmosphere without connections to the facility ventilation system, except through the PCLS expansion tank. Closed loop ventilation units (i.e., radiological ventilation zone 1 recirculating subsystem [RVZ1r]) circulate and cool the air within the IU cell and the TOGS cell. Each subsystem is equipped with a cooling coil and high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) and carbon filters to remove contaminants in the circulated air.

The cooling coil is supplied by the radioisotope process facility cooling system (RPCS). The closed loop ventilation units are entirely located in the primary cooling rooms. There are no normally-open external connections between the RVZ1r subsystem and the main RVZ1 system.

A detailed discussion of RVZ1r is provided in Section 9a2.1.

The PCLS expansion tank has a connection to radiological ventilation zone 1 exhaust subsystem (RVZ1e) which provides a vent path for radiolysis gases produced in the PCLS and light water pool, to avoid the buildup of hydrogen gas. The PCLS expansion tank is located in the IU cell but draws air from the TOGS cell atmosphere. A small line connecting the IU cell and TOGS cell atmospheres creates a flow path from the IU cell, into the TOGS cell, and out through the PCLS expansion tank to RVZ1e. This flow path normally maintains the cells at a slightly negative pressure. The connection to RVZ1e is equipped with redundant dampers or valves that close on a confinement actuation signal, isolating the cells from RVZ1. A detailed discussion of RVZ1e is provided in Section 9a2.1.

The complete listing of variables within the TRPS that can cause the initiation of an IU Cell Safety Actuation is provided in Subsection 7.4.3.1. The parameters indicating a release of radioactive material into the primary confinement boundary are high RVZ1e IU cell radiation (indicating a release of fission products), high tritium purification system (TPS) target chamber supply pressure, and high TPS target chamber exhaust pressure (indicating a release from the neutron driver assembly system [NDAS]).

Following an IU Cell Safety Actuation, PSB and primary confinement boundary isolation valves transition to their deenergized (safe) states. The normal flow of materials passes through the mezzanine RVZ1 exhaust filter banks before being released to the environment. RVZ filtration is not credited in the accident analysis. If sufficient radioactive material reaches the radiation monitors in the RVZ1 exhaust duct, the engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) will isolate the RVZ building supply and exhaust.

Following cell isolation, three mechanisms by which the primary confinement boundary exchanges air with the IF are considered in the accident analysis: pressure-driven flow, counter-current flow, and barometric breathing. The facility accident analysis models the combined effect of these mechanisms as a minor outflow of radioactive material from the primary confinement boundary directly to the IF and then to the environment under accident conditions. The evaluated accident sequences for which the primary confinement boundary is necessary are listed in Table 6a2.1-1 and discussed further in Chapter 13a2.

The requirements for the ICBS and TRPS needed for system operability, periodic surveillance, setpoints, and other specific requirements needed to ensure the functionality of the primary confinement boundary are located in the technical specifications.

SHINE Medical Technologies 6a2.2-2 Rev. 4

Chapter 6 - Engineered Safety Features Detailed Descriptions 6a2.2.1.2 Tritium Confinement Boundary Portions of the TPS serve as the tritium confinement boundary. The TPS is described in detail in Section 9a2.7. A functional block diagram of the tritium confinement is provided in Figure 6a2.2-2.

Tritium in the IF is confined using active and passive features of the TPS. The TPS gloveboxes and secondary enclosure cleanup subsystems are credited passive confinement barriers. The TPS gloveboxes enclose TPS process equipment. The process equipment of the secondary enclosure cleanup subsystem is a credited passive confinement barrier. The TPS gloveboxes are maintained at negative pressure relative to the TPS room and have a helium atmosphere.

The TPS gloveboxes provide confinement in the event of a breach in the TPS process equipment that results in a release of tritium from the isotope separation process equipment.

The TPS gloveboxes include isolation valves on the helium supply, the glovebox pressure control exhaust, and the vacuum/impurity treatment subsystem process vents.

The TPS has isolation valves on the process connections to the NDAS target chamber supply and exhaust lines. The TPS-NDAS interface lines themselves are part of the credited tritium confinement boundary up to the interface with the primary confinement boundary.

When the isolation valves for a process line or glovebox close, the spread of radioactive material is limited to the glovebox plus the small amount between the glovebox and its isolation valves.

The liquid nitrogen supply and exhaust lines and the gaseous nitrogen pneumatic lines for the TPS equipment are credited to remain intact during a DBA and the internal interface between the gloveboxes and nitrogen lines serves as a passive section of the tritium confinement boundary.

Upon detection of high TPS exhaust to facility stack tritium concentration or high TPS glovebox tritium concentration, the ESFAS automatically initiates a TPS isolation. The active components required to function to maintain the confinement barrier are transitioned to their deenergized (safe) state by the ESFAS. A description of the ESFAS and a complete listing of the active components that transition state with a TPS isolation are provided in Section 7.5.

In the event of a break in the process piping within the TPS glovebox, the release of tritium from the glovebox is uncontrolled for up to 20 seconds until the isolation valves close. Long-term leakage and permeation of the confinement barrier result in migration of tritium out of the confinement and into the TPS room, IF, and environment. The facility accident analysis considers the effect of this air exchange in its evaluation of radiological consequences. The evaluated accident sequences for which the tritium confinement boundary is necessary are listed in Table 6a2.1-1 and further discussed in Chapter 13a2.

The requirements for the TPS and ESFAS needed for system operability, periodic surveillance, setpoints, and other specific requirements needed to ensure the functionality of the tritium confinement boundary are located in the technical specifications.

6a2.2.2 COMBUSTIBLE GAS MANAGEMENT Hydrogen gas is produced by radiolysis in the target solution during and after irradiation. During normal operation the concentration of hydrogen gas is monitored and maintained below the lower flammability limit (LFL) using the TOGS. The management of combustible gases during SHINE Medical Technologies 6a2.2-3 Rev. 4

Chapter 6 - Engineered Safety Features Detailed Descriptions Figure 6a2.2 Tritium Confinement Boundary SHINE Medical Technologies 6a2.2-6 Rev. 4

Chapter 6 - Engineered Safety Features Detailed Descriptions is a minor outflow of radioactive material from the confined area to the RPF and the environment under accident conditions. If sufficient radioactive material reaches the radiation monitors in the RVZ1 exhaust duct, ESFAS will isolate the RVZ building supply and exhaust. The evaluated accident sequence for which the process confinement boundary is necessary is listed in Table 6b.1-1 and discussed further in Section 13b.2.

The requirements needed for process confinement boundary system operability, periodic surveillance, setpoints, and other specific requirements needed to ensure the functionality of the process confinement boundary are located in technical specifications.

6b.2.2 PROCESS VESSEL VENT ISOLATION The process vessel vent system (PVVS) captures or provides holdup for radioactive particulates, iodine, and noble gases generated within the RPF and primary system boundary. The system draws air from the process vessels through a series of processing components which remove the radioactive components by condensation, acid adsorption, mechanical filtration with high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters, and adsorption in carbon beds. Two sets of carbon beds are used; the guard beds located in the supercella below-grade, shielded vault, and the delay beds located in the carbon delay bed vault.

Fires may occur in the carbon guard and delay beds which result in the release of radioactive material into the downstream PVVS system, which leads to the facility ventilation system and the environment. The PVVS guard and delay beds are equipped with isolation valves that isolate the affected guard bed or group of delay beds from the system and extinguish the fire. The isolation valves also serve to prevent the release of radioactive material to the environment. The delay beds are equipped with sensors to detect fires which provide indication to ESFAS. The isolation valves close within 30 seconds of the receipt of the actuation signal. The redundancy in the beds and the ability to isolate individual beds allows the PVVS to continue to operate following an isolation.

The evaluated accident sequence for which the PVVS isolation is necessary is listed in Table 6b.1-1 and discussed further in Section 13b.2.

The requirements to be specified in the technical specifications for system operability, periodic surveillance, setpoints, and other specific requirements needed to ensure the functionality of the PVVS isolations are located in Section 7.5 and Section 9.6, which describes the ESFAS and the PVVS, respectively.

6b.2.3 COMBUSTIBLE GAS MANAGEMENT Hydrogen gas is produced by radiolysis in the target solution during and after irradiation. During normal operation, the PVVS removes radiolytic hydrogen and radioactive gases generated within the RPF and primary system boundary. The PVVS is described in detail in Section 9b.6. If PVVS becomes unavailable, the buildup of hydrogen gas is limited using the combustible gas management system, which uses the nitrogen purge system (N2PS), process system piping, and the PVVS to establish an inert gas flow through the process vessels.

The principle objective of the combustible gas management system is to prevent the conditions required for a hydrogen deflagration in the gas spaces in the RPF process tanks.

SHINE Medical Technologies 6b.2-3 Rev. 3

Chapter 6 - Engineered Safety Features Detailed Descriptions The N2PS provides a backup supply of sweep gas following a loss of electrical power or loss of sweep gas flow to the RPF tanks which are normally ventilated by PVVS. A functional block diagram of the combustible gas management system is shown in Figure 6b.2-3.

High pressure nitrogen gas is stored in pressurized vessels which are located in an above-grade reinforced concrete structure adjacent to the main production facility. On a loss of power or receipt of an ESFAS actuation signal, isolation valves on the radiological ventilation zone 2 (RVZ2) air supply to PVVS shut and isolation valves on the N2PS discharge manifold open, releasing nitrogen into the RPF N2PS distribution piping. The nitrogen gas flows through the RPF equipment and into the PVVS process piping. The discharged gases flow through the PVVS passive filtration equipment before being discharged to the alternate vent path in the PVVS. The N2PS is described in detail in Section 9b.6.

The complete listing of variables within the ESFAS that can cause the initiation of an RPF Nitrogen Purge is provided in Subsection 7.5.3.1. These variables indicate a loss of flow. The active components required to function to initiate the RPF Nitrogen Purge are actuated by the ESFAS. A detailed description of the ESFAS is provided in Section 7.5.

The combustible gas management system prevents deflagrations and detonations in RPF process tanks which could lead to a tank or pipe failure and cause a target solution spill inside the process confinement boundary. The accident sequences for which the combustible gas management system is necessary are listed in Table 6b.1-1 and discussed in Chapter 13a2.

The requirements needed for PVVS system operability, periodic surveillance, setpoints, and other specific requirements needed to ensure the functionality of the combustible gas management system are located in technical specifications.

6b.2.4 CHEMICAL PROTECTION There are no ESFs in the RPF associated with protection from chemical exposure. The cChemical dose analysis is provided in Section 13b.3 and has shown that no potential chemical release exceeds the established acceptance limits. As described in Section 13b.3, confinement barriers (i.e., supercell, gloveboxes, subgrade vaults) are credited for mitigation of chemical dose consequencesProtective Action Criteria (PAC)-1 values, the lowest severity, for the worker or at the site boundary in postulated accident scenarios. The URSS uranium storage racks are seismically qualified to maintain their structure and position during seismic events to limit the material at risk for uranium oxide accidents.

SHINE Medical Technologies 6b.2-4 Rev. 3

Chapter 6 - Engineered Safety Features Detailed Descriptions Figure 6b.2 Below Grade Confinement Boundary N2PS TSPS Valve Pits Pipe Trench Tank Vaults Carbon Delay Bed Vaults Process Tanks PVVS Delay Process Valves Process Piping PVVS Beds PVVS Guard Beds Confinement Irradiation Hot Cells Units Primary Confinement Confinement Boundary Supercell Confinement Boundary SHINE Medical Technologies 6b.2-6 Rev. 3

Nuclear Criticality Safety in the Chapter 6 - Engineered Safety Features Radioisotope Production Facility abnormal condition. The system operates by gravity drain, where overflows and leakage flow through installed piping directly to the RDS hold tanks. The hold tank contents can be mixed, sampled, and withdrawn through the VTS to the TSSS or RLWS as appropriate.

Criticality Safety Basis The NCSE for the RDS shows that the entire process will remain subcritical under normal and credible abnormal conditions.

Under normal process conditions, the RDS does not contain fissile material. Leakage or overflow of target solution to the RDS is considered an abnormal condition for the facility but is considered as a normal condition for the purpose of the criticality safety evaluation for the system. The RDS hold tanks and piping are favorable geometry for the most reactive concentration of target solution and are safe-by-design. The vacuum lift tanks within the RDS are favorable geometry within the single parameter limits. The hold tanks are equipped with overflow lines, and RDS drains are adequately sized to prevent buildup of solution in the vault drip tray. Drip trays are also sloped and equipped with leak detectiontoward the drain lines. Interaction is controlled between components with minimum separation distances between components and between vaults.

Precipitation of solids requires application of the DCP to prevent criticality accidents. The hold tanks are equipped with level instrumentation to detect a leak of solution transferred to RDS.

Additionally, administrative controls ensure that, upon a leak, normal operations stop, the leaked solution is sampled, and appropriate recovery actions are performed.

6b.3.2.9 Radioactive Liquid Waste Immobilization System The RLWI system receives radioactive liquid waste from the RLWS and mixes it with solidifying agents to stabilize and solidify the liquid waste in drums. The drums are then moved into storage and eventually to long-term disposal. A process overview is provided in Figure 6b.3-8.

Waste with a uranium concentration capable of meeting the waste acceptance and storage requirements enters the system from the RLWS liquid waste blending tanks and into the immobilization feed tank by drawing a vacuum on the immobilization feed tank. When the waste is ready to be immobilized, it is pumped from the immobilization feed tank by the liquid waste drum fill pump and into a radioactive liquid waste drum pre-loaded with solidification agents. The contents of the radioactive liquid waste drum are solidified and after adequate cure time, the solidified waste drum is remotely loaded into a shielded drum for transport to the material staging building.

Criticality Safety Basis The NCSE for the RLWI system shows that the entire process will remain subcritical under normal and credible abnormal conditions.

Under normal process conditions, the incoming feed stream from RLWS contains low concentrations of fissile material and is significantly below the single parameter limit for uranium concentration in solution. The operational limits on uranium concentration for the input stream are driven by waste acceptance requirements and are even lower than the allowable limits for criticality safety.

SHINE Medical Technologies 6b.3-19 Rev. 4

Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Process Integrated Control System 7.3 PROCESS INTEGRATED CONTROL SYSTEM The SHINE facility is provided with nonsafety-related control systems necessary to perform normal operational activities within the facility. The process integrated control system (PICS) is a nonsafety-related digital control system that performs various functions throughout the SHINE facility. The PICS is the primary interface for operators to perform tasks in both the irradiation facility (IF) and the radioisotope production facility (RPF). PICS functions include signal conditioning, system controls, interlocks, and monitoring of the process variables and system status.

Vendor-provided nonsafety-related control systems, which interface and communicate with the PICS, are also present within the SHINE facility and are used to monitor and control specific facility systems.

The main control board and operator workstations in the facility control room are also part of the PICS and are described in Section 7.6.

7.3.1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The PICS is a collection of instrumentation and control equipment located throughout the facility to support monitoring, indication, and control of various systems. A portion of the PICS supports the main control board and operator workstations in the facility control room by receiving operator commands and collecting and transmitting facility information to the operators, as described in Section 7.6. An architecture of the PICS is provided in Figure 7.3-1.

The following vendor-provided nonsafety-related control systems are also provided for the SHINE facility:

  • The building automation system is a digital control system capable of integrating multiple building functions, including equipment supervision and control, alarm management, energy management, and trend data collection. It provides control for the facility heating water system (FHWS), the facility chilled water system (FCHS), the process chilled water system (PCHS), the radioisotope process facility cooling system (RPCS), facility ventilation zone 4 (FVZ4) air handling, and radiological ventilation zone 1, 2, and 3 (RVZ1/2/3) air handling. The building automation system receives commands from the PICS to start and stop select control sequences and provides information to the PICS for monitoring.
  • The supercell contains a local control system and human system interface equipment for controlling hot cell functions including interior lighting, interior temperature and pressure, and operation of the doors, ports, and waste export system. The supercell control system provides information to PICS for monitoring only.
  • The radioactive liquid waste immobilization (RLWI) system contains a local control system and human system interface equipment for controlling RLWI equipment functions including lighting inside the RLWI enclosure, interior temperature and pressure, operation of the doors and other access ports, and operation of equipment used to handle solidified waste. The RLWI control system provides information to PICS for monitoring only.
  • The neutron driver assembly system (NDAS) control system is used to monitor and make adjustments to any of the eight neutron drivers in the eight irradiation unit (IU) cells. Two NDAS control stations are provided in the facility control room as described in Subsection 7.6.1.2, and a portable local station is provided as described in SHINE Medical Technologies 7.3-1 Rev. 4

Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Process Integrated Control System PICS automatically controls the temperature of the recombiners (trains A and B) and the zeolite bed (train AB) by energizing or deenergizing the associated heater based on the inlet and outlet temperature of each component.

PICS automatically opens the TOGS oxygen inlet valve when oxygen concentration is low, based on the median value of the three TOGS oxygen concentration inputs received from TRPS.

If TSV headspace pressure (Subsection 7.3.1.1.1) increases above the allowable setpoint, PICS opens the TOGS vacuum tank inlet valve. If TSV headspace pressure is too high while TOGS oxygen concentration is low, PICS closes the TOGS oxygen inlet valve prior to opening the TOGS vacuum tank inlet valve. If TSV headspace pressure is too low, PICS opens the TOGS nitrogen inlet valve.

PICS automatically controls the position of the TOGS gas inlet flow control valve to maintain a constant gas injection flowrate when either the TOGS oxygen or nitrogen inlet valve is open.

The following functions are performed while TOGS is not running (Mode 0):

When manually initiated by the operator, the PICS executes a programmed sequence to evacuate the TOGS vacuum tank by opening and closing the TOGS vacuum tank inlet valve, opening and closing the TOGS vacuum tank outlet valve, and opening and closing the vacuum supply valves in a specific order.

When manually initiated by the operator, the PICS executes a programmed sequence to start the TOGS by ensuring TOGS valves are in their required states, enabling the TOGS control loops, and starting the TOGS blowers. This sequence places the TOGS in a Running state.

Interlocks and Permissives PICS provides interlocks and permissives to:

  • Prevent the TOGS vacuum tank inlet valve and TOGS vacuum tank outlet valve from being open simultaneously.
  • Prevent the TOGS oxygen inlet valve and TOGS nitrogen inlet valve from being open simultaneously.
  • Prevent the TOGS vacuum tank inlet valve from being open when either the TOGS oxygen inlet valve or the TOGS nitrogen inlet valve is open.
  • Allow the transition from Mode 0 to Mode 1 only when TOGS is in a Running state.
  • Allow the transition from Mode 1 to Mode 2 only when TOGS is in a Running state.

Indication to the operator is provided on the PICS operator workstation displays when an interlock or permissive is bypassed.

7.3.1.1.3 Primary Closed Loop Cooling System The PCLS provides forced convection water cooling to the TSV and neutron multiplier during irradiation of the target solution and immediately prior to transferring target solution from the TSV to the TSV dump tank. The PCLS is described in Section 5a2.2.

SHINE Medical Technologies 7.3-6 Rev. 4

Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Process Integrated Control System Three local operator PICS stations are provided at the supercell, one located near each extraction hot cell.

Monitoring and Alarms The PICS receives input from the engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) and provides alarms for the position of the MEPS extraction column three-way valves (Subsection 7.5.4.1.16) and the MEPS Heating Loop conductivityradiation (Subsection 7.5.4.1.6).

The PICS directly monitors and provides alarms for molybdenum eluate hold tank level, discharge pressure and status feedback from system pumps, MEPS evaporator temperature, and various other system temperatures and pressures. The PICS also monitors the weight of samples obtained from various processes, but no alarms are provided.

For the MEPS hot water loop, the PICS monitors and provides alarms for temperature, flow, and pressure at various locations.

The PICS also provides alarms for automatic or manual Extraction Column A/B/C Alignment Actuations and MEPS A/B/C Heating Loop Isolations described in Subsection 7.5.3.1.

Control Functions When a target solution extraction sequence is manually initiated by the operator, the PICS executes a programmed sequence to transfer solution from one manually selected TSV dump tank to a manually selected supercell extraction hot cell using the VTS. The PICS opens and closes the associated TSV dump tank drain isolation valve and appropriate system isolation valves based on feedback from associated VTS lift tank level switches and the selected TSV dump tank low-high level switch to accomplish the solution transfer. The PICS also starts and stops the associated extraction feed pump as part of the sequence.

During a target solution extraction sequence, the PICS automatically controls the temperature of the MEPS hot water loop by energizing and deenergizing the hot water loop heater based on the outlet water temperature from the heater. Additionally, the PICS automatically controls the rate of water flow through the heat exchanger based on the temperature of the target solution.

When initiated by the operator during a purification operation, the PICS automatically controls the temperature of the MEPS evaporator by energizing and deenergizing the evaporator heater.

Other than performance of a target solution extraction sequence and the automatic PICS control functions described above, the tasks performed by the operator for the MEPS are manual. The operator is able to use the PICS local supercell control stations to manually open and close individual valves and manually start or stop individual components unless operation is prevented by interlocks, permissives, or active sequences. Components that are capable of being actuated by ESFAS are controlled by PICS as described in Subsection 7.3.1.3.11.

The supercell control system is used by the operator to manually control hot cell (non-process) functions.

