ML19309E027
| ML19309E027 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee, McGuire, 07002623  |
| Issue date: | 04/11/1980 |
| From: | Donohew J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16245A502 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8004160219 | |
| Download: ML19309E027 (13) | |
Text
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U!i!TED STATES' 0F A" ERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COS"'ISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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DUKE POWER COMPANY
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(Amendment to Materials License
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Docket No. 70-2623 SNM-1773 for Oconee Nuclear Station
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Spent Fuel Transportation and Storage
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at McGuire Nuclear Station)
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TESTIMONY OF DR. JACK N. DON 0 HEW Q.
By whom are you employed, and describe the work you perform?
A.
I am employed by the Environmental Evaluation Branch, Division of Operating Reactors, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
I do dose calculations for environmental evaluations of operating nuclear power plants. My work includes analysis of spent fuel modifications and the dose impacts that could occur from damage to scent fuel assemblies caused by such things as
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spent fuel casks falling into spent fuel pools resulting in damage to spent fuel assemblies.
Q.
Would you detail your professional qualifications?
A.
My professional qualifications were ~ briefly described at Tr. 4434. A more i
complete description of my professional qualifications are attached.
Q.
Would you describe the scope of your testimony?
A.
This testimony addresses questions concerning coses caused by rupture of Oconee spent fuel assemblies of at least 270 days in age while stored at the McGuire spent fuel pool.
It also addresses doses caused by rupture of McGuire spent fuel assemblies of a minimum of 40 days in age stored in the i
McGuire spent fuel pool. The cause'of the rupture of spent fuel assemblies 80 04160 2 /h
" is postulated to be frcm the falling of a 25-ton truck cask into the spent fuel assemblies stored in t.he McGuire spent fuel pool. This affidavit does not address occupational dose. That subject will be addressed by another Staff individual.
Q.
Would you describe the background leading to the requirement that you give ~
testimony in this proceeding at the September,1979 hearings?
A.
I was contacted on September 11, 1979, and asked to provide testimony as a witness at the McGuire/0conee hearing with respect to questions concerning radiation dose from the postulated rupture of Oconee spent fuel assemblies of at least 270 days in age proposed to be stored in the McGuire spent fuel pool. At that time, I was not familiar with the proposed licensing action to transport and store Oconee spent fuel of at least 270 days in age in the McGuire spent fuel pool. Nor was I completely familiar with tne review that had been previously conducted relative to opera-tion of the McGuire spent fuel pool as part of the operation of McGuire, Units 1 and 2.
I understand that the application for licenses authorizing the operation of McGuire, Units 1 and 2 is now pending before the Commission.
I was told, however, that the topic raised by the Licensing Board's questions had not been addressed by either the NRC Staff, or the Applicant, Duke Power Company. The reason was that administrative controls would be implemented that would prevent the postulated accident of a 25-ton truck cask falling into the McGuire spent fuel pool from occurring.
The hypothetical situation I was asked to evaluate was described to me as follows: A 25-ton truck cask would fall into the McGuire spent fuel pool 6nto spent nuclear fuel
-_ assemblies.
I was asked to evaluate the consequences of this postulated situation relative to 10 CFR Part 100 requirements.
Q.
Would you describe the scope and basis for your professional opinion given at the September,1979 hearings in this proceeding?
A.
My professional opinion given at the hearing on September 12, 1979 in response to questions about the postulated circumstances was necessarily general (Tr. 4432-47). My conclusions were based on a general description of, facts given to me that day.
Thus, my views were necessarily based on my training and experience as an expert in the subject area involved.
I did no detailed calculations to support my professional opinion due to the time constraints imposed.
In my opinion, however, none were necessary given the fact that the Oconee spent fuel involved in the postulated accident would be at least 270 days in age.
Q.
Were you requested to undertake additional analysis?
A.
Following the hearing, I was asked to do a more detailed analysis to support my conclusions given at the Se;: tem::er 12, 1979 hearing. Accordingly, the following analysis supports my conclusions given at the hearing, and responds to the Licensing Board's Order of October 31, 1979 which, in pertinent part, states:
"***However, regarding the question about consequences of a cask crop into the fuel storage pool, the Board notes that replies to its questions about criticality and radioactive emissions to the public were in the nature of summary statements (Tr. 4439-47).
The Board therefore requests that the parties supplement these answers with numerical analysis, and include the additional question of radioactive exposure of operating employees."l/
if Order Concernina CESG's Petition to Comoel Discovery (October 31,1979).
