ML19309F998
| ML19309F998 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 04/28/1980 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | Rubenstein L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309F999 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8005020116 | |
| Download: ML19309F998 (79) | |
Text
8005020/yh 400 Chestnut Street Tower II April 28, 1980 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
Mr. L. S. Rubenstein, Acting Chief Light Water Reactors Branch No. 4 Division of Project Management U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Dear Mr. Rubenstein:
In the Matter of the Application of
)
Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority
)
50-328 Enclosed for your review as Enclosure 1 are 10 copies of each of the following Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SNP) Emergency Operating Instructions (E01).
E0I-0 Immediate Actions and Diagnostics E0I-l Loss of Reactor Coolant E0I-2 Loss of Secondary Coolant E0I-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Draf t copies of E01-0, E0I-1, E0I-2, and E01-3 were transmitted to you in my April 15, 1980, Aetter.
The final copies that are enclosed with this letter have been reviewed by Westinghouse and TVA's Division of Engineering Design.
In addition, the procedures have been reviewed and approved by the SNP Plant Operations Review Committee.
In your March 7, 1980, letter to H. G. Parris, questions and comments on E0I-l were transmitted to TVA. contains TVA's responses to those questions and comments. is a set of piping and instrumentation drawings f e the emergency core cooling system, con-tainment spray system, and auxiliary feedwater system.
If you have any questions, please get in touch with M. J. Burzynski at FTS 854-2581.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY s_
/
".' n, % y ^ n C M. Mills,. 'x~.!L '.
/
Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety l
Enclosures
1 ENCLOSURE
~
r, tem:oyrh "uclear Plent e
DIST!!TBUTION 1C Plant Master File Superintendent 1U Assistant Superintendent (Oper.)
1U Assistant Superintendent (Maint.)
EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS Administrative Supervisor Maintenance Supervisor (M)
E0I-0 Assistant Maintenance Supervisor (M)
Maintenance Supervisor (E)
IMMEDIATE ACTIONS AND DIAGNOSTICS Assistant Maintenance Supervisor (E)
Mainteniance Supervisor (I)
Units 1 and 2
~{-~~ Hesults Supervisor 1C _ Operations Supervisor Quality Assurance Supervisor i
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irem1h PH9 sics.. _...---. - -... -..
Public Safety Services Supv.
Chief Storekeeper Preop Test Program Coordinator Outage Director Chemical Engineer (Results)
Radiochem Laboratory Instrument Shop Reactor Engineer (Results)
Instrument Engineer (Maint. (I))
Mcchanical Engineer (Results)
Staff Industrial Engineer (Pl. Sys.)
1C Training Center Coordinator PSO - Chickamauga Engrg Unit - SNP Prepared By:
J.R. Walker Public Safety Services - SNP IC Shift Engineer's Office Revised Dy:
-(.R. Walker 1C Unit Control Room 1
QA&A Rep. - SNP Health Physics Laboratory Sub:nitted Hy:
U"ljh rv i:.o r 1U Asst Dir NUC PR (Oper), 727 EB-C 1U Nuclear Document Control Unit, 606 E3-PORC Review:
4/ - 2 / - F D 1U Superintendent, WBNP Date Superintendent, BFNP Superintendent, BENP in NEB, W9C174C-K Approved By:
Supv., NPHPS ROB, MS Super ntendent in NRC-IE:II Power Security Officer, 620 CST 2-C
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Nuclear Materials Coordinator 1410 CU3 Manager. OP-QA&A Staff Date Approved:
I 1c Resident NRC Inspector - SNP Ic NSRS, 249A HEB-K 1c Technical Support Center Rev. No.
D -' e Rev_iw a Pagen Nev. No.
Date Revised Pages 0
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The last page of this instruction is Number
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SQNP E0I Units 1 and 2 Page 1 of 1 Rev. 0 4
PURPOSE This instruction presents the automatic actions, the inmediate operator actions and the diagnostic sequence which is to te followed in the identification of the fol-loving:
A.
Spurious Actuation of Safety Injection B.
Loss of Reactor Coolant C.
Ioss of Secondary Coolant D.
Steam Generator Tube Rupture The reactor automatic protection equipment is designed to safely shut down the reactor in the event of any of the above emergencies. The safety injection system is designed to provide emergency core cooling and boration to maintain the safe reactor shutdown condition. These plant safeguards systems operate with offsite electrical power or from onsite emergency diesel-electric power should offsite power not be available.
In the subsequent documents in this series (E0I-1, 2 and 3), instructions for recovery from the event are presented for each particular accident.
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E0I Units 1 and 2 Page 1 of 9 Rev. 0 I. SYMPTOMS NOTE: The process variables referred to in this instruction are typically monitored by more than one instrumentation channel. The redundant channels should be checked for consistency while performing the steps of this instruction.
A.
The following symptoms are typical of those which may arise in a plant which is undergoing a loss of reactor coolant, loss of secondary coolant or steam generator tube rupture (one or more symptoms may appear in any order):
1.
Low Pressurizer Pressure 2.
Low Pressurizer Water Level 3
High Pressurizer Water Level h.
High Containment Pressure 5
High Containment Radiation 6.
High Air Ejector Radiation 7
High Steam Generator Blowdown Radiation 8.
Steam Flow /Feedwater Flow Mismatch 9
Letdown Isolation / Pressurizer Heater Cutout 10.
Low Low Reactor Coolant System Average Coolant Temperature
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11.
High Containment Recirculation Sump Water Level 12.
Low Steamline Pressure (one or all Steamlines) 13 Low Steam Generator Water Level lb.
Increasing Steam Generator Water Level 15 Rapidly Changing Reactor Coolant System Average Coolant Temperature 16.
Increased Charging Flow 17 High Steam Flow (one or all Steam lines) 18.
High Containment Humidity
-j).
e SQNP E0I Units 1 and 2 Page 2 of 9 Rev. O I.
SYMPTOMS (continued)
- 19. High Containment Temperature 20.
Low Feedwater Pump Discharge Pressure NOTE: The pressurizer water level indication should always be used in conjunction with other reactor coolant system indications to evaluate system conditions and to initiate manual operator actions.
II. IMMEDIATE ACTIONS A.
Conditions warranting reactor trip or safety injection may be characterized by a number of anomalous situations or unusual instrument indications.
1.
If the plant is in a condition for which a reactor trip is warranted and an automatic reactor trip has not yet occurred, manually trip the reactor. Continue monitoring plant conditions as shown in Figure 1.
CAUTION:
If there is not a rapid drop in nuclear power and the control rods are not inserted, then this is an ATWS event. Attempt to trip the reactor by other means,,(see E0I-14 as needed).
2.
If the plant is in a condition for which safety injection is warranted and an automatic safety injection bas.not yet occurred, manually initiate safety injection.
B.
Verify the following actions and system status:
1.
Reactor trip and turbine trip have occurred.
4 a.
All rods inserted b.
Turbine steam stop valves closed 2.
Bus voltages indicate that the busses are energized and all intended loads are being powered.
Generator breakers open (time delay of,30 seconds if no electrical a.
fault) b.
Station service trans'ferred 3.
Feedwater Isolation has occurred a.
F.W. Isolation valves closed b.
Main F.W. reg. valves closed Main F.W. reg. bypass valves closed c.
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SQNP e
E0I Unita 1 cad 2 Page 3 of 9 Rev. O II. IMMEDIATE ACTIONS (continued) 4.
Containment Isolation Phase A, containment ventilation isolation and safety injection have occurred and valves and dampers are in proper position:
NOTE: Test all status monitor lights prior to relying on position indication.
a.
Safety injection and Phase A:
Panel 6C - Dark Panel 6D - Dark Panel 6E - Light (except for outlined)
Panel 6F - Light (except for outlined)
Panel 6G - Dark Panel 6H - Dark 5.
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps have started and the Auxiliary Feedwater System valves are in their proper Emergency Alignment and are open or closed as appropriate for present S/G level.
6.
Safety injection Pumps have started:
a.
Centrifugal charging pumps (hi head SI) b.
Safety injection pumps (lo head SI) c.
AND Verify flow through the BIT, and as pressure falls, verify SI pumps and RER pumps deliver flow.
7.
ERCW and Component Cooling Water Pumpt have started.
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8.
Emergency Diesel Generators have started.
9.
Emergency Gas Treatment an,d Auxiliary Building gas treatment systems have started.
C.
If any of the above automatic actions have not occurred and are required, they should be manually initiated.
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SQ'IP E0I Unito 1 and 2 Pags k of 9 Rev. O II. I!'J4EDIATE OPERATCR ACTIONS (Continued)
C.
Continued Verify the following:
Safety Injection flow from at least one train is being delivered to 1.
the reactor coolant system when the Reactor Coolant System pressure is below the high head safety injection pump shutoff head.
If not, attempt to operate equipment manually or locally.
Auxiliary Feedvater flow from at least one train is being delivered to 2.
the steam generators. If not, attempt to operate equipment manually or locally.
Only after steam generator vater level is established above NOTE:
the top of,the U-Tubes, should the Auxiliary Feedvater System Flow be regulated to maintain reequired level.
3 Verify that heat is being removed from the reactor plant via the steam generators by noting the following:
Automatic steam du=p to the condenser is occurring; a.
b.
Reactor coolant average temperature is decreasing towards progrcmmed no-load temperature.
NOTE: If condenser steam du=p has been blocked due to a control malfunction or loss of the " Condenser Available" condition, decay heat removal vill be effected by automatic actuation of the steam generator power-operated relief valves, or, if these prove ineffective, the steam generator code safety valves.
In this event, steam pressure vill be maintained at the set pressure of the controlling valve (s) a::d reactor coolant average temperature vill stabilize at approximately the saturation temperature for the steam pressure being maintained.
If running, stop containment building " auxiliary" floor and equipment drain D.
pumps (controls on M-9) and verify contain=ent floor and equipment drain pumps stopped (controls on M-15).
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SQNP E01 Units 1 and 2 Page 5 of 9 Rev. 0 II.
IMMEDIATE ACTIONS (Continued)
E.
Whenever the containment hi-hi pressure setpoint (2.81 psig) is reached, verify the following:
1.
Main Steam isolation valves have closed 2.
Containment spray is initiated 3.
Containment isolation phase B is initiated NOTE: Test all status monit3r lights prior to relying on position indication.
a.
Panel 6C - Dark Panel 6D - Dark Panel 6E - Light Panel 6F - Light Panel 6G - Dark Panel 6H - Dark If main steam isolation valves have not closed, manually close from the control board.
If containment spray or phase B isolation have not occurred, manually initiate.
III. ACCIDENT DIAGNOSTICS (Refer to Figure 2)
A.
Evaluate reactor coolant pressure to determine if it is low or decreasing in an uncontrolled manner.
If it is low or decreasing, verify that:
1.
All pressurizer spray line valves are closed and 2.
All pressurizer relief valves are closed If not, manually close the valves from the control board.
If the RCS pressure is above the low pressure reactor trip setpoint and is stable or increasing, go to step G..
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SQNP E0I Units 1 and 2 Page 6 of 9 Rev. 3 III. ACCIDENT DIAGNOSTICS (continued)
Stop ALL Reactor Coolant Pumps after the high head safety injection pump B.
operation has been verified and when the wide range reactor coolant
(
pressure decreases to 1500 psig.
CAUTION: If component cooling water to the reactor coolant pumps is isolated on a containment Phase B isolation,all reactor coolent pumps should be stopped within 5 minutes because of loss of motor bearing cooling.
If the reactor coolant pumps are stopped, the seal injection CAUTION:
flow should be maintained.
NOTE: The conditions given above for stopping reactor coolant pumps should be continuously monitored throughout this instruction.
IF the condenser air ejector radiation or steam generator blowdown radia-C.
tion monitor exhibit abnormally high readings, AND containment pressure, containment radiation and containment recirculation sump level exhibit normal readings, THEN go to E01-3, " Steam Generator Tube Rupture."
IF the steamline pressure is abnormally lower in one steam generator than D.
in the other steam generators, THEN go to E01-2, " Loss of Secondary Coolant."
IF containment pressure, OR containment radiation OR containment recircula-E.
tion sump levels exhibit either abnormally high readings or increasing readings, THEN to to E0I-1, " Loss of Reactor Coolant".
NOTE: For very small breaks inside the containment building, the contain-ment pressure increase will be very small and possibly not recogni-zable. For very small breaks the containment recirculation sump water level will increase very slowly and early in the transient may not indicate a level increase.
IF the containment pressure, containment radiation AND containment F.
recirculation sump water level continue to exhibit stable readings in the normal pre-event range, THEN go to E0I-2, "Losslof Secondary Coolant".
In the event of a spurious safety injection signal, the sequence of reactor G.
trip, turbine trip and safeguards actuation will occur.
The operator must assume that the safety injection signal is non-spurious unless the following are exhibitied:
Normal readings for containment temperature, pressure, radiation 1.
and recirculation sump level AND
. o SQNP E0I Units 1 and 2 Page 7 of 9 Rev. 0 III. ACCIDENT DIAGNOSTICS (continued)
- 2. ' Normal readings for auxiliary building radiation and ventilation' monitoring AND 3.
Normal readings for steam generator blowdown and condenser air ejector radiation i
IF all of the symptoms 1 through 3 above are met and when the following 4 tErough 7 are exhibited:
4.
Reactor coolant pressure is greater than 2000 psig and increasing AND l
5.
Pressurizer water level is greater than programmed no load water level AND 6.
The reactor coolant indicated subcooling is greater than 40 F.
AND 7.
Water level in at least one S/G is stable and increasing as verified by auxiliary feedwater flow to that S/G. Auxiliary feedwater flow to the unaffected S/G's should not be reduced below 400 G?M until indicated level is returned to within,the narrow range level instru-ment.
NOTE: Pressurizer water level should trend with reactor coolant system temperature. If the pressurizer water level is low enough to prohibit pressurizer heater operation, re-establish water level by operating the charging system. Energize the heaters.
THEN 8.
Reset safety injection and stop safety injection pumps not needed for normal charging and RCP seal injection flow.
CAUTION: Automatic reiniitiation of safety injection will not occur since the reactor trip breakers a.re not reset.
