ML19316B010

Response in Opposition to Applicant 800401 Motion to Deny Further Evidence Re Cask Drop Issue.Intervenor Addl Evidence Should Be Accepted Due to Significant Deficiencies & Uncertainties Existing in Present Record

ML19316B010
Person / Time
Site:	07002623
Issue date:	04/16/1980
From:	Jeffrey Riley CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML19316B011	List: ML19316B010 ML19316B013
References
NUDOCS 8005280161
Download: ML19316B010 (4)

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Os:iabeg & Sonica OThb E THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

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DUKE POWER COMPANY

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Docket No. 70-2623

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(Amendment to Materials License

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SNM-1773 for Oconee Nuclear Station

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Spent Fuel Transportation and Storage )

at McGuire Nuclear Station

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CESG'S RESPONSE TO APPLICANT'S MOTION TO DENY FURTHER EVIDENCE IN THE CASK DROP ISSUE Applicant's " Motion to Deny CESG'S Introduction of Further Evidence on the Cask Drop Issue", dated April 1, 1960, is in reference to a demonstration of a scale model of the cask, cask pit, and pit / fuel, pool wall made March 24th with representatives of the parties present.

The demonstration was arranged with Mr. Hoefling in response to information that the model had been built.

Applicant argues that the introduction into evidence of the performance of a scale model in one of the accident circumstances postulated by the Staff and responded to by the Applicant in an analysis which was rebutted by CESG ".

. is inconsistent with the l

Commission regulations governing orderly hearings (e.g.,

10 CFR E2 718, a2.743, and s2.757), previous rulings of the Board and judicial precepts (see Rule 403, Federal Rules of Evidence)".

The cited regulations concern the power of the presiding officer to rule on offers of proof and to receive evidence (52.718); to strike argumentative, repetitious, cumulative, or irrelevant evidence (52 757); and rules of evidence directed toward realizing a, 'g1 nd rue disclosure of the facts", and admitting "Only relevant, material and reliable evidence which is'not unduly

-2 repetitious..

" (52 743).

As it is the charge of the Board to protect public health and cafety, it is not sufficient that its findings be legally defensible based on the record; its findings must be right in fact.

1 CESG's concern is that the present record, based as it is on analyses which on Applicant's part omit substantial gyrational moments arbitrarily, may lead to a finding which is wrong in fact.

I The Applicant could hardly be cal ed on to conduct an actual trial

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of the consequences of the postulated accident--a cask costs upward of a half million dollars, not considering the damage to the pit and fuel pool walls and related facilities.

A Sandia study of l

the behavior of casks in high speed impact situations found'that l

l scale models adequately paralled that behavior.

CESG determined the performance of a crude model.

This confirmation that the cask would fall into the fuel pool was viewed by CESG as an indication of the probable outcone but, because there were many deficiencies in the model, and because a matter of fact was involved, and because the Board and parties would require reliable evidence CESG elected to build a dimensionally accurat.e model and one as similar in materials characteristics, such as compressional and bending moduli, as it could.

The neutron shield tank was omitted.

This omission seemed permissible as the Applicant has testified that it took no credit for the crushing of this tank in its analysis.

l As a p.ractical matter a model neutron shield tank would have been crushed each time a trial was run.

l Intervenor requests the Board to deny Applicant's motion to keep evidence of'the performance of this model, observed by both Applicant and Staff, from entering the hearing record.

It provides the most material and reliable fact that the parties are likely

~ to develop."

It has not b'een, and is not CESG's intent to " pyramid" evidence, which as we perceive it would be an adding to the record in volume, but not in materiality and reliability.

It is essential for the Board to make a determination as to the reliability of Applicant's analyses of physical situations and Staff's support of these analyses.

If Applicant and Staff have both erred in the matter of the cask drop question, their allegation that a dropped cask would not crush individual fuel racks and bring assemblies therein to close proximity and possible criticality is of dubious credibility.

In this matter neither introduced actual analyses.

Their witnesses testified that calculations had been made and the racks would not collapse.

If the calculations were of a piece with those in the cask drop matter, there is no material assurance collapse would not occur.

A Staff witness also testified that the specification for pool boration would, in any event, prevent criticality.

This relies on the assumption that boration will be maintained in specification.

The Three Mile Island accident has made it clear that safe operation cannot be, premised on the assumption that out-of-specification conditions will not combine.

A finding that the cask will drop into the fuel pool will benefit Applicant.

Conservatism is stressed in nuclear design.

Conservatism in design in the cask drop matter is also appropriate.

A technical fix for this problem is simple and relatively inexpensive.

It requires only an increase in the height of the pit / pool wall sufficient to prevent gyration over the wall.

This would add a level of assurance to another safety matter, but one not under l

litigation.

Applicant's calculations have been said by Staff to show that a rail cask would, under the subject circumstances, fall

.g.

Q.

Do you think tME actual cr.sk would behave in this manner under such cinnoces?

A.

I think it veryly.

The presence in actuality of the neutron shieldivould somewhat reduce the propulsive forces and mommE At present there is no basis for quantifying.;

these effectsa$r fall beyond the scope of credible analysis.

The burden of gt in my opinion, clearly f alls on those who contend that thk would not fall into the fuel pool.

Q.

Do you have a Ep1 as to how this safety matter can be resolved?

A.

Yes.

The pit /pk11 can be heightened by a sufficient amount to makeitrational moment required to propel the cask into the #Erger than any moment which can develop in the initia1 *of cask gyration, that is before impact with the pit /pdE1.

This would include a movable portion of the extende55 of similar structural integrity, to bd placed over thaRch gap at the weir gate in the wall.

Q.

Is this th'e on)Rtion to the problem?

A.

No.

The placemt other barriers or deflectors, some fixed, some adjte, could accomplish the same result.

Attachments toikane might be effective but would rely to some extentqprator performance.

I favor a structure which, except Ek weir gate opening element, is fi::ed.

April 16,1980 l

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