SHINE Medical Technologies 7.3-10 Rev. 4

Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Process Integrated Control System Figure 7.3 Process Integrated Control System Architecture Control Room PLC Cabinet Safety Supercell and Ancillary Utilities IU Cells IU Cells IU Cells IU Cell #8 IU Cell #7 IU Cell #6 IU Cell #5 Facility Facility IU Cell #4 IU Cell #3 IU Cell #2 IU Cell #1 Communication Target Solution Equipment Overview Overview Overview Overview Process Process Overview Overview Overview Overview PLC Transfer PLC PLC PLC 1-2 PLC 3-5 PLC 6-8 PLC Supervisor Workstation Server Cabinet NDAS Workstation Operator Workstation Rack Mounted Switch NDAS Workstation Operator Workstation Building Seismic Supercell RLWI Control Automation Monitoring FDWS Controls FNHS Controls Control System System System System NDAS Control System Key ESFAS - engineered safety features actuation system FDWS - facility demineralized water system FNHS - facility nitrogen handling system HC - hot cell IU - irradiation unit IXP - Iodine and xenon purification and packaging MEPS - molybdenum extraction and purification system Cabinet Cabinet Cabinet Cabinet IU Cabinet IU Workstation MIPS - molybdenum isotope product packaging system TSSS TSSS/RLWS RPCS/NPSS Cell 7-8 Cell 1-4 RLWI Area N2PS - nitrogen purge system Cabinet Cabinet Cabinet UPSS/ Cabinet IU Cabinet IU TSSS ESFAS/TRPS Cell 5-6 NDAS - neutron driver assembly system RSSS/RLWS Cell 5-8 Workstation NPSS - normal electrical power supply system Supercell A Cabinet Cabinet MEPS/ Cabinet Cabinet IU Cabinet PLC - programmable logic controller IXP/MIPS/VTS/ Area PVVS HC N2PS Cell 3-4 RCA PVVS - process vessel vent system Cabinet Cabinet RCA - radiologically controlled area Cabinet Cabinet IU Workstation LABS/TSPS/

RDS - radioactive drain system RDS URSS SGS Cell 1-2 Supercell B RLWI - radioactive liquid waste immobilization system Area RLWS - radioactive liquid waste storage system RPCS - radioisotope process facility cooling system Workstation SGS - standby generator system TPS Train A I/O TPS Train A I/O TPS Train A I/O Supercell C TPS - tritium purification system and PLC and PLC and PLC Area TRPS - target solution vessel reactivity protection system TS - target solution TSPS - target solution preparation system Workstation TS Prep Area TSSS - target solution staging system UPSS - uninterruptible electrical power supply system Workstation Workstation Workstation TPS Area TPS Area TPS Area URSS - uranium receipt and storage system VTS - vacuum transfer system SHINE Medical Technologies 7.3-38 Rev. 4

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Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Target Solution Vessel Reactivity Protection System Table 7.4 TRPS Monitored Variables (Sheet 1 of 2)

Instrument Variable Analytical Limit Logic Range Accuracy Response Time 2.52 times the nominal Source range neutron flux flux at 95 percent volume 2/3 1 to 1.0E+05 cps 2 percent 450 milliseconds of the critical fill height Wide range neutron flux 240 percent 2/3 2.5E-8 to 250 percent 2 percent 450 milliseconds Power range neutron flux [ ]PROP/ECI 2/3 (Low power range limit, driver 40 percent 2/3 0 to 125 percent 1 percent 1 second dropout permissive, and high time-averaged limit) 104 percent 2/3 6015x background RVZ1e IU cell exhaust radiation 2/3 10-7 to 10-1 µCi/cc 20 percent 15 seconds radiation TOGS oxygen concentration 10 percent 2/3 0 to 25 percent 1 percent 120 seconds TOGS mainstream flow [ ]PROP/ECI 2/3 [ ]PROP/ECI 3 percent 01.5 seconds TOGS dump tank flow [ ]PROP/ECI 2/3 [ ]PROP/ECI 3 percent 01.5 seconds TOGS condenser demister outlet 25°C 2/3 0 to 100°C 0.65 percent 10 seconds temperature Active/inactiveHigh level/ Discrete Low-high TSV dump tank level signal ActiveHigh level 2/3 1.5 seconds not high level input signal Active/inactiveHigh level/ Discrete High-high TSV dump tank level signal ActiveHigh level 2/3 1.5 seconds not high level input signal PCLS flow [ ]PROP/ECI 2/3 [ ]PROP/ECI 1 percent 1 second SHINE Medical Technologies 7.4-56 Rev. 4

Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System A Supercell Area 10 (IXP Area) Isolation initiates the following safety functions:

  • Deenergize RVZ2 supercell area 10 (IXP area) inlet isolation dampers
  • Deenergize RVZ1 supercell area 10 (IXP area) outlet isolation dampers
  • Supercell Area 6 (extraction area B) Isolation
  • Supercell Area 7 (extraction area C) Isolation The ESFAS initiates a Supercell Area 10 (IXP Area) Isolation based on the following variable or safety actuation:
  • High RVZ1 supercell area 10 (IXP) exhaust ventilation radiation
  • RCA Isolation 7.5.3.1.11 MEPS A Heating Loop Isolation MEPS A Heating Loop Isolation is relied upon as a safety-related control in accordance with the SHINE safety analysis described in Chapter 13 for RPF critical equipment malfunction events (Subsection 13b.1.2.3, Scenario 14).

A MEPS A Heating Loop Isolation initiates the following safety functions:

  • Deenergize MEPS heating loop A inlet isolation valves
  • Deenergize MEPS heating loop A discharge isolation valves
  • Deenergize MEPS A extraction feed pump breakers The ESFAS initiates a MEPS A Heating Loop Isolation based on the following variables or safety actuation:
  • High MEPS heating loop conductivityradiation extraction area A
  • Radioactive drain system (RDS) liquid detection switch signal
  • Supercell Area 2 Isolation 7.5.3.1.12 MEPS B Heating Loop Isolation MEPS B Heating Loop Isolation is relied upon as a safety-related control in accordance with the SHINE safety analysis described in Chapter 13 for RPF critical equipment malfunction events (Subsection 13b.1.2.3, Scenario 14).

A MEPS B Heating Loop Isolation initiates the following safety functions:

  • Deenergize MEPS heating loop B inlet isolation valves
  • Deenergize MEPS heating loop B discharge isolation valves
  • Deenergize MEPS B extraction feed pump breakers The ESFAS initiates a MEPS B Heating Loop Isolation based on the following variables or safety actuation:
  • High MEPS heating loop conductivityradiation extraction area B
  • RDS liquid detection switch signal
  • Supercell Area 6 Isolation SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-24 Rev. 5

Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System 7.5.3.1.13 MEPS C Heating Loop Isolation MEPS C Heating Loop Isolation is relied upon as a safety-related control in accordance with the SHINE safety analysis described in Chapter 13 for RPF critical equipment malfunction events (Subsection 13b.1.2.3, Scenario 14).

A MEPS C Heating Loop Isolation initiates the following safety functions:

  • Deenergize MEPS heating loop C inlet isolation valves
  • Deenergize MEPS heating loop C discharge isolation valves
  • Deenergize MEPS C extraction feed pump breakers The ESFAS initiates a MEPS C Heating Loop Isolation based on the following variables or safety actuation:
  • High MEPS heating loop conductivityradiation extraction area C
  • RDS liquid detection switch signal
  • Supercell Area 7 Isolation 7.5.3.1.14 Carbon Delay Bed Group 1 Isolation Carbon Delay Bed Group 1 Isolation is relied upon as a safety-related control in accordance with the SHINE safety analysis described in Chapter 13 for RPF fire events (Subsection 13b.1.2.5, Scenario 1).

A Carbon Delay Bed Group 1 Isolation initiates the following safety functions:

  • Energize PVVS carbon delay bed group 1 three-way valves
  • Energize PVVS carbon delay bed group 1 outlet isolation valves The ESFAS initiates a Carbon Delay Bed Group 1 Isolation based on the following variables:
  • High carbon delay bed group 1 exhaust carbon monoxide 7.5.3.1.15 Carbon Delay Bed Group 2 Isolation Carbon Delay Bed Group 2 Isolation is relied upon as a safety-related control in accordance with the SHINE safety analysis described in Chapter 13 for RPF fire events (Subsection 13b.1.2.5, Scenario 1).

A Carbon Delay Bed Group 2 Isolation initiates the following safety functions:

  • Energize PVVS carbon delay bed group 2 three-way valves
  • Energize PVVS carbon delay bed group 2 outlet isolation valves The ESFAS initiates a Carbon Delay Bed Group 2 Isolation based on the following variables:
  • High carbon delay bed group 2 exhaust carbon monoxide SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-25 Rev. 5

Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System An IU Cell Nitrogen Purge is relied upon as a safety-related control in accordance with the SHINE safety analysis described in Chapter 13 for insertion of excess reactivity events (Subsection 13a2.1.12, Scenario 5), and detonation and deflagration in the primary system boundary (Subsection 13a2.1.9, Scenario 1).

The ESFAS initiates an IU Cell Nitrogen Purge based on the following variables:

  • UPSS loss of external power
  • TRPS IU Cell 8 Nitrogen Purge signal 7.5.3.1.23 RPF Nitrogen Purge An RPF Nitrogen Purge is relied upon as a safety-related control in accordance with the SHINE safety analysis described in Chapter 13 for external events (Subsection 13a2.1.6, Scenario 7).

RPF Nitrogen Purge initiates the following safety functions:

  • Deenergize PVVS blower bypass valves
  • Deenergize radioactive liquid waste immobilization (RLWI) PVVS isolation valve
  • Deenergize PVVS carbon guard bed bypass valves
  • Deenergize N2PS PVVS north header valves
  • Deenergize N2PS PVVS south header valves The ESFAS initiates an RPF Nitrogen Purge based on the following variable:
  • Low PVVS flow 7.5.3.1.24 RCA Isolation An RCA Isolation is relied upon as a safety-related control in accordance with the SHINE safety analysis described in Chapter 13 for RPF critical equipment malfunction events (Subsection 13b.1.2.3, Scenarios 8, 10, 11, 12, and 16).

RCA Isolation initiates the following safety functions:

  • Deenergize RVZ2 TPS room supply isolation dampers
  • Deenergize RVZ2 TPS room exhaust isolation dampers
  • Deenergize RVZ2 main RCA ingress/egress supply isolation dampers
  • Deenergize RVZ2 main RCA ingress/egress exhaust isolation dampers SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-30 Rev. 5

Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System

  • Deenergize RVZ3 transfer isolation dampers shipping/receiving IF
  • Deenergize RVZ3 transfer isolation dampers shipping/receiving RPF
  • Deenergize RVZ3 transfer isolation dampers main RCA ingress/egress
  • Deenergize RVZ3 transfer isolation dampers RPF emergency exit
  • Deenergize RVZ3 transfer isolation dampers IF emergency exit
  • Deenergize RVZ3 transfer isolation dampers mezzanine emergency exit
  • Deenergize RVZ1 exhaust train 1 blower breakers
  • Deenergize RVZ1 exhaust train 2 blower breakers
  • Deenergize RVZ2 exhaust train 1 blower breakers
  • Deenergize RVZ2 exhaust train 2 blower breakers
  • Deenergize RVZ2 supply train 1 blower breakers
  • Deenergize RVZ2 supply train 2 blower breakers
  • Supercell Area 1 Isolation
  • Supercell Area 2 Isolation
  • Supercell Area 3 Isolation
  • Supercell Area 4 Isolation
  • Supercell Area 5 Isolation
  • Supercell Area 6 Isolation
  • Supercell Area 7 Isolation
  • Supercell Area 8 Isolation
  • Supercell Area 9 Isolation
  • Supercell Area 10 Isolation
  • VTS Safety Actuation
  • TPS Train A Isolation
  • TPS Train B Isolation
  • TPS Train C Isolation
  • TPS Process Vent Actuation The ESFAS initiates an RCA Isolation based on the following variables:
  • High RVZ1 RCA exhaust radiation
  • High RVZ2 RCA exhaust radiation 7.5.3.1.25 Extraction Column A Alignment Actuation Extraction Column A Alignment Actuation is relied upon as a safety-related control in accordance with the SHINE safety analysis described in Chapter 13 for RPF critical equipment malfunction events (Subsection 13b.1.2.3, Scenario 15).

An Extraction Column A Alignment Actuation initiates the following safety functions:

  • Deenergize MEPS area A extraction column upper three-way valve
  • Deenergize MEPS area A extraction column lower three-way valve
  • Deenergize MEPS A extraction column eluent valve The ESFAS initiates the Extraction Column A Alignment Actuation whenbased on both of the following inputs being activeconditions are met:
  • MEPS area A extraction column upper three-way valve supplying position indication in supplying SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-31 Rev. 5

Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System ventilation radiation channels exceed their setpointare active (for a single area), then a Supercell Isolation for that area, MEPS Heating Loop Isolation, and VTS Safety Actuation are initiated.

7.5.4.1.4 High RVZ1 Supercell Exhaust Ventilation Radiation (IXP ExtractionHot Cell)

The high RVZ1 supercell area 10 (IXP) exhaust ventilation radiation signal protects against hot cell equipment leakage or an accident that could potentially result in excess radiation doses to the workers or to the public (Subsection 13b.1.2.3, Scenarios 4, 5, 6, and 7). The signal is generated by ESFAS when an RVZ1 supercell area 10 (IXP) exhaust ventilation radiation input exceeds the high level setpoint. RVZ1 supercell area 10 (IXP) exhaust ventilation radiation is measured using an analog interface on two different channels, one for each Division A and Division B of ESFAS. When one-out-of-two or more high RVZ1 supercell area 10 (IXP) exhaust ventilation radiation channels exceed their setpointare active, then a Supercell Isolation for area 10 and a VTS Safety Actuation are initiated.

7.5.4.1.5 High RVZ1 Supercell Exhaust Ventilation Radiation (Purification and Packaging Hot Cells)

The high RVZ1 supercell area 3/4/5/8/9 (purification A/B/C and packaging 1/2) exhaust ventilation radiation signals protect against hot cell equipment leakage or an accident that could potentially result in excess radiation doses to the workers or to the public for their respective hot cells. The signals are used to indicate potential radioactivity releases in the purification or packaging cells similar to those described in Chapter 13 for RPF critical equipment malfunction events (Subsection 13b.1.2.3). A signal is generated by ESFAS when an RVZ1 supercell area 3/4/5/8/9 (purification A/B/C or packaging 1/2) exhaust ventilation radiation input exceeds its high level setpoint. RVZ1 supercell area 3/4/5/8/9 (purification A/B/C and packaging 1/2) exhaust ventilation radiation is measured using an analog interface on two different channels per area, one for each Division A and Division B of ESFAS. When one-out-of-two or more high RVZ1 supercell area 3/4/5/8/9 (purification A/B/C and packaging 1/2) exhaust ventilation radiation channels exceed their setpointare active (for a single area), then a Supercell Isolation for that area is initiated.

7.5.4.1.6 High MEPS Heating Loop ConductivityRadiation The high MEPS heating loop conductivityradiation extraction area A/B/C signals protects against leakage of high radiation solutions into the heating water loop, which is partially located outside the supercell shielding and could potentially result in an excess dose to the workers (Subsection 13b.1.2.3, Scenario 14). The signal is generated by ESFAS when a MEPS heating loop conductivityradiation extraction area A/B/C input exceeds the high level setpoint. The MEPS heating loop conductivityradiation extraction area A/B/C is measured by an analog interface on two different channels, one for each Division A and Division B of ESFAS. MEPS heating loop conductivityradiation is measured in three locations (MEPS extraction hot cells A, B, and C).

When one-out-of-two or more high MEPS heating loop conductivityradiation extraction area A/B/C channels are activeexceed their setpoint in a given heating loop (A, B, or C), then a MEPS Heating Loop Isolation is initiated for that heating loop.

7.5.4.1.7 High PVVS Carbon Delay Bed Exhaust Carbon Monoxide The high PVVS carbon delay bed group 1/2/3 exhaust carbon monoxide signals protects against a fire in the PVVS delay bed (Subsection 13b.1.2.5, Scenario 1). The signal is generated by SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-40 Rev. 5

Table 7.5 ESFAS Monitored Variables (Sheet 1 of 6)

Variable Analytical Limit Logic Range Accuracy Response Time 6015x background RVZ1 RCA exhaust radiation 2/3 10-7 to 10-1 µCi/cc 20 percent 15 seconds radiation 6015x background RVZ2 RCA exhaust radiation 2/3 10-7 to 10-1 µCi/cc 20 percent 15 seconds radiation RVZ1 supercell area 1 6015x background 2/3 10-7 to 10-1 µCi/cc 20 percent 15 seconds VVS) exhaust ventilation radiation radiation RVZ1 supercell area 2 6015x background extraction A) exhaust ventilation 1/2 10-7 to 10-1 µCi/cc 20 percent 15 seconds radiation radiation RVZ1 supercell area 3 6015x background urification A) exhaust ventilation 1/2 10-7 to 10-1 µCi/cc 20 percent 15 seconds radiation radiation RVZ1 supercell area 4 6015x background packaging 1) exhaust ventilation 1/2 10-7 to 10-1 µCi/cc 20 percent 15 seconds radiation radiation RVZ1 supercell area 5 6015x background urification B) exhaust ventilation 1/2 10-7 to 10-1 µCi/cc 20 percent 15 seconds radiation radiation RVZ1 supercell area 6 6015x background extraction B) exhaust ventilation 1/2 10-7 to 10-1 µCi/cc 20 percent 15 seconds radiation radiation RVZ1 supercell area 7 6015x background extraction C) exhaust ventilation 1/2 10-7 to 10-1 µCi/cc 20 percent 15 seconds radiation radiation NE Medical Technologies 7.5-42 Rev. 5

Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Table 7.5 ESFAS Monitored Variables (Sheet 2 of 6)

Variable Analytical Limit Logic Range Accuracy Response Time RVZ1 supercell area 8 6015x background (purification C) exhaust ventilation 1/2 10-7 to 10-1 µCi/cc 20 percent 15 seconds radiation radiation RVZ1 supercell area 9 6015x background (packaging 2) exhaust ventilation 1/2 10-7 to 10-1 µCi/cc 20 percent 15 seconds radiation radiation RVZ1 supercell area 10 6015x background 1/2 10-7 to 10-1 µCi/cc 20 percent 15 seconds (IXP) exhaust ventilation radiation radiation MEPS heating loop 0.21 to 510,000 conductivityradiation extraction area 2500 micromho/cmmR/hr 1/2 320 percent 5 seconds micromho/cmmR/hr A

MEPS heating loop 0.21 to 510,000 conductivityradiation extraction area 2500 micromho/cmmR/hr 1/2 320 percent 5 seconds micromho/cmmR/hr B

MEPS heating loop 0.21 to 510,000 conductivityradiation extraction area 2500 micromho/cmmR/hr 1/2 320 percent 5 seconds micromho/cmmR/hr C

PVVS cCarbon delay bed group 1 50 ppm 1/2 1 to 100 ppm 10 percent 15 seconds exhaust carbon monoxide PVVS cCarbon delay bed group 2 50 ppm 1/2 1 to 100 ppm 10 percent 15 seconds exhaust carbon monoxide PVVS cCarbon delay bed group 3 50 ppm 1/2 1 to 100 ppm 10 percent 15 seconds exhaust carbon monoxide Active/InactiveLiquid VTS vacuum header Discrete ActiveLiquid detected 1/2 detected/liquid not 5.5 seconds liquid detection switch signal input signal detected SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-43 Rev. 5

Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Table 7.5 ESFAS Monitored Variables (Sheet 4 of 6)

Variable Analytical Limit Logic Range Accuracy Response Time TPS IU cell 4 target chamber supply 8 psia 1/2 0 to 19.5 psia 1 percent 10 seconds pressure TPS IU cell 5 target chamber supply 8 psia 1/2 0 to 19.5 psia 1 percent 10 seconds pressure TPS IU cell 6 target chamber supply 8 psia 1/2 0 to 19.5 psia 1 percent 10 seconds pressure TPS IU cell 7 target chamber supply 8 psia 1/2 0 to 19.5 psia 1 percent 10 seconds pressure TPS IU cell 8 target chamber supply 8 psia 1/2 0 to 19.5 psia 1 percent 10 seconds pressure TPS confinement A tritium 1000 Ci/m3 1/2 1 to 501,000 Ci/m3 10 percent 5 seconds TPS confinement B tritium 1000 Ci/m3 1/2 1 to 501,000 Ci/m3 10 percent 5 seconds TPS confinement C tritium 1000 Ci/m3 1/2 1 to 501,000 Ci/m3 10 percent 5 seconds PVVS flow 5.0 scfm 2/3 1-20 scfm 3 percent 0.5 seconds TSPS dissolution tank 1 level switch Active/InactiveHigh Discrete ActiveHigh level 1/2 1 second signal level/not high level input signal TSPS dissolution tank 2 level switch Active/InactiveHigh Discrete ActiveHigh level 1/2 1 second signal level/not high level input signal Active/

TRPS IU cell 1 Discrete ActivePurging 1/1 InactivePurging/not 500 ms nitrogen purge signal input signal purging Active/

TRPS IU cell 2 Discrete ActivePurging 1/1 InactivePurging/not 500 ms nitrogen purge signal input signal purging SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-45 Rev. 5

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Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Table 7.5 Fail Safe Component Positions on ESFAS Loss of Power (Sheet 1 of 2)

FAIL-SAFE POSITION: CLOSED RVZ1 RCA exhaust isolation dampers RVZ2 supercell area 9 (packaging area 2) inlet isolation dampers RVZ2 RCA exhaust isolation dampers RVZ1 supercell area 9 (packaging area 2) outlet isolation dampers RVZ2 RCA supply isolation dampers RVZ2 supercell area 10 (IXP area) inlet isolation dampers RVZ2 main RCA ingress/egress supply isolation dampers RVZ1 supercell area 10 (IXP area) outlet isolation dampers RVZ2 main RCA ingress/egress exhaust isolation dampers RVZ2 TPS room supply isolation dampers RVZ3 transfer isolation dampers shipping/receiving IF RVZ2 TP S room exhaust isolation dampers RVZ3 transfer isolation dampers shipping/receiving RPF RLWI PVVS isolation valve RVZ3 transfer isolation dampers main RCA ingress/egress MEPS heating loop A inlet isolation valve RVZ3 transfer isolation dampers RPF emergency exit MEPS heating loop B inlet isolation valve RVZ3 transfer isolation dampers IF emergency exit MEPS heating loop C inlet isolation valve RVZ3 transfer isolation dampers mezzanine emergency exit MEPS heating loop A discharge isolation valve TSPS air inlet isolative valve MEPS heating loop B discharge isolation valve TSPS RVZ1 exhaust valve MEPS heating loop C discharge isolation valve RVZ2 supercell area 1 (PVVS area) inlet isolation dampers MEPS A extraction column wash supply valve RVZ1 supercell area 1 (PVVS area) outlet isolation dampers MEPS A extraction column eluent valve RVZ2 supercell area 2 (extraction area A) inlet isolation dampers MEPS A [ ]PROP/ECI wash supply valve RVZ1 supercell area 2 (extraction area A) outlet isolation dampers MEPS A [ ]PROP/ECI eluent valve RVZ2 supercell area 3 (purification area A) inlet isolation dampers MEPS B extraction column wash supply valve RVZ1 supercell area 3 (purification area A) outlet isolation dampers MEPS B extraction column eluent valve RVZ2 supercell area 4 (packaging area 1) inlet isolation dampers MEPS B [ ]PROP/ECI wash supply valve RVZ1 supercell area 4 (packaging area 1) outlet isolation dampers MEPS B [ ]PROP/ECI eluent valve RVZ2 supercell area 5 (purification area B) inlet isolation dampers MEPS C extraction column wash supply valve RVZ1 supercell area 5 (purification area B) outlet isolation dampers MEPS C extraction column eluent valve RVZ2 supercell area 6 (extraction area B) inlet isolation dampers MEPS C [ ]PROP/ECI wash supply valve RVZ1 supercell area 6 (extraction area B) outlet isolation dampers MEPS C [ ]PROP/ECI eluent valve RVZ2 supercell area 7 (extraction area C) inlet isolation dampers IXP recovery column wash supply valve RVZ1 supercell area 7 (extraction area C) outlet isolation dampers IXP recovery column eluent valve RVZ2 supercell area 8 (purification area C) inlet isolation dampers IXP [ ]PROP/ECI wash supply valve RVZ1 supercell area 8 (purification area C) outlet isolation dampers IXP [ ]PROP/ECI eluent valve SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-48 Rev. 5

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Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 5 of 27)

SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-54 Rev. 5

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Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 11 of 27)

SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-60 Rev. 5

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Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 13 of 27)

SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-62 Rev. 5

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Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Actuation System Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 18 of 27)

SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-67 Rev. 5

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Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 19 of 27)

SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-68 Rev. 5

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Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Figure 7.5 ESFAS Logic Diagrams (Sheet 22 of 27)

SHINE Medical Technologies 7.5-71 Rev. 5

Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Radiation Monitoring Systems 7.7 RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEMS This section describes systems and components that perform radiation monitoring functions within the SHINE facility. Radiation monitoring systems and components include:

  • safety-related process radiation monitors included as part of the engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS), target solution vessel (TSV) reactivity protection system (TRPS), and tritium purification system (TPS);
  • nonsafety-related process radiation monitors included as part of other facility processes;
  • area radiation monitoring consisting of the radiation area monitoring system (RAMS);
  • continuous air monitoring consisting of the continuous air monitoring system (CAMS);

and

  • effluent monitoring consisting of the stack release monitoring system (SRMS).