CAUTION: Subsequent to this step, should loss of offsite power occur, manual action (e'.g., manual safety injection initiation),
will be required to load the safeguards equipment onto the diesel powered emergency busses.
9.
Place all safety injection pumps not needed to provide normal changing flow in standby mode and maintain operable safety ';.jection flowpaths.
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'A SQNP E0I Units 1 and 2 Page 8 of 9 Rev. O III. ACCIDENT DIAGNOSTICS (continued)
Isolate safety injection flow to RCS Cold Legs via Boron Injection Tank 10.
and establish normal chcrging flow.
Close seal injection water flow control valve FCV-62-89.
a.
Open the charging pump suction valves from the VCT FCV-62-132 and 133 b.
Close the charging pump suction valves from the RWST FCV-62-135 and c.
136.
Open the centrifugal charging pumps.miniflow isolation valves FCV d.
98 and 99.
Close the BIT inlet isolation valves FCV-62-39 and 40 and outlet e.
isolation valves FCV-62-25 and 26.
f.
Open the charging line isoaltion valves FCV-62-90 and 91.
Open seal water heat exchanges inlet isolation valves FCV-62-61 and g.
63.
h.
Gradually open the seal injection water flow control valve FCV 89. Adjust the seal water flow to 8 GPM per RCP.
- 11. Reestablish normal makeup and letdown (if letdown is unaffected) to main-tain pressurizer water level in the normal operating range and to maintain reactor coolant pressure at values reached when safety injection is terminated. Ensure that water addition during this process does not result in dilution of the reactor coolant system boron concentration.
Open the letdown line isolation valve FCV-62-77 a.
b.
Open FCV-62-81 2 25% on hand and immediately open FCV-62-73 (45 GPM orifice isolation valve). Immediately adjust FCV-62-81 f'or desired letdown pressure setting, then place pressure control on auto.
(Normal pressure is E 320 PSIG @ normal letdown temp.)
NOTE: After charging and, letdown have been. established, additional letdown may be increased as condition permit.
Reestablish operation of the pressurizer heaters. When reactor coolant
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12.
Pressure can be controlled by pressurizer heaters alone, return makeup and letdown to pressurizer water level control only.
0.;
SQNP E0I Units I and 2 Page 9 of 9 Rev. O III. ACCIDENT DIAGNOSTICS (Continued)
IF af ter securing safety injection and attempting to transfer to normal NOTE:
pressurizer pressure and level control, reactor coolant presrure drops below the low pressurizer pressure setpoint for safety injection actuation (1870 psig) OR if pressurizer water level drogs below 10% of span, OR the reactor coolant sub-cooling drops below 40 F, THEN SAFETY INJECTION MUST BE MANUALLY REINITIATED Rediagnose plant conditions and proceed to the appropriate emergency instruction.
Stopping and starting of the high head safety injection pumps and CAUTION:
low head safety injection pumps can cause pump motor overheating or reduced motor life. Hence if the pumps are restarted once after termination, an additional 15 F of sub-cooling should be added to the requires sub-cooling prior to the second termination of the high head pumps.
IF after security safety injection and transferring the plant to normal NOTE:
pressurizer pressure and level control, the reactor coolant pressure does not drop below the low pressurizer pressure setpoint for safety injection actuation (1870 psig) AND the pressurizer water level remains above 10% span, AND the reactor coolant indicated subcooling is greater than 40 F, THEN go to AOI-19 for recovery from inadvertent safety in-jection.
4 SQNP E01 Units 1 & 2 Figure 1 f
Page 1.of I s
Rev. O HAS AN AUTOMATIC EVALUATE NEED FOR I RETURN TO REACTOR
)
NANUAL REACTOR IF NO I NORMAL NO TRIP OCCURRED?
TRIP i
OPERATION YES V
W VERITY MANUALI" INITIATE REACTOR REACTOR TRIP TRIP V
4 HAS AUTOMATIC EVALUATE NEED SI INITIATION NO FOR MANUAL IF NO
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OCCURRED 7 SI INITIATION YES IF YES C0 TO A01'S q
q VERIFY MANUALLY INITIATE SAFECUARDS N
SEQUENCE SI CHECK PAMS V
C0 TO FIGURE 2 FICURE 1 L
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.Sequo,ah "uclosr Plen'.
DISTRIBUTION 1C Plant flaster File
_,___ Superintendent 1U____ Assis tant Superintendent (Oper.)
EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION 1U Assistant Superintendent. (?!a in t. )
Administrative Supervisor EDI-1_
tlaintenance Supervisor (!!)
Assistant tlaintenance Supervi::or (M)
LO3S OF REAC"0E COOLANT Maintenance Supervisor (E)
Assistant ?!aintenance Supervisor (E)
Units 1 & 2
_ tlaintenance Supervisor (I)
Results Supervisor 1C Operations Supervisor Quality Assurance Supervisor r
~
- - ' HirlILfi"I'B9sicr Public Safety Services Supv.
Chief Storckeeper Preop Test Program Coordinator Outage Director Chemical Engineer (Results)
Radiochem Laboratory Instrument Shop Reactor Engineer (Results)
Instrument Engineer (Maint. (I))
_ Mechanical Engineer (Results)
Staff Industrial Engineer (Pl. Sys.)
1C Training Center Coordinat.or PSO - Chickamauga Engrg Unit - SNP Prepared By:
C.T. Benton Public Safety Services - SNP
- g~ Shift Engineer's Office Revi:md ny:
_ J.R. Walker
_yg Unit Control Room
)
QA&A Rep. - SNP Health Physics Laboratory Submitted By:
/
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11I Asst Dir NUC PR (Oper), 727 EB-C Sup. visor lif Nucicar Docu:.ent Contrel Unit, 606 E2-PORC Review:
// 2 / - P O 1 11 Supe rintendent., WBNP Date Superintendent, EFNP Superintendent, BENP IU NEB, W9C174C-K Approved by:
Supv., NPHPS ROB, MS Superirtendent 1U NRC-IE:II Power Security Officer, 620 CST 2-C 1
Nuc1ca r Mat.crials Coo rdinato r-1410 CUB D.s Le Approved:
k b __
Manager. OP-QA&A Staff 10 Resident NRC Inspector - SMP 1C _ NSRS, 249A EBB-K 1.Q_ Technical Support Center Rev. No.
D.i t_ e R. vised Paces Rev. No.
Date Revised Pages 10 3/31/80 All 11 QJ gq T,9,13,1h and 2h The la:;t page of this instruction is Number 28
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E0I-l - Units 1 and 2 Page 1 of 1 Rev. 10 PUZPOSE The objectives of these instructions are to specify required operator actions and prscautions necessary to:
1.
Verify and establish short term core cooling to prevent or minimize damage to the fuel cladding and release of excessive radioactivity.
2.
Maintain long term shutdown and cooling of the reactor by recirculation of spilled reactor coolant, injected water, water from melted ice bed and contain-ment spray system drainage.
This procedure is divided into two sections:
1.
Loss of reactor coolant (E0I-1A) 2.
Station blackout, with SIS reset, following a LOCA while in recirculation mode (E0I-1B).
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gQyy E0I-1A - Units 1 and 2 Page 1 of 15 Rev. 10 I. I! MEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION _
Refer to section on iramediate actions of E0I-0, imediate actions and diagnostics, if not already performed.
II. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS Monitor RWST level closely. If RWST level decreases rapidly such CAUTION:
that the RWST lov level alarm ( $ 29%) appears imminent, go directly to step "M" and then complete steps E through L as soon as possible.
The D/G's should not be operated at idle or minimum load for extended CAUTION _:
periods of time. If the diesels are shut down, they should be pre-pared for restart.
Verify that the Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) instruments are operating NOTE:
and recording. The following instruments are designated as PAM:::
1.
Containment Pressure PdI-30-hh, h5 2.
Refueling Water Storage Tank Ievel LI-63-50, 51 Steam Generator Water Level (narrow range) LI-3-39, 52, gh,107 3
h.
Steam Generator Water Level (vide range) LR h3, 98 5
Steam Line Pressure PI-1-2A, 2B, 9A, 9B, 20A, 20B, 27A, 27B 6.
Pressurizer Water Level LI-68-320, 335A 7
Reactor coolant system temperature TR-68-1, 60 8.
Reactor coolant syste'm pressure PI-68-68A, PR-68-66 NOTE: The process variables referred to in this instruction are typically monitored by more than one instrumentation channel. The redundant channels should be checked for consistency while performing the steps of this instruction.
NOTE: The pressurizer water level indication should always be used in conjunc-tion with other reactor coolant system indications to evaluate system condition and to initiate manual operator actions.
SQNP
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E0I-1A - Units 1 and 2 Page 2 of 15 Rev. 10 II.
SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
A.
As the water level (PAMS) in the refueling water storage tank decreases under the action of the safeguards pumps, check that the recirculation sump water level instrumentation indicates an increase in water level in the If a sump water level increase is not evident then a re-evaluation sump.
of the symptoms in E0I-0 must be conducted.
CAUTION: Reference Leg Heatup: High energy line breaks inside containment can result in heatup of level measurement ref. leg's on the SG's and PZR. This vill result in erroneous level indication, therefore it will be necessary to control the levels as follows during post accident S/G's - Level greater than h0% and less than 71% on narrow range PRZ - level greater than 50% and less than 70%.
Also use the following backup variables to verify the existence of water level in one or more S/G's:
1.
Auxiliary feedvater flov 2.
Steamline pressure 3
Wide range T and T hot eold Reference Leg Boiling: ~Ef!NOT rely upon S/G water level indi-cations in depressurized S/G's during post accidnt conditions.
Regulate the auxiliary feedvater flow to the steam generators to resore and/or maintain between k0% and 71% narrow range water level (PAMS). If narrow range water level in, creases in an unexplained manner in one steam generator, go to E0I-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
NOTE: Monitor the primary water supply (Condensate Storage Tank) for the auxiliary feedvater pumps and upon reaching a lov level, verify auto switch over to the alternate water supply source (ERCW). If auto switch over does not occur by the time the condensate storage tank level decreases to 6", manually switch over.
B.
Verify that all PZR PORV's are closed. Also verify the open status and availability of power to all PZR PORV backup isolation valves.
SQNP E0I-1A - Units 1 and 2 Page 3 of 15 l
Rev. 10 II.
SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)'
^
C.
NOTE: The conditions given below for termination of safety injection should be continuously monitored throughout this instruction:
Ensure that containment isolation is maintained, i.e., not reset until such time as manual action is required on necessary process streams.
Safety Injection can be terminated IF:
(1) Reactor coolant pressure is greater than 2000 psig and increasing, AND (2) Pressurizer water level is greater than 50% of span, MD (3) The reactor coolant indicated subcooling is' greater than h0 F MD (h) Water level in at least one Steam Generator is stable and increasing as verified by auxiliary feedwater flow to that S/G. Auxiliary feed-water flow to the unaffected S/G's should not be reduced below h00 GPM until indicated level is returned to within the narrow range level instrument.
THEN i
(S) Reset safety injection and stop safety injection pumps not needed for normal charging and RCP seal injection flow.
CAUTION: Automatic reinitiation of safety injection will not occur since the reactor trip breakers are not reset.
CAUTION: Subsequent to this step, should loss of offsite power occur, manual action (e.g., manual safety injection initiation) will be required to 16ad the safeguards equipment onto the diesel powered emergency busses.
NOTE: Should loss of offsite power occur du'ing injection mode, use r
~
E0I-1B subsequent operator actions in conjunction with this procedure to reestablish operation of' safety equipment that was operating prior to blackout.
r i
SQNP E0I-1A - Unito 1 and 2 Page h of 15 Rev. 10 II.
SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
(6) Place all safety injection pumps not needed to provide normal charging flow in standby mode and maintain operable safety injection flowpaths.
(T) Isolate safety injection flow to RCS Cold Legs via Boron Injection Tank and establish normal charging flow.
CAUTION: Monitor the primary system (RCS) throughout this instruction for indication of INADEQUATE CORE COOLING. Inadequate core cooling exists when:
i (a) 5 or more core exit thermocouples exhibit readings at above 1200 F, (on computer) i I
_OR (b) If the high range readings from the core exit thermo-ccuples (on computer) are not available, a condition of inadequate core cooling exists when:
The hot leg RTD's are pegged high or five or more incore thermocouples are off-scale above 700 F and SI flow is not being delivered to the RCS and AFW is not being delivered to the intact steam ge Aerators.
I If conditions in (a) or (b) are determined to exist see Appendix D of this procedure for instructions to restore core cooling.
NOTE: Use computer subcooling program and Appendix A to determine margin of subcooling being maintained.
CAUTION: If reactor coolant pressure drops below the low pressurizer i
pressure setpoint for safety injection (1870 psig) or pressurizer water level drops below 20% of span following termination of safety gnjection flow or reactor coolant sub-cooling drops below 40 F.
MANUALLY REINITIATE safety injection to establish reactor coolant pressure and pressurizer vr.ter level. Go to Section III of E0I-0 to reevaluate the evint, unless this reevaluation has already been performed.
CAUTION: Stopping and starting of the ?lgh head safety injection pumps and low head safety injection pumps can cause pump motor overheating or reduced motor life. Hence, if pumps are restarted once after termination, an additional 15 F of sub-cooling should be added to the required sub-cooling prior to the second termination of the high head pumps.
~g-4 I
SQNP E0I-1A - Units 1 and 2 Page 5 of 15 Rev. 10 II.
SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)_
(8) Reestablish normal makeup and letdown-(if letdown is unaffected) to maintain pressurizer water level and to maintain reactor coolant pr'ssure at values reached when safety injection is terminated.
Ensure that water addition during this process does not result in dilution of the reactor coolant system boron concentration.
(9) Reestablish operation of the pressurizer heaters. When reactor coolant pressure can be controlled by pressurizer heaters alone, return makeup and letdown to pressurizer water level control only, (see Appendix B for availability of PZR heaters).
(10) Monitor either the average temperature indication of core exit thermo-couples (if available) or all vide range reactor coolang temperature H (PAMS) to verify that RCS temperature is at least 50 F less than T
saturation temperature at RCS indicated pressure.