. Q.
What specific question did you address?
A.
I was asked to provide a numerical analysis of the potential dose consequences to the public from a twenty-five (25) ton shipping cask falling into the McGuire spent fuel pool and damaging spent fuel that is in the spent fuel pool. /
Q.
In conducting your analysis, what assumptions did you use?
A.
Tables 1 and 2 enclosed list the assumptions for the calculations of the potential consequences of damaging Oconee spent fuel or McGuire spent fuel in the McGuire pool. The number of Oconee spent fuel assemblies assumed damaged is conservatively estimated to be the total storage capacity (500 fuel assemblies) of the McGuire pool. Tne number of McGuire spent fuel assemblies conservatively assumed damaged is conservatively estimated to be the latest refueling (65 assemblies = 40 days) and several earlier refuelings (age = -l year) sufficient to fill the pool. Forty days, equivalent to the amount of time it takes to refuel a reactor, is the minimum age for McGuire spent fuel. My understand-ing is that transfer of Oconee fuel into the McGuire spent fuel pool will not d
be permitted during reactor refueling.,
The assumed age of 270 days for Oconee spent fuel is the youngest age for the Oconee spent fuel proposed to be transferred to the McGuire pool. All the spent fuel damaged was assumed to have the maximum peaking factor in Regulatory Guide 1.25 for a single fuel assembly.
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As I pointed out above, occupational dose calculations relative to the postulated circumstances will be submitted in separate testimony.
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Q.
Would you describe the calculations you made with respect to the potential exposure to the public at the exclusion area boundary?
A.
Figures 1 and 2 show the two-hour potential consequences at the Exclusion Area Boundary from damage to a single Oconee fuel assembly and a single McGuire fuel assembly, respectively, in the McGuire spent fuel pool. Table 1 lists the potential consequences for damaging 500 Oconee fue'l assemblies in the i
McGuire pool. Table 2 lists the potential consequences for damaging spent fuel assemblies from a refueling (65 assemblies, age = 40 days) of the McGuire reactor. Use of the 65 assemblies discharged from a McGuire refueling repre-sents the lowest aged McGuire spent fuel in the pool. The potential conse-quences at the Low Population Z.one (LPZ) are lower than those of the Exclusion Area Soundary, because of the greater distance from the radiation source; therefore, calculations for the LPZ are unnecessary.
Q.
How did you derive the potential consecuences at the exclusion area beundary for fuel handling accidents for McGuire spent fuel and Oconee spent fuel?
A.
The potential consequences given in Tab'es 1, 2 anc 3 are tne product of the potential consequences of damaging a single assembly (figure 1 or figure 2) and the number of fuel assemblies damaged.
Q.
What are the long term potential cJnsequences to the thyroid from damage to a McGuire spent fuel assembly or an Oconee spent fuel assembly?
A.
The long-term potential thyroid exposure to the public from damaging an Oconee fuel assembly or a McGuire fuel assembly is 6.3 x 10-6 rem and 9.7 x 10-6 rem, respectively, at the McGuire Exclusion Area Boundary.
l Q.
What conclusions did 'you make with respect to potential consequences from a cask drop accident at the McGuire spent fuel pool.
A.
The potential consequences to the public of damaging 500 Oconee spent fuel assemblies at the McGuire pool is a very small fraction of the exposure guide-lines of 10 CFR Part 100. The potential consequences are less than 1 mrem thyroid and I rem whole body.
The potential consequences of damaging McGuire fuel at the McGuire pool ~ is well within the exposure ' guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100. This conclusion is based on the use of the youngest McGuire spent fuel for the latest refueling, aged at least 40 days. Any additional McGuire spent fuel in the pool which might be damaged would be frem earlier refuelings.
This McGuire spent fuel would have aged more than one year; thus, calculation of doses for the 40 day old !1cGuire fuel envelope doses that could result from damaged McGuire fuel aged more than one year.
Table 3 lists the potential consequences of da: aging 500 McGuire fuel assemblies which have aged at least one year.
The thyroid potential con-sequences are insignificant compared to the value given in Table 2 for damaging spent fuel 40 days old from the latest McGuire refueling. This analysis conservatively assumed that the youngest McGuire spent fuel would not be restricted from the area _where a shipping cask falling into the McGuire pool would damage spent fuel.
