ML19320C610

LER 80-049/03L-0:on 800614,during Restoration of Containment Pressure Inputs to Safety Features Actuation Sys Cabinets, Actuation Occurred.Caused by Deficient Procedure ST 5061.01 App F Not Requiring Trip Bypass Test

ML19320C610
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	07/11/1980
From:	Isley T TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML19320C602	List: ML19320C601 ML19320C610
References
LER-80-049-03L, LER-80-49-3L, NUDOCS 8007170450
Download: ML19320C610 (3)

Text

(7 77)

b. NULLEAH HLuuLAToRY COMMJLyew LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

' CONTROL

BLOCK

l l l l l l lh (PLEASE PRINT CR T (PE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) 1 6 lo l 8t 9l l 0l LICENSEE 7

Hj DlCODE Bl Sl 1lgl 0l 0l 0l 0lLICENSE 14 15 0l 0lNUMBER 0l 0l 0l 0l 0l@' 4 l 1l 1l 1l 1l@l l l@

25 03 LICENSE TYPE JO b7 CAT 68 COXT 10111 3 8 SO;Rg lL lgl l 5 l 0l -l 0 l 3 l 4 l 6 6dl@l690 l 6EVENT l 1 lDATE 4 l 8 l 074l@l7b 0 l REPORT 7 l ll DATE 1l 8 l O80l@

60 61 DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES h Iol2l l (NP-33-80-59) On 6/14/80 at 1243 hours0.0144 days <br />0.345 hours <br />0.00206 weeks <br />4.729615e-4 months <br /> during the restoration of containment pressure l lo tal l inputs to Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) cabinets, the station experienced ant lo l4 j l SFAS actuation. The actuation caused decay heat suction to switch from the Borated I loisl [ Water Storage Tank to the emergency sump. A loss of suction occurred and the pump l loisl l was stopped. This caused a loss of decay heat flow and violation of T.S. 3.9.8. l j o l 7 l l There was no danger to the public or station personnel. Flow was restore ? two l l o la I i minutes and no increase in core temperature was noted.

7 39 l 0

DE CODE SUSC E COMPONENT CODE SUB ode S E lo19]

7 8 l Cl Fl@ l Dl@ WQ l ZlZ lZ lZ lZ lZ l@ ]@ l Zl@

9 to 11 12 13 18 19 20

_ SEcuENTIAL OCCUR RENCE REPORT RE VISION LER!RO EVENT YE A R REPORT NO. CODE TYPE No.

@Nu'st! _218103 ' 22 l-l 23 l O l 4 l 91 24 26 I'l -

27 I Ol 3l I30 LI I-I I Ol 28 29 31 32 A N A Of ON PL NT E HOURS 22 SB iT FO 1 8. SL PL I MAN FA TU ER

]gl4Gl@ lZl@ lZl@ l0 l0 l0 lD l y@

33 3 3S 36 37 40 41 lNl@

42 lZ l@ lZ l9 l9 l947l@

43 44 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h l t l o l l The cause was a deficient procedure in that ST S061.01 Appendix F did not reoufre the l Iiiii lmechanic to go to test trip bypass while restoring a channel or to reset the channel I li 121 l af ter completion of restoration. At 1252 hours0.0145 days <br />0.348 hours <br />0.00207 weeks <br />4.76386e-4 months <br /> Decay Heat Pump 1-1 was started and l l i l 3 l l flow re-established. A modification to ST 5061.01 will be added to provide these I i 4 l instructions. l 7 8 9 ST S  % POWER oTH ER STATUS DISCO Y y W @ l 0l 0l 0l@lNA l DISCoVE RY DESCRIPTION lBl@lConclusionofSurveillanceTest l ACTIVITY CO TENT RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION oF RELEASE y W @D OF RELE ASElZ .NA l@l l l NA l

U 8 9 10 11 44 45 PERSONNEL F4POSURES 80 i 7 l d'l~0l 0l @ ll Y @ l Yd l IERSONNEL INJUR ES NUM8ER DESCRIPTION 7

i a 8 9 l0l0l0l@l 11 12 NA l

l LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 80 TYPE DE SCRIPTioN lil91 8 9 y @l NA l

F to NRC USE ONLY

'2101 P 8*9 issue @l to NA DESCRIPTION Q

-l lllllllllllll$

68 69 80 5 D 80-096 NAME OF PREPAHER Tom Isley D-NO M' PHONE: ' E 8 0 0 717 0 f50 -

W TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE .

