ML20008E317
| ML20008E317 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee, Mcguire, McGuire, 07002623  |
| Issue date: | 10/21/1980 |
| From: | Mcgarry J, Porter W DEBEVOISE & LIBERMAN, DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20008E318 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8010240552 | |
| Download: ML20008E317 (7) | |
Text
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t-0; DCCKEED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA W RC
,,,6, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 7
OCT 23 sg > a BEFORE THE ATOMIC SiFETY AND LICENSING BOARD O 16il W In the Matter of
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DUKE POWER COMPANY
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(Amendment to Materials License
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Docket No. 70-2623 SNM-1773 for Oconee Nuclear
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Station Spent Fuel Transportation )
and Storage at McGuire Nuclear
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Station)
APPLICANT'S RESPONSE TO CESG'S MOTION TO REOPEN THE RECORD
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On March 9, 1978, Applicant filed an application to amend its Materials License SNM-1773 authorizing storage of Oconee Nucleat Station ("Oconee") spent fuel at the McGu' ire Nuclear Station ("McGuire").
During the course of the hearings regarding the application, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (" Licensing Board") granted the request of Carolina Environmental Study Group ("CESG"), an intervenor in the proceeding, to amend one of its contentions adding an issue regarding the adequacy of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC" or " Commission") Staff and Applicant's analysis of a cask drop or cask tipping incident (Tr. 4182).M Testimony was presented on this revised contention,
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if CESG's specific cask tipping contention is_as follows:
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With respect to case three of the cask drop analysis of Applicant's FSAR, 9.1.2.3.2, submitted int'olving a postulated cask drop accident at the spent fuel pool, the Applicant's anal 7 sis.and_the Stafi's review are inadequate.
Case three involves tipping or drop-ping and tipping the cask, located above the floor or in contact with the floor level of-the pit wall p
opposite the fuel pool side.
[Tr.-4181]
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including a discussion of the boron concentrations in the spent fuel pool.
(Tr. 5078-5095)
At the conclusion of the hearings, all parties' filed proposed findings of fact and con-clusions of law regarding the issues raised.2/
Thereafter, on October 6, 1980, CESG filed the subject Motion to Reopen alleging that a report entitled " Unplanned l
Boron Dilution," Power Reactor Events Vol. 2. No. 4 (NRC-July 1980)
(" Report"), is directly relevant to testimony in l
this proceed 1*ng.
CESG, therefore, requests that the' record be l
reopened to, at a minimum, submit into evidence the aforementioned
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Report and a letter filed by Applicant.in response thereto. -
As discussed below, Applicant submits that CESG's allegations are totally without merit, and that CESG has failed to satisfy the criteria regarding reopening of records.b 2/
On May 29, 1980, CESG filed a document entitled "CESG's propc ed Elements of Fact and Conclusions of Law Toward an Intial Decision."
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CESG is apparently referring to Applicant's letter of June 5, 1980, regarding the incident set forth in the aforementioned Report.
A copy of this letter is attached hereto for the convenience of the Licensing Board and all parties.
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In addition, Applicant submits that much of CESG's Motion to Reopen is simply additional or supplemental argument or discussion which should have been included in CESG's proposed findings of fac' and conclusions of law (e A,
1 CESG's Motion to Reop.en at pp. 2-5).
The time for such filings has long since expired.
Thus, to,the extent that
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CESG's motion is simply additional or supplemental proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, t.he instant motion must be denied as contrary to 10 C.F.R. 52.754.
3.
It it well settled that the proponent of a motion to reopen the record bekrs a heavy burden.
Kansas Gas k Electric Company (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-462, 7 NRC 320, 328 (1978); Duke Power Company (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-359, 4 NRC 619, 620 (1976).
To be successful, the movant must establish that the new information sought to be introduced would significantly affect the testimony received or the outcome of the proceeding.
Public Service Electric & Gas Company (Salem Nuclear Generat-ing Station, Unit 1), LBP-80-10, 11 NRC 337, 342 (1980). See also, Kansas Gas & Electric Company, supra, 7 NRC at 338; Northern Indiana Public Service Company (Bailly Generating Station Nuclear-1), ALAB-227, 8 AEC 416, 418 (1974).5/
A decision regarding reopening is to be made on the basis of the contents of the motion to reopen and the' filings in opposition thereto, including accompanying affidavits regarding the issue.
Vermont Yankee hoclear power Corp., supra, 6 AEC at 523.
In this manner, a " mini-record" is developed which, in essence, acts to supplement the existing record with respect to the ruling on the motion to reopen.
Id.
Thus, for CESG to be successful, it must establish that, in the face of opposing filings, the new information it seeks to raise would significantly affect the 5/
In addition, for a movant to be successful the new informa-tion presented must be timely raised and relate to a significant safety issue.
Georgia power Company (Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, ALAB-291, 2 NRC 404, 409 (1975); Vermont Yankee Nuclear power Corp.