If,50 F indicated subcooling is not present, then at' tempt to establish 50 F indicated subcooling by steam dump from the steam generators to the condenser or the atmosphere, (see Appendix C for guidelines relative to natural circulation if RCP's are off).
CAUTIUN: If steam dump is necessary, reduce the steam generator pressure to 86h psig (200 psig below the lowest steam safety valve setpoint) and maintain a reactor coolant cooldown rate of no more than 50 F/HR, consistent with plant make'-up capability.
If 50 F indicated subcooling cannot be established or maintained, then manually reinitiate safety injection. Go to Section III of E0I-0 to re-evaluate the event,.unless this re-evaluation has already been performed.
(11) Perform a controlled cooldown to cold shutdown conditions using Normal Coo 31own Procedures if reqgired to affect repairs. Maintain subcooled (onditions (at least 50 F indicated subcooling) in t'ae reactor co)lant system. If subcooled conditions cannot be maintained, go to Ster D.
D.
If the conditi)ns for terminating safety injection in Step C are not met, maintain neces lary safety injection pumps operating.
If any safeguards equipment is n$t operating, attempt to operate the equipment from the control room or locally. Effect' repairs if necess'ry.
If reactor coolant a
pressure is above the lov head safety injection pump shut-off head, manually reset safety injection so that safeguards equipment can be controlled by manual action. Stop the low head safety injection pumps and place in the standby s ie.
CAUTION _: Whenever the reactor coolant pressure decreases below the low head safety injection shutoff head, the low head safety injection pumps must be manually restarted to deliver fluid to the reactor coolant system.
s
~
SQNP EOI-1A - Units 1 and 2 Page 6 of 15 Rev. 11 II.
SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
E.
Transfer NR-45 to one source range and one intermediate range channel.
F.
Verify control room ventilation isolation (see S0I-30.1B)
G.
Close U-2 containment equipment hatch temporary doors (734' el.) and check equipment transfer hatch cover in place (734' elelevation to lower elevation).
Request performance of SI-268 to verify position of P-4 contacts (failure H.
of P-4 contacts may prevent resetting SI signal).
I.
Declare Gas Condition I J.
Leave both trains of EGTS in service till recovery portion of procedure is carried out.
K.
Verify A-A and B-B containment air return fans in service (10 min time delay af ter phase B) and suction dampers ZS-30-72 and ZS-30-73 open L.
Stop reciprocating charging pump if in service M.
Stop ALL reactor coolant pumps after the high head safety injection pump operation has been verified and when the wide range reactor coolant y pressure decreases to 1500 psig.
CAUTION:
If component cooling water to the reactor coolant pumps is isolated on a containment phase "B" signal, all reactor coolant pumps are to be stopped within 5 minutes because of loss of motor bearing cooling.
CAUTION:
If reactor coolant pumps are stopped, the seal injection flow should be maintained.
NOTE: The conditions given above for stopping reactor coolant pumps should be continuously monitored throughout this instruction.
N.
Verify UHI accumulator isolation valves close on low level after accumulator liquid is dumped.
O.
Verify cold leg accumulators dump their contents'if RCS pressure decreases below = 400 psig.
P.
In the case of a break characterized by reactor coolant pressure quickly decreasing below steam generator pressure, go to step T.
In the case of a break characterized by a slowly decreasing reactor coolant pressure or.
stabilized reactor coolant system pressure above the lowest steam system safety valve setpoint, (1064 psig), the following additional manual actions should be taken to aid the cooldown and depressurization of the reactor coolant system:
SQNP E0I-1A - Unito 1 and 2 Page 7 of 15 Rev. 10 II.
SUBSEQUENT OPER*iTOR ACTIONS (continued _
If the main condenser is in service, check pressure equalized across P.
1.
MSIV and open at least one main steamline isolation valves or bypass valves and transfer the steam dump control to steam header pressure control and dump steam to the condenser to lover the reactor coolant temperature (PAMS) and consequently the reactor coolant pressure.
If the main condenser is not in service, dump steam to the atmosphere 2.
with the steam relief valves to lower the reactor coolant temperature and consequently the reactor coolant pressure.
Reduce the steam generator pressure to 86h psig (200 psig CAUTION :
below the lowest steam system safety valve setpoint) and maintain a reactor coolant cooldown rate of no more than 50 F/HR, consistent with plant make-up capability.
If RWST low level alarm ( 6 29%) is not imminent, then consideration should Q.
be given to performing a preliminary evaluation of the plant status as follows:
1.
Periodically check auxiliary' building area radiation monitors for detection of leakage.
If significant leakage is detected attempt to isolate the leakage and implement the required radiation protection.
The injectio flov to the RCS must be maintained at all times.
2.
While the plant is,in cold leg injection mode, make provisions for c.n evaluation of equipment in the plant. See Appendix G for checkoff list. Follow rad 5ation control methods while performing checklist.
3 Prior to the time specified for the plant switchover to the cold leg recirculation mode:
Re-energize breakers, as required, for valves needed to affect a.
switchover.
If containment spray has been actuated, and if the containment pressure is R.
reduced to nominal operating pressure (-0.1 to + 0.3 PSID), reset containment Spray pumps should be shutoff and placed in the si,andby, mode with spray.
operable flow paths.
S.
Just prior to going on recirculation mode, reset safety injection, if not previously reset.
CAUTION: If a blackout occurs after switching to the recirculation mode,.
see E0I-1B.
- y-
SQNP E0I-1A - Units 1 and 2 Page 8 of 15 Rev. 11 II.
SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont.)
T.
The following automatic phase of switch-over from the injection to the recirculation mode is initiated when the RWST is at low level E 29%
(120,000 gal) coincident with a containment sump level of E 10%.
NOTE: The times provided at the end of subsequent steps are normal times for the valves to travel full stroke.
NOTE: All operator actions must be performed expeditiously, in a precise, orderly sequence. Do not interrupt the changeover operation until all actions are completed.
If a valve fails to respond or to complete its demanded operation, postpone any corrective actions' until the subsequent steps are performed except as noted. Loss of one complete train of power will allow the other train to be swapped, and parallel valves required to be closed will require one valve to be closed locally, see Appendix F for contingency actions.
1.
Verify that valves FCV-63-72 (A-A) and FCV-63-73 (B-B) RHR pumps suction from containment sump, start to open while RHR pumps continue to run. (40 sec.)
CAUTION:
If a containment sump valve cannot be opened, stop the corresponding RHR pump.
2.
Verify the valves FCV-74-3 and FCV-74-21, RHR pumps suction from RWST start to close.
(2 min)
U.
The following manual operations are ione upon verification that the automatic switchover phase has begun.
CAUTION: Immediately stop any pumpts taking suction from the RWST on indication of the RWST being empty. Complete the switchover steps listed below, thcn restart required pumps.
1.
Close the following RHR HX outlet crosstie valves.
Close FCV-74-33 (40 sec) a.
b.
Close FCV-74-35 (40 sec) 2.
Open the following component cooling valves:
(Panel M-27B)
Open FCV-70-156 RHR HX A outlet (60 sec) a.
b.
Open FCV-70-153 RHR HX, B outlet (60 sec)
NOTE: During a loss of power train situation it may be necessary y
6 to throttle back on unaffected. units component cooling water.
.g.
i
o o
SQNP E01-1A - Units 1 and 2 Page 9 of 15 Rev. 10 II.
SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont.)
3.
Verify flow to the RCS from the safety injection pumps and close the following SI pump miniflow valves:
CAUTION: Repressurization of the RCS following performance of the following steps may cause damage to the SI pumps if-pumps are not removed from service or provided with an adequate flow path (maintain RCS pressure less than SI pump shutoff head for adequate flow path).
Close FCV-63-4 SI pump A-A miniflow (10 see) a.
b.
Close FCV-63-175 SI pump B-B miniflow (10 sec.)
Close FCV-63-3 SI pumps A and B miniflow to RWST c.
(10 see) 4.
Verify that the automatic valve realignments in step T above have been completed.
5.
Open the following:
Open FCV-63-8 RHR HX A outlet to centrifugal charging a.
pumps suction and SI pump A suction (10 sec) b.
Open FCV-63-11 RHR HX B outlet to SI pump B suction (10 sec) 6.
Close FCV-63-1 RHR pump suction header from RWST (2 min)
NOTE: 480V breaker must be closed before operating valve from control room (Rx MOV bd Al-A) 7.
Open the following parallel valves:
Open FCV-63-6 RHR HX A to SI pump A suction (10 sec) a.
b.
Open FCV-63-7 RHR HX A to SI pump A suction (10 see) 8.
Afte.r completion of the above steps verify that the two SI pumps and centrifugal charging pumps are receiving suction supply flow from the RHR pump, and proper flow is estab-lished to RCS cold legs on all injection pumps.
CAUTION: Do not perform steps 9 and 10 until the above verifica-tion is made.
i
. _.. _ _ _ -.... ~. _.. _... _.. -
SQNP E0I-1A - Units 1 and 2 Page 10 of 15 Rev. 10 II. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
Close FCV-63-5 safety injection pump suction from RWST' 9.
(2 min) 10.
Close the following:
Close FCV-62-135 RWST to centrifugal charging pump a.
suction (10 sec) b.
Close FCV-62-136 RWST to centrifugal charging pump suction (10 sec).
11.
Periodically check auxiliary building area radiation monitors for detection of leakage from ECCS during recirculation.
If significant leakage has been identified in the ECCS, attempt to isolate the leakage. The recirculation flow to the RCS must be maintained at all times.
12.
While the plant is in cold leg recirculation mode, make provisions for an evaluation of equipment in the plant if not previously done.
Request sample of recirculation sump and adjust sump PH if required.
V. After going into the recirculation mode, the containment spray pumps will continue using water from the RWST. Upon reaching the RWST low-low level alarm point (C-8% = 50,000 gallons), as indicated on the qualified, PAM indicator channels, realign the Containment Spray System. The following steps are required for the realignment of the Containment Spray System from the injection to the recirculation mode.
Stop both containment spray pumps (CSP) (" pull to lock in stop" to preclude 1.
the possibility of pump restart while realigning suction valves).
2.
Close the following valves:
Close FCV-72-22 containment spray pump A-A sucti,on from a.
RWST (1 minute) b.
Close FCV-72-21 containment spray. pump B-B suction from RWST (1 minute)
SQNP E0I-1A - Units 1 and 2 Page 11 of 15 Rev. 10 II.
SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued) 4.
Open the following CSP suction valves:
Open FCV-72-23 containment spray pump A-A suction a.
from containment sump (1 min) b.
Open FCV-72-20 containment spray pump B-B suction from containment sump (1 min)
CAUTION: If the pump suction valve from sump or the RHR contain-ment sump valve will not open, do not restart the corresponding containment spray pump.
5.
Observe CSP suction valves from containment sump full open. Step 4 above.
(1 min) 6.
Start containment spray pump A-A (HS-72-27A) 7.
Start containment spray pump B-B (HS-72-10A) 8.
Verify at least 4500 gpm flow on CSP A-A (FI-72-34) 9.
Verify at least 4500 gpm flow on CSP B-B (FI-72-13) 10.
After completing the preceding steps, verify that the safety injection system is aligned for cold leg recirculation per Appendix E.
CAUTION: DO NOT remove either of the EGTS trains from service until recovery from the accident is planned. Flow switch problem may prevent restart of equipment.
W.
Thirty minutes or longer af ter the accident occurs, place one of the operating auxiliary building gas treatment systems in standby operation according to SOI-30.6.
X.
Af ter E 15 minutes (sooner if possible) stop the emergency diesel gen-erators if offsite power has not been interrupted, and prepare for restart.
Y.
Approximately two (2) hours aftbr a design basis' accident, the ice in the ice condenser will be depleted. At this time, containment pressure will' increase and if containment pressure increases to 9.5 psig, place one train of RHR in containment spray mode.
SQNP E0I-1A - Units 1 and 2 Page 12 of 15 Rev. 11 II.
SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
Sequence of operator actions required to establish RHR containment spray Z.
flow on train A or B:
Train "A" RHR contsinment spray initiation.
Close the RHR cold leg isolation valve FCV-63-93.
1.
Open the RHR containment spray header isolation valve 2.
FCV-72-40.
Train "B" RHR containment spray initiation.
Close the RHR cold leg isolation valve FCV-63-94.
1.
Open the RHR containment spray header isolation valve 2.
FCV-72-41.
Approximately 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> after transferring to cold leg recirculation, AA.
realign one train of ECCS for hot leg recirculation to assure against an excessive buildup of boric acid concentration in core.
CAUTION: Due to possible cavitation in the vicintly of FCV-74-35 and piping tee downstream of this valve under high flow and low head j
Use Train conditions; use Train A RHR for hot leg recirculction.
B RHR for hot leg recirculation only in extreme emergency. While Train A F001 is in hot leg recirculation, leave Traia B RHR in cold leg recirculation.
Train A RHR Changeover to H.L. Recirculation (Preferred) 1.
Close FCV-63-93, RHR pump A-A cold leg isolation valve a.
.y b.
Verify FCV-74-35 closed and open FCV-74-33, crosstie isolation valve between discharge lines of RHR heat exchanger Open FCV-63-172, RHR pump H.L. isolation valve-c.
d.
Verify H.L.' flow on FI-63-173.
9 t
SQNP E0I-1A - Units 1 and 2 Page 13 of 15 Rev. 11 II.
SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTION (continued) 2.
Train B RHR Changeover to H.L. Recirculation (Used Only if Train A Cannot be Used)
Close FCV-63-94, RHR pump B-B C.L. isolation valve a.
4:
b.
Verify FCV-74-33 closed and open FCV-74-35, RHR pump B-B crosstie valve If not open, open FCV-63-172, RHR pump H.L. isolation c.
valve d.
Verify H.L. flow on FI-63-173.
3.
Realign the safety injection pumps to deliver through the hot leg injection headers to the reactor coolant system.
Stop A-A safety injection pump.
a.
b.
Close FCV-63-152, safety injection pump A-A crosstie isolation valve Verify FCV-63-152 closed, then open FCV-63-156, safety af c.
injection pump A-A hot leg isolation valve
~
d.