The objective of the radiation monitoring systems is to:

  • provide facility control room personnel with a continuous record and indication of radiation levels at selected locations within processes and within the facility;
  • provide local radiation information and alarms for personnel within the facility;
  • provide input to safety-related control systems to actuate safety systems; and
  • provide the ability to monitor radioactive releases to the environment.

A diagram showing how the facility radiation monitoring systems relate to the overall facility instrumentation and control (I&C) architecture is provided as Figure 7.1-1.

7.7.1 SAFETY-RELATED PROCESS RADIATION MONITORING 7.7.1.1 System Description Safety-related process radiation monitors provide input to the safety-related ESFAS or TRPS control systems. These components monitor for either fission products (via beta detection) or tritium. The type of safety-related process radiation monitor (fission product or tritium) is selected based on the location and identity of radioactive material present. Beta detection radiation monitors are part ofmonitor for gaseous fission product release and provide input to the ESFAS or TRPS. The type of safety-related processGamma-ray radiation monitors ( monitor for release of fission product or tritium) is selected based on the location and identity of the radioactive material present. The ESFAS and TRPS process radiation monitors (beta detection) are intended to detect abnormal situations within the facility ventilation systems through leakage into the molybdenum extraction and purification system (MEPS) hot water loop and provide actuation signalsinput to the ESFAS controls. Safety-related tritium monitors are part of the TPS. The TPS monitors are installed within various portions of the TPS to detect potential tritium releases, provide actuation signals to the ESFAS controls, and provide interlock inputs to the TRPS controls. Information from safety-related process radiation monitors is displayed in the facility control room on the operator workstations (via the process integrated control system [PICS]).

A list of safety-related process radiation monitors is provided in Table 7.7-1.

Logic diagrams depicting how the safety-related process radiation monitors provide inputs to TRPS and ESFAS are provided in Figure 7.4-1 and Figure 7.5-1, respectively.

SHINE Medical Technologies 7.7-1 Rev. 4

Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Radiation Monitoring Systems 7.7.1.2 Design Criteria The SHINE facility design criteria applicable to the safety-related process radiation monitors are addressed in this section. SHINE facility design criteria 13 and 38 apply to the safety related radiation monitors.

7.7.1.2.1 Instrumentation and Controls SHINE Design Criterion 13 - Instrumentation is provided to monitor variables and systems over their anticipated ranges for normal operation, for anticipated transients, and for postulated accidents as appropriate to ensure adequate safety, including those variables and systems that can affect the fission process, the integrity of the primary system boundary, the primary confinement and its associated systems, and the process confinement boundary and its associated systems. Appropriate controls are provided to maintain these variables and systems within prescribed operating ranges.

Safety-related radiation monitoring channels produce a full-scale reading when subject to radiation fields higher than the full-scale reading; however, they are expected to remain on-scale during accident conditions. The safety-related process radiation monitors that provide actuation signals are designed to function in the range necessary to detect accident conditions and provide safety-related inputs to the ESFAS and TRPS control systems (Subsection 7.7.1.3.1). Setpoints are selected based on analytical limits and calculated to account for known uncertainties in accordance with the setpoint determination methodology and the monitors are periodically functionally tested and maintained (Subsection 7.7.1.4.3).

7.7.1.2.2 Monitoring Radioactivity Releases SHINE Design Criterion 38 - Means are provided for monitoring the primary confinement boundary, hot cell, and glovebox atmospheres to detect potential leakage of gaseous or other airborne radioactive material. Potential effluent discharge paths and the plant environs are monitored for radioactivity that may be released from normal operations, including anticipated transients, and from postulated accidents.

The safety-related process radiation monitors provide radiation monitoring for the primary confinement boundary, hot cell, and glovebox atmospheres, provide radiation monitoring of the MEPS hot water loop, and monitor effluent release paths (Subsection 7.7.1.4.1). The monitors are designed to operate during normal conditions, anticipated transients, and design basis accidents (Subsection 7.7.1.4).

7.7.1.3 Design Bases 7.7.1.3.1 Design Bases Functions The safety functions of the process radiation monitors are: (1) to detect radioactivity in excess of normal levels and provide an actuation signal to the ESFAS or TRPS controls, or (2) to provide input to TRPS for interlocking the operation of the neutron driver. Additional discussion of TRPS and ESFAS functions, interlocks, and bypasses is provided in Section 7.4 and Section 7.5, respectively.

SHINE Medical Technologies 7.7-2 Rev. 4

Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Radiation Monitoring Systems (Subsection 7.7.1.3.8). Hurricanes, tsunamis, and seiches are not credible events at the SHINE facility (Subsections 2.4.5.1, 2.4.2.7, and 2.4.5.2).

7.7.1.3.9 Quality The safety-related process radiation monitors are designed, procured, fabricated, erected, and tested in accordance with the SHINE Quality Program Description (QAPD). Quality records applicable to the design , procurement, fabrication, erection, and testing are maintained.

The following codes and standards are applied to the design of the safety-related process radiation monitors:

  • IEEE 344-2013, Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (IEEE, 2013), Section 8.
  • IEEE 384-2008, IEEE Standard Criteria for Independence of Class1E Equipment and Circuits (IEEE, 2008); invoked for separation of safety-related and nonsafety-related cables and raceways, as described in Subsection 8a2.1.3 and Subsection 8a2.1.5.

7.7.1.4 Operation and Performance The safety-related process radiation monitors are designed to operate under normal conditions, during anticipated transients, and during design basis accidents such that they will perform their safety function.

7.7.1.4.1 Functionality TRPS process radiation monitors monitor the ventilation line from the primary closed loop cooling system (PCLS) expansion tanks (i.e., radiological ventilation zone 1 exhaust subsystem [RVZ1e]

irradiation unit [IU] cell radiation monitors). These monitors provide an actuation signal when radiation levels exceed pre-determined limits, indicative of a release of target solution or fission products within the PCLS or the primary confinement atmosphere (with which the tank communicates). The actuation results in an IU Cell Safety Actuation for that unit.

ESFAS process monitors associated with the supercell monitor the ventilation exhaust from each hot cell and provide an actuation signal when radiation levels exceed pre-determined limits, indicative of a release of target solution or fission products within that hot cell. The actuation results in isolation of the affected hot cell.

ESFAS process monitors associated with the radiological ventilation zone 1 (RVZ1) and radiological ventilation zone 2 (RVZ2) exhaust are designed to provide an actuation signal when radiation levels in the RCA ventilation exhaust systems exceed pre-determined limits, indicative of a failure of a confinement boundary within the facility. The actuation results in isolation of RVZ1, RVZ2, and radiological ventilation zone 3 (RVZ3) ventilation.

The ESFAS process monitors associated with the MEPS hot water loop are designed to provide an actuation signal when radiation levels exceed pre-determined limits, indicative of a leak of target solution within the loop. The actuation results in isolation of the affected MEPS hot water loop.

SHINE Medical Technologies 7.7-5 Rev. 4

Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Radiation Monitoring Systems Table 7.7 Safety-Related Process Radiation Monitors (Sheet 4 of 4)

Total Minimum Monitored Monitored Unit Available Required Operability Unit Material Location Location Function Channels Channels Requirements Detect elevated RVZ1e IU radiation levels Fission cell 6 PCLS Cooling from IU 6 PCLS Modes 1 22 3 2 products expansion room expansion tank through 4 tank exhaust exhaust (input to TRPS)

Detect elevated RVZ1e IU radiation levels Fission cell 7 PCLS Cooling from IU 7 PCLS Modes 1 23 3 2 products expansion room expansion tank through 4 tank exhaust exhaust (input to TRPS)

Detect elevated RVZ1e IU radiation levels Fission cell 8 PCLS Cooling from IU 8 PCLS Modes 1 24 3 2 products expansion room expansion tank through 4 tank exhaust exhaust (input to TRPS)

Detect elevated Whenever target radiation levels MEPS heating solution or Fission Supercell from section A of 25 loop 2 2 radioisotope products products exterior the hot water extraction A are present in the hot loop (input to cell ESFAS)

Detect elevated Whenever target radiation levels MEPS heating solution or Fission Supercell from section B of 26 loop 2 2 radioisotope products products exterior the hot water extraction B are present in the hot loop (input to cell ESFAS)

Detect elevated Whenever target radiation levels MEPS heating solution or Fission Supercell from section C of 27 loop 2 2 radioisotope products products exterior the hot water extraction C are present in the hot loop (input to cell ESFAS)

SHINE Medical Technologies 7.7-17 Rev. 4

Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Control Systems Neutron Flux Detection System The NFDS is comprised of three redundant divisions of detectors, preamplifiers, and processing circuits for single failure protection (Subsection 7.8.3.3). Communications from the NFDS to the TRPS and PICS (via TRPS) are continuous through isolated outputs that only allow the data to be transmitted out of the system so that no failure from an interfacing system can affect the functions of the NFDS (Subsection 7.8.3.2).

7.8.2.1.7 Protection Against Anticipated Transients SHINE Design Criterion 19 - The protection systems are designed to ensure an extremely high probability of accomplishing their safety functions in the event of anticipated transients.

The NFDS is comprised of three redundant divisions of detectors, preamplifiers, and processing circuits for single failure protection (Subsection 7.8.3.3). The three divisions of the NFDS are physically and electrically independent of each other (Subsection 7.8.3.4) and the NFDS equipment is qualified for normal and transient conditions (Subsections 7.8.3.6 and 7.8.3.7).

7.8.2.2 NFDS System Design Criteria 7.8.2.2.1 General Instrumentation and Control NFDS Criterion 1 - The range of operation of detector channels for the NFDS shall be sufficient to cover the expected range of variation of monitored neutron flux during normal and transient operation.

The neutron flux detector setpoints bound normal operations and accident conditions and provide margin to analytical limits (Subsection 7.8.4.3).

NFDS Criterion 2 - The NFDS shall give continuous indication of the neutron flux from subcritical source multiplication level through licensed maximum power range. The continuous indication shall ensure at least two decades of overlap in indication is maintained while observation is transferred from one channel to another.

The NFDS provides continuous indication of the neutron flux from zero counts per second to at least 250 percent power with two decades of overlap (Subsection 7.8.3.1).

NFDS Criterion 3 - The NFDS power range channels shall provide reliable TSV power level while the source range channel provides count rate information from detectors that directly monitor the neutron flux.

The NFDS power range provides a signal proportional to TSV power level from 0 to 125 percent of the licensed power limit. The source range provides a current signal proportional to count rate for all expected startup count rates (Subsection 7.8.3.1).

NFDS Criterion 4 - The NFDS log power range channel (i.e., wide range channel) and a linear flux monitoring channel (i.e., power range channel) shall accurately sense neutrons during irradiation, even in the presence of intense high gamma radiation.

Each NFDS division includes an fissionionization chamber detector and a Boron Trifluoride (BF3) detector pair. These detector types are primarily sensitive to thermal neutrons with excellent gamma rejection.

SHINE Medical Technologies 7.8-4 Rev. 3

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Normal Electrical Power Supply System

  • Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 384-2008, Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits (IEEE, 2008), invoked for isolation and separation of nonsafety-related circuits from safety-related circuits, as described in Subsections 8a2.1.3 and 8a2.1.5.
  • IEEE Standard 323-2003, Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (IEEE, 2003), invoked for environmental qualification of safety-related equipment as described in Subsection 8a2.1.3.
  • IEEE Standard C.37.13-2015, Standard for Low-Voltage AC Power Circuit Breakers Used in Enclosures (IEEE, 2015a); invoked for ensuring reliability of safety-related breakers, as described in Subsection 8a2.1.3.

8a2.1.2 OFF-SITE POWER SUPPLY DESCRIPTION The SHINE facility is connected to two single power circuits from the off-site transmission electric network. The power circuits are shared with other utility customers. The two power circuits feed five local outdoor 12.47 kilovolt (kV) - 480Y/277 VAC 3-phase transformers. The 12.47 kV feeders originate from the Alliant Energy Tripp Road substation, about 2.8 circuit miles from the SHINE facility, and the Alliant Energy Venture substation, about 2.3 circuit miles from the SHINE facility.

Two transformers are each connected to one of the SHINE facility's two main 480 VAC switchgear buses. Figure 8a2.1-1 depicts the off-site connections to the SHINE facility.

8a2.1.3 NORMAL ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The NPSS operates as five separate branches, each receiving utility power at 480Y/277 VAC.

The branches automatically physically disconnect from the utility by opening the associated utility power (UP) supply breaker (UP BKR 1, UP BKR 2, UP BKR 3, or UP BKR 4) on a loss of phase, phase reversal, or sustained overvoltage or undervoltage as detected by protection relays for each utility transformer. This function is not required for safe shutdown, as described in Subsection 8a2.1.6. UP BRK 5, which provides isolation for the resource building, provides overcurrent and surge protection. UP BKR 5 disconnecting from the utility is not required for safe shutdown since it does not impact safety-related equipment in the main production facility.

The two branches, serving loads in the main production facility and the nitrogen purge system (N2PS) structure, can be cross-connected by manually opening one of the UP breakers and manually closing both bus tie (BT) breakers (BT BKR 1 and BT BKR 2) in the event of the loss of a single utility 480Y/277 VAC feed. This cross-connection would be administratively controlled to ensure the remaining utility feed is not overloaded.

The distribution system serving the main production facility and the N2PS structure consists of two line-ups of 480 volts (V) switchgear, two emergency 480 V transfer buses (that are supported by the standby generator), two emergency breakers, and isolation and cross-tie breakers. The two switchgear line-ups each feed an individual emergencytransfer bus and the single SGS switchgear. The two emergency 480 V transfer buses and associated emergency breakers are nonsafety-related, but each provides power to a safety-related uninterruptible electrical power supply system (UPSS) division via division-specific battery chargers and bypass transformers.

The SGS and the UPSS are further described in Section 8a2.2.

SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.1-2 Rev. 3

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Normal Electrical Power Supply System Figure 8a2.1 Electrical Distribution System (Simplified)

Alliant12.47kV UtilityPower Alliant12.47kV CKT2 UtilityPower

CKT1 NORMARLLYDE-ENGERGIZED NORMARLLYDE-ENGERGIZED

CONTROLLEDBYUTILTITY CONTROLLEDBYUTILTITY N.O. N.O.

N.O. N.O.

12.47kV UP UP UP UP UP 480Y/ XFMR1 XFMR2 SG XFMR5 XFMR3 XFMR4 277VAC UPBKR1 UPBKR2 UPBKR4 UPBKR3 UPBKR5 SG AC 480VSWGRA 480VSWGRB AC ISO 480VSWGRC 480VSWGRD BTBKR1 BTBKR2 Loads BTBKR3 BTBKR4 Loads BKR ResourceBldg

Service SAFETY NVBKR1 NVBKR2 SAFETY RELATED FromSGSSWGR RELATED SGSSWGR CHILLER Storage CHILLER Material

SAFETY TYP(3) Outbuilding TYP(3) Staging

SAFETY RELATED Outbuilding RELATED TYP.4 TransferBusA TYP.4 ToTransferBusA ToTransferBusB TransferBusB

NPSS NDAS SWGR SWGR NDAS EMERG.BKR1 Nonsafety EMERG.BKR2 Related

ServesOutbuildings NPSS Equipment NEC700 NEC701 NEC702 UPSS BATT CHGR

Bypass BATT CHGR

Bypass Safety XFMR XFMR BKR1 BKR1 BKR2 BKR2 Related

BYPASS BYPASS BATTCHGRA XFMRA BATTCHGRB XFMRB Equipment 125VDC 125VDCUPSSA 125VDCUPSSC 125VDCUPSSB BATT UPS BATT UPS

DISC1 DISC1 DISC2 DISC2 DCLoads Battery DCLoads DCLoads Battery A B 208Y/

120VAC ACUPSSA ACUPSSC ACUPSSB AC AC AC

Loads Loads Loads SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.1-7 Rev. 3

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems 8a2.2.2 UNINTERRUPTIBLE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM CODES AND STANDARDS The UPSS is designed in accordance with the following codes and standards:

  • National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 70-2017, National Electrical Code (NFPA, 2017), as adopted by the State of Wisconsin (Chapter SPS 316 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code, Electrical)
  • IEEE Standard 344 - 2013, IEEE Standard for Seismic Qualification of Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (IEEE, 2013); invoked to meet seismic requirements, as described in Subsection 8a2.2.3
  • IEEE Standard 384 - 2008, Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment &

Circuits (IEEE, 2008); invoked for separation and isolation of safety-related and nonsafety-related cables and raceways and for associated equipment, as described in Subsection 8a2.2.3

  • IEEE Standard 450-2010, Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications (IEEE, 2010a);

invoked as guidance for the inspection of batteries, as described in Subsection 8a2.2.3

  • IEEE Standard 484-2002, Recommended Practice for Installation Design and Installation of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications (IEEE, 2002); invoked as guidance for the installation of batteries, as described in Subsection 8a2.2.3
  • IEEE Standard 485 - 2010, Recommended Practice for Sizing Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications (IEEE, 2010b); invoked for battery sizing of UPSS loads, as described in Subsection 8a2.2.3
  • IEEE Standard 323-2003, Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (IEEE, 2003); invoked for environmental qualification of safety-related equipment as described in Subsection 8a2.2.3
  • IEEE Standard 946-2004, Recommended Practice for the Design of DC Auxiliary Systems for Generating Stations (IEEE, 2004); invoked as guidance for the design of the DC components, as described in Subsection 8a2.2.3
  • IEEE Standard C.37.20-2015, Standard for Metal-Enclosed Low-Voltage (1000 Vac and below, 3200 Vdc and below) Power Circuit Breaker Switchgear (IEEE, 2015b); invoked as guidance for the design of UPSS switchgear, as described in Subsection 8a2.2.3 While the UPSS is not classified as a Class 1E system, portions of Class 1E-related standards, as described in this section, are applied to the design of the UPSS in order to satisfy applicable SHINE design criteria.

8a2.2.3 UNINTERRUPTIBLE ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The safety-related UPSS provides a reliable source of power to the redundant divisions of AC and DC components on the safety-related power buses. Each division of the UPSS consists of a 125 VDC battery subsystem, 125 VDC to 208Y/120 volts alternating current (VAC) inverter, rectifier (battery charger), bypass transformer, static switch and a manual bypass switch, 208Y/120 VAC and 125 VDC distribution panels, and a nonsafety-related 208Y/120 VAC bus system. Each division of the UPSS provides 208Y/120 VAC and 125 VDC power through automatic transfer switches to feed division C instrumentation and controls (I&C) system loads as described in Subsections 7.4.3.4 and 7.5.3.3. Nonsafety-related loads powered from the safety-related buses are isolated from the safety-related portion of the system by breakers or SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-2 Rev. 4

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems isolating fuses which meet Section 6.1.2 requirements of IEEE 384 (IEEE, 2008) for isolation devices, ensuring that a failure of nonsafety-related loads does not impact safety-related loads.

Distribution wiring from each division of the UPSS is isolated and separated from the other division per Sections 6.1.2.1, 6.1.2.2, and 6.1.2.3 of IEEE 384 (IEEE, 2008) for isolation and with Section 5.1.1.2, Table 1 of Section 5.1.3.3, and Table 2 of Section 5.1.4 of IEEE 384 (IEEE, 2008) for physical separation.

A simplified diagram of the UPSS is provided in Figure 8a2.2-1.

Each division of UPSS is normally powered by an emergency 480 VAC NPSS transfer bus via a division-specific battery charger. The emergency 480 VAC NPSS transfer buses can also be powered by the SGS, providing an alternate source of power to the UPSS. The SGS is described in Subsection 8a2.2.4.

The UPSS is isolated from the NPSS and SGS by isolating breakers feeding the battery chargers and the bypass transformers. These devices are identified as breakers BATT CHGR BRK 1, BATT CHGR BKR 2, BYPASS XFMR BKR 1 and BYPASS XRMR BKR 2 in Figure 8a2.2-1. The breakers monitor incoming power for voltage, phase, and frequency, and will trip when monitored variables are out of limits.

Each battery charger supplies power to the safety-related 125 VDC bus for its division. The loads on each DC bus consist of the following:

  • Engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS)
  • Target solution vessel (TSV) reactivity protection system (TRPS)
  • TSV off-gas system (TOGS) recombiner heaters
  • Nitrogen purge system (N2PS) solenoid valves
  • TSV dump valves
  • Subcritical assembly system (SCAS), vacuum transfer system (VTS), target solution preparation system (TSPS), and radioactive drain system (RDS) level switches Each 125 VDC bus supplies power to an associated 208Y/120 VAC bus via an inverter. The two 208Y/120 VAC buses can also each receive power directly from the associated emergency 480 VAC NPSS transfer bus through a bypass transformer. The safety-related loads on each AC bus consist of the following:
  • TRPS radiation monitors
  • N2PS solenoid valves
  • TOGS instruments
  • Neutron driver assembly system (NDAS) high voltage power supply breaker undervoltage hold circuits
  • Vacuum transfer system (VTS) vacuum pump breaker undervoltage hold trip circuits
  • Molybdenum extraction and purification system (MEPS) undervoltage hold trip circuits
  • Radiological ventilation zone 1 (RVZ1) exhaust subsystem (RVZ1e) exhaust fans, Radiological ventilation zone 2 (RVZ2) exhaust subsystem (RVZ2e) exhaust fans, and RVZ2 supply subsystem (RVZ2s) air handling units undervoltage hold trip circuits
  • TOGS blowers SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-3 Rev. 4

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems

  • Neutron flux detection system (NFDS) power cabinets and detectors for the associated division Separate distribution panelsNonsafety-related loads important for providing alerts to facility personnel and for monitoring the status of the facility are connected to the 208Y/120 VAC bus, and are isolated from the safety-related portion of the bus by isolation overcurrent devices, provide power to nonsafety-related loads important for providing alerts to facility personnel and for monitoring the status of the facility.