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AS30MPT10NS FOR AND POTENTIAL CONSE00E:.CES OF THE POSTULATED FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENTS AT THE EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY FOR M:GUIRE i
Assumptions:
Guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.25 Power Level 2620 Mwt (0conee)
Fuel Exposure Time 3 years Peaking Factor
- 1.65
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Equivalent Number of Assemclies Damaged 500 (0conee) i Number of Assemblies in Core 177 (Oconee) l Charcoal Filters i
elemental iodine 90L methyl iodine 705 Decay Time Before Moving Fuel 270 days 0-2 hours x/q Value, Exclusion Area Boundary (release) Elevated 9.5 X 10-4 sec/m3
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Doses, Rem Thyroid Whole Body l
Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB)
Consequences from Accidents 0.0032 0.71 1
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- Maximum value.for single assembly.
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t Table 2 ASSUMPTIONS FOR AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE POSTULATED FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENTS AT THE EXCLUSION AREA B0UNOARY FOR McGUIRE l
Assumptions:
Guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.25 Power Level 3565 Mat (McGuire) f Fuel Exposure Time 3 years Peaking Factor
- 1.65 Equivalent Number of Assemblies Damaged 65 (McGuire Refueling)
Number of Assemblies in Core 193 (McGuire)
Charcoal Filters elemental iodine 900 methyl iodine 700 Decay time before moving fuel 40 days i
0-2 hours x/q Value, Exclusion Area 3
I Boundary (release) Elevated 9.5 X 10-4 sec/m Doses, Rem Thyroid Whole Body.
I Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB)
Consequences from Accidents 117 0.67 4
- Maximum value for single assembly.
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~ Table 3 ASSUMPTIOliS FOR AfiD POTEliTIAL CONSEQUEi1CES OF THE POSTULATED FUEL HAtlDLIf4G ACCIDENTS AT THE EXCLUSION AREA BOU'iDARY FOR McGuire Assumptions:
Guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.25 Power Level 3565 Mwt (McGuire)
Fuel Exposure Time 3 years Peaking Factor
- 1.65 Equivalent tiumber of Assemblies Damaged 500(McGuire)
Number of Assemblies in Core 193 (McGuire)
Charcoal Filters elemental iodine
' 90&
methyl iodine 70i; Decay time before moving fuel 365 days 0-2 hours x/q Value, Exclusion Area i
Boundary (release) Elevated 9.5 X 10-4 sec/m3 Doses, Rem Thyroid Whole Body Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB)
Consequences from Accidents 0.004 0.57 4
Maximum value for single assembly.
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JACK N. DONOREW. JR.
l PROFESSIONAL OUALIFICAIIONS DIVISION OF OPEEATING REACTORS OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGL'IATION My na=e is Jack N. Donohev, Jr.
I am a Senior Nuclear Engineer in the Envirennental Evaluation Branch in the Division of Operating Reactors, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). My duties include the review of rad-waste treatnent syste=s and engineered safety feature ventilation systers for opera:Ing reactors.
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I re:eived a Bachelor of Engineering Physics Degree fro = Cornell University in 1965, a Masters of Science Degree in Nuclear Engineering from Massachu-setts Institute of Technology in 1968, and a Doctor of Science Degree in Nuclear Engineering fro = Massachusetts Institute of Te:hnology in 1970.
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received =y Professional Engineers License in Nuclear Engineering from the Con =:nwealth of Pennsylvania in 1974.
After graduation, I worked for Stone and *w*ebster Engineering Corporation as i
an engineer in the Radiation Protection Group.
I was responsible for esti-cating source terms, release rates and resulting doses for the Safety Analysis Report, Environmental Report and response to NRC questions for boiling water nuclear reactors.
I was also responsible for shielding design for the reactor water cleanup syste=.
In February,1973, I beca=e a Power Engineer in the Process Engineering i
Group, Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation.. I was lead engineer for the-Shoreham Project and the equip =ent specialist for all nuclear plants r-=*
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for the contain=ent iodine spray removal syste=, ventilation filter asse:blies, and Boiling Water Reactor and Pressurized Water Reactor gaseous waste treat =ent l
system.
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In June,1975, I joined the Nuclear Regulatory Coc=ission as a senior nuclear engineer in the Effluent Treatment Systems Branch, Directorate of Licensing.
I was involved in rad-waste system licensing reviews of nuclear power plants.
have conducted generic studies of the degradation of charcoal adsorbers in entilation filter asse:blies.
In December,1975, I joined the Environ = ental Evaluation Branch in the Division of Operating Reactors.
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