Start safety injection pump A-A and verify flow to the RCS through the hot leg header.
(FI-63-151)
Stop B-B safety injection pump e.
f.
Close FC-63-153, safety injection pump B-B crosstie isolation valve Verify FCV-63-153 closed, then open FCV-63-157, safety 4-g.
injection pump B-B hot 1eg isolation valve-
~
Start safety injection pump B-B and verify flow to the h.
RCS through the hot leg header.
(FI-63-20)
Close SIS pump isolation' valve FCV-63-22 with HS-63-22A J.
~
S@P E0I-1A - Units 1 and 2 Page 14 of 15 Rev. 10 II.
SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
Ptop the containment spray pump when determined that the containment BB, pressure vill stay below 0.25 psig, if not previously done, reset phase "B" and place spray pumps in standby with operable flow path.
CC.
1.
Place one train of H rec mbiners in service per SOI 83.1 if contain-concentration reaches h% by volume, but no later than 2h hours 2
ment H after the accident to ensure a mixture of less than 2h hours after the 2
accident to ensure a mixture of less than h%, by volume, in contain-Place the other train of H, recombiner in service if contain-ment.
ment H concentration reaches 1% By volume.
2 Each recombiner is rated @ 75 Kw maxicum capacity. If diesel gener-ators are carrying the electrical load, do not exceed 4000 Kv continuously or hh00 Kw for a two hour period. If maiimum load on diesel generators will be reached, notify SRO and make evaluation on which equipment may be safely removed from diesel generator load so as to a31ov loading of recombiners.
2.
Monitor the containment H gas m nitor and once per shift have the 2
containment air sampled and in the event containment atmosphere reaches 3% H, by volume,'the H2 purge system vill also be placed in serviceper$0I-83.1.
NOTE: Sample frequency may be changed based on rate of change of H
n entration and radiation dose received drawing sample.
2 3
Keep containment air return fans in service for duration of H2 buildup problem.
DD.
Guidelines for removing H2.and other non-condensables from the primary system when trapped and cannot escape to containment.
1.
Keep primary system pressure as high as possibic to prevent bubble from enlarging and also to entrain more non-condensables in the reactor coolant water.
e 1
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SQNP E0I-1A - Units 1 and 2 Page 15 of 15 Rev. 10 II.
SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
With Phase "B" isolation reset and RCP's operating (RCP #1 or 2), PZR 2.
heaters operable, use spray valves periodically to strip non-condensables from water to PZR vapor space. Then open PZR PORV momentarily to vent non-condensables to PRT where it can be vented to waste gas system or to containment if RPT rupture disc is blown. With RCP's not operable, Auxiliary spray may be used for stripping non-condensables.
3.
If normal CVCS letdown can be accomplished, non-condensables can be stripped in VCT vapor space and then vented to waste gas system and stored in waste gas decay tanks.
CAUTION: If this method is used, monitor CVCS system closely for leakage and set up, 7per radiation protection measures.
4.
After careful consideration, if it is decided that it is desirable to burp non-condensables from the upper head area, a slow (~ 10 psig/
min) controlled depressurization can be utilized to gradually burp non-condensables into #2 hot leg from the vessel upper head into PZR eurge line where it can be vented to the PRT.
CAUTION: If RCP cavitation occurs, trip RCP's.
CAUTION: If during controlled depressurization flow blockage occurs as indicated by increasing temperature of RCS, re-pressurize l
and establish flow.
i III. RECOVERY The reactor will remain in recirculation mode for an indefinite period of time.
Instructions for recovery shall be prepared when the condition of the contain-ment and the accident evaluation is determined.
IV. REFERENCES FSAR 15.31 6.3 J,
m e
s
, -, -+-
m..
E0I-1B - Units 1 and 2 Paga 1 of 5
)
Rev. 10 STATION BLACK 0UT WITH SIS RESET FOLLOWING A LOCA IN RECIRCULATION MODE I.
SYMPTOMS A.
Loss of normal control room lights and energency lights on.
B.
Loss of all loads connected to the 6 9-kV and h80-V unit board and 6.9-kV and h80-V shutdown board.
C.
"6900-V unit board 1A (1B, 1C, and 1D) (2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D) failure or undervoltage." (Setpoint 68 percent of normal voltage after 5 seconds time delay.)
D.
"h80-V unit board 1A (1B) (2A and 2B) undervoltage or transfer."
(Setpoint 60 percent of normal voltage after 5 seconds time delay.)
E.
"6900-V SD Board 1A-A (1B-B) (2A-A and 2B-B) failure or undervoltage."
(Setpoint h4 percent of normal voltage after 1.5 seconds time delay.)
F.
"480-V SD Board 1Al-A (1A2-A and 2B1-B and 1B2-B) (2Al-A, 2A2-A, 2B1-B, and 2B2-B) failure or undervoltage." (Setpoint 68 percent of normal voltage after 2 seconds time delay.)
G.
"6900-V start bus failure or undervoltage" on control building recording annunciator.
(Setpoint 79 percent of normal voltage after 2 seconds time delay.)
II. AUTCMATIC ACTION A.
Diesel generators lA-A,1B-B, 2A-A, and 2B-B start and close on their respective 6900-V shutdown, board for boards that lost voltage.
B.
Blackout sequence initiated for boards that lost voltage.
III. IMIEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION A.
If a station blackout happens after the LOCA when the emergency core cooling system is in the sump recirculation mode and the SIS has been reset, proceed as follows (only for the unit which has the LOCA):
CAUTION: Do not reinstate the SIS, as this would cause manually reposi-tioned valves or other equipment to go to the condition for the post LOCA recirculation mode.
1.
Verify that the diesel generators close in on the 6900V shutdown boards and the " Blackout Sequencer" starts sequencing loads for boards that lost voltas.
2.
Lockout centrifugal charging pumps prior to (preferred) or just after they start to prevent pump cavitation until RHR pumps are restarted.
- l "l ~
i 9
/
SQNP E0I-1B - Units 1 and 2 Page 2.of 5 Rev. 10 III. I!C4EDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)_
Secure the pressurizer heaters (all) "off" to prevent overloading the 3
diesel generators.
h.
Start control air compressors A and B locally.
5 Watch diesel loads closely. Start the following as soon as possible If diesel loads get without overloading the diesel generators.
excessive, secure equipment in subsequent actions step A.1 below before starting additional equipment.
a.
RHR pumps b.
Centrifugal charging pumps c.
SIS pumps Containment spray pumps (containment pressurejt.81 psig) 2 d.
Containment air return fans if not running, and @ B has initiated.
e.
6.
Announce blackout on PA system.
IV. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS For the unit which underwent the LOCA, secure the following loads A.
1.
(this is done to avoid later overloading the diesels)
OFF:
(a) Reactor lover compartment fans.
NOTE: Will not come on if $ B is not reset.
(b) Control rod drive mechanism cooler fans.
NOTE: Will not come on if %B is not reset.
(c) Boric acid transfer pumps.
Start 2.
The following loads are fed from the diesel generators.
equipment as necessary to reestablish operation of safety equipment that was operating prior to blackout.
Do not delay the following starts, but at all times CAUTION :
keep each diesel generator total load at or belhv 4000 Kv continuously and hk00 Kv for 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> period. If maximum load limits become a problem, notify SRO and decide which components may be removed from service safely.
-\\r-
w,..
, i-E0I-1B - Unite 1 and 2 Paga 3 of 5 Rev. 10 IV. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS'(continued) 2.
(a) Control building cleanup fan, if not running (b) Control building pressure fan, if not running (c) Hydrogen recombiner (H2 y %) SOI-83.1 B.
The following loads are fed from the diesel generators. Verify equipment operating or start as necessary to reestablish pre-blackout conditions:
NOTE: Watch total loads closely.
1.
Essential raw cooling water pumps 2.
Component cooling water per.ps 3
Containment spray pumps 4.
Control building main control room condensing unit 5
Control building electric board room condensing unit 6.
Auxiliary control air compressor 7
Containment air return fans 8.
Vent radiation monitor 10.
Spent fuel pit cooling pump 11.
125-V Vital Battery Chargers 12.
Energency lighting cabinet 13 Fuel handling area exhaust fan (after h hours)
~
lb.
Shut down board room air conditioner chiller 15 Shut down board room elev. 73h AHU 16.
Electric board room AHU 17 Radiation monitor and sampling 18.
Safety injection pump AHU 19 Centrifugal charging pump AHU 20.
Control room air conditioner AHU
- \\c;-
cynr E0I-1B - Units 1 and 2 Page h of 5 Rev. 10 IV. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS'(continued) 21.
Containment spray pump AHU 22.
Pipe chase AHU 23 Penetration rooms el. 669, el 690, el. 71h AHU's t
2h. Auxiliary feedvater pumps 25 Shutdown transformer exhaust fans
- 26. Control building cleanup fans 27 Elev. Th9 board room pressure supply fans
- 28. Elev. 749 board room AHU's 29 Elev. Th9 board room zondenser units 30.
Elev. Th9 board room compressors 31.
Control building battery room elev. 669 exhaust fans 32.
Emergency gas treatment fans and heaters
- 33. Auxiliary building gas treatment fans and heaters 3h. Emergency gas treatment room AHU 35 CCS and AFW AHU
- 36. Shutdown board room air conditioner pressure fan 37 Station air compressor
- 38. Control building pressure fans 39 Shutdown board room air conditioner CW pump h0.
Essential raw cooling water strainer
- 41. Hydrogen recombiner 42.
Boric acid transfer pump h3. Boric acid tank heater kh. Motor operated valves h5 Charging pump auxiliary oil pump,
i*
SQNP E01-1B - Units 1 and 2 Page 5 of 5 Rev. 10 IV. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (Continued)
- 46. 24 volt microwave battery charger
- 47. Diesel starting air compressor
- 48. Diesel battery board exhaust fan
- 49. Diesel building exhaust fans
- 50. Diesel building 'sel oil transfer pump 51.
Diesel building lighting cabinet 52.
125-volt battery charger
- 53. Diesel engine day tank fuel transfer pump
- 54. AERCW pump station trace heating cabinet
- 55. Room exhaust fan
- 56. ERCW pump station fan and heater
- 57. ERCW traveling screen and wash pump
- 58. Spent fuel pit pump AHU
- 59. Diesel building electric heat
- 60. PZR heaters V. RECOVERY Once the required electrical loads are restarted to establish preblackout conditions, continue RCS cooldown in accordance with E0I-1A.
VI. REFERENCES FSAR 6.3 i -
SQNP E0I Unita 1 and 2 Appendix A Page 1 of 1 Rev. 10 SATURATION STEAM TABLE (Temperatures rounded to nearest F)
Sat.
50 F Sat.
50 F PSIG Temp F Subcooled PSIG Temp F Subcooled 100 h22 372 1350 584 53h 350 436 386 1400 588 538 400 hh8 398 1450 593 543 450 459 kO9 1500 597 547 500 h70 h20 1550 602 552-550 480 430 1600 606 556 600 489 439 1650 610 560 650 h97 kh7 1700 61h 56h 700 505 h55 1750 618 568 750 513 h63 1800 622 572 800 520 470 1850 626 576 850 527 477 1900 630 580 900 53h 484 1950 633 583 950 Sho 490 2000 637
'587 1000 546 496 2050 6ho 590 1050 552 502 2100 6kk 59h l
1100 558 508 2150 647 597 t
1150
.563 513 2200 650-600 1200 569 519 2235 653_
603 1250 57h 524 2250 65h 60k 1300 579
'529 i
Saturation temperatures may be read from hot leg temperature RTD's or incore T/C s.
g.
SQNP E0I Unita 1 and 2 Appendix B Page 1 of 1 Rev. 10 PZR Htr's available as follows:
1A-A:
1)
!!anual operation allowed immediately following SI 2)
Auto operation allowed 90 sec. following blackout 3)
Manual operation allowed 90 sec. following B0 and SI 1B-B:
1)
Manual operation allowed immediately following SI 2)
Auto operation allowed 90 sec. following blackout 3)
Manual operation allowed 90 sec. following B0 and SI 1C:
1)
Manual / auto operation allowed following B0 by resetting B0 signal.
2)
Manual / auto operation allowed following SI by resetting SI signal.
1D:
1)
Manual / auto operation allowed following BO by resetting B0 signal.
2)
Manual / auto operation allowed following SI by resetting SI si6nal.
0
SQNP E0I Units 1 and 2 Appendix C Page 1 of 1 Rev. 11 NATURAL CIRCULATION A.
The following are guidelines to determine if natural circulation is taking place in the primary system under subcooled conditions.
1.
Core AT as read on wide range RTD's (hot and cold) or an indicated AT between W.R. cold leg and incore T/C's should be stable or dropping. A relatively stable AT with values less than 55 F with a gradual decrease indicates natural circulation.
2.
Incore T/C's temperature indicating below saturation temperature for the existing primary system pressure.
3.
Heat is being removed from the primary system by secondary system, i.e.,
S/G's steaming and water being added to S/G's and secondary system pressure near saturation for the primary system temperature.
a B.
The following are guidelines to enhance natural circulation under subcooled t
conditions.
1.
Keep S/G levels in narrow range (tubes covered), between 40% and 71% for post accident instrument error.
2.
Keep primary system pressure above saturation pressure for the existing hot leg (W.R.) temperature or incore T/C temperature if possible.
3.
Use candenser steam dump or S/G PORV's to steam off and cool primary system at desired rate.
CAUTION:
If steam dump is necessary, reduce the S/G pressure to 864 psig (200 PSIG below the lowest steam safety valve setpoint) and maintain a reactor coolant cooldown rate of no more than 50 F/
HR, consistent with plant makeup capability.
1
-(
C.
The following are operator actions required to establish, maintain and monitor f
two-phase natural circulation:
Y 1.
Verify safety injection flow is being delivered'to the core.
If not, attempt to operate equipment manually or locally.
{
2.
Verify auxiliary feedwater flow is being delivered tothe S/G's.
If not,,
attempt to operate equipment manually or locally.
"I 3.
Regulate the auxiliary feedwater flow to the S/G's to restore and main-tain an indicated narrow range water level, i
4.