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-80-59 DATE OF EVENT: June 14, 2580 FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Inadvertent actuation of Safety Features Actuation Systen (SFAS) during restoration of containment pressure inputs Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 6, with Power (MWI) = 0 and Load (Gross MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: On June 14, 1980 at 1243 hours0.0144 days <br />0.345 hours <br />0.00206 weeks <br />4.729615e-4 months <br />, during the restoration

- of containment pressure inputs to SFAS cabinets, the station experienced an SFAS cctuation of levels 1, 2, and 3. Level 1 caused some containment isolation. Level 2 caused more isolation and alignment of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems. Level 3 caused decay heat pump 1-1, which was in service, to switch suction from the Reac-tor Coolant System (RCS) hotleg to the Borated Water Scorage Tank (BWST). This caused cbout 16,000 gallons of borated water to be added to the RCS and raised the level in the refueling canal. At 1248 hours0.0144 days <br />0.347 hours <br />0.00206 weeks <br />4.74864e-4 months <br />, the BWST level dropped to 4.5 feet which caused a Level 5 actuation. This switches decay heat suction from the BWST to the emergency cump. DH7A and DH7B went closed isolating the BWST. This caused a loss of suction to the decay heat pump. At 1250 hours0.0145 days <br />0.347 hours <br />0.00207 weeks <br />4.75625e-4 months <br />, the pump was stopped to prevent damage. This caused a loss of decay heat flow and violation of Technical Specification 3.9.8, which requires at least one decay heat loop to be in operatior .n Mode 6. The action statement requires a suspension of all operations involving an increase in the reac-tor decay heat load or a reduction in boron concentration of the RCS. The conditions were met. At 1252 hours0.0145 days <br />0.348 hours <br />0.00207 weeks <br />4.76386e-4 months <br />, the suction for the decay heat pump was restored, the pump placed in service, and the flow was verified at.3000 gpm.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: An I&C mechanic was in the process of restoring the containment pressure inputs to SFAS at the conclusion of the Integrated Leak Rate Test, ST 5061.01, Appendix F. When the mechanic touched the leads for Chan-nel 3 to the terminals, a voltage transient caused a high containment pressure trip of that channel. He then went to Channel 4 and when the leads were attached, a high containment pressure trip was received in that channel. This meant the two out of four requirement for Levels 1, 2, and 3 trip of SFAS was received. ST 5061.01 Appendix F did not require the mechanic to go to test trip bypass while restoring a channel or to reset the channel after completion of restoration which would have pre-vented the trip of SFAS.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. No core alterations were in progress and flow was restored within two minutes after it was lost. No increase in core temperature was noted.

LER #80-049 e

M

a .

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY .

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-80-59 PAGE 2 Carrective Action: At 1252 hours0.0145 days <br />0.348 hours <br />0.00207 weeks <br />4.76386e-4 months <br /> on June 14, 1980, su_rion from the RCS to the decay h;at pump 1-1 was re-established, the pump put in service, and flow verified at 3000 gpm. At 1332 hours0.0154 days <br />0.37 hours <br />0.0022 weeks <br />5.06826e-4 months <br />, the NRC was notified via the red phone. At 1345 hours0.0156 days <br />0.374 hours <br />0.00222 weeks <br />5.117725e-4 months <br />, the rccovery from the safety actuation was complete with the RCS at 92 F and 3000 gpm flow.

A modification, T-4774, has been added to ST 5061.01 to provide instructions on res-toring containment pressure inputs to SFAS.

Failure Data There have been no previous similar reportable occurrences in which decay heat flow was lost due to a procedural inadequacy.

LER #80-049 i

• 4 e

i .

+u i

i i

l

~

1 11 a