ML19209C385
| ML19209C385 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07002623 |
| Issue date: | 09/14/1979 |
| From: | Hoefling R, Olmstead W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7910150228 | |
| Download: ML19209C385 (10) | |
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o Ys%g\\Ng7 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA gj NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 9
BEFORE THE COMMISSION L
e g
a IN THE MATTER OF DUKE POWER COMPANY
-(Amendment to Materials License-Docket No.- 70. 2623
,....,.m SNM-1773 for Oconee Nuclear Station Spent Full Transportation and Storage at McGuire Nuclear Station NitC STAFF RESPONSE TO THE COMMISSION'S IN0UIRY OF SEPTEMBER 12, 1979 I.
INTRODUCTION Following oral argument before the Commission in this proceeding on the
~ question of public disclosura.of route infonnation, the Commission by inquiry--
dated September 12, 1979 raised three matters on which it sought further information"fiom the parties.M The NRC Staff presents i.ts views on these r.-
questions seriatum.
II.
DISCUSSION The Commission first inquired what benefit is gained by protecting route infor-mation when large, well-marked trucks moving by day are to make 300 shipments _
over the routes within a 1-year period.
To respond to this inquiry, some background as to the timing of the 300 shipments proposed to be cade from the Oconee facility is necessary.
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. The background of this matter was ' set out fully in the NRC Staff's Petition -
y to the Ccmission for review, dated Septerbar 7,1979.
Subsequent to the filing of that petition, the Commission by Order of Septer.ber 7,1979 scheduled oral argument on the matter for September 10, 1979.
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' In the proceeding before the Licensing Board, Duke contends that it will lose its full-core sterve (FCR) capability at the Oconee facility in Septen-ber,1982 (Tr. 842).E Given that spent fuel shipments can be made at the rate of one per day (Tr. 3131) and given that a discharge batch at the Oconee facility will average approximately 60 fuel assemblies in size (Affi-davit of Brett S. Spitalny and John P. Roberts, p. 2, following Tr. 3844),
shipments of-spent fuel would. of. necessity have to.ccmmence approximatel'y.
two months prior to the critical dates of September,1982 and September, 1983 in order to avoid either the loss of FCR capability or a plant shutdown.
Subsequent spent fuel shipments would have to be initiated approximately two months prior to subsequent fuel off-1oadings at the Oconee facility.
Trans-shipment of 300 spent fuel assemblies would alleviate the Oconee fuel storage p'roblem.for'approximately 2 years- (Tr. 528) and so transshipment campaigns cou'ld' extend to e'ither 1984 or 1985' depending on whether or not an FCR capability-is retained. Thus the-time interval over which spent fuel. ship-ments could occur can be a lengthy one extending from the point at which authorization is granted into-e4ther-1984-or-1985 depending on the retention.
of an F'CR capability.
Consequently, while it is possible for all 300 shipments of spent fuel to occur in the space of one year, it is not necessary to so compress the i146 275 y
FCR capability allows for off-loading of'an entire core should cir-cumstances so require.
One of the issues in the proceeding below is whether such an FCR capability shou d be maintained by Duke.
In the l
event that such a capability is deemed not necessary, the Oconee Units could continue aceration for an additional year and would not face shut-down until September,1983.
(Tr. 842).
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. schedule.
There is clearly considerable flexibility concerning when a specific spent fuel shipment is made.
Specific spent fuel shipments could be varied within a wide margin subject only to the 1. imitation that suffi-cient storage spaces be available at the Oconee facility to accommodate a discharge of spent fuel in either September of 1982 or September 1983 and at those later points in times when subsequent discharges occur.
Therefore, presuming 'a favorable Licensing Board decis. ion,i.n 1980, the time required for Duke to transship spent fuel assemblies and maintain the Oconee facility operational would be far exceeded by the time available in which to make such shipments.
It would not be necessary to make such shipments on a,
daily basis and the shipment schedules could be adjusted to thwart efforts of saboteurs' seeking to piece together the routes.
For example, if there were indications of surveillance at Oconee in order to follow shipments and
~ discover the specific routes, no shipments need to-be made that day, that week, or even that mo;,ch.