Monitor the core exit thermocouple temperatures to verify adequate core cooling.
w w'*
E0I Unito 1 and 2 Appendix D Page 1 of 1 Rev. 10 INSTRUCTIONS TO RESTORE CORE COOLING DURING A SMALL LOCA A.
PURPOSE To specify precautions and operation actions aimed at restoring a condition of core cooling during a small LOCA.
B.
ACTIONS 1.
Throughout this i;Jtruction, continue efforts to provide safety injection and/or charging flow to the RCS and/or feedwater flow to the S/G's.
Attempt to operate equipment manually locally, if possible.
2.
Continue monitoring of core exit thermocouples to det, ermine effectiveness of subsequent action.
3 Depressurize the RCS by:
Dumping steam to the condeneer, or a.
If the condenser is not available,~ dump steam through the atmosphere e.
relief valves, or, CAUTION: Depressurization through use of the S/G's should only be attempted if there is an effective water level and auxiliary or main feedwater is available, c.
Open the PZR FORV's only it:
1.
SIS or charging is available to deliver to the BCS.
2.
RCS depressurizat, ion cannot be accomplished by steam relief from the S/G's.
3 Feedwater is not available to maintcin the steam generator secondary water level at an effective level.
k.
If no means for RCS depressurization are available, or if the depressuriza-tion did not result in decreasing core exit thermocouple temperatures, then start a reactor coolant pump, if possible.
CAUTION: During the conduct of this instruction, the RWST level should be monitored for switchover to cold leg recirculaticn, if required.
- j[ {' -
b@r E0I Unitz 1 and 2 Appendix E Page 1 of 1 Rev. 10 COLD LEG RECIRCULATION VERIFICATION A.
One RHR Pump is delivering from the containment recirculation sump directly to two reactor coolant system cold legs ar ' to the suction of one SI pump and one centrifugal charging pump.
B.
The other RHR Pump is delivering from the containment recirculation sump directly to two reactor coolant system cold legs and to the suction of one SI pump and one centrifugal charging pump.
C.
The two SI pumps and two centrifugal charging pumps e'e taking suction from the RHR pumps and are delivering to f6ur reactor coolant system cold legs.
D.
The suction paths from the RWST to all safety injection pumps have been isolated.
E.
If containment spray is required, verify that flow is being delivered.
4 e
O
- ab-I
U@Y E0I Unito 1 and 2 Appendix F Page 1 of 1 Rev. 10 CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 1.
Containment Recirculation Sump Valve Fails to Open If a containment recirculation sump valve cannot be opened, stop the corres-ponding RHR pump and verify that:
A.
One RHR pump is delivering flow to two reactor coolant system cold legs and to the suction of two SI pumps and two centrifugal charging pumps.
B.
The two SI pumps and the two centrifugal charging pumps are delivering to four reactor coolant system cold legs.
2.
Loss of One Train of Electrics 1 Power _
A.
If the single active failure is the failure of one of the emergency diesel generators to start in conjunction with a LOCA and a loss of offsite power, electrical power would not be available to one of the vital safe-guard busses. As a consequence, all engineered safeguards equipment assigned to that corresponding electrical power train vould not be avail-able for operation until power could be restored to that bus.
The instruction for switchover to cold leg recirculation, assuming a train failure, is essentially the same as the instruction which assumed no single failures.
Follow the no single failures instruction starting with step T, with the understanding that those valves, without power, do not have to be repositioned.
It should.be noted that if a train failed subsequent to the initiation of the SI signal additional steps may be required.
For example, if no failure is assumed, the parallel suction valves in the line from the RWST to the charging pump suction header would open on an SI signal. Should a subse-quent failure of one of the electrical trains occur, one of the parallel suction valves could not be closed from the main control room. Therefore, positive isolation of the RWST to charging pump suction path would have to be accomplished locally.
e
- J '1 -
SQNP E0I Units 1 and 2 Appendix G Page 1 of 1 Rev. 10 EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY EVALUATION FOLLOWING A IACA MID SM4PLING NOTE: Use appropriate SOI's to assist in equipment evaluation.
l.
Verify centrifugal charging pump availability.
2.
Verify safety injection pump availability.
3.
Verify RHR pump availability i
k.
Verify recirculation mode header and valve availability s
Verify containment vent isolation equ'ipment availability j
5 l
6.
Verify containment Phase "A" isolation equipment availability.
l T.
Verify containment Phase "B" isolation equipment availability.
l 8.
Verify D/G availability a.
Fuel supply adequate b.
Starting air system operable 9
Verify auxiliary feedwater system availability.
10.
Verify shutdown board system availability.
11.
Verify RCP availability.
12.
Verify Containment upper and love cooler availability.
~
13.
Verify CRDM cooler availability.
Ih.
Verify containment spray equipment availability.
15 Request sampling of containment atmosphere.
16.
Request sampling of RCS for:
a.
Boron concentration b.
Fuel damage c.
pH
~
., ' i:cquoy h ; ucice.r P1mt DISTRInttr:0N
,1C _ Plant t! aster File Superintendent 1U Assistant. Superintendent (0,er.)
1U Assistant Superintendent. (fla i nt. )
EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION Administ.ratIve Supervisor Maintenance Supervisor (;!)
E0I _ Assistant. flaintenance Supervisor (M)
MainLenance Supervisor (E)
LCSS OF SECONDARY COOLANT Assistant Maintenance Supervisor (E)
Maintenance Superviser (I)
Units 1 and 2 Results Supervisor 1C Operations Supervisor Quality Assurance Supervisor s
liduttXTh9si~cs
~
~
~~
Public Safety Services Supv.
Chief Storekeeper Preop Test Program Coordinator Outage Director Chemical Enginecr (Results)
Radiochem Laboratory Instrument Shop Reactor Engineer (Results)
Instrument Engineer (Maint. (I))
l Mechanical Engineer (Results)
Staf f Industrial Engineer (Pl. Svs.)
1C Training Center Coordinator PSO - Chickamauga Engrg I' nit - SNP J.R. Walker.
Public Safety Services - SNP Prepared By:
1C Shift Engineer's Office J.R. Walker Revised By:
1C Unit Control Room QA&A Rep. - SNP Submitted By: '
//)/)
!!calth Physics Laboratory Supes s o' r
~ ~ ~
1 11 Asst Dir NUC PR (Oper), 727 EB-C 1 11 Nuclear Document Control' Unit, 606 EB-PORC lieview:
J/_ 2/1,g3 _
J, Superintendent., VBNP Date Superintendent, BFNP Superintendent, BENP lif NEB, W9C174C-K Supv., NPHPS ROD, MS Approved By:
super utendent.
11, NRC-IE:II Power Security Officer, 620 CST 2-C I
Nuclear Materials Coordinator-1410 CUE
_M h
Manager. OP-QA&A Staff Date Approved:
L 1c Resident NRC Inspector - SNP l
1c NSRS, 249A HBB-K 1C. Technical Support Centet Ih v.
No.
Date Revised pagen Rev. No.
Date
, Revi sed Pa ges 9
3/31/80 All l
,Jl g 3,6,9,13 and ik 10 16 l
The last page of this instruction is Number
-~
.r.
sqyy E0I Unita 1 & 2 Page 1 of 1 Rev. 9 PURPOSE The objectives of these instructions are as follows:
To establish stabilized reactor coolant system and steam generator condi-1.
tions prior to plant cooldown.
To minimize the energy release due to the break by isolation of the 2.
break where possible.
To prevent the PZR safety valves from lifting by dumping steam from all 3.
steam generators to the main condenser when possible or to the atmos-phere from the unaffected steam generators.
To isolate the auxiliary feedwater flow to the affected steam generator, h.
to maximize auxiliary feedwater flow to the intact steam generators, and minimize the energy release.
To borate the reactor coolant to establish and maintain reactor shut-5 down margin.
l O
a
.l s
1 il i
)
f-e.,,,
SQNP E01 Units 1 & 2 Page I of 8 Rev. 9 I.
IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS Refer to section on Immediate Operator Actions of EOI-0, Immediate Actions and Diagnostics, if not already performed.
II.
MANUAL ACTIONS:
Verify the actuation of steamline isolation. If not actuated, manually init-iate steamline isolation.
III. SUPSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS The diesels should not be operated at idle or minimum load for CAUTION:
extended periods of time.
If the diesels are shut down, they should be prepared for restart.
The process variables referred to in this Instruct *on are typically NOTE:
The redundant monitored by more than one instrumentation craauel.
channels should be checked for consistency while performing the steps of this Instruction.
i The pressurizer water level indication should alw'ays be used in conjunc-NOTE:
tion with other reactor coolant system indications to evaluate system conditions and to initiate manual operator actions.
If reactor coolant pressure is above the low head safety injection A.
pump shut-off head, manually reset safety injection so that safeguards equipment can be controlled by manual action. Ensure that containment isolation is maintained. Stop the low head safety injection pumps and place in the standby mode and request performance of SI-268 to verify P-4 contact. position (failure of P-4 contacts will prevent reset of SI signal).
CAUTION: Whenever the wide range reactor coolant pressure decreases below the low head safety injection shutoff head, the low head safety injection pumps should be manually restarted to deliver fluid to the reactor coolant system.
CAUTION: Automatic reinitiation of safety injection 'will not occur since the reactor trip breakers are not reset.
Subsequent to this Step, should loss of offsite power occur, manual:
CAUTION:
action (e.g., manual safety injection initiation) will be required
(
to load the safeguards equipment onto the diesel powered emergency i
busses.
l 1
SQNP E0I Units 1& 2 Page 2 of 8 R,ev. 10 SUBSEQUENT CPERATOR ACTIONS (cont.)
III.
Stop all reactor coolant pumps af ter high head safety injection pump operation has been verified and when the wide range reactor coolant B.
pressure decreases to 1500 PSIG.
,g If component cooling water to the reactor coolant pumps is isolated on a PHASE "B" containment' isolation signal, all reactor CAUTION:
coolant pumps should be stopped within 5 minutes because of loss of motor bearing cooling.
If the reactor coolant pumps are stopped, the seal injection flow CAUTION:
should be maintained.
The conditions given above for stepping reactor coolant pumps should be
~
NOTE:
continuously monitored throughout this instruction.
See Appendix "A" for guidelines on natural circulation if RCP's are NOTE:
tripped.
Determine which steam generator is affected by observing the individual steamline pressures (PAMS). A low steamline pressure compared to the C.
others denotes the faulted loop; terminate auxiliary feedwater to that steam generator and verify main feedwater isolated.
Secondary system breaks inside containment may cause PZR-PORV(s) to fail open, should'this occur, isolate associated block valve.
CAUTION:
Secondary system breaks in area of S/G PORVs may cause their se failure in open position, should this occur, isolate if possible.
Should the PZR-PORV fail open and not be isolable, go to E0I-1.
If no loop has a low steamline pressure compared to the others and all steamlines have been isolated, determine if a break has occurred NOTE:
in the steamline, in the main feedline or in any piping system that If no indication of connects with the secondary pressure boundary.
a break in the pressure boundary is found, go to Section III of E0I-0 and re-evaluate the accident with particular emphasis on the Loss of If a leak from the secondary, systems is fouad, Reactor Coolant.
continue to follow these instructions.
i
SQNP E0I Units 1 & 2 Page 3 of 8 Rev. 9 III. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (cont.)
D.
Regulate the auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators to restore and/or maintain an indicated narrow range steam generator water level (PAMS) or indicated wide range level (PAMS) sufficient to assure that the steam generator tubes are covered. If loss of secondary coolant is inside containment, maintain S/G level between 40% and 71% on narrow range for possible instrument error. If water level increases in an unexplained manner in one steam generator, go to E0I-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.
NOTE: Monitor the primary water supply (Condensate Storage Tank) for the auxiliary feedwater pumps and upon reaching a low level, verify auto, switch over to ERCW at E 6" level in condensate storage tank.
If auto.
switch over does not occur, manually switch over.
E.
Monitor Refueling Water Storage Tank level (PAMS).
1.
If containment spray has been actuated, and if the containment pressure is r-duced to nominal operating pressure (-0.1 to +0.3 PSID) reset containment spray. Sprar pumps should be shut off and placed in the standby mode with operabu flow paths.
2.
The high hea/ and low head safety injection pumps should remain aligned to t he Refueling Water Storage Tank. If the Refueling Water Storage Tank low level alarm (= 29%) is reached, reset safety injection. Realign all safety injection pumps 'to the cold leg recirculation mode using the procedure presented in Table E-2.2.
Note, if the reactor coolant system pressure is above the shutoff head of the low head safety injection (SI) pumps, stop these pumps and place in a standby mode prior to transfer to cold leg re-circulation.
3.
If a low Refueling Water Storage Tank level alarm (229%) is reached while the containment spray pumps are still running, reset contain-ment spray. Spray pumps should be realigned to the recirculation mode using the procedure presented in tsble E-2.1 (can not be achieved until RHR pumps are changed over to recircultion mode).
F.
Safety injection should be terminated IF:
NOTE: The conditions given below for termination of safety injection should be continuously m'onitored throughout this procedure.
One wide,F. range reactor coolant temperature TH (PAMS) is less 1.
a.
than 350 AND b.
Wide range reactor coolant pressure (PAMS) is greater than 700 psig and is stable or increasing.,
SQNP E01- - Units 1 and 2 Page 4 of 8 Rev. 9 III. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (cont.)
AND PZR water level (PAMS) is greater than 20% of span and rising.
c.
AND d.
The reactor coolant indicated subcooling is greater than 40 F.
NOTE:
If all wide range reactor coolant temperature indicators go above 350 F when attempting to satisfy the conditions of F1, initiate SI manually and continue operation until conditions of E2 or F3 are satisfied.
^R_
Containment pressure or containment radiation or containment 2.
a.
recirculation sump levels do not exhibit either abnormally high or increasing readings.
AND All wide range rgactor coolant temperature TH (PAMS) are b.
greater than 350 F, AND Wide range reactor coolant pressure (PAMS) is greater than c.
2,000 psig, and is stable or increasing, AND d.
Wide-range indicated water level in at least one S/G is at or above 76%
l AND PZR water level (PAMS) is greater than 20% of span, e.
dND f.