These loads consist of:

  • Main facility stack release monitor (SRM)
  • Process vessel vent system (PVVS) carbon delay bed effluent monitor
  • TPS secondary enclosure cleanup (SEC) blowers
  • Criticality accident alarm system (CAAS)

Additional details about the UPSS loads are provided in Table 8a2.2-1.

Upon a loss of NPSS power and unavailability of SGS power, the AC and DC UPSS buses are powered by the safety-related battery bank for each division. Each UPSS division of the UPSS batteries is located in a separate fire area in the safety-related, seismic portion of the main production facility. The UPSS is required to perform its safety function before, during, and after a seismic event, and is qualified by one of the testing methods described in Sections 8 and 9.3 of IEEE 344 (IEEE, 2013).

Compliance with NFPA 70-2017 (NFPA, 2017) ensures adequate accessibility to UPSS components to permit periodic inspection and testing.

DC components within the UPSS include the safety-related batteries, battery chargers, and DC switchgear. These DC components are designed in accordance with Sections 5.2, 6.2, 6.5, 7.1, 7.3, Table 2 of 7.4, 7.6, and 7.9 of IEEE 946 (IEEE, 2004). Compliance with these portions of IEEE 946 (IEEE, 2004) ensures DC components have sufficient testability and minimizes the probability of losing electric power from the UPSS as a result of or coincident with the loss of power from the off-site electrical power system.

The battery sizing for the UPSS loads is shown in Table 8a2.2-2, using the sizing guidance provided in Sections 6.1.1, 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3, 6.2.4, 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 of IEEE 485 (IEEE, 2010b).

Compliance with these sections of IEEE 485 ensures that the battery capacity and capability are sufficient to support UPSS loads. Batteries are vented lead-acid. Transfer of loads from the NPSS to the UPSS is automatic and requires no control power.

UPSS batteries are installed in accordance with Sections 5 and 6 of IEEE 484 (IEEE, 2002).

Compliance with these sections of IEEE 484 (IEEE, 2002) ensures the batteries are properly installed and tested, and minimizes the probability of losing electric power from the UPSS as a result of or coincident with the loss of power from the off-site electrical power system.

Battery maintenance will be performed in accordance with Section 5 of IEEE 450 (IEEE, 2010a).

Compliance with Section 5 of IEEE 450 (IEEE, 2010a) ensures the batteries are inspected regularly, and any identified issues are corrected, which minimizes the probability of losing SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-4 Rev. 4

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems electric power from the UPSS as a result of or coincident with the loss of power from the off-site electrical power system.

UPSS switchgear is designed in accordance with IEEE C.37.20.1 (IEEE, 2015b). Compliance with IEEE C.37.20.1 (IEEE, 2015b) ensures that the UPSS has a high degree of reliability, which minimizes the probability of losing electric power from the UPSS as a result of or coincident with the loss of power from the off-site electrical power system. UPSS switchgear is designed with the ability to install a temporary load bank to perform required testing.

The required reserve for loads is listed in Table 8a2.2-2. 15 percent of the total is reserved to accommodate variations of power during equipment procurement and an additional 10 percent is initially reserved for future needs that may be identified during the lifetime of the facility.

The run time requirements in Table 8a2.2-1 are based on:

1) Equipment required to prevent hydrogen deflagration is powered for five minutes,
2) Equipment used to minimize transient effects on the facility due to short duration power loss is powered for five minutes,
3) Equipment used to provide alerts for facility personnel and monitor the status of the facility during immediate recovery efforts is powered for two hours, or
4) Defense-in-depth power for nonsafety-related equipment used to monitor and reduce the tritium source term in the tritium confinement is powered for six hours.

The UPSS is designed and tested to be resistant to the electromagnetic interference (EMI)/radio frequency interference (RFI) environment. When equipment (e.g., portable radios) poses risks to the UPSS equipment or distribution wiring, administrative controls prevent the use of the equipment where it can adversely affect the UPSS.

Safety-related UPSS equipment is located in a mild environment, is not subject to harsh environmental conditions during normal operation or transient conditions, and has no significant aging mechanisms. This equipment is designed and qualified by applying the guidance of Sections 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, and 7 of IEEE 323 (IEEE, 2003), and is qualified to the environmental parameters provided in Tables 7.2-2 and 7.2-3.

8a2.2.4 STANDBY GENERATOR SYSTEM DESIGN BASIS The design of the SGS is based on Criterion 27, Electrical power systems, and Criterion 28, Inspection and testing of electric power systems, of the SHINE design criteria. The SHINE design criteria are described in Section 3.1.

The purpose of the SGS is to provide a temporary source of nonsafety-related alternate power to the UPSS and selected additional loads for operational convenience and defense-in-depth.

The SGS:

  • Will provide for the separation or isolation of safety-related circuits from nonsafety-related circuits, including the avoidance of electromagnetic interference with safety-related instrumentation and controlI&C functions;
  • Will provide an alternate source of power for the safety-related electrical buses; SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-5 Rev. 4

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems

  • Will provide an alternate source of power to systems required for life-safety or important for facility monitoring;
  • Will automatically start and supply loads upon a loss of off-site power; and
  • Permits appropriate periodic inspection and testing to assess the continuity of the system and the condition of components.

8a2.2.5 STANDBY GENERATOR SYSTEM CODES AND STANDARDS The SGS is designed in accordance with NFPA 70 - 2017, National Electrical Code (NFPA, 2017) as adopted by the State of Wisconsin (Chapter SPS 316 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code, Electrical).

8a2.2.6 STANDBY GENERATOR SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The SGS consists of a 480Y/277 VAC, 60 Hertz (Hz) natural gas-driven generator, a 480 VAC switchgear, and transfer switches to allow the SGS switchgear to be connected to either or both emergency 480 VAC NPSS transfer buses. Upon a loss of off-site power (LOOP) (i.e.,

undervoltage or overvoltage sensed on utility service), the SGS automatically starts, both non-vital breakers (NV BKR 1 and NV BKR 2) automatically open, and the transfer switches operate to provide power to the associated emergency 480 VAC NPSS transfer bus. Upon a loss of normal power to any transfer switch, the SGS automatically starts, the associated non-vital breaker (NV BKR 1 or NV BKR 2) automatically opens, and the associated transfer switch operates to provide power to the associated emergency 480 VAC NPSS transfer bus.

The loads supplied by the SGS include the loads supplied by the UPSS (see Table 8a2.2-1), as well as the following facility loads:

  • Facility data and communications system (FDCS) equipment
  • Radiation area monitoring system (RAMS) detectors
  • Continuous air monitoring system (CAMS) detectors
  • Facility fire detection and suppression system (FFPS)
  • Hot cell fire detection and suppression system (HCFD)
  • PICS equipment
  • Process vessel vent system (PVVS) equipment
  • TPS SEC heaters
  • Switchgear station batteries (NPSS, SGS)
  • Facility access control system (FACS)
  • Facility ventilation zone 4 (FVZ4) UPSS battery room and equipment room exhaust fans
  • FDCS dedicated cooling systems FDCS equipment, PICS equipment, and the FFPS contain nonsafety-related unit batteries or local uninterruptible power supplies to provide power to span the time between the LOOP event and the start of the SGS.

Emergency lighting located inside the main production facility is provided with unit batteries capable of supplying 90 minutes of illumination.

Operation of the SGS is not required for any safety function at the SHINE facility.

SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-6 Rev. 4

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems Table 8a2.2 UPSS Load List (Sheet 1 of 2) kVA Loads kVA Loads Required Load Description UPS-A UPS-B Runtime Target solution vessel (TSV) off-gas system (TOGS)

Blowers 33.75.2 33.75.2 5 Min Recombiner heaters 32.820 32.820 5 Min Instruments 0.3 0.3 5 Min Nitrogen purge system (N2PS) valves 0.5 0.5 5 Min TSV dump valves 0.41.1 0.41.1 5 Min Neutron flux detection system (NFDS) 128.0 128.0 120 Min TSV reactivity protection system (TRPS) 1.5 1.5 120 Min TRPS radiation monitors 7.70.6 7.70.6 120 Min Engineered safety features actuation 7.70.6 7.70.6 120 Min system (ESFAS) radiation monitors Neutron driver assembly system (NDAS) hold 0.1 0.1 120 Min circuits Vacuum transfer system (VTS) hold circuits Molybdenum extraction and purification system (MEPS) pump hold circuits Radiological ventilation exhaust and supply fans hold circuit ESFAS 0.5 0.5 6 Hrs Tritium purification system (TPS) tritium 2.40.7 2.40.7 6 Hrs monitors Subcritical assembly system (SCAS), VTS, 0.2 0.2 6 Hrs target solution preparation system (TSPS),

and radioactive drain system (RDS) level switches Criticality accident alarm system (CAAS), 1.0.8 1.0.8 120 Min nonsafety-related SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-8 Rev. 4

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems Table 8a2.2 UPSS Load List (Sheet 2 of 2) kVA Loads kVA Loads Required Load Description UPS-A UPS-B Runtime Stack release monitoring system (SRMS), 0.0 3.81.0 120 Min nonsafety-related TPS secondary enclosure cleanup (SEC) 1.6 0.8 6 Hrs blowers, nonsafety-related Note: Required charger kVA does not include battery charging Total: 143.270.4 146.270.6 Required Reserve: 14.37.0 14.67.1 Minimum Charger kVA: 157.577.4 160.877.7 SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-9 Rev. 4

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems Table 8a2.2 UPSS Battery Sizing (Sheet 1 of 2)

Amp-Hours Amp-Hours Load Description Battery A Battery B Target solution vessel (TSV) off-gas system (TOGS)

Blowers 8136 8136 Recombiner heaters 3219 3219 Instruments 0.4 0.4 Nitrogen purge system (N2PS) valves 1 1 TSV dump valves 12 12 Neutron flux detection system (NFDS) 310206 310206 TSV reactivity protection system (TRPS) 34 34 TRPS radiation monitors 19816 19816 Engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) 19815 19815 radiation monitors Neutron driver assembly system (NDAS) hold circuits 3 3 Vacuum transfer system (VTS) hold circuits Molybdenum extraction and purification system (MEPS) pump hold circuits Radiological ventilation exhaust and supply fans hold circuit ESFAS 34 374 Tritium purification system (TPS) tritium monitors 5186 5140 Subcritical assembly system (SCAS), VTS, target 16 16 solution preparation system (TSPS), and radioactive drain system (RDS) level switches Criticality accident alarm system (CAAS), nonsafety- 216 216 related Stack release monitoring system (SRMS), nonsafety- 0 9926 related SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-10 Rev. 4

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems Table 8a2.2 UPSS Battery Sizing (Sheet 2 of 2)

Amp-Hours Amp-Hours Load Description Battery A Battery B TPS secondary enclosure cleanup (SEC) subsystem, nonsafety-related Blowers 6123 61 Note: Total amp-hours include inverter efficiency, 15 percent reserve margin to account for variations in equipment procurement, and 10 percent capacity margin for future needs SubtTotal: 1163582 1218546 SubtTotal with 1.25 aging factor: 1453728 1522683 Total with margin for future loads: 1671 1751 SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-11 Rev. 4

Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems Emergency Electrical Power Systems Figure 8a2.2 Uninterruptible Power Supply System Poweredby Poweredby NonSafety

UtilityServiceA

TransferBusA UtilityServiceB

TransferBusB Related

NPSS Equipment 480Y/277VAC BATT BYPASS BATT BYPASS CHGR XFMR CHGR XFMR UPSS BKR1 BKR1 BKR2 SEC.BKR Safety

BYPASS XFMRA BYPASS XFMRB Related

BATTCHGRB BATTCHGRA Equipment 125VDC DCUPSSA DCUPSSC DCUPSSB BATT UPS BATT UPS

DISC1 DISC1 DISC2 DISC2 DCLoads DCLoads Battery DCLoads DCLoads Battery DCLoads

NonSafety Safety TrainA NonSafety Safety TrainB 208Y/

120VAC ACUPSSA ACUPSSC ACUPSSB ACLoads ACLoads ACLoads ACLoads ACLoads

NonSafety Safety Safety NonSafety Safety SHINE Medical Technologies 8a2.2-12 Rev. 4

Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Systems Details of the inspection and testing requirements of safety-related RV systems are provided in Subsection 9a2.1.1.5.

9a2.1.1.2 System Description Radiological Ventilation Zone 1 RVZ1 is divided into two subsystems: RVZ1r and RVZ1e. A flow diagram of RVZ1r is provided in Figure 9a2.1-2. A flow diagram of RVZ1e is provided in Figure 9a2.1-3.

RVZ1r provides cooling for systems within the irradiation unit (IU) cell and the target solution vessel (TSV) off-gas system (TOGS) cell. RVZ1r recirculates, filters, and cools air within the IU cell and the TOGS cell. The system includes two fan coil units and associated ductwork and dampers per each set of lU/TOGS cells. Each set of RVZ1r units is located within the cooling room and forms a portion of the confinement boundary for the lU/TOGS cells that it serves.

RVZ1r provides sampling, ventilation, and cleanup connections for the primary confinement.

RVZ1e exhausts air from the areas with a high potential for contamination in the facility. The air is filtered and directed out of the main production facility through the exhaust stack. The subsystem includes fans, filters, ductwork, dampers, and a high efficiency filter banks. It also includes the necessary transfer ductwork to allow makeup from the RCA general area into the exhausted areas.

RVZ1e is designed to maintain ventilation zone 1 areas at a lower pressure than ventilation zone 2 areas. The design inhibits backflow with the use of backflow dampers at the discharge of the RVZ1e and RVZ2e exhaust fans in order to minimize the spread of contamination. RVZ1e ductwork provides sampling locations for radiation detectors, fire detection equipment, stack release monitoring, and an exhaust stack connection point for RVZ2e and the process vessel vent system (PVVS).

The RVZ1 serves the following areas:

  • IU cells
  • TOGS cells
  • Tritium purification system (TPS) process equipment
  • Primary closed loop cooling system (PCLS) expansion tank
  • Uranium receipt and storage system (URSS) glovebox
  • Radioactive liquid waste immobilization (RLWI) shielded enclosure
  • Supercell
  • Target solution preparation system (TSPS) glovebox
  • Target solution dissolution tanks
  • Target solution preparation tank Radiological Ventilation Zone 2 RVZ2 includes three subsystems: RVZ2e, RVZ2s, and RVZ2r. A flow diagram of RVZ2e is provided in Figure 9a2.1-4. A flow diagram of RVZ2s air handling units (AHUs) is provided in Figure 9a2.1-5. A flow diagram of RVZ2s distribution and RVZ2r is provided in Figure 9a2.1-6.

SHINE Medical Technologies 9a2.1-2 Rev. 5

Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Systems RVZ2e exhausts air from the general areas of the RCA. The subsystem includes fans, filters, ductwork, dampers, and a high efficiency filter banks. It also includes the necessary transfer ductwork to allow makeup from the RCA general area into the exhausted rooms. The transfer ductwork is located in the following spaces:

  • from the irradiation facility (IF) general area to the TPS room;
  • from each of the cooling rooms to the IF general area;
  • from the analytical lab to the quality control (QC) lab;
  • from the QC lab to the radioisotope production facility (RPF) general area;
  • from the RPF general area to the transfer aisle;
  • from the storage room to the preparation room;
  • from the RPF general area to the RLWI skid; and
  • from the transfer aisle to the radioisotope process facility cooling system (RPCS) room.

RVZ2 provides ventilation and humidity control for ventilation zone 2 rooms within the RCA.

RVZ2e provides an exhaust path for the QC lab and analytical laboratory fume hoods within the RCA and maintains the QC lab and analytical labs at positive pressure with respect to the ventilation zone 2 general area. The system is designed to maintain the RCA at a lower pressure than areas outside of the RCA. The RVZ2e design inhibits backflow within ductwork that could spread contamination. RVZ2e ductwork provides sampling locations for engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) radiation detectors and fire detection equipment.

RVZ2s supplies conditioned outside air into the RCA to provide ventilation and to make up for RVZ1e and RVZ2e exhaust volumes. The system includes AHUs, filters, ductwork, and dampers. RVZ2s provides cooling, heating, humidification for all systems within ventilation zone 2 as well as maintains the QC lab and analytical labs at positive pressure with respect to the ventilation zone 2 general area.

RVZ2r recirculates, filters, and conditions air within the RCA. The system includes AHUs, filters, ductwork, and dampers. The RVZ2r units are located within the RCA. RVZ2r provides additional cooling for systems within ventilation zone 2. RVZ2r is also used to cool air being supplied to the supercell, which reduces the flow rate required to cool the equipment within the supercell. The filters and bubble-tight dampers on the inlet side of the supercell are part of RVZ1e.

Areas served by RVZ2 include:

  • TPS fume hoods
  • QC lab hood
  • Analytical lab hood
  • RCA exhaust filter room
  • Access control area
  • Don/doff rooms
  • Decontamination room
  • Labyrinths
  • Analytical lab
  • Workspace
  • Transfer aisle
  • RPCS room
  • Storage rooms SHINE Medical Technologies 9a2.1-3 Rev. 5

Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Systems

  • Preparation room
  • Tool crib
  • Vestibule
  • Primary cooling rooms
  • IF general area
  • Neutron driver assembly system (NDAS) service cell
  • TPS room
  • Supercell Radiological Ventilation Zone 3 Under normal operating conditions, RVZ3 transfers air from ventilation zone 4 to ventilation zone 3 then from ventilation zone 3 to ventilation zone 2 via engineered pathways. A flow diagram of RVZ3 is provided in Figure 9a2.1-7. Under accident conditions, bubble tight dampers close, isolating ventilation zone 2. The design of RVZ3 inhibits backflow within ductwork that could spread contamination. Transfer ductwork from ventilation zone 3 to ventilation zone 2 is provided for the following spaces:
  • from the shipping/receiving alcove to the IF general area;
  • from the shipping/receiving alcove to the transfer aisle;
  • from the main RCA ingress/egress to the access control;
  • from the RPF emergency exit to the RPF general area;
  • from the IF emergency exit to the IF general area; and
  • from the mezzanine emergency exit to the IF general area.

9a2.1.1.3 System Operation RVZ1e areas draw ambient supply air from adjacent ventilation zone 2 spaces, except for the supercell. During normal operation, areas ventilated by RVZ1e are maintained at negative pressure with respect to their surrounding ventilation zone 2 spaces. The supercell is supplied air directly from RVZ2r. The air supplied to the supercell is exhausted by RVZ1e.

RVZ1e contains redundant fans that are capable of continuous operation. During normal operation, one fan is operating while the other fan is on standby. If the operating fan fails, the standby fan will start automatically.

The exhaust from RVZ1e areas collects in the RVZ1e system duct header and then is drawn through the final filter banks on the mezzanine. These filter banks contains high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters and carbon adsorbers upstream of the building isolation dampers.

These filters and adsorbers are equipped with differential pressure monitoring equipment and are periodically monitored by operations personnel. The building isolation dampers are safety-related automatic isolation dampers controlled by ESFAS. These dampers are located at the RCA boundary, upstream of the exhaust fans and exhaust stack.

Negative pressure is maintained in the ductwork to control contamination and maintain pressure gradients. System operation between RVZ1e, RVZ2e, and RVZ2s is coordinated such that the overall airflow and pressure gradients are maintained. The pressure gradients create flow patterns that direct air towards areas of increasing contamination potential. This is maintained by the variable frequency drives (VFDs) on the exhaust fans. Minimum airflow will be maintained during normal system operation.

SHINE Medical Technologies 9a2.1-4 Rev. 5

Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Systems During upset conditions, affected sections of the RVZ1e, RVZ2s, and RVZ2e ventilation systems are isolated as required for the specific event or indication. Bubble tight dampers close, based on detection of radiation more than 60 times normal background radiation levelsat setpoints designed to protect analytical limits. The RVZ1e supply flow path to the supercell includes nonsafety-related HEPA and carbon filters. The RVZ1e exhaust flow path from the supercell includes nonsafety-related HEPA filters and safety-related carbon filters. The remaining RVZ1e flow paths that exhaust confinements for fission products contain nonsafety-related HEPA and carbon filters. The RVZ1e safety-related, redundant bubble-tight dampers are situated as near to the confinement boundary as practical.

The IU cell exhaust flow path of RVZ1e provides ventilation of the IU cell and TOGS cell via the PCLS expansion tank headspace. This path is equipped with radiation monitoring instrumentation and redundant isolation valves. Between the RVZ1e IU cell radiation instrumentation and RVZ1e IU cell isolation valves is an isolation lag tank. If thehigh RVZ1e IU cell radiation measurements exceed 60 times normal background radiationis detected, the TSV reactivity protection system (TRPS) initiates an IU Cell Safety Actuation, which closes the RVZ1e IU cell isolation valves. The isolation lag tank provides an exhaust gas delay time greater than the closing time of the valves.

Upon loss of power, loss of signal, or ESFAS initiation of confinement, dampers seal the affected confinement areas within 30 seconds.

The RVZ1r fan coil units (FCUs) are capable of continuous operations. The RVZ1r recirculates, and cools air within the IU cell and TOGS cell. The IU cell and TOGS cell are established as low leakage boundaries.

RVZ2e fans are capable of continuous operation. RVZ2e exhausts the various normally occupiable rooms within the RCA as well as fume hoods, filters the air via a HEPA filter banks and discharges to the facility stack. Exhaust headers are maintained at a negative pressure by the VFD. Negative pressure is maintained in the ductwork to control contamination and maintain pressure gradients. The exhaust from RVZ2 areas collects in the RVZ2 system duct header and then is drawn through final HEPA filters and carbon adsorbers prior to discharge to the exhaust stack.

During normal operation, ventilation zone 2 areas are maintained at negative pressure with respect to RVZ3 airlocks. The speed of the RVZ2e exhaust fans is controlled to maintain a negative pressure setpoint in the RVZ2e exhaust header. Minimum airflow will be maintained during normal system operation.

RVZ2s AHUs are capable of continuous operation. Ventilation zone 2 areas are directly supplied air via the RVZ2s AHUs. The AHUs supply conditioned, 100 percent outside air. Each AHU contains filters, pre-heat and cooling coils, and supply fans. The supply system includes redundant AHUs. If a single AHU fails, the standby AHU will start automatically. The AHUs normally supply a constant volume of conditioned air to RVZ2 areas.