Other factors also support maintaining the confidentiality of these routes even given the visibility of the spent fuel shipments.3f There is a 3f No argument relative to the security significance of the routing infor-
~'
mation was entertained by the Licensing Board.-- The-question of. whether;. <.
routing information should be accorded confidential treatment was never reached-below.
However, the Staff was prepared at oral argument to present the route infomation to the Commission and to develop its security significance (Tr.12;36).
The Staff still feels that the Ccm-mission should consider this material in camera to-be fully infomed on. --
the security significance of this information.
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. distinction to be made between routing information gathered by unknown sources of unknown realibility and presented to the public as fact and route i
information which is disseminated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission with its official imprimatur.
In the Staff's view, the latter infomation would provide greater incentive and a sounder basis for potential sabotage.
Given the substantial effort a successful sabotage would entail, it is less likely that a saboteur woul'd be inspired to act based on unofficial information.
Should a saboteur plan an effort directed at these spent fuel shipments he would likely find it necessary to establish or verify the route information.
~
This would require some conspicuous a,ctivity such as extensive surveillance of the Oconee site and/or following the trucks, thus exposing himself to discovery.
Additional-arguments support maintaining the confidential.ity of the route information in this case.
There are alternative routes available to Duke for the proposed shipments.. Efforts-to identify alLthe routes would be.
considerable, increasing the risk of discovery.
A decision to release routing information in this case would be precedent-setting.
There are circumstances, such as coast-to-coast spent fuel shipments, where efforts at route detection would be virtually impossible.
The safeguards significance of maintaining the route information in confidence in such circumstances is clear.
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. In summary, it is the Staff's view that much is to be gained by protecting route information.
Duke has available great flexibility in the timing of its spent fuel shipments.
This flexibility can be of substantial aid in thwarting attempts on the part of others to ascertain and then disclose the route information.
Releasing route information wou.ld place a government imprimatur on informa-.
tion which otherwise ~would necessarily be of a doubtful and infim nature unless personally developed by a potential saboteur.
In this latter event, the saboteur would expose himself to discovery.
And such exposure woJld be substantial given the number of alternate routes involved.
Finally, consid..
eration must be given to any precedents to be set in this area.O Tn'e $taffwould note 'two additional points relative to the Commission's
~
~
- first inquiry.
First, the concept that.. restricting general public access....
to specific route information is a unique and nov.el step is incorrect.
The 4/
As the Commission is aware, specific route information relative to Category I shipments has always been held in confidence by the NRC Staff.
In the future, such information will be classified CNSI.
These shipments are also made in large placarded vehicles.
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. ICC requires carriers to maintain route infomation in confidence.E To the extent that there is a need to know what these routes are as for example in the' context of the ongoing Licensing Board proceeding there are procedures available for the handling of that situation.
Second, the Staff has approached this entire question as one of implementing Commission policy.
As was emphasized at oral argument 10 CFR Section 73.37 deals with safe-g0aNs~information in general and routing infomation.in.particular and
, _..... t, n,,
10 CFR 2.790(d)(1) limits disclosure of such information..The Commission was infomed of the implementation of this policy by the Staff on June 25, 1979.O 5/
See Part II, Interstate Commerce Act, Section 222, Paracraoh (e),, _
"It shall be unlawful for any motor carrier or broker engaged.in inter.,
~
state or foreign commerce or any officer, receiver, trustee,.le.ssee, agent, or employee of such carrier, broker, or person, or for any othe,r person authorized by such carri'er, broker, or person to receive infoma-tion, knowingly to disclose to, or pemit to be acquired by any person other than the shipper or consignee without the consent of such shipper
._or consignee, any information concerning the nature, kind, quantity, destination, consignee, or rou'tino of ~any property tendered or delivered to such motor carrier or broker for such transportation, which-infoma-tion may be used to the detriment or prejudice of such shipper or con-signee, or which may improperly disclose his business transactions to a competitor; and it shall also be unlawful for any person to solicit or knowingly receive any such information which may be so used."
(emphasis added).
6/.
Memorandum for: Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary to the Commission, From:
William J. Dircks, Directer, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards,
Subject:
SECY 79-279 and 278A Physical Protection of radia-
'ted fuel shipments SECY memorandum of May 25, 1979.