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear power Station) ALAB-138, 6 AEC 520, 523 (1973).
4.
testimony previously received or the outcome of the pro-ceeding.5/
The Report upon which CESG bases its Motion to Reopen briefly describes an unplanned' boron dilution in the reactor coolant system of Oconee Unit 2 during a cold shutdown con-dition.
In essence, a spare "deborating demineralizer" was j
inadvertently placed into service without adequate preparation.
The deborating demineralizer was not boron saturated (i.e.,
conditioned to assure that it does not remove boron from the water) and thus a decrease in the boron concentration of the reactor coolant system resulted.
Although the incident was quickly discovered by routine sampling, the Report states that, in any event, the lowest boron level that could hhve been achieved had no actions been taken was 1400 parts-per-million p/
Then considering CESG's motion, Applicant submits the following observation is warranted.
CESG is an experienced intervenor having actively participated in the construction permit proceedings for Applicant's McGuire, Catawba and perkins nuclear plants, the. operating license proceeding for the McGuire facility, as well as the instant case.
CESG is well aware of the Commission's rules and regula-tions.
Specifically, CESG is quite familiar with the reopening procedure of the Commission, having sought such relief on several occasions.
For example, on June 9, 1980 and August 15, 1980, CESG filed motions to reopen the McGuire operating license proceeding.
Indeed, one of the lead Commission reopening cases is Catawba.
Duke power Company (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-359, 4 NRC 619 (1976).
Accordingly, CESG should be held to a high standard of compliance with the pertinent regulations and precedents.
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(" ppm") boron (as compared to the 1895 ppm operating con-dition).
Atthatconcentration,.thedem[neralizerwould have become boron saturated.
While the Report notes that corrective action was taken to prevent recurrence of such
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a condition, CESG alleges (1) that this incident could have also occurred in the McGuire spent fuel pool from a demineralizer l
in the cooling system if it were not boron saturated, and (2) that if such a low boron condition was present in the reactor coolant system, the mixing oi the spent fuel pool water and reactor coolant system water, which occurs only during a refuel-ing, could result in extremely low concentrations of boron in the spent fuel pool.
As discussed below, such allegations are totally without merit.
N The McGuire spent fuel pool cooling water system contains a mixed-bed demineralizer designed to remove impurities in the spent fuel pool water.
Affidavit of W. C. Orth.
The demineralizer is con-ditioned (i.e., saturated with boron) to assure that no additional boron is removed from the water.
Id.
The quantity of boron necessary to saturate this type of demineralizer is approximately thirty pounds.
Id.
Due to the large volume of water in the spent fuel pool, removal of 30 pounds of boron
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therefrom would result in an insignificant change in total boron concentration from 2000 ppm to 1989 ppm.,
Id.
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It should be noted that at McGuire the lowest similar condition that could be achieved in the reactor coolant system is 1800 ppm prior to boron saturation of the. Boron Thermal Regeneration domineralizers.
Attached Affidavit of W. C. Orth.
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6.
Boron concentration in the McGuire spent fuel pool was discussed at the hearing "in the context of its impact upon k effective.
Applicant and Staff witnesses testified that a decrease in the concentration level of 100 ppm would result in an approximate increase in k effective of 1% and that this relationship is essentially linear.
(Tr. 4973-5075)
It follows th'at an 11 ppm decrease would result in an insignificant
.1% increase in k effective.
A.1% increase (i.e.,
a.001 contribution to the k effective values set forth in the record) would not permit the achievement of criticality.
In short, CESG's allegation that improper " conditioning" of the demineralizer in the spent fuel pool cooling water system could potentially result in a significant ecrease in the boron concentration is totally without merit.
With regard to CESG's position that a decrease in the boron concentration of the reactor coolant system could materially affect the boron concentration of the spent fuel pool, as set forth in the attached affidavit, the only time that there is any mixing of the two systems is during refueling.1#
During such a period the actual mixing is extremely limited.
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Thus, a low boron concentration in the reactor coolant system would have an insignificant effect on the boron concentration 7/
As noted in the attached affidavit, even if there was total mixing of the two systems during refueling, the resultant boron concentration would be only approximately 1980 ppm.. Under such a circumstance, a.2% increase in k effective could result.
This would be an insignificant contribution to the k effective values contained in the record and could not lead to criticality.
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in the spent fuel pool.
In any event, as noted in previous testimony, Applicant has stated that it will not transfer Oconee fuel into the'McGuire pool during periods of refuel.ing.
(Tr. 4777)
In that the boron concentration of the spent fuel pool is sampled daily during refueling (Tr. 5095), any abnormal condition in such concentrations would be discovered before transfers of Oconee fuel into the McGuire pool were resumed after refueling.
In sum, CESG's allegations that the boron concentration in the spent fuel pool water could materially be affected by either a reduction in boron due to an unsaturated demineralizer, or a dilution in boron due to mixing with the reactor coolant system water are totally without meri:.