The RVZ2s supply duct contains safety-related automatic isolation dampers controlled by ESFAS. These dampers are located at the RCA boundary.

RVZ2r AHUs are capable of continuous operation. The RVZ2r AHUs further condition the air in the RCA general area to comfort levels.

SHINE Medical Technologies 9a2.1-5 Rev. 5

Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Systems The RVZ1e and RVZ2e subsystems combine downstream of each subsystems respective filter banks, RCA isolation bubble-tight dampers, and exhaust fans, as shown in Figure 9a2.1-8. The PVVS delay bed discharge is also combined with the RVZ1e and RVZ2e flow downstream of the exhaust fans and upstream of the stack release monitor. The discharge of the stack is approximately 10 feet above the roofline of the facility and will maintain a minimum discharge velocity of 3,000 fpm.

9a2.1.1.4 Instrumentation and Control The RV systems are designed such that the process integrated control system (PICS) monitors the system equipment, flow rates, pressures, and temperatures. Instrumentation monitors the ventilation systems for off-normal conditions and signal alarms as required. The PICS starts, shuts down, and operates the RV system in normal operating modes. Coordinated controls maintain negative pressurization to create flow patterns that direct air toward areas of increasing contamination potential.

PICS monitors the differential pressures across all the filters in the RVZ1e and RVZ2e filter banks and produces an alarm if the differential pressure of any filter is above its established limit.

9a2.1.1.5 Inspection and Testing The ventilation systems are balanced upon installation. Control systems are tested to assure that control elements are calibrated and properly adjusted. Safety-related isolation dampers are inspected and tested as required by, and in accordance with, Section DA of ASME AG-1, Code on Nuclear Air and Gas Treatment (ASME, 1992009). Safety-related ductwork will be inspected and tested as required by, and in accordance with, Section SA of ASME AG-1 (ASME, 1992009).

9a2.1.1.6 Nuclear Criticality Safety Subsection 6b.3.2.7 provides a discussion related to the nuclear criticality safety requirements for the URSS glovebox ventilation. Subsection 6b.3.2.4 provides discussion related to the nuclear criticality safety requirements for the TSPS glovebox ventilation.

9a2.1.1.7 Technical Specifications Certain material in this subsection provides information that is used in the technical specifications. This includes limiting conditions for operation, setpoints, design features, and means for accomplishing surveillances. In addition, significant material is also applicable to, and may be used for, the bases that are described in the technical specifications.

9a2.1.2 NON-RADIOLOGICAL AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM The non-radiological area ventilation system is the facility ventilation zone 4 (FVZ4) system.

Ventilation zone 4 consists of areas which are located within the main production facility, but outside of the RCA. The FVZ4 system is completely independent of the RV systems described in Subsection 9a2.1.1. The FVZ4 system supply AHUs draw at least 10 percent outside air to make up for air exhausted and exfiltrated. The outside air is mixed with recirculated air and conditioned through the AHUs before being supplied to FVZ4 areas. FVZ4 exhaust streams exhaust directly SHINE Medical Technologies 9a2.1-6 Rev. 5

Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Systems A flow diagram of the return air associated with the FVZ4s subsystem is provided in Figure 9a2.1-10. A diagram of the FVZ4s subsystem AHUs is provided in Figure 9a2.1-11.

FVZ4 Exhaust Subsystem (FVZ4e)

FVZ4e serves the following locations of the non-RCA area of the facility:

  • Janitor closets
  • Chemical storage
  • Restrooms
  • Battery rooms
  • Control room The FVZ4e subsystem exhausts the battery rooms and UPS rooms within ventilation zone 4 to maintain the hydrogen concentration below 2 percent and the temperature under 120°F. Upon a loss of power, the battery rooms will be exhausted by dedicated fans powered by the standby generator system (SGS).

Dampers are provided to isolate the FVZ4 exhaust air subsystem to each battery room and each UPS room, independently, on an initiation signal from each locations fire suppression system.

The distribution of the FVZ4e subsystem is provided in Figure 9a2.1-12.

FVZ4 Room Cooling Recirculation Subsystem (FVZ4r)

The FVZ4r subsystem recirculates and cools air within the human machine interface (HMI)/

telecommunication room and the process/serverelectrical/telephone rooms. The system is made up of two split systems that cool the server space. The FVZ4r subsystem provides equipment status to the PICS.

9a2.1.2.4 Radiation Protection and Criticality Safety There are no radiation contamination hazards or criticality safety hazards associated with the FVZ4 system.

9a2.1.2.5 Instrumentation and Control The supply air subsystem HVAC controls operate through the PICS. The FVZ4 system is designed such that the PICS monitors and controls the non-RCA recirculation air subsystem ventilation equipment, flow rates, pressures, and temperatures. Instrumentation monitors the ventilation systems for off-normal conditions and signal alarms as required.

The PICS performs the following functions relative to FVZ4:

  • starts, shuts down, and operates FVZ4 in normal operating modes;
  • monitors the return and supply temperature from the AHUs; and
  • monitors the pressure differential across the filters.

SHINE Medical Technologies 9a2.1-8 Rev. 5

Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Systems 9a2.1.4.1 Design Bases The design bases of the FHWS include:

  • Supply heated water to the RVZ2s subsystem and the FVZ4 system as well as other heating coils outside of the RCA.
  • Maintain system operation in the event of a single pump or single boiler failure.

The FHWS is constructed to the requirements of Chapters SPS 341 and SPS 365 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code. Natural gas piping and natural gas piping installations comply with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 54, National Fuel Gas Code (NFPA, 2018), as required by Chapter SPS 365 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code.

9a2.1.4.2 System Description The FHWS is nonsafety-related.

The FHWS consists of equipment required to deliver heating hot water to RVZ2 and FVZ4 AHUs in non-RCA portions of the main production facility. The boilers, pumps, air separator and expansion tank are in the resource building. Three boilers and three pumps are provided to maintain the system flow rate and supply temperature. When one pump or boiler is down for maintenance, two 50 percent capacity pumps and boilers are capable of meeting system demands. Two pumps each are provided on the FVZ4s subsystem and the RVZ2s subsystem to maintain freeze protection. When one pump is down for maintenance the other can ensure freeze protection.

The primary components of the FHWS include:

  • three 50 percent natural gas-fired boilers;
  • three 50 percent centrifugal hot water pumps;
  • eight 100 percent centrifugal hot water circulating pumps for heating coil freeze protection;
  • an air separator; and
  • an expansion tank.

9a2.1.4.3 System Operation A single set of pumps provides flow through both the boilers and the heating coils. The flow through the system is varied by modulating the pump speed based upon maintaining the temperaturepressure differential across the boilerspumps. A bypass valve (supply to return) is installed at the end of the coil loop piping to maintain the minimum flow required to operate the pumps.

Each boiler is a natural gas-fired, fully modulating condensing type with high mass and high volume to allow large variations in flow through the boiler with no minimum return water temperature requirement and low water pressure drop.

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Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Systems Figure 9a2.1 Ventilation System Zone Designations Within the Main Production Facility SHINE Medical Technologies 9a2.1-13 Rev. 5

Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Systems Figure 9a2.1 Radiological Ventilation Zone 1 Exhaust Subsystem (RVZ1e) Flow Diagram TPS GLOVEBOXES PRESSURE CONTROL AND VACUUM/ITS EXHAUST TPS ROOM RVZ1E HEPA / HEPA / HEPA / HEPA / HEPA / HEPA / HEPA / HEPA /

CARBON CARBON CARBON CARBON CARBON CARBON CARBON CARBON TSPS TANK TSPS TANK TSPS TANK COOLING ROOM COOLING ROOM COOLING ROOM COOLING ROOM COOLING ROOM COOLING ROOM COOLING ROOM COOLING ROOM RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE TSPS GLOVEBOX RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE URSS GLOVEBOX PCLS PCLS PCLS PCLS PCLS PCLS PCLS PCLS WASTE SOLIDIFICATION HEPA RVZ2r CARBON / HEPA CARBON / HEPA CARBON / HEPA CARBON / HEPA CARBON / HEPA CARBON / HEPA CARBON / HEPA CARBON / HEPA CARBON / HEPA CARBON / HEPA SUPERCELL IXP PKG PUR EXT EXT PUR PKG PUR EXT PVVS CARBON / HEPA CARBON / HEPA CARBON / HEPA CARBON / HEPA CARBON / HEPA CARBON / HEPA CARBON / HEPA CARBON / HEPA CARBON / HEPA CARBON / HEPA RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE CONTROL VALVE RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE RZE BUBBLE TIGHT DAMPER RZE RADIATION MONITOR ISOLATION LAG TANK RCA SHINE Medical Technologies 9a2.1-15 Rev. 5

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Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Systems Figure 9a2.1 Radiological Ventilation Zone 2 Exhaust Subsystem (RVZ2e) Flow Diagram SHINE Medical Technologies 9a2.1-16 Rev. 5

Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Systems Figure 9a2.1 Radiological Ventilation Zone 2 Supply Subsystem (RVZ2s) Air Handling Units (AHUs)

RVZ2s AHU PDT TI FAN PDT TI SD ARRAY FI TI BACKDRAFT SMOKE/DISCHARGE DAMPER DAMPER FROM OUTSIDE FINAL FILTER OUTSIDE AIR COOLING COIL HEATING COIL DAMPER HUMIDIFIER PRE-FILTER FDWS FCHS RETURN FCHS SUPPLY FHWS RETURN FHWS SUPPLY PI BUBBLE TIGHT TORNADO RVZ2 SUPPLY DAMPER DAMPER TO RPF TEST CONNECTION RVZ2s AHU PDT TI FAN PDT TI SD ARRAY FI TI BACKDRAFT SMOKE/DISCHARGE DAMPER DAMPER FROM OUTSIDE FINAL FILTER OUTSIDE AIR COOLING COIL HEATING COIL DAMPER HUMIDIFIER PRE-FILTER FDWS SD SMOKE DETECTOR FCHS RETURN TI TEMPERATURE INDICATOR FCHS SUPPLY FI FLOW INDICATOR FHWS RETURN PDT PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL TRANSMITTER MANUAL VALVE FHWS SUPPLY RCA CONTROL VALVE NON-RCA MEZZANINE SHINE Medical Technologies 9a2.1-17 Rev. 5

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Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Systems Figure 9a2.1 Radiological Ventilation Zone 2 Supply Subsystem (RVZ2s) and Radiological Ventilation Zone 2 Recirculating Cooling Subsystem (RVZ2r) Flow Diagram SHINE Medical Technologies 9a2.1-18 Rev. 5

Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Systems Figure 9a2.1 Radiological Ventilation Zone 1 Exhaust Subsystem (RVZ1e) and Radiological Ventilation Zone 2 Exhaust Subsystem (RVZ2e) Mezzanine PDT PDT PDT PDT VFD RVZ2R RECIRCULATION BACKDRAFT FROM IF DAMPER HEPA HEPA FILTER CARBON FILTER RVZ2 EXHAUST PREFILTER FROM IF FILTER RZE RZE RZE PI RVZ2 FILTER BANK RVZ2 BLOWER TORNADO DAMPER VFD RVZ2 EXHAUST FROM RPF TEST BACKDRAFT ISOLATION ISOLATION CONNECTION DAMPER FROM STACK RVZ2 EXHAUST DAMPER DAMPER TO STACK FROM PVVS FROM LABS RELEASE MONITOR RELEASE MONITOR RVZ2 BLOWER FROM MEZZANINE STACK PDT PDT PDT PDT FT VFD BACKDRAFT DAMPER HEPA HEPA RVZ1 EXHAUST FILTER CARBON FILTER PREFILTER FROM IF FILTER RZE RZE RZE PI RVZ1 FILTER BANK RVZ1 BLOWER TORNADO DAMPER VFD RVZ1 EXHAUST FROM RPF TEST BACKDRAFT BALANCE CONNECTION DAMPER ISOLATION DAMPER ISOLATION DAMPER DAMPER RVZ1 BLOWER RCA MEZZANINE NON-RCA MEZZANINE VFD RZE RADIATION MONITOR VARIABLE FREQUENCY DRIVE PI PRESSURE INDICATOR PDT PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL TRANSMITTER FT FLOW TRANSMITTER BUBBLE TIGHT DAMPER SHINE Medical Technologies 9a2.1-20 Rev. 5

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Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Systems Figure 9a2.1 Facility Ventilation Zone 4 Supply and Transfer Air Subsystem (FVZ4s) Distribution SHINE Medical Technologies 9a2.1-21 Rev. 5

Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Systems Figure 9a2.1 Facility Ventilation Zone 4 (FVZ4) Air Handling Units (AHUs) (Typical)

HI TI FVZ4s RETURN AIR FAN RETURN AIR DAMPER PDT TI PDT FAN TI FI ARRAY TI HI SPI MIN OA DAMPER FVZ4s OUTSIDE AIR (OA) FINAL FILTER HEATING COIL COOLING COIL HUMIDIFIER MAX OA DAMPER PRE-FILTER FDWS FHWS PDT PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL TRANSMITTER FHWS FI FLOW INDICATOR HEATING COIL PUMP TI TEMPERATURE INDICATOR FCHS HI HUMIDITY INDICATOR FCHS SPI STATIC PRESSURE INDICATOR MANUAL VALVE CHECK VALVE SHINE Medical Technologies 9a2.1-23 Rev. 5

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Possession and Use of Byproduct, Source, Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems and Special Nuclear Material SNM is also used for neutron flux detection and measurement. Up to eight (alpha, neutron) neutron sources (e.g., Pu-238/Be) with combined strength up to [ ]SRI are used, one in each IU, for IU start-up operations, as described in Section 4a2.2. Additionally, up to 0.55 lbs.

(250 g) of uranium-235 are used within neutron flux detectors.

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Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Other Auxiliary Systems Figure 9a2.7 TPS Process Flow Diagram SHINE Medical Technologies 9a2.7-12 Rev. 4

Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Cover Gas Control in the Radioisotope Production Facility the tank headspace, to the PVVS conditioning and filtration equipment. Gases pass through condensers, cooled with process chilled water, to remove excess heat and reduce absolute humidity of the off-gas.

Condensate is collected in the PVVS condensate tank within the PVVS hot cell, located within the supercell. Condensate may be returned to the target solution staging system (TSSS) tanks as makeup water or to the radioactive liquid waste storage (RLWS) system for waste processing. An in-line heater, the PVVS reheater, downstream of the condenser heats the off-gas back to ambient temperature to reduce the relative humidity. The off-gas then flows through acid adsorber beds, and HEPA filters, and the guard beds to neutralize entrained acid droplets or gases, and filter particulates, and capture iodine. The gas flows from the hot cell to a below-grade, shielded vaults, passing through guard beds to capture iodine prior to passing through a series of delay beds packed with carbon to delay the release of fission product noble gases such as xenon and krypton. The eight delay beds are organized into three groups as shown in Figure 9b.6-1. Group 1 includes Delay Beds 1 and 2. Group 2 includes Delay Beds 3, 4, and 5.

Group 3 includes Delay Beds 6, 7, and 8. A final set of HEPA filters removes any entrained carbon fines upstream of the blowers, and the treated gases are discharged to the facility stack.

In the event PVVS flow drops below the minimum flow rate of 5.0 standard cubic feet per minute, the engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) automatically initiates an RPF Nitrogen Purge. This results in the nitrogen purge system (N2PS) providing nitrogen flow to the RPF tanks to mitigate hydrogen generation. Upon actuation of the N2PS, the RPF header valves actuate open, the isolation valves at the PVVS north and south header valves actuate closed, and the PVVS isolation valve at the radioactive liquid waste immobilization (RLWI) interface actuates closed to prevent nitrogen backflow. During the nitrogen purge, the PVVS equipment and piping continues to provide the flow path for the off-gas through the RPF.

Safety-related bypasses are provided around filtration equipment in the hot cell that could contribute to a blocked pathway and an alternate, safety-related exhaust point to the roof is actuated open. The branch to the alternate release point is upstream of the PVVS blowers.

Fire protection is provided for the guard beds and delay beds. Temperature instrumentation and carbon monoxide detection are used to monitor for oxidation. The beds may be isolated or purged with nitrogen to smother the reaction. Additionally, operators can attempt to increase the system flow rate to increase convective cooling. The ESFAS automatically isolates affected delay bed groups when carbon monoxide concentrations in the effluent gas exceed 50 ppm.

Principal components of the PVVS are identified in Table 9b.6-2.

A process flow diagram of the PVVS is provided in Figure 9b.6-1.

9b.6.1.3 Operational Analysis and Safety Function The PVVS provides confinement of fission products to prevent release of radioactive material.

The PVVS maintains hydrogen concentrations below the lower flammability limit (LFL) to preclude a hydrogen deflagration or detonation, as discussed in Subsection 9b.6.1.3.1. The PVVS passively reduces the concentration of radionuclides in the gaseous effluent to the facility stack, including during postulated transients, as discussed in Subsection 9b.6.1.3.2.

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Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Other Auxiliary Systems

  • Perform selective removal of classification-driving isotopes, as needed, from blended liquid waste in waste cleanup columns.
  • Perform solidification of blended liquid waste.
  • Reduce radiation exposure during operation in accordance with applicable guideline exposures set forth in 10 CFR 20.

The RLWI system piping is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME B31.3, Process Piping (ASME, 2013). Nonsafety-related components within the RLWI system are designed to standards satisfying system operation.

9b.7.3.2 System Description The RLWI system solidifies blended liquid waste to a form suitable for shipping and disposal. The RLWI system removes selected isotopes, as needed, from the blended liquid waste and then immobilizes the wastes for ultimate disposal. The headspace cover gas in the immobilization feed tank is swept by the PVVS.

The blended liquid waste sources and radionuclide and uranium concentrations are described in Subsection 9b.7.4.

The immobilization feed tank is filled from the liquid waste blending tanks on a batch basis by vacuum suction applied to the immobilization feed tank from the vacuum transfer system (VTS).

Positive displacement pumps transfer the contents of the immobilization feed tank through the waste cleanup columns, if required, and meter the tank contents to a disposable waste drum.

The empty waste drums are prefilled with measured amounts of dry, powdered solidification agent in accordance with the process control program (PCP). The prefilled drum is transferred into an enclosure for contamination control. The radiological ventilation zone 1 exhaust subsystem (RVZ1e) equipment processes air from the enclosure through a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) and carbon filter before discharging to the facility stack. Transfer of the prefilled waste drum inside the enclosure is by remote handling equipment and positioners.

The liquid waste drum is filled with blended liquid waste and mixed. Subsequent to fill and mixing, the fill and vent ports are disengaged. The waste drum is then remotely transferred to a curing station where the mixed contents of the waste drum hardens prior to removal fromremains in the enclosure until curing is complete. The cured waste drum is remotely transferred into a shielded cask and transported to the material staging building for further radiological decay, as needed, prior to shipment to a licensed disposal facility.

Remote sampling for waste characterization is performed in the RLWS prior to solidification activities. Radiation measurements are performed on the solidified waste drum prior to shipment in the material staging building to verify it meets shipping dose rate requirements.

Table 9b.7-1 identifies the systems which interface with the RLWI system. Figure 9b.7-1 provides a process flow diagram of the RLWI system.

9b.7.3.3 Operational Analysis and Safety Function Liquid waste solidification is performed in accordance with a PCP. The RLWI system is sized to process approximately double the routine liquid waste generation rate from the RPF.

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Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Other Auxiliary Systems 9b.7.6.2 System Description The RDS consists of drip pans with drain lines, tank overflow lines, collection tanks and instrumentation to alert operators of system status. The RDS includes drip pans located beneath the extraction and IXP hot cells, favorable geometry tanks, and piping for systems that normally contain high concentration (> 25 gU/l) fissile solution. The RDS also collects overflow from target solution and uranium waste tanks. The RDS consists of two favorable geometry tanks (annular tanks) that collect leakage from postulated sources. The leakage and overflow are connected by piping that is substantially located within the basemat of the RPF as well as in the RPF pipe trench. Gravity provides the motive force between the various drip pans and the RDS tanks. No valves are installed between the potential collection source and the collection tanks.

Table 9b.7-4 identifies the systems which interface with the RDS.

Figure 9b.7-5 provides a process flow diagram for the RDS.

9b.7.6.3 Operational Analysis and Safety Function The RDS includes two sump tanks, each sized to accept the largest volume of liquid containing SNM that is postulated to leak from a favorable geometry tank. The largest volume of liquid containing SNM postulated to leak into the RDS system is the volume of the largest favorable geometry tank, assuming the tank is filled to the overflow line. The inclusion of two RDS tanks provides operational margin.

The RDS sump tanks are connected to the target solution storage tanks, target solution hold tanks, and uranium liquid waste tanks. Additionally, the sump tanks are connected to drip pans in vaults containing annular tanks, drip pans in valve pits servicing annular tanks, drip pans in the main pipe trench, and drip pans in the extraction and IXP hot cells. Redundant overflows to a common RDS header are provided for each annular tank. The RDS is not used in any normal operating conditions. Instrumentation is provided to alert operators of the presence of liquid in the various drip pans and of liquid level in the RDS sump tanks. If liquid is detected in the drip pans or sump tanks, contingency actions may be performed by using systems other than the RDS.

Contents of the RDS tanks are sampled and transferred by the VTS to the appropriate location.

Characterization of the sample is performed by the quality control and analytical testing laboratories (LABS).

The RDS needs to remain open for drainage of fissile-containing liquids (for criticality safety),

while also not compromising the integrity of the confinement barrier. Fluids are contained within appropriate process piping and vessels, and the system is vented to the PVVS.

Piping that contains potentially-radiological material is routed through shielded pipe chases to limit the exposure of radiation to personnel. The RDS tanks are shielded by a tank vault, which is a part of the PFBS. The PFBS shielding requirements are described in Section 4b.2.

RDS operations are performed in accordance with the requirements of the radiation protection program, described in Section 11.1.

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Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Other Auxiliary Systems Figure 9b.7 RLWI System Process Flow Diagram SHINE Medical Technologies 9b.7-29 Rev. 5

Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems References 9b.8 REFERENCES ANSI, 1993. Radioactive Materials - Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More, ANSI N14.6-1993, American National Standards Institute, 1993.

ANSI/ANS, 1998. Guide for Nuclear Criticality Safety in the Storage of Fissile Materials, ANSI/ANS 8.7-1998 (R2007), American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society, 1998.

ASCE, 2006. Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, ASCE 7-05, American Society of Civil Engineers, 2006.

ASME, 2004. Rules for Construction of Overhead and Gantry Cranes (Top Running Bridge, Multiple Girder), NOG-1-2004, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2004.

ASME, 2009. Code on Nuclear Air and Gas Treatment, AG-1-2009, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2009.