(Marked as Staff Exhibit No. 23 in this proceeding.)
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.. In response to the second Comission inquiry relative to the draft protec-tive agreement, the Staff would suggest the following modification to the second sentence for the purpose of clarity.
I will protect such information, including transcripts of inn camera sessions at which such information is discussed so that it will at all times be under my control and cannot ba read by anyone except a person who has executed an affidavit to the same effect as this one.
~
With regard to'the third inquiry of the Commission concerning Duke's ship-ment schedule, Duke has indicated that'it would to be' gin spent fuel shipments shortly after approval of its instant application and that the rates of ship-ment old be subject to a number of, factors.
(Tr. 7689).E.However, as elaborated by the Staff above, Duke possesses considerable flexibility in conduct 1ng the spent fuel shipments-and-need not begin such shipments until..,
approximately two months prior to Tosing FCR capability at Oconee which would occur in September of 1932.
7j -
It should be noted that the casks.which Dyke originally proposed for use in transshipping, namely the Model No. NFS-4 casks, are presently subject to an Order to Show Cause issued in Docket No. 71-6598 on April 6,1976 which removed this model from service.
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8-Finally, the Staff would renew its offer to present tc the Commission the route specific infomation 3 camera and to elaborate for the Commission the security significance of that information.
Respectfully submitted,
/
M R hard K. Hoefli g Counsel for NRC Staff William J. Olmstead Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 14th day of September 1979.
O e
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0fdISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSION In the Matter of DUKE POWER COMPANY Docket No. 70-2623 (Amendment to Materials License SNM-1773 for Oconee Nuclear Station
)
Spent Fuel Transportation and Storage
)
at McGuire Nuclear Station)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of "NRC STAFF RESPONSE TO THE COMMISSION'S INQUIRY OF: SEPTEMBER 12,1979"l dated September 14,'1979 in the above.-
e.
captioned proceeding, have been served on the following, by deposit in the united states mail, first class, or,.as indicated by an asterisk, through deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Comission's internal mail system, this 14th day of September, 1979:
- Mr. Joseph M. Hendrie, Chairman-
- Dr. John H. Buck U.SJNuclear Regulatory Comiss.lon...
_ Atomic Safety;and Licensing App.eal.. -
Washington, D. C.
20555
.. u.
Board.
- s. =
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission
- Mr. Victor Gilinsky Washington, D. C.
20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D. C.
20555
- Michael C. Farrar, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal
- Mr. Richard T. Kennedy Board LT.S. Nuclear ~ Reg ~ula' tory Comissidri '
Washington, D. C.
20555
' UlS. NucTear Regulatory Comiss' ion -
Washington, D. C.
20555
- Peter A. Bradford
- Marshall E. Miller U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Washington, D. C.
20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D. C.
20555
- John F. Ahearne U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr., Director Washington, D. C.
20555 a-----
Bodega Marine Laboratory
^ --
University of California
- Mr. Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman -
P.O.; Box 247 -
Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Bodega Bay, California 94923 Board U.S.- Nuclear Regulatory Comiss, ion-4
- Drc Emmeth A. iuebke
.. I m --
Washington, D. C.
20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Washington, D. C.
20555
'1146 282
. W. L. Porter, Esq.
- Mr. Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary
' Associate General Counsel Office of the Sacretary Legal Department U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 422 South Church. Street Washington, D.C.
20555 Duke Power Company Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 Anthony Z. Roisman, Esq.
c/o Sheldon, Harmon, Roisman, & Weiss 1725 I Street, N.W.
Suite 506 Washington, D. C.
20006 J. Michael McGarry, III, Esq.
Debevoise & Liberman 1200 Seventeenth Street, L W.
Washington, D. C.
20036 Mr. Jesse L. Riley, President Carolina Environmental Study Group 854 Henley Place Charlotte, North Carolina 28207 Richard P. Wilson, Esq.
William J. QImstead
=
Assistant Attorney Gene,ral Counsel for NRC Staff State of South Carolina 2600 Bull Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201..
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissinn..
Washington, D. C.
20555
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
- Docketing and Service Section U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissian Washington, D. C.
20555 1146.283