The reactor coolant indicated subcooling is greater than 40 F.
NOTE: If containment pressure, or containment radiation, or containment recirculation sump level exhibit either abnormally high or increasing readings when attempting to satisfy the conditions of F2, initiate safety in-jection and continue operation until the following conditions are satisfied.
~~
SQNP E0I Units I and 2 Page 5 of 8 Rev. 10 III. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (cent.)
Containment pressure or containment radiation, or containment 3.
a.
recirculation sump level exhibit either abnormally high or increasing readings.
AND b.
All wide range reactor coolant temperature TH ( AMS) are greater then 350 F, AND Wide range reactor coolant pressure (PAMS) is greater than c.
2000 psig, and is stable or increasing.
,g AND above d.
Narrow
.-nge water level in at least one S/G is at w.
40%.
AND PZR water level (PAMS) is greater than 50% of span, e.
AND f.
The reactor coolant indicated subcooling is greater than 40 F.
THEN 4.
Reset safety injection and stop the safety injection pumps not needed for normal charging and reactor coolant pump seal injection flow.
CAUTION:
If wide range reactor coolant pressure decreases by 200 psi or PZR water level decreases by 10% of span from the point of safety injection termination or reactor coolant sub-cooling drops below 40 F, Manually Reinitate safety injec-tion to maintain reactor coolant pressure and PZR level.
Control reactor coolant pressure to the nominal value which l
existed when safety injection was initially terminated
~
or to a nominal value of equaltoorlessthan350}F).
(Tg Go to EOI-0 to 20u0 psig (Tu greater than 350 rediagnose tHe event.
Stopping and starting of the charging / safety injection CAUTION:
pumps can cause pump motor overheating or reduced motor life. Hence, if pumps are restarted once after termin-l ation, an additional 15 F of subcooling should be added to the required subcooling prior to the second termination of the high head pumps. ;
SQNP E0I Units 1 & 2 Page 6 of 8 Rev. 9 III. SUBSEQUENT OPERATCR ACTIONS (cont.)
5.
Place all non-operating safety injection pumps in de stand-by mode, and n:aintain operable safety biection flowpaths.
6.
Isolate flow to the reactor coolant system cold tags via the boron injection tank and establish normal charging.
7.
Reset containment isolation (Phase A). Re-establish normal makeup to maintain system pressure at values reached when safety injection 5350 F) or to a nominal value of 2000 psig wastermgnated(Tu (Ty >350 F). Ensure that water addition during this process does not result in dilution of t.
reactor coolant system boron con-centration.
8.
Re-establish operation of the presa r..zer heaters after verification of sufficient pressurizer level to assure coverage of the pressur-izer heaters, e.g. through comparisons of pressurizar surge line, water space, and vapor space temperatures and maintain PZR water level between 50% and 70% for instrument error if loss of secon-dary coolant is inside containment. When system pressure e.an be controlled by pressurizer heaters, and containment temperatures are low enough to assure proper operation of control systems, restore normal pressurizer level control.
CAUTION: Should RCS temperature decrease.below NDTT for the RX vessel, do not allow pressure to increase above required pressure - temperature limits in TI-28.
G.
Monitor eitbar the average temperature indication of ' core exit ther-mocouplea hf available) or all wide range reactor coolant temperature T (PAMS).overifythatRCStemperatureisatleastg0Flessthansat-y uYation temperature at RCS indicated pressure. IfSgFindicatedsub-cooling ii not present, then attempt to establish 50 F indicated sub-cooling b, steam dump from the steam generators to the condenser or the a tmo sphe re..
CAUTION:
It' steam dump is necessary, reduce the steam generator pre sure to 864 psig (200 psi below the lowest steam safety valv3 setnoint) and maintain a reactor coolant cooldown rate of no mor'e than 50 F/HR, consistent with plant make-up capability.
Steam dump should be initiated in the following manner. i
SQNP E0I Units 1 & 2 Page 7 of 8 Rev. 9 III. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (cont.)
Establish a flow path in at leest one steamline in an intact loop 1.
(if possible) IF the main condenser is available and IF an uncontro-lled steam release will not be reinitiated upon opening the MSIV.
Transfer the steam dump system to steam header pressure con-a.
trol.
b.
Set the steam header pressure control setpoint to the pres-sure in the intact steam generator (s) at the time safety injection is terminated.
Close steam seal supply valve 1-560.
c.
d.
On the intact S/G(s), open the bypass warning valves for the MSIV(s).
With MSIV differential pressure less than 100 psig, open e.
MSIV(s) on intact S/G(s).
f.
With conditions stabilized, establish main turbine seals and vacuum per GOI-2.
OR l~
E all steamline stop valves are CLOSED and cannot be reopened, the main condenser is not available, or the rupture is downstream of the main steamline isolation valves, dump steam to the atmosp-here from the intact loops using the steam generator power operated relief valves. Set each steam generator power operated relief valve pressure control setpoint to the pressure in the intact steam generator (s) at the time safety injection is terminated.
If 50 F indicated subcooling cannot be established or maintained, then manually reinitiate safety injection. Go to Section III of E01-0 to re-evaluate the event, unless this re-evaluation has already been performed.
H.
Implement emergency plan as required I.
Verify control room vent isolation (See 50I-30.1B).
Verify U-2 containment equipment hatch temporary door closed (734el.)
J.
K.
Verify Fuel handling floor equipment transfer hatch cover in place (734 el to lower elevations).
L.
Place additional CRDM cooling fans and lower containment cooling fans in service if break is inside containment and Phase B isolation has not yet occurred.
M.
Transfer *.<R-45 to 1 SR and 1 IR detector.
SQNP E0I Units 1 & 2 Page 8 of 8 Rev. 10 III. SUBSEQUENT OPERAT6K ACTIONS (cont.)
When the reactor coolant temperature and pressure (PAMS) are stable, N.
borate the reactor coolant system to cold shutdown conditions, as nece s sa ry.
O.
After offsite power is available, establish the auxiliary systems neces-sary for a controlled cooldown to cold shut-down.
If offsite power is available and all reactor coolant pumps are stopped, restart at least one reactor coolant pump in an intact loop (with the pressurizer spray line if possible) for cooldown purposes in accordance with procedures.
Maintain subcooled conditions in the reactor coolant system consistent with the normal cooldown curve.
If these subcooled conditions cannot be maintained, restart safety injection pumps.
NOTE: If there is significant radioactivity in one or more steam gen-erator's secondary side due to tube leaks and steam is being dumped to the atmosphere, immediately isolate the steam generator associated with the break.
If all steam generators with sign-ificant radioactivity cannot be isolated, begin cooldown and depressurization of the reactor coolant system to limit the re-lease of radioactivity to the environs.
NOTE: Safety injection pump operation should be reinitiated if an un-controlled reactor coolant system depressurization or an uncontro-lled drop in pressurizer water level occurs during the cooldown These criteria apply in lieu of those given in Step F.
process.
Stop D/Gs after ~ 15 minutes (sooner if popossible) if not needed.
P.
Q.
After establishing operation of auxiliary systems, initiate a controlled cooldown and depressurization to cold shutdown conditions using Normal Cooldown Procedures.
NOTE: Safety Injection should be reinitiated if an uncontrolled reactor coolant system depressurization or an uncontrolled drop ~in pressurizer water level occurs during the cooldown process.
These criteria apply in lieu of those given in Step F.
NOTE: During the controlled cooldown, the reactor coolant system pres-sure will decrease below*1500 psig. Tripp'ing the operating s
reactor coolant pump (s) due to the pressure criterion of Step B is not required. Other criteria of Step B are still appliable at this time.
Recovery procedures for the particular event must be developed and R.
implemented to effect plant return to service.
'o..
SQNP E0I Units 1 & 2 Page 1 of 1 Rev. 9 APPENDIX A NATURAL CIRCULATION OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES The following are guidelines to detereine if natural circulating is taking A.
place in primary system.
Core AT as read on wide range RTD's'(hot and cold) or an indicated 1.
AT between WR cold leg and incore T/C's, should be stable and temperature dropping a relatively stable AT with valves less than 55 F with a gradual decrease indicates natural circulation.
Incore T/C's temperature indicating below saturation temperature for 2.
the existing primary system pressure.
Heat is being removed form primary system by secondary system 3.
i.e., SG's steaming and water being added to SG's, and secondary system pressure near saturation pressure for the primary system temperature.
B.
Instructions to enhance natural circulation.
Keep SG levels in narrow range (tubes covered), between 40% and 71%
1.
for post accident instrument error.
Keep primary system pressure above saturation pressure for the 2.
existing hot leg (WR) or incore T/C temperature if possible.
3.
Use steam dump or atmospheric reliefs to steam off and cool primary j
system.
e t
6 SQNP E0I Units 1 & 2 Page 1 of 2 Rev. 9 TABLE E-2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SWITCHOVER TO RECIRCULATION MODE A.
With a low RWST level alarm (229%) and containment spray pumps still running, reset containment spray with HS-72-42 & 72-43 and:
1.
Stop both containment spray pumps (CSP) (" pull to lock in stop" to preclude the possibility of pump restart while realigning suction valves).
2.
Close the following valves:
Close FCV-72 22 containmeit spray pump A-A suction a.
from RWST (1 minute) b.
Close FCV *2-21 containment spray pump B-B suction from RWST (1 minute) 3.
Open the following ERCW valves (Panel M-27A):
Open FCV-67-125 containment spray HX A ERCW inlet a.
(1 min) b.
Open FCV-67-126 containment spray HX A ERCW outlet (1 min)
Open FCV-67-123 containment spray HX B ERCW inlet (1 min) d.
Open FCV-67-124 containment spray HX B ERCW outlet (1 min) 4.
Open the following CSP suction valves:
Open FCV-72-23 containment spray pump A-A suction a.
from containment sump (1 min)
~
b.
Open FCV-72-20 containment spray pump B-B suction from containment sump (1 min)
CAUTION: If the pump s'uction valve from sump or the RHl. contain-ment sump valve will not open, do not restart the corresponding containment spray pump.
l bqsse E0I Units 1 & 2 Pagt 2 cf 3 Rev. 9 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SWITCHOVER TO RECIRCULATION MODE (cont)
TABLE E-2.1 Observe CSP suction valves from containment su.p full open.
A.
5 Step k above.
(1 min) 6.
Start containment spray pump A-A (HS-72-27A) 7 Start containment spray pump B-B (HS-72-10A) 8.
Verify at least 4500 gpm riov en CSP A-A (FI-72-34) 9 Verify at least h500 gpm flow on CSP B-B (FI-72-13) 4 I&
7 w
w p-w 7-ea
SQNP E0I Units 1 & 2 Page 1 of 4 Rev. 10 TABLE E-2.2 COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER INSTRUCTIONS I.
OPERATIONAL STEPS A.
The following automatic phase of switch-over from the injection to the recirculation mode is initiated when the RWST is at low level 29%
(120,000 gal) coincident with a containment sump level of 10%.
NOTE: This times provided at the end of subsequent steps are normal times for the valves to travel full stroke.
NOTE: All operator actions must be performed expeditiously, in a precise, orderly sequence. Do not interrupt the changeover operation until all actions are completed.
If a valve fails to respond or to com-pleted its demanded operation, postpone any corrective action until the subsequent steps are performed except as noted.
Loss of one complete train of power will allow the other train to be swapped, and parallel valves required to be closed will require one valve to be closed locally.
1.
Verify RHR pumps operating or start if not.
2.
Verify that valves FCV-63-72 (A-A) and FCV-63-73 (B-B)
RHR pumps suction from containment sump, start to open while RHR pumps continue to run.
(40 sec.)
CAUTION: If a containment sump valve cannot be opened, stop the corresponding RHR pump.
3.
Verify the valves FCV-74-3 and FCV-74-21, RHR pumps suction from RWST start to close.
(2 min)
B.
The following manual operations are done upon verification that the automatic switchover phase has begun.
CAUTION:
Immediately stop any pumps taking suction from the RWST on indication of the RWST being empty. Complete the switchover steps listed below, t, hen restart required pumps.
1.
Close the following RHR HX outlet crosstie valves.
Close FCV-74-33 (40 sec) a.
b.
Close FCV-74-35 (40sec) -
I r
SQNP E0I Units 1 & 2 Page 2 of 4 Rev. 10 TABLE E-2.2 I.
OPERATIONAL STEPS (cont) 2.
Open the following component cooling valves:
(Panel M-278)
A outlet (60sec) a.
b.
B outlet (60 sec) 4 NOTE: During a loss of power train situation it may be necessary to throttle back on unaffected units component cooling water.
3.
Verify flow to the RCS from the safety injection pumps and close the following SI pump miniflow valves:
Close FCV-63-4 SI pump A-A miniflow (10 see) a.
b.
Close FCV-63-3 SI pumps A and B miniflow to RWST (10 sec) 4.
Verify that the automatic valve realignments in step A above have been completed.
5.
Open the following:
Open FCV-63-8 RHR HX A outlet to centrifugal charging a.
pumps suction and SI pump A suction (10 sec) b.
Open FCV-63-11 RHR HX B outlet to SI putp B suction (10 sec-)
6.
Close FCV-63-1 RHR pump suction header from RWST (2 min)
NOTE: 480V breaker must be closed before operating valve from control room (Rx MOV bd Al-A) 7.
Open the following parallel valves:
Open FCV-63-6 RHR HX A to SI pump A suction (10sec) a.
b.
Open FCV-63-7 RHR HX A to SI pump A suction (10 sec) 8.
After completion of the above steps verify that the two Si pumps and centrifugal charging pumps are receiving suction supply flow from the RHR pump, and proper flow is established to RCS cold legs on all injection pumps.
CAUTION: Do not perform steps 9 and 10 until the above verification is made. _ _ _.
E01 Units 1 & 2 Page 3 of 4 Rev. 9 TABLE E-2.2 I.
OPERATIONAL STEPS _ (cont)
Close FCV-63-5 safety injection pump suction from RWST 9.
(2 min) 10.
Close the following:
Close FCV-62-135 RWST to centrifugal charging pump a.
suction (10 sec) b.
Close FCV-62-136 RWST to centrifugal charging pump suction (10 sec) 11.