ASME, 2010. Rules for Construction of Pressure Vessels, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section VIII, Division 1, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2010.

ASME, 2011a. Overhead and Gantry Cranes (Top Running Bridge, Single or Multiple Girder, Top Running Trolley Hoist), B30.2-2011, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2011.

ASME, 2011b. Building Services Piping, B31.9-2011, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2011.

ASME, 2013. Process Piping, B31.3-2012, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2013.

ASME, 2018. Slings, B30.9-2018, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2018.

CMAA, 2004. Specifications for Top Running Bridge & Gantry Type Multiple Girder Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes, CMAA 70-2004, Crane Manufactures Association of America, Inc.,

2004.

USNRC, 1980. Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0612, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 1980.

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Chapter 11 - Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management Radiation Protection The design of the main production facility maintains airborne radioactive material at very low concentrations in normally occupied areas. Confinement and ventilation systems are designed to protect workers from sources of airborne radioactivity during normal operation and minimize worker exposure during maintenance activities, keeping with the ALARA principles outlined in 10 CFR 20.

Although most process gas systems within the facility are maintained below atmospheric pressure, some leakage of process gases is expected due to the difference in partial pressure between the system and the surrounding environment. A conservative best estimate of airborne releases due to normal operation and maintenance was performed to estimate derived air concentrations (DACs) for the facility.

Leakage from process systems was estimated based on the number of components and fittings, achievable leak tightness per fitting, permeation through equipment, and partial pressures of airborne radionuclides. For processes in hot cells that require routine disconnection of components (e.g., extraction columns) special fittings are used to minimize process leakage.

The effects of the confinement systems are incorporated into the analysis. The results of the evaluation, broken down into particulates, halogens, noble gases, and tritium, are provided in Table 11.1-6. These values provide a conservative best estimate of the facility DACs.

Figure 11.1-2 provides the DAC zoning map for the facility, using the following definitions:

  • Zone 1 (< 1.0 DAC);
  • Zone 2 (1.0 - 10 DAC); and
  • Zone 3 (> 10 DAC).

Gaseous activity from the TSV and process operations is routed through the PVVS which includes carbon delay beds to allow for airborne radionuclides to decay to low enough levels such that normal releases are below the 10 CFR 20 limits. PVVS includes a sample line to the carbon monoxide (CO) detection cabinet that contains CO gas analyzers above grade. The CO cabinet does not have potential for excessive leakage. Additional airborne release pathways are RVZ1 ventilation of the facility hot cells, flow out of the primary confinement boundary to RVZ1, and radiological ventilation zone 2 (RVZ2) ventilation of any leakage to the general area (material evaluated for the DAC). These additional pathways do not pass through the carbon delay beds but do contain filters as described in Subsection 9a2.1.1. Table 11.1-7 lists key parameters used in the normal release calculation. Tritium releases that are treated by TPS are negligible in comparison to tritium releases to the general area due to maintenance and leakage and are not included in Table 11.1-7 or Table 11.1-8.

Annual off-site doses due to the normal operation of the SHINE facility have been calculated using the computer code GENII2 (PNNL, 2012). The GENII2 computer code was developed for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and is distributed by the Radiation Safety Information Computational Center (RSICC). Annual average relative atmospheric concentration (/Q) values were determined using the methodology in Regulatory Guide 1.111, Methods for Estimating Atmospheric Transport and Dispersion of Gaseous Effluents in Routine Releases from Light-Water-Cooled Reactors (USNRC, 1977) with the meteorological data in Section 2.3. The /Q values for the maximally exposed individual (MEI), which is the nearest point on the site boundary, and the nearest full-time resident are 7.1E-5 sec/m3 and 5.3E-6 sec/m3, respectively.

SHINE Medical Technologies 11.1-4 Rev. 4

Chapter 11 - Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management Radiation Protection Procedures and engineering controls are based upon sound radiation protection principles to achieve occupational doses to on-site personnel and doses to members of the public that are ALARA. The radiation protection program content and implementation are reviewed at least annually as required by 10 CFR 20.1101(c).

The radiation protection program includes written procedures, periodic assessments of work practices and internal/external doses received, work plans, and the personnel and equipment required to implement the ALARA goal. Protection of plant personnel requires (a) surveillance of and control over the radiation exposure of personnel and (b) maintaining the exposure of personnel not only within permissible limits, but also within ALARA philosophy and exposure goals.

SHINEs administrative personnel exposure limits for radiation workers are set below the limits specified in 10 CFR 20. This provides assurance that regulatory radiation exposure limits are not exceeded and that the ALARA principle is emphasized. Administrative exposure limits are provided in Table 11.1-11.

The radiation exposure policy and control measures for personnel are established in accordance with requirements of 10 CFR 20 and the guidance in the following regulatory guides:

  • Regulatory Guide 8.10, Revision 2, Operating Philosophy for Maintaining Occupational Radiation Exposures as Low as Is Reasonably Achievable (USNRC, 2016)

The SHINE corrective action process is implemented if (1) personnel dose monitoring results or personnel contamination levels exceed the administrative personnel limits; (2) if an incident results in airborne occupational exposures exceeding the administrative limits; or (3) the dose limits in 10 CFR 20 are exceeded.

Information developed from reportable occurrences is tracked in the corrective action program and is used to improve radiation protection practices, decreasing the probability of similar incidents.

11.1.2.1.1 Responsibilities of Key Program Personnel The key personnel responsible for implementing the radiation protection program are shown in Figure 11.1-3 and are discussed below. Chapter 12 discusses the SHINE organization and responsibilities of key management personnel in further detail.

Chief Executive Officer The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is responsible for the overall management and leadership of the company.

SHINE Medical Technologies 11.1-7 Rev. 4

Chapter 11 - Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management Radiation Protection Regulatory Guide 8.10. Radiation protection procedures related to personnel radiation protection are reviewed by the SHINE Review and Audit Committee.

Work performed in radiologically controlled areas is performed in accordance with the RWP process. The RWP specifies radiological controls for intended work activities and provides written authorization for entry into and work within Radiation Areas, High Radiation Areas, Very High Radiation Areas, Contamination Areas and Airborne Radioactivity Areas. The RWP informs workers of area radiological conditions and entry requirements and provides a mechanism to relate worker exposure to specific work activities. The procedures controlling RWPs are consistent with the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 8.10 (USNRC, 2016).

11.1.2.1.6 Commitment to Radiation Protection Training The design and implementation of the radiation protection training program complies with the requirements of 10 CFR 19.12. Records are maintained in accordance with 10 CFR 20, Subpart L.

The development and implementation of the radiation protection training program is consistent with the guidance provided in the following regulatory guidance documents:

  • Regulatory Guide 8.10 - Operating Philosophy for Maintaining Occupational Radiation Exposures As Low As Reasonably Achievable (USNRC, 2016)
  • ASTM E1168 Radiological Protection Training for Nuclear Facility Workers (ASTM, 2013).

Individuals who require unescorted access into restricted areas (as defined in Subsection 11.1.5.1.1) receive training that is commensurate with the radiological hazard to which they may be exposed. Non-facility visitors and fire or emergency responders requiring access to restricted areas are provided with trained escorts who have received radiation protection training.

The level of radiation protection training provided is based on the potential radiological health risks associated with an employee's work responsibilities and incorporates the provisions of 10 CFR 19.12. In accordance with 10 CFR 19.12, any individual working at the facility who is likely to receive in a year a dose in excess of 100 mrem (1 millisievert [mSv]) is:

  • Kept informed of the storage, transfer, or use of radioactive material.
  • Instructed in the health protection problems associated with exposure to radiation and radioactive material, in precautions or procedures to minimize exposure, and in the purposes and functions of protective devices employed.
  • Provided with access to and training on the use of personal protective equipment (PPE).
  • Required to observe, to the extent within the worker's control, the applicable provisions of the NRC regulations and licenses for the protection of personnel from exposure to radiation and radioactive material.

SHINE Medical Technologies 11.1-11 Rev. 4

Chapter 11 - Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management Radiation Protection 11.1.3 ALARA PROGRAM Subsection 11.1.2.1 states the facility's commitment to the implementation of an ALARA program. The objective of the program is to make every reasonable effort to maintain exposure to radiation as far below the dose limits of 10 CFR 20.1201 and 10 CFR 20.1301 as is practical.

The design and implementation of the ALARA program is consistent with the guidance provided in Regulatory Guides 8.2 (USNRC, 2011), 8.13 (USNRC, 1999a), and 8.29 (USNRC, 1996). The operation of the facility is consistent with the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 8.10 (USNRC, 2016).

Annual doses to individual personnel are maintained ALARA. In addition, the annual collective dose to personnel (i.e., the sum of annual individual doses, expressed in person-sievert [Sv] or person-rem) is maintained ALARA. The dose equivalent to an embryo/fetus of a declared pregnant worker is maintained at or below the limit in 10 CFR 20.1208.

The radiation protection program is written and implemented to ensure that it is comprehensive and effective. The written program documents policies that are implemented to ensure the ALARA goal is met. Procedures are written so that they incorporate the ALARA philosophy into the routine operations and ensure that exposures are consistent with administrative dose limits.

As discussed in Subsection 11.1.5, radiological zones/areas are established within the facility.

The establishment of these zones supports the ALARA commitment by minimizing the spread of contamination and reducing exposure of personnel to radiation.

Specific goals of the ALARA program include maintaining occupational exposures and environmental releases as far below regulatory limits as is reasonably achievable. The ALARA concept is also incorporated into the design of the facility. The plant is divided into radiation zones with radiation levels that are consistent with the access requirements for those areas.

Areas where on-site personnel spend significant amounts of time are designed to maintain the lowest dose rates reasonably achievable.

The Radiation Protection Manager is responsible for implementing the ALARA program and ensuring that adequate resources are committed to make the program effective. The Radiation Protection Manager prepares an annual ALARA program evaluation report. The report reviews (1) radiological exposure and effluent release data for trends, including ALARA dose goals, (2) results of audits and inspections, (3) use, maintenance, and surveillance of equipment used for exposure and effluent control, and (4) other issues that may influence the effectiveness of the radiation protection/ALARA programs. The effectiveness of the ALARA program is reviewed by the RSC. The RSC sets the ALARA goals for the facility and reviews new activities to ensure ALARA principles are considered. Efforts for improving the effectiveness of equipment used for effluent and exposure control are also evaluated by the RSC. Any resulting recommendations from the committee reviews and evaluations are documented in RSC meeting minutes. The committee's recommendations are dispositioned in the facilitys corrective action process.

11.1.3.1 ALARA Program Considerations The SHINE facility is designed to maximize the incorporation of good engineering practices and lessons learned to accomplish ALARA objectives.

SHINE Medical Technologies 11.1-14 Rev. 4

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Chapter 11 - Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management Radiation Protection Table 11.1 Airborne Radioactive Sources (Sheet 1 of 4)

Estimated Exterior Major Maximum Dose Rate System Component Location Sources Activity (Ci) (mrem/hr)(a)

Tritium purification TPS TPS gloveboxes H-3 300,000(b) < 0.25 system Driver vacuum NDAS IU cell H-3 [ ]PROP/ECI(c) < 0.25 hardware Off-gas piping, zeolite TOGS TOGS shielded cell I, Kr, Xe 120,000(d) < 0.25 beds IU cell atmosphere and Ar-41: 1E-05 RVZ1 IU cell Ar-41 and N-16 N/A PCLS N-16: 10(d)

I, Kr, Xe, and RVZ1 Supercell atmosphere Supercell gloveboxes 3 < 0.2 particulates Pipe trenches, valve pits, PVVS and VTS PVVS and VTS piping PVVS CO cabinet, and I, Kr, Xe 25,000(d) <1 PVVS hot cell

a. Dose contribution from listed source in normally occupied area, includes direct dose at 30 cm from the exterior of the shielding surface and contributions from the derived air concentration.
b. Includes inventory in NDAS units.
c. H-3 activity is per NDAS unit.
d. Value is per irradiation unit (IU).

SHINE Medical Technologies 11.1-39 Rev. 4

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Chapter 11 - Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management Radiation Protection Table 11.1 Airborne Radioactive Sources (Sheet 3 of 4)

RVZ1, Supercell Atmosphere, Supercell Gloveboxes (Conservative Best Estimate Activity)

Extraction and IXP Cells PVVS Cell Isotope Activity (Ci) Isotope Activity (Ci)

Br-83 [ ]PROP/ECI I-123 [ ]PROP/ECI I-130 [ ]PROP/ECI I-124 [ ]PROP/ECI I-131 [ ]PROP/ECI I-125 [ ]PROP/ECI I-132 [ ]PROP/ECI I-126 [ ]PROP/ECI I-133 [ ]PROP/ECI I-129 [ ]PROP/ECI I-134 [ ]PROP/ECI I-130 [ ]PROP/ECI I-135 [ ]PROP/ECI I-131 [ ]PROP/ECI Mo-99 [ ]PROP/ECI I-132 [ ]PROP/ECI Tc-99m [ ]PROP/ECI I-132m [ ]PROP/ECI Xe-133 [ ]PROP/ECI I-133 [ ]PROP/ECI Xe-133m [ ]PROP/ECI I-134 [ ]PROP/ECI Xe-135 [ ]PROP/ECI I-135 [ ]PROP/ECI Xe-135m [ ]PROP/ECI Kr-81 [ ]PROP/ECI Kr-83m [ ]PROP/ECI Purification Cell Kr-85 [ ]PROP/ECI Isotope Activity(Ci) Kr-85m [ ]PROP/ECI I-130 [ ]PROP/ECI Kr-87 [ ]PROP/ECI I-131 [ ]PROP/ECI Kr-88 [ ]PROP/ECI I-132 [ ]PROP/ECI Xe-127 [ ]PROP/ECI I-133 [ ]PROP/ECI Xe-131m [ ]PROP/ECI I-134 [ ]PROP/ECI Xe-133 [ ]PROP/ECI I-135 [ ]PROP/ECI Xe-133m [ ]PROP/ECI Mo-99 [ ]PROP/ECI Xe-135 [ ]PROP/ECI Tc-99m [ ]PROP/ECI Xe-135m [ ]PROP/ECI Xe-133 [ ]PROP/ECI Xe-138 [ ]PROP/ECI Xe-133m [ ]PROP/ECI Xe-135 [ ]PROP/ECI Xe-135m [ ]PROP/ECI SHINE Medical Technologies 11.1-41 Rev. 4

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Chapter 11 - Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management Radiation Protection Table 11.1 Airborne Radioactive Sources (Sheet 4 of 4)

PVVS and VTS, PVVS and VTS Piping, Pipe Trenches, Valve Pits, and PVVS Hot Cell, PVVS CO Cabinet (Conservative Best Estimate Activity)

Isotope Activity (Ci)

I-123 [ ]PROP/ECI I-124 [ ]PROP/ECI I-125 [ ]PROP/ECI I-126 [ ]PROP/ECI I-129 [ ]PROP/ECI I-130 [ ]PROP/ECI I-131 [ ]PROP/ECI I-132 [ ]PROP/ECI 1-132m [ ]PROP/ECI I-133 [ ]PROP/ECI I-133m [ ]PROP/ECI I-134 [ ]PROP/ECI I-135 [ ]PROP/ECI Kr-81 [ ]PROP/ECI Kr-83m [ ]PROP/ECI Kr-85 [ ]PROP/ECI Kr-85m [ ]PROP/ECI Kr-87 [ ]PROP/ECI Kr-88 [ ]PROP/ECI Xe-122 [ ]PROP/ECI Xe-123 [ ]PROP/ECI Xe-127 [ ]PROP/ECI Xe-131m [ ]PROP/ECI Xe-133 [ ]PROP/ECI Xe-133m [ ]PROP/ECI Xe-135 [ ]PROP/ECI Xe-135m [ ]PROP/ECI Xe-138 [ ]PROP/ECI SHINE Medical Technologies 11.1-42 Rev. 4

Chapter 11 - Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management Radiation Protection Table 11.1 Estimated Derived Air Concentrations Source Description Location Particulate Halogen Noble Gas Tritium Total Primary System Boundary IF General Area - 0.41% 0.10% - 0.41%

TPS Room - - - 1.4% 1.4%

IF General Area,

- - - 3.20.8% 3.20.8%

Tritium Systems Normal Operation IF General Area,

- - - 5.21.1% 5.21.1%

Maintenance Below-Grade Vaults, RPF General Area - 0.18% 0.0% - 0.18%

PVVS CO Cabinet PVVS Hot Cell - 12%> 10 DAC 271.96% - 14%> 10 DAC PVVS Hot Cell RPF General Area - 0.01% 0.0% - 0.01%

Extraction and IXP Extraction Hot Cells 138% > 10 DAC 76.3% 0.0% > 10 DAC Hot Cells RPF General Area 0.0% 2.1.5% 0.0% 0.0% 2.1.5%

Purification Hot Cell 38.7% > 10 DAC 2202% 0.0% > 10 DAC Purification Hot Cell RPF General Area 0.0% 42.2% 0.0% 0.0% 42.2%

IF General Area Total - 0.41% 0.10% 8.31.9% 8.82.0%

RPF General Area Total 0.0% 6.4.7% 0.0% - 6.4.7%

SHINE Medical Technologies 11.1-43 Rev. 4

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Chapter 11 - Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management Radiation Protection Figure 11.1 Probable Radiation Area Designations Within the SHINE RCA, Ground Floor Level



SHINE Medical Technologies 11.1-63 Rev. 4

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Chapter 11 - Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management Radiation Protection Figure 11.1 Estimated Derived Air Concentrations, Ground Floor Level SHINE Medical Technologies 11.1-64 Rev. 4

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Chapter 11 - Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management Radioactive Waste Management 11.2.2.2.6 Process Vessel Vent System The process vessel vent system (PVVS) removes radioactive particulates, iodine, and noble gases that are generated within the radioisotope production facility (RPF) and primary system boundary (PSB) prior to being discharged to the atmosphere. PVVS waste consists of spent HEPA filters and spent carbon guard beds. The spent HEPA filters aredisposed as Class A waste and the spent carbon guard beds are Class A or Class B waste. Condensate from PVVS can be blended with other waste streams and processed by RLWI.

11.2.2.2.7 Iodine and Xenon Purification and Packaging System The iodine and xenon purification and packaging (IXP) system separates the iodine fission products from the uranyl sulfate target solution or from [ ]PROP/ECI. The IXP system generates spent iodine recovery, [

]PROP/ECI.

Iodine recovery, [ ]PROP/ECI will be regularly changed out and are Class B or Class C waste.

11.2.2.2.8 Hot Cells Hot cells contain HEPA and carbon filter combinations on the air supply and return lines. Spent HEPA and carbon filters are Class A waste.

11.2.2.2.9 Primary Closed Loop Cooling System The primary closed loop cooling system (PCLS) has potential for radioactive contamination due to minor leakage from the PSB and activation products. Contamination would collect on the PCLS filters and deionizer resins. PCLS filters could become contaminated with radionuclides due to activation of corrosion particles as the water passes through the TSV, however, corrosion of the stainless steel components is expected to be small. The spent PCLS filters are expected to be Class A waste. PCLS deionizer resins are contained in disposable deionizer units. The tanks are designed for complete replacement without removal of the ion exchange resins in the tanks.

The disposable tanks are Class A waste.

11.2.2.2.10 Light Water Pool System The light water pool has potential for radioactive contamination due to minor leakage from the PSB and activation products. Any contamination would collect on the filters and deionizer resins used to cleanup the light water pool. Similar to the PCLS, the deionizer resins are contained in disposable deionizer units and are expected to be Class A waste. Spent filters are expected to be Class A waste.

11.2.2.2.11 Radioactive Liquid Waste Radioactive liquid waste streams include waste liquids from:

  • MEPS
  • IXP system
  • PVVS SHINE Medical Technologies 11.2-7 Rev. 3

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Chapter 11 - Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management Radioactive Waste Management Table 11.2 Estimated Annual Waste Stream Summary (Sheet 1 of 2)

As As As Class as Generated Generated Disposed Shipment Description Matrix Generated Amount Units (ft3) Type Destination(a)

MEPS Extraction Columns [ [

B or C [ ]PROP/ECI ft3/yr 270 Type B WCS

]PROP/ECI ]PROP/ECI Selective Ion Stripping Columns [ ]PROP/ECI B or C 72 ft3/yr 72 Type B WCS IXP Separation Columns [ ]PROP/ECI B or C [ ]PROP/ECI 3 ft /yr 3547 Type B WCS Type A or LWPS Deionizer Units Resin A 48 ft3/yr 80 EnergySolutions LSA Type A or PCLS Deionizer Units Resin A 48 ft3/yr 80 EnergySolutions LSA Type A or Uranium Canisters Solid A 2.0(b) ft3/yr 3.3 EnergySolutions LSA Type A or NDAS Accelerator Subassembly Solid A [ ]PROP/ECI ft3/yr 13,6003,321 EnergySolutions LSA Type A or NDAS Target Chamber Subassembly Solid A [ ]PROP/ECI ft3/yr 1330586 EnergySolutions LSA Type A, B, or EnergySolutions or TOGS Skids Solid A or B 922846 ft3/yr 1,540411 LSA WCS TOGS Zeolite Beds Solid B or C 0.64 ft3/yr 1.1 Type B WCS Type A or LWPS Filters Solid A 1.6 ft3/yr 2.7 EnergySolutions LSA Type A or PCLS Filters Solid A 1.6 ft3/yr 2.7 EnergySolutions LSA TSPS, URSS, PVVS, Hot Cell, RVZ1, RVZ2, RLWI Type A or Solid A 182 ft3/yr 142 EnergySolutions HEPA Filters LSA Type A or Hot Cell, RVZ1, RVZ2 Charcoal Filters Solid A 32 ft3/yr 54 EnergySolutions LSA Type A or TSPS Uranyl Sulfate Solution Filters Solid A 0.35(c) ft3/yr 0.58 EnergySolutions LSA SHINE Medical Technologies 11.2-12 Rev. 3

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Chapter 11 - Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management Radioactive Waste Management Table 11.2 Estimated Annual Waste Stream Summary (Sheet 2 of 2)

As As As Class as Generated Generated Disposed Shipment Description Matrix Generated Amount Units (ft3) Type Destination(a)

EnergySolutions or PVVS Carbon Guard Bed Solid A or B 0.48 ft3/yr 0.81 Type B WCS Type A or MEPS Glassware Solid A 208 ft3/yr 347 EnergySolutions LSA Type A or Class A Trash Solid A 400(d) ft3/yr 677 EnergySolutions LSA Type A or Contaminated Oil Oil B 2.0 ft3/yr 3.34 WCS LSA Extraction Column Acid Wash Liquid(e) A [ ]PROP/ECI [ ]PROP/ECI Extraction Column Water Wash Liquid(e) A [ ]PROP/ECI [ ]PROP/ECI

[ ]PROP/ECI Liquid(e) A [ ]PROP/ECI [ ]PROP/ECI

[ ]PROP/ECI Liquid(e) A [ ]PROP/ECI [ ]PROP/ECI

[ ]PROP/ECI Liquid(e) A [ ]PROP/ECI [ ]PROP/ECI Iodine Recovery Column [ ]PROP/ECI Liquid(e) A [ ]PROP/ECI [ ]PROP/ECI Spent Target Solution Liquid(e) A [ ]PROP/ECI [ ]PROP/ECI Type A or 2,599(f)(g) EnergySolutions LSA Vacuum Transfer System Knockout Pot Liquid(e) A 14 gal/yr Radiological Laboratory Waste Liquid(e) A 275 gal/yr (e) A 2,768 gal/yr Decontamination Waste Liquid Cintichem Purification Waste & Rotary Evaporator Liquid(e) A 82 gal/yr Condensate

[ ]PROP/ECI Liquid(e) A [ ]PROP/ECI [ ]PROP/ECI PVVS Condenser Condensate Liquid(e) A 701 gal/yr

a. Waste destination may be subject to change.
b. Uranium metal and/or uranium oxide cannisters may be returned to the supplier in lieu of disposition as solid waste.
c. TSPS uranyl sulfate dissolution tank filter elements may not become a waste stream if reconditioned and reused.
d. Class A trash is exclusive of other solid wastes identified in the table.
e. Liquid waste streams may be reused or may be combined and treated as a homogenous influent waste stream and solidified together.
f. As shipped volume of liquid waste streams is in the form of a uniform solidified matrix using a solidification agent.
g. 25 percent margin has been added to volume of solidified liquid shipped waste.