Thus, CESG has failed to establish that the new information it seeks to raise significantly affects the previo'us testimony in this proceeding such that the outcome thereof may be altered.
In conclusion, as noted above, CESG has failed to satisfy the reopening criteria and, accordingly, its Motion to Reopen must be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
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Will1am'L. porter Associate General Counsel Duke power Company p.O. Box 33189 Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 Of Counsel:
J. Michael McGarry, III Debevoise k Libenman 1200 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
20036 October 21, 1980 l
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June 5, 1980 V*Cg PetSeDgest Tgggonomet; Aaga 704 Sega. Peoovenon 373 40e3 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission O
Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 g
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Atlanta, Georgia 30303 usSB0 OCT 2319E? '"{
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g the Seestuf Re: Oconee Unit 2 M
/g Docket No. 50-270 to
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report R0-270/80-3.' This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.a(4), which concerns an unplanned reactivity insertion of greater than 0.5% Ak/k, and describes an incident which occurred while Oconee 2 was cold shutdown and which is considered to be of no significance with at respect to the health and safety of the public.
My letter of May 21, 1980 addressed the delays in the preparation of this report.
Ve truly yours, l
ecd William O. Parker, r.
SRL:sc Attach = t Director Mr. Bill Lavallee Office of Management & Program Analysis Nuclear S'afety Analysis Center U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 10412 Washington, D. C.
20555 Palo Alto, California 94303 L
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1 DUKE POWER COMPAhi OCONEE UNIT 2 i
Report Number: R0-270/80-3 Report Date: June 5, 1980 Occurrence Date: May 7, 1980 Facility: Ocones 2, Seneca, South Carolina Identification of Occurrence: Unplanned Reactivity Insertion at Cold Shutdown Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Cold Shutdown Descriotion of Occurrence:
At 2104 on May 7, 1980, the spare deborating demineralizer was placed in service for chloride removal from the Oconee 2 Low Pressure Injection (LPI) System while the unit was at cold shutdown and the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) partially drained for reactor coolant pump maintenance. Chemistry records indicated that the demineralizer was boron-saturated to approximately the same concentration as the LPI system, 1895 ppmb. The demineralizer was operated for ten minutes to allow a chemistry sample to be taken and was then secured. The sample results indicated a demineralizer outlet concentration of 1884 ppab, 'nd the de=ineralizar a
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was returned to service at 2144. At 2150 another chemistry sample was requested, but there was an inconsistency in the results, and another sample was taken at 2240. At 2320 the sample evaluation was completed', indicating a LPI system boron concentration of 1539 ppmb and a demineralizer outlet concentration of 800 ppmb.
The deminerali:er was immediately bypassed and isolated.
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Aoparent Cause of Occurrence:
Apparently, the chemistry records which indicated that the deborating demineralizer was boron-saturated had not been kept up-to-date.
In addition, it is possible that the demineralizer was not operated for a long enough period prior to taking the first sample to reach equilibrium outlet conditions.
i Analysis of Occurrence:
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The RCS deboration from 1895 ppeb to 1539 ppab corresponds to reduction in the shutdown margin of from -11.89% ak/k to -7.44: ak/k. A margin of 296 ppmb existed I
above that necessary to maintain the 1% ak/k shutdown margin required by Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3.1.3.4.
This includes allowance for the worth of a stuck rod, which is highly unlikely under these conditions, as well as an additional 100 ppab conservation for calculational uncertainty.
In addition, l
assuming an RCS volume of approximately 30,000 gallons and an initial boron cen-l centration of 1895 ppab, a new demineralizer would become saturated at approximately 1400 opab, still above the concentration required for a 1% Ak/k shutdown margin.
. Thus. this incident consticuted an unplanned reactivity insertion of greater than 0.5% ak/k, and must be reported pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.la(4),
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although it was not considered to be significant with respect to safe operation, l
and the health and safety of the public were not affected.
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_2 Corrective Action:
L The immediate corrective action was to bypass and isolate the deborating demineral-izer. Makeup to the RCS was initiated in order to restore it to its original con-centration. Steps will be taken to assure that chemistry records concerning the demineralizar are kept up-to-date.
Further administrative controls will be developed concerning the use of domineralizers. Administrative controls will be implemented to preclude the use of demineralizers while the RCS is in a drained-down condition.
In addition, a step will be added to the procedure for inscru-ment surveillance while at shutdown to require the source range alarm to 'oe checked once per shift, since it would provide early warning in the unlikely event of an approach to criticality.
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g i shutdown and the RCS was drained down. Chemistry records and the first I'ii"T71 I sample indicated a boren concentration close to that of the RCS.
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g l RCS boron concentration was reduced from 1895 ppm to 1539 ppm.
A substantial t o is i i concentration above that necessary for a 1% Ak/k shutdown margin was main-
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s o ie i I safe coeration, and the health and safety of the public were not affected.
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