Periodically check aurtliary building area radiation monitors for detection of leakage from ECCS during recirculation. If significant leakage has been identified in the ECCS, attempt to isolate the leakage. The recirculation Flow to the RCS must be maintained at all times.
12.
While the plant is in cold leg recirculation mode, make provisions for an evaluation of equipment in the plant.
II.
VERIFICATION:
After completing the preceding steps, verify that th'e safety injection A.
system is aligned for cold leg recirculation as follows:
1.
One low head safety injection pump is delivering from the contain-ment recirculation snap directly to two reactor coolant system cold legs and to the st: tion of two charging / safety injection pumps.
2.
The other low head safety injection pump is delivering from the containment recirculation sump directly to two reactor coolant system cold legs and to the suction of two high head safety in-i jection pumps.
3.
The two high head safety injection and two. charging / safety in-jection pumps are taking suction from the low head safety injection pumps and are delivering to four reactor coolant system cold legs.
4.
The suction paths from the RWST to all safety. injection pumps have been isolated.
5.
If containment spray is required, verify that flow is being del-ivered.
-B.
If any failures have occurred, proceed to contingency actions.
1, ;
SQNP E0I Units 1 & 2 Page 4 of 4 Rev. 9 TABLE E-2.2 III. CONTINGENCY ACTIONS A.
CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SUMP VALVE FAILS TO OPEN If a containment recirculation sump valve cannot be opened, stop the corresponding low head safety injection pump and verify that:
1.
One low head safety injection pump is delivering flow to two reactor coolant system cold legs and to the suction of the two high head safety injection and two charging / safety injection pumps.
2.
The two high head safety injection and the two charging / safety injection pumps are delivering to four reactor coolant system cold legs.
B.
LOSS OF ONE TRAIN OF ELECTRICAL POWER If the single active failure is the failure of one of the emergency diesel generators to start in conjunction with a LOCA and a loss of offsite power, electrical power would not be available to one of the vital safeguard busses. As a consequence, all engineered safeguards equipment assigned to that corresponding electrical power train would not be availat.e for operation until power could be restored to that bus. The insi.ruction for switchover to cold leg recirculation, as-sur.ing a trait failure, is essentially the same as the lastruction, which assumed no single failures. The operator could follow the in-struction which assumed no single failure, with the understanding that those valves, without power, do not have to be repositioned.
It should be noted that if a train failed subsequent to the initiation of the safety injection signal additional steps may be required. For example, if no failure is assumed, the parallel suction valves in the line from the RWST to the charging / safety injection pump suction header would open on a safety injection signal.. Should a subsequent failure of one of the electrical trains occur, one of the parallel suction valves could not be closed from the main control board. Therefore, position isolation of the RWST to charging / safety injection pump suction path would have to accomplished locally.
t
- . Cequoynh :'uclesr Plant DISTRIDUTION 1C Plant Master File Superintendent 1U_ Assistant Superintendent (Ope r. )
EMERGE'!CY OPERATING INSTRUCTION 1U Assistant Superintendent (!!a in t. )
Administrative Supervisoe E0I-3 H3i"tenance Supervisor-(M)
Assistant flaintenance Supervisor (H)
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE Maintenance Supervisor (E)
Assistant Maintenance Supervisor (E)
Units 1 and 2 Maintenance Supervisor (I)
Results Supervisor g Operations Supervisor Quality Ansurance Supervir:or e
-~ 71Tciittli7hysics Public Safety Services Supv.
j Chief Storckeeper Preop Test Program Coordinator Outage Director Chemical Engineer (Results)
Radiochem Laboratory Instrument Shop Reactor Engineer (Results)
Instrument Engineer (P.aint. (I))
1 Mechanical Engineer (Results)
Staf f Industrial Engineer (Pl. Sys.)
1C Training Center coordinator PSO - Chickamauga Engrg Unit - SNP Prepared By:
George Wilson Public Safeiy Services - SNP 1C Shift' Engineer's Office Revised By:
,.R. Walker 1C Unit Control Room
),
}_
QA&A !!cp. - SNP Submitted By M / w s
!!calth Physics Laboratory Sup asor lif Asst Dir NUC PR (Oper), 727 EB-C lif Nuclear Document Control Unit, 606 EB-PCRC Review:
//,g/;g4_
1 11 Superintendent, WBNP Date Superintendent, DFNP 3
Superintendent, BENP 1U NEB, W9C174C-K 4
Approved By:
,T}L Supv., NP11PS ROB, MS Superi tem en 1U NRC-IE:II 1
Power Security Officer, 620 CST 2-C Nuclear Materials Coordinator _1410 CUB Date Approved:
1k b
Manager. OP-QA&A Staff A
\\
1C Resident.NRC Inspector - SNP 1C NSRS, 249A HBB-K 1C Technical, Support Center llev. No.
Date uovincal Pagen Rev. No.
Date Revised'Pages 7
3/31/80 All I
O h/g 2 and 5 I
The laut page of this instruction is Number 12 1
t e
edes 4
SQNP E0I Units 1 & 2 Page 1 of 1 Rev. 7 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE PURPOSE The objectives of these instructions are as follows:
1.
To minimize the release of radioactive material by identifying and isolating the faulted steam generator and by reducing reactor coolant steam pressure below the steam generator safety valve settings.
2.
To establish capability to supply feedwater to all steam generators and to isolate feedwater to the faulted steam generator.
3.
To niaintain the ability to remove the necessary residual heat from the reactor through the intact steam generators via the steam dump valves or power operated relief valves.
4.
To maintain the reactor coolant system in a subcooled state during the recovery.
5.
To prevent overflooding of the faulty steam generator.
]
l l
SQNP E0I Units 1 & 2 Page 1 of 9 Rev. 8 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE I.
IMMEDIATE ACTIONS Refer to section on immediate actions or E0I-0, Immediate Actions and Diagnostics, if not already performed.
II.
SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS CAUTION: The diesels should not be operated at idle or minimum load for ex-tended periods of time.
If the diesels are shut down, they should be prepared for restart.
NOTE:
If at any time during the conduct of steps A through H the faulted steam generator is positively identified, immediately proceed to step I.
Following completion of this step, the remainder of the recovery must be accomplished from the last step of steps A through H which had been com-pleted prior to identifying the faulted steam generator.
NOTE: Make arrangements to sample containment atmosphere and steam generators to identify presence of abnormal radioactivity.
NOTE: The process Variables referred to in this instruction are typically monitored by more than one instrumentation channel. The redundant channels should be checked for consistency while performing the steps of this instruction.
NOTE: The pressurizer water level indication should always be used in con-junction with other reactor coolant system idications to evaluate system conditions and to initiate manual operator actions.
A.
Verify that all pressurizer power operated relief valves are closed.
Verify the open status and availability of power to all pressurizer power operated relief valve backup isolation valves.
B.
Stop all reactor coolant pumps after the Ligh head safety injection pump operation has been verified and when the wide range reactor coolant pres-if suce decreases to 1500 psig.
CAUTION:
If component cooling to the reactor coolant pumps is isolated on a containment Phase B isolation signal, all reactor coolant
~
pumps are to be stopped within 5 minutes because of loss of motor bearing cooling.
CAUTION:
If reactor coolant pumps are stopped, the seal injection flow should be maintained.
NOTE: The conditions given above for stopping reactor coolant pucps should be continuously monitored through Step J of this instruction.
NOTE:
See Table 1 or computer subcooling program for subcooling margin and see Appendix A for guidelines on natura] circulation.
SQNP E0I Units 1 & 2 Page 2 of 9 Rev. 7, II.
SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont.)
If offiste power and the condenser are available, open bypass valves, C.
equalize pressure across MISV(s), open any closed main steam line iso-lation valves to provide a flowpath to the condenser dump valves.
Establish power sources necessary to operate at least one pressurizer D.
power operated relief valve, at least one steam generator power operated relief valves, and charging and letdown flowpaths.
NOTE: Ensure that containment isolation is maintained, i.e.,
not reset until such time as manual action is required on necessary process streams.
Stabilize the reactor coolant system at approximately no-load temperature E.
by steam dump to the main condenser if offsite power and the condenser are avaiilable. If offsite power or the condenser is not available, utilize the steam generator power operated relief valves to stabilize the reactor coolant system at approximately no-load temperature.
F.
Regulate the auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators to restore and maintain steam generator water level in the narrow range span, or in the wide range span at a level sufficient to assure that the U-tubes are covered (76%).
If reactor coolant system pressure is above the low head safety injection G.
pump shut-off head, manually reset safety injection so that safeguards equipment can be controlled by manual action. Stop the low head safety injection pumps and place *in the standby mode and request performance of SI-268 to verify position of P-4 contacts (failure of P-4 may prevent resetting safety injection).
CAUTION:
If the reactor coolant system pressure decreases uncontrollably below the low head safety injection shut-off head, the low head safety injection pumps must be manually restarted to de-liver fluid to the reactor coolant system.
CAUTION: Automatic reinitiation of safety injection will not occur since
~
the reactor trip breakers are not reset.
CAUTION: Subsequent to this st'ep, should Icss of offsite power occur, manual action (e.g., manual safety injection initiation) will be required to load the safeguards equipment onto the diesel powered emergency busses.
Identify the faulted steam generator by one or more of the following II.
methods:
An unexpected rise in one steam generator water level with auxiliary 1.
feedwater flow reduced or stopped.
SQNP E0I Units 1 & 2 Page 3 of 9 Rev. 7 II.
SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont.)
H.
(Cont.)
2.
High radiation from any one steam generator blowdown line radiation monitor.
3.
High radiation from any one steam generator blowdown line, as de-termined by analysis or radiation detector.
4.
High radiation from any one steam generator main steam line.
I.
When the faulted steam generator has been positively identified, then:
1.
Stop all feedwater flow to the faulted steam generator.
2.
Close the main steam isolation valve and bypass valves asenciated with the faulted steam generator.
3.
Verify the closure of all power operated relief valves associated with the faulted steam generator.
4.
Verify the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump is not being supplied with steam from the faulted S/G.
CAUTION: Do not proceed to step J until the faulted steam gen-erator has been identified and isolated.
NOTE: With faulted S/G isoleted @ RCS temperature of 547*F, the faulted S/G pressure will be E 1000 psig.
J.
After the faulted steam generator has been identified and isolated, begin a cooldown of the reactor coolant system, the rate of cooldown should be relatively fast, but not so fast as to cause the UHI accumulators to dump on low pressure. Terminate the cooldown at 497'F on the RCS.
1.
If offsite power and the condenser are available, dump steam to the main condenser from the intact steam generators by manual control of the steam header pressure controller.
2.
If oftsite power is not available or the main condenser is not avail-able, dump steam from the intact steam generators through the steam:
generator power operated relief valves.
K.
Declare Gas Condition I or in the event blackout conditions exist, delcare Gas Condition II.
L.
Sound the plant radiological emergency siren to expedite assembly of per-sonnel and to re', ace onsite doses to personnel. l
0, SQNP E0I Units 1 & 2 Page 4 of 9 Rev. 8 II.
SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont.)
M.
Survey meteorological information and dispatch the shif t HP technician to survey the downwind sector at the plant boundary and request KP section perform survey of secondary site of plant.
N.
Transfer NR-45 to 1 SR and 1 IR detector.
O.
After the reactor coolant system temperature has been reduced to 50'F below the no-load temperature, if necessary begin a de-pressurization of the reactor coolant system to a value equal to the faulted steam gen-erator steam pressure while maintaining 50'F subcooling.
NOTE: With RCS temperature @ 497'F, 50*F subcooling will be maintained down to 2 1000 psig on the RCS.
NOTE. During subsequent controlled reactor coolant system depressur-ization, the reactor coolant system pressure criteria for tripping the reactor coolant pumps established in step B DOES NOT APPLY.
If the RCP's are in service, use the pressurizer spray to reduce the pressure.
If offsite power is not available, or the RCP's are not in service open one pressurizer PORV to decrease pressure.
NOTE: Prior to the initiation of a controlled RCS depressurization, there may be no indicated PZR level. As the depressurization process proceeds, an increase in indicated PZR level is expected as liquid replaces steam in the PZh.
CAUTION: Monitor containment indications to verify that a loss of reactor coolant other than the steam generator tube rupture is not in progress.
If recirculation sump level or a containment sample (if available at this time) are not in the normal pre-event range, further accident recovery must be directed according to Emergency Instruction E0I-1, Loss of Reactor Coolant, step M (Small LOCA).
P.
As the reactor coolant system pressure decreases, due to the quenching gi of the steam by the pressurizer' spray or due to the steam release through the pressurizer PORV, monitor the pressurizer water level indications and stop the depressurization operation:
1.
If the indicated water level in the pressurizer rises above 50 per-cent of span OR 1
2.
As soon as the reactor coolant system pressure decreases to a value.
equal to the faulted steam generator steam pressure.
i 5-
SQNP E0I Units 1 & 2 Page 5 of 9 Rev. 7 II.
SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont.)
Q.
When the reactor coolant system pressure is reduced to 1500 psis, ise-late the upper head injection system as follows or verify isolated:
1.
Close FCV-87-21 and GAG 2.
Close FCV-87-22 and GAG 3.
Close FCV-87-23 and GAG 4.
Close FCV-87-24 and GAG I
R.
Isolate the cold le2 accumulators by closing the following valves when RCS pressure drops below 1000 psig if content of accumulators has not been dumped to RCS.
NOTE: Power will have to be placed on these valves.
1.
FCV-63-118 2.
FCV-63-98 3.
FCV-63-80 4.
FCV-63-67 S.
After the depressurization operation has been verified to have been term-insted (using the pressurizer PORV stem-mounted position indicators or acoustic valve position monitoring system and spray valve demand signal),
continue to monitor the reactor coolant system pressure and the pressurizer water level.
1.
If the pressurizer water level continues to rise or remains nearly constant concurrent with a reactor coolant system pressure decrease, suspect leakage from the pressurizer steam space. Monitor the pres-sure relief tank (PRT) pressure, temperature and level to identify continuously increasing conditions. Close the PORV isolation valves if a reactor coolant leak to the PRT is identified. Monitor PRT con-ditions to verify PRT integrity.