SHINE Medical Technologies 11.2-13 Rev. 3

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Chapter 11 - Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management Radioactive Waste Management Table 11.2 Chemical Composition and Radiological Properties of Liquid Waste Streams (Sheet 1 of 2)

Qualitative Chemical Composition Estimated Annual Radiological Radiological Description (wt/wt) Volume Inventory(1) Properties

[ ]PROP/ECI Extraction Column [ ]PROP/ECI

[ ]PROP/ECI Acid Wash [ ]PROP/ECI PROP/ECI

[ ]

>99% H2O Extraction Column trace H2SO4

[ ]PROP/ECI Water Wash trace UO2SO4

[ ]PROP/ECI

[ [ ]PROP/ECI

[ ]PROP/ECI [ ]PROP/ECI PROP/ECI PROP/ECI Most fission

] [ ]

products pass

[ [ ]PROP/ECI through separation

[ ]PROP/ECI [ ]PROP/ECI columns, though

]PROP/ECI

[ ]PROP/ECI some are Medium expected to be

[ retained on the

[ ]PROP/ECI

[ ]PROP/ECI columns and then

[ ]PROP/ECI

]PROP/ECI be removed with column washes.

[ ]PROP/ECI Iodine Recovery [ ]PROP/ECI

[ ]PROP/ECI Column Washes [ ]PROP/ECI PROP/ECI

[ ]

[ [ ]PROP/ECI

[ ]PROP/ECI [ ]PROP/ECI

]PROP/ECI [ ]PROP/ECI

[ [ ]PROP/ECI

[ ]PROP/ECI [ ]PROP/ECI

]PROP/ECI [ ]PROP/ECI Fission products remaining in the

[ ]PROP/ECI target solution Spent Target [ ]PROP/ECI after useful lifetime

[ ]PROP/ECI High Solution [ ]PROP/ECI contribute to a PROP/ECI

[ ] relatively high radiological inventory.

SHINE Medical Technologies 11.2-18 Rev. 3

Chapter 11 - Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management Respiratory Protection Program 11.3 RESPIRATORY PROTECTION PROGRAM The SHINE respiratory protection program conforms to the guidance of Regulatory Guide 8.15, Acceptable Programs for Respiratory Protection (USNRC, 1999b). In accordance with 10 CFR 20, Subpart H, the respiratory protection program:

  • Incorporates process and engineering controls, pursuant to 10 CFR 20.1701, to control the concentration of radioactive material in the air. The design of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems is described in Section 9a2.1.
  • Implements other controls, pursuant to 10 CFR 20.1702, when it is not practical to apply process or engineering controls to control the concentrations of radioactive material in the air to values below those that define an airborne radioactivity area. Consistent with the as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) program described in Section 11.1, the respiratory protection program implements increased monitoring and limiting intakes by controlling access, limiting exposure times, and using respiratory protection equipment.
  • Implements controls, pursuant to 10 CFR 20.1703, for the use of individual respiratory protection equipment to limit the intake of radioactive material. The respiratory protection program includes evaluation of potential hazards and estimated doses by performing surveys, bioassays, air sampling, or other means as necessary. The program provides protection of personnel from airborne concentrations exceeding the limits of Appendix B to 10 CFR 20 and ensures that respiratory equipment is tested and certified, including testing of respirators for operability before usage. The program ensures that written procedures specify the selection, fitting, issuance, maintenance, testing, training of personnel, monitoring, medical evaluations, and recordkeeping for individual respiratory protection equipment and for specifying when such equipment is to be used. Procedures for the use of individual respiratory protection equipment are revised as applicable when making changes to processes, facility, or equipment. Records are maintained for the respiratory protection program, including training in respirator use and maintenance.

SHINE Medical Technologies 11.3-1 Rev. 1

Chapter 11 - Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management References

11.4 REFERENCES

ANSI/ANS, 2007. The Development of Technical Specifications for Research Reactors, ANSI/ANS-15.1-2007, American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society, 2007.

ANSI/ANS, 2014. American National Standard for Radiation Protection Instrumentation Test and Calibration, Portable Survey Instruments, ANSI N323AB-2013, American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society, 2014.

ANSI/ANS, 2016. Radiation Protection at Research Reactor Facilities, ANSI/ANS 15.11-2016, American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society, 2016.

ASTM, 2013. Radiological Protection Training for Nuclear Facility Workers, ASTM E1168-95, American Society for Testing and Materials, 2013.

EPA, 2006. Guidance on Systematic Planning Using the Data Quality Objectives Process, EPA QA/G-4, Environmental Protection Agency, February 2006.

PNNL, 2012. GENII Version 2 Users Guide, PNNL-14583, Revision 4, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, September 2012.

USNRC, 1977. Methods for Estimating Atmospheric Transport and Dispersion of Gaseous Effluents in Routine Releases from Light-Water-Cooled Reactors, Regulatory Guide 1.111, Revision 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 1977.

USNRC, 1978. Information Relevant to Ensuring that Occupational Radiation Exposures at Nuclear Power Stations Will be As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable, Regulatory Guide 8.8, Revision 3, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 1978.

USNRC, 1986. Relative Importance of Individual Elements to Reactor Accident Consequences Assuming Equal Release Fractions, NUREG/CR-4467, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 1986.

USNRC, 1991. Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Guidance: Standard Radiological Effluent Controls for Pressurized Water Reactors, Generic Letter 89-01, Supplement No. 1, NUREG-1301, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, April 1991.

USNRC, 1992. Monitoring Criteria and Methods to Calculate Occupational Radiation Doses, Regulatory Guide 8.34, Revision 0, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 1992.

USNRC, 1993. Acceptable Concepts, Models, Equations and Assumptions for a Bioassay Program, Regulatory Guide 8.9, Revision 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 1993.

USNRC, 1996. Instruction Concerning Risks from Occupational Radiation Exposure, Regulatory Guide 8.29, Revision 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, February 1996.

USNRC, 1999a. Instruction Concerning Prenatal Radiation Exposure, Regulatory Guide 8.13, Revision 3, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 1999.

SHINE Medical Technologies 11.4-1 Rev. 1

Chapter 11 - Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management References USNRC, 1999b. Acceptable Programs for Respiratory Protection, Regulatory Guide 8.15, Revision 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, October 1999.

USNRC, 2009. Radiological Environmental Monitoring for Nuclear Power Plants, Regulatory Guide 4.1, Revision 2, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 2009.

USNRC, 2011. Administrative Practices in Radiation Surveys and Monitoring, Regulatory Guide 8.2, Revision 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May 2011.

USNRC, 2012. Health Physics Surveys During Enriched Uranium-235 Processing and Fuel Fabrication, Regulatory Guide 8.24, Revision 2, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 2012.

USNRC, 2016. Operating Philosophy for Maintaining Occupational Radiation Exposures As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable, Regulatory Guide 8.10, Revision 2, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August 2016.

USNRC, 2018. Instructions for Recording and Reporting Occupational Radiation Exposure Data, Regulatory Guide 8.7, Revision 4, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, April 2018.

SHINE Medical Technologies 11.4-2 Rev. 1

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Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Accident Analysis and Determination of Consequences to the building for the worker dose (duration of the event), and the source volume to the environment for the public dose (duration of the event).

Radiological Consequences The radiological consequences for each accident are presented in terms of TEDE.

The methodology uses external and internal radiation sources to calculate the effective external dose equivalent and dose equivalent for external sources and committed effective dose equivalent and committed dose equivalent for internal sources. The TEDE and the total dose equivalent (TDE) are measures of the total body and organ doses respectively, received from external and internal radiation sources.

External doses are calculated for submersion in contaminated air for both the public and worker with appropriate dose conversion factor (DCF) values for submersion for each radionuclide.

Inhalation doses are calculated based on the respirable fraction, DCF for inhalation, and breathing rate. The DCF values used in the analysis are taken from Federal Guidance Report No. 11, Limiting Values of Radionuclide Intake and Air Concentration and Dose Conversion Factors (DCF) for Inhalation, Submersion, and Ingestion (EPA, 1988), and Federal Guidance Report No. 12, External Exposure to Radionuclides in Air, Water, and Soil (EPA, 1993).

Worker dose was generally calculated over a 30-day interval. The scenario resulting in the release of tritium from the tritium purification system (TPS) gloveboxes uses a 10-day release interval because it is expected that tritium recovery can be accomplished within this time frame.

Worker dose also includes the control room occupancy factor used in the calculation of RAF.

Operator action inside the facility is not required to stabilize accident conditions.

The public dose was generally calculated over a 30-day interval at the site boundary. The scenario resulting in the release of tritium from TPS gloveboxes uses a 10-day release interval because it is expected that tritium recovery can be accomplished within this time frame. A ground release was used as the release point.

Releases into the IF or RPF control volumes are assumed to be detected by the radiation monitors on the radiological ventilation zone 1 (RVZ1) and radiological ventilation zone 2 (RVZ2) building exhausts, isolating building ventilation supply and exhaust dampers on high radiation, reducing potential dose to workers and the public.

Conservatism Additional areas of conservatism included in the determination of radiological consequences include:

  • Conservative TSV power history and operational cycle: The TSV power history was derived from nearly continuous TSV operation over a [ ]PROP/ECI period at a power level that exceeds the design power level by ten percent. No credit was taken for medical isotope extraction activities that normally occur during the operation of the SHINE facility.
  • Conservative statistical bounding of nuclide inventory: Due to inherent uncertainties in MCNP5, multiple unique sets of results were run through ORIGEN-S to determine the nuclide inventories. The nuclide inventories were analyzed such that a 95 percent SHINE Medical Technologies 13a2.2-5 Rev. 5

Radioisotope Production Facility Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Accident Analysis Methodology Scenario 8 - Spill of Target Solution in the Pipe Trench from a Single Pipe A spill of target solution in the pipe trench results in the release of radioactive gases, aerosols, and particulates into the pipe trench. Potential consequences of spilled target solution inside the pipe trench include radiological dose. To mitigate the impact of spilled target solution, the following controls are applied: the pipe trench is designed as a confinement boundary, RDS drains prevent the accumulation of target solution in the pipe trench, the RDS sump tank liquid detection sensor detects fluid in-leakage and provides a signal to ESFAS to stop any in-process transfers of solution within the facility via opening ESFAS-controlled VTS vacuum transfer pump breakers and VTS vacuum break valves, and the RVZ1 and RVZ2 building exhausts are equipped with radiation monitors (i.e., the RVZ1 and RVZ2 RCA exhaust radiation monitors) that provide a signal to ESFAS to isolate the building ventilation supply and exhaust dampers on high radiation. This scenario is further described in Subsection 13b.2.4.3.

Scenario 9 - Spill of Target Solution in the Pipe Trench from Multiple Pipes A spill of target solution in the pipe trench results in the release of radioactive gases, aerosols, and particulates into the hot cell and ventilation systembelow-grade confinement. Potential consequences of spilled target solution in the pipe trench include radiological dose. To preventmitigate the impact of spilled target solution resulting from the failure of multiple target solution-carrying pipes, the pipes are seismically qualifiedfollowing controls are applied: the pipe trench is designed as a confinement boundary, RDS drains prevent the accumulation of target solution in the pipe trench, the RDS sump tank liquid detection sensor detects fluid in-leakage and provides a signal to ESFAS to stop any in-process transfers of solution within the facility via opening ESFAS-controlled VTS vacuum transfer pump breakers and VTS vacuum break valves, and the RVZ1 and RVZ2 building exhausts are equipped with radiation monitors that provide a signal to ESFAS to isolate the building ventilation supply and exhaust dampers on high radiation.

This scenario is further described in Subsection 13b.2.4.3.

Scenario 10 - Spill of Target Solution in a Tank Vault (Hold Tank Leak or Rupture)

A spill of target solution in a tank vault results in a release of radioactive gases, aerosols, and particulates into the tank vault. Potential consequences of target solution spilling in the tank vault include radiological dose. To mitigate the impact of spilled target solution, the following controls are applied: the tank vault is designed as a confinement boundary, RDS drains prevent the accumulation of target solution in the tank vault, the RDS sump tank liquid detection sensor detects fluid in-leakage and provides a signal to ESFAS to stop any in-process transfers of solution within the facility via opening ESFAS-controlled VTS vacuum transfer pump breakers and VTS vacuum break valves, and the RVZ1 and RVZ2 building exhausts are equipped with radiation monitors (i.e., the RVZ1 and RVZ2 RCA exhaust radiation monitors) that provide a signal to ESFAS to isolate the building ventilation supply and exhaust dampers on high radiation.

This scenario is further described in Subsection 13b.2.4.4.

Scenario 11 - Spill of Target Solution in a Tank Vault (Hold Tank Deflagration)

A spill of target solution in a tank vault caused by a hold tank deflagration results a release of radioactive gases, aerosols, and particulates into the tank vault. Potential consequences of target solution spilling in the tank vault include radiological dose. To prevent a deflagration in the hold tank, the N2PS automatically actuates on a failure of PVVS and is relied upon to dilute hydrogen concentrations. To mitigate the impact of spilled target solution, the following controls SHINE Medical Technologies 13b.1-7 Rev. 4

Radioisotope Production Facility Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Accident Analysis Methodology are applied: the tank vault is designed as a confinement boundary, RDS drains prevent the accumulation of target solution in the tank vault, the RDS sump tank liquid detection sensor detects fluid in-leakage and provides a signal to ESFAS to stop any in-process transfers of solution within the facility via opening ESFAS-controlled VTS vacuum transfer pump breakers and VTS vacuum break valves, and the RVZ1 and RVZ2 building exhausts are equipped with radiation monitors (i.e., the RVZ1 and RVZ2 RCA exhaust radiation monitors) that provide a signal to ESFAS to isolate the building ventilation supply and exhaust dampers on high radiation.

This scenario is further described in Subsection 13b.2.4.4.

Scenario 12 - Spill of Target Solution in a Tank Vault (Seismic Event)

A spill of target solution in a tank vault caused by a seismic event results in a release of radioactive gases, aerosols, and particulates into the tank vault. Potential consequences of target solution spilling in the tank vault include radiological dose. To prevent seismically caused damage, the process tanks and piping are designed to withstand earthquakes. To mitigate the impact of spilled target solution, the following controls are applied: the tank vault is designed as a confinement boundary, RDS drains prevent the accumulation of target solution in the tank vault, the RDS sump tank liquid detection sensor detects fluid in-leakage and provides a signal to ESFAS to stop any in-process transfers of solution within the facility via opening ESFAS-controlled VTS vacuum transfer pump breakers and VTS vacuum break valves, and the RVZ1 and RVZ2 building exhausts are equipped with radiation monitors (i.e., the RVZ1 and RVZ2 RCA exhaust radiation monitors) that provide a signal to ESFAS to isolate the building ventilation supply and exhaust dampers on high radiation. This scenario is further described in Subsection 13b.2.4.4.

Scenario 13 - Spill of Molybdenum Eluate in the Supercell (Deflagration)

Loss of sweep gas flow from PVVS through the eluate tank in the supercell may result in a buildup of hydrogen in the eluate tank and a subsequent deflagration. A spill of molybdenum eluate caused by a deflagration in the eluate tank results in the release radioactive gases, aerosols, and particulates into the hot cell. Potential consequences of spilled eluate solution in a hot cell include radiological dose. To prevent deflagrations in tanks and vessels in the RPF, the N2PS automatically actuates upon a loss of PVVS and is relied upon to dilute hydrogen concentrations. To mitigate the impact of spilled eluate solution, the following controls are applied: the supercell is designed as a confinement boundary, hot cell exhaust ventilation (RVZ1) is equipped with radiation monitors (i.e., the RVZ1 supercell area 1-10 radiation monitors) that provide a signal to ESFAS to isolate the affected cell, hot cell outlet (RVZ1) ducts are equipped with carbon filters, and hot cell inlet (RVZ2) and outlet (RVZ1) ventilation ducts are equipped with ESFAS-controlled redundant isolation dampers. This scenario is further described in Subsection 13b.2.4.2.

Scenario 14 - Target Solution Leaking out of the Supercell (MEPS Preheater Tube Leak)

A leak in the MEPS extraction column preheater allows target solution to enter the hot water loop. Potential consequences of target solution leaking into the hot water loop, which is partially located outside of the supercell, include radiological dose. To prevent the target solution from circulating through the water loop, conductivity instrumentationradiation monitors in the hot water loop detects target solution in-leakage and provides a signal to ESFAS to close the isolation valves on the supply and return of the hot water loop at the supercell boundary. This scenario SHINE Medical Technologies 13b.1-8 Rev. 4

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Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Analyses of Accidents with Radiological Consequences irradiated target solution batch as described in Section 13a2.2. Development of the accident source term for this scenario is discussed further in Section 13a2.2.

Radiological Consequences The radiological consequences of this accident scenario are determined as described in Section 13a2.2. The results of the determination are provided in Table 13b.2-2.

13b.2.4.3 Spill of Target Solution in the RPF Pipe Trench Initial Conditions A batch of irradiated target solution is being transferred within the RPF pipe trench. The target solution has been irradiated using the assumptions in Section 13a2.2 and has been held for decay in the TSV dump tank for [ ]PROP/ECI.

Initiating Event An event causes a single pipe or multiple pipes containing target solution to break in the pipe trench. Multiple pipe failures from a seismic event is considered to be highly unlikely because the pipes and their supports are seismically qualified. Therefore, the failure of multiple solution-containing pipes would require the onset of a design basis earthquake concurrent with the failure of multiple passive, seismically-qualified components. Consequently, dose consequences for multiple pipe failures are not evaluated. Potential initiating events for this scenario and the analogous scenario for a spill in a valve pit are discussed further in Subsection 13b.1.2.3; Scenarios 8, 9, and 16.

Sequence of Events

1. A single pipe or multiple pipes containing target solution within the pipe trench breaks, spilling target solution into the trench.
2. The target solution collects on one of the three drip pans in the trench and drains to the radioactive drain system (RDS).
3. The RDS sump tank liquid detection provides a signal to ESFAS, initiating a VTS Safety Actuation, and limiting the MAR.
4. Radioactive material is released into the pipe trench atmosphere.
5. A portion of the released material leaks through the process confinement boundary (trench cover) into the RPF and the environment, resulting in radiological consequences to workers and the public.

The controls credited for mitigation of the dose consequences for this accident are:

  • Process confinement boundary (trench or pit cover and cover seal)
  • RDS liquid detection
  • ESFAS VTS Safety Actuation
  • Target solution decay time requirements
  • Facility personnel evacuate the immediate area within 10 minutes after receipt of electronic dosimeter or local radiation alarms SHINE Medical Technologies 13b.2-5 Rev. 3

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Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Analyses of Accidents with Radiological Consequences Additional controls described in Subsection 13b.1.2.3 are provided but not credited in the dose analysis.

Damage to Equipment The leak of target solution into the pipe trench does not cause further damage to equipment.

Transport of Radioactive Material The methods used to calculate radioactive material transport are described in Section 13a2.2.

The LPF model terms used in this accident are provided in Table 13b.2-1.

Radiation Source Terms The initial MAR for this scenario is a batch of target solution from the IU at [ ]PROP/ECI PROP/ECI period removes more post-shutdown. The action of the TOGS during this [ ]

than 67 percent of the iodine present in the solution at shutdown. It is conservatively assumed that 35 percent of the post-shutdown iodine inventory is released to the pipe trench during the accident. Additionally, partitioning fractions are applied to the noble gases present in target solution. Development of the accident source term for this scenario is discussed further in Section 13a2.2.

Radiological Consequences The radiological consequences of this accident scenario are determined as described in Section 13a2.2. The results of the determination are provided in Table 13b.2-2.

13b.2.4.4 Spill of Target Solution from a Tank A spill of target solution from any of the below-grade hold or storage tanks results in a release of target solution into the associated tank vault. Radionuclides from the target solution become airborne and migrate into the RPF and the environment.

The liquid waste blending tanks contain large volumes of dilute target solution that has already undergone extraction and processing. The accident analysis considers freshly-irradiated target solution that has not undergone processing and bounds the failure of the liquid waste blending tank.

Initial Conditions A full batch of target solution is present in a target solution hold or storage tank at the time of the initiating event. The target solution has been irradiated using the assumptions in Section 13a2.2 and has been held for decay for [ ]PROP/ECI post-shutdown, which accounts for [

]PROP/ECI of hold time in the TSV dump tank and [ ]PROP/ECI of processing time.

Initiating Event An event causes a tank containing target solution to break and leak. Potential initiating events are discussed further in Subsection 13b.1.2.3; Scenarios 10, 11, and 12.

SHINE Medical Technologies 13b.2-6 Rev. 3

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Chapter 13 - Accident Analysis Analyses of Accidents with Radiological Consequences Sequence of Events

1. A tank containing target solution breaks, spilling target solution into the tank vault.
2. The target solution collects on the drip pans in the vault and drains to the RDS.
3. Radioactive material is released into the pipe trench atmosphere
4. A portion of the released material leaks through the process confinement boundary (vault cover) into the RPF and the environment, resulting in radiological consequences to workers and the public.