CAUTION:
If pressurizer relief tank integrity is lost, abnormal con-tainment conditions could exist and may not be true indi-cations of a continued loss of reactor coolant. If con-ditions of step S1 persist after closing the pressurizer PORV isolation valves, further recovery must be directed according to E0I-1, Loss of Reactor Coolant, step M.
The conditions of step S2 must be satisfied before proceeding.
to step T..
SQNP EOI Units 1 & 2 Page 6 of 9 Rev. 7 II.
SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont.)
S.
(Cont.)
If the pressurizer water level subsequently continues to increase 2.
concurrent with a reactor coolant system pressure increase con-current with verified PRT integrity, the safety injection flow is greater than the leak.
Then, when reactor coolant system pressure has increased by at least 200 psi (af ter shutting the spray valve or verified closure of the pressurizer PORV) and an indicated water level has returned in the pressurizer, stop all operating safety injection pumps not needed for normal charging and reactor coolant pump seal injection flow.
The diesels should not be operated at idle or minimum CAUTION:
load for extended period of time. If the diesels are shut down, they should be prepared for restart.
Following termination of safety injection, pressurizer NOTE:
pressure should decrease to a value equal to the faulted steam generator steam pressure.
Place all safety injection pumps in a standby mode and maintain operable T.
safety injection flow paths.
Verify main control room ventilation isolation (See SOI-30.1B).
U.
Verify U-2 containment equipment hatch temporary doors closed (734' El.)
V.
Verify fuel handling floor equipment transfer hatch cover closed (734 El.
W.
to lower elevations).
Re-establish charging and letdown flows to maintain the pressurizer water X.
level in the operating range (approximately 25 percent indicated level):
If, during subsequent recovery actions, pressurizer water level CAUTION:
cannot be maintained above 20 percent indicated level, msnually initiate safety injection flow to re-establish pressurizer water level in the operating range. If pressurizer water level cannot be established by this method, return t'o step 0 and proceed with the instruction from that point.
Close seal injection water flow control valve FCV-62-89.
1.
Open the charging pump normal suction valves FCV-62-132 and FCV-2.62-133 from the VCT.
Close the charging pump suction valves FCV-62-135 and FCV-62-136 3.
from the refueling water storage tank..
SQNP E0I Units 1 & 2 Page 7 cf 9 Rev. 7 II.
SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont.)
X.
(Cont.)
4.
Open the centrifugal charging pumps miniflow isolation valves FCV-62-98 and FCV-62-99.
5.
Open the charging line isolation valves FCV-62-90 and FCV-62-91.
6.
Open seal water heat exchanger inlet isolation valves FCV-62-61 and FCV-62-63.
7.
Gradually open the seal injection water flow control valve FCV 89.
Adjust the seal water flow to 8 gpm per RCP.
8.
Open letdown isolation valves FCV-62-69 and FCV-62-70.
9.
Open the letdown line isolation valve FCV-62-77.
10.
Open the 45 GPM letdown orifice isolation valve FCV-62-73.
11.
Position PCV-62-81 to control pressure at letdown orifices above steam flash point.
12.
Close the BIT inlet isolation valves FCV-63-39 and FCV-63-40 and outlet isolation valves FCV-62-25 and FCV-62-26.
NOTE: Flush the injection lines and reestablished BIT concentiation per AOI-19, IV, L thru M.
Y.
Re-establish the use of the PZR heaters to maintain the RCS pressure.
If offsite power is available, establish the required conditions for operation of a reactor coolant pump and start the pump in a.:on-faulted loop (preferably in loop 2 or if not available, in loop 1).
If all RCP's are running, trip all but one RCP so as to maintain one pump operating in the loop connected to the PZR (loop 2), or if this is the faulted loop, in loop 1.
Z.
If offsite power is available, begin a controlle'd cooldown of the RCS at a rate of about 50 F/hr. by use of the steam dump to the main condenser from the non-faulted S/G's.
Cohtrol the water le'vels in the S/G's to maintain S/G water level in the narrow range span or in the wide range span at a level sufficient to assure that the U-tubes are covered (76%).
If offsite power is not available, dump steam from the non-faulted S/G's through the.S/G PORV's to provide a controlled cooldown of the reactor coolant system at a rate of about 50*F/hr.....
e SQNP E0I Units 1 & 2 Page 8 of 9 Rev. 7 II.
SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont.)
AA.
Simultaneour. with the cooldown using the non-faulted S/G, slowly decrease the faulted S/G pressure by opening the MSIV bypass valve to the con-denser (if available), or using the S/G PORV.
BB.
As pressure is reduced in the faulted S/G, control the RCS pressure at a value-approximately equal to the steam pressure in the faulted S/G to minimize the leakage flow. RCS pressure control should be accomplished by use of the PZR heaters and action of one of the following:
1.
Normal PZR spr y (if a RCP is in service)
OR 2.
Use of PZR auxiliary spray (if spray is heated by letdown through the regen. HX.)
OR 3.
Brief intermittant opening of one PZR PORV.
NOTE: Maintain RCS temperature and pressure within the limits of the normal cooldown curves in TI-28.
CAUTION: If RCS pressure control is accomplished by use of the PZR PORV, continuously monitor the PRT pressure, temperature, and water level and take appropriate actions to verify and maintain PRT integrity. Verify PZR PORV closure using the PORV stem-mounted position indicators, ACOUSTIC VALVE POSITION MONITORING SYSTEM and PRT conditions.
If a reactor coolant leak to the PRT is identified, close the PORV isolation valves.
CC.
Periodically sample and analyze the reactor coolant boron concentration during the continuing cooldown. Borate as necessary to maintain the required shutdown margin at all times during the cooldown.
DD.
Continue to cooldown and depressurize the reacto'r coolant system and faulted steam generator until the reactor coolant. hot leg temperatures are below 400*F in the non-faulted loops and the ' reactor coolant pres-sure has reached about 400 psig (do not collapse the pressurizer steam bubble).
EE.
Place the residual heat removal system in operation using Normal Cooldown.
Procedures.
NOTE: Throughout this cooldown procedure, maintain a steam bubble in the pressurizer. Solid water pressure control may not be effective. l
SQNP E0I Units 1 & 2 Page 9 of 9 Rev. 7 II.
SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS (Cont.)
FF.
Continue the plant cooldown in a normal mode except that after the RCP operation has been terminated, continue to simultaneously control the faulted steam generator steam pressure and reactor coolant pressure to minimize the leakage flow.
GG.
When the reactor coolant system hot leg temperatures are reduced below 200*F, the pressure in the pressurizer may be reduced by using auxiliary spray until reactor coolant system precsure and the faulted system gen-erator pressure equilibrate.
KH.
Continue the operation of the residual heat removal system to remove the core residual heat and maintain the charging and letdown in service
.to control the pressurizer water level and provide a boration path.
III. RECOVERY Following a steam generator tube rupture, the exact procedure will be planned by the Plant Operations Review Committee for repairing the affected tube or tubes and decontamination of the se:ondary system. The procedure for repairing the affected steam generator will include necessary decontamination and exposure precautions for maintenance personnel. Decontamination of the secondary system will be carried out after the extent and type of radiation present is analyzed, with protection to plant personnel bein' the mose important consideration.
IV.
REFERENCES FSAR 15.4.3
r
=
SQNP E0I Units 1 & 2 Table 1 Page 1 of 1 Rev. ?
SATURATION STEAM TABI.E (Temperatures rounded to nearest *F)
Sat.
50*F.
Sat.
50*F.
PSIG Temp 'F Subcooled PSIG Temp 'F Subcooled 300 422 372 1350 584 534 350 436 386 1400 588 538 400 448 398 1450 593 543 450 459 409 1500 597 547 500 470 420 1550 602 552 550 480 430 1600 606 556 600 489 439 1650 610 560 650 497 447 1700 614 564 568 700 505 455 1750 618 750 51,3 463 1800 622 572 800 520 470 1850 626 576 850 527 477 1900 630 580 900 534 484 1950 633 583 950 540 490 2000 637 587 1000 546 496 2050 640 590 1050 552
-502 2100 644
-594 1100 558 508 2150
'647 597 1150 563 513 2200 650 600 1200 569 519 2235 653 603 1250 574 524 2250 6.'q 604 1300 579 529 Saturation temperatures may be read from hot leg temperatt RTD's or incore T/C's.
Y s 7-
SQNP E01 Units 1 & 2 Appendix A Page 1 of 1 Rev. 7 NATURAL CIRCUI.ATION A.
The following are guidelines to determine if natural circulation is taking place in the primary system.
1.
Core AT as read on wide range RTD's (hot and cold) or an indicated AT between W.R. cold leg and incore T/C's should be stable or dropping.
A relatively stable AT with values less than 55*F with a gradual de-crease, indicates natural circulation.
2.
Incore T/C's temperature indicating below saturation, temperature for the existing primary system pressure.
3.
Heat is being removed from the primary system by secondary system, i.e., S/G's steaming and water being added to S/G's and secondary system pressure near saturation pressure for the primary system temperature.
B.
The following are guidelines to enhance natural circulation.
1.
Keep S/G 1evels in narrow range (tubes covered).
2.
Keep primary system pressure above saturation pressure for the existing hot let (W.R.) temperature or incore T/C temperature if possible.
3.
Use condenser steam dump or S/G PORV's to steam off and cool primary system at desired rate.
i 4
I 8
4 d
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- u..a n nw : a.
ENCLOSURE 2
~
TVA RESPONSES TO NRC COMMENTS (March 7, 1980) ON E0I-I Major Deficiencies 1.
TVA has revised the Sequoyah Emergency Operating Instructions (E0I's) to include an E0I-0 procedure which directs the operator to the emergency procedure appropriate to the symptoms.
TVA's E0I-0 is based upon the Westinghouse owners' group guideline E-0.
2.
The latest revision of Sequoyah E0I's includes some changes to the cautions, notes,and action steps to provide a more logical progres-sion. However, cautions and notes are still intermixed with action statements where such a format is consistent with the Westinghouse owners group procedures.
3.
E0I-I has been revised to be consistent in technical content and format with the Westinghouse owners' group procedure E-1.
These procedures cover small and large LOCA situations.
i 4.
E0I-1 has been revised to include appropriate numerical values of j
parameters at which action must be taken, General Comments i
1.
This information will be provided.
j 2.
See response to item 1 under Major Deficiencies.
3.
Some notes and cautions were eliminated in the latest revision of E0I-1.
However those notes and cautions which are consistent in format with the Westinghouse owners' group procedures were retained.
4.
See response to item 3 under Major Deficiencies.
S.
E0I-1, 2,and 3 contain steps which activate the Radiological Emer-gency Plan as appropriate.
6.
These limitations are considered as a part of the SI termination criteria for E0I-2 (which involves a cooldawn).
E0I-1 is not as-sumed to be used for handling a cooldown accident.
Specific Comments 1.
Page 2, I.B.I This symptom is located in E0I-0 consistent with the Westinghouse owners' group procedures.
2.
Page 3 This note is the same as contained in the Westinghouse owners' group procedure.
3.
Page 3, II F These auto actions are new in E0I-0 with the same terminology as the Westinghouse owners' group proce-dure.
I 26.
Page 9 This is resolved in the latest revision.
27.
Page 9 This is resolved in the latest revision.
28.
Page 9 This is resolved in the latest revision.
29.
Page 9 This step is consistent with the Westinghouse owners' group procedure.
30.
Page 9 This is resolved in the latest revision.
31.
Page 9 This is resolved in the latest revision.
32.
Page 10 These have been deleted in the latest revision.
33.
Page 10, Step 17 This note has been deleted in the latest revision.
34.
Page 10 This step is consistent with the Westinghouse owners' group procedures.
35.
l' age 10 This note has been deleted in the latest revision.
36.
Page 10, J.1 This step is consistent with the Westinghouse owners' group proedures.
37.
Page 11 This caution has been deleted in the latest revision.
38.
Page 11, IV.L No procedure is required to verify that the accumu-lators have discharged.
39.
Page 11 This is resolved in the latest revision.
40.
Page 11 This is resolved in the latest revision.
~
41.
Page 11 This is resolved in the latest revision.
42.
Page 12 This is resolved in the latest revision.
43.
Page 13 This is resolved in the latest revision.
44.
Page 13 This is resolved in the latest revision.
45.
Page 15 This is resolved in the latest revision.
46.
Page 16 Path B remains an acceptable path for hot leg recircula-tion although not the " preferred path."
Therefore, hot leg injection is single failure proof.
47.
Page 16 Extreme emergency is when the other train is not available.
48.
Page 17 This is resolved in the latest revision.
49.
Page 18 This is resolved in the latest revision.
3
j i
1 ATTACl! MENT 1 l
Westinghouse RCP termination criterion applied to Sequoyah.
Reference Westinghouse letter TMI-0G-120 (attached) sample calculation.
Step 2 - Secam flow rate - heat rate q, 3411 (tech spec man)
(.035 decay heat fraction) 4 loops 6 BTU 8
BTU
= 29.85 =w + 29.85 mv
- 3.412 x 10
= 1.0185 x 10
,j hr-loop Steam flow ratc/ loop TU 1.0185 x 10 13, hr-1 op
= 1.596ES 638.27 BTU hr-loop lbm th Steam valve capacity = 3,917,900 (FSAR Section 5.5) at 1117 psig hr-loop (1131.7 psia) therefore, at 1064 psig (1078.7 psia) + valve capacity assuming critical flow
= J078.7 x 3,917,900 = 3,734,416
~
1131.7 hr-loop lbm capacity of 1064 valves =.2 x 3,734,416
= 746,883.lbm/hr hr-loop 1 596E5 Therefore the required flow is
= 21.3 f the valve capacity.
7.469E5 Since this is less than 60% + the 1064 valve setnoint should be used.
Step 4 - L'ncertainty in opening pressure = 3% (FSAR) + ap uncertainty
=.03 x 1073.7 = 32.4 psi t
Step 5 - AP safety valves to S.G. snell AP full power = 21 psi (FSAR Sectiog 5.5)
Therefore,.iP at 4. 5% = 21 * (. 04 5 )' =. 04 psi use 1 psi l
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.