The controls credited for mitigation of the dose consequences for this accident are:

  • Process confinement boundary (tank vault plugs and seals)
  • Target solution decay time requirements
  • Facility personnel evacuate the immediate area within 10 minutes after receipt of electronic dosimeter or local radiation alarms Additional controls described in Subsection 13b.1.2.3, including drainage of the solution out of the vault via RDS, are provided but not credited in the dose analysis.

Damage to Equipment The leak of target solution into the tank vault does not cause further damage to equipment.

Transport of Radioactive Material The methods used to calculate radioactive material transport are described in Section 13a2.2.

The LPF model terms used in this accident are listed in Table 13b.2-1.

Radiation Source Terms The initial MAR for this scenario is a full batch of target solution from the IU at

[ ]PROP/ECI post-shutdown. The action of the TOGS during the [ ]PROP/ECI hold-up period in the dump tank removes more than 67 percent of the iodine present in the solution at shutdown. It is assumed that 35 percent of the post-shutdown iodine inventory is released to the tank vault during the accident. Additionally, partitioning fractions are applied to the noble gases present in target solution. Development of the accident source term for this scenario is discussed further in Section 13a2.2.

Radiological Consequences The radiological consequences of this accident scenario are determined as described in Section 13a2.2. The results of the determination are shown in Table 13b.2-2.

13b.2.4.5 Spill of Waste Solution in RLWI Initial Conditions A 380-liter batch of waste solution (diluted target solution) is present in the radioactive liquid waste immobilization (RLWI) system immobilization feed tank at the time of the initiating event.

The volume of solution in this scenario is based on the volume of the immobilization feed tank SHINE Medical Technologies 13b.2-7 Rev. 3

ENCLOSURE 2 ATTACHMENT 2 SHINE TECHNOLOGIES, LLC SHINE TECHNOLOGIES, LLC APPLICATION FOR AN OPERATING LICENSE SUPPLEMENT NO. 14 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT CHANGE

SUMMARY

PUBLIC VERSION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS MARKUP

Table 3.2.4 ESFAS Process Instrumentation Actions Action Completion Time

1. If one channel of PVVS flow is inoperable, Place the SFM for the associated channel in trip 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> AND Restore the channel to Operable. 30 days
2. If two or more channels of PVVS flow are inoperable, OR Action and associated completion time of Condition 1 not met, Actuate the RPF Nitrogen Purge. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />
3. If one channel of MEPS heating loop conductivity is inoperable, Place the associated MEPS Heating Loop Isolation actuation 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> components in the actuated state.
4. If both channels of MEPS heating loop conductivity are inoperable, Place the associated MEPS Heating Loop Isolation actuation 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> components in the actuated state.
53. If one channel is inoperable, Open the VTS vacuum pump breakers 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> AND Open the VTS vacuum break valves. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />
64. If both channels are inoperable, Open the VTS vacuum pump breakers 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> AND Open the VTS vacuum break valves. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />
75. If one channel for a single carbon delay bed group is inoperable, Close the associated carbon delay bed group isolation valves 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> AND Verify at least 5 carbon delay beds are operating. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />
86. If both channels for a single carbon delay bed group are inoperable, Close the associated carbon delay bed group isolation valves 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> AND Verify at least 5 carbon delay beds are operating. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />
97. If one channel of dissolution tank level is inoperable, Page 3.2-8 Revision 45

Table 3.2.4-a ESFAS Process Instrumentation Required Variable Setpoint Applicability Action SR Channels

a. MEPS heating 478 2 Target solution or 3, 4 1, 2 loop conductivity µmho/cm (per hot radioactive process cell) fluids present in the associated hot cell ba PVVS carbon 42 ppm 2 Associated carbon 75, 86 1, 2

. delay bed (per delay delay bed group exhaust carbon bed Operating monoxide group) cb VTS vacuum ActiveLiquid 2 Solution transfers 53, 64 3

. header liquid detected using VTS in-detection progress dc RDS liquid ActiveLiquid 2 Solution transfers 53, 64 3

. detection detected using VTS in-progress ed PVVS flow 7.1 SCFM 3 Facility not Secured 1, 2 31,

. 2 fe. TSSS TSPS ActiveHigh 2 Dissolution tank or 97, 108 3 dissolution tank level TSPS glovebox level contains uranium gf. Uninterruptible Loss of Power; 2 Any IU in Mode 1, or 119, 3 electrical power actuation 2, 3, or 4 1210 supply system delayed by (UPSS) loss of 180 seconds external power hg MEPS three-way Supplying 2 Target solution 1311, 3

. valve position (per valve) present in the 1412 indication associated hot cell ih. IXP three-way Supplying 2 Target solution 1311, 3 valve position (per valve) present in the IXP hot 1412 indication cell ji. TPS target 7.7 psia 2 Tritium in associated 1513, 1, 2 chamber supply (per IU) TPS process 1614 pressure equipment not in storage kj TPS target 7.7 psia 2 Tritium in associated 1513, 1, 2 chamber exhaust (per IU) TPS process 1614 pressure equipment not in storage Page 3.2-11 Revision 45

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Basis 3.2.4 LCO ESFAS process variable instrumentation is required to initiate safety functions specified by the SHINE safety analysis, as described in FSAR Subsection 7.5.3.1.

LCO 3.2.4 addresses the input devices and the trip determination portions of ESFAS. The scope of this LCO (i.e., each channel) begins at the input devices, includes the safety function modules (SFMs) and extends to the inputs to the SBVMs or SBMs. Radiation monitors that provide inputs to ESFAS are addressed in LCO 3.7.1.

More than one input device provides a signal to each SFM. The following table describes the allocation of inputs to the ESFAS modules:

Table B-3.2.4 ESFAS Input Variable Allocation Variable Division A Division B Division C

a. MEPS A heating loop [

conductivity MEPS B heating loop conductivity MEPS C heating loop conductivity ba PVVS carbon delay bed [

. group 1 exhaust carbon monoxide PVVS carbon delay bed group 2 exhaust carbon monoxide PVVS carbon delay bed group 3 exhaust carbon monoxide cb VTS vacuum header liquid

. detection dc RDS liquid detection ed PVVS flow fe. TSPS Ddissolution tank level gf. UPSS loss of external ]PROP/ECI power Page B 3.2-14 Revision 45

3.7.1-a for all affected channels are required to be completed within the specified completion time, or the condition(s) of applicability exited.

Any inoperable SFM that has been placed in trip in accordance with this LCO is required to be restored to Operable within 30 days. A completion time of 30 days allows for replacement of failed components, while limiting the amount of time equipment protected by the ESFAS is allowed to operate with reduced ESFAS reliability. The 30 day duration is acceptable because placing the SFM in trip preserves the single failure criterion for the remaining Operable modules.

Additional discussion for each variable listed in Table 3.2.4-a is provided below:

a. The ESFAS monitors conductivity in the MEPS heating water loop to protect against a leakage of high radiation solutions into the MEPS hot water heating loops, as described in FSAR Section 4b.3 and Subsection 7.5.4.1.6. The MEPS heating loops extend outside of the supercell; radioactive material in the loop would lead to increased radiological doses to workers, as described in FSAR Subsection 13b.1.2.3 (Scenario 14). Two channels of conductivity instrumentation are provided for each extraction hot cell. Conductivity exceeding 478 µmho/cm results in a MEPS Heating Loop Isolation for that heating loop for the associated extraction cell, and provides margin to an analytical limit of 500 µmho/cm.

With one channel inoperable, the MEPS heating loop isolation valves are required to be closed, and the extraction feed pump breakers are required to be opened within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, to complete the MEPS Heating Loop Isolation function. A completion time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> allows for the performance of minor repairs and is acceptable based on the continued availability of the redundant channel. With both channels inoperable, the MEPS heating loop isolation valves are required to be closed, and the extraction feed pump breakers are required to be opened within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, to complete the MEPS Heating Loop Isolation function. A completion time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> recognizes the importance of promptly isolating the equipment to mitigate a potential accident once the safety function has been lost.

b.a. The ESFAS monitors the carbon monoxide concentration of the gases leaving the PVVS carbon delay beds to protect against a fire in the carbon delay beds, as described in FSAR Subsections 6b.2.2 and 7.5.4.1.7. The setpoint of 42 ppm provides indication of combustion occurring inside of a carbon delay bed within the delay bed group and provides margin to an analytical limit of 50 ppm. Two channels of carbon monoxide instrumentation is are provided for each carbon delay bed group. Exceeding the carbon monoxide setpoint results in a Carbon Delay Bed Isolation for the affected delay bed group.

With one channel for a single carbon delay bed group inoperable, the group is required to be isolated within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to fulfill the Carbon Delay Bed Isolation function. Five carbon delay beds must also be verified to be Operating within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. A completion time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> allows for the performance of minor repairs and is acceptable based on the continued availability of the redundant channel. With both channels for a single carbon delay bed inoperable, the group is required to be isolated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to fulfill the Carbon Delay Bed Isolation function. Five carbon delay beds must also be verified to be Operating within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. A completion time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Page B 3.2-17 Revision 45

Action Completion Time

11. If one channel is inoperable, Place the associated MEPS Heating Loop Isolation actuation 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> components in the actuated state.
12. If two channels are inoperable, Place the associated MEPS Heating Loop Isolation actuation 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> components in the actuated state.

Table 3.7.1-a Safety-Related Radiation Monitoring Instruments Applicability Setpoint and Required (per IU, TPS train, Monitored Location Monitored Action Channels or monitored Material location)

RVZ1 supercell 5x background

a. exhaust ventilation 3 Facility not Secured 1, 2, 3 (PVVS hot cell) Fission products RVZ1 supercell 2 Target solution or exhaust ventilation 5x background radioactive process
b. (per hot 4, 5 (Extraction and IXP Fission products fluids present in the hot cells) cell) associated hot cell Radioisotope RVZ1 supercell 2 5x background products or exhaust ventilation
c. (per hot radioactive process 4, 5 (Purification and Fission products cell) fluids present in the Packaging hot cells) associated hot cell 5x background
d. RVZ1 RCA exhaust 3 Facility not Secured 1, 6, 7 Fission products 5x background
e. RVZ2 RCA exhaust 3 Facility not Secured 1, 6, 7 Fission products RVZ1e IU cell 5x background 23 Associated IU in
f. 1, 8 exhaust Fission products (per IU) Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 2 Tritium in TPS confinement 927 Ci/m3 associated TPS
g. (per TPS 9 A/B/C Tritium process equipment train) not in storage 0.96 Ci/m3 Tritium in any TPS TPS exhaust to
h. 3 process equipment 1, 10 facility stack Tritium not in storage Page 3.7-3 Revision 45

Applicability Setpoint and Required (per IU, TPS train, Monitored Location Monitored Action Channels or monitored Material location) 2 Target solution or MEPS heating loop 1000 mR/hr radioactive process

i. extraction area (per hot 11, 12 Fission products fluids present in the A/B/C cell) associated hot cell LCO 3.7.2 The annually averaged concentration of radioactive material released in gaseous effluents to unrestricted areas shall be limited to 2800 times the concentrations specified in 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table 2, Column 1.

Applicability Facility not Secured Action According to Table 3.7.2 SR 3.7.2 1. Total curies released shall be assessed monthly.

2. A Channel Calibration of the stack release monitor shall be performed annually.
3. A Channel Calibration of the PVVS carbon delay bed effluent monitor shall be performed annually.

Table 3.7.2 Gaseous Effluents Actions Action Completion Time

1. If the monthly curie assessment exceeds 1/12th of the limit, Verify the annual curie assessment is within the limit. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Page 3.7-4 Revision 45

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Input Division A Division B Division C

i. MEPS A [

heating loop MEPS B heating loop MEPS C ]PROP/ECI heating loop At least two channels of safety-related radiation monitors are provided for each monitored location. Some monitored locations are provided with three channels, as indicated in Table 3.7.1-a and FSAR Table 7.7-1. Only two channels are required to be Operable to provide redundancy to protect against a single failure.

Each SFM can be placed in maintenance bypass or in a trip state by use of the out-of-service (OOS) switch located on the front of the SFM and an associated trip/bypass switch located below the SFM, as described in FSAR Subsections 7.4.4.3 and 7.5.4.4. Placing an SFM in trip or bypass causes all channels associated with that SFM to be placed in trip or bypass, respectively.

For variables provided with three channels, actuation of the safety function occurs on 2-out-of-3 voting logic when all three channels are Operable.

When any single channel is inoperable for variables provided with three channels, the inoperable channel is required to be placed in trip within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, effectively changing the voting logic to 1-out-of-2, preserving the single failure protection. A completion time of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> allows for the action to be accomplished in an orderly manner.

For variables provided with only two channels, actuation of the safety function occurs on 1-out-of-2 voting logic.

Performance of a Channel Calibration may cause a channel to be unable to perform its safety function during the SR. To allow the performance of these SRs during operation of equipment protected by TRPS or ESFAS, any single channel for any of the radiation monitoring instruments may be placed in bypass during performance of a required SR, effectively changing the voting logic to 2-out-of-2 (with two other channels Operable) or 1-out-of-1 (with one other channel Operable). A time limit of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> is acceptable based on the small amount of time the channel could be in bypass, the continual attendance by operations or maintenance personnel during the test, the continued operability of the redundant channel(s), and the low likelihood that an accident would occur during the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> time period.

When a channel is declared inoperable due to an inoperable radiation monitor or other issue associated with only one input on an SFM, only the applicable action(s) listed in Table 3.7.1-a for the affected channel are required to be completed within the specified completion time, or the condition of applicability exited.

When a channel is declared inoperable due to an inoperable module (SFM), all variables (i.e., channels) associated with that module as listed in Tables B-3.2.4 Page B 3.7-3 Revision 45

and B-3.7.1 are inoperable. Applicable action(s) listed in Tables 3.2.4-a and 3.7.1-a for all affected channels are required to be completed within the specified completion time, or the condition(s) of applicability exited.

Any inoperable SFM that has been placed in trip in accordance with LCO is required to be restored to Operable within 30 days. A completion time of 30 days allows for replacement of failed components, while limiting the amount of time equipment protected by the TRPS or ESFAS is allowed to operate with reduced Safety System reliability. The 30 day duration is acceptable because placing the SFM in trip preserves the single failure criterion for the remaining Operable modules.

The setpoint for fission product radiation monitors, i.e., all monitored locations identified in Table 3.7.1-a except item g. and item h., is 5 times the normal background radiation. This setpoint provides margin to an analytical limit of 6015 times the normal background radiation.

Additional discussion for each variable listed in Table 3.7.1-a is provided below:

a. The supercell PVVS hot cell contains equipment for the PVVS and VTS, which contain fission product gases. The RVZ1 supercell area 1 radiation monitors provide an actuation signal that isolates the affected hot cell and initiates a VTS Safety Actuation to minimize the spread of radioactive material, as described in FSAR Subsection 7.5.4.1.2. Three channels of radiation monitoring are provided.

With one channel inoperable, the SFM for the associated channel is placed in trip within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and must be restored to Operable within 30 days. With two channels inoperable, or if actions for one channel inoperable are not met, at least one damper in the inlet and outlet of the associated hot cell must be closed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. A completion time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> allows for the performance of minor repairs and is acceptable based on the continued availability of the redundant channel. With 3 channels inoperable, at least one damper in the inlet and outlet of the associated hot cell must be closed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. A completion time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> recognizes the importance of promptly isolating the equipment to mitigate a potential accident once the safety function has been lost.

b. The supercell extraction and IXP hot cells periodically contain irradiated target solution. The RVZ1 supercell area 2/6/7/10 radiation monitors provide an actuation signal that isolates the affected hot cell to minimize the spread of radioactive material, as described in FSAR Subsections 7.5.4.1.3 and 7.5.4.1.4. Two channels of radiation monitoring are provided per area.

With one channel inoperable, at least one damper in the inlet and outlet of the associated hot cell must be closed and operations involving the transfer or processing of target solution, radioactive process fluids or radioisotope products in the associated hot cell must be suspended within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. A completion time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> allows for the performance of minor repairs and is acceptable based on the continued availability of the redundant channel.

With two channels inoperable, at least one damper in the inlet and outlet of the associated hot cell must be closed and operations involving the transfer or processing of target solution, radioactive process fluids or radioisotope products in the associated hot cell must be suspended within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. A Page B 3.7-4 Revision 45

or a tritium release, as described in FSAR Subsection 7.5.4.1.12. The radiation monitors limit the spread of tritium throughout and outside the facility via the ventilation system by providing an actuation signal that isolates the potential release paths to the facility stack from all three TPS gloveboxes via a TPS Process Vent Actuation. Three channels of radiation monitoring are provided.

With one channel inoperable, the SFM for the associated channel is placed in trip within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and must be restored to Operable within 30 days. With two or three required channels inoperable, tritium is required to be returned to its storage location within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (i.e., a depleted uranium bed) or at least one redundant TPS Process Vent Actuation device per TPS exhaust flow path is closed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to provide the isolation function. A completion time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> allows for the performance of minor repairs and is acceptable based on the low likelihood of a tritium release during the allowed time.

i. The ESFAS monitors radiation in the MEPS heating water loop to protect against a leakage of high radiation solutions into the MEPS hot water heating loops, as described in FSAR Section 4b.3 and Subsection 7.5.4.1.6. The MEPS heating loops extend outside of the supercell; radioactive material in the loop would lead to increased radiological doses to workers, as described in FSAR Subsection 13b.1.2.3 (Scenario 14). Two channels of radiation monitors are provided for each extraction hot cell. Radiation exceeding 1000 mR/hr results in a MEPS Heating Loop Isolation for that heating loop for the associated extraction cell, and provides margin to an analytical limit of 2500 mR/r.

With one channel inoperable, the MEPS heating loop isolation valves are required to be closed, and the extraction feed pump breakers are required to be opened, within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to complete the MEPS Heating Loop Isolation function. A completion time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> allows for the performance of minor repairs and is acceptable based on the continued availability of the redundant channel. With both channels inoperable, the MEPS heating loop isolation valves are required to be closed, and the extraction feed pump breakers are required to be opened, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to complete the MEPS Heating Loop Isolation function. A completion time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> recognizes the importance of promptly isolating the equipment to mitigate a potential accident once the safety function has been lost.

SR The surveillance requirements ensure the continued operability of the radiation monitors when required. An ESFAS or TRPS input channel consists of the field instrument through the SFM, ending at the input to the SBVM or SBM. Channel Check and Channel Calibration frequencies are based on guidance from ANSI/ANS 15.1-2007 and ensure the instrumentation is capable of performing its intended function when required.

Page B 3.7-7 Revision 45

Table 3.8.9-a RCA Isolation Dampers Number Component Provided per Flow Path

a. RVZ1 RCA exhaust isolation dampers 2
b. RVZ2 RCA exhaust isolation dampers 2
c. RVZ2 RCA supply isolation dampers 2
d. RVZ3 RCA transfer isolation dampers 2
1. Shipping/receiving IF (per location)
2. Shipping/receiving RPF
3. Main RCA ingress/egress 4.3. RPF emergency exit 5.4. IF emergency exit 6.5. Mezzanine emergency exit
e. RVZ2 TPS room supply and exhaust isolation dampers 2 (per location)
f. RVZ2 main RCA ingress/egress supply isolation dampers 2
g. RVZ2 main RCA ingress/egress exhaust isolation dampers 2 LCO 3.8.10 Each safety-related valve listed in Table 3.8.10-a shall be Operable. A valve is considered Operable if:
1. The valve is capable of opening or closing on demand from ESFAS.

Note - A single Division of required component(s) may be inoperable for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> during the performance of required surveillances.

Applicability According to Table 3.8.10-a Action According to Table 3.8.10 SR 3.8.10 Safety-related valves listed in Table 3.8.10-a shall be stroke tested annually.

Page 3.8-8 Revision 45

DF 4.1.4 Supercell ventilation is designed with a maximum flowrate of 40 air exchanges per hour (ACH) for extraction and purification cells.

DF 4.1.5 The design of the N2PS contains the following characteristics to protect its equipment from the effects of external events:

1. Reinforced concrete structure for the compressed gas supply tanks and piping to protect against severe weather and tornado generated missiles.
2. Nitrogen gas purge exhaust height designed to be above the design snow accumulation depth.
3. Seismic design of the N2PS and SSCs in interfacing systems that could significantly impact its operation are seismically designed to ensure N2PS operability during and after a seismic event.

4.2 Coolant Systems DF 4.2.1 1. Each subcritical assembly system is submerged in an individual light water pool.

2. Each light water pool is provided a seismically qualified stainless steel liner.
3. Piping penetrations into the stainless steel liner are located above the minimum acceptable light water pool water level for decay heat removal, or a specific evaluation is performed to determine the potential for loss of pool water through the penetration. Piping penetrations into the light water pool with the potential for siphoning below the minimum acceptable water level contain anti-siphon devices or other means to prevent inadvertent loss of pool water.
4. Each light water pool is designed to maintain temperatures 50°F and 95°F.

4.3 Subcritical Assembly System and Target Solution DF 4.3.1 Target solution is an aqueous uranyl sulfate solution containing uranium enriched to less than 20 wt. % in U-235.

Page 4.0-2 Revision 45

Proprietary Information - Withheld from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390(a)(4)

Export Controlled Information - Withheld from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390(a)(3)

Category Characteristic The fill rate of target solution into the TSV is not more than

[ ]PROP/ECI. This rate is set and verified during Startup Testing using an throttle valve that is subsequently locked in placeorifice plate.

The overflow lines in the TSV are located at a height sufficient to protect the TSV headspace to allow proper operation of the TOGS.

Irradiation Unit The TSV dump tank is designed with keff < 0.94 for the most reactive (continued) uranium concentration for the prevention of criticality.

The TOGS physical design ensures keff is < 0.94 for the most reactive uranium concentration for the prevention of criticality.

[

]PROP/ECI The PCLS expansion tank is provided with a flame arrester at the tank Coolant Systems vent inlet to prevent ignition of hydrogen accumulated in the expansion tank from ignition sources in the primary Confinement boundary.

The TSSS process pipestanks are seismically qualified.

The MEPS hot water loop is seismically qualified.

The design of the MEPS upper three-way valve prevents reverse flow from the target solution return header to the eluate tank.

Isotope Production The MEPS extraction feed pump discharge lines have overpressure Systems protection.

Vaults, trenches, valve pits, and hot cells where high concentration uranium-bearing solutions may be present are equipped with drains to the favorable geometry RDS sump tanks. The RDS drain in the supercell additionally provides over pressure protection via a relief path to the RDS.

Confinement boundaries within the facility are provided to limit the release of effluents from the enclosure to the external environment through controlled or defined pathways.

Confinement The holdup volume in RVZ1e from the PCLS expansion tank, between radiation detectors and isolation devices, provides a time delay for isolation of IU cell gases exiting the confinement boundary.

Page 5.0-12 Revision 45

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